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“Foreign Passports Only”: Geographies of (Post)ConflictWork in Kabul, AfghanistanJennifer Fluri aa Department of Geography, Dartmouth College,

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To cite this article: Jennifer Fluri (2009): “Foreign Passports Only”: Geographies of (Post)Conflict Work in Kabul, Afghanistan,Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 99:5, 986-994

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“Foreign Passports Only”: Geographies of(Post)Conflict Work in Kabul, Afghanistan

Jennifer Fluri

Department of Geography, Dartmouth College

Geopolitical “peace-building” relies increasingly on intersections of neoliberal economies of war, violent conflict,and corruption. This article addresses U.S.-led international (post)war aid and development through a spatialexamination of Kabul, Afghanistan, examining international worker epistemologies of Afghanistan and “post”conflict aid and development to investigate the spaces of privilege and power associated with political influence,(in)security, and economic and spatial inequities (2006–2008). I draw on recent scholarship in critical feminism,geography, and development studies and the work of Giorgio Agamben regarding the sovereign body andstate of exception to demonstrate the spatial disparities and resource inequalities between the “internationalcommunity” defined as the (un)commonwealth and “local” Afghans. I examine the sovereign status of the(un)commonwealth who manage, assist, or financially profit from international aid and development economiesthrough four interrelated themes: economic and spatial exclusion, (in)security, mobility, and cosmopolitanauxiliary economies. Key Words: Afghanistan, development geography, international workers, sovereignty, state ofexception.

La “construccion de paz” geopolıtica depende cada vez mas de las intersecciones entre economıas neoliberales deguerra, el conflicto violento y la corrupcion. Este artıculo se ocupa de los programas internacionales liderados porEE.UU. para proporcionar ayuda de (post)guerra y desarrollo, mediante un estudio espacial de Kabul, Afganistan,examinando las epistemologıas internacionales del trabajador de ese paıs y los programas de ayuda y desarrollo“post” conflicto, para investigar los espacios de privilegio y poder asociados con influencia polıtica, (in)seguridady desigualdades economicas y espaciales (2006–2008). Mi trabajo toma en cuenta los recientes desarrollos delfeminismo crıtico, estudios de geografıa y desarrollo, y el trabajo de Giorgio Agamben relacionado con el cuerposoberano y el estado de excepcion, para demostrar las disparidades espaciales y desigualdad de recursos entrela “comunidad internacional,” definida como la “(in)comonalidad” [(un)commonwealth], y los afganos “locales.”Examino el estatus de soberanıa de la (un)commonwealth que maneja, ayuda o se lucra financieramente de la ayudainternacional y las economıas del desarrollo, a traves de cuatro temas interrelacionados: exclusion economica yespacial, (in)seguridad, movilidad, y economıas auxiliares cosmopolitas. Palabras clave: Afganistan, geografıa deldesarrollo, trabajadores internacionales, soberanıa, estado de excepcion.

Critical geographies of peace and war increas-ingly discuss the interlocking spaces of ne-oliberal economic structures and practices of

development, humanitarian aid, geopolitics, and mil-itarism (Hyndman 2000; Power 2003; Roberts, Secor,and Sparke 2003; Katz 2005; Kothari 2005; Laurie andBondi 2005; Coleman 2007; Sparke 2007; Vandergeest,

Idahosa, and Bose 2007). Geographers and other crit-ical researchers also link these macroscale global eco-nomic and political imbalances with racial, orientalist,and gendered discourses that influence economic, po-litical, and legal actions (White 2002; Olds, Sidaway,and Sparke 2005; Gregory and Pred 2006; Coleman2007; Klein 2007). I add to these studies by examining

Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 99(5) 2009, pp. 986–994 C© 2009 by Association of American GeographersInitial submission, September 2008; revised submission, January 2009; final acceptance, February 2009

Published by Taylor & Francis, LLC.

