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Alex Rosenfelder

Prof. Owen McLeod

The Meaning of Life Final

5/4/12

Free Will and Taoist Theory of the Meaning of Life

Introduction

In this paper I will be examining the compatibility between a universe so conceived that

the free will required for the moral responsibility of our actions does not exist, and a Taoist

account of the meaning of life. I will begin by going through some definitions so the terms I use

will not be ambiguous. I will continue by explaining the arguments in favor of a conception of

the universe where we lack free will required for moral responsibility. Following that I will

inspect some Taoist theory and determine whether it is compatible with a universe where we lack

the free will required for moral responsibility, and finally deal with some miscellaneous concerns

regarding the question of the meaning of life.

It will be my contention that the arguments that support a view of the universe as one

lacking the free will required for moral responsibility are strong. I will also find that the sort of

Taoist theory I extract from the literature is compatible with this view of the universe. The sorts

of claims in this particular Taoist theory about life’s meaning and the best way to live life are

compelling with regard to certain goods in life, such as perceiving meaningfulness and happiness,

but there are concerns about how well these claims support a theory of objective (or what I will

call “ultimate”) meaning. Last, some of the miscellaneous issues I raise, none of which are likely

original, are liable to shake the ground upon which some theories of the meaning of life are laid.

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I: Some Definitions

In a 1987 paper “What Does Death Have to Do with the Meaning of Life?”, Michael

Levine discusses two types of meaning. Borrowing from Paul Edwards, he discusses “a ‘cosmic

and ‘terrestrial sense’” (Levine 457). “The cosmic sense is that of an overall purpose of which

our lives are a part and in terms of which our lives must be understood and our purposes and

interests arranged. … The terrestrial sense of meaning is the meaning people find (subjectively)

in their own lives apart from the place of their lives in any ultimate end or context” (Levine 457).

He continues,

In Western religious traditions it is often claimed that life cannot be meaningful, in the

relevant sense of ‘ultimate’ meaning, unless (1) people’s lives are part of some divine

cosmic scheme, and (2) there is eternal life. Some atheists (those Edwards calls

‘pessimists’) agree with theists and maintain that unless conditions 1 and 2 are met, life

must be ‘ultimately’ meaningless (i.e. meaningless in the cosmic sense). (Levine 457)

In this paper I will concern myself with this “ultimate” sense of meaning, and what

arguments for our lack of moral responsibility for our actions entail for this sense of meaning.

Thus a good definition for ultimate meaning would be meaning in life outside of a subjective

evaluation – in other words, an objective meaning. It could be that ultimate meaning is derived

solely from an individual’s subjective feelings – but the meaning is not in those feelings

themselves. Thus an individual’s feelings about the meaning in their life could be very important

in assessing the quality of their life, but we will not treat it as an important sense of meaning here.

I will not attempt to argue that feeling one’s life to be meaningful couldn’t be a valuable good –

in fact, it may be more important to an individual when determining whether living their life is

“worthwhile” than an ultimate sense of meaning. I will leave the matter of discussing that

particular good to future debate.

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Next it will be important to discuss different conceptions of responsibility which affect

our understanding of free will. In the opening paragraph of his 2002-3 paper “Meaning in Life

Without Free Will,” Derk Pereboom borrows from

Gary Watson [who] instructively distinguishes two faces or senses of responsibility. The

first is the self-disclosing sense, which concerns the aretaic or excellence-relevant

evaluations of agents. An agent is responsible for an action in this respect when it is

inescapably the agent’s own; if as a declaration of her adopted ends, it expresses what the

agent is about, her identity as an agent; it expresses what the agent it ready to stand up for,

to defend, to affirm, to answer for. (1996: 233-4). The second face of responsibility has

had a more prominent role in debates about free will – it concerns control and

accountability. (Pereboom 1)

I think it will important to maintain Watson’s distinction as it plays out in informative

ways for our understanding of free will and moral responsibility. Therefore, let us define self-

disclosing responsibility as the fact of actions or events having stemmed from an agent due to

who the agent is, including their ends, identity, and what they are willing to defend. Let us define

accountability as the fact of actions or events having occurred due to the agent’s having control

of or having caused them. An example of a situation where we would typically attribute self-

disclosing responsibility but not accountability would be the criminally insane. It is easy to see

how a murderer may have committed their crime due to their individual psychological make-up –

part of their identity – but it does not follow from that that they were accountable for their

actions. Something else is required to assign this sense of responsibility – the sense that the

murderer caused their actions.

