Filozofia

I. *GENURI ŞI STILURI ÎN FILOZOFIE

Immanuel Kant-Criticismul Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel –Filozofia speculativă Auguste Compte-Filozofia pozitivă Friedrich Nietzsche-Filozofia voinţei de putere Edmund Husserl-Fenomenologia Filozofie şi analiză logică a limbajului:

a. Rudolf Carnapb. Ludwig Wittgenstein

II. FILOZOFIE ŞI VIAŢĂ

Platon Baruch Spinoza Lucian Blaga Bertrand Russell Karl Jaspers

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Genuri şi stiluri în filozofie

Concepţia despre filozofie a lui Immanuel Kant -Criticismul-

1. Concepţia sa despre filozofie este redată printr-un fragment din principala sa lucrare, Critica raţiunii pure.

2. teme:a. contextul:emprism +raţionalism= revoluţia

copernicanăb. domenii:

i. gnoseologieii. filozofie practică

c. idealism transcendentald. concepte: lucri in sine, fenomen, , raţiune,

intelect, snesibilitate, intuiţie, categorie, idee, analitică, transcendental, voinţă, datorie, imperativ (categoric, ipotetic), maximă

3. Filozofia sa mai este cunoscută şi sub numele de criticism.Aceasta deoarece Kant a considerat că principala sarcină a filozofiei constă în realizarea unei critici a cunoaşterii umane.Prin critică trebuie să

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înţelegem discriminare analitcă (de la grecescul krisis –discriminare raţională).

4. Immanuel Kant a considerat că filozofia trebuie să devină asemenea unei ştiinţe, să fie riguroasă în determinarea afirmaţiilor sale despre lumea înconjurătoare, iar acest lucru se poate face doar printr-o determinare a capacităţii noastre de cunoaştere ( redată prin cele trei faclutăţi ale cunoaşterii din Critica raţiunii pure: sensibilitatea, intelectul şi raţiunea).

5. Kant a încercat astfel o reconstrucţie a ideii de filozofie, care ar fi trebuit să aibă următoarele sarcini:

a. respingerea vechiului stil de filozofare speculativă (metafizica);

b. reconstruirea metafizicii sub forma riguroasă a unei ştiinţe;

c. analiza (critica) celor trei facultăţi de cunoaştere şi precizarea limitelor fiecăreia din ele;

d. stabilirea raportului dintre experienţa simţurilor şi aportul formelor mentale în constituirea cunoaşterii;

e. verificarea validităţii cunoştinţelor prin raportarea la date eixstente în experienţă.

Principalele concepte şi idei, în ordinea importanţei mesajului textului, sunt: criticism, analiză, critică a cunoaşterii,limite ale cunoaşterii, facultăţi ale cunoaşterii, sensibilitate, intelect, raţiune,experienţă,respingere a metafizicii, cunoaştere speculativă.

Immanuel Kant

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1. Immanuel Kant is one of the most influential philosophers in the history of Western philosophy.

2. His contributions to metaphysics epistemology(C.R.Pur) ethics( C.R.Pr, Baz. Metaf. morav) aesthetics (C.R Fac. de Jud.) have had a profound impact on almost every

philosophical movement that followed him.

CRITICA RAŢIUNII PURE

1. A large part of Kant's work addresses the question "What can we know?"

2. The answer, if it can be stated simply, is that our knowledge is constrained to mathematics and the science of the natural, empirical world.

3. It is impossible, Kant argues, to extend knowledge to the supersensible realm of speculative metaphysics.

4. The reason that knowledge has these constraints, Kant argues, is that the mind plays an active role in constituting the features of experience and limiting the mind's access to the empirical realm of space and time.

Historical Background to Kant

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1. There are two major historical movements in the early modern period of philosophy that had a significant impact on Kant:

a. Empiricism andb. Rationalism.

2. Kant argues that both the method and the content of these philosophers' arguments contain serious flaws.

3. A central epistemological problem for philosophers in both movements was determining how we can escape from within the confines of the human mind and the immediately knowable content of our own thoughts to acquire knowledge of the world outside of us.

4. The Empiricists sought to accomplish this through the senses and a posteriori reasoning.

5. The Rationalists attempted to use a priori reasoning to build the necessary bridge.

6. A posteriori reasoning depends upon experience or contingent events in the world to provide us with information. That "Bill Clinton is president of the United States in 1999," for example, is something that I can know only through experience;

a. I cannot determine this to be true through an analysis of the concepts of "president" or "Bill Clinton."

7. A priori reasoning, in contrast, does not depend upon experience to inform it.

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a. The concept "bachelor" logically entails the ideas of an unmarried, adult, human male without my needing to conduct a survey of bachelors and men who are unmarried.

8. Kant believed that this twofold distinction in kinds of knowledge was inadequate to the task of understanding metaphysics for reasons we will discuss in a moment.

Kant's Answers to his Predecessors

1. Kant's answer to the problems generated by the two traditions mentioned above changed the face of philosophy.

2. First, Kant argued that that old division between a priori truths and a posteriori truths employed by both camps was insufficient to describe the sort of metaphysical claims that were under dispute.

3. An analysis of knowledge also requires a distinction between synthetic and analytic truths.

4. In an analytic claim, the predicate is contained within the subject.

a. In the claim, "Every body occupies space," the property of occupying space is

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revealed in an analysis of what it means to be a body.

5. The subject of a synthetic claim, however, does not contain the predicate.

a. In, "This tree is 120 feet tall," the concepts are synthesized or brought together to form a new claim that is not contained in any of the individual concepts.

6. The Empiricists had not been able to prove synthetic a priori claims like "Every event must have a cause," because they had conflated "synthetic" and "a posteriori" as well as "analytic" and "a priori."

a. Then they had assumed that the two resulting categories were exhaustive.

b. A synthetic a priori claim, Kant argues, is one that must be true without appealing to experience, yet the predicate is not logically contained within the subject, so it is no surprise that the Empiricists failed to produce the sought after justification.

c. The Rationalists had similarly conflated the four terms and mistakenly proceeded as if claims like, "The self is a simple substance," could be proven analytically and a priori.

7. Synthetic a priori claims, Kant argues, demand an entirely different kind of proof than those

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required for analytic, a priori claims or synthetic, a posteriori claims.

8. Indications for how to proceed, Kant says, can be found in the examples of synthetic a priori claims in natural science and mathematics, specifically geometry.

9. Claims like Newton's, "the quantity of matter is always preserved," and the geometer's claim, "the angles of a triangle always add up to 180 degrees" are known a priori, but they cannot be known merely from an analysis of the concepts of matter or triangle.

a. We must "go outside and beyond the concept. . . joining to it a priori in thought something which I have not thought in it." (B 18)

b. A synthetic a priori claim constructs upon and adds to what is contained analytically in a concept without appealing to experience.

10. So if we are to solve the problems generated by Empiricism and Rationalism, the central question of metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason reduces to "How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?"

a. If we can answer that question, then we can determine the:

i. Possibilityii. legitimacy, and

iii. range of all metaphysical claims.

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Kant's Copernican Revolution: Mind Making Nature

1. Kant's answer to the question is complicated, but his conclusion is that a number of synthetic a priori claims, like those from geometry and the natural sciences, are true because of the structure of the mind that knows them.

2. "Every event must have a cause" cannot be proven by experience, but experience is impossible without it because it describes the way the mind must necessarily order its representations.

3. We can understand Kant's argument again by considering his predecessors. According to the Rationalist and Empiricist traditions, the mind is passive either because:

a. it finds itself possessing innate, well-formed ideas ready for analysis,

b. or because it receives ideas of objects into a kind of empty theater, or blank slate.

4. Kant's crucial insight here is to argue that experience of a world as we have it is only possible if the mind provides a systematic structuring of its representations.

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5. This structuring is below the level of, or logically prior to, the mental representations that the Empiricists and Rationalists analyzed.

6. Their epistemological and metaphysical theories could not adequately explain the sort of judgments or experience we have because

a. they only considered the results of the mind's interaction with the world,

b. not the nature of the mind's contribution.

7. Kant's methodological innovation was to employ what he calls a transcendental argument to prove synthetic a priori claims.

8. Typically, a transcendental argument attempts to prove a conclusion about the necessary structure of knowledge on the basis of an incontrovertible mental act.

9. Kant argues in the Refutation of Material Idealism that "There are objects that exist in space and time outside of me," (B 274)

a. which cannot be proven by a priori or a posteriori methods, is a necessary condition of the possibility of being aware of one's own existence. It would not be possible to be aware of myself as existing, he says, without presupposing the existing of something permanent outside of me to distinguish myself from. I am aware of myself as existing. Therefore, there is something permanent outside of me.

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This argument is one of many transcendental arguments that Kant gives that focuses on the contribution that the mind itself makes to its experience. These arguments lead Kant to conclude that the Empiricists' assertion that experience is the source of all our ideas. It must be the mind's structuring, Kant argues, that makes experience possible. If there are features of experience that the mind brings to objects rather than given to the mind by objects, that would explain why they are indispensable to experience but unsubstantiated in it. And that would explain why we can give a transcendental argument for the necessity of these features. Kant thought that Berkeley and Hume identified at least part of the mind's a priori contribution to experience with the list of claims that they said were unsubstantiated on empirical grounds: "Every event must have a cause," "There are mind-independent objects that persist over time," and "Identical subjects persist over time." The empiricist project must be incomplete since these claims are necessarily presupposed in our judgments, a point Berkeley and Hume failed to see. So, Kant argues that a philosophical investigation into the nature of the external world must be as much an inquiry into the features and activity of the mind that knows it.