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Geographies of (Post)Conflict Work in Kabul, Afghanistan 987

humanitarian aid and development workers in a postwarconflict zone, arguing that peace geographies of devel-opment are interlinked with neoliberal economics andimperial geopolitics that are spatially organized and em-bodied by international aid and development workers.Rather than “developing Afghanistan,” this situationresults in an extension and reproduction of hierarchi-cal wealth and uneven development. Kabul, the capitalcity of Afghanistan, is a key site for the U.S.-led in-ternational system of neoliberal economics and milita-rized violence. In spaces such as Afghanistan, “free mar-kets” exist within a formal system of regulation marredby extensive corruption, inconsistency, and insecurity(Johnson and Leslie 2002; Ewans 2005; Rubin 2006;Rashid 2008).

Everyday life operates in this place of inequity andcorruption, and both Afghans and internationals par-ticipate in and resist this system in various ways. This isnot a flawed version of an existing system but rather anoutgrowth of proxy war geopolitics and neoliberal free-market economic development, which benefits citizensof sovereignty and ensures the continued poverty ofAfghans, or citizens of exception. The state of exceptionrefers to extralegal practices (such as the suspensionof rights) within the context of a legal framework thatis temporally bounded and often follows a state ofemergency (such as 11 September 2001), and as Agam-ben (2003, 2) argues, the “state of exception tendsincreasingly to appear as the dominant paradigm of gov-ernment in contemporary politics.” The sovereign bodythat acts outside the law claims his or her application oflaw under the framework of legal exception to the law.This legal exception also corresponds to the sovereignbody’s legal home-citizenship status while placed withina space of exception. Gregory (2004) identifies locationsthat exhibit a continual state of legal exception and cor-poreal violence (i.e., Afghanistan) as spaces of exception.There is also an embodied mobility and privilege asso-ciated with one’s location-based sovereign-citizenshipor claim to “legitimate” and legal sovereignty. I definecitizens of sovereignty as individuals who may liveand work in places marked by a continual state ofexception, while retaining benefits associated withtheir legitimate and “acceptable” sovereign citizenship(confirmed by one’s passport or visa). Conversely,citizens of exception exist within the bounded spacesof their citizen-affiliated state, which is defined as rogueor failed by a more powerful and legitimate sovereign.The sovereign state subsequently monitors, occupies,or partially controls the “illegitimate” state. Citizens ofsovereignty living within such sites of exception experi-

ence political and economic legitimacy and sovereigntynot afforded to the “local” citizens of exception.

This article analyzes the sovereign bodies of interna-tional workers who manage, assist, or financially profitfrom international aid and development economies. Athorough examination of the complexities surround-ing aid and development in Afghanistan requires morespace than permitted in this article. Therefore, I fo-cus on international workers through four interrelatedthemes: economic and spatial exclusion and exclusivity,spatial marginalization and (in)security, mobility, andcosmopolitan auxiliary economies. I begin with a briefreview of the literature, followed by an overview of myresearch methods, results, summary, and conclusions.

Literature Review

In Afghanistan, the history of continued resistance toinvasion is equally marked by a common unwillingnessof imperialist nations to see and work with Afghansas equals. Rather, Afghans are identified as “unciv-ilized or traditional” and therefore force rather thandiplomacy becomes the most “suitable” option for en-gagement (Ewans 2005; Rashid 2008). Current aid anddevelopment approaches seek to discipline the Afghanpopulation into their peripheral position within theglobal neoliberal economic structure through modern-ization and capital-driven privatization (Atmar 2001;Barakat and Wardell 2002; Goodhand 2002; Johnsonand Leslie 2002, 2004; Nawa 2006; Rubin 2006; Suhrke2007). Modernization efforts to “liberate” Afghanwomen are also marred by neoliberal approaches andhegemonic feminist frameworks (Aaftaab 2005; Abi-rafeh 2005; Davis 2005; Zulfacar 2006; Kandiyoti 2007).

