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Wealth, Debt, and Luck: Forms of Belief in Thailands Global Economy.

Mike Hayes

Office of Human Rights Studies, Mahidol University

In the long history of the research on the poor in Thailand and Asia in general, much

work has been done on the curse of debt and the evils of rent seeking behavior bycertain classes and organizations. Though much of the analysis is done through more

mainstream economic theories which examine issues of rational choice, saving and

consumer behavior, and the relationship between work, capital, and economic

security, there is less interest in what has been called, in different ways, irrational

economic choices, beliefs in economic luck, or to use a recently coined academic term

occult economies. This paper seeks to contribute to these ideas though a general

discussion of the belief structures and social structures around the relationship of luck

to economic wealth in Thailand, and specifically looking at the underground lottery.

As most Thais, and even most visitors to Thailand realize, it is a country extremely

interested in the lottery. Similar to Burma, and to a lesser extent Cambodia,

Thailands bi-monthly lottery is followed by a large (but uncountable) number ofpeople. How the lottery is played in Thailand, Cambodia and Burma are simply

matters of luck, picking the correct numbers.1I will argue that the reason Thailand is a

lottery country is multidimensional: the socio-economic system makes economic

mobility difficult and winning money a logical alternative, a flexible religious belief

allows for commercialization, a compliant (and at times complicit) political system

allows for an underground lottery system. All these factors are invigorated by the

impact of globalization, and in fact can be seen as products of a globalizing Thailand.

One of the main assumptions of this paper is that there exists an increasing number of

people bringing spiritual understandings to capitalism. Quite the opposite of what

we assume is the dissemination of rationalism though global products, many people

particularly on the fringes of capitalism are integrating into a system of rational

capital, but are engaging in the new economy more profoundly in a way that is belief

based. By spiritual capitalism here, I mean the use of belief, spirits, fatalism, Karma

and so on, to understand, interact, and practice economic behaviors. A claim such as

this can only ever be a qualitative guess, for there is no clear way to measure or rate

the way people engage in economic behavior or understand their economic activity.

However, I follow the work of anthropologists such as John and Jean Comoroff

(1999; 2000), who in their work on occult economies and millennial capitalism

highlight an increasing fascination with these economies. Similarly, the work of Alan

Klima (2006), argues that a result of the 1997 global financial crisis was therefiguring of local outside the system economies not to eradicate but to incorporate

activities such as supernatural forecasting. The resulting development was the

emergence of a sense of a continuation between global speculative capital and local

level prophecy of the lottery number.

Most mainstream globalization theory assumes that the spread of global capital, with

its rationalist systems most clearly highlighted in the global production of McDonalds

1 Burma does not have an official lottery system. However, Burmese migrants regularly play the Thai

lottery, and within the country there are underground lotteries based on the Thai lottery. Further, there

is also a lottery which gambles on the last two digits of the Stock market daily index. The numbers,after the decimal point can almost be considered random. Further, these numbers are issued twice a day

meaning there is a lot more opportunity for gambling than the bi-monthly lottery.

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(and George Ritzers work is most relevant here (Ritzer 1993, Ritzer 1998). In

contrast the recent work Pradip Thomas is relevant. His paper, which is more about

products than practices, makes two valid points. Firstly, there is little research which

serious looks at how religion is figured in the global economy: he argues there is an

equally compelling need for explorations of the political economy of religious

products and production, the circulation and distribution of religiousproducts, [and] the religious commodity market, (Thomas 60). Itseems that religion, spirituality and belief in luck are too quicklydeemed traditional or parochial, and therefore are not allowed tofunction rationally in the global system. Secondly, the increasinglyclose relationship between mediated Christianity and thecommodity form facilitates the extension of specific, conservative,forms of values-based capitalism (Thomas 60). That is, inrelationship to this paper, forms of belief and luck around the lotteryis not an escape for capitalism, but an extension, or a form ofalternative understanding of capitalism for those who cannotoperate rationally in the legitimate State-based system. While Praditargues the spiritual economy fits more closely into conservativeChristian values, within the religious beliefs Thailand and its region,there acceptance is more mainstream. We can understand thecommoditization of belief, with many Christian, Buddhist, and otherreligious becoming increasingly commercialized;2 but as yet there islittle understanding on how spiritual systems of belief, operatingoutside their regular religious frameworks, as practiced in society.