The idea that the mind plays an active role in structuring reality is so familiar to us now that it is difficult for us to see what a pivotal insight this was for Kant. He was well aware of the idea's power to overturn the philosophical worldviews of his contemporaries and predecessors,

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however. He even somewhat immodestly likens his situation to that of Copernicus in revolutionizing our worldview. On the Lockean view, mental content is given to the mind by the objects in the world. Their properties migrate into the mind, revealing the true nature of objects. Kant says, "Thus far it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to objects" (B xvi). But that approach cannot explain why some claims like, "every event must have a cause," are a priori true. Similarly, Copernicus recognized that the movement of the stars cannot be explained by making them revolve around the observer; it is the observer that must be revolving. Analogously, Kant argued that we must reformulate the way we think about our relationship to objects. It is the mind itself which gives objects at least some of their characteristics because they must conform to its structure and conceptual capacities. Thus, the mind's active role in helping to create a world that is experiencable must put it at the center of our philosophical investigations. The appropriate starting place for any philosophical inquiry into knowledge, Kant decides, is with the mind that can have that knowledge.

Kant's critical turn toward the mind of the knower is ambitious and challenging. Kant has rejected the dogmatic metaphysics of the Rationalists that promises supersensible knowledge. And he has argued that Empiricism faces serious limitations. His transcendental method will allow him to analyze the metaphysical requirements of the empirical method without venturing

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into speculative and ungrounded metaphysics. In this context, determining the "transcendental" components of knowledge means determining, "all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori." (A 12/B 25)

The project of the Critique of Pure Reason is also challenging because in the analysis of the mind's transcendental contributions to experience we must employ the mind, the only tool we have, to investigate the mind. We must use the faculties of knowledge to determine the limits of knowledge, so Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is both a critique that takes pure reason as its subject matter, and a critique that is conducted by pure reason.

Kant's argument that the mind makes an a priori contribution to experiences should not be mistaken for an argument like the Rationalists' that the mind possesses innate ideas like, "God is a perfect being." Kant rejects the claim that there are complete propositions like this one etched on the fabric of the mind. He argues that the mind provides a formal structuring that allows for the conjoining of concepts into judgments, but that structuring itself has no content. The mind is devoid of content until interaction with the world actuates these formal constraints. The mind possesses a priori templates for judgments, not a priori judgments.

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Kant's Transcendental Idealism

With Kant's claim that the mind of the knower makes an active contribution to experience of objects before us, we are in a better position to understand transcendental idealism. Kant's arguments are designed to show the limitations of our knowledge. The Rationalists believed that we could possess metaphysical knowledge about God, souls, substance, and so; they believed such knowledge was transcendentally real. Kant argues, however, that we cannot have knowledge of the realm beyond the empirical. That is, transcendental knowledge is ideal, not real, for minds like ours. Kant identifies two a priori sources of these constraints. The mind has a receptive capacity, or the sensibility, and the mind possesses a conceptual capacity, or the understanding.

In the Transcendental Aesthetic section of the Critique, Kant argues that sensibility is the understanding's means of accessing objects. The reason synthetic a priori judgments are possible in geometry, Kant argues, is that space is an a priori form of sensibility. That is, we can know the claims of geometry with a priori certainty (which we do) only if experiencing objects in space is the necessary mode of our experience. Kant also argues that we cannot experience objects without being able to represent them spatially. It is impossible to grasp an

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object as an object unless we delineate the region of space it occupies. Without a spatial representation, our sensations are undifferentiated and we cannot ascribe properties to particular objects. Time, Kant argues, is also necessary as a form or condition of our intuitions of objects. The idea of time itself cannot be gathered from experience because succession and simultaneity of objects, the phenomena that would indicate the passage of time, would be impossible to represent if we did not already possess the capacity to represent objects in time.

Another way to understand Kant's point here is that it is impossible for us to have any experience of objects that are not in time and space. Furthermore, space and time themselves cannot be perceived directly, so they must be the form by which experience of objects is had. A consciousness that apprehends objects directly, as they are in themselves and not by means of space and time, is possible--God, Kant says, has a purely intuitive consciousness--but our apprehension of objects is always mediated by the conditions of sensibility. Any discursive or concept using consciousness (A 230/B 283) like ours must apprehend objects as occupying a region of space and persisting for some duration of time.

Subjecting sensations to the a priori conditions of space and time is not sufficient to make judging objects possible. Kant argues that the understanding must provide the concepts, which are rules for identifying what is common or universal in different representations.

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(A 106) He says, "without sensibility no object would be given to us; and without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind." (B 75) Locke's mistake was believing that our sensible apprehensions of objects are thinkable and reveal the properties of the objects themselves. In the Analytic of Concepts section of the Critique, Kant argues that in order to think about the input from sensibility, sensations must conform to the conceptual structure that the mind has available to it. By applying concepts, the understanding takes the particulars that are given in sensation and identifies what is common and general about them. A concept of "shelter" for instance, allows me to identify what is common in particular representations of a house, a tent, and a cave.

The empiricist might object at this point by insisting that such concepts do arise from experience, raising questions about Kant's claim that the mind brings an a priori conceptual structure to the world. Indeed, concepts like "shelter" do arise partly from experience. But Kant raises a more fundamental issue. An empirical derivation is not sufficient to explain all of our concepts. As we have seen, Hume argued, and Kant accepts, that we cannot empirically derive our concepts of causation, substance, self, identity, and so forth. What Hume had failed to see, Kant argues, is that even the possibility of making judgments about objects, to which Hume would assent, presupposes the possession of these fundamental

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concepts. Hume had argued for a sort of associationism to explain how we arrive at causal beliefs. My idea of a moving cue ball, becomes associated with my idea of the eight ball that is struck and falls into the pocket. Under the right circumstances, repeated impressions of the second following the first produces a belief in me that the first causes the second.

The problem that Kant points out is that a Humean association of ideas already presupposes that we can conceive of identical, persistent objects that have regular, predictable, causal behavior. And being able to conceive of objects in this rich sense presupposes that the mind makes several a priori contributions. I must be able to separate the objects from each other in my sensations, and from my sensations of myself. I must be able to attribute properties to the objects. I must be able to conceive of an external world with its own course of events that is separate from the stream of perceptions in my consciousness. These components of experience cannot be found in experience because they constitute it. The mind's a priori conceptual contribution to experience can be enumerated by a special set of concepts that make all other empirical concepts and judgments possible. These concepts cannot be experienced directly; they are only manifest as the form which particular judgments of objects take. Kant believes that formal logic has already revealed what the fundamental categories of thought are. The special set of concepts is Kant's Table of

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Categories, which are taken mostly from Aristotle with a few revisions:

Of Quantity

Unity

Plurality

Totality

Of Quality Of Relation

Reality Inherence and Subsistence

Negation Causality and Dependence

Limitation Community

Of Modality

Possibility-Impossibility

Existence-Nonexistence

Necessity-Contingency

While Kant does not give a formal derivation of it, he believes that this is the complete and necessary list of the a priori contributions that the understanding brings to its judgments of the world. Every judgment that the

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understanding can make must fall under the table of categories. And subsuming spatiotemporal sensations under the formal structure of the categories makes judgments, and ultimately knowledge, of empirical objects possible.

Since objects can only be experienced spatiotemporally, the only application of concepts that yields knowledge is to the empirical, spatiotemporal world. Beyond that realm, there can be no sensations of objects for the understanding to judge, rightly or wrongly. Since intuitions of the physical world are lacking when we speculate about what lies beyond, metaphysical knowledge, or knowledge of the world outside the physical, is impossible. Claiming to have knowledge from the application of concepts beyond the bounds of sensation results in the empty and illusory transcendent metaphysics of Rationalism that Kant reacts against.

It should be pointed out, however, that Kant is not endorsing an idealism about objects like Berkeley's. That is, Kant does not believe that material objects are unknowable or impossible. While Kant is a transcendental idealist--he believes the nature of objects as they are in themselves is unknowable to us--knowledge of appearances is nevertheless possible. As noted above, in The Refutation of Material Idealism, Kant argues that the ordinary self-consciousness that Berkeley and Descartes would grant implies "the existence of objects in space outside me." (B 275)

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Consciousness of myself would not be possible if I were not able to make determinant judgments about objects that exist outside of me and have states that are independent of the of my inner experience. Another way to put the point is to say that the fact that the mind of the knower makes the a priori contribution does not mean that space and time or the categories are mere figments of the imagination. Kant is an empirical realist about the world we experience; we can know objects as they appear to us. He gives a robust defense of science and the study of the natural world from his argument about the mind's role in making nature. All discursive, rational beings must conceive of the physical world as spatially and temporally unified, he argues. And the table of categories is derived from the most basic, universal forms of logical inference, Kant believes. Therefore, it must be shared by all rational beings. So those beings also share judgments of an intersubjective, unified, public realm of empirical objects. Hence, objective knowledge of the scientific or natural world is possible. Indeed, Kant believes that the examples of Newton and Galileo show it is actual. So Berkeley's claims that we do not know objects outside of us and that such knowledge is impossible are both mistaken.