The geopolitics of humanitarian aid and develop-ment assistance has a long history of mirroring ratherthan subverting or critiquing neoliberal economics andtheir corresponding geopolitical frameworks (Baiten-mann 1990; Hyndman 2000; McKinnon 2000; Fox2001; Roberts, Secor, and Sparke 2003; Barnett 2005;Kothari 2005; Belloni 2007; Coleman 2007; Leebaw2007; Sparke 2007). Critiques of international human-itarian aid and development highlight common themes,such as the increased role of neoliberal economic theoryon aid and development praxis that strengthen donorstates and further weaken recipient states (Hancock1989; De Waal 1998; Hyndman 2000; Reiff 2002).These studies each briefly discuss the role of the in-ternational worker as an important agent in neolib-eral aid and development. The racial and orientalistconfiguration of these spaces is a key component in

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shaping the development policy and in many cases amilitarized response (and continual presence of foreigntroops) as a necessary component of “peace-building”and humanitarianism (Woodward 2001; White 2002;Denike 2008). I focus on the international worker inan effort to “study up” (see Hyndman 2000) and withinthe organizations and agencies that disseminate devel-opment policy in Afghanistan.

Research Methods

This research on international workers in Kabul,Afghanistan, is based on three field site visits (summer2006, winter 2007, summer 2008). My field methodsconsisted of qualitative surveys, interviews, and focusgroups with a variety of international workers1 (150international workers, 55 percent female, 45 percentmale2). The data include policy reports and materialsprovided to me by my respondents.

Research participants (RPs) identified the diversityof international workers based on the following criteria:type of work (i.e., humanitarian aid, faith-based aid, de-velopment, private investment, or security), reasons forbeing in the country, level of integration with Afghans,and length of time in Afghanistan (range of one monthto six years), more than one’s nationality or home loca-tion (North America, Europe, or Australia). Similarlymy data identified that RPs’ specific patterns of thought,behavior, and perceptions of Afghanistan correspondedto these categories. Also, the overwhelming majority

of respondents (98 percent) reported a profound lackof training and knowledge about Afghanistan prior totheir arrival.3

RPs identified themselves as modern/western (andused these terms interchangeably), unquestionablypreferable and progressive in direct contrast to the “tra-ditional/conservative” society of Afghanistan withinwhich they were working (also see Kabeer 1994; Davis2005). English was the primary language of communi-cation among international workers, which is largelyattributed to the role of the United States as the largestdonor country.

I also conducted informal discussions with and ob-servations of workers in “international” spaces suchas restaurants, shopping centers, and hotels that caterto internationals. Due to the complexities of thecharacteristics of both the Afghan and internationalworkers, I provide the following categorizations of thepopulation of individuals living in Kabul city: one-third-world international workers, two-thirds-worldauxiliary economy workers, and two-thirds-world lo-cal Afghans (see Table 1). One-third/two-thirds-worldterminology was chosen to “represent what Esteveand Prakash [1998] call social minorities and socialmajorities—categories based on the quality of life ledby people in both the North and the South” (Mo-hanty 2004, 227). This terminology also diverges fromambiguous geographic and ideological dichotomiesassociated with north–south, east–west, and first–thirdworld terminology (see Mohanty 2004).

Table 1. Overview of workers living in Kabul

One-third world Two-thirds world Two-thirds world

Population International workers(professional)

Expatriate Afghans

Local Afghans International workers(auxiliary economy)

Employment options Aid & developmentorganizations andnongovernmentalorganizations(both faith- andnon-faith-based)

EmbassiesPrivate sector organizations:

Private security,contractors, logistics,property management,war entrepreneurs

Property ownerDriverSecurity guardSmall business ownerOffice workerService sector

employeeDe-minerDomestic laborerDay laborer

Security guardSmall business ownerService sector employeeSex worker

Type of aid/development organization based on level of financial inputTier 1 Multimillion- to billion-dollar budget with core and continuous fundingTier 2 Multithousand- to million-dollar projects per year without core fundingTier 3 Small-scale projects without core funding and with a significant use of international volunteers