Undoubtedly the global production networks which lead to Toyotaism structures of

manufacturing, or the control of the international financial institutions which unifiesstate economies into broadly neo-liberal, export orientated, and privatized systems has

had a massive social impact and does spell the emergence of a new period of

economic, social, and cultural practice. 3 Yet, these views are more about what is

happening at the centre of global capital, and not its fringes. In city centres, and

perhaps Bangkok is a better example than most cities, McDonalds, Starbucks, Korean

hair styles, huge shopping malls, and conspicuous wealth are a clear testament to the

impact of global capital. But one does not have to scratch far below this surface to see

that not all global capital is so rationalist in its ideology, or that capital is so free

flowing in its transitions.

The most obvious question is, why do people resort to the spiritual when engaging inwhat is supposed to be a rational system? Should not the developing economy lift

them up, like boats on the water as the tide comes in? (to use a frequently quoted

metaphor from neo-liberal economists). From within the economy itself it would seem

that embracing rationalism would give the best benefit to those on the fringes. I would

like to explore these issues by using as an illustrative example the land rights battles

2 There has been much work on this, but for Thailand in particular seeJackson (1999a, 1999b,2003), Pattana (2005a, 2005b)3 Here I mean the out sourced, and dispersed production of components for a product, so that the

modern Toyota is manufactured in perhaps 40 countries, or the Nike shoe is not made by Nike

company. This form of manufacturing is written at length by Manuel Castells who talks of Toyotaismin his first volume The information age (Castells 1996). For a more economic viewpoint see Gereffi

2005.

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in northern Thailand. Currently there are a number of civil society groups and NGOs

working for farmers groups to repossess land that has been taken by banks and other

finance organizations.4 This is a frequent occurrence because farmers take out a loan

by using their land as collateral, and then fall into debt. The land can then be taken by

the Bank or money lender, and frequently then left unused, much to the

disappointment of any farmers who do not have enough land themselves for raisingcrops. It is an irrational system for which the farmers wish to insert a more rational

and efficient system of use. Farming can be a high risk business with much of the

income depending on weather and crop prices; two rather uncontrollable variables.

Further, events such as ill health, bad decisions, and family troubles can quite easily

place a farmer or market vendor in debt very quickly. However, when visiting and

talking to these groups about their need to reclaim the land, we are not talking about

people who are attempting to lift themselves out of poverty. As one commentator has

noted, the land movements demonstrates a battle to enter the middle class, not to

escape poverty or ensure basic livelihood.5The farmers wanted to use the land to

increase their earning so they could exchange their motorbike for a car; or to ensure

their kids which are currently in high school will finish and may go to technicalcolleges or university; or to extend their house with an extra floor or outbuilding. We

are not talking about a poverty movement here, but a class mobility one.

A couple of points should be made about this understanding. Firstly, that these

movements are using the discourse of rational capital to explain their actions to take

over and use the unused land. The battle is not about rationalizing a traditional rural

people, but of economic structures which will not allow people access to a rational

economic system. It would seem quite logical and economically beneficial for all

parties for these people to use the land. But the Banks are concerned that land use will

transfer into land ownership; they also dont have procedures to rent land (Banks are

not real estate agents); and further, as we can see in Bangkok on nearly every city

block, the mentality of land owners is more why develop a piece of land when you

can sit on its value without any cost (given that there is no land tax) and wait until the

prices are much higher and selling is going to make more money. Simply, the rules

favour the landowning rich. A rational economic system does not mean a social

system which allows class mobility.

