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The Mesh of Power Michel Foucault

We will attempt to proceed towards an analysis of the concept of power.1 I am not thefirst, far from it, to attempt to skirt around the Freudian schema that pits instinct againstsuppression [rpression!, instinct against culture." Many decades ago, an entire school of psychoanalysts tried to modify and de#elop this Freudian schema of instinct #ersusculture, and of instinct #ersus suppression $ I am referring to psychoanalysts in the%nglish as well as the French language, like Melanie &lein, Winnicott, and 'acan, whoha#e tried to show that suppression, far from (eing a secondary, ulterior, or latermechanism, which would attempt to control a gi#en or natural play of instinct, constitutesa part of the mechanism of instinct, or, more or less, of the process through which these)ual instinct [l*instinct se)uel! is de#eloped, unfolded and constituted as dri#e

[pulsion!.The Freudian concept of Trie(+ need not (e interpreted as a simple natural gi#en, anatural (iological mechanism upon which suppression would come to posit its law of prohi(ition, (ut rather, according to the psychoanalysts, as something which is already profoundly penetrated (y suppression. eed, castration, lack, prohi(ition and the law arealready elements through which desire has (een constituted as se)ual desire, and thisimplies a transformation of the original notion of se)ual instinct, such as Freud hadconcei#ed of it at the end of the 1-th century. It is then necessary to think instinct not as anatural gi#en, (ut as already a de#elopment, as already (eing a comple) play (etween the (ody and the law, (etween the (ody and the cultural mechanisms that assure the control

of persons.I therefore (elie#e that the psychoanalysts ha#e considera(ly displaced the point inuestion, (y (ringing to light a new idea of instinct, or, in any case, a new conception ofinstinct, dri#e and desire. e#ertheless, what trou(les me, or at least what seemsinsufficient to me, is that, in this re#ision proposed (y psychoanalysts, they ha#e perhapsaltered the concept of desire, (ut they ha#e in no way altered our concept of power.

In their work, they still continue to regard the signified of power, the central point, that inwhich power consists, as prohi(ition, law, the act of saying no, and a(o#e all, the figureor e)pression/ 0ou must not.2 Power is essentially those who say, 0ou must not.2 Itappears to me that this is a totally insufficient conceptuali3ation $ and I will speak a(outthis later $ a 4uridical idea, a formal idea of power, and it is necessary to ela(orate adifferent idea of power that will, no dou(t, permit us to (etter understand the relationsesta(lished (etween power and se)uality in our Western societies.

I am going to attempt to de#elop $ or (etter, indicate the direction in which we will (ea(le to de#elop $ an analysis of power that would not simply (e a negati#e, 4uridical ideaof power, (ut rather, the idea of a technology of power.



We freuently find among the psychoanalysts, psychologists and sociologists this ideaaccording to which power is essentially rule, law, prohi(ition, that which marks the limit (etween the permitted and the for(idden. I (elie#e that this conception, generallyunderstood to (e de#eloped (y ethnology at the end of the 1-th century, was incisi#ely

formulated. %thnology always tried to #iew systems of power in societies different fromours as (eing systems of rules. 5nd we oursel#es, when we try to reflect upon oursociety, on the manner in which power is e)ercised here, we essentially construct thisanalysis from a 4uridical idea/ where is power, who holds power, what are the rulesgo#erning [les r6gles ui rgissent! power, what is the system of law that poweresta(lishes within the social (ody.

Thus, we always perform, for our society, a 4uridical sociology of power, and, when westudy societies different from ours, we perform an ethnology that is essentially anethnology of the rule, an ethnology of prohi(ition. For e)ample, look at the ethnologicalstudies from 7urkheim to '#i89trauss. What was the pro(lem that always reappeared,

that was perpetually re8ela(orated: The pro(lem of prohi(ition, essentially the prohi(ition of incest. 5nd, from this matri), from this kernel that would (e the prohi(ition of incest, one attempted to understand the general functioning of the system.5nd we had to wait until recent years to see new points of #iew appear a(out power, thatis, either a strictly Mar)ist point of #iew or a point of #iew more distant from classicalMar)ism. In any case, we see since the appearance, with the work of ;lastres<, fore)ample, a whole new conceptuali3ation of power as technology, which attempts to freeitself from the pre#ailing one, from this pri#ileging of rule and prohi(ition, which had (asically reigned o#er ethnology from 7urkheim to '#i89trauss.

In any case, the uestion that I would like to pose is the following/ how is it that oursociety, Western society in general, has concei#ed of power in such a restricti#e,impo#erished and negati#e way: Why do we always concei#e of power as law and prohi(ition, why this pri#ilege: =f course, we could say that all this is due to theinfluence of &ant, to the idea according to which, in the final instance, the moral law, the0you must not,2 the opposition 0you must2 > 0you must not2 is, in fact, the matri) ofe#ery regulation of human conduct. ?ut, to speak frankly, e)plaining this with recourse tothe influence of &ant is, of course, totally insufficient. The pro(lem is to know whether&ant had such an influence, and why what influence he had could (e so strong. Why did7urkheim, a philosopher with #ague socialist tendencies at the start of the Third French@epu(lic, rely upon &ant in this fashion when performing an analysis of the mechanismof power in society:

I (elie#e that we can crudely analy3e the reason in the following terms/ (asically, in theWest, the great systems esta(lished since the Middle 5ges had (een de#eloped throughthe increase in monarchical power, at the e)pense of power, or (etter, of feudal powers. ow, in this (attle (etween feudal powers and monarchical power, right [le droit!A wasalways the instrument of monarchical power against the institutions, customs, prescriptions [rglements! and forms of (ond and (elonging characteristic of feudalsociety. I*ll simply gi#e you two e)amples of this (attle. =n the one hand, monarchical



power de#eloped in the West (y, in large part, relying upon 4uridical institutions and (yde#eloping these institutionsB through ci#il war, a system of courts supplanted the oldsolution of pri#ate disputes. In fact, the laws esta(lished (y these courts ga#emonarchical power itself the a(ility to resol#e disputes (etween indi#iduals. In the samemanner, @oman law, which reappeared in the West in the 1+th and 1<th centuries, was a

formida(le instrument in the hands of the monarchy for succeeding in delimiting theforms and mechanisms of its own power, at the e)pense of feudal power. In other words,the growth of the 9tate in %uropewas partially assured (y, or in any case was used as aninstrument in, the de#elopment of 4uridical thought.Monarchical power, the power of the9tate was essentially represented as right [le droit!.