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II: Free Will and Moral Responsibility

In the earlier pages of his paper Pereboom discusses how moral responsibility applies

primarily to decisions, as a matter of free will as accountability:

The view that moral responsibility for decisions is especially important is driven by the

sense that it is fundamentally a matter of a kind of control, a kind of control agents would

primarily have over their decisions, in conjunction with the fact that decisions are

causally prior to consequences of decisions. … In Thomas Nagel’s example, two agents,

A and B, are psychologically identical and each makes the decision to shoot an innocent

person, and then carries out the decision (Nagel 1979). However, A’s bullet fails to reach

the intended victim because it hits a bird instead, whereas B’s bullet kills him. A

common intuition here is that A and B are equally blameworthy in a particularly

significant respect, an intuition captured by the notion that responsibility for decisions is

especially important. (Pereboom 3)

Pereboom’s argument amounts to this:

1. If A and B (who differ only in success at carrying out their decision) are equally

blameworthy in a significant respect, then the conditions of decisions are important in

assigning blame (a type of moral responsibility).

2. A and B are equally blameworthy (morally responsible) in a significant respect.

3. Thus, the conditions of decisions are important in assigning moral responsibility.

This argument appears to be sound; after all, what relevant factors are there in judging an

agent in terms of blame other than the conditions of the decision and the outcome of the decision?

If A and B are largely judged to be equally blameworthy, despite the important difference in the

outcome of the decision, it must be the decision itself that accounts for that (assuming there are

no other relevant factors for assigning blame).

A stronger version of Pereboom’s argument could be proposed where premise 2 reads “A

and B are equally blameworthy.” Here the outcome of the decision is completely irrelevant to

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assigning moral blame. This version is not needed, however, so long as we conclude that certain

conditions of the decision (Pereboom will argue accountability) are necessary in assigning blame.

Consequentialists may attack the argument by going after premise 2. They may attempt to

argue that only the consequences of decisions matter in assigning blame – that is, that the

decisions themselves only matter as an efficient cause of the consequence. However, it may be

that consequentialist claims about the morality of a person are really only claims about the

person’s responsibility as self-disclosure – claims about the character of the person as distinct

from their control. Consequentialists have in some sense rounded the bend ahead of the pack –

because ultimately Pereboom’s argument is the same – that blame or praise cannot be assigned to

the agent, since agents are only self-disclosingly responsible, and not accountable, for their

decisions.

Let’s assume that premise 2 is correct. Are there situations where agents are not

accountable for their decisions? Pereboom argues that a deterministic causal history – one

wherein by knowing events that have preceded a moment in time one could predict with

certainty what would occur at that time – undermines accountability (and thus moral

responsibility):

My view is that an agent’s moral responsibility for an action is explained not by the

existence of alternative possibilities to her, but rather by the action’s having a causal

history of a sort that allows the agent to be the source of her action in a specific way. … I

contend that no relevant and principled difference can distinguish an action that results

from moral responsibility-undermining manipulation from an action that has a more

ordinary deterministic causal history. (Pereboom 4)

Here is the argument more formally:

1. There exist cases of manipulation wherein an agent’s moral responsibility is

undermined.

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2. If there is no relevant and principled difference between cases where moral

responsibility is undermined and a deterministic causal history, then moral

responsibility is undermined by a deterministic causal history.

3. There is no relevant and principled difference.

4. Thus, moral responsibility is undermined by a deterministic causal history.

The argument is strong, but it is useful to look into the reasoning behind premises 1 and 3.

It does seem that there are cases where people can be manipulated such that they are not morally

responsible for their decisions (and actions). If someone is brainwashed in a reeducation camp,

or socialized in a certain way from a young age, or made submissive by a cocktail of

sophisticated drugs, it doesn’t seem that their deliberation process is one that can support moral

responsibility. The question is, is there a relevant difference between those circumstances and

others in a deterministic universe? It doesn’t seem that it matters whether someone is determined

to do something by conscious manipulation or by the unconscious rumblings of universal

causality. Either way, the decision is not theirs. Pereboom discusses his reasoning behind his

premises in a paper called “Why We have No Free Will and Can Live Without It,” and addresses

several proposed relevant differences and why they don’t actually make for a relevant difference

in terms of moral responsibility.