In conjunction with his analysis of the possibility of knowing empirical objects, Kant gives an analysis of the knowing subject that has sometimes been called his transcendental psychology. Much of Kant's argument can be seen as subjective, not because of variations from

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mind to mind, but because the source of necessity and universality is in the mind of the knowing subject, not in objects themselves. Kant draws several conclusions about what is necessarily true of any consciousness that employs the faculties of sensibility and understanding to produce empirical judgments. As we have seen, a mind that employs concepts must have a receptive faculty that provides the content of judgments. Space and time are the necessary forms of apprehension for the receptive faculty. The mind that has experience must also have a faculty of combination or synthesis, the imagination for Kant, that apprehends the data of sense, reproduces it for the understanding, and recognizes their features according to the conceptual framework provided by the categories. The mind must also have a faculty of understanding that provides empirical concepts and the categories for judgment. The various faculties that make judgment possible must be unified into one mind. And it must be identical over time if it is going to apply its concepts to objects over time. Kant here addresses Hume's famous assertion that introspection reveals nothing more than a bundle of sensations that we group together and call the self. Judgments would not be possible, Kant maintains, if the mind that senses is not the same as the mind that possesses the forms of sensibility. And that mind must be the same as the mind that employs the table of categories, that contributes empirical concepts to judgment, and that synthesizes the whole into knowledge of a unified, empirical world. So the fact that we can empirically judge proves, contra

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Hume, that the mind cannot be a mere bundle of disparate introspected sensations. In his works on ethics Kant will also argue that this mind is the source of spontaneous, free, and moral action. Kant believes that all the threads of his transcendental philosophy come together in this "highest point" which he calls the transcendental unity of apperception.

Kant's Analytic of Principles

We have seen the progressive stages of Kant's analysis of the faculties of the mind which reveals the transcendental structuring of experience performed by these faculties. First, in his analysis of sensibility, he argues for the necessarily spatiotemporal character of sensation. Then Kant analyzes the understanding, the faculty that applies concepts to sensory experience. He concludes that the categories provide a necessary, foundational template for our concepts to map onto our experience. In addition to providing these transcendental concepts, the understanding also is the source of ordinary empirical concepts that make judgments about objects possible. The understanding provides concepts as the rules for identifying the properties in our representations.

Kant's next concern is with the faculty of judgment, "If understanding as such is explicated as our power of rules, then the power of judgment is the ability to subsume under rules, i.e., to distinguish whether

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something does or does not fall under a given rule." (A 132/B 172). The next stage in Kant's project will be to analyze the formal or transcendental features of experience that enable judgment, if there are any such features besides what the previous stages have identified. The cognitive power of judgment does have a transcendental structure. Kant argues that there are a number of principles that must necessarily be true of experience in order for judgment to be possible. Kant's analysis of judgment and the arguments for these principles are contained in his Analytic of Principles.

Within the Analytic, Kant first addresses the challenge of subsuming particular sensations under general categories in the Schematism section. Transcendental schemata, Kant argues, allow us to identify the homogeneous features picked out by concepts from the heterogeneous content of our sensations. Judgment is only possible if the mind can recognize the components in the diverse and disorganized data of sense that make those sensations an instance of a concept or concepts. A schema makes it possible, for instance, to subsume the concrete and particular sensations of an Airedale, a Chihuahua, and a Labrador all under the more abstract concept "dog."

The full extent of Kant's Copernican revolution becomes even more clear in the rest of the Analytic of Principles. That is, the role of the mind in making nature is not limited to space, time, and the categories. In the Analytic

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of Principles, Kant argues that even the necessary conformity of objects to natural law arises from the mind. Thus far, Kant's transcendental method has permitted him to reveal the a priori components of sensations, the a priori concepts. In the sections titled the Axioms, Anticipations, Analogies, and Postulates, he argues that there are a priori judgments that must necessarily govern all appearances of objects. These judgments are a function of the table of categories' role in determining all possible judgments, so the four sections map onto the four headings of that table. I include all of the a priori judgments, or principles, here to illustrate the earlier claims about Kant's empirical realism, and to show the intimate relationship Kant saw between his project and that of the natural sciences:

Axioms of Intuition

All intuitions are extensive magnitudes.

Anticipations of Perception

In all appearances the real that is an object of sensation has intensive magnitude, i.e., a

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degree.

Postulates of Empirical Thought

What agrees (in terms of intuition and concepts) with the formal conditions of experience is possible.

What coheres with the material conditions of experience (with sensation) is actual.

That whose coherence with the actual is determined according to universal conditions of experience is necessary (exists necessarily)

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Kant's Dialectic

The discussion of Kant's metaphysics and epistemology so far (including the Analytic of Principles)has been confined primarily to the section of the Critique of Pure Reason that Kant calls the Transcendental Analytic. The purpose of the Analytic, we are told, is "the rarely attempted dissection of the power of the understanding itself." (A 65/B 90). Kant's project has been to develop the full argument for his theory about the mind's contribution to knowledge of the world. Once that theory is in place, we are in a position to see the errors that are caused by transgressions of the boundaries to knowledge established by Kant's transcendental idealism and empirical realism. Kant calls judgments that pretend to have knowledge beyond these boundaries and that even require us to tear down the limits that he has placed on knowledge, transcendent judgments. The Transcendental Dialectic section of the book is devoted to uncovering the illusion of knowledge created by transcendent judgments and explaining why the temptation to believe them persists. Kant argues that the proper functioning of the faculties of sensibility and the understanding combine to draw reason, or the cognitive power of inference, inexorably into mistakes. The faculty of reason naturally seeks the highest ground of unconditional unity. It seeks to unify and subsume all particular experiences under higher and higher principles of knowledge. But sensibility cannot by its nature

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provide the intuitions that would make knowledge of the highest principles and of things as they are in themselves possible. Nevertheless, reason, in its function as the faculty of inference, inevitably draws conclusions about what lies beyond the boundaries of sensibility. The unfolding of this conflict between the faculties reveals more about the mind's relationship to the world it seeks to know and the possibility of a science of metaphysics.

Kant believes that Aristotle's logic of the syllogism captures the logic employed by reason. The resulting mistakes from the inevitable conflict between sensibility and reason reflect the logic of Aristotle's syllogism. Corresponding to the three basic kinds of syllogism are three dialectic mistakes or illusions of transcendent knowledge that cannot be real. Kant's discussion of these three classes of mistakes are contained in the Paralogisms, the Antinomies, and the Ideals of Reason. The Dialectic explains the illusions of reason in these sections. But since the illusions arise from the structure of our faculties, they will not cease to have their influence on our minds any more than we can prevent the moon from seeming larger when it is on the horizon than when it is overhead. (A 297/B 354).

In the Paralogisms, Kant argues that a failure to recognize the difference between appearances and things in themselves, particularly in the case of the introspected self, lead us into transcendent error. Kant argues against several conclusions encouraged by Descartes and the

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rational psychologists, who believed they could build human knowledge from the "I think" of the cogito argument. From the "I think" of self-awareness we can infer, they maintain, that the self or soul is 1) simple, 2) immaterial, 3) an identical substance and 4) that we perceive it directly, in contrast to external objects whose existence is merely possible. That is, the rational psychologists claimed to have knowledge of the self as transcendentally real. Kant believes that it is impossible to demonstrate any of these four claims, and that the mistaken claims to knowledge stem from a failure to see the real nature of our apprehension of the "I." Reason cannot fail to apply the categories to its judgments of the self, and that application gives rise to these four conclusions about the self that correspond roughly to the four headings in the table of categories. But to take the self as an object of knowledge here is to pretend to have knowledge of the self as it is in itself, not as it appears to us. Our representation of the "I" itself is empty. It is subject to the condition of inner sense, time, but not the condition of outer sense, space, so it cannot be a proper object of knowledge. It can be thought through concepts, but without the commensurate spatial and temporal intuitions, it cannot be known. Each of the four paralogisms explains the categorical structure of reason that led the rational psychologists to mistake the self as it appears to us for the self as it is in itself.

We have already mentioned the Antinomies, in which Kant analyzes the methodological problems of the

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Rationalist project. Kant sees the Antinomies as the unresolved dialogue between skepticism and dogmatism about knowledge of the world. There are four antinomies, again corresponding to the four headings of the table of categories, that are generated by reason's attempts to achieve complete knowledge of the realm beyond the empirical. Each antinomy has a thesis and an antithesis, both of which can be validly proven, and since each makes a claim that is beyond the grasp of spatiotemporal sensation, neither can be confirmed or denied by experience. The First Antinomy argues both that the world has a beginning in time and space, and no beginning in time and space. The Second Antinomy's arguments are that every composite substance is made of simple parts and that nothing is composed of simple parts. The Third Antinomy's thesis is that agents like ourselves have freedom and its antithesis is that they do not. The Fourth Antinomy contains arguments both for and against the existence of a necessary being in the world. The seemingly irreconcilable claims of the Antinomies can only be resolved by seeing them as the product of the conflict of the faculties and by recognizing the proper sphere of our knowledge in each case. In each of them, the idea of "absolute totality, which holds only as a condition of things in themselves, has been applied to appearances" (A 506/B534).