The second point about battles to enter the middle class is that we are not talking only

about an unsympathetic economic system. We are also talking about other global

discourses like democracy and human rights being unusable in these situations. I want

to briefly address some human rights issues here because this does demonstrate thatspiritual economies are resorted to not because people only believe in spiritualism

alone, but rather there is sometimes little other choice for economic mobility. From a

human rights perspective, peoples economic rights are covered primarily in the

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Without going intodetail about specific economic rights, one question is if economic rights ensures that

someone will be able to send their children to university or trade up from a motorbike

to a car? Simply, this cannot be assured through human rights. Rather human rights

4 Examples of these organizations include the Northern Farmers Network.5 Pers. Comm. Shihab Abid. 2006.This conversation I had with a Bangladeshi development worker has

stayed with me for some time because it clearly shows that many development battles within Thailand

are an entirely distinct form of development from those occurring in Bangladesh. However, thesecomments may not relate to movements such as the assembly of the poor, because these organizations

are very much grounded in livelihood rights

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well. Most supermarkets will employ people who have finished year 10 high school,

and more commonly only people who have completed their 12 year education. An

average worker in one of these supermarkets, such as a cash register or aisle packer,

would be getting paid about 6,000 baht a month for a 54 hour week.10 After 3-4 years

their salary would raise to about 8-10,000 baht. The highest level for the average high

school trained worker would be as a section manager, who could get as high as 15,000(a manager would be between 30-40,000, but a degree would be needed for this). For

someone who has not worked at the supermarket for long, given their rent costs in

Bangkok (lets say about 2,000 baht/month), they are looking at surviving on about

130 baht a day for all other costs.

It does not take much to see how someone in this position of 130 baht a day can get

into financial trouble easily. A motorbike crash, and expensive phone bill, a sickness

or pregnancy can easily leave someone with a debt. While smaller debts of 1-3,000

Baht are more likely to be carried by friend and family, if a worker needs to find an

extra 5,000-10,000 they commonly need to seek finance elsewhere. This is where the

real financial trouble can begin not with the initial problem, but with the lack ofaccess to credit. The credit market has expanded dramatically in Thailand in the past

decade, with banks being able to give credit cards based on money saved in a bank

account (and not wages), or with credit agencies like Aoen who can offer small loans

to people who cannot get bank loans. Even though Aoen interest rates are high at

around 20-30%, these rates are small compared to the rates charged by money

lenders. A person who borrows 5,000 baht from a money lender, the rate is generally

charged by the month. A low rate is about 10% a month (normally expressed as 10

baht per 100 borrowed), and this is the minimum payment. An average rate would be

about 15%, and rates can get as high as 30 baht per hundred for people who are seen

as a risk, or if there are no other lenders available. However, the most likely rate for a

Big C worker would be about 15 Bath per hundred. If a worker needed take out a

5,000 Baht loan, they would be paying in interest alone 750 baht a month, and this

would mean a drop in monthly earning of the worker, after taking out fixed costs, of

about 20%. More critically, this cost never reduces because the principle is not paid

off. What can happen is that after a set period (normally six months or a year) when

the principle is due, the person would then have to transfer the debt to another lender,

likely at higher rates, unless they can pay off the debt. This cycle would continue

because the higher the interest rate, the less likely one is able to pay the debt until they

are forced to flee from the lenders, or talk a friend or family member into covering

their debts. It is easy to see how, in these situations, a small 5,000 baht debt can blow

out into a 20,000 Baht or larger debt in a year, and people may pay five to ten timestheir original loan back. This practice of money lending is widespread. Again, looking

at a supercentre, it would not be unusual to have 3-4 staff who lend to other staff.

There are guarantees or deposits, normally at ATM cards and PIN numbers so the

lender can take out their money first when the monthly salary arrives, but it can also

be motorbikes, watches, or phones, depending on the loan size. At the shop floor level

the money lending is imperfect, but enables these people to meet their basic financial

commitments. Some of these lenders may get rich and be able to leave their job and

start their own small business, but also an equal number of the lenders would find

10 These are general figures given to me from interviews with people who work at Big C. Starting

salaries vary, but around 5,700 Baht a month is average. There are more details to the pay includingovertime, which most people get, but this does not increase monthly salaries by much more than 1,500

month.

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themselves in debt as they would get bad loans from people fleeing their debt or

simply unable to pay.

