Bilbao, Ann Gloria G.

SocSci 2

Prof. Molmisa

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

Liberalism, the principle of the Philipine democracy, is an ideology committed to the

individual and a society in which individuals can pursue and realize their interests. To its right is

conservatism while socialism is in its left. Conservatism is a political attitude with a strong desire

to conserve and resist change. It is manifested in the Philippines by the traditional politics of

guns, goons and gold or “elite democracy”1. And this oligarchic rule roots from Political

Dynasties, which is defined as the concentration, consolidation or perpetuation of public office

and political power by persons related to one another.2 Using other intellectual works of other

scholars, the author will try to analyze the nature of the Philippine elite consolidated by families

and clans. Wrapping up, this essay aims to add to the academic discourse of elite democracy

prevailing in the Philippines. Entitled the Philippine clandestine clan drive, the study will be

composed of four main sections discussing the (1) history of the issue, (2) effects of the issue, (3)

efforts to address the issue and (4) recommendations and lessons from the issue. The statements

contained in the paper will be highly informative and intend to suppose that the inefficient

governance of elite can also be blamed from the electorate who selected their leaders. Marx’s

class antagonism will also be implied through the course of the paper: the political elite exploits

the resources supposed to be for the masses. However, the deprived majority in the Philippines

seem to have not learned in their past experiences, and continue on voting inept leaders.

1 Teehanke, Julio. Primer on liberalism. (Manila: National Institute for Policy Studies, 2005) PDF file.2 Casiño , Teddy A., et al. House Bill No.3314, The Anti-Political Dynasty Act of 2010. (Quezon City: House of Representatives, 2010).

HISTORY/ORIGIN OF THE ISSUE

The Philippine elite originated from the quasi-feudal society of two classes: the small

minority of landholding datus, and a large majority of landless tao. Here, “the products of the

land, but not the land itself, could be owned and sold.”1 Farmers only pay tribute to their datu

and render service to the upper classes. When the Spaniards came, the concept of land-ownership

was introduced and would later be exploited by different forces. Such powers include the

progenies of these datus; by collaborating with the colonizers, intermarriages and education, the

ruling class of the pre-Spanish period became known as the Pricipalia or the principal citizens of

the community. Their offspring could be identified into two mestizo kinds: the Spanish and the

Chinese ones. “These principalia, encountering the new land tenure concept, found it easy to

claim as ‘private property’ land earlier cultivated by their barangays, under the pretext that it was

land granted to them by the Spanish monarchy.”2 Through different means, legal or not, the

principalia acquired lands and even built haciendas. Exploitative usurious loans given to the

middle income landowning farmers in need, and with overpriced interests, they eventually gave

up their lands to pay their debts. Religious orders also grabbed vast lands, and these scenarios

aggravated the social inequality and debased the social order into a purely landlord-tenant

relationship. However, these datu descendants were given less power in the government, and

were only allowed to be cabeza de barangays or gobernadorcillos. The principalia now bereft of

their previous control, nurtured resentments to the current leadership. With their wealth they

were able to let their children attain tertiary and post-tertiary education locally and abroad,

especially Europe. Endowed with the liberal thoughts of those times, political resistance, through

their want of political power through reforms, grew upon this class. It will be manifested by the

Propaganda Movement of the illustrados, their spokesmen. “The ilustrados took advantage of the

economic opportunity for them to study and to translate their knowledge into access to political

power.”3 Despite their fruitless efforts against the Spanish government, their ideas inspired the

masses who were much more aware of the grave abuse in the society. Kataas-taasang kagalang-

galangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan, or simply Katipunan, is a radical social movement

founded by the masses upon the ilustrado’s writings, especially of those of Jose Rizal.4 The

elites’ economic and intellectual resources soon enabled them to get to the leadership pinnacle of

the Katipunan, and later on, the First Philippine Republic.

