political dynasties in the philippines
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Political dynasties in the PhilippinesFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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Politics in the Philippines has been under the control of a few notable families. It is normal for a politician's
son, wife, brother, or other kinsman, to run for the same or other government office. The term coined by
Filipinos to describe this practice is "Political dynasty", the equivalent of an oligarchy in political science.
One can trace its roots from the Spanish colonial times where favored families of the mestizo stock, or
the Illustrados were given responsibilities of Gobernadorcillo, or Alcalde. As such, these men have wielded
some influence in their communities, and patronage politics was a common undertaking.
During the early years of American rule of the Philippine Islands, these Illustrados joined the democratic
process introduced by the Philippine Bill of 1902. During this period, family names such
as Cojuangcos, Lopezes, Marcoses, Osmeñas and Aquinos started to emerge, later on becoming household
names.
The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines states in Article II Section 26, "The State shall guarantee equal access
to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law."
Many have called for the Congress to pass the Anti-Dynasty Law, but this bill has been passed over by each
Congress since 1987. Some have pointed thatoligarchy is the root problem of all the corruption in the Philippine
government.[1]
Despite the entry of the Party List System in the 11th Congress, the proportion of lawmakers with relatives in
elective positions have remained the same in the post-Marcos political scene.[2] The table below illustrates the
percentage:
House NumberPercentag
ePercent Without Party List
8th Congress (1987-1992) 122 62% 62%
9th Congress (1992-1995) 128 64% 64%
11th Congress (1995-1998) 136 62% 65%
12th Congress (1998-2001) 140 61% 66%
Political scientist Dante Simbulan, in a study of the elites of Philippine politics from 1946 to 1963 lists 169
prominent families. These families have produced 584 public officials, including seven Presidents, two Vice
Presidents, 42 Senators, and 147 Representatives. The tables below outlines the demographics of families in
politics.[3]
In the 9th Congress of the Philippines:
Representatives' relativeswho are in office
No. % of All Reps.
Parents 60 30%
Children 18 9
Spouses 16 8
Siblings 43 22
Other Relatives 56 28
In-Laws 30 15
Grandparents 35 18
In the 11th Congress of the Philippines
Representatives' relativeswho are in office
No. % of All Reps.
Parents 66 30%
Children 17 8
Spouses 25 11
Siblings 38 17
Other Relatives 64 29
In-Laws 32 15
Grandparents 40 `8
In the 12th Congress of the Philippines
Representatives' relativeswho are in office
No. % of All Reps.
Parents 71 31
Children 25 11
Spouses 22 10
Siblings 47 21
Other Relatives 60 26
In-Laws 31 14
Grandparents 41 18
Family affairs: The two faces of political dynasties
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LET'S FACE IT. The likelihood that an anti-political dynasty bill will be passed by Congress is grimly low, plainly because it is against the interest of most of our legislators -- a little less than 70% of whom are members of political clans themselves. Generally, political dynasties are deemed to have inimical effects on the development and welfare of the populace.- Photo by Jonathan L. Cellona
There is, however, a growing body of literature that suggests that political clans aren’t necessarily unfavorable to economic development, and that they may actually facilitate progressive policies since a longer time horizon in office gives them incentive to develop their jurisdictions. In this context, it is quite interesting to review the existing literature pertaining to political dynasties.
As a prelude to establishing the importance of empirical mapping and analysis of political dynasties, Mendoza et al. (2011) identify three conduits through which political clans can affect socio-economic outcomes in a perverse manner. First, political dynasties can weigh down on the government’s response to social and economic issues if the clans’ pervasiveness thwarts the citizenry’s means to communicate their needs to the government. Second, should dynastic officials use the powers of their political positions for self-serving purposes, democratic institutions will necessarily be compromised.
Last, given the massive political machinery that political clans possess, they can effectively discourage political competition in elections, skewing the electoral results towards them -- away from other candidates who could well be ‘the best and the brightest’-- which could bring sub-optimal policy choices and feeble socio-economic outcomes.
While the findings of Mendoza et al. (2011) involve correlations and do not establish causation, these somewhat corroborate the abovementioned observations on the effect of political dynasties on socio-economic development.
They find that the majority of representatives in the 15th congress are dynastic politicians; that they tend to be more affluent compared to non-dynastic legislators; that legislators who belong to political dynasties also win by wider margins relative to those who are not clan members; that political dynasties are inclined to dominate major political parties; and that, on average, they can be found in jurisdictions that have relatively higher inequality and poverty levels.
