From  a  Culture  of  Disaster  Response  to  a  Culture  of  Adaptation:  Addressing  Flooding  and  Climate  Change  in  Honduras  

 

by Laura Kuhl

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy The Fletcher School, Tufts University

January 2011

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North  Meets  South David  Mallet,  Alright  Now,  2009   This is where the journey ends Here where the river bends Rough water down the line And this old boat is past your prime We can still make her come about Here in this wind. This is where the north meets south. And this is where the east meets west. And this is where we are our best. Goodbye to the good old days Put all that stuff away. Our belief is bigger than our doubt. Time to begin And this is where the north meets south Calling all our wisdom and clout. Time to begin This is where the north meets south This is where we start to heal It’s a brand new deal And listen to the old bell ring This is where they did those things All that fighting and flailing about This is where it ends This is where the north meets south. And we all got us here, we got to get us out Time to begin This is where the north meets south.  

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Acknowledgements   This thesis would not have been possible without the support of numerous people, and I’d like to take this moment to thank them for supporting me through this journey. First I’d like to thank everyone who supported me during my fieldwork in Honduras. Justo, Ela, Karen and Alexandre, thank you for so generously sharing your home and your lives with me. You were so welcoming to me, so supportive of my work, and so encouraging of my Spanish. I will always look fondly on my time in La Ceiba, Ela’s wonderful tortillas, and wonderful conversation with all of you! Justo, thank you also for arranging all of the logistics of my research and allowing me to work with FUCSA. I had a wonderful time getting to know the organization. Pepe Herraro, thank you for serving as my mentor in La Ceiba- you are an incredible wealth of resources. Thank you for all the wonderful journeys to the river house- my sanity at times depended on this amazing relaxing place! Cinthia Hernandez, thank you for being my constant companion during this research and serving as a trustworthy guide to La Ceiba. You did an excellent job transcribing all our interviews- no one could have asked for a better research assistant. Finally, I am eternally grateful to all the residents of La Ceiba and the surrounding communities who took part in this study. I am amazed at your openness and willingness to share your lives and your work with me. This thesis is a tribute to the hard work and strength with which you live. Next I’d like to thank my advisors for supporting me academically. Professor Moomaw, thank you for introducing me to sustainable development diplomacy, and helping to spark my interest in adaptation. Thank you for pushing me to excel and encouraging me to think critically- your advice has served me well. Astier Almedom, thank you for encouraging me throughout the process, and reminding of my “personal resilience.” Your encouragement has meant a lot. Paul Kirshen, thank you for introducing me to adaptation in Boston, and for being my companion on crutches! Your feedback and sharing of resources was always insightful and very helpful. Rich Vogel and the WSSS program, thank you for being a “support group for all the water people.” You helped me get a much earlier start on this project than I otherwise might have, and made sure I got to know Paul, without whom this thesis would never have developed. Finally, I’d like to thank my family and Ben for your support throughout this journey, especially this past semester. To my parents, thank you for always believing in me, and for helping create the space for me to accomplish everything. Amy, thank you for many rides to Harvard and Fletcher all semester-sometimes it’s the little things that make all the difference. Ben, thank you for trusting that this semester would end, that you wouldn’t have to do everything forever, and for continuing to encourage me throughout it all. You all are a testament to the strength of love, and I deeply appreciate all you did and continue to do for me.

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Abstract  Honduras is highly vulnerable to natural disasters, particularly hurricanes, and this

vulnerability is likely to increase with climate change. La Ceiba, the third largest city in the country, is highly vulnerable to floods due to its unique location at the foot of a steep mountain range, proximity to the coast, and rapid urban development. After Hurricane Mitch devastated the country in 1998, Honduras has developed a more sophisticated disaster response system, but still has been strongly criticized for lacking a culture of disaster risk management. With climate change, the current system of disaster response will be even less adequate. This thesis explores how La Ceiba can transition from a culture of disaster response to a culture of adaptation that incorporates a broad range of risks, including climate change. The research is based on fieldwork conducted on the northern coast of Honduras between May and July 2010. Over 100 interviews were conducted with stakeholders involved in flooding and disaster management at the municipal and regional level, as well as with NGOs, community leaders and residents.

In order to encourage a transition from a culture of disaster response to a culture of adaptation, I suggest that a disaster risk reduction framework may be helpful. Disaster risk reduction is a broad concept that can encompass the priorities of both the fields of disaster management and climate change, but by placing a strong emphasis on risk and prevention, it forces both fields to look outside of their traditional approaches to natural disasters and view them more holistically. More specifically for La Ceiba, disaster risk reduction is an appropriate framework for several reasons. First, natural disasters are recognized as a key priority by both government and residents. In addition, disaster risk reduction has been identified by the government as an important area for improvement, so it is likely to get traction with stakeholders as an important policy agenda. Finally, a disaster risk reduction strategy could address many of the challenges that La Ceiba faces with flooding, and effectively help La Ceiba adapt to both the current flooding it experiences and the increased pressures associated with climate change.

Based on my fieldwork, I identify seven potential building blocks for adaptation in La Ceiba. The seven potential building blocks are: local coping strategies, knowledge of climate change, the current disaster management strategy in La Ceiba, national climate policies, national policies on disaster risk reduction, donors and international NGOs, and the international climate negotiations. These building blocks represent an extremely broad range of potential components of an adaptation strategy and contributors to a transition to a culture of adaptation. After evaluating the current status in each potential building block, I conclude that all of these building blocks are necessary for a comprehensive approach to adaptation. Each one offers essential elements of the strategy and can contribute in significant ways. While La Ceiba can reduce its risk of flooding and resilience to natural disasters without all of these building blocks, it is unlikely to be successful unless a significant number of these components are included. The analysis of these building blocks also demonstrates, however, that this transition will not be easy, and will require dedicated effort on the part of all stakeholders. The current culture of disaster response is deeply entrenched, and cultural practices are extremely difficult to change. A culture of adaptation will not be built quickly, but through small measures, this transition can be encouraged. By viewing adaptation in the broader context of disaster risk reduction, adaptation measures are more likely to address the needs and priorities of residents and policymakers and contribute to integrated solutions to flooding and natural disasters in La Ceiba.

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Table  of  Contents  

Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................... 5  Chapter 2: Defining adaptation and linking it to disaster risk reduction ...................................... 13  Chapter 3: Introduction to the Case Study.................................................................................... 28  Chapter 4: Community-Based Adaptation.................................................................................... 49  Chapter 5: The Role of Local Government................................................................................... 66  Chapter 6: National Policies ......................................................................................................... 86  Chapter 7: From local to global: bridging across scales ............................................................... 98  Chapter 8: Conclusion................................................................................................................. 116  References................................................................................................................................... 122  Appendix..................................................................................................................................... 132    

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Chapter  1:  Introduction    From  a  culture  of  disaster  response  to  a  culture  of  adaptation  

Honduras is highly vulnerable to natural disasters, particularly hurricanes. Based on data

on natural disasters in the past twenty years, Honduras was identified as one of the top three most

vulnerable countries in the world to extreme events, and this vulnerability will increase with

climate change (Harmeling 2009). In addition to its physical vulnerability, Honduras is socio-

economically vulnerable as one of the poorest countries in Central America, second only to its

neighbor Nicaragua (Cordero 2009). La Ceiba, the third largest city in the country, is highly

vulnerable to floods from a variety of causes due to its unique location at the foot of a steep

mountain range, proximity to the coast, and rapid urban development. This thesis explores

climate change adaptation and flooding in La Ceiba, Honduras and is based on fieldwork

conducted during the summer of 2010.

Although many parts of this thesis address theoretical questions and may at times appear

abstract, I want to highlight that the challenges that La Ceiba faces are not abstract, and La

Ceiba’s need to develop better strategies to handle flooding is both real and urgent. I recently

received an email from my research assistant informing me that a week ago, a strong storm hit

La Ceiba, and many of the communities included in this study were affected. Several

communities were out of contact with the outside world for days following the storm. Families

had to be rescued and evacuated, and three naval officers died in the rescue attempt. One of the

guards of the wildlife refuge where much of the fieldwork was conducted is also missing (Email

Communication, Cinthia Hernandez, Research Assistant, January 17, 2011). Without a

comprehensive strategy to address flooding, tragedies such as this will continue to affect La

Ceiba. Although natural disasters will always cause losses, many measures can be taken to

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reduce these losses. It is with this goal that this thesis explores the potential of climate change

adaptation strategies in the city.

Hurricane Mitch, which hit Honduras in 1998, was a defining moment in Honduras and

continues to shape policy decisions. Due to underlying vulnerabilities and poor management

systems, Hurricane Mitch caused massive devastation throughout the country and in La Ceiba.

Since then, Honduras, with the help of international donors and development agencies, has

developed a more sophisticated disaster response system, but still has been strongly criticized for

lacking a culture of disaster preparedness and risk management (UNDP and CEPREDENAC

2003, Telford et al. 2004, Newborne 2008). With climate change, the need for disaster risk

reduction and adaption strategies will increase and addressing the flooding challenges in La

Ceiba will continue to become more urgent.

The ability to respond quickly and effectively to disasters is critical in regions where

natural disasters are frequent and severe. It is highly encouraging to see how much progress

Honduras made since Hurricane Mitch in this regard and how many lessons have been learned

from the experience. However, disaster response is only one component of a comprehensive

disaster management strategy, and a holistic approach to natural disasters and flooding needs to

address the underlying drivers of flooding and risk factors for disasters, including climate

change. Although there are many concrete steps that could be taken to address flooding in La

Ceiba, more importantly, the city needs to shift from a culture of disaster response to one of

adaptation. This overarching cultural shift is necessary if La Ceiba is to address its vulnerability

to flooding and become a climate-resilient city.

The primary research question addressed in this thesis is: How can La Ceiba transition

from a culture of disaster response to a culture of adaptation? Many approaches to

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adaptation focus on an assessment of the assets or resources that government or households have

at their disposal, and while these elements are critical, they fail to acknowledge the critical role

that process plays in adaptation (Jones et al. 2010). Acknowledging the role of process

necessitates paying attention to less tangible elements, such as institutional frameworks that

support adaptation and enable innovation and learning. This requires looking not only at what a

system has that enables it to adapt, but what a system does that enables it to adapt (WRI 2009).

This thesis is primarily concerned with the process in La Ceiba for transitioning to a culture of

adaptation.

Introducing  a  Building  Block  Approach  to  Adaptation  

In Copenhagen hopes were high for a comprehensive climate deal, but after Copenhagen

failed to deliver, expectations were scaled back, and the goal in Cancún was to build the

foundation for future negotiations using a “building block” approach that capitalized on aspects

of the negotiations that appeared feasible and where a consensus was achievable. While no one

would call Cancún a resounding success, the cautious building block approach proved useful for

moving beyond the impasse the world found itself in at Copenhagen, and substantive progress

was made on several key issues. Cancún concluded with five key building blocks for a future

climate treaty: a shared vision, mitigation, adaptation, finance and technology (UNFCCC 2010a).

In conceptualizing approaches to adaptation in La Ceiba, the building block concept

provides a useful framework. Like the climate negotiations, the issues of flooding in La Ceiba

can be overwhelming. The multitude of drivers of flooding is at times disheartening and

complicated. The variety of potential impacts of climate change is overwhelming, and the

network of actors and institutions that could be relevant is complex. Throughout my fieldwork, I

constantly struggled with the desire to be comprehensive and the need to remain focused. If I

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were to attempt to develop comprehensive solutions to La Ceiba’s flooding issues as well as all

of the other impacts of climate change, like in Copenhagen, I would have become paralyzed.

While necessarily limited in scope, in this thesis I have chosen not to address the specific drivers

of flooding, apart from highlighting that adaptation strategies will need to be robust to both

climate change and other drivers. I have also chosen not to address adaptation in its broadest

context. Instead, I am specifically focusing on flooding and natural disasters, as these are the

most critical for La Ceiba.

Adaptation is growing in prominence, both within the climate community, and more

broadly in international development. Many projects are beginning to incorporate adaptation,

either as the explicit goal, or as a consideration within broader development projects. While this

is highly encouraging, the emphasis on the ground does not appear to be matched by progress in

scholarly work on adaptation. Case studies of specific adaptation options (ie in water

management or agriculture) are being developed, and best practices are emerging, but as of yet, a

comprehensive framework for thinking about adaptation is still developing. Many organizations

are recognizing the need to compile adaptation options (one recent example is the Center for

Sustainable Development’s database of Hands-on Field Activities for Community-Based

Adaptation with 300 options) (The Center for Sustainable Development 2011). Although this is

extremely useful at the project level, how do we make broader transitions in policy, culture and

governance that will facilitate adaptation? Thinking about adaptation in terms of a cultural

transition, and using a building block approach may help to promote our thinking about

adaptation.

Before exploring potential building blocks, it is important to identify several guiding

principles for adaptation. Adaptation is a broad concept and risks being pursued as an end in

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itself, particularly if climate finance becomes available specifically for adaptation. Before

embracing adaptation, it is important to think critically about what adaptation means and how it

is relevant to the challenges La Ceiba faces with flooding. The following principles guided my

analysis of potential building blocks of an adaptation strategy for La Ceiba.

1) Adaptation is closely linked to development. Climate change is not the only cause of

flooding and any approach to adaptation needs to address the multiple drivers of flooding,

recognizing climate change as one but not the only driver.

2) Individuals and communities have always adapted to changes in their environment,

whether those changes are climatic, economic, political, or social. Adaptation to climate

change needs to draw on the existing systems in place at the local level (for individuals,

communities and governments) and seek to incorporate climate change into these coping

strategies and approaches.

3) Adaptation occurs locally, but climate change is global. An effective approach to

adaptation must look across scales from the very local to the global, and build linkages

between these scales to facilitate adaptation.

While adaptation is a daunting task in a vulnerable country like Honduras, especially since

climate change is only one of many urgent priorities for the country, a building block approach

recognizes that many components of a successful adaptation strategy are already in place. It also

recognizes that not everything has to be done at once. Strengthening any of the building blocks

will increase La Ceiba’s ability to handle flooding and natural disasters in the face of climate

change.

Based on my fieldwork, I identify seven potential building blocks for adaptation in La

Ceiba. These building blocks alone are insufficient to create a resilient city and will not solve

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the problems of flooding in La Ceiba. However, each of these components might contribute to a

successful strategy for adaptation and together may help the city shift from a culture of disaster

response to one of adaptation. If La Ceiba can make this transition, it will be much better

positioned to address flooding issues. The thesis explores each building block in detail,

analyzing its potential to serve as part of the foundation for a comprehensive adaptation strategy,

and highlights aspects of each building block that would need to change in order for La Ceiba to

transition from a culture of disaster response to a culture of adaptation.

Potential building blocks for adaptation:

1) Local coping strategies for flooding. How do individuals, families and communities handle flooding now, and are these strategies robust to climate change?

2) Knowledge of climate change. Do people understand climate change and do they realize the implications of climate change for their communities?

3) The current system of disaster response. How does La Ceiba respond to flooding now, how resilient are the institutional arrangements for disaster response and could these institutional linkages be leveraged for adaptation?

4) Climate policies. Is climate change being incorporated into planning at either the local or national level? Can Honduras’ National Climate Strategy facilitate adaptation?

5) Disaster risk reduction policies. What policies does Honduras have for managing disaster risk? How effective are they and how can different actors utilize these laws to encourage adaptation?

6) NGOs and donor organizations. What role do NGOs and donor organizations play in La Ceiba? Are they addressing climate change?

7) International negotiations. How is adaptation addressed in the international climate negotiations and how can the international climate arena facilitate adaptation in La Ceiba? Although much of this thesis is specifically focused on La Ceiba, hopefully many of the

challenges and observations will be relevant in other locations, and this analysis will provide a

broader framework for thinking holistically about adaptation. Adaptation strategies will be

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different in every location, but I believe many of the building blocks identified for La Ceiba are

critical for developing an adaptation framework in other locations.

Thesis  Structure  

The remainder of this thesis is arranged as follows: After introducing a theoretical

framework for transitioning from a culture of disaster response to a culture of adaptation, I will

provide background on La Ceiba, the challenges the city faces with flooding, and the research

methodology. After this, the thesis will explore each of the potential building blocks, moving

from local to global. Although climate change is a global phenomenon, adaptation is highly

local, and an understanding of adaptation needs to be grounded in the local realities. It is for this

reason that the thesis begins with the local and builds up to the global. Although presented in a

linear fashion, progress on each potential building block will facilitate progress on others and

inherent synergies exist among many of these components.