When the Philippine-American war was still raging, this class facilitated another betrayal

and went over to the American side. They were able to convince the young Republican

government to surrender, wasting the efforts of 14 generals, 28 colonels, 20 majors, 6 chief

guerillas, 46 captains, 116 lieutenants and 2640 soldiers.5 With the use of their wealth, they’ve

also impeded the total selling of friar estates to the landless peasantry by the new colonial force,

U.S.A and even obtained these lands. True agrarian reform was never enforced to lessen the

widening social gap. On the epoch of American regime, U.S. was politically dependent on the

Filipino elite on implementing their interests in the country. After building a representative

system of government, the new colonial authorities supported the Pricipalia dominance in the

country. It was later strengthened through an electoral system of property and literacy

qualifications. Seeking the help of their American padrinos and their connections, the elites now

garnered political power: In the Philippine Assembly, a politician gained power over the

distribution of resources; at home, his network protected his local turf and served as trusted

lieutenants… Outside the Assembly, the socializing continued… This formation of a “national

elite” out of the gathered local power-holders was another step in the realization of “the

Philippines” as it is today.6

Ever since then, the country was infused with so much politics. A unique political culture

developed which later on brought forth pervasive corruption. And Timberman observed it mainly

involves “the (a) primary of kinship, the (b) influence of particularism and personalism, the (c)

importance of reciprocity and patron-client relations, the emphasis on (d) smooth interpersonal

relations, and the (e) effect of pervasive poverty on values and behavior.”7 Elite families continue

to dominate Philippine politics up until today. And such families don’t only mean household or

kinship, but a kinship network, of which a working coalition of a larger group, bound by

different ties, actual or fictive8. Politics then became a battlefield of different factions of elite

personalities vying for elected positions. Political clans, then, are assumed to be the main form

political organization instead of political parties. These families constituted a political caste, and

over the years members of each clan have been elected to at least one important position. To

maintain the powers they are holding, they make the Congress resist laws that would have

enabled non-family, nontraditional representatives to be elected.9 In this scenario, there’s also a

continuing trend of party switching or political turncoatism, with patronage and spoils, not

policies or programs, as their bind10. Simply put, competing to get positions in the government,

for holding public offices mean holding licenses and resources for monopolies of the markets.

Also, to ensure their success in the elections, many resort to political violence, alliances and

marriages to other political families, the accumulation of wealth and influence and the

diversification of economic interests.11 As analyzed by McCoy, this “rent-seeking” attitude of the

political elites enriched themselves not only with power but also with more connections. In local

levels, some of them would purchase instruments of coercion such as private armies. This is

commonly done to protect their interests from rival families and other competing forces.

Especially exercised during elections in provinces, these families have created their own “de

facto autonomy” using political violence with their paramilitary units. This phenomenon, called

“warlordism” merely helps these families gain a more secure tenure over local elected offices.

And to sustain and ensure political survival, local warlords will compromise (such as guarantees

of votes from their units) with the national elites to seek rents.12 Through the years, different

avenues of influence, such as media, were employed to gain seats in government offices.

Philippine Center for Investigative Journalisms sums these up into 7 Ms, namely: Money,

Machine, Media and/or Movies, Marriage, Murder and Mayhem, Myth and Mergers. Money, in

massive amounts, used in costly elections, can easily be compensated by the profits of

government positions. Local networks of campaigners or political Machines are set up by the

candidates to ensure victory. Also, popular Media and/or Movie personalities have been either

hired to endorse or become politicians themselves. Murder and Mayhem marks political kingpins

rise to governance. Lasting Myths of heroism, humble origins, honesty, potency, generosity or

credibility, passed down to generations, are used to heighten electoral appeal. Politics as addition

takes place via Mergers or manipulative Alliances of different clans with those who either in

great power (such as the President), or could grant them with great power themselves (well-off

sponsors in elections).13 Through these trends, many politicians transform electoral offices into

lasting family assets or family dynasties. And this constituted the so-called elite democracy in

the Philippines, wherein citizens have equal political rights (through voting), yet ruled only by

the selected elite.