Where this economy gets dark, is in the more aggressive and commercial areas of

loans. These loans are normally for small or semi legal businesses for people who

cannot get access to other loans. The loans may be charged at a rate of 5% a day (andthink this means an annual rate of around 1,800%), or more commonly 40-60% but

still paid back daily. The loans are enforced through threats and violence. It is

generally seen that these loans come from people of influence (ittipon), as thefinancial structure can lead up like a pyramid payment to a senior figure, who likely

has the silent complicit support of the authorities, and is most likely permitted through

corruption. These loans, whether the small scale shop floor lending at a supercentre,

or the more dark finance from the loan sharks, they represent a large part of

Thailands rent seeking economy. Many areas, from real estate to small businesses

rent seeking is a fact of the economy, and is part of the larger States predatory

behavior.

The wage and lending system in Big C is prevalent socio-economic environment for

many through Bangkok, with many lower level clerks, shop assistants, food sellers

living like this. It is clear that economic development through the global economy is

limited. Yet large sections of the society do not live like this. The middle class civil

servants and people in the business district would work under better conditions and

higher pay, and would not be prey to this kind of economy, but much of the rural

working class in Bangkok and high school leavers who cannot get entrance into

university would face this kind of economic constraint. It is not surprising that a

reliance on luck for wealth is strongest in this class.11

If one faces economic hardship at work, with little chance of a promotion or change of

job offering better conditions, people would need to look for finance elsewhere. While

some social commentators choose to focus on crime and prostitution, which

undoubtedly is an avenue, by far the more common avenue is through the lottery and

other forms of gambling. This paper does not discuss organized illegal gambling,

because the shop floor workers at Big C are unlikely to visit an illegal casino, and

certainly could not have a gambling habit at one of these places simply because they

do not have the money to gamble.12 They most definitely engage in gambling, but

normally it is with co workers or other people in their socio-economic bracket.

Usually it is through card games, like a gambling version of Gin Rummy, or a version

of Black Jack. These games are played at someones house while drinking andsocializing, and the average wager is somewhere around 5-20 baht. A big win or loss

would likely be around 1,000 Baht, but one would expect on average they would not

win or lose more than a couple of hundred baht. The games are illegal and if the

police raid they would most likely take any money on the table for themselves instead

of arresting anyone.13

The more popular form of gambling is the lottery. The Official government lottery is

drawn twice a month, on the 1st and 16th of the month. The legal way of playing is

11 It should be noted that luck and lottery is also ethnic as well, with the Chinese Thais participating

more in the spiritual economy, and having more complex beliefs on lucky numbers, Karma, and so on.12 For a more detailed discussion of this gambling a good start is Pasuket al2008.13 For this information Id like to thanks again the workers at Big C for their informal interviews.

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purchasing a 40 Baht ticket which has a six digit number on it. If this number comes

up the first prize is 4 million baht. There are also sub prizes worth 100,00 Baht,

40,000 Baht, and 10,00 Baht. Further, there are also prizes for the last two and three

numbers of the six digit number (worth 2,000 and 4,000 baht). It is difficult to assess

how big is lottery; each draw the Lottery office issues 14 million tickets, but not all of

these are sold. In 1998, researchers claimed that there were 38 million tickets sold ayear. The Thai Lottery Office raises 4 Billion in revenues for the Government, and

this does not include all its charities and funds.14 While the official lottery does raise

substantial revenues, the underground lottery is much larger than this legitimate form.

Pasuk claims the illegal lottery has been estimated at 9 times as large as the legitimate

lottery and somewhere around 8% of Thailand GDP (Pasuket al1998). This could

mean in todays figures the lottery turns over 490 Billion baht.15 The size of the

underground lottery has repercussions through the political economy as it raises funds

for money politics, is a source of funds for rich and influential figures in Thailand,

and creates a whole industry of thousands of workers throughout the country.