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The (Un)Commonwealth

The one-third-world workers in Afghanistan iden-tify themselves as “the international community”; how-ever, the term community does not aptly describe thediversity of individuals and their roles in reproduc-ing, resisting, redefining, or reaping financial benefitsfrom existing geopolitical power structures and neolib-eral economic systems. I identify this group as the(un)commonwealth to describe the commonalities pro-vided by their sovereign and one-third-world statusdespite significant differences in home location, oc-cupation, knowledge, income, and so on. Despite acommon understanding of what constitutes civil so-ciety, order, economic opportunity, and modernity, Iincluded (un) as a tool to indicate that this is not ahomogenous or monolithic “community” in either geo-graphic sovereignty or ideology. Thus, (un) is intendedto act as a continual reminder of the several fissuresto this commonality; however, the diversity of one-third-world internationals and the many who activelyresist dominant paradigms of aid and development, the(un)commonwealth retain specific opportunities, mo-bility, and spatial access associated with their sovereigncitizenship and one-third-world status. Not all aid anddevelopment workers receive material wealth as part oftheir work or presence in Afghanistan. Yet, they retaina commonwealth corporeally inscribed and identifiedby their “legitimate” foreign or sovereign citizenship.

There is a common epistemology (with some no-table exceptions) among the (un)commonwealth thathighlights modernity, modernization, and neoliberaleconomic and “democratic” political systems as prefer-able, progressive, and necessary for Afghanistan’s future.Conversely, they also recognize the immediate need forsocial programs, state-sponsored health care and ed-ucation, a strong central government, and increasesin Afghan government funding and oversight. Thisunderstanding, however, remains outside current ne-oliberal economic, geopolitical, and militarized systemsfor aid and development in Afghanistan.

In conjunction with these disparate and didac-tic characterizations for “developing” Afghanistan,the collective economies of the (un)commonwealthestablish and reproduce spaces of comfort and con-venience for their population that far exceed that ofthe two-thirds-world Afghans. The flows of capitalaid within Kabul have developed temporally limitedeconomies that include various business opportunities,such as logistics organizations, private security com-panies, service sector jobs, brothels, restaurants, malls,

and shops. The individual and collective incomes ofthis (un)commonwealth also displaced much of the lo-cal Afghan population from specific sites in the centralcapital city due to the internationally induced increasesin housing costs. As one RP noted, “The warlords ownmany of these properties,4 and they rent to the PeaceLords, who have the economic means to pay” (Sue2008). The “peace lords” in Afghanistan also benefitfinancially from the continued conflict and threat ofwar by way of economic structures of postwar aid anddevelopment (also see Japan International CooperationAgency 2006; Dittman 2007; Issa and Sardar 2007).

These economic benefits are also used to offset someof the restrictions of employment required by many or-ganizations. For example, the majority of RPs have largesalaries that are further inflated by danger pay, housingallowances, and leave time. Danger pay exemplifies thehierarchies of global capitalism and sovereign citizen-ship. The sovereign body, by virtue of its legitimacy,status, and affiliation with certain aid and develop-ment organizations, receives both physical and finan-cial insurances to maintain his or her bodily needs andpersonal safety. Afghan salaries are fractional by com-parison, do not include danger pay, and vary widelyby organization and type of work. Also, working for aninternational nongovernmental organization (NGO),government, or private-sector group yields a muchhigher salary than that of their Afghan counterparts(Dittman 2007). For example, one RP noted, “If thepriority is local reconstruction and capacity buildingwhy do they pay a local such low rates, $50–100 permonth when an international comes in to do the samejob and is paid $200 per hour” (Sally 2006).

The quantifiable value placed on the lives and workof the (un)commonwealth with acceptable and legit-imate claims to sovereignty reinforces existing globalclass structures that ensure bodily mobility, services,comfort, and consumption to the citizens of sovereigntyin stunning contrast to the citizens of exception. Inaddition to these economic methods used to enticeinternational workers, spatial divisions, physical bar-riers, and mobility restrictions insulate many membersof the (un)commonwealth from the lives of “everyday”Afghans.