5nd yet, as it happened, while the (ourgeoisie was largely profiting from thede#elopment of royal power and the diminution and regression of feudal power, it alsohad, on the other hand, e#ery interest in de#eloping a system of rights that would permitit to gi#e form to economic e)changes that assured its own social de#elopment. Theresult (eing that the #oca(ulary and form of rights was the system of representation of

power common to the (ourgeoisie and the monarchy. The (ourgeoisie and the monarchysucceeded little (y little at esta(lishing, from the end of the Middle 5ges up to the 1Cthcentury, a form of power representing itself as language, a form of power which ga#eitself $ as discourse $ the #oca(ulary of rights. 5nd, when the (ourgeoisie had finallydisposed of monarchical power, it did so precisely (y using this 4uridical discourse $which had more or less (een that of the monarchy $ which the it turned against themonarchy itself.

To simply gi#e one e)ample/ @ousseau, when he formulated his theory of the 9tate,attempted to show how a so#ereign $ (ut a collecti#e so#ereign, a so#ereign as social (ody, or (etter still, a social (ody as so#ereign $ is (orn out of the transfer of indi#idualrights, the alienation of these rights and the posing of laws of prohi(ition that eachindi#idual must recogni3e, (ecause it is he himself who has imposed the law, to thee)tent that he is a mem(er of the so#ereign, to the e)tent that he is himself a so#ereign.5ccordingly, the theoretical mechanism through which the critiue of the monarchicalinstitution was made, this theoretical instrument was the instrument of rights, which had (een esta(lished (y the monarchy itself. In other words, the West ne#er had anothersystem of representation, e)pression or analysis of power aside from that of rights, thesystem of law. In the final analysis, I (elie#e that is ultimately the reason for which weha#e not had, until #ery recently, other possi(ilities for analy3ing power, e)cept in usingthese elementary, fundamental, etc. ideas which are those of law, rule, so#ereign,commission, etc. I (elie#e that we must now free oursel#es from this 4uridical conceptionof power $ this conception of power deri#ed from the law and so#ereign, from the ruleand prohi(ition $ if we wish to proceed towards an analysis of the real functioning of power, rather than its mere representation.

Dow may we attempt to analy3e power in its positi#e mechanisms: It appears to me thatwe may find, in a certain num(er of te)ts, the fundamental elements for an analysis ofthis type. We may perhaps find them in ?entham, an %nglish philosopher from the end ofthe 1Cth and (eginning of the 1-th century, who was (asically the great theoretician of



(ourgeois power, and we may of course also find these elements in Mar), essentially inthe second #olume of ;apital. It*s here, I think, that we may find some elements that Iwill use for the analysis of power in its positi#e mechanisms.

First, what we may find in the second #olume of ;apital is that one power does not e)ist,

(ut many powers.E Powers, this means forms of domination, forms of su(4ugation thatfunction locally, for e)ample in the workshop, in the army, on a sla#e plantation or wherethere are su(ser#ient relations. These are all local and regional forms of power, whichha#e their own mode of functioning, their own procedure and techniue. 5ll these formsof power are heterogeneous. We may not, therefore, speak of power if we wish toconstruct an analysis of power, (ut we must speak of powers and attempt to locali3e themin their historic and geographic specificity.

5 society is not a unitary (ody, in which one and only one power is e)ercised. 9ociety isin reality the 4u)taposition, the link, the coordination and also the hierarchy of different powers that ne#ertheless remain in their specificity. Mar) places great emphasis, for

e)ample, on the simultaneously specific and relati#ely autonomous $ in some senseimper#ious $ character of the de facto power the (oss e)ercises in a workshop, comparedto the 4uridical kind of power that e)ists in the rest of society. Thus, the e)istence ofregions of power. 9ociety is an archipelago of different powers.

9econd, it appears that these powers cannot and must not simply (e understood as thederi#ation, the conseuence of some kind of o#erriding power that would (e primary.The schema of the 4urists, whether those of rotius, Pufendorf, or @ousseau, amounts tosaying/ 0In the (eginning, there was no society, and then society appeared when a central point of so#ereignty appeared to organi3e the social (ody, which then permitted a wholeseries of local and regional powers2B implicitly, Mar) does not recogni3e this schema. Deshows, on the contrary, how, starting from the initial and primiti#e e)istence of thesesmall regions of power $ like property, sla#ery, workshop, and also the army $ little (ylittle, the great 9tate apparatuses were a(le to form. 9tate unity is (asically secondary inrelation to these regional and specific powersB these latter come first.

Third, these specific regional powers ha#e a(solutely no ancient [primordial! function of prohi(iting, pre#enting, saying 0you must not.2 The original, essential and permanentfunction of these local and regional powers is, in reality, (eing producers of the efficiencyand skill of the producers of a product. Mar), for e)ample, has super( analyses of the pro(lem of discipline in the army and workshops. The analysis I*m a(out to make ofdiscipline in the army is not in Mar), (ut no matter/ What happened in the army from theend of the 1Eth and the (eginning of the 1Gth century practically right up to the end of the1Cth century: 5n enormous transformation in an army that had hitherto (een essentiallyconstituted of small units of relati#ely interchangea(le indi#iduals, organi3ed around onecommander. These small units were replaced (y a great pyramidal unit, with a wholeseries of intermediate commanding officers, of non8commissioned officers andtechnicians too, essentially (ecause a technical disco#ery had (een made/ the gun withcomparati#ely rapid and cali(rated fire.