Chapter 2 provides a theoretical foundation for the transition from a culture of disaster

response to a culture of adaptation by analyzing similarities and differences between these

concepts. I suggest disaster risk reduction strategies as a conceptual model to link these two

approaches to natural disasters. Chapter 3 introduces the research methodology used in this study

and provides background on the case study that forms the basis for the thesis. A case study

approach provided the opportunity to explore the local nature of adaptation and look critically at

the interconnected nature of adaptation, development and disaster management. The chapter

provides background on La Ceiba and the other communities included in the study, as well as an

overview of the challenges for flooding in La Ceiba, including climate change projections.

Chapter 4 addresses the first two potential building blocks: local coping strategies for flooding

and knowledge of climate change. It describes current adaptation strategies at the household and

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community level. I discuss concerns regarding the robustness of these strategies under climate

change, and some of the limitations of these local strategies. In addition it addresses the current

knowledge and awareness of climate change, some of the challenges for community members to

recognize climate impacts, and the implications of this for adaptation. Chapter 5 looks as the role

of local government. It presents the current disaster response system and the institutional actors

involved in disaster response with the goal of examining how institutional arrangements

developed for disaster response might be used for adaptation. Chapter 6 looks at national

policies, both climate policies and disaster management polices and examines their applicability

to La Ceiba, as well as their ability to address adaptation. Chapter 7 brings the scale back from

the local to the global by examining the role of NGOs, donor organizations and the international

climate negotiations in facilitating adaptation in La Ceiba. It looks at whether NGOs and donor

organizations are currently incorporating adaptation into their work and how they could

influence a transition to a culture of adaptation. It also takes a critical look at how adaptation is

approached in the international negotiations, what the potential is for the negotiations to facilitate

adaptation in La Ceiba and what some of the barriers in the negotiations are for this. The final

chapter brings together the observations and concerns raised throughout the thesis and provides

insight into how the various building blocks could come together and be used in La Ceiba to

transition from a culture of disaster response to a culture of disaster preparedness.

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Chapter  2:  Defining  adaptation  and  linking  it  to  disaster  risk  reduction  

Currently, La Ceiba handles flooding and natural disasters by responding to them; the

city has greatly improved its ability to prepare for and respond to disasters but has not taken the

next step of addressing the causes of flooding through a comprehensive disaster management

strategy. In this thesis I argue that La Ceiba needs to transition from a culture of disaster

response to a culture of adaptation. Before the following chapters explore potential building

blocks for this transition, it is important to examine what a “culture of disaster response” and a

“culture of adaptation” mean. This chapter provides a theoretical overview of the fields of

disaster management and climate change adaptation. In addition to providing an analysis of key

terminology in both fields, I examine some of the important differences between the fields.

Although disaster response will always be necessary, I analyze ways in which moving away

from a culture of disaster response, which is primarily reactive, towards a more proactive

adaptation approach, may better equip La Ceiba to handle flooding, particularly in light of the

increased stress that climate change will put on the system.

Reducing the vulnerability of local communities to natural hazards has been a primary

focus in the fields of disaster management, climate change adaptation, environmental

management and development, but each field has worked in relative isolation (Schipper and

Pelling 2006, Thomalla et al. 2006). Each field offers its own strengths and contributions to the

issue, but there is a need to bring these fields together. Both the fields of disaster management

and adaptation are beginning to recognize this and adjust their viewpoints accordingly, and learn

from what the other has to offer.

While theoretically, these fields have a lot in common, even though they use different

frameworks to discuss the issues, it is difficult to envision a cultural shift in La Ceiba directly

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from a disaster recovery approach to a climate adaptation approach. Disaster risk reduction

strategies that incorporate awareness of climate change may be one of the most effective ways to

bridge the gap between these fields, particularly in locations, like Honduras, where disasters are

already acknowledged as an important priority. Therefore, I analyze the concept of disaster risk

reduction and its relation to both disaster recovery and adaptation, highlighting ways that it may

serve as a bridge.

Disaster  Risk  Reduction:  A  Bridge  between  the  Disaster  and  Climate  Fields  

The disaster management and climate change fields have developed as isolated fields,

and as such, each one has their own language and terminology used to often describe similar

concepts. In this section I describe some of the key concepts in both fields, highlighting some

areas where there are conceptual differences, and others where the differences are merely in

language. Before beginning the analysis of each, it is important to define what is meant by

disaster response and climate change adaptation. Disaster response “is primarily concerned with

the intense ‘rescue’ period during which critical assets– lives, especially, and property – are

directly at risk (Leonard and Howitt 2009). A disaster response mentality also includes a focus

on disaster preparedness. Preparedness focuses on the ability to respond to a disaster, but not the

prevention or mitigation of disasters (Reyes Chirinos and Lara Pineda 2007). Although the

UNFCCC has not officially adopted a definition of adaptation, the document “Impacts,

Vulnerabilities and Adaptation in Developing Countries” defines adaptation as “a process

through which societies make themselves better able to cope with an uncertain future. Adapting

to climate change entails taking the right measures to reduce the negative effects of climate

change (or exploit the positive ones) by making the appropriate adjustments and changes”

(UNFCCC 2007). As can be seen from these two definitions, although both disaster response

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and climate change adaptation are concerned with the same issues, the approach they take to

address them is quite different.

Risk is at the center of the transition from a culture of disaster response to a culture of

adaptation. By focusing on risk assessments and ways to reduce risk, La Ceiba can begin to

address the current problems that it already faces with flooding as well as the increased damages

expected with climate change. An analysis of damages from Hurricane Mitch in Honduras

suggests that practices that increased risk were responsible for much of the damage. The study

identified the concentration in vulnerable areas of groups with few economic resources to

tolerate impacts and recover, environmental degradation, inappropriate land use in fragile areas,

and poor government management as reasons for the rise in catastrophic events in the country

(UNDP and CEPREDENAC 2003). Because the concept of risk is at the heart of both the

disaster management and climate adaptation fields, disaster risk reduction can serve as the bridge

between these two different intellectual fields and communities of practice. Disaster risk

reduction is defined by the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction as “the

concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyze and manage

the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened

vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and

improved preparedness for adverse events” (UNISDR 2009). Disaster risk reduction takes a

comprehensive approach to natural disasters looking at both physical and social causes of

disasters.

Risk management is increasingly being viewed as a critical step in addressing climate

change adaptation. Lawrence Susskind, Professor in the Urban and Environmental Program at

MIT and the founder of the Consensus Building Institute, recently urged cities and towns to take

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a risk management approach to adaptation. He argued that stand alone climate policies are

insufficient, and that it is necessary to incorporate risk management strategies into every land use

planning, growth management and infrastructure investment decision made (CBI 2010). It is also

growing in prominence within the disaster field. Traditionally, the focus has been on

preparedness and response. Two leading experts on disaster recovery and leadership in crisis at

the Harvard Kennedy School discuss the need for the field to move beyond response and

preparedness.

“But preparation for response – that is, making preparations so as to be able to execute response/rescue actions – is not the only way that societies can or should manage the hazards of uncertain events. More comprehensive management of large-scale risks – or, to put it another way, more complete and systematic development and exploitation of cost-effective opportunities to reduce the negative consequences from major risks – requires us to expand the common but narrow focus away from mere response…We need to look farther into the past – into things that can be done to avert events (by preventing them altogether), to shape them so that their consequences are not so severe if they do occur (through efforts at mitigation), or to permit more rapid recovery from disaster consequences that still occur in spite of these efforts” (Leonard and Howatt 2009).

With both fields recognizing a need to focus on disaster risk reduction, this is a natural area for

convergence. It is also an ideal mechanism for introducing the concept of climate change

adaptation to La Ceiba, as natural disasters are a priority area for the city.

The humanitarian aid community is also shifting its focus from a primarily disaster

response approach towards a disaster risk reduction strategy. The anticipated impacts of climate

change, particularly coastal flooding, resemble the natural disasters that humanitarian agencies

have dealt with in the past, meaning that humanitarian agencies bring skills, but also that it

potentially changes the framing of natural disasters (Nicholls et al. 2007). Although humanitarian

aid typically has focused on short-term solutions to address immediate needs, usually with the

goal of saving as many lives as possible, climate change is shifting the way that relief

organizations think about natural disasters and humanitarian responses. Instead of responding to

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emergencies, humanitarian agencies are beginning to take a proactive approach and view

adaptation as an important measure to ensure that communities are prepared to handle disasters

(Red Cross/Red Crescent Climate Guide 2007). Rather than responding reactively to threats

when they arrive, much of the climate work being undertaken by humanitarian agencies

recognizes the repeated nature of these threats and seeks to build either resilience within

communities or adaptive capacity to respond.

Commonly within the disaster literature, risk is calculated based on the hazards, exposure

(which can include measures of proximity as well as the frequency of events), and vulnerability

(which can include social, political or physical vulnerabilities) (Associated Program on Flood

Management 2008). Although this definition suggests a high degree of certainty (simply

multiple the three components, and calculate the risk), it is important to recognize that risk is

inherently a subjective concept, and is highly influenced by individual and societal values

(UNISDR 2009). A broader conceptual definition or risk, more frequently employed by the

climate community, is the probability of an event multiplied by its consequences (Anderegg

2010). Climate change may increase either the probability of an event or the consequences.

Both of these definitions necessitate an examination of uncertainty. For example, risk reduction

strategies for flooding can be thought of as attempts to limit losses that are inherently uncertain.

Both occurrence and magnitude are uncertain and efforts can be made to mitigate both

dimensions of loss (Berger et al. 2006). If the goal of disaster management or adaptation is to

minimize risk, then uncertainty has to be incorporated.

Inherent in the concept of risk is the idea of hazards, a term used primarily by the disaster

management community. A natural hazard is defined as a “natural process or phenomenon that

may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and

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services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage” (UNISRD 2009). Natural

hazards exist and cannot be stopped (although they can be accelerated through climate change),

but they do not need to become natural disasters (Uribe et al. 1999). Disasters are often described

as a result of exposure to a hazard, vulnerability, and insufficient capacity or measures to reduce

or cope with the potential negative consequences (Uribe et al. 1999, UNIDSR 2009). Hazards,

therefore are only one component of a disaster, and both disaster risk reduction and adaptation

strategies focus on reducing the vulnerability, or increasing the capacity to cope with the hazard,

in order to avoid natural disasters.

One of the key distinctions between disaster management and climate adaptation fields is

the way that natural hazards are framed: in disaster management disasters are viewed as distinct

events where the impacts overwhelm local coping capacities, and the focus of interventions,

therefore, has been on improving structural defenses that protect against these extreme events,

improving early warning systems, and improving humanitarian response mechanisms (Thomalla

et al. 2006). Climate adaptation, in contrast, tends to focus on long-term trends and socio-

ecological causes of vulnerability. Broadly speaking, disaster management focuses on current

threats, while climate adaptation focuses on future threats (Thomalla et al. 2006). Traditionally,

climate adaptation has also focused primarily at the global scale, while disaster management has

focused on the local or national, without paying attention to global trends, such as political

economy, that can contribute to vulnerability at the local level (Shipper and Pelling 2006).

Neither of these frameworks is complete, although both provide important perspectives.

However, a disaster risk reduction framework allows both the local and global threats to be

incorporated as well as both current and future risks.

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Using a disaster risk reduction framework requires thinking broadly about risk. Unlike a

traditional climate lens, a disaster risk reduction strategy looks at both current and future risks,

and a broad potential array of risk factors. Although climate change is increasing the risk of

flooding in many locations throughout the world, and damage values from flooding and storms

have increased, in most cases the increased damages come not from increased frequency or

severity of storms but from the increased exposure to flooding caused by more development or

the increased value of development (Loucks et al. 2005). It is also important to think broadly

about risk in order to avoid addressing one risk factor while exacerbating another. As more

measures have been taken to reduce the risk of flooding, worldwide deaths from flooding have

decreased. However, the damages and property losses associated with flooding have increased,

in large part because of greater development in flood-prone areas, some of which may be

facilitated by risk reduction measures (Berz 2000 in Berger et al. 2006). Risk reduction

strategies need to be part of broader strategies that address development in order to be successful.

The other key concept for risk is vulnerability. Vulnerability can be understood as a

function of exposure to underlying impacts and the ability to handle the impacts (Ensor and

Berger 2009, Smith et al. 2003). Although vulnerability is often thought of in terms of physical

vulnerabilities, socio-economic conditions can contribute significantly to vulnerability, and

vulnerability and poverty are closely linked (McGray et al. 2007). For example, poor people

often do not have the resources to purchase insurance to protect their property against flooding or

drought, nor can they purchase health insurance to protect them against increased disease

outbreaks such as malaria or dengue (Reid et al. 2009). One critique of climate change

adaptation is that it has tended to focus on specific ways that individuals or sectors can shift

behavior in response to climatic changes (ie changing crops), without addressing the underlying

20

vulnerabilities (Thomalla et al. 2006). Both the disaster community and the adaptation

community have been criticized for focusing on “what is exposed” rather than the “processes and

dynamics of exposure and responses” (Thomalla et al. 2006). A disaster risk reduction strategy

needs to keep process at the center of its approach to reducing risk.

While a discourse on vulnerability remains central to the discussion of climate change

and natural hazards, the concepts of resilience and adaptive capacity are gaining prominence as

an alternative framework with which to view both disaster risk reduction and adaptation.

Resilience is defined by the Resilience Alliance as “the capacity of a system to absorb

disturbance, undergo change and still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity, and

feedbacks” (The Resilience Alliance 2010). The concept of resilience has a long history and has

been applied in a wide variety of fields, of which climate change is now perhaps the most

prominent. The original conception of the term, developed by Bud Holling (1973), focused on

ecological resilience and the ability of ecological systems to withstand shocks (Holling 1973).

While this conception clearly has relevance for climate change, the understanding of resilience

has progressed to also examine concepts of socio-ecological and human resilience. Socio-

ecological resilience looks as the paired nature of social and ecological systems, recognizing the

inherent interconnections between them and the dependence of each on each other. Retaining a

similar focus on the capacity of systems to retain their essential identity, socio-ecological

resilience acknowledges the role that human ability to anticipate and plan for the future

(Almedom and Tumwine 2008). In a similar vein, human resilience has taken the original focus

of resilience on ecological systems and adapted it to human systems, demonstrating how human

systems display resilience in the face of shocks and investigating the characteristics of human or

social systems that lead to greater resilience. Human resilience can be defined as “the capacity

21

of individuals, families, communities, systems, and institutions to anticipate, withstand and/or

judiciously engage with catastrophic events and/or experiences; actively making meaning with

the goal of maintaining normal function without fundamental loss of identity” (Almedom and

Tumwine 2008). Human resilience can be envisioned on the scale of an individual (what makes

certain individuals resilient), at societal or community level scales (what makes certain types of

societies, different groups of people resilient), and also at institutional scales (what types of

institutions are resilient and what kinds of institutional arrangements are more resilient).

A related concept, and which helps to link vulnerability and resilience is adaptive

capacity. Adaptive capacity is the ability to respond to a changing climate, or more broadly,

changing conditions (Ensor and Berger 2009, Smith et al. 2003). Essentially it can be

understood as increasing the coping strategies available to communities and empowering people

with the tools to handle climate change as well as other challenges. While much of the work on

disasters has focused on a vulnerability model, adaptation models have the potential to focus on

the more empowering concepts of adaptive capacity and resilience. Vulnerability models

highlight the weaknesses of communities, while adaptation models highlight the resilience and

strength of communities, or ways to build upon existing strengths in order to build resilience. By

using a vulnerability model, disaster fields run the risk of presenting communities as victims, and

thus exacerbating some of the tensions that already exist in the climate arena. Resilience models,

on the other hand, focus on the tools communities have to live with adversity.

Some of the differences between the disaster and climate fields are primarily issues of

language and terminology. One of the most confusing issues is the use of the term mitigation. In

the climate literature, mitigation refers to actions taken to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases

(or mitigate the cause of climate change), and in the disaster management mitigation refers to

22

efforts to contain specific hazards (ie building a river embankment to mitigate flooding) (Shipper

and Pelling 2006). Without a common language, it can be difficult to see many of the overlaps

between the fields and potential for mutually reinforcing principles. One way that a disaster risk

reduction strategy can move beyond this barrier is to use the less ambiguous term “prevention,”

which has the same meaning in both fields and is less confusing.