Work by other scholars also lead to the “predatory view” of political dynasties (i.e. Asako et al, 2010, 2012; Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003; McCoy, 1994; Coronel, 2007; Teehankee, 2007). Basically, political clans are seen to have inimical effect on socio-economic outcomes and development, that is, their presence may exacerbate poverty, inequality, fear, and backwardness due to rent-seeking behavior, self-serving and populist policies, sub-optimal policy choices, and corruption linked to them.
In Japan, the results of Asako et al. (2010, 2012) suggest that although districts represented by dynastic legislators enjoy more intergovernmental transfers, their economic performance is rather laggard because dynastic legislators tend to spend the amount inefficiently -- only for the benefit of a small portion of the constituents in the district.
There exists a strand in the literature, however, that sees political dynasties as not necessarily detrimental to development, and that a jurisdiction may actually be better-off by having them. Solon et al. (2001) contend that the decisive factor behind poor public services provision and low-level welfare in many local areas may actually be the lack of competition among political families -- not their presence per se. They find that incumbent dynastic governors adopt projects and programs that are anchored towards development when faced with challenges from other political clans, basically to differentiate themselves from rival political families.
More importantly, a classic work by well-known economist Mancur Olson facilitates viewing political clans in a positive light. In Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development, Olson (2003) builds up the notion of “Roving Bandits vs. Stationary Bandits”.
The idea is that, leaders with relatively longer tenure in office -- or expect to be in office for a longer period (Stationary Bandits) -- will have the incentive to develop their respective jurisdictions, as they foresee the future benefits it will reap for them. On the other side, leaders who resemble the behavior of “Roving Bandits” do not have the incentive to perform well in office or to invest for the future since they will leave the position soon enough. In this manner, political dynasties can be likened to the Stationary Bandits.
Indeed, several political dynasties have been largely involved in the development of their areas, the most remarkable are the Ynareses of Rizal province, Binays of Makati City, and Lee Kwan Yew and Lee Hsien Loong (father and son; both served as prime minister) of Singapore.
Still on a positive note, Dal Bo et al. (2009) credit membership in a political clan as a possible catalyst of women’s political participation in the U.S. Congress, by facilitating the entrance of more female legislators in the political arena through kinship connections.
In sum, we see that the impact of political dynasties on development remains rather ambiguous. Whether or not Congress will ever pass anti-political dynasty legislation that will finally define the term “political dynasty,” -- the missing piece in the futile constitutional stipulation proscribing political clans (Article II, section 26 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution) -- is a matter of political will on the part of our congressmen. At the end of the day though, it is the electorate who will choose their leaders. Their decision must be respected, whomever they choose fit to serve them.
Sources: Asako, Y., Iida, T., Matsubayashi, T., & Ueda, M. (2010). Dynastic legislators: Theory and evidence from Japan. University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Asako, Y., Iida, T., Matsubayashi, T., & Ueda, M. (2012). Dynastic politicians: Theory and evidence from Japan. Waseda University Organization for Japan-US Studies Working Paper No. 201201.
Coronel, S. (2007). The seven Ms of dynasty building. Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. Retrieved from the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism Web site.
Dal Bo, E., Dal Bo, P. & Snyder, J. (2009). Political dynasties. Review of Economic Studies 76(1):115-142. Retrieved from Review of Economic Studies Web site.
Hutchcroft, P., & Rocamora, J. (2003). Strong demands and weak institutions: The origins and evolution of democratic deficit in the Philippines. Journal of East Asian Studies 3.McCoy, A. (1994). An anarchy of families: State and family in the Philippines. (Ed.). Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
Mendoza, R., Beja, E., Venida, V., & Yap, D. (2011). Political dynasties: An empirical analysis of in the 15th Philippine congress. Asian Institute of Management Policy Center.
Olson, M. (2003). Dictatorship, democracy and development. American Political Science Review 87: 567-576.
Solon, O, Fabella, R., & Capuno, J. (2001). Is local development good politics? Local government expenditures and the re-election of Governors in the Philippines for 1992, 1995 and 1998. (UPSE Discussion Paper No. 0104) Quezon City: School of Economics, University of the Philippines.