Spatial (In)Security

Personal security for many members of the(un)commonwealth (particularly employees of Tier1 and some Tier 2 organizations) include fortified

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compounds that are bound by a perimeter wall, secu-rity fences, razor wire, and armed guards. This spatiallybounded security provides the protected sovereign bod-ies inside the compound with limited spatial proxim-ity to the “others” living outside, who are perceivedto pose a continual and often undefined threat. Manycompounds also employ Afghans for service sector jobsand guards are often outsourced through private secu-rity companies, which hire two-thirds-world employeesfrom neighboring countries (Nawa 2006). Internationalworkers with strict security requirements have limitedmobility; for example, they cannot enter an Afghanhome, drive, or walk without a security detail.

The compound life creates a false spatial reality,which supplies both visible security for the individu-als within the compound and a narrow conception ofthe (in)security that lies outside. It is also importantto note that security is defined and experienced muchdifferently by internationals living and working directlywith Afghan communities both in and outside of thecapital city (more common in Tier 2 and 3 organiza-tions). For these individuals and organizations, securityis achieved over time by building relationships with lo-cal Afghan families and community leaders. The com-pound dwellers of the (un)commonwealth received thehighest scrutiny from their contemporaries living andworking outside these security restrictions, as exempli-fied by the following quotes:

I don’t want to demonize the whole of the internationalcommunity; however, there is a lot of arrogance. Peopleare separated and segregated. People ride in their ownprime white SUV. What can they do for the city? In aperfect world, I wish internationals thought about whatthey could learn from Afghans. Often they only see thisplace as a one-way street. (Kathy 2006)

Internationals are rude and obnoxious. Most don’t have aclue because they are stuck behind their compound wallsand herded around like sheep and oblivious to the actualneeds of the people here. (Jim 2006)

I think that there is a wide diversity of people working herein Afghanistan and therefore it is difficult to generalize.There are a number of people here to make money. Thisgroup generally does not mix with the Afghan population,follows security rules strictly, and may treat the locals withless respect than they deserve. Often cultural sensitivityamongst this group is minimal. There is another group thatare more compassionate and committed to the results oftheir work. This group is more likely to develop relation-ships with the local population and have increased levelsof cultural sensitivity. The fact that security is so tight hasa negative impact on the relationship between locals and

internationals as it generates a situation of segregation andfrequently mistrust of the international community. (Nat2006)

The spatial divisions between internationals and lo-cals are part of the epistemological processes that mani-fest into imagined geographies of place and people. RPswho operate within spatially bounded security spacesalso identified these structural divisions as problematicand undermining their “goals.” Conversely, they simul-taneously identified this form of security as a necessaryaspect of war-zone development.

Inside the compounds, there is little hint that youare in Afghanistan. The spatial layout of offices, homes,personal comforts, and amenities differs significantlyfrom Afghan homes and government offices. Most two-thirds-world Afghans have “moved” to the outskirts ofthe city because of inflated rents or live on the moun-tains that surround the city where the land is free andrunning water and proper sanitation are scarce.

Most two-thirds-world Afghans living in Kabul havelimited access to clean drinking water, electricity, In-ternet, and mobile phone usage due to the costs of theseamenities and services. In contrast, all of my RPs (inTier 1 and 2 organizations and most Tier 3 organiza-tions) had daily access to hot and cold running water,bottled water for drinking and cooking, flush (Western-style) toilets, a high level of food availability, accessto reliable and regular electricity (via generators), dailyInternet access (in their homes, offices, or both), at leastone (but more likely two or three) mobile phone, andat least one car and driver. The (un)commonwealthalso experience technological efficiency and comfort-able lifestyles, which occur through “imported” ma-terials that require minimal infrastructural change inAfghanistan, whereas city-generated electricity and wa-ter accessibility remain minimal or compromised forlocal Afghans.