Although some of the differences between disaster strategies and adaptation are merely

the framing of the issue, some important distinctions can be made. Within the adaptation

discourse, disaster recovery is sometimes termed “reactive adaptation,” as this adaptation occurs

after the impact. An example of reactive adaptation is the rebuilding of infrastructure after its

destruction during extreme events. Research has shown, however, that reactive adaptation often

reinforces existing inequalities and does not address the needs of the most vulnerable populations

or increase their adaptive capacity (Adger et al. 2005). Glantz and Jamieson (2000) argue that

the impacts and recovery from Hurricane Mitch reinforced inequalities stemming from land

tenure and entitlement systems in Honduras (Glantz and Jamieson 2000). Although disaster

recovery must be one component of an effective adaptation strategy, concerns such as this

demonstrate that when risk is not considered in a holistic fashion, there can be adverse outcomes.

Shifting from a reactive response to disasters, which can reinforce vulnerabilities, to a culture of

adaptation, which focuses on addressing vulnerability and building adaptive capacity, is critical

if Honduras wants to be less impacted by future extreme events.

Although the disaster risk management and climate adaptation communities have

traditionally approached natural hazards differently, increasingly there is convergence between

these fields. Thomalla et al. (2006) point to several encouraging indications of convergence. 1)

Both communities focus on risk management approaches to assess risk and vulnerability and

23

have developed numerous methodologies to do so, 2) The disaster risk management community

is shifting towards a more anticipatory approach that is capable of incorporating climate change,

3) climate change adaptation communities are recognizing the importance of addressing

vulnerabilities to current climates, 4) poverty reduction and sustainable development can serve as

a foundation for both fields, and 5) both communities increasingly recognize the importance of

natural resource management as a means to reduce vulnerability (Thomalla et al. 2006).

Linking  adaptation  and  development  

As Thomella et al (2006) highlighted, a disaster risk reduction framework can also link

the climate change adaptation and development communities (Thomella et al. 2006). Natural

disasters and sustainable development are closely linked. The communities most vulnerable to

climate change are frequently the poorest and most disadvantaged, increasing their vulnerability

to natural disasters. It is estimated that 97% of deaths associated with natural disasters occur in

developing countries, demonstrating that natural hazards don’t have to become disasters; this

happens in places where sustainable development is most needed (Reyes Chirinos and Lara

Pineda 2007). One of the most effective ways to address vulnerability is to address poverty,

aligning the goals of development and adaptation.

The concepts of adaptive capacity and resilience help to link the fields of disaster

management and climate change adaptation to the field of development. Building the adaptive

capacity of vulnerable populations has the benefit of being a “no regrets” strategy, in which

measures are beneficial for development regardless of the specific climate impacts (Smith et al.

2003). Infrastructure, savings, networks, and livelihood alternatives all increase the ability of

individuals and communities to respond to climate change, but are goals for sustainable

development regardless of climate change (Klein et al. 2007, Smith et al. 2003). One of the

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arguments that has been made against adaptation is that the lack of certainty surrounding

impacts, particularly on the local scale, makes it hard to plan for adaptation. This has given rise

to a mentality that adaptation measures cannot be undertaken until better predictions at the local

level are available (Schipper 2007). However, no regret strategies such as building adaptive

capacity, increasing livelihood strategies and improving savings are not dependent on specific

climate responses, and therefore can be undertaken even in the face of a poor understanding of

local climate impacts.

When working to integrate climate change and development goals, the concept of

mainstreaming is also important. Mainstreaming can be understood as the “integration of policies

and measures that address climate change into development planning and ongoing sectoral

decision-making, so as to ensure the long-term sustainability of investments as well as to reduce

the sensitivity of development activities to both today’s and tomorrow’s climate” (Klein et al.

2007). Inherently, mainstreaming adaptation involves a sustainable approach to development.

Acknowledging the relationship between climate change and development forces organizations

to internalize the reality that if development does not consider environmental factors, it will not

achieve its development objectives, and is thus beginning to change the way they think about

doing development. For example, the World Bank estimates that over 40% of development

financed by development assistance is sensitive to climate change, and thus is beginning to

prioritize climate vulnerability assessments and risk analyses (Caravani et al. 2010a). A common

approach to addressing climate risk is “climate-proofing,” a process which involves making sure

that projects are designed with a changing climate in mind and will still fulfill their goals if

projected climate impacts occur (Klein et al. 2007). Climate-proofing is seen as a necessary

measure to ensure the quality of investments made in development, and is promoted by the

25

World Bank and other development agencies (World Bank 2009a). Mainstreaming climate

change into development, however, is not simply a matter of climate-proofing, and requires a

more holistic view of the intersection between climate and development. Development projects

will not only need to add climate into their considerations, but addressing adaptation will require

fundamental shifts in the process of development. As UNDP states, “Adapting to climate change

means that we must do development better. In coming decades, greater progress is needed to

develop national capacity and to support cross-sectoral policy processes as the foundation for

sustainable adaptation. However, better development is only part of the challenge — the

complexity of climate change adaptation means we must also do development differently.

Changes in planning and practices are crucial to reducing climate change risks.” (UNDP 2009).

In addition to ensuring that development projects integrate climate change, climate

change adaptation projects need to take development needs into consideration and not focus

solely on climate impacts. Many practitioners have criticized adaptation projects for their single

focus, arguing that it is unreasonable to ask people to be concerned with future needs (ie food

security, disaster preparedness), when they have immediate needs. Adaptation requires

investment and long-term planning, which is beyond the scope of many people whose basic

needs are not being met. Many argue that we cannot think about doing adaptation without

addressing the “development deficit” which requires addressing immediate needs of water and

sanitation, food security and livelihoods (Raihan et al. 2010). By focusing on measures that will

reduce risk both now and in the future, adaptation projects can avoid this criticism. The climate

community increasingly is recognizing both the ethical reasons for a risk reduction approach, as

well as the practical reality that engaging local communities to address future threats when

current needs are urgent is not realistic.

26

It is important to recognize that adaptation is not necessarily always beneficial, and

adaptation cannot be pursued without critical reflection (Adger et al. 2005, Barnett and O’Neill

2010). Maladaptation can be defined as “action taken ostensibly to avoid or reduce vulnerability

to climate change that impacts adversely on, or increases the vulnerability of other systems,

sectors or social groups” (Barnett and O’Neill 2010). Sometimes the ways that people or systems

adapt actually represent maladaptive responses, and can cause more harm than good. For

example, building irrigation canals in a coastal area as an adaptive strategy to address increasing

drought may prove to be a maladaptive strategy if the increased irrigation decreases the water

table and leads to salt-water intrusion with rising sea levels (Klein et al. 2007). Barnett and

O’Neill (2010) describe five ways that adaptation measures can be maladaptive. Adaptation

measures can be maladaptive if they: 1) increase emissions of greenhouse gases, 2)

disproportionately affect the most vulnerable populations, 3) have high opportunity costs, 4)

reduce the incentives to adapt, or 5) create path dependency (primarily associated with large

infrastructure projects) (Barnett and O’Neill 2010). By focusing on adaptation strategies that

increase adaptive capacity and resilience, adaptation projects can hopefully avoid some of these

problems, but it is important to be aware of them.

Particularly when it comes to the implementation stage, the “toolbox” of methods

available to disaster risk reduction and adaptation practitioners overlaps significantly with tools

generally used in development (McGray et al 2007). Although earlier conceptions of adaptation

focused on structural solutions, there is increasing recognition that structural solutions are

insufficient for adaptation (Boyce 1999, Hey and Philippi 2006, Olsthoorn et al 2008). Instead,

adaptation needs to focus on governance, communication infrastructure and other “soft”

components of development (Schipper 2007). By focusing on risk, development projects can

27

address the broad range of drivers of vulnerability, including climate change, and incorporate

both structural and non-structural measures.

With disaster risk reduction as a mechanism to help La Ceiba transition from a culture of

disaster response to a culture of adaptation, the rest of this thesis explores what different

components of a disaster risk reduction strategy might be, and what roles different actors might

play in that strategy. As a holistic concept, there is no single strategy or actor that can implement

disaster risk reduction in La Ceiba. Instead, a building block approach will be necessary to shift

from the approach to flooding and natural disasters.

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Chapter  3:  Introduction  to  the  Case  Study    Flooding  in  La  Ceiba,  Honduras  

This chapter introduces the case study that forms the foundation for the thesis. It

describes the research methodology used and provides background on the city of La Ceiba and

surrounding villages included in the study. The issue of flooding in the city is introduced

through an analysis of stakeholder perceptions of the drivers of flooding. This analysis

demonstrates the wide variety of drivers of flooding in the city, highlighting the complexity of

the issue and the need for integrated solutions. Next, the projections for climate change in the

region are analyzed, with particular attention to ways in which the projections of climate change

will exacerbate the flooding problems that La Ceiba already experiences. The chapter concludes

by discussing the impacts of Hurricane Mitch on the country. Hurricane Mitch destroyed much

of Honduras and, more than 10 years later, remains a key event for Hondurans. Mitch serves as

a focal point for policy decisions regarding disaster response and risk reduction, and any

adaptation strategies will likely use Hurricane Mitch as their benchmark. By providing a context

for the problems La Ceiba faces with flooding, the ways that climate change will exacerbate the

problem, and the example of a traumatic past experience, I hope to demonstrate the importance

of the shift from a culture of disaster response to a culture of adaptation in La Ceiba.

Research  Methodology  

This case study is based on fieldwork conducted in La Ceiba, Honduras. Fieldwork was

conducted between May and July 2010 in the Department of Atlántida on the northern coast of

Honduras (see Figure 1). Research consisted of interviews with 120 stakeholders in the cities of

La Ceiba, Porvenir and San Fransisco as well as surrounding villages, although the majority of

29

interviews were conducted in La Ceiba (n=61). Using snowball-sampling techniques1, the study

attempted to identify all official stakeholders in the planning and response to flooding or climate

change. Many stakeholders were identified by staff at COPECO (The Permanent Contingency

Commission). As the coordinating body for disaster preparedness and response, COPECO was

able to identify contacts at many municipal and regional departments and agencies. Fifteen

interviews were conducted with municipal-level officials and 21 with officials at state agencies

with regional headquarters in La Ceiba.

In addition to interviewing official stakeholders about their roles in disaster preparedness,

response and adaptation, the study sought to understand the experience of vulnerable

neighborhoods and communities through interviews with local leaders and residents.

Neighborhoods within La Ceiba were selected based on an index for vulnerability to flooding

provided by the CODEM (Municipal Emergency Committee). Contact information for

community leaders was provided by the Department of Community Development in La Ceiba.

A total of 7 neighborhoods were included in the study and 29 stakeholders were interviewed (see

Figure 2 for locations of the neighborhoods).

Communities outside of La Ceiba were included because they exemplified unique

flooding challenges in the region as identified by key informants. Several of these villages were

located in or adjacent to the Cuero y Salado wildlife refuge. Because the refuge spans several

political jurisdictions, the municipalities of Porvenir and San Fransisco were included in the

study, as villages within the refuge correspond to these municipalities (7 stakeholders).

Interviews were conducted in 4 communities bordering the Cuero y Salado wildlife refuge to the

1 Snowball sampling techniques collect a sample by identifying several key informants and collecting referrals of other potential participants with specific characteristics of interest for the research. This technique is particularly useful when subjects are difficult to reach or hard to identify. Each new subject is then used to generate additional referrals. The technique is widely used in qualitative sociological research (Biernaki and Waldorf 1981).

30

west of the city (29 stakeholders). In addition, interviews were conducted in one community to

the east of the city known for flooding (Nueva Armenia), and one upstream community in the

Congrejal watershed (Las Mangas) (5 stakeholders) (see Figure 3 for locations of all study

communities). Further upstream community interviews had to be cancelled due to a medical

emergency.

Most interviews with municipal or state officials were conducted individually, although

in some cases two officials were interviewed jointly. The format of the neighborhood and

village interviews varied more widely and was dictated by the needs of each community. In all

cases, we contacted the president of the Patronato (or other key contact identified by informants)

ahead of time to arrange a site visit to the community, and asked to meet with representatives

from the Patronato, the Junta de Agua (water board) and the CODEL (local emergency

committee). In some cases, we met solely with the president of the Patronato, and in others the

president had arranged a meeting with a majority of the members of these committees. In other

communities, we interviewed multiple community leaders individually. Interviews ranged in

size from 1 individual to 10 individuals. After the formal interview was concluded, we received

a guided tour of the community, which provided additional time for informal interviews and

interactions with residents.

Interviews were open-ended and lasted between 20 minutes and 3 hours. Interview

questions addressed flooding, disaster preparedness and response, and climate change.

Questions related to flooding addressed past experiences with flooding, the major challenges that

people experienced relating to flooding (either personally, as a community or professionally),

and what they viewed as the causes of flooding. Questions relating to disaster preparedness and

response addressed what the current system of planning for and responding to floods is, their

31

roles in preparing for and responding to flooding are (either personally, as a community or

professionally), and what would happen if there was another Hurricane Mitch in the future.

Questions related to climate change addressed whether people are currently experiencing climate

change impacts or observing changes in climate and whether climate change impacts being

incorporated into planning and policy-making.

All interviews were conducted by myself and my research assistant, Cinthia Hernandez, a

native of La Ceiba and a recent college graduate in agricultural economics. I conducted all

interviews and Cinthia took detailed notes. Most interviews were recorded using a digital tape

recorder, unless the informant chose not to use the tape recorder. The study was explained to all

participants and participants gave verbal consent before participating. This study and consent

process was approved by the Tufts Institutional Review Board in spring 2010. The recordings

were transcribed in Spanish by Cinthia, and I checked them for accuracy. Having a native

Spanish-speaker transcribe all interviews helped to ensure that content was not lost due to

language barriers in the analysis. These transcripts as well as my interview notes were used to

provide evidence and examples in the case study. In addition, my own observations throughout

the fieldwork, as well as innumerable casual conversations with residents informed this research.

Background documents and presentations provided to me by stakeholders during fieldwork were

also utilized, and are cited when appropriate.

By conducting interviews in both the city of La Ceiba (large by Honduran standards,

although admittedly small by global standards), as well as in the much smaller municipalities, I

gained an appreciation for the different challenges faced by different types of cities, and the

multiple constraints faced by local governments. Although the study area for this fieldwork was

relatively small, consisting of 70 km along the coast, the diversity of flooding challenges is quite

32

broad and points to the importance of an integrated approach to adaptation that addresses the

specific challenges in each locale. Not only are the types of flooding challenges different

depending on the specific local circumstances, but in all cases the causes of the problem are

multi-faceted and solutions will require combined efforts of a wide variety of actors.

My collaboration with the Fundación Cuero y Salado (FUCSA) was integral to the

success of the study. FUCSA is a small NGO located in La Ceiba. It is the oldest environmental

NGO in Honduras and was founded in 1986 to manage the 1st national wildlife refuge, Cuero y

Salado, designated because it contains critical habitat for the endangered manatee. The Cuero y

Salado wildlife refuge is located 33 kms from La Ceiba, and covers an area of 13,000 hectares.

My collaboration with FUCSA led to a focus in the study on communities located in and around

the refuge. Because of the support offered by FUCSA, their interest in these communities, and

their excellent contacts, I was able to conduct my research not just in the city of La Ceiba, but to

expand my scope and also examine flooding issues in the communities bordering the reserve.

This provided an opportunity to conduct fieldwork in several communities that are extremely

vulnerable to flooding. FUCSA also provided me office space, arranged for my research assistant

to help on the project, and introduced me to numerous valuable stakeholders. The director of

FUCSA also generously hosted me in his home with his family, and shared many of his personal

insights into life in La Ceiba, flooding, and environmental issues in Honduras more broadly.

These experiences contributed significantly to my ability to understand flooding and climate

change in a holistic fashion in La Ceiba.

33

Flooding  in  La  Ceiba  

La Ceiba is the third largest city in Honduras with a population of approximately

200,000. The city was founded as the headquarters for Standard Fruit Company in the 1870s.2

Standard Fruit Company, a subsidiary of Dole, continues to play an important role in the

economy, although pineapples are now the primary export in place of the bananas that originally

attracted the company. There is still a strong influence of Standard Fruit throughout the city, with

many old buildings bearing the distinctive white wooden frames and dark green trim

architecture, reminiscent of New Orleans where the company was based. Standard buildings can

also be clearly identified because they are built on stilts to protect the houses from flooding, a

practice that is rarely seen in current construction in the city, although it is still prevalent in some

flood-prone villages and outlying neighborhoods of Ceiba. Although still the second most

important port city in Honduras, tourism has become one of the largest economic sectors in the

city. As the gateway to the Bay Islands and the second largest reef system in the world, as well

as other highly desirable areas, including world-class rafting on the Rio Cangrejal and hiking in

Pico Bonito National Park, many tourists pass through the city. Due to the presence of Standard

Fruit Company and the inflow of tourists, the economy of La Ceiba is better than in many other

parts of Honduras, but poverty is still widespread, city services far from sufficient, and

environmental problems critical.