The underground lottery is played by picking two or three digit numbers. If a twodigit number wins the payment is about 650 baht for a 10 baht wager. For a three digit

number, there are two choices, the number as is (which pays 5,000 for a 10 baht

wager) or the numbers in any order (which pays 1,000 Baht). The flexibility of this

system greatly favours those on a lower income. They can bet as low as they want,

betting one baht on a three digit number (for a prize of 500 Baht), or betting a couple

of hundred baht on 20 or so numbers. For the official lottery each ticket is 40 baht,

and it is more difficult to pick number directly as it depends on the availability from

the lottery sellers. A winning two digit ticket is worth 2,000 baht (but generally they

winner gets 1,950 because they sell it to a trader who takes it into the office for them),

or 4,000 baht for a three digit number. The payment in the illegal lottery are much

better (paying 600 baht more for a two digit and 15,000 for a three digit than the

official lottery). Further, other incentives making the underground lottery more

appealing is that people may not need to pay up front (though this can lead to debt

problems), and there is a free choice of numbers and wagers. Of course there is a risk

that the underground vender will not pay the money back, and this does occasionally

happen with smaller lottery venders, but given that the organized network for the

lottery is big they generally do pay up. The odds, obviously, are stacked towards the

venders, with people given a 1-65 payment on a 1-100 bet, or a 1-500 payment on a 1-

1000 bet.

Indeed, this form of the lottery is so popular that there were attempts to legalize itduring the Thaksin period. For about two years the two and three number lottery was

legal, with about the same odds as the underground lottery. This was a benefit to the

lottery sellers who would get a commission on these numbers, and the government

could earn taxes from the revenues, Thaksin claimed it earned 70 Billion a year (AFR

2005). The lottery, however, was stopped and those who proposed it have been

undergoing a court case about the legality of running two and three digit lotteries. It is

clear that those who controlled the underground lottery would be extremely pleased

14See Thailand Lottery. (2009)15

This of course is pure speculation that the lottery is still worth around 8% o GDP. While there is nodoubt this figure is flawed, it should be emphasized that the lottery is a very substantial part of the

illegal economy.

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with this move by the government to turn the lottery back over to the illegal

organizations which control it.16

There are some other cultural differences with the Thai form of lottery compared to

western lotteries. The numbers someone picks are not just picked at random, which

tends to be how western lottery players play. This is a very important distinction tomake. Western lottery players believe in the luck of the draw itself. However, for Thai

(and also Burmese and Cambodian gamblers), there is a reason for a number, and a

likely way to find out that number. While we may claim that this is the residue of a

traditional society that has not fully modernized, this answer too easily jumps to the

conclusion of traditional peasant culture. It does not explain the widespread belief,

across classes, of an ordained number. It does not explain the perseverance, or even

arguably the increase, of these beliefs during economic development. More

fundamentally, this response does not attempt to understand the practice itself, for

here we cannot simply dismiss lottery practices as irrational.

There are a few statements we can make about the numbers in the lottery. Firstly, thenumber must have a meaning. While how someone decides their number, and the

meaning of the number, vary greatly, there is always a reason for the number.

Sometimes it is cultural. Chinese players consider any bad luck must be balanced by

good, so the license plate of a car in a car crash could be a lucky number, the bad luck

of the crash must be compensated some how with good luck. For most people

birthdates, telephone numbers, car license plates, room numbers, and so on can be

sources of numbers. However one cannot just guess a number at random like in the

west, the selection of numbers must be deliberate.

Secondly, there are systems and structures to the number. For example there are

books available for interpreting ones dreams into numbers, (for instance a dream of

an elephant gives the numbers 19, 39, 119, 139, 309, and to dream of fishing gives

the numbers 18, 68, 168, 178, 708, 66817). There is an aesthetics: one can say numbers

are beautiful or ugly - more beautiful ones generally have different numbers evenly

spread like 496; and ugly number would be one that would appear unlikely like 111.

There has been little cultural or anthropological study of this number phenomena

because too quickly it is assumed as a spiritualism or an occult economy, when, as I

will soon argue, this system could be just as rational as any other in producing wealth.

Thirdly, there are some people or things which have a greater ability to pick the

number. There are numerous temples which are used to find numbers. The morefamous include Wat Mahabut made famous for the Nang Nark story, which has a tree

stump on which numbers apparently appear if you rub it enough.18 There is also Wat

Pailom with the mummified body of monk in a glass coffin, and similarly on Soi

Thakarm Wat Hua Krabua the mummified remains of an still born child also can be

used for people to predict numbers (Vanchai 2006). Sometimes the numbers come

16 There is a much larger political story here about Thaksin trying to reduce the strength of the rural

political clans and their sources of illegal money, which is told in much better detail in McCargo

(2005) and Pasuk and Baker (2004).17 Yarnthep.Predictions dreams: Lucky numbers from Dreams. Simwit Bundakarn Publications. n.d.18 The story of Nang Nark, which is a traditional ghost story, is of a wife who died during childbirth

while her husband was fighting a war against the Burmese. Her ghost comes back to look after herhusband once he returns, without him knowing that his wife is a ghost. This has been made into movies

and series a number of times.