The international bodies are at times bound bysecurity restrictions limiting their mobility withinAfghanistan. Conversely, the (un)commonwealth en-joy increased mobility internationally by virtue oftheir sovereign citizenship, passports, and the economicmeans to travel. Travel outside Afghanistan provides“spatial escapes” for the (un)commonwealth and is de-scribed as essential and of high importance by the major-ity of RPs. International worker mobility also includeshigh turnover rates and short-term projects labeled byone of my RPs as “parachute-in and not quite fix devel-opment.” Short-term assignments (i.e., three months toone year) provide workers a crucial line item on their

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resumes as part of a longitudinal career trajectory. Thewillingness to work in a war zone helps to secure a futureexpectation for more amenable job placement in NorthAmerica or Europe. For example:

People come here for six months or one-year contracts,to build their careers in the UN and NGO world. It is akind of resume building . . . if you come [here] it looks likeyou are serious and hard working. There are many peopleworking their way up for that cushy job in Geneva or NewYork. (Giles 2006)

High salaries are also used to entice international work-ers at all levels of “experience” and “expertise” to par-ticipate in the (un)commonwealth of development. In-ternationals overwhelmingly believe high salaries andcomfortable “first-world-like” living conditions are re-quired because they relinquish that lifestyle to workin Afghanistan. Simultaneously, Kabul has a thrivingauxiliary economy that caters to the service and con-sumptive desires of the (un)commonwealth.

Cosmopolitan Kabul

Local Afghans are bound by economies of desper-ation attributed to the aftermath of a war-inducedshattered infrastructure, high unemployment, lowlevels of education, an unskilled labor force (or onethat is perceived as such), and food and other economicinsecurities. These conditions stand in direct contrastto the high salaries of international workers in the(un)commonwealth. The excessive disposable incomesof these workers and their desires for one-third-worldlifestyles, entertainment, and consumption havecreated a quasi-cosmopolitanism in Kabul city. Thedisposable incomes of the (un)commonwealth devel-oped an auxiliary economy of service sector employees,private security personnel, logistics organizations, andeconomies of desire, including sex workers, interna-tional restaurants, shopping malls, and hotels. Thedisposable incomes of this (un)commonwealth alsoprovide economic opportunities for two-thirds-worldentrepreneurs who come from neighboring countries(such as Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan)and open businesses to “cash in” on the excess incomesof one-third-world international workers.

The short-term work and transient natureof the (un)commonwealth exemplify sovereigncitizenship and elite mobility. Members of the(un)commonwealth’s behavior, desires, and personalfreedoms are chosen and often determined by the tem-porality of their assignments and the inability of local

governance to enforce the rule of law on internationalswho engage in illegal activities.

Kabul city acts as a site of exception from local, na-tional, and international juridical processes and proce-dures. The low-level salaries of “officials” in all branchesof Afghan governance and law enforcement personnelin conjunction with the high cost of living act as a by-product of top-heavy aid and development allocationsthat both create the auxiliary economies of develop-ment’s disposable incomes and provide the economicconditions for corruption. The enforcement of law ismore often determined by the capital needs of under-paid government employees than by actual disciplinarystructures of law and force of law (also see Agamben1995).

Economically induced corruption helps to increasethe perceived need among internationals for private“gun-for-hire” security services. Additionally, aid anddevelopment organizations largely hire internationalcontract and logistics companies (rather than localAfghans) to (as stated by several RPs) “get the jobdone,” which subsequently leads such firms to hireprivate security companies to ensure that projectsare completed with minimal casualties. Multinationalcorporations in this postwar-conflict system receive theprimary flow of funds through layers of top-heavy cap-ital aid inputs, which are continually subcontracted toprivately run organizations and NGOs. The level of sub-contracting leads to a “lack of funds” when the projectbegins and a subsequent use of inadequate materialsand low-paid labor. Additionally, the overwhelm-ing majority of workers in the (un)commonwealtharrive without formal training or knowledge aboutAfghanistan’s culture, geography, and social or polit-ical history. Local customs, norms, and laws are alsodismissed by many in the (un)commonwealth.