Geographically, La Ceiba is located at the delta of the river Cangrejal at the foot of the

mountain range known as the “Cordillera Nombre de Dios.” One of the major challenges for the

city is that it is located at the bottom of a narrow but tall watershed, with a short distance

2 In the early years, Standard Fruit provided the majority of the services in the city. For example they ran a train throughout the city, primarily to transport their equipment and bananas. However, when they turned the train over to the city to manage, it fell into disrepair. Today you can still see the remnants of the tracks on the main street of the city, but only one small train remains functional- a quaint tourist train going out to the Cuero y Salado wildlife refuge.

34

between the mountains and the coast. This means that water rapidly accumulates and flows

down the Rio Cangrejal and its tributaries though the city and to the coast. In addition, La Ceiba

receives an average rainfall of about 286 cm, making it one of the wettest cities in Central

America (Weatherbase 2011). The Cangrejal is the largest and most powerful of the rivers in

Ceiba, but the Dante and Bonito also flow through the city to the north (see Figures 1 and 2 for

locations of the three rivers and Nombre de Dios mountains). All three rives cause serious

flooding problems in the city. In addition to its importance for flooding, the Bonito is also an

important source of drinking water, and the majority of the city’s drinking water comes from this

source.

Twenty km away from La Ceiba, in the Nombre de Dios mountain range, are two

national parks that help to protect the city from flooding. Pico Bonito is the larger of the two,

and is the second largest national park in the country. It consists of 107,000 hectares and

contains 9 mountains and 19 watersheds, as well as a huge diversity of wildlife. The core of the

park is restricted for conservation purposes, but 82 communities with 24,000 people live in the

buffer zone surrounding the park. The Nombre de Dios National Park is much smaller (slightly

larger than 30,000 hectares) and is the newest national park in the country. It was established in

2007 in order to connect the Pico Bonito National Park and the Cayos Cochinos National Marine

Sanctuary, effectively serving as an ecological corridor from the mountains to the coast

(Interview, Executive Director, Nombre de Dios National Park Foundation, July 15, 2010).

These parks serve as important protected areas for the city, although they are under immense

pressure from small-scale agriculture and urban expansion because of their proximity to the city.

With the high levels of deforestation in Honduras, it is highly advantageous for La Ceiba to have

35

protected areas so close by, but the parks are understaffed, and like many other parks, struggle to

ensure that their boundaries are maintained.3

Although there are many causes of flooding in La Ceiba, a poor urban drainage system is

one of the distinctive challenges that La Ceiba faces (see Figure 4 for a diagram of some of the

drivers of flooding in La Ceiba). After even a light shower, many sections of the city fill with

water. Larger storm events can cause major flooding throughout the city, even before issues

begin to arise from either riverine or coastal flooding. This is not to suggest that riverine and

coastal flooding are not also large problems, but rather to highlight the diversity of challenges the

city faces. The causes for the failure of the drainage system are complex and stem from many

sources. However, several key themes emerged from interviews, which will be discussed here.4

One concern highlighted by the Director of OMASAN, the municipal water and

sanitation agency, is the poor state of the current drainage system. Although a drainage system

exists for the central part of the city, many of the newer neighborhoods do not have a formal

drainage system, and where the system does exist, it is in a serious state of disrepair. Most of the

major drainage pipes have collapsed, or are predicted to collapse in the near future. In addition,

the system is a combined water and sewer system. This means that every time it rains and the

pipes overflow, there are serious health consequences as raw sewage can spill into the streets

(Interview, Director of OMASAN, June 22, 2010). In the opinion of the Director of the

3 Honduras has the highest rates of deforestation in Latin America (Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Kongphan-apirak 2009, SERNA and UNDP 2010). 4 Approximately four months before my fieldwork, a new mayor was elected. As a result almost all city officials were new to office, and consequently were very open about talking about problems that the city faces. They could simultaneously blame the previous government for all for the problems they identified and explain how they plan to address these shortcomings. This offered a unique opportunity to discuss the problems the city faces without public officials attempting to avoid culpability, although responses have to be interpreted carefully. There are many reasons public officials may have wanted to highlight the incompetence of their predecessors, leading to exaggeration of some problems. On the other hand, they may have been attempting to portray themselves in the best light by overstating future plans or their own capabilities. Therefore, discernment is necessary in interpreting public responses.

36

Department of Urban Planning, this “sanitation emergency” is one of the largest problems the

city faces, particularly in certain sectors of the city where high fecal coliform counts are common

and the management of soild waste is non-existant. The city doesn’t have the capacity to

provide services to everyone, leaving certain areas without these services (Interview, Director,

Department of Urban Planning, June 1, 2010). The Director of Public Services explained the

problem with the combined sewer-stormwater drainages, arguing that the uncontrolled growth of

the city is largely responsible.

"There are sewers but they are out of sync with the growth of the city. There were not enough, the city grew, and their capacity became lower. With more growth, there is more cement, less filtration, and more flooding….Drainage that doesn’t meet the standards is common, so, already it’s necessary to provide drainage that is in line with the actual growth of the city." (Interview, Director, Public Services, June 24, 2010).

More broadly, the lack of urban planning and uncontrolled growth of the city was identified as a

key source of the problem. As the following quote demonstrates, the lack of an urban plan has

led to many problems, including development that has outpaced city services, and construction in

highly vulnerable areas.

“There has never been growth based on an urban development plan. This has permitted the accelerated and disorganized growth of the city. The continual necessities of life, of certain types of buildings [has taken priority]. This situation of disorderly growth has resulted in city clusters....This has allowed people to avoid looking towards the future and prevented them from thinking about the problems of future generations.” (Interivew, Director, Department of Urban Planning, June 1, 2010).

The city has recognized the urgent need for an urban development plan, and efforts are

underway, with funding support from Denmark, to develop a comprehensive urban plan for the

city that will incorporate risk and vulnerability analysis. Land-use planning can help to mitigate

disasters and reduce risks by discouraging construction in hazard-prone areas, including

consideration of service routes for transport, power, water, sewage and other critical facilities

(UNISDR 2009). With an urban plan, in theory there will not be continued development in

37

vulnerable areas, and construction planning will be coordinated with city services, although this

is dependent on enforcement, an issue that is challenging for a government with limited

resources.

A specific concern with the growth of the city has been the loss of the natural canals and

drainages that previously ensured that water drained to the ocean, many of which have been

filled and converted for urban uses. The Director of the Department of Ubran Planning discussed

this as a key priority for her department.

“I am asking for permits for these fillings [of the natural drainages]. In order to fill, we evaluate the soil to check for pipes or for the natural drainages. We try not to block in any way [these drainages] for any work made by the hand of man. These natural drainages of the city, as the name says, were naturally designed by God so that water would flow to the sea without any issues, but man with his hand has constructed buildings that go beyond the laws of nature and this has caused the chaos.” (Interview, Director, Department of Urban Planning, June 1, 2010)

Without the natural drainages, the piped drainage system is even more taxed than it otherwise

would be, placing additional strains on an already inadequate system.

Although the inadequate pipe system, the lack of urban planning and the filling of natural

drainages are probably the largest causes of flooding, the most common issue brought up by both

residents and public officials was trash. Residents blamed themselves for cultural practices

regarding trash and city officials for failing to clean the drainage ditches or provide trash

services. Public officials, as the below quote exemplifies, were more likely to blame cultural

practices, and were also quick to point out how these practices made it harder for them to

perform their jobs.

"Here we have the bad habit of throwing trash into the streams. We throw refrigerators, old furniture, soda cans, water bottles. Anything, we throw it away. In the end this all arrives and forms a dam. And when this all happens together, a refrigerator, furniture, then the rivers and streams begin to overflow and cause flooding " (Interview, Director, CODEM, June 22, 2010)

38

Trash was identified as the cause of numerous issues throughout the city: it was the top concern

of the Director of Tourism, and the most common topic that stakeholders brought up when

discussing the environment. Even when people talked about preparing for emergencies, cleaning

up trash was a key theme. Although trash is a major problem, particularly because of the human

health impacts when trash is transported into neighborhoods during floods, it plays a larger role

in stakeholders’ analyses of the causes of flooding than is reasonable. Although trash is

described as a cause of flooding, perhaps it would be more accurate to describe the trash as

exacerbating flooding impacts. This issue likely was prominant because of its visibility in the

city (issues such as the filling of natural drainages and poor urban planning are much harder to

observe). In addition, trash is an issue that can be addressed more easily, and the city thus has

many campaigns against trash, raising its profile in the mind of residents.

These urban drainage problems, combined with the frequent riverine flooding during

heavier storms, and coastal flooding during hurricanes and tropical storms, make La Ceiba

extremely vulnerable to flooding.

Flooding  in  Surrounding  Towns  and  Villages  

Other towns and communities in the study faced some similar issues to La Ceiba in

regard to flooding, although the more rural nature of these locations created different threats.

The city of El Porvenir is the next municipality to the west of La Ceiba. Significantly smaller

than La Ceiba, El Porvenir has a population of a little over 2000 people in the city proper, and

approximately 13,000 in the municipal jurisdiction (Republica de Honduras 2011a). Porvenir is

at the center of a large agricultural area owned by Standard Fruit Company for pineapple

production. In addition to flooding from rivers (one of which passes directly through the

municipality), Porvenir is heavily affected by flooding from the agricultural fields of Standard

39

Fruit. The run-off from these fields drains directly into several communities, causing flooding

problems, as well as numerous health problems caused by the chemicals and fertilizers used in

production (Interview, Businessman, Professor and Environmentalist, July 15, 2010). Tensions

are high in the municipality between residents and the Company because it is the primary

employer, but residents complain of poor working conditions and environmental impacts

(Interview, Director, CODEM, July 7, 2010).

San Fransisco is slightly smaller than El Porvenir, with approximately 10,000 residents

within the municipal jurisdiction (Republica de Honduras 2011b). It faces similar flooding

issues as its neighbor El Porvenir, although several highly vulnerable communities (including

Boca de Toro, described below) are included within the municipal jurisdiction, making flooding

a higher concern in this municipality. One of the most notable features of San Fransisco is that

they have had the same mayor for over 12 years, a period unheard of in Honduras’ political

climate. The mayor is strongly committed to development in the municipality, and this

dedication has led to major improvements in water service, rural electrification (80% of the

municipality has electricity, and it is the mayor’s goal to complete this project by the end of his

current term), and improvements in education through the building of multiple schools. The

mayor is also the President of the CODEM (Municipal Emergency Committee), allowing for

continuity between disaster preparedness and response and the other priorities of the

municipality (Interview with the Mayor, San Fransisco, July 7, 2010).

To the east of La Ceiba, the town of Nueva Armenia is prone to both riverine and coastal

flooding. This community was unique because of its large Garifuna population. The Garifuna

are an Afro-Caribbean indigenous group with a strong presence on the northern coast of

Honduras. Racism against the Garifuna is fairly strong, and the Garifuna are portrayed in

40

mainstream Honduran culture as lazy, uneducated, and fat. However, Nueva Armenia was a

mixed Garifuna/Latino town, and residents strongly asserted the cultural value that this added to

their community. Although tensions must exist, residents reiterated that no tensions existed in

their village between Garifunas and Latinos; instead, they highlighted tensions between men and

women, stating that women did all the work, and held all of the leadership positions in the

community because the men were too lazy. In terms of disaster preparedness, Garifuna

communities have the additional support of the NGO ODECO (Organization of Ethnic

Community Development) based in La Ceiba, whose activities include capacity-building and

training on disaster preparedness (Interview, Director, ODECO, June 24, 2010). The Garifuna

community is politically well-organized, and many have argued that their advocacy groups, such

as ODECO, are more effective than local government.

Flooding  in  the  Cuero  y  Salado  Wildlife  Refuge  

The village of Salados Barra, at the entrance to the refuge, like many villages, was also

founded by Standard Fruit Company, and served as the hub for their coconut industry. Now a

sleepy village dependent on subsistence fishing and the occasional tourists to the refuge, Salados

Barra was a thriving port at the height of Standard’s empire. Standard Fruit Company hired

almost all of the residents, and would frequently bring European and American tourists to the

port. The population was over three times its current size, and the community enjoyed services

such as running water and electricity provided by the company. However, a blight hit the

coconuts at the end of the eighties, the coconut industry had to be abandoned, and Standard Fruit

left the area. This history continues to play a critical role in the culture of Salados Barra today.

People are resentful that the company has “abandoned them,” and the community has created a

victim narrative for themselves in which they are the forgotten village that government does not

41

care about. The community also has a conflicted relationship with FUCSA (which has its

tourism headquarters in the community), because they are dependent on the tourism that FUCSA

brings, but frustrated that FUCSA is not providing them the same services they received with

Standard Fruit Company. These dynamics are important when considering climate change

adaptation. In part because of their previous dependence on Standard Fruit, their subsequent

narrative of abandonment, and sense of entitlement and anger with FUCSA for not providing

these services, the community is not well organized and has not mobilized to collectively address

any of the problems they face or petition their government for services. In contrast, several of

the more remote villages on the other side of the refuge are very self-empowered and well

organized. They have succeeded in getting electricity and running water in their communities,

and are better organized for flooding and natural disasters. These characteristics may prove to be

very important for adaptation.

The community of Boco del Toro experiences some of the most extreme flooding of any

community in the region and floods multiple times a year. The community is located outside of

the Cuero y Salado wildlife refuge on the bank of the Limón River. The river is very shallow,

and frequently overflows its banks, flooding the entire community. It can sometimes take up to a

week for the water to recede. During this time, the community is totally isolated from outside

support, as there is only one road out of the community and it becomes impassable. The only

other alternative is the river, but the current is usually too strong for assistance to pass. The

neighboring community, Micely, faces similar issues, although it is further up from the river than

Boco del Toro, and therefore the flooding is less extreme.

Boca Cerrada is the other community within the boundaries of the refuge. Of all

communities in the study, Boca Cerrada was the most remote. The only way to access the

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community is by boat from Salados Barra on the other side of the refuge. There is a road further

to the west of the refuge that comes closer to the community, but from there it is also necessary

to take a boat. As a result, the community is very isolated, and lives a primarily subsistence

lifestyle. There is a small village center, but most families are spread out along the banks of the

river, on either the refuge side, or on a small strip of land between the river and coast, making

this community highly vulnerable not only to flooding from the river, but also from ocean.

Communication is difficult, as it is necessary to travel by canoe between most homes. In

contrast to Salados Barra, this community had good relationships with FUCSA (as did Boca del

Toro). Although not as organized as Boco del Toro, the community had been proactive in

several community projects.

The  Impacts  of  Climate  Change:  An  Overview

All of the cities and communities in this study already experience flooding, necessitating

a disaster preparedness and risk reduction approach to development. However, climate change is

anticipated to exacerbate the flooding issues that they currently experience. The need for

adaptation is inextricably linked to the projected impacts of climate change. While the science of

climate change is fairly well-developed, particularly in regards to the relationship between

emissions and temperature, the science of climate impacts is less certain, as it is difficult to

predict exactly how changes will manifest in different regions, and how temperature and carbon

changes will impact weather and storm patterns. However, even with the high degree of

uncertainty in the estimates, there is a lot of knowledge regarding the likely impacts of climate

change. The types of impacts that can be expected (and are already happening) are well known.

What remains to be seen is the scale, severity and timing of impacts. Some impacts are already

occurring, while other, more drastic impacts, may not occur for several hundred years (such as

43

the melting of the Greenland or West Antarctic ice sheets) (Kriegler et al. 2009). As the

scientific understanding of climate change has grown, it has become clear that the magnitude of

impacts is much larger than originally believed (IPCC 2007, Persson et al. 2009). New evidence

continues to emerge demonstrating the likelihood of major impacts throughout the world. Poor

baseline data in many parts of the developing world has hindered the development of robust

predictions of impacts. This emerging data on the scale and likelihood of diverse impacts has

highlighted the necessity of adaptation.