Just as determinism rules out moral responsibility, so too do event-causal indeterministic

chains:

I also argue that exclusively event-causal indeterministic versions of libertarianism (Kane,

1996) – i.e. those in which only events have a role in an indeterministic causal history of

a decision – are equally incompatible with moral responsibility … because on this view

antecedent causal conditions – the events that precede a decision and that make a causal

contribution to it – leave it open whether the decision in question will transpire or not,

and given the causal contribution of these antecedent conditions, nothing, including the

agent, has any further causal role in determining which of the options transpires.

(Pereboom 5)

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Essentially Pereboom is arguing for an agent-causal view of what is necessary for moral

responsibility – that “an agent’s moral responsibility for an action is explained… by the action’s

having a causal history of a sort that allows the agent to be the source of her action in a specific

way” (Pereboom 4).

1. An agent has to make a causal contribution to an event or decision to have moral

responsibility for an action.

2. An agent does not make a causal contribution to either an event or a decision in an

exclusively event-causal indeterministic universe.

3. Thus, moral responsibility does not exist in an exclusively event-causal

indeterministic universe.

Premise 1 is an heir of the “relevant differences” argument above. If there isn’t a manner

in which agents are accountable for their decisions, then their decisions are not relevantly

different from cases of moral responsibility-undermining manipulation or a deterministic chain

of events. In event-causal indeterministic situations, it is only the events prior to the moment in

question and never the agent that contribute to what occurs, so agents are not morally responsible

here either.

In fact, the relevant difference that is required for moral responsibility – the fact that the

agent causes the events as a substance of some sort – is not to be found in other conceivable

universes either. It is argued that the agent must cause events as a substance because otherwise

the agent’s role is reducible to events (like psychological processes), and in that case the agent

doesn’t exert control in any meaningful sense at all. In a truly indeterministic universe, where

events happen randomly, the agent certainly does not cause things to occur. The only other

universe that seems to be conceivable in terms of causation is an agent-causal universe, and there

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appears to be no evidence for such a universe at all. Thus, we must conclude that free will as

accountability does not exist (and thus neither does moral responsibility).

III: A Different Theory for the Meaning of Life

If we reject the existence of the kind of free will required for moral responsibility, then

meaning in life cannot come from being accountable for (moral) decisions. If that is so, what

other prospects do we have for living meaningful lives? There are a number of writings on

supernaturalist grounds for meaning – such as fulfilling God’s purpose – as well as on naturalist

grounds for meaning – like serving some objective good. Many of these theories are deeply

concerned with whether we are accountable for moral decisions, not to mention every other

aspect of our existence. Interesting theories regarding life’s meaning, purpose, and order can be

found in Taoist literature of China. I will attempt to uncover some of the arguments embedded in

two of these writings and see what the implications for these theories are if we lack free will in

the sense of accountability.

Before I do so, a disclaimer of sorts is in order. It should be noted that the texts I am

dealing with – the Tao Te Ching and Chuang Tzu – date back to some centuries B.C. They were

also written in another language. Alteration over time may have changed their meanings, and the

interpretations of the translators also affect my reading. Last, my own interpretation has an

impact on the arguments, and a large part of my task involves extracting formal arguments where

there do not appear to be any. Thus, any theory produced here is only a partial and shaded

interpretation of the Taoist school. Still, I will claim that even where my interpretation fails the

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texts, it still produces an interesting theory for the meaning of life that likely already has

analogues elsewhere.

A central concept of Taoism is the notion of the Tao, translated as the Way. The Way is

understood as the fundamental order of the universe – as reality itself. Thus any ultimate

meaning can be understood to be grounded in the Way, since the order of the universe would

contain or imply a meaning that is found in the universe, rather than in some human

interpretation of it. The Way is also understood as the proper course of living life, which we will

come to see involves embracing the universe as it is. Thus a sense of reality is embedded in both

uses of the term.