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from staring into floating candle wax, from shaking number sticks from a canister, or

from rubbing oil or powder into a tree stump or other object. These are but a few of

the may Wats which provide numbers, sometimes temporarily, to people for the

lottery. Some of these Wats, like Mahabus, have had longevity as a source for lottery

number for many years, others can come and go quite quickly. Another phenomenon

which I wont go into is a medium, or monk, who gives the number. There has beenresearch in this area with studies on mediums, such as the work of Alan Klima, or

studies on monks who can bring luck, like the work of Pattana Kitiarsa (2005a,

2005b) and Peter Jackson (1999a, 1999b, 2003). As Klima (2006) details, theeconomy is simple. The more people come, which means the more number that can be

given out, which means the more chance of a correct number, which means that more

people come. At many of the Wats which people come to pick money there may be a

resident monk who will take alms, offer prayers, and give predictions. Less common

is the medium, the person possessed by a spirit who gives advice, prophecies, and

predictions.19

From this very brief outline it can be seen that there is a popular culture of lotterynumbers. There may have been attempts to stop gambling on the lottery, but never on

picking the numbers. Rather, there is a high level of social acceptance and relatively

little criticism or distain towards peoples activities to predict the lottery numbers. As

far as I know there have never been any activities by the Government to attempt to

eliminate these practices. Instead, communities are much involved in the discussing,

deciding and justifying numbers, for picking numbers is a community response.

Winning the lottery, unlike getting a raise at work or winning a promotion, is non-

competitive. Further, the pervasiveness of number picking strategies suggest that if

you win the lottery, it is not because of your luck, but because you deserved it. Either

your numbers were fated to come, or you were dedicated enough to see the numbers

in the tree stump or candle wax, or that you picked the right monk or medium to bring

you the numbers. Winning the lottery is not about luck, but getting what one deserves,

in a sense it is Karma.

There appears a contradiction: most of society will happily participate in selecting

numbers, yet moral and political support for the lottery is at best ambivalent. The

culture of finding numbers is supported, the investment in the lottery is not. This

disjunction between the moral and political contest over the lottery and the social

acceptance towards predicting numbers can be understood in two ways: that of failed

development theories, or of the myth of economic rationalism. Firstly, to turn to the

previous failures of development theory; at the heart of Modernization theory isreplacing traditional, superstitious societies with modern rational ones. While much

modernization theory has been widely criticized, it still has a strong legacy

particularly around the idea that tradition and superstition occur as a binary opposite

to scientific development. We can see evidence of this in some critical responses to

the lottery. A academic study from 2004-5 in response to Thaksins legalization of the

gambling industry clearly frames its logic in this way. In 2004 academics from

Durakit Pandit university released a study which claims Thailand's state-run lottery

has "intoxicated" the public and caused billions of dollars in lost productivity by

people hoping to strike it rich.20 The study further claimed there was lost productivity

on the days of the draw, amounting to a loss of 4.4 Billion dollars a year, because of

19 For more details on spirit mediums see Morris (2000).20 AFP (2005)

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people watching the draw; people were hooked on the lottery; the lottery causes

more social problems than corruption, and half a million students were gambling

which leads to increasing debts, murders, and prostitution. Daniel Lerner, one of the

founding thinkers of Modernization, described this action as instability arising out of

frustration from rising expectations (Lerner 1976). Lerner writes that once a national

economy starts making some people wealthy, the have not will expect that they toocan live like the rich. Unless a State carefully manages the expectations of the poor,

this will lead to social unrest and more. This is a viewpoint which is very common in

communication development, and it assumes quite questionably that when a person

sees wealth, they immediate want it. As a myth about class in Thailand, the response