EFFECTS OF THE ISSUE

Theoretically, given the nature of elites, Philippine politics should have been progressive.

They could have access with the best quality of education, locally and abroad, and be filled with

great ideas as to how the country be properly managed. Even Jean Jacques Rousseau showed

preference for an elective aristocracy.14 But Philippine experience proved otherwise. The two

worst Philippine presidents15, Marcos and Arroyo, were both educated in the top academic

institution of the country, University of the Philippines, with the latter having a PhD degree in

Economics.16 Local corruption monitors confirm that graft and bribery in the Philippines remain

rampant. Corruption has penetrated every level of government, from the Bureau of Customs

down to the traffic police officers who pull over motorists to demand bribes. Nearly $2 billion

dollars, or roughly 13 percent of the Philippines' annual budget, is lost to corruption in the

country each year, according to the United Nations Development Program.17

Moreover, political dynasties could have a causal effect on socio-economic outcomes

through policy choices and implementation made by incumbents linking with their dynastic rule

and how the implications of chosen policies on poverty and inequality reduction.18 Often, elite

politicians serve the interests of themselves and their families. Comprehensive Agrarian Reform

(CARP), legislated in the time of President Corazon Aquino, a member of the landowning

Cojuangcos, epitomized this grave reality. Another study of PCIJ showed how congressmen who

came from different big industries tend to legislate for themselves. “Several members of the

House of Representatives have filed out bills that could benefit their enterprises but many have

avoided sanctions because of legal loopholes in the conflict-of-interest rule.”19 According to

some analysts, economic stagnation may be related to the focus on elite representation with its

parliamentary mechanisms to further its class interests, instead of social reformation and

progressive developmental programs.20 Furthermore, a paper made by the Asian Institute of

Management found out that “measures for poverty incidence, poverty gap, and poverty severity

are consistently higher in districts with dynastic legislators compared to other areas. Specifically,

jurisdictions with dynastic legislators tend to have poverty incidence of five percentage points,

poverty gap that is one percentage point and poverty severity that is half a percentage point

higher than other areas.21 This table22 from the same study represents their statistical findings of

legislators in the 15th Congress with kinship links to at least one legislator in the 12th, 13th, 14th, or

15th Congress, or at least one local government official elected in 2001, 2004, 2007 or 2010:

2009 Per Capita Income, Poverty Incidence, Gap and Severity for Dynastic and Non-Dynastic Districts

Per Capita Income

Poverty Incidence Poverty Gap Poverty Severity

Dynastic Php23,275.43 24.15 6.18 2.31 Non-Dynastic PhP26,872.38 18.95 4.93 1.86 Mean Difference -PhP3,596.95 5.2 1.25 0.45 Test Statistic -3.565 (0.0003***) 2.606 (0.0039***) 2.107 (0.0174**) 1.794 (0.0367**)

Besides the substandard governance that the oligarchic system elicits, political stability

has also been sacrificed for years. The “continuing domination of political clans was one of the

most formidable obstacles that block genuine democratization from being implemented in the

country”.23 Political actors in grassroots level align themselves with political clans that could best

dispense patronage and access to power, with programs that respond to their interests. With the

current practice of factionalism in the government, policy gridlock arises, thereby aggravating

the circumstances. Within this system, deal-making is inevitable and it produces political

operators and not statesmen. Political parties only concern themselves with the spoils of office

while individual politicians are the ones governing. “The virtual absence of a party system also

means our electorate gets no meaningful policy choices.”24

In addition, members of the governing class have been traditionally exempted from the

rule of law. Legal immunity emanates from the informal and cultural obligations of alliances

within the party the party of power. “As a result, corruption pervades all levels of government

and has crippled the government’s attempts to achieve fiscal stability.”25 With the failure of

delivering economic prosperity, reducing mass alienation and the increasing social inequality,

Filipinos have exercised what John Locke’s advocated in his time, “the right to resist the

government.”26 Resistances came into different forms from various sectors of the society which

will be discussed later on. These movements were not directed to the government per se, but to

those in power, namely, the elites.

EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE

“…the Philippines remains the classic example of a flawed attempt by a constitutional

order to achieve substantive democracy. It has become the laboratory to test and confirm the

variety of regimes associated with the weak post-colonial state. Studies cover all levels of

Philippine politics, although the sphere most extensively covered is the local level. While

typologies differ, these studies generally agree that the exercise of power by local

strongmen/women, bosses, and families has been in pursuit of selfish ends.”27 Bereft of their to

right for public officers that are “accountable to the people, serving with utmost responsibility,

loyalty, and efficiency, acting with patriotism and justice, and leading modest lives”28, Filipinos

have resorted into different proposals to remove the self-serving elites. These oppositions have

varied from the most radical to self-conscious ones. And a prevailing character radiates over

them: none have been successful in eliminating the elites in either power or expedient actions.

The most radical groups rise in the pre-martial law era: the Stalinist PKP (Partido

Komunista ng Pilipinas) who sought reform through legal means, and Marxist-Leninist- Maoist

CPP-NPA (Communist Party of the Philippines – New People’s Army) who seek after their

goals by armed revolution.29 Even Martial Law was seen at first to be a an address to fight

“oligarchy” but later on reveal its true colors. “Martial law,” according to Paul Hutchcroft,

“created many new opportunities for reform, but at the same time facilitated the capture of the

state by new—and more centralized—regime interests. As Marcos’s chief ideologue remarked,

Marcos ‘believed he could have a vision for society . . . and still loot it’”.30 After Martial Law,

social movements persisted. Some declined yet others were strengthened and even propagated.

These were due to the problems the State, still governed by the elites, were unable to address.

Peace talks have failed and harassments, killings of worker-demonstrators (Mendiola Massacre)

occurred. Several events and innovations made significant changes, such as: the military

supremacy of AFP over NPA, the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union, debate within the

CPP which led to its split and the rise of NGOs, Because of these different factors, the armed

struggle of CPP-NPA-NDF, which was a dilemma since pro-martial law administrations, was

eventually weakened. Social movements also challenged the power of the State formally or

informally. The concerns of such groups were not emphasized on class-based issues, but more of

people empowerment. Their advocacies include helping the marginalized sectors of the

community, environmental protection, human rights protection, and calls for accountable and

good governance. Further democratization was also pushed, as opposed to elite democracy, by

strategies other than armed struggle, through legal or extralegal means. Electoral politics, via

marginalized representation in Congress, become another avenue for the movements to further

the interest of the masses. Also, emerging trends of information and communication technology

were also taken advantage, such as the massive text messaging during the ouster of President

Estrada.31 Freedom of expression were commonly exercised by rallies of different advocate

assemblages such as BAYAN MUNA and League of Filipino Students (LFS) and other groups

commonly found in Universities and Colleges. Though the Philippines already had three major

postwar uprisings (EDSA, EDSA 2 and EDSA 3), they were only seen as insurrections used to

achieve the political ends of competing elites.32 Seeing their efforts ineffective, many Filipinos

developed lethargic outlook on demonstrations and rallies on the streets. This “protest fatigue”

and waning popular interest in alternative politics made mass mobilization less effective. As a

result, party-list organizations such as Akbayan (Citizen’s Action Party) and Sanlakas (One

Strength) began to focus more on electing candidates and expanding networks, and less on

protests and picket lines.33 With the efforts of these pro-poor party lists, a bill has been proposed

to totally abolish the roots of the inefficient aristocrats, political dynasties. House Bill No.3314,

named as the Anti-Political Dynasty Act of 2010, is set out to embody Section 26 of the Article 2

of the 1987 Constitution, wherein “The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities fro

public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.”34 The provisions of the

bill prohibits the establishment of political dynasties in local government units and districts, with

a blatant case of daughter-father tandem serves as mayor and vice mayor respectively.35 In spite

of this grand attempt, the bill hast not been passed into law and dynasties still linger and intend

to stay in the coming elections of 2013.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS

The most accepted model of democracy in the world is generally termed as liberal

democracy. It is the equivalent of representative democracy where political equality is exercised

and political office gained through regular elections36 and encapsulates the ideals of Jean Jacques

Rosseau, wherein sovereign power of the people is inalienable, indivisible and cannot be

represented by itself.37 Supposed to be, this is the democracy Filipinos should live through. And

if one analyzes the activist groups here in the Philippines, it is a surprising fact to know that they

see democracy here in an elitist view, and not really in a Marxist way, as they prefer to believe.

Most of their aims and calls are really for the pluralist and not really a classless society, even

though they articulate repeatedly that their aim is communism and for communism.

Unfortunately, the basic Lockean notion that “Laws must apply equally to rich and

poor”38 does not happen in this country, and this leads to what McCoy used for a title in his book

“an anarchy of Families.” Trapos, or traditional politicians have continued to rule the Philippines

based on 3 different facts: (1) their avowed motives are fatally and unquestionably accepted (2)

they aren’t made truly accountable and (3) force of people power is needed, more than the

capability of only changing the leaders, but not their practice.39 St. Augustine’s concept that “a

bad government is a punishment for the people”40 applies, this time the consequence is not

directly from God, but from the bad choices Filipinos made. The political culture persisting in

the Philippines needs not only lead actors but also participants, to which the masses have played

well. Keeping an eye on the ruling elite is the job of the civil society and majority of the

Filipinos are either too busy or apathetic to thoroughly check and redress their government’s

grievances. Additionally, politics here is so personalistic and people base their party affiliations

and candidate-preference not mainly on platforms, but on impressions. In a pulse Asia survey on

the last elections, 68% of the respondents agreed that media image is the major influence on their

votes.41 The media has played a great role in informing the citizens the activities of the

government, yet their coverage also has limits (and some biases). Local government anomalies,

if not big enough to cause public stir, are kept secret within the walls of public offices. With the

79 provinces, 138 Cities, 1,496 Municipalities, 42,025 Barangays, and 17 Regions that we

have41, checks will rather be a great responsibility.

There would lots of actions that could be done to successfully address the prevailing elite

democracy in the country. But before anything else, a changed mindset should jump start the

change—for the better, that we need. For example, if the masses would only be informed how

selling of their votes deprive them of proper social services entitled to them, then maybe they

would think twice before accepting the money in exchange for their ballots. Information, a power

held by the academe, should be disseminated to the electorate to warn them of the perils decided

by their votes. Paradoxically, the problem in the Philippines is that the knowledgeable people are

so great that their greatness do not reach the underprivileged, which are often swayed by the

populists’ appeals. Data about the synergistic correlation of our corrupt elite democracy has

always been presented in ways the masses do not understand. Because they can not relate their

lives with the statistics presented to them, they would rather not care and continue living with the

rotten system. Given the faculties of discerning more, the academe can and should think of

creative ways to reach the majority. If reforms be done, it should start with the brains then

circulate the body politic.

NOTES

1. Abinales, Patricio N. and Donna J. Amoroso. State and Society in the Philippines. (Pasig

City: Anvil, 2005), 27.

2. Ibid., 57.

3. Tadem, Teresa Encarnacion. “Philippine Social movements before Martial Law.” in

Philippine Politics and Governance: Challenges to Democartization and Development ed. Noel

M. Morada and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. (Quezon City: Department of Political Science,

College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines, 2006), 5.

4. Ibid., 6.

5. Simbulan, Dante S. The Modern Pricipalia: the Historical Evolution of the Philippine

Ruling Oligarchy. (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2005), 294.

6. Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society, 135-137.

7. Timberman, David. A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics.

(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Manila: 1991), 15-70.