Another important Taoist concept is that of wu wei, which means natural action,

sometimes “action without action.” When one performs wu wei one does not worry about when

to act yet still one acts appropriately. It can be thought of as acting naturally, unconsciously, or

acting without self-awareness or certain concepts of the world.

The Chuang Tzu is a classic Chinese text named after its purported author, master

Chuang (Tzu being an honorific). In section 2 of Burton Watson’s translation of the text, Chuang

Tzu: Basic Writings, we meet with an argument regarding human efforts to understand and act

within reality:

The understanding of men of ancient times went a long way. How far did it go? To the

point where some of them believed that things have never existed—so far, to the end,

where nothing can be added. Those at the next stage thought that things exist but

recognized no boundaries among them. Those at the next stage thought there were

boundaries but recognized no right and wrong. Because right and wrong appeared, the

Way was injured, and because the Way was injured, love became complete. But do such

things as completion and injury really exist, or do they not? (Watson 36)

There are a few arguments that can be extracted from this passage. But first, let’s get

more context from Watson. The love mentioned is meant to mean the desires of people.

Completion is a similar notion to that expressed by Plato’s metaphysics – it is a sort of

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instantiation of an ideal form – the Way. Completion thus brings about something distinct from

true reality – which cannot be represented fully by distinctions created out of likes and dislikes.

Here is the first argument which we will call the Distinctions Argument, which deals with

metaphysics:

1. The Way (reality) was injured (undermined) because right and wrong (and other

distinctions) appeared.

2. Desires appeared because the Way (reality) was injured (undermined).

3. Therefore, desires appear only when distinctions appear.

The argument in this form has some problems. The conclusion doesn’t follow from the

premises. We could accept that distinctions undermine (an accurate perception of) reality (1),

and that desires can appear only when reality is undermined (2), yet it is still possible that 3 is

false. It is possible in this view that things other than distinctions undermine reality and that once

reality is undermined, desires can appear in the absence of distinctions. The argument can be

fixed by changing premise 2: desires are a form of distinction. Further, the language suggests a

different conclusion than we would expect, namely, the conclusion that desires undermine our

understanding of reality. Let’s try to fix the argument:

1. Our understanding of reality is undermined by (all) distinctions.

2. Desires are a form of distinction.

3. Therefore, desires undermine our understanding of reality.

This argument is valid. But what of its premises? Let’s skip 1 for a moment and look at 2.

Are desires a form of distinction? Dictionary.com defines distinction as “[2.]

the recognizing or noting of differences; discrimination.” Is a desire a noting of differences?

Desires may necessitate a recognition of difference; how could I desire something if I don’t find

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it preferable to something else, such as my current state or an attribute of my current state?

However, desires don’t appear to be the noting of difference itself. Therefore the Distinctions

Argument should be refined once again.

1. Our understanding of reality is undermined by (all) distinctions.

2. Desires necessitate a distinction.

3. Therefore, desires undermine our understanding of reality.

The argument is better now, but how about premise 1? Do distinctions undermine reality,

or is it more useful to say something else?

Nieh Ch’üeh asked Wang Ni, “Do you know what all things agree in calling right?”

“How would I know that?” asked Wang Ni.

“Do you know that you don’t know it?”

“How would I know that?”

“Then do things know nothing?”

“How would I know that? However, suppose I try saying something. What way

do I have of knowing that if I say I know something I don’t really not know it? Or what

way do I have of knowing that if I say I don’t know something I don’t really in fact know

it? Now let me ask you some questions. If a man sleeps in a damp place, his back aches

and he ends up half paralyzed, but is this true of a loach? If he lives in a tree, he is

terrified and shakes with fright, but is this true of a monkey? Of these three creatures,

then, which one knows the proper place to live? … The way I see it, the rules of

benevolence and righteousness and the paths of right and wrong are all hopelessly snarled

and jumbled. How could I know anything about such discriminations?” (Watson 40)

This passage appears to contain a version of the problem of the criterion. The problem of

the criterion deals with the apparent issue that one cannot justify belief fully, for if belief comes

solely from other justified beliefs, then there appears to be a problem with justifying every belief

that one holds prior to a particular belief. Here is an argument from the passage:

1. If I know a belief x, then I know that I know x (call this knowledge y).

2. If I know y, then I know that I know y (z), and I know everything that precedes z and

allows me to know z, y, and x (call this preceding knowledge z-prime).