The result of Kant' analysis of the Antinomies is that we can reject both claims of the first two and accept both claims of the last two, if we understand their proper

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domains. In the first Antinomy, the world as it appears to us is neither finite since we can always inquire about its beginning or end, nor is it infinite because finite beings like ourselves cannot cognize an infinite whole. As an empirical object, Kant argues, it is indefinitely constructible for our minds. As it is in itself, independent of the conditions of our thought, should not be identified as finite or infinite since both are categorial conditions of our thought. Kant's resolution of the third Antinomy (A 445/B 473) clarifies his position on freedom. He considers the two competing hypotheses of speculative metaphysics that there are different types of causality in the world: 1) there are natural causes which are themselves governed by the laws of nature as well as uncaused causes like ourselves that can act freely, or 2) the causal laws of nature entirely govern the world including our actions. The conflict between these contrary claims can be resolved, Kant argues, by taking his critical turn and recognizing that it is impossible for any cause to be thought of as uncaused itself in the realm of space and time. But reason, in trying to understand the ground of all things, strives to unify its knowledge beyond the empirical realm. The empirical world, considered by itself, cannot provide us with ultimate reasons. So if we do not assume a first or free cause we cannot completely explain causal series in the world. So for the Third Antinomy, as for all of the Antinomies, the domain of the Thesis is the intellectual, rational, noumenal world. The domain of the Antithesis is the spatiotemporal world.

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The Ideas of Reason

The faculty of reason has two employments. For the most part, we have engaged in an analysis of theoretical reason which has determined the limits and requirements of the employment of the faculty of reason to obtain knowledge. Theoretical reason, Kant says, makes it possible to cognize what is. But reason has its practical employment in determining what ought to be as well. (A 633/B 661) This distinction roughly corresponds to the two philosophical enterprises of metaphysics and ethics. Reason's practical use is manifest in the regulative function of certain concepts that we must think with regard to the world, even though we can have no knowledge of them.

Kant believes that, "Human reason is by its nature architectonic." (A 474/B 502). That is, reason thinks of all cognitions as belonging to a unified and organized system. Reason is our faculty of making inferences and of identifying the grounds behind every truth. It allows us to move from the particular and contingent to the global and universal. I infer that "Caius is mortal" from the fact that "Caius is a man" and the universal claim, "All men are mortal." In this fashion, reason seeks higher and higher levels of generality in order to explain the way things are. In a different kind of example, the

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biologist's classification of every living thing into a kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, genus, and species, illustrates reason's ambition to subsume the world into an ordered, unified system. The entire empirical world, Kant argues, must be conceived of by reason as causally necessitated (as we saw in the Analogies). We must connect, "one state with a previous state upon which the state follows according to a rule." Each cause, and each cause's cause, and each additional ascending cause must itself have a cause. Reason generates this hierarchy that combines to provide the mind with a conception of a whole system of nature. Kant believes that it is part of the function of reason to strive for a complete, determinate understanding of the natural world. But our analysis of theoretical reason has made it clear that we can never have knowledge of the totality of things because we cannot have the requisite sensations of the totality, hence one of the necessary conditions of knowledge is not met. Nevertheless, reason seeks a state of rest from the regression of conditioned, empirical judgments in some unconditioned ground that can complete the series (A 584/B 612). Reason's structure pushes us to accept certain ideas of reason that allow completion of its striving for unity. We must assume the ideas of God, freedom, and immortality, Kant says, not as objects of knowledge, but as practical necessities for the employment of reason in the realm where we can have knowledge. By denying the possibility of knowledge of these ideas, yet arguing for

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their role in the system of reason, Kant had to, "annul knowledge in order to make room for faith." (B xxx).

Kant's Ethics

1. It is rare for a philosopher in any era to make a significant impact on any single topic in philosophy.

2. For a philosopher to impact as many different areas as Kant did is extraordinary.

3. His ethical theory has been as, if not more, influential than his work in epistemology and metaphysics.

4. Most of Kant's work on ethics is presented in two works:

a. The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) is Kant's "search for and establishment of the supreme principle of morality."

b. In The Critique of Practical Reason (1787) Kant attempts to unify his account of practical reason with his work in the Critique of Pure Reason.

5. Kant is the primary proponent in history of what is called deontological ethics.

a. Deontology is the study of duty.

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b. On Kant's view, the sole feature that gives an action moral worth is not the outcome that is achieved by the action, but the motive that is behind the action.

c. The categorical imperative is Kant's famous statement of this duty: "ACT ONLY ACCORDING TO THAT MAXIM BY WHICH YOU CAN AT THE SAME TIME WILL THAT IT SHOULD BECOME A UNIVERSAL LAW."

Reason and Freedom

1. For Kant, as we have seen, the drive for total, systematic knowledge in reason can only be fulfilled with assumptions that empirical observation cannot support.

2. The metaphysical facts about the ultimate nature of things in themselves must remain a mystery to us because of the spatiotemporal constraints on sensibility.

3. When we think about the nature of things in themselves or the ultimate ground of the empirical world, Kant has argued that we are still constrained to think through the categories, we cannot think otherwise, but we can have no

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knowledge because sensation provides our concepts with no content.

4. So, reason is put at odds with itself because it is constrained by the limits of its transcendental structure, but it seeks to have complete knowledge that would take it beyond those limits.

5. Freedom plays a central role in Kant's ethics because the possibility of moral judgments presupposes it.

6. Freedom is an idea of reason that serves an indispensable practical function.

7. Without the assumption of freedom, reason cannot act.

a. If we think of ourselves as completely causally determined, and not as uncaused causes ourselves, then any attempt to conceive of a rule that prescribes the means by which some end can be achieved is pointless. I cannot both think of myself as entirely subject to causal law and as being able to act according to the conception of a principle that gives guidance to my will. We cannot help but think of our actions as the result of an uncaused cause if we are to act at all and employ reason to accomplish ends and understand the world.

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So reason has an unavoidable interest in thinking of itself as free. That is, theoretical reason cannot demonstrate freedom, but practical reason must assume for the purpose of action. Having the ability to make judgments and apply reason puts us outside that system of causally necessitated events. "Reason creates for itself the idea of a spontaneity that can, on its own, start to act--without, i.e., needing to be preceded by another cause by means of which it is determined to action in turn, according to the law of causal connection," Kant says. (A 533/B 561) In its intellectual domain, reason must think of itself as free.

It is dissatisfying that he cannot demonstrate freedom, nevertheless, it comes as no surprise that we must think of ourselves as free. In a sense, Kant is agreeing with the common sense view that how I choose to act makes a difference in how I actually act. Even if it were possible to give a predictive empirical account of why I act as I do, say on the grounds of a functionalist psychological theory, those considerations would mean nothing to me in my deliberations. When I make a decision about what to do, about which car to buy, for instance, the mechanism at work in my nervous system makes no difference to me. I still have to peruse Consumer Reports, consider my options, reflect on my needs, and decide on the basis of the application of general principles. My first person perspective is unavoidable, hence the deliberative, intellectual process of choice is unavoidable.

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The Duality of the Human Situation

The question of moral action is not an issue for two classes of beings, according to Kant. The animal consciousness, the purely sensuous being, is entirely subject to causal determination. It is part of the causal chains of the empirical world, but not an originator of causes the way humans are. Hence, rightness or wrongness, as concepts that apply to situations one has control over, do not apply. We do not morally fault the lion for killing the gazelle, or even for killing its own young. The actions of a purely rational being, by contrast, are in perfect accord with moral principles, Kant says. There is nothing in such a being's nature to make it falter. Its will always conforms with the dictates of reason. Humans are between the two worlds. We are both sensible and intellectual, as was pointed out in the discussion of the first Critique. We are neither wholly determined to act by natural impulse, nor are we free of non-rational impulse. Hence we need rules of conduct. We need, and reason is compelled to provide, a principle that declares how we ought to act when it is in our power to choose

Since we find ourselves in the situation of possessing reason, being able to act according to our own conception of rules, there is a special burden on us. Other

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creatures are acted upon by the world. But having the ability to choose the principle to guide our actions makes us actors. We must exercise our will and our reason to act. Will is the capacity to act according to the principles provided by reason. Reason assumes freedom and conceives of principles of action in order to function.

Two problems face us however. First, we are not wholly rational beings, so we are liable to succumb to our non-rational impulses. Second, even when we exercise our reason fully, we often cannot know which action is the best. The fact that we can choose between alternate courses of actions (we are not determined to act by instinct or reason) introduces the possibility that there can be better or worse ways of achieving our ends and better or worse ends, depending upon the criteria we adopt. The presence of two different kinds of object in the world adds another dimension, a moral dimension, to our deliberations. Roughly speaking, we can divide the world into beings with reason and will like ourselves and things that lack those faculties. We can think of these classes of things as ends-in-themselves and mere means-to-ends, respectively. Ends-in-themselves are autonomous beings with their own agendas; failing to recognize their capacity to determine their own actions would be to thwart their freedom and undermine reason itself. When we reflect on alternative courses of action, means-to-ends, things like buildings, rocks, and trees, deserve no special status in our deliberations about what goals we should have and what means we use to achieve

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them. The class of ends-in-themselves, reasoning agents like ourselves, however, do have a special status in our considerations about what goals we should have and the means we employ to accomplish them. Moral actions, for Kant, are actions where reason leads, rather than follows, and actions where we must take other beings that act according to their own conception of the law, into account.

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Concepţia despre filozofie a lui Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel -Filozofia speculativă-

1. Concepţia sa despre filozofie este redată printr-un fragment din lucrarea Prelegeri de istorie a filozofiei.

2. Filozofia lui Hegel, după propriile cuvinte, este o filozofie speculativă, a Ideii ce se desprinde de lumea sensibilă şi trece dincolo de experienţa înşelătoare şi particulară a simţurilor.