From this moment forward, one could no longer deal with the army $ it was dangerous tooperate it $ under the plan of small isolated units, composed of interchangea(le elements.It was necessary, so that the army could (e effecti#e, so that one could use the guns in the (est possi(le manner, that each indi#idual (e well trained to occupy a determined position on an agreed upon front, to (e deployed at the same moment, according to a line

that must not (e (roken, etc. The whole pro(lem of discipline implied a new techniue of power with non8commissioned officers, a whole hierarchy of non8commissioned officers, 4unior officers, and senior officers. 5nd it was in this way that the army could (e dealtwith as a #ery comple) hierarchical unit, (y ensuring the ma)imal performance of wholedeployment according to the specificity of the position and role of each person.

There was a #ery superior military performance thanks to a new practice of power, whosefunction was a(solutely not that of prohi(iting something. =f course, the new practice of power came to prohi(it this or that thingB ne#ertheless, the goal was a(solutely notsaying, 0you must not,2 (ut rather essentially o(taining a (etter performance, a (etter production and a (etter producti#ity in the army. The army as production of dead (odies,

this was perfected, or (etter still, this was what was assured (y this new techniue of power. This was a(solutely not prohi(ition. We could say the same thing of the disciplinein workshops, which (egan to take shape in the 1Gth and 1Cth centurieswhen the smallworkshops of a corporate type were replaced (y large workshops and an entire series ofworkers $ hundreds of workers $ it was necessary to (oth monitor [sur#eiller! andcoordinate mo#ements, with the di#ision of la(or. The di#ision of la(or was, at the sametime, the reason it was o(ligatory to in#ent this new discipline of the workshop, (ut,in#ersely, we could say that the discipline of the workshop was the condition of possi(ility for achie#ing a di#ision of la(or. Without this discipline of the workshop,which is to say, without hierarchy, without sur#eillance, without the appearance offoremen, without the timed control of mo#ements, it would not ha#e (een possi(le toachie#e a di#ision of la(or.

Finally, the fourth important idea/ these mechanisms of power, these procedures of power, it*s necessary to regard them as techniues, which is to say as procedures thatwere in#ented, perfected, that were unceasingly de#eloped. There is a #erita(letechnology of power, or (etter still, of powers, which ha#e their own history. Dere, onceagain, we can easily find (etween the lines of the second #olume of ;apital an analysis,or at least the outline of an analysis, which would (e the history of the technology of power, such as it was e)ercised in the workhouses and factories. I will therefore followthese essential indications and I will attempt, with regard to se)uality, not to concei#e of power from the 4uridical point of #iew, (ut from the technological.

It appears to me, in fact, that if we analy3e power (y pri#ileging the 9tate apparatus, if weanaly3e power (y regarding it as a mechanism of preser#ation, if we regard power as a 4uridical superstructure, we will (asically do no more than take up the classical theme of (ourgeois thought, for it essentially concei#es of power as a 4uridical fact. To pri#ilegethe 9tate apparatus, the function of preser#ation, the 4uridical superstructure, is, (asically,to 0@ousseauify2 Mar). It reinscri(es Mar) in the (ourgeois and 4uridical theory of



power. It is not surprising that this supposedly Mar)ist conception of power as 9tateapparatus, as instance of preser#ation, as 4uridical superstructure, is essentially found in%uropean 9ocial 7emocracy of the end of the 1-th century, when the pro(lem was precisely that of knowing how to make Mar) work inside a 4uridical system, which wasthat of the (ourgeoisie. 9o, what I would like to do, in taking up what can (e found in the

second #olume of ;apital, and in mo#ing away from all that was added, rewrittenafterwards on the pri#ileges of the 9tate apparatus, power*s function of reproduction, thecharacteristics of the 4uridical superstructure, is to attempt to see how it is possi(le to do ahistory of powers in the West, and essentially of powers inasmuch as they are in#ested inse)uality.

Thus, from this methodological principle, how can we do a history of the mechanisms of power with regards to se)uality: I (elie#e that, in a #ery schematic manner, we could saythe following/ the system of power that the monarchy had succeeded in organi3ing fromthe end of the Middle 5ges presented two ma4or incon#eniences for the de#elopment ofcapitalism. First, political power, as it was e)ercised within the social (ody, was a #ery

discontinuous power. The mesh of the net was too large, and an almost infinite num(er ofthings, elements, conducts, and processes escaped the control of power. If we take fore)ample a precise point $ the importance of smuggling in all of %urope up until the endof the 1Cth century $ we would o(ser#e a #ery important economic flow, almost asimportant as the other, a flow which entirely escaped power. 5nd it was, moreo#er, oneof the conditions for the e)istence of menB if there had not (een maritime piracy,commerce would not ha#e functioned, and men would not ha#e (een a(le to li#e. In otherwords, illegality was one of the #ery preconditions of life, (ut it signified at the sametime that there were certain things which escaped power, and o#er which power did notha#e control. ;onseuently, economic processes, di#erse mechanisms, which in a certainway remained outside control, reuired the esta(lishment of a continuous, minute power,in a certain atomi3ing fashionB from a lacunal, glo(al power to a continuous, atomic, andindi#iduali3ing power/ that e#eryone, each indi#idual in and of himself, in his (ody, inhis mo#ements, could (e controlled, in the place of total and mass controls.

The second great incon#enience to the mechanisms of power, such as they functioned inthe monarchy, is that they were e)cessi#ely costly. 5nd they were costly precisely (ecause the function of power $ that which consisted power $ was essentially the powerto le#y, to ha#e the right and the force to collect something $ a ta), a tithe where#er theclergy was concerned $ from the har#ests that were made/ the compulsory collection ofthis or that percentage for the master, for royal power, for the clergy. Power was thenessentially ta) collector and predator. In this way, it always performed an economicsu(traction, and, (y conseuence, far from fa#oring and stimulating economic flow,monarchical power was perpetually its o(stacle and its restraint. Dence this second preoccupation, this second necessity/ finding a power mechanism such that, at the sametime that it controlled things and persons right down to the most minute detail, it wouldneither (e e)pensi#e nor essentially predatory on society, that it would, on the contrary, (e e)ercised through the economic processes themsel#es.



