fnpp acpr50s and preliminary study on international

Natural Energy Powering Nature

China Nuclear Power Technology Research Institute (CNPRI)

China General Nuclear Power Corporation (CGN)

May, 2018

FNPP ACPR50S and Preliminary Study on

International Transportation

Jue YANG

01 Floating NPP ACPR50S


Floating NPP of compact SMR

Thermal output: 200 MW

Electrical output: 50 MW

High level of safety

Modularity

Multiple application


ACPR50S

ACPR50S: Advanced, Customer-friendly, Practicable, Reliable

1.1 Introduction


Floating SMR NPP Large PWR NPP

SMR Industry-proven sea

floating platform

technology

Industry proven PWR and sea facility technology

The ACPR50S realizes design simplification with less cost and lower investment risks in order

to be competitive with conventional offshore energy sources.

ACPR50S Design Philosophy

1.1 Introduction


High level of Safeyty

Design

Safety

Inherent

Safety

Passive and active

Safety

Multiple

Reactivity

Barriers

Very Low

Reactivity

Release

Frequency

No Off-site

Emergency

Measure

SG joined to the RPV with pipe to pipe which largely reduces the frequency of LOCA.

Residual heat removal depends on natural or forced circulation.

Seawater is used as ultimate heat sink

Negative reactivity coefficient; Low linear power density;

Coolant natural circulation in accidents.

5 barriers：fuel pellet\fuel canning\primary loop

\reactor cabin (containment)\hull structure

Severe accident mitigation:

containment flooded by sea water

1.1 Introduction


ACPR50S project

1.1 Introduction

Technical proposal of FNPP

Key technology research

Preliminary conceptual design of ACPR50S

Conceptual design of ACPR50S

Preliminary design of ACPR50S

ACPR50S engineering project approved by China government

ACPR50S engineering project


Thermal output (MWt) 200 Main steam pressure(MPa) 3.79

Electrical output (MWe) ~50 Inner diameter of RPV (m) 2.3

Primary loop pressure

(MPa) 15.5 Generation efficiency ~25%

Fuel arrangement 17×17 RPV height (m) 7.2

Assembly number 37 Primary loop design

pressure(MPa) 17.23

Burnable poison Gd Reactor cabin size(m) 12.5*12.5*14

CR material Ag-In-Cd Designed life (Year) 40

Fuel enrichment <5% Average reload burnup of fuel assembly (MWd/tU)

<20000

Core coolant average

temperature(℃) 300

Equivalent Full Power

Days(day) ~500

CDF(One core per year) 10-7 LRF(One core per year) 10-8

NSSS Parameters

1.2 ACPR50S Design

Natural Energy Powering Nature Natural Energy Powering Nature

FA design

Fuel assembly The design of fuel assemblies “STEP-S”suitable for ACPR50S has been completed

Related assembly Control rod assembly, Neutron source assembly, Thimble plug assembly

Reactor design

Fuel management 37 fuel assemblies, ~500EFPD, Rod controls the core (no boric acid )

Thermal-hydraulic design Meet the thermal design criteria, with a large thermal margin

DBC accident mitigation, Capacity design

Determine the configuration and capacityof the engineered safety system according to basic safety functions, and develop accident mitigation strategies

Severe accident prevention and mitigation

Developed a serious accident prevention measures; Developed severe accident mitigation strategies;

Shielding design Primary shielding, Secondary shielding Abolition, The shielding design of refueling system

1.2 ACPR50S Design - NSSS


Compact

layout

Compact layout of reactor module Welding/pipe in pipe connection; Modular

installation

Compact layout in reactor cabin Compact layout of safety systems in reactor cabin

System

design

Simplifying configuration of systems 89 main systems as total.