3. Lumea are o structură ideală, ea este o expresie a transfigurărilor unei entităţi ideale denumite de Hegel, Spiritul Absolut.Istoria omului nu reprezintă altceva decât etapele( determinaţiile) pe care le parcurge această entitate absolută şi misterioasă de la forme mai simple de gândire la forme mai de gândire mai înalte şi speculative.

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4. Filozofia se confundă de fapt cu istoria filozofiei, care este identică, la rândul său, cu istoria devenirii Spiritului Absolut ca gândire. Etapele devenirii Spiritului Absolut sunt momente ale istoriei filozofiei, care trebuie gândite ca fiind legate între ele într-un proces dialectic în trei momente: teză – antiteză – sinteză.

5. Filozofia reprezintă forma de gîndire integratoare a tuturor acestor momente ca fiind părţi ale aceluiaşi proces.Filozofia reprezintă gândirea care a înţeles întregul, care are perspectiva întregului, înălţându-se dincolo de momentele particulare.Ea este gândirea la scara istoriei, nu doar a unui singur moment.Este gândirea sintetică, prin care lucrurile sunt legate împreună.

6. Pentru Hegel, faţă de Kant, cunoaşterea adevărată este cunoaşterea speculativă, ca fiind mai mult decât privirea dincoace şi dincolo de ceea ce ne apare hic et nunc (acum şi aici) şi este verificabil prin confruntarea cu experienţa.

7. Principalele concepte şi idei, în ordinea importanţei mesajului textului, sunt: Spirit Absolut, Idee, dialectica hegeliană în trei trepte, filozofia ca istoria filozofiei, istoria filozofiei ca istoria devenirii Spiritului Absolut, gândire sintetică , gândire speculativă.

Concepţia despre filozofie a lui Auguste Compte -Filozofia pozitivă-

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1. Este redată printr-un fragment din cartea sa Curs de filozofie pozitivă.

2. Auguste Compte ca şi Imannuel Kant, de exemplu, este unul dintre aceia care au dorit ca filozofia să fie trnsformată în ştiinţă. Conceptul de ştiinţă şi ideea de ştiinţă, au suferit de la o epocă la alta diverse modificări de înţeles. În timpul lui Compte, ştiinţa este înţeleasă ca ştiinţă pozitivă, bazată pe experiment şi pe analiza exclusivă a fenomenelor, ignorând cauzele ascunse (metafizice), care le determină pe acestea din urmă.

3. Şi Auguste Compte este un critic al metafizicii, accepţiune dată filozofiei speculative, care emite idei ce trec dincolo de orice cadru experimental prin care ele să poată fi verificate.

4. După Compte, gândirea umanităţii se găseşte într-un proces progresiv, care cuprinde următoarele etape:

a. etapa teologică, dominată de gândirea de tip superstiţios, care încearcă să vadă în spatele fenomenelor obişnuite cauze supranaturale;

b. etapa metafizică, corespunde unei evoluţii: la baza manifestării fenomenelor sunt gândite principii abstracte precum conceptele de ,,principiu”, ,,cauză primă”, ,,esenţă”;

c. etapa pozitivă , care corespunde gândiri de tip ştiinţific şi pozitiv, în care explicaţiile bazate pe observaţie, experienţă şi teorii ştiinţifice identifică ca determinante pentru fenomene anumite legi naturale.

5. Principalele concepte şi idei, în ordinea importanţei mesajului textului, sunt: filozofie pozitivă, filozofie speculativă, ştiinţă, ştiinţă pozitivă, fenomene, cauze,

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metafizică, etape ale eoluţiei gândirii, etapa telogică, etapa metafizică, etapa pozitivă, legi naturale, principii abstracte ale gândirii, superstiţii.

Concepţia despre filozofie a lui Friedrich Nietzsche -Filozofia ,,vieţii”-

1. Este redată prin câteva fragmente din cărţile Dincolo de bine şi de rău şi Voinţa de putere.

2. Ca şi Kant, Nietzsche se raportează critic la filozofia anterioară lui. ,,Critica” lui Nietzsche nu este, precum cea kantiană, raţionalistă, ci din perspectiva manifestărilor psihologice abisale ale omului.Filozofia de tip raţionalist este criticată de Nietzsche ca fiind o piedică şi o falsificare a adevăratelor impulsuri ale omului, cele provenind din voinţa de putere. Critica sa se îndreaptă în special împotriva definirii omului ca fiinţă eminamente raţională (definiţie consacrată de tradiţia de gândire europeană) şi, de asemenea, împotriva considerării omului, din această cauză, ca o fiinţă aproape angelică, fără insincte sau senzualitate.

3. Sarcina filozofie, după Nietzsche, ar tebui să constea în recuperarea imaginii integrale a omului, în care senzualitatea, instinctualitatea şi zestrea sa biologică să nu mai fie refulate sau evitate din discursul filozofic.

4. Filozofia trebuie să fie o expresie a vieţii, a bucuriei de a crea.Nietzsche dezvoltă în acest sens o teorie a supraomului, văzut ca o persoană dotată cu o voinţă de putere mare, pe care o converteşte în creaţia artistică de excepţie.

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5. Filozofia , în concepţia lui Nietzsche se asemeană cu un exerciţiu de demontare a miturilor impuse de filozofia raţionalistă şi de gândirea teologică creştină, ea trebuie să anunţe un amurg al idolilor. În acest sens, Nietzsche dezvoltă o concepţie proprie despre adevăr, cunoscută sub numele de perspectivism.Conform acesteia, adevărul, falsul, binele şi răul sunt construcţii valorice ale omului(metafore), vestigii ale aspectelor abisale ale omului, şi nicidecum entităţi obiective, detaşate de subiectivitatea umană.

6. Principalele concepte şi idei, în ordinea importanţei mesajului textului, sunt: voinţă de putere, critică a filozofiei raţionaliste, perspectivism, teoria supraomului, senzualism,intepretare,creaţie artistică, subiectivitate.

Concepţia despre filozofie a lui Edmund Husserl - Fenomenologia-

1. Concepţia sa despre filozofie este redată printr-un fragment din cartea Filozofia ca ştiinţă riguroasă.

2. Edmund Husserl este părintele fenomenologiei, curent filozofic care pune accent pe studierea lumii lăuntrice a omului, denumită subiectivitate sau lume a conştiinţei.

3. Există o lume a conştiinţei la fel cum există o lume fizică exterioară nouă.Reprezentările noastre despre lume nu sunt simple copii sau ogilndiri ale lumii fizice date într-o conştiinţă pasivă. Dimpotrivă, consideră Husserl, conştiinţa noastră are iniţiativă, trimite semnale spre lumea exterioară, denumite de el acte

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intenţionale.Prin aceste intenţionări se învestesc cu sens şi valoare, dinspre lumea interioară a omului, obiectele din lumea fizică, care sunt în sine neutre, lipsite de sens sau valoare. Ele capătă sens pentru noi, sunt îmbogăţite în statutul lor ontic printr-o dimensiune valorică.

4. Pentru Husserl, filozofia este fenomenologie, iar fenomenologia este analiză a lumii conştiinţei intenţionale, este o explorare a lumii interioare a conştiinţei.

5. Ca şi alţi filozofi, Husserl a crezut că filozofia trebuie să se transforme într-o ştiinţă riguroasă.O ştiinţă este opusă superstiţiilor, convingerilor neîntemeiate. Ştiinţele pozitive moderne, după Husserl, conţin însă o mare doză de superstiţii, anume acelea legate de faptul că ar putea exista cunoştinţe absolut obiective, provenite sută la sută din fapte brute.În realitate, în ştiinţele pozitive, o mare parte din ceea ce se numeşte cunoaştere este datorat subiectivităţii. Ştinţa riguroasă, ca ideal al lui Husserl, ar trebui să pornească de la o analiză temeinică a structurilor conştiinţei, care ar face posibilă înţelegerea mai bună a cunoştinţelor despre lumea exterioară sau fizică.

6. Principalele concepte şi idei, în ordinea importanţei mesajului textului, sunt: fenomenologie, lume a conştiinţei, conştiinţă intenţională, analiză a conştiinţei, sens, valoare, intenţionalitate, acte intenţionale.

Filozofie şi analiză logică a limbajului

Concepţia despre filozofie a lui Rudolf Carnap

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1. Concepţia sa despre filozofie este redată printr-un fragment din lucrarea Depăşirea metafizicii prin analiza logică a limbajului.

2. Rudolf Carnap este unul din reprezentanţii pozitivismului logic, nume dat unei orientări filozofice care avea dept program următoarele:

a. fundamentarea filozofiei pe baze experimentale ca cele din ştiinţele pozitive;

b. respingerea oricărei filozofii de tip metafizic şi speculativ ca fiind eronată;

c. determinarea adevărului propoziţiilor filozofice prin metoda analizei logice a limbajului, care presupunea următoarele:

i. diferenţierea între propoziţii: cu semnificaţie:

a. tautologiile;b. propoziţii de

experienţă; propoziţii fără semnificaţie

(propoziţiile metafizice care conţin termeni fără un corespondent direct în realitate ca: Absolut, Necondiţionat, Fiinţă etc.)

3. Filozofia, în accepţiunea dată de pozitivismul logic, ar trebui să devină o disciplină de analiză şi verificare a propoziţiilor cu sens şi de separare a acestora de cele fără sens.Filozofia nu ar avea , prin urmare, o funcţie creatoare sau constitutivă de teorii, ci se reduce la o simplă metodă de verificare, pusă în slujba ştiinţei, singura care poate să fie constructivă.