Teehankee, J. (2007). And the clans play on. Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. Retrieved from Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism Web site.
Villanueva, J.E., & Mauricio, M. (2012). Political dynasty and local fiscal performance (Undergraduate thesis). Quezon City: UP School of Economics, UP Diliman.
The Institute for Development and Econometric Analysis (IDEA), Inc. is a non-stock, non-partisan institution dedicated to high-quality economic research, instruction, and communication. The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the organization. For questions and inquiries, please contact Remrick Patagan via [email protected] or telefax no. 920-6872.
- See more at: http://bworldonline.com/content.php?section=Beyond&title=Family-affairs:-The-two-faces-of-political-dynasties-&id=59508#sthash.AeqBFClH.dpuf
What is wrong with political dynasties? By NICOLE CURATOOctober 1, 2012 6:02pm 131 31 3686
Recent surveys for the 2013 senatorial elections paint a familiar picture: many top-ranked
candidates are either re-electionists or relatives of incumbent or former politicians. This, once again,
prompts a discussion on political dynasties, whether this is an issue that should concern voters in
the upcoming elections or something that can be accepted as part of our representative democracy.
In principle, there is nothing wrong with political dynasties. In practice, however, its prevalence
exemplifies the exclusionary power structure in the Philippines, where local elites continue to exert
considerable influence in our country.
Illustration by Analyn Perez
Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile has said in an interview that dynasties have existed since
politics was invented. Dynastic politics is not unique to the Philippines, he added, citing the example
of the Kennedys and Roosevelts in the United States. Following the footsteps of one’s parents or
relatives is not in itself unacceptable so why should politics be any different?
Part of the answer lies in the historic character of electoral politics in thePhilippines. Dante
Simbulan’s pioneering study described thePhilippines as an elite democracy where elections have
been institutionalized to manage intra-elite competition. Elections have formalized the process of
political succession through a periodic democratic exercise which can be easily manipulated for
selfish ends. Elite rule is legitimized through this process by giving the illusion that the public has the
power to choose its leaders, even though the pool of electable candidates is generally limited to a
set of individuals with familiar surnames.
Based on this analysis, one can make an argument that political dynasties are mere post-colonial
legacies. To this extent, Enrile is correct – that dynasties have existed since the beginning of
Philippine politics. They are social realities that can be traced to the emergence of a cacique class
from the Spanish colonial era and, in several cases, the creation of new elites under the Marcos
regime. These de facto nobilities are able to stay in power by addressing the needs of their
constituents through the strategic distribution of patronage masking as “public service” and the
maintenance of compadre ties. To put it crudely, dynastic politicians are not entirely to blame, given
that they too are products of the principalía’s evolution into the modern day elite.
To accept this as part of our contemporary reality, however, is to be oblivious of political dynasties’
abuse of our weak democratic structures. One of the main promises of representative democracy is
its commitment to future redistribution of material wealth and political power that were accumulated
through historic injustices. What’s wrong with political dynasties is that instead of working towards
the creation of equitable political structures, they have further strengthened the barriers to political
inclusion of traditionally disenfranchised citizens such as peasants, workers, indigenous and other
minority groups. In his research, Pablo Querubin has found a causal effect between winning
elections and having relatives in office. In particular, “individuals who win their first race by a small
margin” are “four times more likely to have relatives in office in the future” compared to “individuals
who run but lose by a narrow margin and never serve.” These findings are revealing in that they
expose how relatives of previous incumbents exclusively benefit from the political investments of
their predecessors which, in turn, consolidates disproportionate political power in a few families.
This is particularly troubling because in the Philippines, political power is closely linked to economic
power. It is unlike other countries that have a distinct political class of civil servants and technocrats
that are relatively autonomous from oligarchic interests and, in the case of South Korea, can
discipline economic elites. Instead, as John Sidel argues, politicians in the Philippines have
“monopolistic control over both coercive and economic resources within given territorial jurisdictions
or bailiwicks.” Consequently, concentration of political power among a few families benefits a narrow
set of economic interests over a period of time, institutionalizes economic inequalities and
perpetuates a culture of dependency between an economically/politically dominant patron and an
otherwise disenfranchised client. It is not accidental that provinces with established political
dynasties are also among the poorest.
The trend of political dynasties has also served to limit the liberating potential of democratic politics.