With these two o(4ecti#es, I (elie#e that we can roughly grasp the great technologicalmutation of power in the West. We ha#e the ha(it $ once again according to the spirit ofan e#er so limited Mar)ism $ of saying that the great in#ention was, as e#eryone knows,the steam engine, or at least in#entions of this sort. It is true, this was #ery important, (utthere was an entire series of other technological in#entions 4ust as important as this one

and which were, in the last instance, the condition of possi(ility for the functioning of theothers. Thus it was in political technologyB there was an in#ention at the le#el of forms of power throughout the 1Gth and 1Cth centuries. ;onseuently, we must not only make ahistory of industrial techniues, (ut also that of political techniues, and I (elie#e that wemay group the in#entions of political technology under two great chapters, and for thesein#entions we must credit, a(o#e all, the 1Gth and 1Cth centuries. I will group these political technologies under two great chapter headings (ecause it appears to me that theywere de#eloped in two different directions. =n the one hand, there was this technologythat I will call 0discipline.2 7iscipline is (asically the mechanism of power (y which wecome to e)ert control in the social (ody right down to the finest elements, (y which wesucceed in gra((ing hold of the social atoms themsel#es, which is to say indi#iduals.

Techniues for the indi#iduali3ation of power. Dow to monitor [sur#eiller! someone, howto control his conduct, his (eha#ior, his aptitudes, how to intensify his performance,multiply his capacities, how to put him in a place where he will (e most useful/ this iswhat I mean (y discipline.

5 moment ago, I cited for you the e)ample of discipline in the army. It is an importante)ample (ecause it was truly the site where the great disco#ery of discipline was madeand de#eloped in the first place. 'inked then to this other in#ention of a techno8industrialsort that was the in#ention of the gun with a comparati#ely rapid fire. ?asically from thismoment on, we can say the following/ the soldier was no longer interchangea(le, was nolonger pure and simple cannon fodder [chair H canon! $ a simple indi#idual capa(le ofdoing harm. To (e a good soldier, he needed to know how to shootB therefore he had toundergo a process of apprenticeship. It was necessary that the soldier eually know howto mo#e, that he know how to coordinate his mo#ements with those of other soldiers, insum/ the soldier (ecame something skillful. %rgo, something #alua(le [precieu)!. 5nd themore #alua(le he was, the more he had to (e preser#edB the more he had to (e preser#ed,the more necessary it (ecame to teach him the techniues capa(le of sa#ing his life in (attle, and the more techniues he was taught, the longer this apprenticeship, the more#alua(le he (ecame. 5nd suddenly, you ha#e a kind of rapid de#elopment of thesemilitary techniues of training [dressage!, culminating in the famous Prussian army ofFrederic II, which spent most of its time doing e)ercises. The Prussian army, the modelof Prussian discipline, is precisely the perfection, the ma)imal intensity of this corporealdiscipline [discipline corporelle! of the soldier, which was, to a certain e)tent, the modelfor other disciplines.

5nother instance where we see this new disciplinary technology appearing is education.It is first in secondary schools and then in primary schools where we see thesedisciplinary methods appearing in which indi#iduals are indi#iduali3ed within amultiplicity. The secondary school (rings together do3ens, hundreds and sometimesthousands of high schoolers and schoolchildren, and it then (ecame an issue of e)ercising



a power o#er them that would rightly (e much less e)pensi#e than the power of the tutorand that could only e)ist (etween pupil and master. Dere we ha#e one master for do3ensof disciplesB it was necessary, howe#er, despite this multiplicity of pupils, to achie#e anindi#iduali3ation of power, a permanent control, a sur#eillance of e#ery moment. Dencethe appearance of the figure well known to all those who attended secondary school, the

monitor [le sur#eillant!, who, in the pyramid, corresponds to the non8commissionedofficer in the armyB also the appearance of uantitati#e grades, the appearance of e)ams,the appearance of competition, and the possi(ility, (y conseuence, of classifyingindi#iduals in such a manner that each one would (e precisely in his place, under the ga3eof the teacher, or in the ualification and 4udgment that we make of each indi#idual pupil.

9ee, for e)ample, how you are seated in rows in front of me. It*s a position that perhapsappears natural to you, (ut it is important to recall, howe#er, that this is a relati#ely recentde#elopment in the history of ci#ili3ation, and that it is possi(le, at the start of the 1-thcentury, to find schools where the pupils are assem(led in a standing crowd, around a professor who instructs them. 5nd this of course implies that the professor could not

effecti#ely or indi#idually monitor them/ there is a crowd of students and, then, a professor. ;urrently, you are arranged in rows so that the ga3e of the professor canindi#iduali3e each of you, so he or she can call your name to know if you are present,what you*re doing, if you*re dreaming, if you*re yawning These are (analities, (ut #eryimportant (analities, for finally, at the le#el of a whole series of e)ercises of power, itwas through these little techniues that these new mechanisms were a(le to take o#er,were a(le to operate. That which happened in the army and in secondary schools may (eeually o(ser#ed in the workhouses throughout the 1-th century. This is what I will namethe indi#iduali3ing technology of power, a technology that (asically targets indi#idualsright down to their (odies, their (eha#iorsB it is grosso modo a kind of political anatomy,an anatomo8politics, an anatomy that targets indi#iduals to the point of anatomi3ing them.

5s I ha#e indicated a(o#e, we ha#e a family of technologies of power that appeared inthe 1Gth and 1Cth centuriesB we ha#e another family of technologies of power whichappeared a (it later, during the second half of the 1Cth century, and which was de#elopedJwe must say that the former, to the shame of France, was a(o#e all de#eloped in Franceand ermanyK a(o#e all in %ngland/ technologies that do not target indi#iduals as such, (ut which, on the contrary, target the population. In other words, the 1Cth centurydisco#ered this capital thing/ power is not simply e)ercised upon su(4ectsB this idea wasthe fundamental thesis of the monarchy, according to which there was the so#ereign andthe su(4ects. It was disco#ered that power is e)ercised o#er the population. 5nd whatdoes population mean: Population does not simply mean a large group of humans, (utli#ing (eings tra#ersed, ordered and go#erned [rgis! (y (iological processes and laws. 5 population has a (irthrate and a death rateB a population has a generational cur#e [unecour(e d*Lge!, a life ta(le [une pyramide d*Lge!, mor(idity, a general state of health, a population might perish or might, on the contrary, increase.