Sovereign Privilege

The international bodies of the (un)commonwealthpartake in various forms of compliance with and re-jection of Afghan customs, laws, and behavioral ex-pectations. There is a distinct spatial division in theconstruction and maintenance of international spacesthat excludes two-thirds-world Afghans. Internationalrestaurants that serve alcohol post signs that read ei-ther “Foreign Passports Only” or “We regret we cannotserve alcohol to Afghan Nationals.” This is done inan attempt to effectively “allow” internationals to op-pose Afghan law, which prohibits the consumption of

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alcohol. Other places that cater to internationals donot physically prevent Afghans from entering; how-ever, they secure exclusion through the costs of goodsor services in these locations, which remain beyond theeconomic reach of most Afghans. The respondents inthis study, when asked about these spaces of exclusion,also identified gendered and racialized reasons for bar-ring Afghans from these spaces, as exemplified by thefollowing quotes.

Afghans aren’t allowed into the restaurants because anAfghan man doesn’t know how to act when he sees awoman in a bathing suit. Although, I could say the samething about most of the Western men after a few drinks.(Paul 2006)

Even though many expat establishments don’t allowAfghans in, you can’t help but “corrupt” their culturejust by their presence. Some [Afghans] welcome Westerninfluence, but other are contemptuous. When you havea place like [XX], for example, there are women sippingcocktails in their bikinis around a pool. As an expat, Ithink it’s great because sometimes you need that escape.And it’s just for that reason that Afghans aren’t allowed in.It’s almost an affront to their culture. But at the same time,setting up an establishment that keeps the local popula-tions out is as well. Either way, the things that keep peoplelike me sane, are bound to piss off the local community.(HC 2006)

The consumption of alcohol and carnival-likeatmosphere of international restaurants and partiestypify one aspect of the (un)commonwealth, which isnot indulged in by all. The international spaces thatexclude Afghans (unless they are escorted and vettedby an international) also include many internationaloffices, businesses, and homes. Many of these placesare also identified as “spatial escapes” from Afghanculture, particularly for women who are bound bygreater restrictions regarding their mobility, dress, andbehavioral expectations. These places exemplify thecommon assumptions among international workersregarding the positive and necessary aspects of con-sumptive modernity associated with one-third-worldlifestyles as well as their identity and “sanity” whileworking in Afghanistan. These places also illustrateKabul as a site of exception.

This site of exception epitomizes an economicallyand politically bounded space. The (un)common-wealth’s actions and leisure activities are often infusedwith desire or fantasy, afforded by disposable incomes,and accepted through international workers’ legitimatesovereignty and mobility. This allows (un)common flu-idity and choice regarding one’s compliance with or

rejection of national or international laws and localcustom. The transience of the (un)commonwealth pro-vides a carte blanche approach to personal behaviors.For example:

You know what we say here? “What happens in Kabul,stays in Kabul.” You can drink, smoke, do drugs and ofcourse sleep around. Stuff that you wouldn’t do at home,it’s okay here because the community here is always ontheir way elsewhere. (Simon 2006)

Citizens of sovereignty are rarely held accountablefor failures, missteps, or mistakes associated with theirwork in postwar dissonance zones such as Afghanistan.Ordinary Afghan citizens may also act outside the law tosecure a livelihood; this behavior, continually cited byaid and development workers, ensures that corruptionclaims rest squarely on Afghan shoulders. The Afghancitizens of exception exemplify the sacred and profanesubjects of neoliberal geopolitics—targeted for under-paid modernity and the collateral bodies of militarizeddiscipline. The site of exception and its bounded spacesof economic opportunism, income disparities, and re-source disparities secure and reproduce corruption andconflict.