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4. Principalele concepte şi idei, în ordinea importanţei mesajului textului, sunt: pozitivism logic, analiză logică a limbajului, propoziţii cu sens sau semnificaţie, tautologii, propoziţii de experienţă, critică a metafizicii, metodă de verificare, ştiinţă.

Concepţia despre filozofie a lui Ludwig Wittgenstein

1. Concepţia sa despre filozofie este redată printr-un fragment din cartea sa Tractatus logico – philosophicus.

2. Filozofia, consideră Wittgenstein, nu are alt rost decât acela de a fi o analiză logică a limbajului.Relaţia dintre limbajul logic şi lume este una simetrică, propoziţiilor elementare sau atomare le corespund situaţii simple din realitate, iar propoziţiilor compuse sau moleculare, stări de fapt cmplexe.

3. Filozofia este considerată de Wittgenstein o activitate de clarificare a limbajului, de identificare a propoziţiilor fără sens ale metafizicii ca fiind lipsite de semnificaţie.

4. Rolul filozofiei este unul strict explicativ, creaţia de teorii revine ştiinţei.Filozofia nu este o doctrină, ci o activitate.

5. Concepţia sa filozofică a cunoscut două etape.În textul din manual, se redă prima concepţie filozofică a sa, care este în mare parte asemănătoare cu cea a lui Carnap.

6. Principalele concepte şi idei, în ordinea importanţei mesajului textului, sunt:

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analiză logică a limbajului, propoziţii atomare, propoziţii moleculare, propoziţii metafizice, stare de fapt, doctrină, activitate.

Filozofia şi viaţă

Concepţia despre filozofiei a lui Platon

1. Concepţia sa despre filozofie este redată printr-un fragment din dialogul Republica.

2. Filozofia platoniciană a fost expusă de autorul ei sub forma unor dialoguri pe anumite teme, dezbătute de anumite personaje; cel mai celebru dintre acestea fiind personajul Socrate, care apare aproape constant în dialogurile platonice.Prin Socrate, se spune, este exprimat indirect punctul de vedere al lui Platon.

3. Dialogul Republica este unul dintre cele mai mari şi mai complexe dialoguri platonice.Tema rolului filozofiei în viaţa omului şi a caracteristicilor adevăratului filozof este abordată în cărţile VI şi VII ale dialogului amintit.

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4. Cea mai spectaculoasă parte a acestei dezbateri despre filozofie se regăseşte în aşa numitul Mit al Peşterii, care redă esenţa concepţiei platoniciene despre filozofie, despre realitate şi despre cunoaştere.

5. Mitul Peşterii cuprinde următoarele idei redate simbolic:

a. viaţa omului de pe pământ poate fi asemănată cu mediul unei peşteri, în care domină întunericul, care determină orientarea omului prin cunoaşterea înşelătoare a simţurilor;

b. mitul redă trei etape în care se găseşte un ipotetic personaj uman, care :

i. face parte dintr-un grup de oameni legaţi de la naştere şi aşezaţi în faţa unui perete, pe care sunt proiectate nişte umbre.Neavând posibilitatea să se mişte şi să vadă şi altceva, ei iau drept realitate acest spectacol al umbrelor;

ii. unul dintre aceştia, personajul ipotetic, este dezlegat făcând următoarele:

învaţă să se mişte; învaţă să priveasă şi să

compare obiectele pe care le descoperă ;

urcă dinspre ieşirea din peşteră spre domeniul luminii ;

iii. personajul iese din peşteră şi străbate următoarele etape:

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învaţă să-şi obişnuiască privirea cu lumina zilei;

reuşeşte să privească direct în soare, simbol al cunoaşterii absolute.

6. Prin Mitul Peşterii, Platon ne transmite mesajul că filozofia ar fi asemenea urcuşului personajului principal, care este de fapt filozoful, către adevăr şi realitatea ultimă, prin străbaterea unor trepte ale cunoaşterii ( cunoaştere prin simţuri, cunoaştere analitică , cunoaştere intelectual-intuitivă) şi , o dată cu acestea, ale realităţii (trecerea de la lumea umbrelor şi aparenţelor la lumea entităţilor absolute –Ideile platonice).

7. Filozofia este, prin urmare:a. un urcuş transformator al celui care se

îndeletniceşte cu ea;b. are un rol paideutic,;c. este o, ,,artă a răsucirii” esenţiale a omului

dinspre ceea ce este aparent şi înşelător către ceea ce este real în cel mai mare grad .

Principalele concepte şi idei, în ordinea mesajului textului, sunt: simbolul peşterii, simbolul urcuşului, gradele cunoaşterii, gradele realităţii, ,,arta răsucirii”, educaţie esenţială (paideia), lumea simţurilor, aparenţe, lumea inteligiblă, Idei platonice, soarele ca simbol al Ideii de Bine-Ideea supremă.

PlatoI INTRODUCTION

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Plato (circa 428-c. 347 BC), Greek philosopher, one of the

most creative and influential thinkers in Western philosophy.

II LIFE

Plato was born to an aristocratic family in Athens. His father,

Ariston, was believed to have descended from the early

kings of Athens. Perictione, his mother, was distantly

related to the 6th-century BC lawmaker Solon. When Plato

was a child, his father died, and his mother married

Pyrilampes, who was an associate of the statesman Pericles.

As a young man Plato had political ambitions, but he

became disillusioned by the political leadership in Athens.

He eventually became a disciple of Socrates, accepting

his basic philosophy and dialectical style of debate:

the pursuit of truth through questions

answers

and additional questions.

Plato witnessed the death of Socrates at the hands of the

Athenian democracy in 399 BC. Perhaps fearing for his own

safety, he left Athens temporarily and traveled to Italy,

Sicily, and Egypt.

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In 387 Plato founded the Academy in Athens, the

institution often described as the first European university. It

provided a comprehensive curriculum, including such

subjects as astronomy, biology, mathematics, political

theory, and philosophy. Aristotle was the Academy's most

prominent student.

Pursuing an opportunity to combine philosophy and practical

politics, Plato went to Sicily in 367 to tutor the new ruler

of Syracuse, Dionysius the Younger, in the art of

philosophical rule. The experiment failed. Plato made

another trip to Syracuse in 361, but again his engagement in

Sicilian affairs met with little success. The concluding years

of his life were spent lecturing at the Academy and writing.

He died at about the age of 80 in Athens in 348 or 347 BC.

FORMA ŞI CLASIFICAREA OPERELOR LUI PLATON

Plato's writings were in dialogue form; philosophical ideas

were advanced, discussed, and criticized in the context of a

conversation or debate involving two or more persons.

The earliest collection of Plato's work includes :

35 dialogues

13 letters.

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The authenticity of a few of the dialogues and most of

the letters has been disputed.

The dialogues may be divided into

early middle later periods of composition.

I.THE EARLIEST represent Plato's attempt to

communicate the philosophy and dialectical style of

Socrates. Several of these dialogues take the same form.

Socrates, encountering someone who claims to know much,

professes to be ignorant and seeks assistance from the one

who knows. As Socrates begins to raise questions,

however, it becomes clear that the one reputed to be wise

really does not know what he claims to know, and Socrates

emerges as the wiser one because he at least knows that he

does not know. Such knowledge, of course, is the beginning

of wisdom. Included in this group of dialogues are

Charmides (an attempt to define temperance), Lysis (a

discussion of friendship), Laches (a pursuit of the meaning

of courage), Protagoras (a defense of the thesis that virtue

is knowledge and can be taught), Euthyphron (a

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consideration of the nature of piety), and Book I of the

Republic (a discussion of justice).

Middle and Late Dialogues

The dialogues of the middle and later periods of Plato's life

reflect his own philosophical development. The ideas in

these works are attributed by most scholars to Plato himself,

although Socrates continues to be the main character

in many of the dialogues.

II.THE MIDDLE PERIOD include Gorgias (a

consideration of several ethical questions), Meno (a

discussion of the nature of knowledge), the Apology

(Socrates' defense of himself at his trial against the charges

of atheism and corrupting Athenian youth), Criton

(Socrates' defense of obedience to the laws of the state),

Phaidon (the death scene of Socrates, in which he

discusses the theory of Forms, the nature of the soul, and

the question of immortality), the Symposium sau

Banchetul (Plato's outstanding dramatic achievement,

which contains several speeches on beauty and love), the

Republic (Plato's supreme philosophical achievement,

which is a detailed discussion of the nature of justice).

III:THE WORKS OF THE LATER PERIOD include the Theaitetos (a denial that knowledge is to be

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identified with sense perception), Parmenides (a critical

evaluation of the theory of Forms), Sophist (further

consideration of the theory of Ideas, or Forms), Philebos (a

discussion of the relationship between pleasure and the

good), Timaios (Plato's views on natural science and

cosmology), and the Laws (a more practical analysis of

political and social issues).

TEORIA PLATONICĂ A IDEILOR (FORMELOR)

At the heart of Plato's philosophy is his theory of Forms, or

Ideas. Ultimately, his view of :

knowledge

his ethical theory

his psychology

his concept of the state

A Theory of Knowledge

Plato's theory of Forms and his theory of knowledge are so

interrelated that they must be discussed together.

Influenced by Socrates, Plato was convinced that

knowledge is attainable. He was also convinced of two

essential characteristics of knowledge:

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First, knowledge must be certain and infallible.