The most obvious impact of climate change is rising temperatures. With increasing

carbon levels, the heat trapping potential of the atmosphere increases, leading to increased global

temperatures. Internationally the world has set a goal of limiting temperature rise to 2 degrees

Celsius, although many argue that even with a 2 degree increase, we will not be able to avoid

“dangerous anthropogenic warming” (Meinshausen et al. 2009). However, it is looking

increasingly unlikely that we will be able to achieve the 2 degree target, and current projections

suggest that under “business as usual” emissions scenarios, we are headed for a 4 or even 5

degree warmer world (Sokolov et al. 2009).

Rising temperatures will have direct consequences, most of which will be negative,

although a few northern countries such as Russia will see increased productivity due to a longer

growing season. For most of the world, rising temperatures will lead to decreased crop yields as

temperatures exceed the crop tolerance limits (IPCC 2007, Vermeulen et al. 2010). Many

tropical diseases, particularly vector-borne diseases, will increase in their range and intensity

with increased temperatures. Heat waves, such as Europe experienced in 2003, will also become

more common, with elderly and infirm individuals at highest risk (IPCC 2007).

44

However, rising temperatures arguably will have a larger impact through their influence

on the hydrological cycle. Richard Seager, a climate expert at Columbia’s Earth Observatory

states, “The term 'global warming' does not do justice to the climatic changes the world will

experience in coming decades. Some of the worst disruptions we face will involve water, not

just temperature" (UCAR 2010). Increased temperatures cause the hydrological cycle to “speed

up,” as water evaporates more rapidly with higher temperatures. This greater evaporation leads

to increased droughts, frequently in areas that already experience droughts and insufficient water.

Droughts are complex events, caused by decreased levels of precipitation and drier soil

conditions that cannot absorb water, which can cause a vicious cycle of increasing drought

conditions (Dai 2010). Droughts will have large implications for agriculture and food security,

and will threaten already-scarce drinking water sources in many parts of the world (Dai 2010,

Vermeulen et al. 2010). Combined with rising temperatures, droughts also make forest fires

more likely, a phenomenon observed in Russia this past summer, and of serious concern in the

Amazon region (Nepstad et al. 2008, Kreiger et al. 2009).

Droughts are only one side of the coin. More rapid evaporation will also lead to

increased precipitation events and flooding. Many regions are expected to receive more frequent

and intense rain events. In addition to the evaporation from land sources, rising ocean

temperatures will cause more evaporation from oceans. This will increase precipitation events, as

well as tropical storms. Storms, including hurricanes, are expected to increase in intensity with

climate change (Nicholls et al. 2007). Emanuel, one of the leading experts on hurricanes,

suggests that hurricanes may decrease in frequency (due to changing wind patterns) but increase

in intensity, particularly in the Atlantic. These changing patterns are particularly difficult to

predict for areas heavily influenced by El Nino events, as these have complex interactions with

45

storm events (Emanuel et al. 2008), but the consensus is that more intense storms are likely in

the future. Evidence suggests a recent increase in hurricane landfalls in Mesoamerica after a

historically quiet period of 40 years. In addition, 4 of the 10 most active years for hurricanes

have occurred in the past 10 years (De la Torre et al. 2009).

Many of the impacts of climate change are hard to predict reliably for specific locations,

but there is a high degree of confidence regarding sea level rise and levels are projected to rise at

least 24-135 centimeters (Nicholls et al. 2007). Sea level rise is caused both by the expansion of

the ocean with warmer temperatures and the melting of glaciers. The combined effects of sea

level rise and increased storms make coastal regions, many of which face high underlying

vulnerabilities, particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change (Adger 1999, Parks and

Roberts 2006).

Although nations will need to adapt to many impacts from climate change, flooding is an

especially important impact to examine. Flooding accounts for one-third of disasters worldwide

and one-half of disaster-related deaths (Berz 2000 in Berger et al. 2006). Already flooding and

other extreme events cause serious damages, both in terms of direct losses of life and property,

but also increasing vulnerability, disease and poverty. Simply in terms of direct loss of life, in the

period between 1990 and 2008, almost 600,000 people died directly from over 11,000 extreme

weather events (Harmeling 2009). With climate change we can expect to see more frequent and

intense flooding, which is concerning not just because the floods themselves will be more

damaging, but because as the magnitude of disasters increases, the chances of correlated negative

outcomes, such as diseases and economic losses, also grows (Berger et al. 2006). For Latin

America, malaria and dengue are of particular concern, with projections of increases in malaria

46

incidence of 8% by 2050 and 23% by 2100, and 21% by 2050 and 64% by 2100 for dengue (De

la Torre et al. 2009).

Climate  Impacts  for  Central  America  and  Honduras    

Germanwatch recently produced a report on the relative vulnerability of different

countries to extreme events that identified Honduras as the third most vulnerable country in the

world after Bangladesh and Myanmar (Harmeling 2009).5 The report makes an important

distinction between those countries, like Bangladesh, that face continuous threats, and countries

like Honduras that have experienced the majority of losses in exceptional catastrophes. Over

80% of the losses in Honduras occurred in 1998 due to Hurricane Mitch. Although perhaps not

as indicative of the exposure to climate risk, the high losses associated with a single event are

indicative of the country’s low adaptive capacity and the failure of disaster preparedness

measures (Harmeling 2009).

As highlighted by the Germanwatch analysis, natural disasters and storms are some of the

most serious potential climate impacts for Honduras. Previous disasters have demonstrated the

potentially devastating impacts of coastal flooding and the need for adaptation (Parks and

Roberts 2006, Mendelsohn 2009). In the past several decades, natural disasters have been

increasing in the region, with some estimates showing an annual growth rate of 5%, although

these authors argue that the increase in frequency has more to do with increasing vulnerability

than with increasing intensity of events (UNDP and CEPREDENAC 2003). This increase is

concerning, due to the high cost that natural disasters already impose on the region. In Latin 5 The findings are based on a Global Climate Risk Index developed using data from Munich Re. The index indicates a level of exposure and vulnerability to extreme events (data includes weather-related losses between 1990 and 2008). While the index can serve as a useful indicator of those countries most likely to be impacted by climate change, it is important to recognize several data limitations. First, the index only shows direct effects, and not indirect losses. Including indirect losses would cause African countries to feature more prominently in the analysis, because drought and food scarcity, which disproportionately affect Africa, are indirect losses. In addition, the data is based on past trends, and does not account for shifting patterns of damages, such as those associated with climate change.

47

America and the Caribbean, the estimated costs of current climate-related disasters is $5 billion

annually, a number which will only continue to rise with climate change (Caraveni et al. 2010b).

A recent study conducted by the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility on the

Economics of Climate Adaptation in the Caribbean documents the high level of vulnerability of

the Caribbean to climate change. The report states that annual losses from storm surge, wind

damage related to hurricanes, and inland flooding already account for 6% of GDP in some

countries, and climate change is projected to contribute an additional 1 to 3% loss of GDP

annually by 2030 (CCRIF 2010). Although the Caribbean islands are more vulnerable to

hurricanes than the mainland countries in Central America, the same trends exist throughout the

region. Another report indicates that Central America could experience a three-fold increase in

annual losses due to hurricanes by 2020-2025, representing 6% of GDP (De la Torre et al. 2009).

The increasing prevalence of storms observed in the region and projected with climate

change is particularly concerning for Honduras because of the country’s past experience with

devastating hurricanes. Hurricane Mitch in 1998 was a defining event for the region, and

particularly for Honduras. Today, more than 10 years later, people still speak about their

experiences with the hurricane, and events are frequently recalled as “pre” or “post-Mitch.”

Hurricane Mitch caused over 2 billion dollars in damages and losses represented over 80% of the

GDP for the year (World Bank 2005). Over 90% of the national territory was affected, and over

50,000 houses were destroyed, 70% of roads were damaged, 90 bridges were destroyed and over

1700 water and sanitation systems were damaged. The hurricane has led to a social and

economic recession lasting over 10 years (UNDP and CEPREDENAC 2003). Although Mitch

affected the whole country, it made landfall near La Ceiba. In La Ceiba, it deposited 0.88 m of

rainfall in one week and flooded two-thirds of the city (USAID 2008). Although Hurricane

48

Mitch was unique in the length of time that it remained over the country causing excessive

damages, the underlying vulnerability of the country contributed significantly to the high degree

of damages. Environmental degradation and deforestation, rapid population growth, inadequate

infrastructure and high levels of inequality all contributed to the high vulnerability (Telford et al.

2004).

While Honduras has made many changes since Mitch to ensure that the country will not

suffer “another Mitch,” particularly in terms of disaster preparedness and response, many of the

underlying vulnerabilities remain. Mitch was more than a hurricane for Honduras: it exposed

many of the problems that the country already faced and demonstrated the lack of resilience in

society and the failure of public and private institutions to meet basic needs. In order to truly

ensure that the country will not suffer from a similar event, there needs to be a shift from a

culture of disaster response, where the focus is on ensuring that when the next Mitch comes,

institutions will be ready to handle it, to a culture of adaptation, where the underlying

vulnerabilities, both physical and socio-economic, are addressed. With climate change, the

chances of a hurricane as intense as Mitch increases, but if Honduras can build a culture of

adaptation, it does not need to remain as vulnerable to these events as it was when Mitch hit.

49

Chapter  4:  Community-­‐Based  Adaptation  Coping  Strategies  for  Flooding  and  Awareness  of  Climate  Change  

Adaptation is a local phenomenon, and as such, it makes sense to begin building a culture

of adaptation at the local level. While some adaptation projects require large-scale resources,

technical expertise, and government coordination, many forms of adaptation happen at the

individual, household, and community level. Particularly as adaptation moves beyond structural

approaches, it can’t be implemented in a top-down fashion (Wisdell 2003, Reid et al. 2009,

Scholten 2009). Decisions on how best to handle risk, how to cope with flooding, and whether to

continue to live in flood-prone areas are often made individually. Although adaptation is widely

acknowledged as a local phenomenon, surprisingly little research has been done on adaptation

and adaptive capacity at the local and household level (Reid et al. 2009, Jones et al. 2010). Much

of the focus on adaptation has been at the national level, but national-level indicators generally

fail to capture many of the processes and contextual factors that influence adaptive capacity, and

are not, therefore, an effective reflection of adaptive capacity at the local level, where most

adaptation actions take place (Eriksen and Kelly 2007). There is a risk that sub-national and local

variability will be subsumed into national plans and poorly handled if particular attention is not

paid to local needs and local capacity (Thomas and Twyman 2005).

Adaptation also runs the risk of making the same mistakes that have been made in the

past in development. Far too often in development, local communities have been left out of the

process and both their local knowledge and opinions disregarded in the planning and

implementation process. The global agenda for adaptation and the international funding

mechanisms run the risk of following this trend if the local nature of adaptation is not at the

center of policy and practice. In recognition of the need to include local communities in the

planning process, studies of local adaptation are becoming more common, but they are often

50

isolated case studies of local communities that fail to place local strategies in the larger political

and socio-economic context. The building block approach to developing a culture of adaptation

that I employ in this thesis seeks to combine the focus on local adaptation strategies with an

analysis of tools and resources across scales, recognizing that a successful adaptation strategy

needs to bridge across scales, leveraging all possible resources (Adger et al. 2005).

This chapter examines two components that are critical to the success of community-

based adaptation: local coping strategies and awareness of climate change. Local communities

are already using a variety of creative approaches to protect themselves from flooding. Although

they have developed these strategies to deal with the current flooding challenges, these strategies

can serve as the foundation for successful adaptation strategies and will be critical as flooding

becomes more intense with climate change. In this chapter I describe some of the strategies that

local communities use to deal with flooding and analyze their potential as adaptation strategies.

While on the one hand, current coping strategies may better prepare communities for climate

change, it is important to think critically about the suitability of these current coping strategies in

the face of a changing climate. It is possible that strategies may be maladaptive by enabling

community members to remain in vulnerable environments and not take more drastic action.

Awareness of climate change is another critical component of adaptation. If people are

not aware of climate change, it is hard to plan well for climate change. Although individuals,

communities and institutions will adapt to climate impacts even if they do not directly recognize

the changes as associated with climate change, these efforts will be reactionary at best, and have

the potential to be maladaptive (Adger et al. 2005, Barnett and O’Neill 2010). Therefore, it is

important to examine how well people understand the implications of climate change in their

lives and in their communities. In this section, I describe some of the changes that local

51

communities have observed and their awareness of climate change. I analyze some of the

challenges for developing a robust adaptation strategy based on local knowledge of climate

change and consider some of the challenges for presenting climate information to local

communities.

Community-­‐Based  Adaptation:  A  Review  of  the  Literature  

Community-based adaptation is increasingly being recognized as a critical approach to

adaptation planning and implementation. The underlying premise of community-based

adaptation is that communities know best what their specific vulnerabilities to climate change

are. Local communities are best situated to develop appropriate adaptive behaviors and

measures, by drawing on a long history of coping to natural disasters and other challenges (Ensor

and Berger 2009, Smith et al. 2003). Arguments in favor of community-based adaptation span

the spectrum from ethical arguments that vulnerable communities are the most affected by

climate change and thus should be at the center of adaptation planning, to economic arguments

that it is most efficient to draw on the local coping strategies and adaptive capacity that

communities already have.

Community-based adaptation draws on methods and participatory techniques in disaster

risk reduction and community development6 (Reid et al. 2009). It can be thought of as a

participatory process that helps communities identify available resources and opportunities, and

access and manage them in order to adapt to climate change. Local knowledge allows people to

6 Although participatory planning is a well-developed field for natural resource management, development planning and disaster risk reduction, efforts to engage local communities in adaptation planning are very new, and our understanding of the challenges for this process are not advanced. Adaptation presents unique challenges because of the unknown quality of impacts, and the high level of uncertainty regarding future scenarios. Whether local communities can understand and incorporate these projected impacts into planning, and whether it is possible to develop robust adaptation plans across a range of uncertain futures is an important area of future research. My PhD proposal addresses this research gap and follows on the fieldwork conducted for this thesis to examine the planning process in local communities and the role of past experiences with natural disasters in planning for climate change.

52

analyze their situation, but adaptation must also draw on scientific knowledge to ensure that

there is an understanding of climate change and its impacts (Raihan et al. 2010). At the same

time, information on climate change needs to be presented carefully to avoid disempowering

communities by suggesting that climate impacts are beyond their control, even though they have

been dealing with climate variability successfully for years and are often quite resilient (Reid et

al. 2009, Warrick 2009). Finding ways to ensure that communities can engage with the scientific

information in constructive ways is critical to the success of community-based adaptation

strategies. More broadly, vulnerability discourses run the risk of disempowering communities,

and emphasis should be placed on adaptive capacity rather than focusing on vulnerabilities

(Thomas and Twyman 2005).

The theoretical foundation for community-based adaptation lies with theories of social

capital, and the concept that social relationships allow individuals to coordinate collective action

for shared goals such as adaptation (Ebi and Semenza 2008). Many of the goals of community-

based adaptation aim to empower communities to engage in collective action by providing

climate information and facilitating knowledge-sharing. Although community is central to the

concept of community-based adaptation, it is important to think critically about conceptions of

community. While the term suggests that community is a coherent unit, this masks large power

imbalances within communities. Certain populations can be highly marginalized within

populations, and are thus both more vulnerable and harder to include in participatory processes

(Allen 2006, Raihan et al. 2010). Olson (2005) cautions against subsuming the individual into

the community when analyzing community dynamics. “By treating communities as collective

actors, and assuming the predictability of political-economic forces, such approaches take the

context, logic and meaning of localities as given” (Olson 2005: 250). Instead we must be aware

53

of differences in priorities, needs, vulnerabilities and capabilities within communities (Reid et al.

2009).

Committing to an adaptation process where community needs and priorities are central

requires a flexible approach, and one that is willing to acknowledge that climate change may not

be the top priority for community members. Communities may have more pressing concerns that

they believe should be met first. It is for this reason that community-based adaptation projects

should have livelihood and poverty-reduction goals in addition to goals of addressing natural

disasters (Reid et al. 2009). This requires a resilience and adaptive capacity perspective to

adaptation, and not a simple focus on climate impacts.