Reactor coolant system 2-loop design

Engineered Safety System Passive and active systems, 2+x configuration

Main nuclear auxiliary system Chemical and volume control system(CVS)

Containment system Containment（reactor cabin） and containment

isolation system

Fuel handling and storage system Special designed for ACPR50S

CI systems Simplified configuration and design



Main component

Main pump Canned-motor pump/Wet Winding Motor RCP

OTSG Helical-coiled tube OTSG

CRDM Electromagnetic stepping CRDM of PWR with Spring mechanism

PRZ Proven technology of PWR, optimal design, miniaturization

RPV Proven technology of PWR, optimal design, miniaturization

Pipe in pipe Pipe in pipe connects main components

RVI Proven technology of PWR, optimal design, miniaturization

Core N measure IIS, NIS In-core: IIS, out-core: NIS

I&C Overall scheme A integrated technical solutions using DCS , PLC, field bus and

remote IO.

electrical system power supply

configuration Finished power supply configuration for DC & AC



Floating platform overall layout

8 cabin totally

moulded length:~135m

moulded width:~30m

moulded depth:~18m

1.2 ACPR50S Design


Commissioning

of Main steam

turbine

Fuelling integrated

commissioning

Marine

experiment

Ship block

method

Module

installation

Ship

shaping

Equipment

and cable

installation

Construction Proposal

Commissioning proposal

Launching

1.2 ACPR50S Design

Construction and commissioning

process design


1.2 ACPR50S Design

The land-base of ACPR50S has functions of refueling and temporary store of

spent fuels, disposal of nuclear waste, and maintenance.


Large Hydraulics Test Facility

Integrated Hydraulics Test Facility

Test Facilities

1.3 Verification

Integrated Thermal-hydraulic Test Facility

Control Rod Driven Line Test Facility


No. Experiments compeleted

1 Once-through steam generator (OTSG) principle

test

2 OTSG spiral tube heat transfer and resistance test

3 Passive safety system experiment

4 Natural circulation transient experiment

5 The principle experiment of the suppression pool

1.3 Verification On going experiments

1 Control rod driving system test

2 Overall performance of safety system test

3 Heat flux density of fuel critical test

4 Reactor integrated hydraulic simulation test

5 Reactor Vessel Internal flow-induced vibration test

6 Pipe in pipe seal test


Ship model resistance test Hydrostatic damping test

The resistance curve of the floating platform

Natural period and the damping coefficient of the floating platform

Experiments related to floating platforms

1.3 Verification

02 Preliminary Study on International

Transportation of Floating NPP

Preliminary Study on International Transportation of

Floating NPP

Objective and Main Contents

Legal and Safeguard Issues

Possible Solutions

Background 2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

2.5 Conclusions and recommendations


2.1 Background

the overall design of FNPP

the establishment and perfection of legal and institutional standards

extend more widespread applications and development space.

Investigation on FNPP is of value to

modularity

high safety performance

Multipurpose

flexible operation

strong adaptability

Advantages of FNPP

Special legal and

safeguards issues

mobility characteristic

There is hardly specialized laws or rules on international transportation

of FNPP.

potential for theft

malicious attack

disasters


2.2 Objective and Main Contents

Overall Objective

Ultimate goal is to realize the safe, secure, efficient and reliable transport of

FNPP.

The main contents :

Existing international conventions and rules are investigated, and references

as well as their limitations are analyzed.

Discuss the rights and oblivions of relevant parties, including third part

international organization.

Some suggestions of possible solutions on ensuring the Safety of FNPP

transportation are put forward.


2.3 Legal and Safeguard Issues

Supplier State A：FNPP is designed, fabricated.

Host State B：

FNPP is used and operated.

Transit State C：

FNPP is transported by.