Second, knowledge must have as its object that

which is genuinely real as contrasted with that

which is an appearance only. Because that which

is fully real must, for Plato:

be fixed,

permanent,

and unchanging, he identified the real with the

ideal realm of being as opposed to the physical

world of becoming.

One consequence of this view was Plato's rejection of

empiricism, the claim that knowledge is derived from sense

experience. He thought that propositions derived from sense

experience have, at most, a degree of probability. They are

not certain. Furthermore, the objects of sense experience

are changeable phenomena of the physical world. Hence,

objects of sense experience are not proper objects of

knowledge.

Plato's own theory of knowledge is found in the

Republic, particularly in his discussion of the image of the

divided line and the myth of the cave. In the former, Plato

distinguishes between two levels of awareness:

I. opinion

II. knowledge.

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Claims or assertions about the physical or visible world,

including both commonsense observations and the

propositions of science, are opinions only. Some of these

opinions are well founded; some are not; but none of them

counts as genuine knowledge. The higher level of awareness

is knowledge, because there reason, rather than sense

experience, is involved. Reason, properly used, results in

intellectual insights that are certain, and the objects of

these rational insights are the abiding universals, the eternal

Forms or substances that constitute the real world.

The myth of the cave describes individuals chained deep

within the recesses of a cave. Bound so that vision is

restricted, they cannot see one another. The only thing

visible is the wall of the cave upon which appear shadows

cast by models or statues of animals and objects that are

passed before a brightly burning fire. Breaking free, one of

the individuals escapes from the cave into the light of day.

With the aid of the sun, that person sees for the first time

the real world and returns to the cave with the message that

the only things they have seen heretofore are shadows and

appearances and that the real world awaits them if they are

willing to struggle free of their bonds. The shadowy

environment of the cave symbolizes for Plato the

physical world of appearances. Escape into the sun-filled

setting outside the cave symbolizes the transition to the

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real world, the world of full and perfect being, the world of

Forms, which is the proper object of knowledge.

B Nature of Forms

The theory of Forms may best be understood in terms of

mathematical entities. A circle, for instance, is defined as a

plane figure composed of a series of points, all of which are

equidistant from a given point. No one has ever actually

seen such a figure, however.

What people have actually seen are drawn figures that are

more or less close approximations of the ideal circle. In fact,

when mathematicians define a circle, the points referred to

are not spatial points at all; they are logical points. They do

not occupy space. Nevertheless, although the Form of a

circle has never been seen—indeed, could never be seen—

mathematicians and others do in fact know what a circle is.

That they can define a circle is evidence that they know

what it is. For Plato, therefore, the Form “circularity”

exists, but not in the physical world of space and time.

It exists as a changeless object in the world of Forms or

Ideas, which can be known only by reason. Forms have

greater reality than objects in the physical world both

because of their perfection and stability and because they

are models, resemblance to which gives ordinary physical

objects whatever reality they have. Circularity, squareness,

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and triangularity are excellent examples, then, of what Plato

meant by Forms. An object existing in the physical world

may be called a circle or a square or a triangle only to the

extent that it resembles (“participates in” is Plato's phrase)

the Form “circularity” or “squareness” or “triangularity.”

Plato extended his theory beyond the realm of mathematics.

Indeed, he was most interested in its application in the

field of social ethics. The theory was his way of explaining

how the same universal term can refer to so many particular

things or events. The word justice, for example, can be

applied to hundreds of particular acts because these acts

have something in common, namely, their resemblance to,

or participation in, the Form “justice.” An individual is

human to the extent that he or she resembles or

participates in the Form “humanness.” If “humanness” is

defined in terms of being a rational animal, then an

individual is human to the extent that he or she is rational. A

particular act is courageous or cowardly to the extent that it

participates in its Form. An object is beautiful to the extent

that it participates in the Idea, or Form, of beauty.

Everything in the world of space and time is what it is by

virtue of its resemblance to, or participation in, its universal

Form. The ability to define the universal term is evidence

that one has grasped the Form to which that universal

refers.

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Plato conceived the Forms as arranged hierarchically;

the supreme Form is the Form of the Good, which, like

the sun in the myth of the cave, illuminates all the other

Ideas. There is a sense in which the Form of the Good

represents Plato's movement in the direction of an ultimate

principle of explanation. Ultimately, the theory of Forms is

intended to explain how one comes to know and also how

things have come to be as they are. In philosophical

language, Plato's theory of Forms is both an

epistemological (theory of knowledge) and an

ontological (theory of being) thesis.

V POLITICAL THEORY

The Republic, Plato's major political work, is concerned with

the question of justice and therefore with the questions

“what is a just state” and “who is a just individual?”

The ideal state, according to Plato, is composed of three

classes. The economic structure of the state is maintained

by the merchant class. Security needs are met by the

military class, and political leadership is provided by the

philosopher-kings. A particular person's class is

determined by an educational process that begins at birth

and proceeds until that person has reached the maximum

level of education compatible with interest and ability. Those

who complete the entire educational process become

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philosopher-kings. They are the ones whose minds have

been so developed that they are able to grasp the

Forms and, therefore, to make the wisest decisions. Indeed,

Plato's ideal educational system is primarily structured so as

to produce philosopher-kings.

Plato associates the traditional Greek virtues with the

class structure of the ideal state:

Temperance is the unique virtue of the artisan

class;

courage is the virtue peculiar to the military class;

wisdom characterizes the rulers.

justice, the fourth virtue, characterizes society as a

whole. The just state is one in which each class

performs its own function well without

infringing on the activities of the other

classes.

Plato divides the human soul into three parts: the

rational part, the will, and the appetites. The just person

is the one in whom the rational element, supported by the

will, controls the appetites. An obvious analogy exists here

with the threefold class structure of the state, in which the

enlightened philosopher-kings, supported by the soldiers,

govern the rest of society.

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VI ETHICS

Plato's ethical theory rests on the assumption that virtue is

knowledge and can be taught, which has to be understood

in terms of his theory of Forms. As indicated previously, the

ultimate Form for Plato is the Form of the Good, and

knowledge of this Form is the source of guidance in

moral decision making. Plato also argued that to know the

good is to do the good. The corollary of this is that anyone

who behaves immorally does so out of ignorance. This

conclusion follows from Plato's conviction that the moral

person is the truly happy person, and because individuals

always desire their own happiness, they always desire to do

that which is moral.

VII INFLUENCE

Plato's influence throughout the history of philosophy has

been monumental. When he died, Speusippus became head

of the Academy. The school continued in existence until AD

529, when it was closed by the Byzantine emperor Justinian

I, who objected to its pagan teachings. Plato's impact on

Jewish thought is apparent in the work of the 1st-century

Alexandrian philosopher Philo Judaeus. Neoplatonism,

founded by the 3rd-century philosopher Plotinus, was an

important later development of Platonism. The theologians

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Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and St. Augustine were early

Christian exponents of a Platonic perspective. Platonic ideas

have had a crucial role in the development of Christian

theology and also in medieval Islamic thought (see Islam).

During the Renaissance, the primary focus of Platonic

influence was the Florentine Academy, founded in the 15th

century near Florence. Under the leadership of Marsilio

Ficino, members of the Academy studied Plato in the original

Greek. In England, Platonism was revived in the 17th

century by Ralph Cudworth and others who became known

as the Cambridge Platonists. Plato's influence has been

extended into the 20th century by such thinkers as Alfred

North Whitehead, who once paid him tribute by describing

the history of philosophy as simply “a series of footnotes to

Plato.”

Concepţia despre filozofie a lui Baruch Spinoza

1. Concepţia sa despre filozofie este reddată printr-un fragment din cartea Etica.

2. Ca şi Platon, Spinoza priveşte filozofia ca o cale spre desăvârşirea interioară a celui care o practică.Din

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înţelegerea lumii, prin parcurgerea mai multor etape, survine în cele din urmă înţelegerea naturii umane.

3. Concepţia depre lume a lui Spinoza se numeşte panteism.Pentru el Natura şi Dumnezeu sunt una.Omul este o parte din Natură, care este absolut ordonată, raţională şi necesară.Înaintarea în filozofie înseamnă înaintarea în înţelegerea acestui mecanism perfect.

4. Cunoaşterea nefilozofică este o cunoaştere iluzorie, în care omul crede că se poate sustrage acestei ordini; în realitate, el este supus necesităţii naturale.Neînţelegerea este datorată, după Spinoza, pasiunilor iraţionale ale sufletului, care distorsionează realitatea.Filozofia are rolul de a rectifica modul omului de a privi în lume, de a adecva cunoaşterea şi a sincroniza sufletul cu Natura.Această ,,însănătoşire” a sufletului are loc printr-o asceză raţională, de analiză şi discriminare atentă a lumii înconjurătoare şi a celei lăuntrice, sufleteşti.

5. Consecinţele îndeletnicirii cu filozofia sunt:a. schimbarea opticii asupra lumii: necesitatea

nu mai este resimţită ca o constrângere, ci ca o formă de ordine; astfel , necesitatea este convertită în libertate;

b. Atingerea unei stării contemplativ-raţionale, care culminează cu ceea ce Spinoza numeşte amor Dei raţionalis (iubirea intelectuală de Dumnezeu), forma de cunoaştere supremă a omului, după Spinoza , care îi aduce acestuia împăcarea cu sine, cu ordinea raţională a Naturii sau a lui Dumnezeu.