Local  Coping  Strategies  and  their  Potential  for  Adaptation  

The coping strategies that communities already use to deal with flooding may be a critical

building block of an adaptation strategy, if these strategies are robust to climate impacts. The

strengthening of local coping strategies can serve as an important bridge between a disaster

response culture and an adaptation culture, because as the United Nations International Strategy

for Disaster Reduction states, “the capacity to cope requires continuing awareness, resources and

good management, both in normal times as well as during crises or adverse conditions. Coping

capacities contribute to the reduction of disaster risks” (UNISDR 2009). Most efforts to help

local governments plan for adaptation, to date, have focused on translating and interpreting

scientific climate information, and remarkably little effort has been spend examining how local

communities have dealt with climate variability in the past and how their coping strategies could

inform planning (Reid et al. 2009). Local communities have often developed sophisticated

coping strategies, and these should be given at least as prominent a role in an adaptation strategy

as the top-down climate information.

54

The first step in analyzing the potential of local coping strategies to contribute to an

adaptation strategy is to examine what strategies households and communities are currently

using. Most of the floods in La Ceiba are caused by poor urban drainage or rivers breaching their

banks, and while these floods cause damages, they are generally not life-threatening. Residents

have developed diverse coping strategies to handle these floods, primarily revolving around

protecting property from rising water levels, and ensuring that livestock are safe. In Boco del

Toro, for example, all of the houses are built on stilts to protect them from flooding. The

distance to the river can be measured by the height of the stilts: as you approach the river, the

stilts get higher. Close to the river the stilts are a full story high, demonstrating how high the

water can rise. In Salados Barra, where homes are made of bamboo and thatch, community

members tie all of their belongings to the rafters of the house to protect them during floods. In

La Ceiba, many residents raise all their furniture up on cinderblocks (sometimes two or three) to

protect it from flooding. Although some people raise everything whenever there is a storm

warning, others flood so frequently that they leave all of their belongings elevated for the entire

rainy season. When there are more serious floods, everything in the house gets damaged and has

to be thrown away, but cinderblocks appeared to be sufficient in most circumstances. One of the

most innovative adaptation strategies I observed was a family that had taken old plastic bottles

and used them to create a fence around their property. They filled the property with additional

soil, and raised their entire property by about a foot to protect it from flooding. Although this

approach only protects their property from small floods, I was surprised that neighbors had not

adopted the strategy, as everyone agreed it was effective.

In addition to ensuring that their homes and property are protected, a top priority for

many families in rural communities is to move their livestock to high ground. Loss of livestock

55

is devastating for families whose livelihoods are dependent on the income these resources

provide. Many families do not have the financial resources to replace lost livestock, and

rebuilding these assets can take many years. While larger livestock are usually successfully

transported to high ground, smaller livestock, particularly chickens, often drown when it floods.

One adaptive strategy several families have adopted is to switch to ducks, because ducks can

swim and thus are less likely to drown during floods. Surprisingly, although this was

acknowledged to be an effective solution, very few people have adopted the strategy, suggesting

that communities may benefit from adaptation projects that encourage knowledge-sharing and

sharing of best practices.

Coping strategies not only include actions to protect property and valuable assets, but

also behavioral practices that households and communities adopt to cope with flooding. In Boco

de Toro, most families keep a canoe under their home to use during the floods, and residents

explained that children can often paddle before they can run. While a serious topic, community

members have learned to find the humor in the situation. Laughingly, an older woman described

how the children put their bikes in a canoe and paddle uphill until the water is shallow enough to

bike to school. She did explain that it was dangerous for small children, because the current

could be strong, and generally children under three aren’t allowed in canoes alone. People get

used to keeping a week’s supply of food and medicine on hand throughout the rainy season in

case they can’t leave. With these precautions, it becomes a matter of patiently waiting for the

water to subside.

Although most of the strategies community members described dealt with minimizing the

damages that flooding did to their property, some coping strategies sought to mitigate the

flooding directly. In one community, community members had organized and planted trees

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along the bank of the river to protect their community from flooding. Trees help to reduce

erosion of the riverbanks and act as barriers during storm events. Other communities collectively

cleaned drainages and canals to prepare their community for the rainy season. Many

communities were interested in similar activities, but did not appear to believe this was

something they could do on their own, and were waiting for the government to help out.

Community-based adaptation is based on a premise that communities can add

collectively, but most of the coping strategies I observed were individual or household level

strategies. Community organizations that could have been focused on collective action at the

local level appeared to be focusing primarily as advocacy agents between the community and the

municipal government. Although advocating for the needs of the community and their rights for

government services is an important role for community organizations, the concept of

community-based adaptation is underpinned by a belief that communities can undertake

adaptation activities in their own right. Until communities organize and are capable of taking

collective action, it may be difficult to translate the individual coping strategies that community

members currently employ into part of a robust adaptation strategy.

Coping strategies help community members deal with floods, but more difficult than the

floods themselves is the recovery afterwards. Many of the rural communities are primarily

dependent on agriculture and dairy farming, and when the floods wipe out crops and pastureland,

families can lose their primary source of income and subsistence for the year. Community

members described that not only do the floods ruin the current crops, but with the floods come

mud, which can cover the pastureland. Farmers often have to wait for the mud to dry out before

they can plant again, which can take most of the rest of the season. While most of the larger

livestock survive the floods, the lack of pastureland afterwards can cause livestock to die. While

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communities have learned to cope with the floods as they occur, coping strategies for the

consequences appear much less well-developed.

Even though flooding causes a lot of pain in the community, the floods were also

described as a source of bonding in Boco del Toro. Community members discussed how they all

work together whenever there are floods, and how anything that anyone has is shared with

everyone else. They believed that their strength as a community stems from their ability to

handle flooding together. Although it is difficult to gather accurate information on outmigration

from community members, it did not appear that the community has lost many members because

of the flooding issues it faces. 7 While some people have left in search of better economic

opportunities, the community has been growing in the past several decades. Residents spoke

with great pride about the peaceful lifestyle of their community, away from the stress and

dangers of life in the big cities of San Pedro Sula or La Ceiba. They described the great natural

beauty of their surroundings, with the river and the wildlife refuge surrounding them. Perhaps

because of the challenges they face with flooding, they were extremely well organized, with a

strong Patronato, Junta de Agua and CODEL, as well as a newly established tourism committee

seeking to expand the livelihood alternatives for the community through ecotourism to the

refuge. Compared to Salados Barro on the other side of the refuge, they were much more

organized, had accomplished many more community projects (one of the major accomplishments

was the establishment of drinking water in the community and electricity, both of which were

accomplished by the community with little government support), and were overall much more

positive about their community. The complex relationships between communities and their

location cannot be underestimated, and play a critical role when considering adaptation. At the

7 Collecting accurate data on migration patterns is particularly challenging, as community members who remain have strong reasons to misrepresent data, either to better portray their community or their own decision-making.

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same time, while natural disasters can bring communities together and inspire collective action,

they can also cause tensions within communities, particularly as relief is usually delivered

individually and can create tension and competition among community members (Raihan et al.

2010). Adaptation strategies need to work to harness the potential for collective action that

coping strategies for natural disasters can bring out, while avoiding the conflict that can also

result.

The situation in Boco del Toro highlights one of the fundamental challenges for

adaptation: how do you handle adaptation in areas that are inherently vulnerable and where one

of the most viable adaptation strategies may be to retreat and abandon the area? Although the

residents of Boco del Toro have learned to live with flooding, during extreme foods they lose all

sources of livelihood and become entirely dependent on disaster relief. With more intense

storms and flooding events predicted with climate change, this coping strategy is not sustainable.

It is unclear if residents of a community as hazard-prone as Boco del Toro can sustainably adapt

to climate change. One potential adaptation strategy would be to abandon the area and move

somewhere less vulnerable. Residents, however, usually do not view relocation as an acceptable

alternative. People have deep connections to place, even when these places are challenging to

live in.8 Decisions to stay or leave will also be made by individual families, as they balance the

benefits of the community and social ties with the risk of continuing to live in hazard-prone

areas. Making decisions about whether to rebuild after disasters, and whether to undertake

8 A similar issue came up after Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. As a city below sea level on the hurricane-prone Gulf Coast, there are strong arguments that billions of public tax dollars should not be spent rebuilding the city. Katrina was only a category three hurricane, and it is inevitable that another storm will hit the city at some point. Apart from the financial decision to spend tax dollars rebuilding a vulnerable city, the government (or any other organization facilitating rebuilding) must address moral questions regarding their responsibility facilitating people living in high-risk environments. The levees that caused such damage in Katrina have been repaired, but are only adequate to withstand a category three storm. Collectively, we have decided that this is a risk we are willing to live with, because we are not willing to invest enough to reduce risk nor are we willing to force residents to abandon the city and lose the cultural value of New Orleans. Whether this risk is later viewed as acceptable will largely be determined by future impacts on the city and what damages are caused.

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adaptation projects in extremely vulnerable areas will become increasingly difficult with climate

change, as we can no longer assume that natural disasters are random, rare occurrences.

The coping strategies that households and communities have deal with hazards that

already exist, but climate change adds a new dimension to the problem. Most of the coping

strategies are well-suited for the slow-onset floods that commonly occur in the region, where

there is time to plan for the floods, move livestock and stow belongings, but where there is little

danger of loss of life. None of these strategies, however, will protect communities from stronger

storms and flooding events, such as the region experienced during Hurricane Mitch, that are

more likely to occur with climate change. Based on the current coping strategies, which

primarily focus on individual and household level strategies to protect property and livestock

from the floodwaters during storms, and do not address some of the more long-term

consequences of flooding, it appears that additional work is needed before local coping strategies

can be incorporated into a robust adaptation strategy. Community-based adaptation projects will

need to work with communities to develop the organizational capacity for collective action, and

help communities take more proactive approaches to adaptation, that move beyond merely

“coping” towards a more resilient model.

Knowledge  and  Awareness  of  Climate  Change    

Communities are more likely to cope with change if they have appropriate knowledge

about potential future threats and understand how to adapt to them. A successful adaptation

strategy therefore requires understanding likely future changes and the complexity of climate

change, knowledge about adaptation options, and the ability to assess and implement options

(Frankhauser and Tol 1997 in Jones et al. 2010). In addition to increasing vulnerability, climate

change may make some of the coping strategies that communities have used in the past

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inappropriate. The local knowledge that communities draw upon as the foundation for their

coping strategies may be less effective as climate impacts change local conditions (Reid et al.

2009). Robust adaptation strategies, therefore, cannot simply seek to support local coping

strategies, but must combine this local knowledge with expert knowledge about climate impacts

and potential adaptation strategies (Raihan et al. 2010). Before bringing in expert knowledge on

climate impacts, it is useful to examine how much communities already know about climate

change, if there are areas of confusion, and analyze how community members interpret changing

climatic patterns. By analyzing where communities currently are with regards to these issues, it

will be easier to understand what kinds of expert knowledge is needed and how this can be

integrated with local knowledge to form the basis of community-based adaptation plans.

In general I found that community members had a fairly good understanding of the major

impacts of climate change, and mentioned key impacts such as droughts, flooding, hurricanes,

rain events, temperature increases, and sea level rise. However, there was a fair amount of

confusion regarding the difference between climate change and other natural phenomena,

including earthquakes and tsunamis. Community members seemed to be using the term “climate

change” to describe any changes in the climate and weather, and not necessarily to refer to the

specific phenomenon of climate change. Last year, for the first time in memory, La Ceiba

experienced an earthquake. As a new experience, it garnered a lot of attention. Although the

earthquake did little damage, it raised people’s awareness that they were not prepared for this

kind of hazard and appeared to have caused a fair amount of anxiety. Although it is important

for residents to be prepared for all kinds of natural hazards, there did not appear to be a clear

understanding that the causes of earthquakes and tsunamis are different from the causes of

hurricanes, droughts or increased precipitation.

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In terms of understanding the drivers of climate change, I believe that most people, when

describing the drivers of climate change, were really speaking of drivers of environmental

change more broadly and not specifically addressing the causes of climate change. While some

individuals mentioned increased driving of vehicles and energy consumption, “lack of care for

the environment” and deforestation were the most common explanations associated with climate

change. While these issues are drivers of climate change (until recently deforestation was the

largest source of emissions in Honduras, and only recently was surpassed by energy use by

electricity and vehicle use), they are also local drivers of flooding through their impact on local

watersheds and ecosystem services. It is more likely that deforestation is influencing flooding in

the region through these proximate causes than through climate change.

It is argued that one of the strengths of local knowledge is that it does not differentiate

between natural, environmental, socio-economic and cultural aspects of the issue, and thus gives

a comprehensive picture of the situation (Raihan et al. 2010). However, this can make it difficult

to disentangle drivers and separate out those over which local communities have control and can

mitigate, and those which are beyond the community’s control, and are best handled by

adaptation. Community members described many changes in weather patterns and flooding in

their communities, but they were more likely to attribute these changes to local drivers rather

than to climate change. As there are many local drivers of environmental change in the region, it

is likely that these factors play a much larger role than climate change for flooding, although this

balance may shift as climate impacts become more noticeable. One of the dangers of introducing

expert knowledge on climate change is that it may lead to an overemphasis on climate change as

a driver instead of the more proximate local drivers. For this reason, many practitioners

recommend focusing on the responses to climate stress and variability and coping strategies

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rather than focusing on the drivers (Warrick 2009). It is important that when incorporating

climate change into planning, the focus doesn’t shift too heavily towards climate change at the

expense of continuing to acknowledge the role of local drivers of environmental change.

Climate change needs to be incorporated into planning, but doing so will not eliminate the

numerous other causes of flooding, and robust disaster risk reduction and adaptation strategies

will need to take an integrated approach to planning that addresses all drivers of flooding, not

just climate change.

Regardless of whether individuals are attributing changes in weather patterns that they

observe to climate change, it is interesting to analyze the kinds of changes that they are

observing, and consider some of the challenges for detecting changes attributable to climate

change. One of the most interesting observations came from a fisherman in La Ceiba, who had

lived in the same neighborhood and fished there since its founding in 1975. As a fisherman, he

was very aware of changing weather and sea level patterns, as they have direct implications for

his catch and personal safety. One of the things he observed was that the wind had shifted

direction this year for the first time since he began fishing there, which he believed to be

correlated with the high level of hurricanes predicted for the season (in May NOAA released

hurricane predictions that suggested Honduras might get hit by as many as seven category 3 or

higher storms in the 2010-11 season) (NOAA 2010). He explained that the city was more

vulnerable when the wind came from this direction, due to the geography of the coast and the

build up of waves. He was quite concerned about this, as the only other time the wind had come

from that direction was during Hurricane Mitch (the direction that Mitch hit the coast was one of

the reasons that it caused so much damage). While this wind direction might be correlated with

increased damage from hurricanes, there is little evidence to suggest that this is due to climate

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change, highlighting the importance of combining local observations with scientific knowledge

of climate change. He also spoke about sea level rise, and how the waves have been eating away

the beach. While he noted that the water level had risen significantly, to the point where at high

tide, there is no beach left in places, he had numerous explanations for why this was the case,

including upstream deforestation leading to sedimentation, and urban development that has led to

coastal erosion. That the sea level itself might be rising appeared to be a new concept for him.

In general, it was difficult for him to separate changes stemming from climate (and even weather

patterns) from broader environmental changes, including issues of overfishing, poor regulations

(including net size), and chemical dumping leading to fish kills. (Interview, fisherman, La Ceiba,

July 8, 2010).

One of the challenges is that it is very hard for people to distinguish changes in weather

from changes in climate. Many people highlighted the events of the past year or several years as

the evidence for their beliefs about the impact of climate change. Some of this stems from a lack

of understanding of the nature of climate change and how it is different from the weather.

However, another factor is the natural tendency people have to consider a small sample. This is

what is known as the “law of small numbers,” in which individuals place a large weight on a

relatively small sample when making decisions or judgments and believe that this small sample

is representative of larger trends (Tversky and Kahneman 1982 in Berger et al. 2006). In

addition, people tend to focus more heavily on recent events, which might not lead to accurate

interpretation of long-term trends (Reid et al. 2009). Another reason that participants may have a

hard time identifying climate trends is that the climate projections for the region predict greater

variability in the future, particularly with regards to precipitation. Some participants responded

that there was less rain than in the past, while others believed that there was more rain. Some

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participants distinguished that it was not the amount of rain that had changed, but the patterns of

rainfall. While in the past, the rain fell softly throughout the season; now they described it as a

harsh rain that hit the land quickly, causing the rivers to rise rapidly. Other community

members spoke of decreasing predictability in weather patterns. This was particularly

concerning for farmers, as their planting patterns have always been linked to seasonal weather

patterns, which now, they argued, were much harder to depend on. Because local impacts can be

very hard to identify, particularly when there is so much variability, expert knowledge on longer-

term trends can help local communities distinguish weather patterns from climate change.