ow all of this (egins to (e disco#ered in the 1Cth century. We can therefore glimpse thatthe relation of power with the su(4ect or, (etter still, with the indi#idual, need not simply (e this form of dependency [su4tion! that permits power to le#y goods, wealth, and



possi(ly (ody and (lood from the su(4ect, (ut, rather, power must (e e)ercised o#erindi#iduals insofar as they constitute a kind of (iological entity that must (e taken intoconsideration if we actually want to use this population as a machine for producing, for producing wealth and goods, for producing other indi#iduals. The disco#ery of the population is, along with the disco#ery of the indi#idual and the traina(le (ody, the other

great technological core around which the political practices of the West transformedthemsel#es. We in#ented in that case what I will call, in opposition to the anatomo8 politics I mentioned a moment ago, (io8politics. It*s at this point that we o(ser#e theemergence of pro(lems like those of housing, of uality of life in the city, of pu(lichygiene, of the modification of the ratio (etween (irth rate and mortality. 5t this time the pro(lem appears of knowing how to ca4ole people to produce more (a(ies, or in any case,how we can regulate the population flow, how we can also regulate the growth rate of the population, and migration too. 5nd from this moment on, a whole series of o(ser#ationaltechniues, including statistics, of course, (ut also all the great administrati#e, economic,and political organs, are gi#en the duty of regulating the population. There were two greatre#olutions in the technology of power/ the disco#ery of discipline and the disco#ery of

regulation, the impro#ement of anatomo8politics and the impro#ement of (io8politics.'ife now (ecomes, (eginning in the 1Cth century, an o(4ect of power. 'ife and the (ody.Pre#iously, there had only (een su(4ects, 4uridical su(4ects from whom we could collectgoods, and life too, moreo#er. ow, there are (odies and populations. Power (ecomesmaterialist. It ceases to (e essentially 4uridical. It has to deal with real things [des chosesrelles!, which are (odies and life. 'ife enters the field of power/ a ma4or transformation[mutation capitale!, dou(tless one of the most important, in the history of humansocietiesB and we can clearly see how se) [le se)e!Gcould (ecome, from this momentforward, which is to say precisely from the 1Cth century, an a(solutely capitalcomponentB for, (asically, se) is situated #ery precisely at the point of articulation (etween the indi#idual disciplines of the (ody and the regulations of population. 9e) isthat through which one can assure the sur#eillance of indi#iduals, and we understand whyin the 1Cth century, and precisely in secondary schools, adolescent se)uality (ecame amedical pro(lem, a moral pro(lem, nearly a political pro(lem of the highest importance, (ecause, through $ and under the prete)t of $ this control of se)uality, one could monitorhigh schoolers, adolescents, o#er the course of their li#es, at each instant, e#en duringtheir sleep. 9e) will therefore (ecome an instrument of 0disciplinari3ation,2 it will (e oneof the essential elements of this anatomo8politics of which I spokeB (ut also, on the otherhand, it is se) that assures the reproduction of populations, it is with se), with a politicsof se) that we are a(le to change the relation (etween (irthrate and mortalityB in any case,the politics of se) will install itself within this whole politics of life that will (ecome soimportant in the 1-th century. 9e) is the le#er (etween anatomo8politics and (io8politicsBit is at the 4uncture of disciplines and regulations, and it is in this function that it (ecame,at the end of the 1-th century, a political component of the utmost importance for makingsociety into a machine of production.

M. Foucault/ Would you like to ask some uestions:

Male 5uditor/ What producti#ity does power target in prisons:



M. Foucault/ It*s a long history. The prison system, I mean the repressi#e prison, the prison as punishment [chLtiment!, was esta(lished late, practically at the end of the 1Cthcentury. ?efore the end of the 1Cth century, prison was not a legal sanction [punitionlgale!B we imprisoned men simply to hold them (efore initiating legal process against

them and not to punish them, e)cept for in e)ceptional cases. Well, we create prisons, asa system of suppression, (y declaring the following/ the prison is going to (e a system forthe reeducation for criminals. 5fter doing time in prison, thanks to a domestication of amilitary and scholarly type, we will (e a(le to transform the offender into a law8a(idingindi#idual. We were therefore seeking, with their time spent in prison, the production ofo(edient indi#iduals.

ow, #ery uickly, from the #ery (eginning of the prison system, we saw that the systemwas a(solutely not conducted [conduisait! towards this result, (ut that it was frankly producing precisely the opposite result/ the longer an indi#idual stayed in prison, the lessre8educated and more delinuent he (ecame. It was a(solutely not 3ero producti#ity, (ut

rather negati#e producti#ityB otherwise, the prison system, under normal circumstances,would ha#e had to disappear. 9o it stayed, and it continues, and when we ask people whatwe might replace prisons with, no one responds.

Why do prisons persist, in spite of this counter8producti#ity: I would say/ on thecontrary, they persist precisely (ecause, in actuality, the prison system is (usy producingoffenders and (ecause delinuency has a particular economic8political utility in thesocieties with which we are familiar. We can easily unco#er the economic8political utilityof delinuency/ first, the more offenders there are, the more crimes there will (eB themore crimes there are, the more fear there will (e within the population, and the morefear there is in the population, the more accepta(le, and e#en desira(le, the system of police control will (ecome. The e)istence of this small permanent internal danger is oneof the conditions of accepta(ility for this system of controlB it e)plains why, in thenewspapers, on the radio and tele#ision, in all countries of the world without a singlee)ception, we gi#e so much space to criminality, as if the passing of each day made itsome kind of no#elty. 9ince 1C+, in e#ery country of the world, campaigns around thetheme of an increase of delinuency were de#eloped, e#en though this increase was ne#er pro#enB (ut this supposed presence, this menace, this growth of criminality is anacceptance of these controls.