3. I cannot know z-prime.

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4. Therefore, I cannot know x.

This argument can be avoided if we use a useful and classic definition of knowledge: true,

justified belief. With this definition it is not necessary to know that you know something in order

to know it; if you believe something with justification and you are correct then you know it. In

other words, this definition avoids Wang Ni’s epistemological (though not very practical)

concern that he might think he does not know something when he in fact does, for if he has true

justified belief it doesn’t matter much whether he has true justified belief in his knowledge. On

the other hand, the first concern that one might think one knows something without actually

knowing it persists. A particularly useful rendering of the problem of the criterion exists in Roy

Sorensen’s A Brief History of the Paradox:

The problem of the criterion locks into a classic infinite regress. The following four

propositions about justification seem plausible but are jointly inconsistent:

1. Some beliefs are justified.

2. A belief can only be justified by another justified belief.

3. There are no circular chains of justification.

4. All justificatory chains have a finite length. (Sorensen 154)

The problem of the criterion, as its name implies, suggests that we lack any criterion for

judging whether beliefs are or are not justified. As the exchange between Nieh Ch’üeh and Wang

Ni shows, there are many beliefs in the natural world between mankind and different animals

about what is preferable and right. Further, there are many disagreements between people about

what is preferable or right. Recall premise 1 of the Distinctions Argument: 1. Our understanding

of reality is undermined by (all) distinctions. It appears that regardless of which proposition we

choose to reject in the problem of the criterion as formulated by Roy Sorensen, we are still bound

to the fact that distinctions undermine (or prevent) an understanding of reality. If we reject

proposition 1, then we do not accept that any beliefs are justified – thus, we cannot possess

knowledge about what distinctions (if any) are correct. If we reject proposition 2, we are still left

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without a means to settle disputes between people about what distinctions or knowledge is

correct – and there are indeed disputes about which (mutually exclusive) beliefs are self-

evidently true. If we reject 3, we are yet again at a loss, since circular reasoning can be employed

by those who endorse mutually exclusive claims. If we reject proposition 4, any justification for

a belief must extend forever, and since deliberation takes time, beings who are finite in time

(such as humans) cannot ever match that infinite requirement (even if they had the desire to!).

The argument for premise 1 of the Distinctions Argument that utilizes the problem of the

criterion is thus:

1. We must know which distinctions to hold in order for distinctions to be useful to our

understanding of reality.

2. In order to know which distinctions to hold we must be able to sort them into

distinctions we ought to hold and distinctions we ought not to hold.

3. If we cannot justify just one of any mutually exclusive distinctions then we cannot

sort them into distinctions we ought to hold and distinctions we ought not to hold.

4. We must reject at least one proposition of the problem of the criterion.

5. Regardless of which proposition(s) we reject, we cannot sort beliefs into those we

ought to hold and those we ought not to hold.

6. Thus, distinctions our not useful to our understanding of reality.

The first premise is rather straight-forward. If we do not know what to believe (and

distinctions are beliefs about the nature of reality), then our understanding of reality is arbitrary –

a matter of chance, and thus of no use in making decisions. Thus to know what to believe we

have to sort from among different candidates. The only proper way it seems for sorting beliefs

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such as distinctions is through determining which are justified, but there seems to be no way to

justify only one of a set of mutually exclusive beliefs all of the time.

Another set of arguments ties together the concepts of wu wei and accountability:

1. If deliberation depends upon (and is determined by) distinctions, then deliberation

does not concern itself with reality except by chance.

2. Deliberation depends upon (and necessitates) distinctions.

3. Thus, deliberation does not concern itself with reality except by chance.

Premise 1 is simple. If deliberation depends on an agent’s distinctions, the truth of which

are a matter of chance, then deliberation does not concern itself with reality except by chance. In

other words, deliberation will produce a course of action that is in accord with reality (the Way)

only by chance, since distinctions in any person cannot be shown to be worth having or not.

Premise 2 asserts that deliberation depends upon and necessitates distinctions. There can only be

choice if there is a distinction between different ends.

1. If actions for which we are accountable involve deliberation, then they do not concern

themselves with reality except by chance.

2. Actions for which we are accountable involve deliberation.

3. Thus, actions for which we are accountable do not concern themselves with reality

except by chance.