One of the key findings from this research was that attributing changes in weather

patterns to climate change is very complicated, and individuals are aware of the multiple drivers

of flooding. More emphasis was placed on local drivers rather than climate change in explaining

flooding. In addition, climate variability was a primary factor of changing weather patterns in

the region, making it more difficult to detect trends. Local communities need more information

on the impacts of climate change and how these differ from changes in the weather. However,

attempts to integrate local and expert knowledge need to be careful not to disempower local

communities by relying on a vulnerability narrative.

Conclusions  

Community-based adaptation has the potential to play an important role in a robust

adaptation strategy, but projects cannot naively base their projects solely on local knowledge.

Although community members have a sophisticated understanding of many of the changes

occurring in their communities, they have a difficult time distinguishing changes in weather from

longer-term climate trends and differentiating between local drivers and climate change. While

local communities have many coping strategies to deal with flooding that could form the

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foundation for comprehensive adaptation plans, some of these strategies are not robust to climate

change, and in extreme cases, it is unclear whether even with successful adaptation strategies if it

will be feasible for community members to continue to live in highly vulnerable areas. Local

communities have an important role to play in adaptation, and any plan must ensure that they

remain central to planning. However, efforts need to be made to ensure that the adaptation

strategies pursued are robust to climate change and that they do not over-emphasis climate

change at the expense of local drivers that also increase the risk of flooding.

 

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Chapter  5:  The  Role  of  Local  Government    An  analysis  of  La  Ceiba’s  current  framework  for  disaster  response  and  its  suitability  for  disaster  risk  reduction  and  adaptation    

While individuals and communities can undertake adaptation measures, climate change is

not an individual problem, and adaptation requires collective responses (Raihan et al. 2010). At

the same time, much of the debate on adaptation has focused on national and international

processes, even though adaptation is widely acknowledged to be a local process. Local

government serves as the critical bridge between the efforts that individual households and

communities undertake and broader processes ongoing at the national and international level.

Local governments play a central role ensuring access to scarce resources, providing basic

services and providing protection from natural disasters, all of which are critical to the adaptation

process (Raihan et al. 2010).

Participants of the “Mitch+10” regional forum produced a declaration analyzing the

current status of disaster management in the region 10 years after Mitch in July 2010. One of

their conclusions was that local governments need to become more involved in risk management.

They stated, “The governmental structure and its resources continue to be highly centralized and

limited. More emphasis must be placed on strengthening mechanisms for governance,

decentralization and building community autonomy and resilience” (Mitch+10 Declaration

2010). An UNISDR analysis of disaster risk reduction implementation by local governments

identified four key roles for local government in disaster risk reduction: 1) local government is

critical for coordinating multiple stakeholders in local projects, and sustaining program

momentum over time, 2) local government can act as a bridge between local communities and

national priorities, ensuring that citizens are engaged in the implementation of national policies,

3) local governments have a responsibility to implement disaster risk reduction strategies

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themselves, and 4) local governments can be innovators of new best practices which can spread

to other communities or be scaled up nationally (UNISDR 2010).

This chapter examines what role the local government can play in the transition from a

culture of disaster response to a culture of disaster risk reduction and adaption.9 I begin with a

discussion of institutional resilience, as the institutional framework for managing disasters is

central to the local government’s ability to incorporate disaster risk reduction and adaptation.

The overview of theory on institutional resilience highlights the importance of redundancy. This

provides the basis for the following analysis of the current system of disaster preparedness and

response in La Ceiba and the institutional arrangements that underlie this system. I examine

what the current system looks like, and identify strengths and weaknesses for disaster risk

reduction and adaptation. Finally, I address one of the barriers most frequently mentioned by

stakeholders: corruption. I analyze how this impacts La Ceiba’s ability to handle flooding and

transition to a culture of adaptation.

Institutional  Resilience:  A  Theoretical  Overview  

Both the literature on adaptation and disaster management are clear that local

governments play a central role in managing risk and facilitating adaptation. Although it is

possible to analyze exactly what the local government should be doing, a broader question is

what kinds of institutional arrangements are best suited for facilitating disaster risk reduction and

adaptation. In this section, I provide an overview of some of the literature on institutions,

focusing on the issue of resilience, as this will be critical if the local government’s institutional

framework is going to be robust in the face of a changing climate. The goal of this institutional

analysis is to identify characteristics of a system that is capable of handling the challenges of

9 When analyzing local government, I consider both municipal government departments and regional branches of public service institutions that have their headquarters in La Ceiba.

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today while also being robust to uncertain future challenges. Becker and Ostrom (1995) stress

that there is no one institutional framework that will be most appropriate in all situations, and

rather than study the specifics of institutional arrangements, it is more critical to look for design

principles that lead to robust institutional frameworks (Becker and Ostrom 1995). It is the

intangible factors in institutional arrangements, such as flexibility, innovation, and redundancies,

that play a critical role in adaptive capacity, and while these factors are hard to measure, it is

important to attempt to capture them in our analysis (Jones et al. 2010).

In the broadest sense, institutions can be described as sets of formal and informal rules

and norms that shape interactions with others and nature (Becker and Ostrom 1995). One of the

benefits of institutions, and the reason we rely on them so heavily, is that institutions promote

stability of expectations, which leads to consistency in actions (Agrawal and Gibson 1999).

However, this does not mean that institutions are static and incapable of changing and adapting

to new circumstances, shifting priorities, and new needs. Different types of institutional

arrangements are more static than others, and much of the literature on institutions explores the

question of what types of institutional arrangements are flexible enough to adjust to change. The

adequacy of current institutional frameworks, both formal and informal, to address climate

change is an important question. The National Research Council calls for increased research on

the institutional frameworks that can handle the new challenges of climate change (National

Research Council 2009). Much of the debate on government institutions and their adequacy for

addressing climate change has focused on the national and international levels, but adaptation is

an inherently local process, and the capacity of local government is critical for adaptation

(Raihan et al. 2010).

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One of the concepts prevalent in the literature on institutional frameworks and adaptation

is redundancy. Redundancy is not a new concept and has been central to the institutional debate

for a long time. Redundancy, especially in government, has long been criticized as inefficient

and wasteful and public policy has frequently tried to reduce this redundancy. Cost reduction

and better service are touted as rationale for the reorganization and consolidation. If two

agencies have the same function, the logic is, consolidation or elimination will minimize the

duplication and overlap of jurisdiction (Miranda and Lerner 1995). In bureaucracy, duplication

and overlap of jurisdiction can be a large problem, as Raihan et al. (2010) discuss in their

analysis of adaptation in Bangladesh. They argue that responsibility for climate policy and

adaptation is spread out among so many agencies that no one has a clear mandate for action and

there is no clear division of responsibilities. As a result, they argue, although climate change is a

strong national priority, very little action takes place at the local level (Raihan et al. 2010).

However, other fields, particularly adaptive management, argue that redundancy and

flexibility are critical for learning, especially in changing environments (Holling 1973, Folke et

al. 2005). Adaptive management theory states that redundancy, and the extent to which

components of a system can be substituted or interchanged to deal with failure, is necessary for

adaptation to changing circumstances (Ospina and Heeks 2010 in Jones et al. 2010). Informed

decision-making, transparency, and prioritization are key elements of a flexible and collaborative

governance system, and these elements contribute to the adaptive capacity and coping ability of

the system (Jones et al. 2010). Redundancy may also be critical as a means of dealing with risk

(Holling 1973, Folke et al. 2005). With climate change, the ability to manage risk becomes even

more critical. Particularly when the risks are unknown, it makes sense to ensure that there are

multiple options available. In a world with climate change, the balance needed between

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efficiency and redundancy is not static, and institutional arrangements will need to adapt to the

changing nature of the risks they face.

Recognizing that redundancy is not necessarily something that we should “design out” of

systems leads to a deeper examination of the role of redundancy. Low et al. (2005) explore the

role of redundancy in natural systems as a means of shedding light on the potential benefits that

could emerge from allowing redundancy. They highlight the high levels of redundancy in

genetics (where gene sequences are highly redundant and often appear unnecessary but have led

to evolutionary advantages). They also describe the functional redundancy in ecosystems that

leads to greater ability to withstand shocks. They argue that redundancy can serve multiple

purposes. First, it can protect against errors by allowing for replication of effort if one part fails.

Second, it allows for adaptation to a variety of conditions, or in engineering language, it allows

for “robustness,” especially when the different components serve the same purpose but are not

exactly identical.10 Another advantage, at the institutional level, is that redundancy can lead to

competition, ensuring better provision of services (Low et al. 2005).

While a certain level of redundancy may be beneficial, it is difficult to determine the

optimal level of redundancy in institutional arrangements. In genetics and ecosystems, the level

of redundancy is determined through natural selection, but the appropriate feedback systems may

not operate in human decision-making. However, it is clear that a certain level of redundancy

can also lead to improvements in governance. Low et al (2005) argue that in a perfectly

hierarchical system, a failure of judgment by one actor quickly becomes amplified throughout

the whole system, which can lead to catastrophes. On the other hand, if there is a lot of

redundancy in the system, a failure on the part of an individual actor can be compensated for by

10 A classic example of designing for redundancy can be seen in the airplane industry. A Boeing 777 has 150,000 subsystems, even though it has been calculated that it would run successfully with only a few hundred, because the costs of failure are so great that the tradeoff in efficiency is worthwhile (Low et al. 2005).

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other actors in the system. However, it is important to recognize that redundancy within

hierarchies can have the perverse effect of allowing failures to be amplified. Therefore it is

critical that redundant actors have a certain level of independence (Bendor 1985 in Low et al.

2005).

While redundancies can lead to reduced risk and greater resilience, there are times when

redundancy does not improve the situation. In La Ceiba there is frequently wasteful duplication

of effort and redundancies that do not enhance the functioning of systems, but rather make things

more difficult and complex. A perfect example that can be readily seen on all the main streets of

the city is the electrical wiring system. Over the years, more and more electrical wiring has been

added, but the old wires have never been removed. The situation is now out of control, and in

certain areas literally hundreds of wires cross the street. Although the government has

recognized the need to remove the wires, as they are a health and safety danger and add costs to

the provision of electricity, no one knows which wires are active and so the redundant systems

remain in place. In recognition of the value of redundancy, but also the danger of inefficiency,

the following section examines the institutional framework for disaster management in La Ceiba.

Local  Government’s  Planning  for  Flooding:  A  focus  on  disaster  preparedness  and  response  

As the analysis in Chapter 3 of La Ceiba’s problems with flooding demonstrated, there

are many things that the local government could be doing to address flooding in the city: they

could clean the drainage ditches to make sure they are functional before the rainy season, they

could fix the sewer and piped drainage system where it is broken and expand services to the parts

of the city that are not covered, they could build embankments along the rivers to protect

vulnerable neighborhoods, they could enforce building codes to ensure that more of the natural

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drainage canals aren’t filled, they could develop a urban plan to restrict development in

vulnerable areas, they could focus on reforestation upstream, they could improve trash collection

to maintain clear drainage canals, etc. While stakeholders, including government officials,

identified all of these options as the responsibility of the municipal government, little was being

done in any of these areas. These activities would fall under a disaster risk reduction strategy;

they all help to reduce the likelihood of damages to the city and residents during flooding. They

also have the added benefit of improving the quality of life even when there is not a disaster.

However, all of these activities require a proactive approach; these are not activities that can be

undertaken once a hurricane is on its way.

Most of the local government’s efforts related to flooding, rather than address these

drivers, focus on disaster preparedness and response. Here, again, it is important to distinguish

between disaster mitigation (of which all of the previous examples would qualify) and disaster

preparedness, which focuses on the ability to respond to a disaster (Reyes Chirinos and Lara

Pineda 2007). Both activities require advance planning and organization, but disaster

preparedness does not try to limit the flooding; the primary goal is to ensure an effective

response and limit the loss of human life. Disaster preparedness is a very important component

of a comprehensive disaster risk reduction strategy, and it is encouraging that La Ceiba is

focusing on disaster preparedness instead of only on disaster response. Disaster preparedness and

response systems have been highlighted by the United Nations as a high return on investment

(Jarraud 2005) and many best practice guidelines emphasize the need for a greater focus on the

development of such “soft” approaches to flood management (Associated Program on Flood

Management 2008, Hyogo Framework for Action 2005). This focus on disaster preparedness is

fairly new, and efforts to develop an effective system are still underway. After Hurricane Mitch

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demonstrated the consequences of a lack of preparedness, La Ceiba (and Honduras as a whole)

have placed considerable attention on developing a disaster preparedness system.

Because La Ceiba’s local government is currently focused on disaster preparedness and

response, it makes sense to evaluate the institutional frameworks for these activities as the basis

of an analysis of the institutional framework that could be used for adaptation. Although there

are many potential institutional frameworks that could facilitate adaptation, the current

framework used for disaster response is probably the most appropriate to use as a foundation.

While the ability to handle natural disasters is only one component of adaptation, it is one of the

most critical components for La Ceiba, and a very appropriate place to begin building a culture

of adaptation.

Disaster  Preparedness  and  Response  in  La  Ceiba      

Although disaster preparedness and response can encompass many activities, for the

purposes of this analysis, I focus on two key activities: early warning systems and evacuations.

Early warning systems are essential to ensure that individuals and communities know about

events and take necessary precautions (DKKV and UNISDR 2010). Evacuation planning is

necessary because people live in flood-prone areas, and plans need to be in place to ensure a

timely and organized response (Gilbert 2010). In conjunction with early warning systems,

evacuation plans can be effective in minimizing human losses, dependent on the ability of

government to assist residents and provide shelter as well as resident’s willingness to evacuate.

In La Ceiba, the overarching authority in charge of disasters is COPECO (the Permanent

Commission for Contingencies). Although COPECO’s mandate in theory includes disaster risk

reduction in addition to disaster preparedness and response, in reality it focuses almost entirely

on preparedness and response. This is perhaps not surprising, considering its name. Contingency

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planning is “a management process that analyses specific potential events or emerging situations

that might threaten society or the environment and establishes arrangements in advance to enable

timely, effective and appropriate responses to such events and situations” (UNISDR 2009).

Contingency planning is a critical component of preparedness, and through the use of scenarios

of possible emergency conditions or disasters, problems that may emerge during a crisis can be

planned ahead of time. If done successfully, contingency planning should result in organized

and clearly defined institutional roles, information processes and operational arrangements

(UNISDR 2009). COPECO’s limited focus on contingency planning was a frustration expressed

by the Deputy Regional Director of COPECO, as he saw a lot of potential for COPECO to

address risk reduction, but with a limited mandate or resources,he has not been able to move

beyond preparedness (Interview, Deputy Regional Director of COPECO, May 26, 2010).

COPECO has a high degree of authority and by law, once a disaster has been declared, all

government authorities report to COPECO. Nationally, once a disaster is declared, the President

becomes the head of COPECO, and all national resources and personnel are at the disposal of

COPECO. According to government stakeholders, this arrangement is very clear and the chain

of command is straightforward, which aids in communication and response. COPECO uses a

color-coded scheme for disasters (code green- alert, yellow- preparations, red- disaster), which

trigger different responses from all of its partners. This code system is well-known by all

residents, as well as all government officials, providing everyone with a common language with

which to communicate risk. This simple system also ensures that protocols can easily be enacted

without complex decision-making on the part of numerous institutional actors.

One of the challenges for COPECO is that while they are given a high degree of authority

during disasters, they are not provided with a clear mandate for action before a disaster. They

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have few resources of their own (ie vehicles) and instead rely on mandatory take-over of all State

and private vehicles during a disaster. This arrangement means that while they are effective in

disaster response, their ability to engage in disaster preparedness and prevention is limited. Until

a disaster is declared, the regional office (of which there are only 7 throughout the country) has a

staff of approximately five, only two of whom are active in the field. With such limited

resources, COPECO has been able to develop a fairly sophisticated and well-organized disaster

preparedness and response system.

The key to COPECO’s ability to have a functional disaster preparedness and response

system with limited resources is partnering. COPECO primarily functions as a coordinating

body and relies heavily on partner institutions (both municipal departments and regional state

agencies) for implementation. Each department and state agency has specific roles “before,

during, and after” a disaster. For example, SOPTRAVI, the Secretary of Public Works,

Transportation and Housing, is responsible for repairing roads and bridges that get damaged

during a disaster. Hondutel, the state telephone company, immediately begins to repair

telephone lines. Although these functions make sense for each agency to perform based on their

responsibilities, they are also grouped under the authority of COPECO to ensure a coordinated

response. In addition, the liaison for each agency and department reports to COPECO’s

headquarters in La Ceiba as soon as a code yellow is announced, and a representative of each

institution is required to be on-hand until the alerts are over. This provides a direct line of

communication between COPECO and all the partner institutions. It also provides additional

personnel to staff COPECO’s operations during the emergency. This division of tasks, and

flexible arrangement of labor during emergencies allows COPECO to operate quickly and

effectively during disasters even with minimal staffing.