lays out some common values: the poor are intoxicated and hooked on wealth, as if an

addiction or unnatural desire, which appears as desires for the latest brand mobile

phone or expensive designer clothes, and they get into debt by gambling to gain this

wealth or overspending. They will go to any length to get wealth (including murder

and prostitution), and this is a problem bigger than corruption. Hence any activities

around the lottery are considered part of a frustrated desire which must be managed in

order to ensure social and political stability. Bringing this back the issues of thespiritual economy, the response attempts to clearly demarcate a rational and legal

economy that is unfettered by intoxication or addiction. Yet, how does one distinguish

intoxication for wealth, and normalized consumer behavior? How these two

registers are distinguished is predominantly moral: the illegal economy is as immoral

as prostitution or murder; the legal economy is wealth gained by work. Hence, a

logical response by those who consider the lottery as a means to wealth, could be to

instill a sense of spiritual order to justify the search for wealth. One gains wealth

because it has been fated; this is not to question a social order, but bringing social

order back to its spiritual or predetermined origins.21

A second way to understand this is through globalization theorys simplification of

economic theory. Particularly during the earlier period of hyper-globalization theory,22

it was too simply assumed that global capital and the scientific bureaucracy were the

latest evolution of a science of civilization. Yet, it is useful to consider Foucaults

concept of governmentality here for this both shows that States continue to play an

important role, and that the legitimate view of what is rational in the economy is a

discursive construct. Foucault, in his original conceptualization was arguing that

Governmentality was more a function of population and health control for a

productive workforce and a strong Nation State, done through disciplinary measures

like the policing of sexuality (bio-politics), the discursive production of the good

citizen, the control of knowledge and so on. Similarly, the production of a workforce,buying global products at a supermarket was not simply about increasing wealth, but

also producing a discourse of truth, that of rationalism. Much like Modernization

theory, this rational truth quickly labeled any other economic responses as irrational

21Within the claim of frustration of rising expectations there is a contradiction in the myth of wealthand the practice of getting it. Many societies have myths around a lucky person who found sudden

wealth, whether this is the old television series TheBeverly Hillbillies, the stories of marrying wealth

(like Imelda Marcos or Anna Nicole Smith, or of a simple discovery or computer program which turns

someone into a billionaire). However, watching any Thai soap opera people can quickly see the

pervasiveness of the myth of wealth as an inherited right. In these shows people are wealthy because

they are born that way. Occasionally poor people become wealthy, but mostly that is because they were

cheated out of their wealth, which they eventually regain, much like Cinderella or Snow White beingrestored to their Royal status.22 For an outline of hyper-globalization theorists see Held and McGrew (1999).

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or traditional. In relationship with economic theory, for instance the tendency to

consider market mechanisms as rational, and to believe that peoples economic

choices are made upon rational decisions, there has been a sustained attack from a

number of angles such as the behavioral economists, and the pop economy writings

such as Stephen LevittsFreakonomics. However, what is of concern here is how the

lottery is labeled as irrational, as an underground economy. But can we say it isirrational? It is true that people only have a 1 in 1000 chance of winning, but does the

market system give better odds? Clearly not for the average worker at Big C. The

rational economic system, particularly in Thailand, can be classified as predatory: the

rich feed off the poor. The lending practices with their complicit support by the State

mean there is much more likelihood of large, debts which cannot be repaid, of a large

quasi taxation in the form of interest rates, and a tolerance of rent seeking in most

parts of the SME economic environment. Which is the more rational system: that of

predicting numbers in a pre-determined response to an unfair social order, or to

attempt to survive low wages and exorbitant interest rates to find economic security?

Assuming a person uses belief as a method to make sense of the world and giveguiding principles, are we talking about a replicated belief system in a purely material

arena, or is religion being overrun and disappearing as people transform their belief to

ensure their security? While it is too far to assume that lottery practices are replacing

religious practices, the extension of beliefs into the economic field is certainly a

mechanism social groups use for improving their lives. Perhaps religion was a better

mechanism for this, but if religion does not address social inequalities, and if it offers

little assurances for peoples welfare and livelihood, then it is more than likely that

people will search elsewhere for mechanisms which offer more hope.

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