final team gary becker, fm2, free topic ppt; game theory in movies

8/2/2019 Final Team Gary Becker, FM2, Free Topic PPT; Game Theory in Movies

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The Joker gives both ferries 30 minutes in which they can detonate

the other side.

Even with this complication, the outcome should be the same and

both actors ought to choose detonation at the first node (t =1 or

when the first move is available).

Using backward deduction, both players recognize that their

opponent will choose to detonate in the final iteration.

What happened in the movie can probably be explained by the

concepts of Survival and Morality



DOES MORALITY MATTER?

Perhaps social norms mattered for the actors in the game?

There are some social benefits from being a moral agent.

However, being moral is not as beneficial as being alive.

The pure strategy equilibria are {cooperate-detonate} and {detonate-cooperate}

with a Mixed Nash Equilibrium of playing cooperation and detonation with a

probability of .5 for both players with this specification.

If Survival < Morality then { cooperate, cooperate} is the dominant strategy



IRRATIONALITY IS GOOD

The decision making process for both ships is different

Prisoners Law Abiding Citizens

• Decision to detonate becomes

decentralized as time goes by and any

one actor willing to grab the detonator

could do so.

•

Eventually one prisoner takes thedetonator and throws it out.

• A simple majority vote

• The decision to detonate the other ferry

is chosen

• They voted to kill the prisoners but no

one is willing to carry-out-the-task.

•

Civilians are rational but don’t want tocarry out a morally reprehensible task

Since, detonating was the dominant strategy, Joker did not expect the two

ships to cooperate.



THE COLD W AR TIMES

US of A USSR

Both countries used to have bombers constantly in the air, already

well on their way to their targets.

You either launch first or convince the enemy that you can strikeback even if you're dead.

The Nuclear war between the two during that timeturned into a Chicken Game



G AME THEORY DURING COLD W AR

Game theory's developmentaccelerated at a record pace

during World War II

Though it was intended foreconomics, both the US andthe USSR quickly saw its

value for forming warstrategies.

Game theorist ThomasSchelling convincedofficials that nuclear

weapons were only usefulas deterrents.

Mutual Assured

Destruction (MAD):neither nation could gain

advantage through nuclearattack -- the reprisals would

be too devastating



Deterrence is the art of producing in the mind of the enemy... the

fear to attack

The US PLAN R

Plan R is an emergency war plan in which

a lower echelon commander may order

nuclear retaliation after a sneak attack if

the normal chain of command is

disrupted.The plan of Plan R is to make

deterrence more credible by thethreat of losing central control.

Loss of control is exacerbated by the

intentional inability to communicate with

the planes while in the air.



The doomsday machine gets triggeredautomatically and all life on the planet is

destroyed

How is it possiblefor this thing to be

triggeredautomatically, andat the same time

impossible tountrigger

Akin to a driverremoving the

steering wheel of a

car

Ruling out "humanmeddling" is crucialbecause one must

make the incredible

threat of suicidecredible



Seemingly the ultimate deterrent, thereis one flaw in its deterrence capability:

the Americans don't know it exists

BRINKMANSHIP

Apparently, doomsday machine are easy tobuild. So everyone would end up building it. Andeven a small mistake would lead to disaster.

Turgidson: "I admit the human elementseems to have failed us here. But the ideawas to discourage the Russkies”

The Doomsday machine goes off and theentire Planet is destroyed



OLIGOPOLY AND COLLUSIVENESS- GAME THEORY



TUCKER: THE MAN AND HIS DREAM- OLIGOPOLY AND COLLUSION

TUCKER CONSTRUCTS ‘THE CAR OF TOMMOROW’ WITH GROUND BREAKING

FEATURES PITTED AGAINST THREE OPPRESIVE DETROIT BASED CAR MANUFACTURERS

THE ENTRY OF TUCKER SEDANS INTO MARKET MAY BE MARRED BY COLLUSIVE

BEHAVIOR OF THE THREE INCUMBENTS EXPECTED TO PROTECT THEIR MARKET SHARE

TO PROTECT THEIR MARKET SHARE, THE INCUMBENTS THROUGH THEIR STRONG

LOBBYING EFFORTS MAY FORCE ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD AGAINST TUCKER

HOW WILL THE INCUMBENTS STRATEGIZE TO KEEP TUCKER OFF THE MARKET?



TUCKER: THE MAN AND HIS DREAM- OLIGOPOLY AND COLLUSION

THE INCUMBENTS

ALLEGATION NO ALLEGATION

TUCKER ENTER (-2, 10) (12, 2)

DO NOT ENTER (-2, 10) (0, 10)

TUCKER

ENTERS

DOES NOT ENTER

INCUMBENT

ALLEGATION

NO ALLEGATION

STRATEGIC FORM NASH EQUILIBRIUM:

EXTENSIVE FORM:

(0, 10)

(-2, 10)

(12, 2)

CREDIBLE THREAT AS PER SUB GAME PERFECTION: TUCKER WON’T ENTER MARKET

final team gary becker, fm2, free topic ppt; game theory in movies

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