It undermines the principle of political equality in its most basic form through the principle of one
person, one vote. While this right is often qualified by saying that voters usually end up choosing
between tweedledum and tweedledee, virtually unopposed political dynasties do not even make
room for tweedledee. The seeming inheritability of political positions is reminiscent of an oppressive
absolutist state, where citizens are mere subjects that have no choice but to affirm the dictates of a
ruling family rather than active citizens that are able to shape their political destiny.
By making this argument, I do not mean to discredit dynastic politicians who, through their actions,
have expressed commitment to reform Philippine politics. Congressman Erin Tañada has been at
the forefront of institutionalizing transparency through the Freedom of Information Bill. Senator Pia
Cayetano has strengthened the system of rights through the Magna Carta for Women and the RH
bill. Senator TG Guingona has been the champion of participatory modes of governance in budget
reform. It is indisputable that some dynastic politicians have a good track record of advocating
progressive policies but these individual achievements have done little in dismantling the structures
that perpetuate political exclusion in a representative democracy. It is only when a person who has
worked up the ranks in a political organization can stand an equal chance of being elected with a
candidate with a political last name can we consider dynasties as fair practices in a democratic
process.
So where do we go from here? A viable option is to strengthen alternative political spaces for the
public to organize and secure meaningful inclusion in the political process. Electoral politics has
become so crowded with dynastic politicians, requiring mechanisms for citizen participation that are
relatively independent of electoral politics. Political scientists describe this as “democracy from
below” or the practice of democracy through people’s organizations, non-government organizations,
social movements, new political parties and social networks that oppose elite politics and espouse
new politics.
Indeed, Philippine politics has been historically driven by bottom-up struggles for social justice and
accountability. Grassroots political activities have ousted presidents, raised wages, and guarded
ballot boxes. Hopefully, these democratic impulses eventually translate to systemic reform where the
citizenry can effectively enforce democratic control over its politico-economic elites. That way, to
paraphrase candidate Bam Aquino’s hubristic statement, Aquinos don’t have to become President
every time there’s a political crisis. – GMA News
Nicole Curato, PhD is Assistant Professor in Sociology at University of the Philippines Diliman. She
was previously a postdoctoral fellow at the Australian National University and is the current
Associate Editor of Manila Review.
http://www.pilipino-express.com/features/anak/1417-philippine-political-dynasties.html
http://www.google.com.ph/#q=effects+of+political+dynasty+in+the+philippines&hl=en&ei=HFE7Ua7PDM6GrAf2tYDIDw&sqi=2&start=10&sa=N&bav=on.2,or.r_qf.&bvm=bv.43287494,d.bmk&fp=d8216f4b079e0143&biw=1360&bih=667
Putting an end to political dynastiesFROM THE STANDS By Domini M. Torrevillas (The Philippine Star) | Updated November 1, 2012 - 12:00am
We’ve seen it, we are seeing it, and we will continue to see it — the parade of lawmakers passing on to their
kin the mantle of power and governance. Senators, congressmen and mayors turning over their reign to their
wives, sons, daughters, sons-in-law, daughters-in-law, nieces, nephews, sisters-in-law, brothers-in-law,
grandsons and distant relatives. We’ve seen clans enjoying the monopoly of rulership with impunity, as if it is
their birthright, as if only their bloodlines are worthy and capable of ruling over their kingdoms.
Some people would call the practice sheer greed. Some ask why government executives are not allowed to
practice nepotism. But why are legislators — national and local — allowed to practice it?
Here comes now a group of men trying to wrest the insidious hold on power from these power blocs. These
brave, and frustrated, petitioners are asking the Supreme Court to issue a Writ of Mandamus to compel
Congress to enact a law prohibiting and defining political dynasty as provided for in Article II, Section 26 of the
Philippine Constitution. For non-lawyers, a Writ of Mandamus is “an order issued from a court of superior
jurisdiction that commands an inferior tribunal, corporation, municipal corporation, or individual to perform, or
refrain, from performing a particular act, the performance or omission of which is required by law as an
obligation.”
For the past 25 years, the petitioners say in their 26-page petition, Congress has “wantonly neglected to pass
this law. Meanwhile the ordinary citizens are deprived then and up until now of the assurance given to them by
the Constitution of ‘guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service.”
The petitioners are former Vice-President and Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., Leonard de Vera (lead
counsel), Dante Jimenez of Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption, Eduardo V. Bringas, Vicente Velasquez,
and Raymundo P. Jarque.