State D： FNPP is regulated by

Option1：FNPP is assembled, fueled,

commissioned ,maintained and refueled on A

Option2：FNPP is assembled, maintained,

fueled and refueled on B

Basic definition and assumption

Legal

Safeguard

Rights and obligations

Safe transportation


2.3 Legal and Safeguard Issues: Legal

Referable

Conventions

and Rules

nuclear

marine

Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of

Radiation Waste Management （IAEA,1997）

Convention on earlynotificaton of nuclear accident（IAEA，1986）

Convection on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

（IAEA，1986）

Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material（IAEA）

Regulation on radioactive material transportation safety（IAEA，2012）

Emergency preparedness on nuclear and radioactivity and corresponding international

action plan （IAEA，2004）

Guide on international transboundary transfer of radioactive waste （IAEA）

Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes

and Their Disposal （1989）

INF（1993）

International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea（SOLAS ,IMO）

International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue ( IMO, 1979)

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime

navigation (1988)

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)

Code of Safety for Nuclear Merchant Ships (1981)

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL, 1973)

Many bilateral treaty about ocean transport and maritime

Some referenced conventions and rules :


Conventions Main contents Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management

and on the Safety of Radiation Waste Management

A brief description of the responsibilities and rights of the origin

country, transit country and recipient country.

Convention on early notificaton of nuclear accident Immediate informing of state parties and related countries when nuclear

accidents happened to prepare for minimizing the impacts.

Convection on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or

radiological emergency

It is aimed to build an international aid system to response quickly to

nuclear accident or radiological emergency.

Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material A brief description of physical protection level for nuclear material

during international movements.

Basel Convention on the Control of Trans boundary

Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal

Rules for rights and obligation of exporters and importers about

hazardous wastes

International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue Rules for rights and obligation of state parties that they shall provide the

necessary convenience for rescuers from other countries.

SOLAS A brief demands of dangerous packages transportation (fire prevention

and packing requirements).

Code of Safety for Nuclear Merchant Ships

A brief description of the design criteria of nuclear propulsion devices,

such as subdivision and stability requirements and fire protection

requirements.

MARPOL A brief description of the prevention and restriction demands of the

discharge of oil and other harmful substances from the ship.

No mature international conventions

Lack of the operability

Lack of Compensation System

Lack of specific Nations’ duty

International cooperation should be

strengthened.

2.3 Legal and Safeguard Issues: Legal


2.3 Legal and Safeguard Issues: Safeguard

Malevolent attack on the reactor or fuel;

Stealing or hijacking fuel or reactor;

Malevolent collisions;

Stand-off attacks ;

Threats

The application of safeguards to FNPPs will be in great importance to

assure the safety of the transit.

Safeguards

obligations

adherence to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons(NPT),

adherence to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA),

adherence to a Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement (VOA),

adherence to an item-specific safeguards agreement,

adherence to an Additional Protocol,

commitment to an export control mechanism,

commitment to a reporting mechanism.

Agreement

Host State

Supplier State

Transit state

Regulator

Safeguards obligations should be specified by agreement or rules.


2.4 Possible Solutions

Legal framework Regulatory system

Safeguard

design Emergency

Specified Rights and

obligations

Host State

Supplier State

Transit State

Regulator

FNPP Regulator Relevant international

organizations

Safeguards by design，Physical safeguards system

for platform and plant

Mitigate consequences

and of accidents

Nuclear

Emergency

Platform

Emergency



2.4.1 Legal framework

Relevant international organizations are suggested to call member states to make an

agreement the rights and obligations in the FNPP transport, and develop relevant conventions

and standards for reference. Clearing and defining responsibility and cooperation are the

most important.

Host

State

Transit

State

Documents required of transit,

Security problems in transit,

Emergency and

compensation after a

accident in transit,

……

Safety standards for FNPP,

Security issues (including

domestic and overseas),

Emergency planning,

safety responsibility,

……

Operator training

and qualification

Introduction of

technology,

Security issues,

Contingency plan

and attribution of

safety responsibility

……

Member states should implement the international conventions and standards. On this

basis, combined with the actual state situation to establish relevant laws and regulations.

Supplier

State

Regulator: Coordination, regulation and information verification for FNPP transport


Host State should be responsible for FNPP, including its transport, but it has the right to

pursue the third party.