It seems that actions stemming from agents involve and depend upon deliberation

between different choices. Deliberation with regard to action involves choosing between

different courses of action. This supports an intuition we have that people are not morally

responsible for things they do not deliberate to do – accidents, mishaps, etc., unless of course

they deliberated to be excessively negligible. It appears that the agent is identical to or closely

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associated with the conscious part of the mind, where deliberation occurs. Since deliberation gets

at reality only as a matter of chance, actions for which we are accountable secure certain ends in

reality only as a matter of chance.

1. Actions where we are accountable are only worthwhile if they are not less likely to

secure ultimate meaning than actions for which we are not accountable (wu wei –

actions without distinctions).

2. Actions for which we are accountable are less likely to secure ultimate meaning than

actions for which we are not accountable.

3. Thus, actions for which we are accountable are not worthwhile.

Premise 1 states a condition for what makes actions where we are accountable

worthwhile. In order for actions implying accountability to be worthwhile, meaning worth doing,

they cannot be less likely than actions not implying accountability to secure ultimate meaning.

As premise 2 asserts, actions of accountability are less likely to secure ultimate meaning. This is

because actions of accountability necessarily involve distinctions, and as we have already

mentioned, distinctions can tell us little about reality. Oftentimes, distinctions are responsible for

leading deliberation towards actions that are not grounded in reality – in other words, actions that

do not achieve what the agent may intend. Thus it is more likely that actions not involving

distinctions (and therefore precluding both deliberation and accountability), also known as wu

wei, are able to deal with reality and secure ultimate meaning, a good that exists in reality.

1. If having free will as accountability is not valuable in securing ultimate meaning, then

Taoist beliefs about securing meaning are compatible with a universe where we lack

accountability for our actions.

2. Having free will as accountability is not valuable in serving ultimate meaning.

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3. Thus, Taoist beliefs about securing meaning are compatible with a universe where we

lack accountability for our actions.

Taoist beliefs about meaning, right action, and virtue ground such things in actions for

which we are not accountable. This is largely because actions for which we are accountable

depend upon distinctions which, according to Taoists, obscure our understanding of reality and

thus our attempts to secure meaning in reality (ultimate meaning). Therefore we conclude that

Taoist beliefs about what constitutes ultimate meaning are compatible with a universe so

conceived that we lack accountability – the kind of free will that is required for moral

responsibility.

IV: The Taoist Conception of Meaning, Virtue, and a Good Life

So far we have looked at different conceivable universes, determined in which of those

people can be accountable for their actions, decided which of those universes are in fact plausible,

and determined that the Taoist notions of reality suggest meaning cannot be found through

actions that produce accountability. However, what Taoism suggests ultimate meaning to be is

still unclear. A passage from Watson’s translation of the Chuang Tzu hints at what that meaning

may be:

Whether you point to a little stalk or a great pillar, a leper or the beautiful His-shih, things

ribald and shady or things grotesque and strange, the Way makes them all into one. Their

dividedness is their completeness; their completeness is their impairment. No thing is

either complete or impaired, but all are made into one again. Only the man of far-

reaching vision knows how to make them into one. So he had no use [for categories], but

relegates them all to the constant. The constant is the useful; the useful is the passable;

the passable is the successful; and with success, all is accomplished. He relies upon this

alone, relies upon it and does not know he is doing so. This is called the Way. (Watson

36)

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Part of living life properly, or what may be suggested here as “with ultimate meaning,” is

to avoid the distinctions that undermine understanding of reality. Recall that completeness is a

distortion of true reality – the Way – because reality is not in distinctions. The man of far-

reaching vision, taken to be the man who lives the meaningful or proper life, is one who forgets

distinctions, “relegates all to the constant,” and relies only upon the constant without knowing so.

This form of living is embodied in wu wei – action without action. By action without action it

means in a sense that the person – the agent – does nothing. The actor acts naturally and without

deliberation, because he or she does not recognize distinctions and instead sees all as one

experience. Part of acknowledging the oneness of experience is to recognize that truth and

understanding is lost in distinctions. Just as the experience of eating ice cream cannot be

replicated in a description, or a compartmentalization of sensations into cold, sweet, smooth, etc.,

action in accord with reality is not captured (fully – and thus in a true sense not captured at all)

by distinctions.