?ut that*s not all. 7elinuency is economically useful. 'ook at the amount of trafficking $ perfectly lucrati#e and engaged in capitalist profits $ which is criminali3ed/ thus prostitution $ e#eryone knows that the control of prostitution in e#ery country of %uropeJI don*t know if this also happens in ?ra3ilK is performed (y men whose profession iscalled pimping, who are all e)8offenders and ha#e the role of channeling the profitsearned from se)ual pleasure into economic circuits like the hotel industry, and towards (ank accounts. Prostitution allowed for the se)ual pleasure of some populations to (ecome e)pensi#e, and its management and super#ision has allowed profits on se)ual pleasure to (e di#erted into specific circuits. 5rms trafficking, drug dealing, and, in fact,



an entire series of trafficking, which for one reason or another cannot (e forthrightly orlegally conducted in society, fall under the delinuency that accordingly sustains them.

If we add to all this the fact that criminality was largely used in the 1-th century, and inthe "th century too, (y an entire series of political manoeu#res, such as (reaking up

strikes, infiltrating la(or unions, (eing used as a workforce and as (odyguards (y theheads of political parties, including those more and less respecta(le. Dere I*m speakingmore specifically a(out France, where all political parties ha#e a workforce which rangesfrom the (illposters to the hoodlums Jthe #iolent riotersK, a workforce constituted (yoffenders. Thus, we ha#e a whole series of economic and political institutions thatfunction on the (asis of delinuency, and, to this e)tent, prisons, which produce professional offenders, ha#e a utility and producti#ity.

Male auditor/ First of all, I*d like to e)press what a pleasure it has (een listening to you,seeing you, and rereading your (ooks. 5ll of my uestions are (ased on the critiue that7ominiue ['ecourt! le#eled at you/ if you go one step further, you will no longer (e an

archaeologist, an archaeologist of knowledgeB if you go one step further, you will fall intohistorical materialism.C That*s the (asis of the uestion. Then, I would like to know whyyou maintain that those who defend historical materialism and psychoanalysis are notsure of themsel#es, are not sure of the scientificity of their positions. The first thing, andthis surprised me, after reading so much a(out the difference (etween refoulement andrpression-, a difference which we do not ha#e in Portuguese, is that you start (yspeaking of suppression without differentiating it from refoulement. It*s surprising to me.The second surprise is the following/ in attempting to trace an anatomy of the social (ydrawing on discipline in the army, you make use of the same terminology that thelawyers today use in ?ra3il. In the =5?1 congress, which took place in 9al#ador, thelawyers were constantly using the words 0offset211 and 0discipline2 to define their 4uridical function. ;uriously, you make use of the same terms to speak of powerB you usethe same 4uridical language. What I would like to ask you is whether or not you fall#ictim to the same representati#e discourse of capitalist society, to the illusion of power,the discourse that these lawyers ha#e started using. Thus, the new law of pu(liccompanies appears as an instrument for disciplining monopolies, (ut what it actuallyrepresents is a #ery ad#anced, #alua(le, technological instrument that o(eys purposesindependent of the will of 4urists, to wit the necessities of capital reproduction. In thisway, your usage of the same terminology surprises me, to continue, while you esta(lish adialectic (etween technology and discipline. 5nd my last surprise is that you use the population as an element of social analysis, returning, therefore, to a period prior toMar)*s critiue of @icardo.

M. Foucault/ There is a pro(lem of time. 5t any rate, we are going to meet againtomorrow afternoon, at +/+, and then we can more completely discuss these ma4oruestions (etter than right now. I*m going to attempt to respond (riefly to two uestionsand tomorrow you will pose them anew. This doesn*t (other you, does it: Is this okay:Dere*s the general su(4ect of the uestion. 5(out the 'ecourt pro(lem and of historicalmaterialism we will speak tomorrow, (ut these two other points, you*re right, for theymake reference to what I maintained this morning. In the first place, I ha#e not spoken of



refoulementB I spoke of suppression [rpression!, the for(idden, and the law. This is dueto the necessarily (rief and allusi#e character of what I*m a(le to say in such little time.Freud*s thought is in fact much more su(tle than the picture I*#e presented here. 5roundthis notion of repression we find the de(ate (etween, we could say, grosso modo @eich,the @eichians, Marcuse, and, on the other hand, psychoanalysts proper, like Melanie

&lein and a(o#e all 'acan. For the concept of repression could (e used for an analysis ofthe social mechanisms of suppression (y arguing that the demand which determinesrepression is a particular social reality that esta(lishes itself as reality principle andimmediately pro#okes repression.

In general terms, this is a @eichian analysis modified (y Marcuse with the concept ofsurplus repression.1" 5nd on the other hand, you ha#e the 'acanians who take up theconcept of repression and maintain/ it is not that at all, when Freud speaks of repression,he is not thinking a(out suppression, he is instead thinking a(out a particular mechanisma(solutely constituti#e of desireB (ecause, for Freud, says 'acan, there is no non8repressed desire/ desire only e)ists as desire (y #irtue of the fact that desire isrepressed,

and (ecause that which constitutes desire is the law, and therefore he deri#es the conceptof repression from the concept of the law.

5s a result, two interpretations/ an interpretation with suppression and an interpretationwith law, which in fact descri(e two phenomena or two a(solutely different processes.It*s true that the notion of repression in Freud could (e used, according to the te)t, eitherin the one sense or in the other. It*s to a#oid this difficult pro(lem of Freudianinterpretation that I only spoke of suppression, (ecause as it happens, historians ofse)uality ha#e ne#er used a concept other than suppression, and for a #ery simple reason/this concept re#eals the social contours that determine repression. We could then do ahistory of repression using the concept of suppressionB whereas, using the concept of thefor(idden $ which, in a certain sense, is more or less isomorphic to e#ery society $ wecouldn*t do a history of se)uality. This is why I a#oided the concept of repression, andwhy I only spoke of suppression.