Conclusions

It is imperative to examine critically the spaces ofaid and development at the site of geopolitical violenceand neoliberal economic engagement where economiesof desperation meet economies of desire. The lackof personal service amenities, health care, economicstability, and global mobility that are characteristicof postwar spaces such as Afghanistan are not expe-rienced or embodied by most internationals who livein manufactured quasi-cosmopolitan environments(also see Hyndman 2000). Spatial removals from thedaily inputs necessary to socially reproduce oneselfor commute from home to work are therefore notfully understood by many in the (un)commonwealth.The (un)commonwealth, by virtue of their legitimatesovereignty and economic status, experience a flexiblemobility to “escape” Afghanistan. In the country,the exclusive spaces of the aid and development elitespatially segregate the “everyday” lives of Afghans.

Spatial proximity, and lack thereof, remains an es-sential component of displaced development and aid;however, breaking down these physical barriers will notsolve the entire epistemological processes that continueto place Afghans into a narrow and orientalist catego-rization of the two-thirds-world “other.” For example,

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Geographies of (Post)Conflict Work in Kabul, Afghanistan 993

several popular quasi-nonfiction memoirs (such as TheBookseller of Kabul and The Kabul Beauty School) au-thored by one-third-world individuals who lived closelywith Afghans have also orientalized and misunderstoodAfghanistan due to lack of information and training aswell as interpreting their personal experiences througha narrow lens of one-third-world modernity and occi-dental epistemologies.

The embodied experiences and movements ofunequal assistance, development, reconstruction,and security reproduce cyclical benefits to manyone-third-world individuals and organizations workingand living in these temporally limited, postwar conflict,and capital gain zones. These sovereign bodies activelymaintain aid and development ideologies that assist thestructural networks of sovereign state power, militarism,and enormously unbalanced economies. For example,all respondents were eager to critique the structuralproblems with international aid and development andprivatization; however, most removed themselves asagents of change regarding this structure and converselyidentified their work as “necessary” for Afghanistan to“move forward.” In these cases, geopolitical dissonanceoils the engine of capital accumulation for thoseprofiting from the economies of postwar conflict.

Conversely, the (un)commonwealth also includesfissures in the structures of neoliberal policy-driven de-velopment. There are one-third-world internationalscollaborating, living, and working with Afghans, out-side of the normative development and aid industryand within Afghan culture, language, and social con-texts. Several have also left large aid and developmentorganizations to start projects that counter macroscaledevelopment and aid philosophies and praxis.

Postwar conflict aid and development are crucial ar-eas of study for geographers, because peace-buildingthrough aid and development remains within the bel-licose economies and geopolitics of sovereign bodiesand sites of exception. Field-based qualitative analy-ses such as those discussed in this article are neces-sary to expand critical geographies of “peace-building”and their increasingly intersected reliance on war, vio-lent conflict, corruption, and other informal economiessuch as narcotics and sex trafficking. As this article ar-gues, the places and actors in peace “building” and post-war aid and development are intricately interconnectedand woven into the fabric of war’s economic enterpriseand opportunities. Deconstructing these geographies ofpower and inequity requires additional research and at-tention from critical geographers.

Acknowledgments

Special thanks to Audrey Kobayashi for her editorialassistance and the anonymous reviewers for their com-ments and suggestions. This research was possible dueto a grant provided by the Nelson A. Rockefeller Cen-ter at Dartmouth College. I would also like to thank myresearch participants for the honest and candid infor-mation and for generously taking the time to participatein this study.

Notes1. To ensure the confidentiality of the responses and infor-

mation provided for this study, pseudonyms are used foreach participant and their affiliations are not included.

2. This sample size does not represent an accurate percent-age of gender within the international community. Themajority of international workers are male, particularlyin the private sector such as contract workers, logistics,and military and security personnel. This sample size wasbased on my own positionality as a female researcherand the willingness of respondents to participate in thisstudy.

3. I define the training as profoundly lacking as respon-dents answered none or I received a dos/don’ts sheet to thequestion “Please describe (length and content of) thetraining you received prior to and/or after your arrival inAfghanistan.” Several respondents did outside reading,which largely consisted of fiction (i.e., The Kite Runner).

4. Warlord ownership of property was discussed by manyRPs (also see Wily 2003; World Bank 2005).

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