In the Chuang Tzu, Confucius is sometimes used as a mouthpiece for false virtue, and

sometimes as a teacher of the Way. In the following passage I interpret his role as the latter:

Confucius said, “In the world, there are two great decrees: one is fate and the other is

duty. That a son should love his parents is fate—you cannot erase this from his heart.

That a subject should serve his ruler is duty—there is no place he can go and be without

his ruler, no place he can escape to between heaven and earth. These are called the great

decrees. Therefore, to serve your parents and be content to follow them anywhere—that

is the perfection of filial piety. To serve your ruler and be content to do anything for

him—this is the peak of loyalty. And to serve your own mind so that sadness or joy do

not sway or move it; to understand what you can do nothing about and to be content with

it as with fate—this is the perfection of virtue. As a subject and a son, you are bound to

find things you cannot avoid. If you act in accordance with the state of affairs and forget

about yourself, then what leisure will you have to love life and hate death? Act in this

way and you will be all right. (Watson 56)

In this passage Confucius suggests that the way to live in accord with the Way is by

accepting what you cannot control and being content with it. Striving against the inevitable not

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only causes pain and hardship, but it also demonstrates distinctions in the mind about what ought

to be and what is possible to change, both of which are understood to be a form of ignorance

apart from reality. Confucius urges us to “forget about ourselves,” and live so that neither

sadness nor joy sway our minds, and we do not love life nor hate death, but yield to both.

“Just go along with things and let your mind move freely. Resign yourself to what cannot

be avoided and nourish what is within you—this is best. What more do you have to do to

fulfill your mission? Nothing is as good as following orders (obeying fate)—that’s how

difficult it is!” (Watson 57)

Here Confucius emphasizes (again as a Taoist sage) that “what is best” is to “go along

with things and let your mind move freely” (wu wei). Resigning yourself to what is unavoidable

and obeying fate is the right action.

Again Chuang Tzu uses Confucius to serve his philosophy:

Confucius said, “Life, death, preservation, loss, failure, success, poverty, riches,

worthiness, unworthiness, slander, fame, hunger, thirst, cold, heat—these are the

alternations of the world, the workings of fate. Day and night they change place before us

and wisdom cannot spy out their source. Therefore, they should not be enough to destroy

your harmony; they should not be allowed to enter the storehouse of spirit. If you can

harmonize and delight in them, master them and never be at a loss for joy, if you can do

this day and night without break and make it be spring with everything, mingling with all

and creating the moment within your own mind—this is what I call being whole in

power.” (Watson 70)

All of the range of fortune and misfortune are like a test for the mind of the enlightened

one. For one who is whole in power, there is joy to be found in everything. Mastering oneness

with everything, and accepting everything, appears to be the key to living in harmony with the

Way. Confucius adds, “if virtue is preeminent, the body will be forgotten. But when men do not

forget what can be forgotten, but forget what cannot be forgotten—that may be called true

forgetting” (Watson 71).

Preeminent virtue is forgetting the body, and true forgetting is forgetting what cannot be

forgotten. Forgetting what cannot be forgotten seems like an impossible task, but context nudges

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me to hazard a guess and say that what cannot be forgotten is what cannot be forgotten [by men

and women] – that is, they themselves. A man cannot forget himself because a man only exists

so long as the mind creates the ego – the self. To forget oneself – one’s interests, desires,

distinctions and relationship to the world, and to experience one’s own oneness with one’s

experience – for both experience and experience need one another – that is wu wei. It is both

enlightenment and living with the Way.

V: Objections to and Further Discussion of the Taoist Conception of Meaning, Virtue,

and a Good Life

One of the main problems with the Taoist theory I’ve developed is that it is not clear that

it grounds the ultimate meaning which I have been concerned with in this essay. While it makes

sense to assume that the Way, as something absent of distinctions, represents reality when fitting

together Taoism with a universe lacking free will as accountability, it’s difficult to defend the

idea that distinctions don’t ever exist in objective reality, though it may still be true that we can

never select the right ones with certainty (a claim which still supports the legitimacy of not

acting on distinctions).