8. McCoy, Alfred W. “An Anarchy of Families: The Historiography of State and Family in

the Philippines” In An Anarchy of Families: The State and Family in the Philippines,edited by

Alfred W. McCoy, 1-32. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1994.

9. Coronel, Shiela S. “Born to rule: Dynasty,” in The Rulemakers: How the wealthy and well-

born dominate the Congress, Shiela S. Coronel et al. (Quezon City: Philippine Center for

Investigative Journalism, 2004), 46-53.

10. Gutierrez, Eric U. et al. “Clans as Primary political organizations” and “Analysis and

prospects” In All in the Family: A study of elites and power relations in the Philippines, edited

by Noel T. Pangilinan, 1-15, 156-166. Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy, 1992.

11. Coronel, “Born to rule.”

12. McCoy, “An anarchy of Families.”

13. Coronel, Shiela S. “Born to rule: The 7 M’s of Dynasty Building,” in The Rulemakers:

How the wealthy and well-born dominate the Congress, Shiela S. Coronel et al. (Quezon City:

Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2004), 46-53.

14. Molmisa, Ronald. From Hobbes to Rousseau (synthesis of the ideas of political thinkers).

(UP Diliman: prepared for Social Science II course, 2nd semester AY 2011-2012).

15. Both administrations were mired with the most massive corruption, extra-judicial killings

and abuse of power in the history of the Philippines.

16. “Presidential Museum and Library”. Accessed March 25, 2012,

http://malacanang.gov.ph/presidents/fifth-republic/gloria-macapagal-arroyo/

17. Conde, carlos H. “Philippines most corrupt, survey says,” The New York Times, March

13, 2007, accessed March 25, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/13/business/

worldbusiness/13iht-peso.4891792.html?_r=1

18. Mendoza, Ronald U. et al. An Empirical Analysis of Political dynasties in the Congress.

(Asian Institute of Management, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1969605. html. Accessed March

7, 2012.

19. Gutierrez, Eric. “A house for the elites” in Betrayals of Public Trust: Investigative

reports in Corruption, ed. Shiela S. Coronel. (Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism,

2000), 103-114.

20. Bello, Walden. THE ANTI-DEVELOPMENT STATE: The Political Economy of

Permanent Crisis in the Philippines. (Pasig: Anvil Publishing, Inc. and Walden Bello, 2009),1-5.

21. Mendoza, et al., “An Empirical analysis.”

22. Ibid., 27.

23. Gutierrez et al. “All in the family”.

24. Almonte, Jose T. “Leveling the Playing Field: Reforming our democracy of stalemate,”

in To put our house in order we must LEVEL THE PLAYING FIELD, Jose T. Almonte. (Metro

Manila: Foundation for Economic Freedom, Inc., 2007), 190.

25. Rogers, Steven. Philippine Politics and the Rule of Law. Journal of Democracy, Volume

15, Number 4 (October 2004):117.Accessed February 23, 2012.DOI:10.1353/jod.2004.0071

26. Molmisa, “From Hobbes to Rousseau.”

27. Abinales, Patricio N. “Weak State, Resilient President,” Southeast Asian Affairs Vol.

2008(2008): 295. Accesed February 23, 2012. DOI:10.1353/saa.0.0007

28. De Leon, Hector S. Textbook on the Philippine Constitution 2008 edition. (Manila: Rex

Bookstore, Inc., 2008), 472.

29. Tadem, “Philippine Social movements”.

30. Paul D. Hutchcroft qtd. in Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society, 213.

31. Tadem, Teresa S. and Jorge V. Tigno. “Philippine Social Movements after Martial Law,”

in Philippine Politics and Governance: Challenges to Democartization and Development edited

by Noel M. Morada and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem (Quezon City: Department of Political

Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines, 2006), 43-58.