Their petition, filed Oct. 25, 2012, defines the rule of political dynasties with comments from constitutionalists
and legal experts. One of the quoted is Jose N. Nolledo, former member of the Constitutional Commission, who
authored Article II, Section 26 of the Philippine Constitution on political dynasties. He told his colleagues at the
ConCom that in the Philippines, a governor is allowed by law to run for the office three times, after which he is
prohibited from running again until a lapse of another election period.
Opinion ( Article MRec ), pagematch: 1, sectionmatch: 1
“What does he do? Because he is old already and decrepit, he asks his son to run for governor. In the
meantime, he holds public office while the campaign is going on. He has control; he has already
institutionalized himself. His son will inherit the position of governor, in effect, and then this will go to the
grandson, et cetera. The others who do not have political advantage in the sense that they have no control of
government facilities will be denied the right to run for public office. Younger ones, perhaps more intelligent
ones, the poorer ones, can no longer climb the political ladder because of political dynasty.
“It seems to me that public office becomes inherited. Our government becomes monarchical in character and
no longer constitutional.”
The petition for mandamus requests the High Tribunal to compel Congress (the Senate and the House) to pass
a law prohibiting and defining “political dynasties. Without a mandate from the Court, petitioners aver, the
citizens will be left “empty-handed with our Constitutional right to equal access to opportunities for public
service. The guarantee of the State to citizens for the equal access to opportunities for public service has been
and is continuously being violated.”
Some lawmakers have introduced, but failed, to have an anti-political dynasty law enacted. These include
former Senators Teofisto Guingona Jr. and Alfredo Lim and Representative Satur Ocampo. Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago filed Senate Bill 2649 on political dynasties on Jan. 24, 2011 last year. Her bill only covers
politics in the local, and not national, level, say the current six petitioners, and so political dynasties will remain
untouched on the national level. Her bill is still on the committee level.
An anti-political dynasty bill may be passed in the Senate as the bill filed in 1987 by Senator Guingona, but it
did not pass the House. There is no assurance therefore that a bill passed in one house will pass in the other.
So a mandate from the Supreme Court to define and prohibit political dynasties will compel both Houses to
pass and enact an anti-dynasty law.
The absence of a Supreme Court mandate produced a glaring number of relatives of officials in Congress.
Former Representative and now Philippine STAR columnist Satur Ocampo wrote about an Asian Institute of
Management Policy Center study stressing that political dynasties “have held sway in our national life for much
too long — over 100 years!”
The AIMPC study, wrote Satur, said that the dynasties’ “persistent dominance in Philippine politics . . . explains
why attempts towards democratic electoral reforms and social legislation to uplift the lives of the poor have
been difficult to pass in Congress.”
For example, the AIMP study said, at last 115, or 68 per cent, of the members of the 15th Congress (the House
of Representatives) elected in 2010 have relatives who have been members of the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th
congresses, or local officials who were elected in 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010. A bigger number - 144 — are
related to other members of Congress or local officials elected in 2001, 2003 and 200.”
The study also noted that legislators belonging to political dynasties appear to be richer than those not
belonging to dynasties; members of the dynasties also dominate members in the major political parties, and 77
per cent of the legislators aged 26-40 belong to political dynasties; 64 per cent of those aged 41-55 are also
from political dynasties.
To be sure, the Constitutional Commission took cognizance of the negative effect of political dynasties, which
was so evident in ConCom president Cecilia Munoz Palma’s confirmation of the “legacy” left by Commissioner
Jose Nolledo with regard to the “elimination of dynasties.”
The Constitution states that political dynasties should be eliminated. It leaves with Congress, however, the
power to define what constitutes such dynasties. So questions that legislators have to struggle with is up to
what degree of relationships should be allowed to run at the same time. Should a legislator finish his term(s)
first before he anoints his son or wife or another relative to run for office? For sure, there are brothers and
sisters and cousins in the 15th Congress, and some of them are unquestionably intelligent serious lawmakers,
but can’t they wait for their kin to serve out his term before running, whether for the same post or a local post?
For former Sen. Ramon Magsaysay Jr., who is running for reelection in 2013, the issue of political dynasties is
more moral than legal. He told Philippine STAR editors and reporters that incumbent political family leaders
“should act as the ‘moral compass’ for their relatives and even children to avoid dynasties.”