9econdly, it surprises me a lot that the lawyers are using the word 0discipline2 $ as forthe word 0offset,2 I ne#er used it a single time. In this respect I*d like to say thefollowing/ I (elie#e that, from the appearance of what I call (io8power or anatomo8 politics, we li#e in a society which is in the process of no longer (eing a 4uridical society.Nuridical society was the monarchical society. %uropean societies from the 1"th to the1Cth century were essentially 4uridical societies in which the pro(lem of rights was thefundamental pro(lem/ we fought for rightsB we made re#olutions for them. From the 1-thcentury onward, in societies which appear as societies of rights, with parliaments,legislatures, codes, courts, an entirely different mechanism of power was (eginning toseep in, which did not follow 4uridical forms and which did not ha#e the law as itsfundamental principle, (ut instead had the principle of the norm, and which no longer hadcourts, law, and 4uridical apparatus as its instruments (ut instead, medicine, socialcontrols, psychiatry, psychology. We are therefore in a disciplinary worldB we are in aworld of regulation. We (elie#e that we are still in a world of law, (ut, in fact, this othertype of power is taking shape through channels [relais! that are no longer 4uridical



channels. 9o it is perfectly normal that you would find the word 0discipline2 in themouths of lawyers. It*s similarly interesting to see, regarding a specific point, how thesociety of normali3ation [!1+ inha(ited the rights society and at the same time caused itto malfunction.

'ook at what happened in the penal system. I don*t know if it happened in ?ra3il, (ut in%uropean countries like ermany, France, and reat ?ritain, there is practically not asingle criminal of the slightest importance, and soon there will not (e a single personwho, in passing through the criminal courts, does not also pass through the hands of amedical, psychiatric, or psychological specialist. This is (ecause we li#e in a societywhere crime is no longer simply and essentially a transgression of the law, (ut rather ade#iation in relation to a norm. @egarding penality, we no longer speak of it e)cept interms of neurosis, de#iance, aggression dri#e, as you all know #ery well. 9o, when Ispeak of discipline and normali3ation, I*m not falling (ack into a 4uridical frameworkB it*son the contrary the men of rights, men of law, 4urists, who are o(ligated to use the#oca(ulary of discipline and normali3ation. That they speak of discipline in the =.5.?.

;ongress only confirms what I*#e said, and not that I*#e fallen (ack on some 4uridicalconceptuali3ation. They*re the ones who ha#e (een displaced.

Male auditor/ Dow do you see the relation (etween knowledge and power [sa#oir et pou#oir!:Is it the technology of power that pro#okes se)ual per#ersion or is it the natural (iological anarchy among men that pro#okes it:

M. Foucault/ =n this last point, which is to say, on that which moti#ates, that whiche)plains the de#elopment of this technology, I do not (elie#e we can say it*s (iologicalde#elopment. I attempted to show the opposite, which is to say how this transformation inthe technology of power a(solutely takes its departure from the de#elopment ofcapitalism. The transformation takes its departure from this de#elopment to the e)tentthat, on the one hand, the de#elopment of capitalism necessitates this technologicaltransformation, (ut also, this transformation ena(les the de#elopment of capitalism. Inshort/ a permanent implication of the two mo#ements, which are in a way enmeshed ineach other.

ow, the other uestion, which concerns the fact that the relations of power ha#e [!1<when pleasure and power work together. It is an important pro(lem. I*d like to (riefly saythat it*s precisely this, which seems to characteri3e the mechanisms in place within oursocietiesB it*s this that eually gi#es us pause in simply saying that power has the functionof for(idding, of prohi(iting. If we admit that power only has the function of prohi(iting,we must in#ent some types of mechanisms $ 'acan must do this, and the others too $ to (e a(le to say/ 0'ook, we self8identify with power2B or otherwise we say that there is amasochistic relation of power that is esta(lished, which makes us lo#e the one who prohi(its. ?ut, then again, once you admit that the function of power is not essentially to prohi(it, (ut to produce, to produce pleasure, at that moment you can perfectlyunderstand how we are a(le to o(ey power and find pleasure in this o(edience, whichisn*t necessarily masochistic. ;hildren can ser#e as e)amples to us/ I (elie#e that the wayin which the se)uality of children was made into a fundamental pro(lem for the



(ourgeois family during the 1-th century pro#oked and made possi(le a great num(er ofcontrols o#er the family, o#er parents, o#er children, and created at the same time awhole series of new pleasures/ the pleasure of parents in monitoring children, the pleasure of children in playing with their own se)uality, against their parents and withtheir parents, an entirely new economy of pleasure around the (ody of the child. We

needn*t necessarily say that parents, out of some sort of masochism, self8identify with thelaw

Female auditor/ ou ha#en*t responded to the uestion that was asked of you regardingthe relation (etween knowledge and power, and of the power that you, Michel, youe)ercise through your knowledge.

M. Foucault/ Thank you for repeating the uestion to me. Indeed, the uestion must (e posed. I (elie#e that $ in any case, it*s one meaning of the analyses that I make, in whichyou can see the source of inspiration $ I (elie#e that the relations of power must not (econsidered in such a simplistic manner as if there are those who, on the one hand, possess

power and, on the other, those who do not. =nce again, here a particular #ersion ofacademic Mar)ism freuently uses the opposition of dominant class #ersus dominatedclass, the dominant discourse #ersusthe dominated discourse. 5nd yet we will ne#er findthis dualism in Mar)B howe#er, it can (e found in reactionary and racist thinkers likeo(ineau, who maintains that, within society, there are always two classes, a dominatedand another who dominates. ou can find this in many places, (ut ne#er in Mar), (ecause, in fact, Mar) is too cunning to maintain something like thisB he knew perfectlywell that what strengthens relationships of power is that they ne#er stopB there is notsome single relationship of power here, and many o#er thereB they course throughoute#erything/ the working class retransmits relationships of powerB it makes use ofrelationships of power. From the mere fact of (eing a student, you are already inserted ina particular position of powerB I, as a professor, I am also in a position of powerB I am in a position of power (ecause I am a man and not a woman, and, from the fact that you are awoman, you are also in a position of power, not the same, (ut we are all likewise in positions of power. =f anyone who knows something, we could say/ 0ou e)ercise power.2 It*s a stupid critiue to the e)tent that it is limited to 4ust that. What is indeedinteresting is to know how the mesh of power functions in a gi#en group, class or society,which is to say, what is the locali3ation of each group within the net of power, how eache)ercises it anew, how each preser#es it, how each passes it on.