32. Bello, “THE ANTI-DEVELOPMENT STATE,” 325-332.

33. Abinales and Amoroso, “State and Society,” 267.

34. De Leon, “Textbook,” 110.

35. Pertain to the case of Davao City, wherein Sarah Duterte, current mayor is directly linked

to the Vice Mayor Rodrigo Duterte, her father. Davao City Website, 2011. Accessed March 25,

2012. http://www.davaocity.gov.ph/davao/default.aspx

36. Heywood, Andrew. “Democracy”, in Politics, third edition. (London and New York:

Palgrave, 2007), 72-88.

37. Molmisa, “From Hobbes to Rousseau.”

38. Ibid.

39. Valdehuesa Jr., Manuel E. A Nation of Zombies: powerless grassroots, clueless elites and

the cycle of corruption in the Philippines. (Cagayan de Oro: Capitol University and Manuel

Valdehuesa, 2009), 5-33.

40. Thompson Mark R. “Reformism Vs. Populism in the Philippines.” Journal of

Democracy, Volume 21, Number 4 (National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns

Hopkins University Press, October 2010): 154-167. Accessed February 23, 2012.

41. 2010 figures in http://www.dilg.gov.ph/

REFERENCES

Abinales, Patricio N. and Donna J. Amoroso. State and Society in the Philippines. Pasig

City: Anvil, 2005.

Almonte, Jose T. To put our house in order we must LEVEL THE PLAYING FIELD

Metro Manila: Foundation for Economic Freedom, Inc., 2007.

Bello, Walden. THE ANTI-DEVELOPMENT STATE: The Political Economy of

Permanent Crisis in the Philippines. Pasig: Anvil Publishing, Inc. and Walden Bello, 2009.

Coronel, Shiela S. et al. The Rulemakers: How the wealthy and well-born dominate the

Congress. Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2004.

Coronel, Shiela S. ed. Betrayals of Public Trust: Investigative reports in Corruption,

Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2000.

Davao City Website, 2011. Accessed March 25, 2012. http://www.davaocity.gov.ph/

davao/default.aspx

De Leon, Hector S. Textbook on the Philippine Constitution 2008 edition. (Manila: Rex

Bookstore, Inc., 2008.

Heywood, Andrew. “Democracy”, in Politics, third edition. London and New York:

Palgrave, 2007.

Journal of Democracy, Volume 15, Number 4 (October 2004):117.Accessed February

23, 2012.DOI:10.1353/jod.2004.0071

Journal of Democracy, Volume 21, Number 4 (National Endowment for Democracy and

The Johns Hopkins University Press, October 2010): 154-167. Accessed February 23, 2012.

41. 2010 figures in http://www.dilg.gov.ph/

McCoy, Alfred W. ed. An Anarchy of Families: The State and Family in the Philippines.

Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1994.

Mendoza, Ronald U. et al. An Empirical Analysis of Political dynasties in the Congress.

(Asian Institute of Management, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1969605. html. Accessed March

7, 2012.

Morada Noel M. and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem eds. Philippine Politics and

Governance: Challenges to Democartization and DevelopmentI.Quezon City: Department of

Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines,

2006.

Pangilinan, Noel T. ed. All in the Family: A study of elites and power relations in the

Philippines. Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy, 1992.

“Presidential Museum and Library”. Accessed March 25, 2012,

http://malacanang.gov.ph/presidents/fifth-republic/gloria-macapagal-arroyo/

Simbulan, Dante S. The Modern Pricipalia: the Historical Evolution of the Philippine

Ruling Oligarchy. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2005.

Timberman, David. A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics.

Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Manila: 1991

Southeast Asian Affairs Vol. 2008(2008): 295. Accesed February 23, 2012.

DOI:10.1353/saa.0.0007

The New York Times, March 13, 2007, accessed March 25, 2012.

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/13/business/worldbusiness/13iht-peso.4891792.html?_r=1

Valdehuesa Jr., Manuel E. A Nation of Zombies: powerless grassroots, clueless elites and

the cycle of corruption in the Philippines. (Cagayan de Oro: Capitol University and Manuel

Valdehuesa, 2009