Joaquin Bernas, S.J, wrote in his book The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, A Commentary: “The
establishment of political dynasties is an effective way of monopolizing and perpetuating power. Hence, the
state is commanded to prohibit political dynasties. But the argument that the electorate should be left free to
decide whom to choose is not without validity. Partly for that reason, the meaning of political dynasties has
been left Congress to define.”
Should the Supreme Court rule that Congress should decide what in heaven’s name political dynasties mean,
will the ruling apply to candidates in the 2013 elections? Comelec Chairman Sixto Brilliantes declared that
since there’s no law prohibiting relatives to run, the electoral body will not decide on the issue.
Let’s wait and see how the Supreme Court will rule on the request for a Writ of Mandamus.
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Editorial 11-3-12 The problem of political dynasties will forever be with us if nothing is done to change the power
structure of the Philippine government, such as the non-legislation of an Anti-Dynasty Law. Down to the level of the
barangay, the elected leaders hold not only political power, but economic power as well; and this is perpetuated when
members of the same family are elected or appointed into office. Many governments all over the world face the same
problem. When a politician is elected into office, his or her family and relatives view this as an opportunity to enrich
themselves (as in Thailand, South Korea, and the African nations; and now China is in the news). Some countries
have built in laws to boot out these politicians from office, but others have to wait for a collective sentiment to oust the
erring official as in our own EDSA phenomenon. Alternative laws to prevent an official from enriching himself such as
the declaration of the SALN have not been effectively enforced. As a politician gain momentum in becoming rich, he
or she needs to cling to power (or the other way around), which can be made possible only through a political
dynasty. Why are political dynasties entrenched in the Philippine power structure? To protect government officials
from the eventuality of being replaced or impeached, political dynasties come in handy. Putting in spouses, siblings,
and children in influential positions helps much in swaying opinion or a collective movement for impeachment.
Political dynasties are also a natural extension of the governing structure, especially in Mindanao where the Datu
system still prevailed even at the turn of the century. Local history shows that in the Datu System, the constituents
depend on the Datu and his family to move the economy and provide security. It was helpful in staving off colonial
powers and expanding territory as exemplified by Sultan Kudarat, his grandson Datu Barahaman, and Barahaman’s
son Datu Anwar; and later Datu Uto and his son Datu Ali (Eric Casino, 2000). Maguindanaons and other local tribes
therefore look at political dynasties positively, since there is pride in the accomplishments of past rulers. How relevant
are political dynasties in this modern era where election is the mode in choosing leaders and not kinship ties? The
western concept of democracy is helping the region move on with the pace of modernization, and there are a lot of
changes in the political landscape. Education and exposure to the outside world have convinced many constituents
that government officials should be elected on merit and qualification; not by blood relation. However, this region is
still in an era of transition. Those who wish to cling to age old practices still form a sizable part of the electorate, and
no amount of campaigning on a development platform will convince them to disregard their “nobility”. There is still
magic in that family name, and tracing heredity or blood ties is still the norm. Probably, the next generation will be
more open in criticizing the negative effects of political dynasties; but for the present, here’s hoping that more
members of the electorate will realize the folly of being nostalgic of the past.
Political Dynasty is common in Asian Countries, especially in countries like Philippines. A lot of Filipinos are doing their best to totally abolish political dynasty in the country, but there are politicians who see nothing wrong with it.What is political dynasty?It is defined as succession of government leadership from the same family. It may sound the same as the monarch government, but political dynasty has a totally different meaning. Is there something wrong with political dynasty? If you are going to study article II section 26 1987 Philippine Constitution, it states that the state should have equal access to public service opportunities and it should prohibit the practice of political dynasty. Hence, political dynasty goes against the state policy.However, a lot of government officials are not abiding with the law. As a matter of fact, in the Philippine senate you will find siblings as well as father (outgoing senator) and son (running for senatorial position). Local government in the Philippines also appoints their relatives to different government positions. These are basically the symbols of Philippine Dynasty in the Philippines.Political clans in the Philippines indeed belong to a traditional group. The Philippines is stratified to social status and power. The family where you belong also determines your place in the community. As mentioned above, the campaign for prohibiting political dynasty is still on. But will it be successful? The answer to this question remains a mystery up until now.On the positive side, political dynasty has a positive effect in some places in the Philippines. Davao City is ruled by the same clan and this has actually a positive effect on the city. Davao City is one of the livable cities not only in the Philippines, but as well as the world. Political dynasty is a very powerful political trend and it has both negative and positive implications.