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6. Principalele concepte şi idei, în ordinea importanţei mesajului textului, sunt: panteism, înţelegere, cunoaştere adecvată, pasiuni ale sufletului, asceză raţională, schimbarea opticii umane, necesitate, ordine naturală sau divină, libertate, convertirea necesităţii în libertate, iubirea intelectuală de Dumnezeu, contemplaţie.

Concepţia despre filozofie a lui Lucian Blaga

1. Concepţia sa despre filozofie este redată printr-un fragment din lucrarea Despre conştiinţa filozofică.

2. Domeniul privilegiat al reflecţiei filozofice blagiene este reprezentat de filozofia culturii.Concepţia sa despre filozofie este privită dintr-o perspectivă culturală şi umanistă.În lucrarea mai sus amintită, considerată o lucrare de metafilozofie (domeniu filozofic care are drept obiect de reflecţie filozofia) , capitolele Filozofie, ştiinţă, experienţă şi Filozofie şi artă , Despre conştiinţa filozofică ,Blaga îşi expune concepţia sa despre filozofie în urma unei comparări a filozofiei cu ştiinţa şi cu arta.Toate acestea, spune el trebuie judecate nu detaşat de cadrul cultural, ci ca manifestări culturale cu note specifice.

3. Specificul filozofiei, de exemplu este redat de următoarele caracteristetici:

a. este un domeniu autonom al culturii, b. este reflexivă; c. caută înţelegerea misterului;

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d. domeniul sau obiectul său de reflecţie îl constitue întregul existenţei;

e. filozofia dezvoltă o conştiinţă filozofică celui care filozofează.Aceasta se caracterizează prin faptul că filozoful supune reflecţiei sale, din dorinţa de a înţelege ,chiar activitatea sa , filozofia.

4. Principalele concepte şi idei, în ordinea importanţei mesajului textului, sunt:

filozofia culturii, cultură, metafilozofie,domenii ale culturii,ştiinţă, artă, mister, totul existenţei, conştiinţă filozofică, reflecţie.

Concepţia despre filozofie viziunea lui Bertrand Russell

1. Concepţia sa despre filozofiei este redată printr-un

fragment din lucarea sa Problemele filozofiei.Carte apărută în 1911, care cuprinde 15 capitole şi în care autorul abordează teme filozofice precum: ce este realitatea, ce este materia, ce este idealismul, ce înseamnă cunoaşterea şi despre câte feluri de cunoaştere se poate vorbi, ce este filosofia (mai ales în ultimele două capitole: Limitele cunoaşterii filosofice şi Valoarea filosofiei ).

2. Pentru Bertrand Russell, filozofia reprezintă un

exerciţiu intelectual cu urmări practice desoebite

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pentru viaţa celui care se îndeletniceşte cu acest tip de activitate:

a. îl eliberează de prejudecăţi;b. îi dezvoltă o atitudine critică (ne eliberează de

,,atitudinea dogmatică”);c. îi lărgeşte orizontul gâdirii şi îl eliberează

de ,,tirania obişnuinţei”;d. prin acceptarea incertitudinii sau a limitelor

cunoaşterii noastre ni se dezvoltă atitudinea de a ne mira în faţa măreţiei lumii;

e. ne dezvotlă simţul libertăţii ca o consecinţă a contemplării universului;

f. ne face generoşi, prin lărgirea Eului nostru la dimensiunile şi măreţia Universului contemplat, eliberându-ne astfel de egocentrism şi egoism.

Principalele concepte şi idei, în ordinea importanţei mesajului textului, sunt: valoare a filozofiei, atitudine critică, atitudine dogmatică, prejudecăţi, mirare, lărgire a Eului, Univers, incertitudine, certitudine, cunoaştere.

3. Russell, Bertrand Arthur William, 3rd Earl

Russell (1872-1970), British philosopher, mathematician, and Nobel laureate, whose emphasis on logical analysis influenced the course of 20th-century philosophy.

4. Born in Trelleck, Wales, on May 18, 1872, Russell

was educated at Trinity College, University of Cambridge. After graduation in 1894, he traveled in France, Germany, and the United States and was then

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made a fellow of Trinity College. From an early age he developed a strong sense of social consciousness; at the same time, he involved himself in the study of logical and mathematical questions, which he had made his special fields and on which he was called to lecture at many institutions throughout the world. He achieved prominence with his first major work, The Principles of Mathematics (1902), in which he attempted to remove mathematics from the realm of abstract philosophical notions and to give it a precise scientific framework.

5. Russell then collaborated for eight years with the

British philosopher and mathematician Alfred North Whitehead to produce the monumental work Principia Mathematica (3 volumes, 1910-1913). This work showed that mathematics can be stated in terms of the concepts of general logic, such as class and membership in a class. It became a masterpiece of rational thought. Russell and Whitehead proved that numbers can be defined as classes of a certain type, and in the process they developed logic concepts and a logic notation that established symbolic logic as an important specialization within the field of philosophy. In his next major work, The Problems of Philosophy (1912), Russell borrowed from the fields of sociology, psychology, physics, and mathematics to refute the tenets of idealism, the dominant

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philosophical school of the period, which held that all objects and experiences are the product of the intellect. Russell, a realist, believed that objects perceived by the senses have an inherent reality independent of the mind.

6. Russell condemned both sides in World War I (1914-

1918), and for his uncompromising stand he was fined, imprisoned, and deprived of his teaching post at Cambridge. In prison he wrote Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (1919), combining the two areas of knowledge he regarded as inseparable. After the war he visited the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, and in his book Practice and Theory of Bolshevism (1920) he expressed his disappointment with the form of socialism practiced there. He felt that the methods used to achieve a Communist system were intolerable and that the results obtained were not worth the price paid.

7. Russell taught at Beijing University in China during

1921 and 1922. From 1928 to 1932, after he returned to England, he conducted the private, highly progressive Beacon Hill School for young children. From 1938 to 1944 he taught at various educational institutions in the United States. He was barred, however, from teaching at the College of the City of New York (now City College of the City University of New York) by the state supreme court because of

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his attacks on religion in such works as What I Believe (1925) and his advocacy of sexual freedom, expressed in Manners and Morals (1929).

8. Russell returned to England in 1944 and was

reinstated as a fellow of Trinity College. Although he abandoned pacifism to support the Allied cause in World War II (1939-1945), he became an ardent and active opponent of nuclear weapons. In 1949 he was awarded the Order of Merit by King George VI. Russell received the 1950 Nobel Prize for Literature and was cited as “the champion of humanity and freedom of thought.” He led a movement in the late 1950s advocating unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain, and at the age of 89 he was imprisoned after an antinuclear demonstration. He died on February 2, 1970.

9. In addition to his earlier work, Russell also made a major contribution to the development of logical positivism, a strong philosophical movement of the 1930s and 1940s. The major Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, at one time Russell's student at Cambridge, was strongly influenced by his original concept of logical atomism. In his search for the nature and limits of knowledge, Russell was a leader in the revival of the philosophy of empiricism in the larger field of epistemology. In Our Knowledge of the External World (1926) and

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Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (1962), he attempted to explain all factual knowledge as constructed out of immediate experiences. Among his other books are The ABC of Relativity (1925), Education and the Social Order (1932), A History of Western Philosophy (1945), The Impact of Science upon Society (1952), My Philosophical Development (1959), War Crimes in Vietnam (1967), and The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell (3 volumes, 1967

Concepţia despre filozofie a lui Karl Jaspers

1. Este redată printr-un fragment din lucarea sa Originile filozofiei.

2. În această lucrare, Jaspers încearcă să caute originile filozofării şi să identifice specificitatea ei.De-a lungul istoriei filozofiei , spune el, filozofia a parcurs anumite trepte de poziţionare înţelegătoare a subiectului faţă de lumea din jurul său şi faţă de sine, redate de autor astfel:

a. mirarea sau uimirea (primul act al căutării înţelegeri de tip filozofic, ca o cunoaştere de tip dezinteresat);

b. îndoiala (ca îndoială metodică, de confruntare cu limitele cunoaşterii umane);

c. cutremurarea (atitudinea de implicare de sine a subiectului cunoscător, luare de atitudine,

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reflexivitatea adâncă legată de situaţiile-limită precum moartea, suferinţa, eşecul etc. ).

3. În ceea ce priveşte specificul şi menirea filozofiei, Jaspers consideră că filozofia trebuie să-i ajute pe practicanţi să realizeze o comunicare autentică, dincolo de tendinţa de banalizare şi stereotipizare a comunicării.Acestă comunicare autentică poate fi realizată prin implicarea participanţilor la comunicare într-un dialog revelator al propriei fiinţe, dar şi prin care să desoperim comunicarea animată de iubirea seamănului (liebender Kampf).Ea trebuie să fie o comunicare transfiguratoare prin iubire de adevăr.

4. Concepţia lui Jaspers despre filozofie poate fi inegrată existenţialismului religios, în care autenticitatea existenţei individuale este atinsă prin transcenderea egoismului uman spre forme de comunicare mai cuprinzătoare, precum sunt cele oferite de diferitele forme de transcendenţă religioasă.

5. Principalele concepte şi idei, în ordinea importanţei mesajului textului, sunt: origine a filozofiei, specificul filozofiei, uimire, îndoială, cutremurare, dialog, comunicare autentică, situaţie-limită, comunicare animată de iubire, trnscendenţă, existenţialism.

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