OTranslated (y ;hristopher ;hitty

1. This lecture was deli#ered (y Michel Foucault in 1-GE at the in#itation of thePhilosophy department of the Federal ni#ersity of ?ahia in 9al#ador, ?ra3il. It wasoriginally pu(lished in two parts, translated into Portuguese for issue < of the 4ournal?ar(Qrie in 1-C1 and issue A in 1-C" respecti#ely. The lecture is reproduced in its entiretyin Michel Foucault, 7its et crits, #ol II, eds. 7aniel 7efert, FranRois %wald and Nacues'agange JParis/ Sditions allimard, "1K, 1181". 5ll notes are the translator*sunless otherwise indicated.



". @efoulement or repression is the French translation of Freud*s #erdrngung, andrpression is the French translation of nterdrUckung traditionally rendered0suppression2 in %nglish.

+. The 9tandard %dition of Freud uniformly translates Trie( as 0instinct.2

<. 9ee the work of Pierre ;lastres, collected in 9ociety 5gainst the 9tate/ %ssays inPolitical 5nthropology, trans. @o(ert Durley and 5(e 9tein, Vone ?ooks, 1-C-[pu(lished in French (y %d. 7e Minuit in 1-G<B note in original!.

A. There is a temptation to translate le droit as 0the law2 in %nglishB howe#er, to do so isto miss something essential a(out Foucault*s su(tle argument here. For Foucault, le droit,all claims on a right, are always indications of a struggle o#er power rather than e#idenceof some uni#ersal su(4ect of the law. De uses 0right2 in the sense of the common %nglishe)pression 0might makes right.2 These themes are e)plored in depth in Foucault*slectures from this year at ;oll6ge de France, 9ociety Must ?e 7efended/ 'ectures at the

;oll6ge de France, 1-GA81-GE, Picador/ ew ork, "+, <-8A"B I uote the end of thatdiscussion in which Foucault defines rights discourse/ 0the su(4ect who speaks in thisdiscourse, who says I* or we,* cannot, and is in fact not trying to, occupy the position ofthe 4urist or the philosopher, or in other words the position of a uni#ersal, totali3ing, orneutral su(4ect he is in#ol#ed in the (attle, has ad#ersaries, and is working toward a particular #ictory. =f course, he speaks the discourse of right, asserts a right and demandsa right. ?ut what he is demanding and asserting is his* rights $ he says/ We ha#e aright.* These are singular rights, and they are strongly marked (y a relationship of property, conuest, #ictory, or nature. It might (e the right of his family or race, the rightof superiority or seniority, the right of triumphal in#asions, or the right of recent orancient occupations. In all cases, it is a right that is (oth grounded in history and decen8tered from a 4uridical uni#ersality it is always a perspecti#al discourse. It is interestedin the totality only to the e)tent that it can see it in one8sided terms, distort it and see itfrom its own point of #iew.2

E. The editors of 7its et crits included a footnote that refers to the erman and Frencheditions of &arl Mar), ;apital/ 5 ;ritiue of Political %conomy, Xolume II/ The Processof ;irculation of ;apital Jew ork/ Penguin, 1--"K. Dowe#er, it seems more likely thatFoucault is in#oking the second #olume of #olume 1 of ;apital, since the Frenchtranslation had (een pu(lished in multiple #olumes (y Sditions 9ociales. This second#olume of #olume 1 $ consisting of sections <, A, and E $ contains the material onmanufacture that Foucault refers to throughout 7iscipline and Punish. I would like tothank Nason @ead for (ringing this to my attention.

G. French has no way of distinguishing (etween 0se)2 and 0gender,2 as many feministcritics, following Moniue Wittig and Nudith ?utler, are wont do in %nglish. 'e genre is agrammatical concept determining the class of nouns according to a natural di#ision of these)es and other formal criteria, whereas le se)e is a uality of (odies. 'e se)e can signifythe cellular, organic, hormonal, physical and cultural ways in which men aredifferentiated from women, in addition to the way we thus categori3e other animal



species and plants. 'e se)e can also mean 0genitals2 and 0se)ual acti#ity.2 'ike hiscontemporary Nacues 'acan, Foucault deploys le se)e (y retaining the am(iguity of itsreferent. 9ee Distory of 9e)uality, Xolume 1/ 5n Introduction, trans. @o(ert Durley.Jew ork/ Xintage ?ooks, 1--K,<8<E, where he argues that the power in#ested in se) (ecomes generali3ed through focus on and concern for the figures of women, children

and se)ual de#iants. The implication is that se)ual categories are the result of ahistorically new technology of power. The periodi3ation here significantly re#isesDistory of 9e)uality*s emphasis upon se)ual science of the late8nineteenth century.

C. 7ominiue 'ecourt notes that 5rchaeology of &nowledge significantly re#isesFoucault*s theory (y a(andoning its central notion of the episteme/ 0For my part, I thinkthe critics are well8ad#isedB they are not wrong to trem(le, for the concept of historywhich functions in The 5rchaeology has many consonances with another concept ofhistory which they ha#e good reason to hate/ the scientific concept of history as it appearsin historical materialism. The concept of a history which is also presented as a processwithout a su(4ect structured (y a system of laws. 5 concept which, on this (asis, is also

radically anti8anthropologistic, anti8humanist and anti8structuralist.2 Mar)ism and%pistemology/ ?achelard, ;anguilhem and Foucault, trans. ?en ?rewster, J'ondon/ ew'eft ?ooks, 1-GAK, 1C-.

-. =riginal words are in French in the transcript. It should (e noted that refoulement is theFrench translation of Freud*s #erdrngung, and rpression is rightfully translated (y the%nglish word 0suppression.2 In psychoanalytic theory, suppression, or rpression, is adesire that is consciously pushed (ack into the unconsciousB repression, or refoulement, is pushed (ack into the unconscious without ha#ing attained the le#el of consciousness.

1. =rden dos 5d#ogados do ?rasil/ The =rder of ?ra3ilian 'awyers. [ote in original.!

11. The lector says 0compenser.2

1". 9ee Der(ert Marcuse, %ros and ;i#ili3ation, J?oston/ ?eacon Press, 1-EEK.

1+. 5 gap in the recording, indicated in the original ?ra3ilian te)t. [ote in original.!

1<. ap in the recording. [ote in original.!

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