Political dynasties By Isagani CruzInquirerFirst Posted 00:44:00 01/20/2007
Filed Under: Politics, Elections, Constitution, Eleksyon 2007
ONE of the most ambitious policies of the present Constitution is expressed in its Art. II, Sec. 26, which says, ?The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.? It is also the most ignored by Congress for obvious reasons.
The framers left it to Congress to define ?political dynasties? -- which it has not -- but I suppose the people understood what the phrase meant when they ratified the Constitution in 1987. They knew that certain families so controlled their constituents -- by guns or gold or, in some cases, merit -- as to be able to retain political power, to the exclusion of other candidates. By transferring elective positions among themselves, from one relative to another, often regardless of qualifications, they are able to prevent other citizens, including the more qualified ones, from enjoying ?equal access to opportunities for public service.?
Why the Constitutional Commission did not see fit to define and prohibit political dynasties itself is worth pondering, but uselessly. The fact is that the provision is not self-executing but needs legislative implementation to be really effective. The prohibition in the said section can be enforced only if ?political dynasties? is defined, unfortunately not by the Commission but by Congress. As the rule now stands, it is only an empty aspiration of the Constitution, the supreme law of the land, disdainfully disregarded and therefore violated by Congress.
What makes the transgression especially vicious is its encouragement by another brainstorm of the Constitution providing for term limits for elective officials from the President down. To retain his political hold on his constituents, a forcibly retired official arranges to have his wife, a ?querida? [mistress], one of his children, his own brother or sister, or a parent to occupy his position for one term, after which he will be qualified to run again for his accustomed office.
This has become an accepted dodge of the constitutional aversion against political dynasties that continue to exist and even grow against the toothless prohibition. The substitute is usually a token caretaker only for the retired family member who actually still pulls the strings and retains his hold on his constituents during his disqualification. The anomaly is usually compounded if the ?front? is inept, with little political experience or credible credentials for the position he or she is holding for the real political kingpin.
Although its evils are readily recognizable, the political dynasty may not really be easy to define. Should it be limited to the immediate family only or may it extend to other relatives, by consanguinity or affinity, within the fourth civil degree under the Civil Code? This is a question that may be offered by Congress as its excuse for not defining the political dynasty. But the real reason, of course, is the refusal of its members to commit political suicide by applying their prohibition to themselves.
In fairness, there are some persons with acknowledged abilities who may be considered members of a political dynasty and thus be unfairly disqualified from public service. One example would be Sergio Osme�a Jr., a worthy public official in his own right, who might have been disqualified for being the son of his illustrious father. And might Manuel Roxas II be also excluded for being the son of Gerardo Roxas who was the son of a former president? The credentials of this family are unquestionable.
Without making any judgment on the effects of such temporary substitutions on the the public welfare, I will mention some current or recent evasions of the policy against political dynasties. In Makati City, Jejomar Binay finished three terms as mayor, was succeeded by his wife for one term, and then returned to his former post. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority chief Bayani Fernando also retired as mayor of Marikina City, where his wife now sits in his
place. Ben Hur Abalos replaced his father, now chair of the Commission on Elections, as mayor of Mandaluyong City. In Las Pi�as City, Nene Aguilar was succeeded by his wife as mayor, and Manuel Villar, a member by affinity of his wife?s clan, was replaced by her in the House of Representatives when he became a senator.
There are now two Estradas in the Senate and another relative of Joseph Estrada is eyeing the same chamber on the strength mainly of his father?s name. JV Ejercito will campaign for his mother to succeed him as mayor of San Juan, but Jinggoy Estrada, who also served in that position is pushing for his wife. Pia Cayetano expects her brother Alan, and Nene Pimentel his bar topnotcher son, to be in the Senate too. Lito Atienza is finishing his last term as mayor of Manila and wants his son Ali to replace him. There are more examples in the lower House, many of them too odious to remember.
?Full many a flower is born to blush unseen, and waste its sweetness on the desert air,? like many qualified Filipinos who can improve the public service but are barred from doing so by the powerful political dynasties. The Constitution does not directly check them, Congress will not do it, but the voters can -- and should.
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