As long as the damage is caused in FNPP transit, and there is a causal relationship

between the damage results and state behavior, Country A should bear the responsibility.

Supplier State A

（State of origin）

State B:

（Transit State）

Host State C

（Receipt State）

2.4.1 Legal framework


Host State

Third States

Endanger the interests of

third states


2.4 Possible Solutions 2.4.2 Regulatory system

Regulator should be established, or the existing regulator should be expanded to bear

the supervision responsibility for the safeguards implementation during the design,

procurement, licensing and operation of TNPPs.

Option 1

Option 2

The regulator should undertake the obligations for establishing of international rules

and the supervision for implementation. And provide triple or multi-part benefit

coordination and communication.

The Supplier State should be mainly responsible for regulation for design,

construction, fuelled, commissioned and safety issues related to FNPPs.

The Host State also should provide partial regulatory supervision in supplier

State for design, construction, fuelling and commissioning, and is mainly

responsible for operation.

The Supplier State should be mainly responsible for regulation for design,

construction.

The Host State also should provide partial regulatory supervision in supplier

State for design and construction, but mainly responsible for licensing, fuelling,

pre-commissioning tests and operation.



2.4.3 Safeguard design

The safeguards design of TNPP should abide by principles of defense in depth. And

the safeguards should be ensured by the internal design source.

Communications

International treaty


2.4 Possible Solutions 2.4.3 Safeguard design

The physical protection system can be designed based on the

requirements and guidance from the available publications.

The responsibility for the establishment, implementation and

maintenance of a physical protection regime within a State Party

rests entirely with that State.

Each State Party shall establish an appropriate physical protection

regime applicable to nuclear material and nuclear facilities under its

jurisdiction.

The security monitoring for seaway and remote sea border

and long-term environmental monitoring are required.

To achieve a full range of surface water and underwater

targets’ detection ,warning and driving away.

FNPP around the waters is in absence of physical barriers, the

special considerations for access control of personnel and the

vessel are necessary.

Nuclear security should focus on nuclear-related cabins and

power cabins.

Security system design should apply mature advanced technology.

Ship anti violence and piracy

Cyber attack is an

external threat which

should be paid more

attention


Because of the small power and high safety, the radioactive source term of FNPP is

much smaller than the land-based large nuclear power plant. The off-site emergency is not

necessary. Risk guidance and mechanism source terms are used to get the EAZ, LPZ, EPZ

of ACPR50S.The three are all in the range of 500 meters(site area).

Therefore, the nuclear emergency of FNPP is mainly about on-site emergency. In

addition, platform emergency should be considered. As listed below, for example.

Typhoon emergency plan Fire emergency plan Emergency plan for

stranding Ship out of control

emergency plan

2.4 Possible Solutions 2.4.5 Nuclear Emergency



Platform emergency may require transit state help, Because at this point the transit

country is closest to the platform.The following questions are to be considered in the

emergency.

In case of a nuclear accident in transportation, the state involed should inform the regulator

and relevant states at the first time, to reduce the possible radiation effects to the minimum

Building an international assistance system (when and after the accident), member states are

obliged to cooperate and provide assistance in a timely manner in order to reduce the impact

of the consequences of the accident on the relevant countries and the marine environment;

The requesting state should grant the aid workers necessary privileges to carry out aid work

When assistance is based on the payment of part of the cost, the requesting country should

pay the relevant expenses to the donor countries

2.4.5 Nuclear Emergency

03 Summary


CGN is developing compact SMR FNPP (ACPR50S) which is

modular designed with high level safety, industry-proven and

reliable NPP and sea facility technology which makes ACPR50S

good economics.

ACPR50S is multiple applications which makes ACPR50S having

broad market prospects.

The legal and safeguards issues of FNPP international

transportation should be further investigated to perfect legal

standards of FNPP, expanding more widespread application scopes

and broad development space of FNPP.

Summary


Thank You !