Another problem is that it is not clear what constitutes events of fate, and what constitutes

events that can be resisted and changed. Perhaps what is being implied is that no events can be

resisted and changed, and thus the only course of action that makes sense is one of dwelling in

the constant.

Just as the problem of the criterion undercuts beliefs about reality, it undercuts at least

some of the reasoning in the Taoist theory.

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Last, it may be that all of the talk of a good life and a life of meaning and the “best” life

is really talk of terrestrial (subjective) meaning. It may be that a life lived in serenity, acceptance,

and the practice of wu wei is one of supreme happiness and even of great influence. But are these

goods the same as a good “ultimate meaning”?

VI: Miscellaneous Discussion

There are a couple of issues that arose in the course of this essay.

One of the big ones is the nature of agents. Earlier I spoke of agents being closely

associated with the conscious mind. A question seems necessary: does it even make sense to talk

of agents? Are agents something independent of the mind? Are they a process of the brain, such

as the conscious mind? Are agents just the sum of all brain activity and processes at a given

moment? Such an agent would of course have no constancy, since each brain state is different

from the last. Are agents identical with the ego? Then discussion of forgetting oneself would

coincide well with discussion of surrendering accountable action in favor of wu wei.

The question of asking about meaning could be a futile question. Not only could meaning

not be something that exists in reality (as opposed to interpretations of reality), but it could be

something that does exist and yet cannot be comprehended on any level of consciousness. In

addition, it’s not clear that ultimate meaning in life is something that anyone really ought to be

concerned about. Whether or not life has some ultimate meaning (unless defined in particular

ways), it does not follow that life is good for those who live it, enjoyable, or worthwhile. These

issues are the ones that really seem at the forefront of much of discussion of life’s meaning, and

the existential crises of individuals.

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Talk of the Way – using distinctions and concepts for something that is described as

“unnameable” seems self-defeating. See D.C. Lau’s translation of the Tao Te Ching: “The way

can be spoken of,/But it will not be the constant way;/The name can be named,/But it will not be

the constant name” (Lau 49). However, it is useful to think of the discussion as sign-posts for the

truth – and not the truth itself. Just as a description of a sensation I feel, like the wind blowing

across my skin, is not the same as the experience of the sensation, a discussion of the

unnameable is merely a gesture toward its understanding. “Concerning these three sayings,/It is

thought that the text leaves yet something to be/desired/And there should, therefore, be

something to which it is/attached:/Exhibit the unadorned and embrace the uncarved/block,/Have

little thought of self and as few desires as possible” (Lau 67).

Conclusion

The arguments in Derk Pereboom’s “Meaning in Life Without Free Will” make a

compelling case that we lack free will in the sense of accountability. As it happens, Taoism, as

revealed by Burton Watson’s Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings and D.C. Lau’s Tao Te Ching,

produces theories for life’s meaning which are quite apt to take on that conclusion. However,

Taoism’s claims about ultimate meaning in life tend to fall short of the mark, though it isn’t

always obvious what mark they are shooting for. They describe some ways to achieve happiness

and contentment that other theories about the meaning of life ignore. Ultimately, the question of

life’s ultimate meaning is not answered, nor is it clear that it ever can be.

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Works Cited

Chuang Tzu. Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings. Trans. Burton Watson. New York: Columbia UP,

1996. Print.

IAC Corporation. "Distinction." Dictionary.com. Dictionary.com. Web. 04 May 2012.

<http://dictionary.reference.com/>.

Lao Tzu. Tao Te Ching. Trans. D.C. Lau. New York: Knopf, 1994. Print.

Levine, Michael P. "What Does Death Have to Do with the Meaning of Life?" Religious Studies

23.04 (1987): 457-65. JSTOR. Web. 17 Jan. 2012.

Pereboom, Derk. "Meaning in Life Without Free Will." Philosophic Exchange 33 (2002-3): 18

34. Moodle.lafayette.edu. 19 Jan. 2012. Web.

<http://moodle.lafayette.edu/mod/resource/view.php?id=145970>.

Pereboom, Derk. "Why We Have No Free Will and Can Live Without It." Reason and

Responsibility. Fourteenth ed. Boston, MA: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2011. 456-70.

Print.

Sorensen, Roy A. A Brief History of the Paradox: Philosophy and the Labyrinths of the Mind.

Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003. Print.