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Early warning systems are a critical component of a comprehensive disaster preparedness

strategy. Unlike other natural hazards, such as earthquakes, floods are particularly well-suited to

early warning systems. COPECO, along with donors and NGOs, have focused considerable

attention towards developing La Ceiba’s early warning system, although more work is still

needed to make it fully functional. Since Hurricane Mitch, the development of early warning

systems throughout the country has been a priority. Many donor agencies, particularly USAID,

have also contributed to these efforts.11 An effective early warning system contains four key

elements: 1) understanding the risks, 2) monitoring and forecasting the hazards, 3)

communication of alerts and warnings, and 4) local capacity to respond to the warnings

(UNIDSR 2009). COPECO is at the center of all four stages, some of which it undertakes itself

and others it relies more heavily on the local government.

The institutional structure for disaster preparedness and response is fairly sophisticated,

and displays both hierarchical and collaborative elements. The early warning system functions

with a strict hierarchy, which helps to ensure that roles are clear and information gets distributed

to as many individuals as possible (see Figure 5 for a schematic diagram of the early warning

system). Below COPECO are CODEMS (Municipal Emergency Committees) in each

municipality and CODELS (Local Emergency Committees) that operate at the village or

neighborhood scale. Every neighborhood and rural community is supposed to have a CODEL

with a designated contact for communication with the CODEMs. The CODEMs in turn each

have a designated contact for COPECO. Through this clear hierarchy, information is supposed

to pass from COPECO, who has the most sophisticated information to the CODEMS, who share

this information with all of the CODELs under their jurisdiction. It is then the responsibility of

11 The USAID-MIRA Project (Integrated Management of Environmental Resources) was a five-year project ending in 2009 that addressed disaster preparedness in La Ceiba. For more information, see Chapter 7 on the role of NGOs and donors.

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the CODEL to alert every member of their neighborhood or rural community about the risks and

relay flood warnings. At the local level this is done by calling (or texting) everyone in the

community, or if the situation is more urgent, walking door-to-door alerting residents. Some

CODELs use megaphones or whistles to alert their neighbors.

In addition to receiving warnings from COPECO (by way of the CODEMs), the early

warning system is also supposed to allow local communities to inform the CODEMs and

COPECO about any rising threats that they observe locally. This is particularly important for

upstream communities that may observe water levels rising in the river before there is any

indication of danger downstream. This channel of communication is also available for

communities to communicate their needs in the case of a disaster (this can include assistance

rescuing or evacuating community members, or providing aid after an event). COPECO, in

addition to coordinating the preparedness and response, is also in charge of coordinating

humanitarian aid delivery in the event of a serious disaster. COPECO coordinates the logistics

of aid distribution (helped in large part by the Honduran Red Cross and the World Food

Program), but passes the responsibility on to CODEMs for delivering the aid that has been

allotted to their municipality.

In order for this early warning system (as well as the response system) to function,

channels of communication need to be clear. Each CODEL is supposed to have a radio on at all

times to receive alerts from COPECO and with which to relay messages to their CODEM. In

reality, as of summer 2010, many of the radios were not functioning or needed battery

replacements, which the municipality was responsible for providing. CODEM officials claimed

that they had replacement parts available, but due to a lack of vehicles, could not deliver the

parts to rural communities. It appears that the system is currently relying on cell phone

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communication, which may not be effective during a disaster if cell phone coverage is

compromised by the storm events. In addition, the upstream monitoring system does not appear

to be functioning. The CODELs in upstream communities are responsible for monitoring the

river depths and reporting this to downstream communities if levels begin to rise. However,

there does not appear to be any specific monitoring system in place, nor do the upstream

communities have working radios with which to relay the information in the event of poor cell

phone coverage. These issues suggest that the upstream monitoring system functions only

occasionally and cannot be relied on in the event of an emergency.12 The early warning and

response system operated by COPECO has the potential to function well, but when logistical

barriers such as non-functioning radios are not dealt with the entire system is jeopardized. The

inability of the institutional structure to resolve these relatively simple barriers is indicative of

weaknesses in the system, and need to be addressed if COPECO and the CODEMs are to take on

greater responsibilities for disaster risk reduction and adaptation. Although these institutions are

the natural candidates for this responsibility, they currently are not fully developed, and would

need to be strengthened before local government could successfully implement a comprehensive

disaster risk reduction and adaptation strategy.

Communication between COPECO, the CODEMs, and the CODELs serves as the

primary system for early warning and communication during disasters. However, because of the

essential nature of these services, redundant systems have developed in La Ceiba. Separate from

the state-run system, the Catholic Church has developed its own system of local emergency

committees that help to alert residents in the event of a disaster. While not all residents of La

Ceiba are members of the Catholic Church (the evangelical movement is very active in the city,

12 Unfortunately, additional upstream interviews had to be cancelled due to a medical emergency, so it is possible that the upstream monitoring system did function in some communities. However, interviews with CODEM and COPECO staff, as well as the limited upstream interviews conducted, suggest that the system is not functional.

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and residents estimate that approximately half the population in the city are evangelical

Christians), this system provides added redundancy for members of the Catholic Church and

increases the overall resilience of the system. Not every parish appeared to having a functional

early warning system, and no one suggested that this system could replace the state-run system,

but it is an interesting example of redundancy. For certain community members that are well

connected to their church, this may be a stronger, more reliable source of information. Any

additional systems that provide timely information to community members help to ensure that

people are well-informed and will be able to take the necessary precautions to prepare

themselves for floods.

Early warning systems are an important part of a preparedness and response plan, but are

only useful if individuals can respond to the information they receive. Therefore, evacuation

plans are key. Within the city, a gymnasium in an area of higher elevation has been designated as

a sheltering location. The Catholic cathedral can also be used in extreme situations. Residents

are asked to voluntarily evacuate from areas deemed at high risk, but many do not, primarily due

to concerns that their valuables will be stolen. Unlike in the United States, COPECO has the

right and responsibility to forcibly evacuate residents if necessary. The Army, Navy, and Fire

Department work closely with COPECO to evacuate residents, as they have much greater

manpower and resources. Surprisingly residents did not appear resentful of the forced

evacuations, and although they did not want to evacuate, appeared to understand the necessity of

evacuations. However, many still wait until someone arrives to evacuate them. This limits the

effectiveness of evacuations, causes large delays and leaves residents vulnerable to flooding if

officials do not arrive in time.

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In rural areas, schools or other community buildings are usually designated as shelters. A

key concern is whether these buildings are suitable for sheltering and for what time period.

According to community members, many are highly vulnerable to flooding and are not equipped

with even basic sanitation facilities. Many appear to have been designated because they are the

only existing public building, with little analysis of risk. For communities that live in highly

vulnerable areas, it is quite possible to be out of contact with the outside world for up to a week

or more following a large storm event. It is therefore an important question to consider whether

evacuating within the community is sufficient or if more drastic evacuation plans are needed.

As an activity that requires immediate response, and which can be filled with uncertainty

and surprises, institutional redundancy is essential for an evacuation system. The stakes are very

high if only one institution was responsible for evacuation and their capacity was overwhelmed.

La Ceiba’s system for handling evacuation, which involves numerous institutions, ensures

redundancy and increases the resilience of the system. With multiple institutions capable of

performing the same functions, there is less danger that the system will be overwhelmed. At the

same time, it is critical that COPECO remains in command of all efforts to avoid duplication and

chaos. It is perhaps not surprising that the army, navy, air force and fire department, all

institutions with a strong sense of hierarchy, are responsible for evacuation. This arrangement

allows for an optimal balance of redundancy and efficiency needed for the critical, time-sensitive

activities of evacuation and search and rescue.

The  Elephant  in  the  Room:  Corruption    

When discussing the role of local government in the transition from a culture of disaster

response to a culture of adaptation, it is impossible not to address the elephant in the room:

corruption. Honduras is one of the most corrupt countries in the world, according to

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Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, which ranks Honduras 134 out of 178

for corruption (with Somalia at 178 being the most corrupt) (Transparency International 2010).

While multiple stakeholders indicated that corruption is less rampant in La Ceiba than in the

larger cities of Tegucigalpa or San Pedro Sula, corruption remained one of the largest perceived

barriers to success in addressing flooding, disaster preparedness, economic development, or any

other goal for the city. Generally, most stakeholders, including some government officials,

expressed serious dissatisfaction with the quality of the municipal government and the lack of

competence of civil servants. This came up again and again as perhaps the most critical issue in

the city. Government officials could not be trusted, nor did anyone truly expect that the

municipal government to accomplish anything.

One issue was the inefficiency and lack of effectiveness of municipal departments. There

were far too many employees, many of whom did not appear to have anything to do, and did not

have their own desks or computers at which to work if they wanted to work. The number of

employees noticeably increased on Fridays, as this was payday: a clear indication that there was

little correlation between work accomplished and pay received. In addition to the general lack of

accountability evident in most departments, in the opinion of many residents, this large staff of

civil servants was a large tax on the municipal budget, leaving little room for expenditures on

services or capital improvements.

However, while the inefficiency and lack of effectiveness of the public sector was clearly

a problem, inefficiency in itself is not necessarily indicative of corruption. More concerning to

residents was the political nature of public offices. Almost all civil servants, with the exception

of some lower-level technical staff, were politically appointed, and it was clear that bribes and

political favors played a key role in appointments. Stakeholders identified several problems with

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this system. First of all, it does not provide incentives to work hard, as appointments are based

on political favor and not on merit. Second of all, it means that there is no institutional memory.

La Ceiba recently held mayoral elections (in early 2010), and a new political party took office.

All of the previous civil servants lost their jobs, and new staff were appointed. This meant that

most of the municipal government only had four months of experience when I arrived, and many

had never previously held office or worked in the public sector. Speaking with past employees

of a USAID project that worked extensively with the municipality to address disaster

preparedness, this was a huge source of frustration. They explained that donors come in and do

effective projects and offer capacity-building to government, but in several years, all of the

people that were trained are no longer in office, and another donor project has to come in and

offer the same capacity-building all over again (Interviews, Risk Management Staff, USAID-

MIRA, May 25, 2010). The problem of institutional memory has been identified before in

Honduras as a barrier to effective management. An analysis of the response to Hurricane Mitch

identified loss of institutional memory after elections as one of the major reasons for a poor

response and recovery process (Telford et al. 2004). Without a dedicated civil service, it is hard

to ensure consistency in policy-making or implementation and makes it challenging to learn from

past experiences. A third problem with the political nature of appointments is that incompetent

people can end up in positions of authority. After interviewing the head of a regional

department, my research assistant, a resident of La Ceiba, informed me that the department head

was a prominent dairy farmer, a skill in no way related to his current position. Interviews with

other department heads demonstrated a clear lack of knowledge of their area of responsibility.

The challenges La Ceiba faces are complex and require a sophisticated understanding of the

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technical aspects of different departments and the interconnections between departments, things

that cannot be acquired quickly without a background or experience.

Making a transition from a reactive disaster response approach to a proactive risk

reduction and adaptation approach will require a competent municipal government, with

knowledge of risk reduction techniques and awareness of climate change. While institutional

memory loss is a large problem during disaster response, it is even more essential for the subtler

task of disaster risk reduction and adaptation. Honduras’ current approach to disaster

management, which focuses on the immediate response to hazardous events, requires a relatively

short time horizon. On the other hand, disaster risk reduction and adaptation are only effective if

policies remain consistent across departments over a long timeframe, and are integrated into

development policies. Honduras will have to address this issue of institutional learning and

incompetency in the civil service in order to have a more effective government. Doing so will

have implications far beyond climate change adaptation, but emerging areas like adaptation that

require a level of technical knowledge and integration will require well-trained staff with deep

knowledge of their own fields and the ability to integrate their work with others.

In recognition that government, particularly in the larger municipalities with higher levels

of political corruption, may not be ready to lead the transition from a culture of disaster response

to a culture of adaptation, it is important to look beyond the municipal government to other

actors in society that may play a key role in the transition from disaster response. Some aspects

of adaptation can be appropriately handled at the household or community level, as we saw in

the previous chapter, although the more that government can support these processes, the more

effective they will be. National policies may be able to facilitate this transition, with local

government following the guidance of national policy rather than being the leader. The next

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chapter will examine the potential of national policies to facilitate local action. The following

chapter will look at whether NGOs and donor organizations can help to address disaster risk

reduction and adaptation.

Conclusion  

One of the features that emerges through the examination of disaster preparedness and

response in La Ceiba is the large number of institutional actors involved. An important question

is whether this complicated institutional approach helps to address flooding issues or whether it

makes planning too complicated and ineffective. For critical time-sensitive activities, such as

evacuation, redundancy helps to ensure resilience. Relying on a large network of actors also

allows the system to draw on resources that can’t be allocated for disasters at all times (such as

the resources of the energy or telephone companies), but which are needed during an emergency.

The institutional framework in La Ceiba, which relies on the strong decision-making and

organizational powers of COPECO, but weak operational capacity, is ideal for disaster response,

as it allows for an efficient use of resources and personnel by the State. However, this

institutional framework makes it difficult for COPECO to undertake disaster risk reduction

activities. One of the strengths of this institutional framework is its flexibility. While different

departments and agencies each have their own responsibilities in relation to disaster preparedness

and response, all staff are also on call to help COPECO with whatever is deemed necessary.

This flexible arrangement allows the usually rigid institutional arrangements of a bureaucracy to

become flexible and adaptive. The challenge is how to harness this flexible, adaptive culture

when there is not an emergency to catalyze the response.

If La Ceiba is to transition from a culture of disaster response to a culture of adaptation,

the institutional relationships between COPECO and the municipal government will need to

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shift. Municipal departments and regional agencies will need to think about disasters not only

when COPECO announces a state of emergency, but consistently throughout their work.

COPECO does not have the resources to undertake disaster risk reduction directly, and it should

be the responsibility of each department to incorporate this into their work. However, La Ceiba

could utilize the strong institutional framework for collaboration across departments and sharing

of resources that occurs during disasters more broadly. COPECO and the CODEMs together

could play an important coordinating role at the municipal level, ensuring that different

departments understand disaster risk reduction and adaptation strategies and work to incorporate

them into their activities. A disaster risk reduction and adaptation focus will place a large

amount of responsibility on the municipal government, and issues of corruption and

incompetence at the municipal level may be barriers to the success of such an endeavor.

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Chapter  6:  National  Policies  The  Role  of  Climate  and  Disaster  Risk  Reduction  Policies  in  La  Ceiba    

Although local governments may ultimately implement adaptation measures, they operate

in a national political and institutional context, and implement policies that are often determined

at the national level. Therefore, having a national climate policy that addresses adaptation is

critical to facilitate adaptation at the local level (Raijan et al. 2010). While specific policies that

address adaptation are ultimately necessary, other policies can serve as building blocks for the

transition to a culture of adaptation. This chapter examines two types of national policies that

might be able to facilitate the transition from a culture of disaster response to a culture of

adaptation: climate policy and policies on disaster risk reduction.

When analyzing Honduras’ climate policy, I consider both mitigation and adaptation

policies. Strong mitigation measures may help create a culture in which climate change is

incorporated into planning, and raise the profile of climate change on the national agenda, which

in turn could lead to consideration of climate impacts when planning. Policies on disaster risk

reduction are important because they may encourage public agencies and government

departments to focus on risk reduction before disasters rather than simply on disaster response.

Disaster risk reduction policies could be instrumental in changing the way that Honduras

approaches risk and vulnerability, and perhaps climate change could be incorporated directly

through this framework.

In order for national policies and legal frameworks to help La Ceiba shift from a culture

of disaster response to one of adaptation, several things must be in place. First, national policies

need to exist that address climate change, adaptation, and disaster risk reduction or risk

management. Second, these policies need to be enforced. Many laws, especially environmental

laws, can exist on paper and never get implemented, particularly when enforcement is weak. It

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is also possible to have policies or laws at the national level, but little integration at the municipal

level. I therefore first analyze the current policies and provide a brief historical overview of their

development. I then analyze whether any government officials are incorporating climate change

into their planning in La Ceiba, and what their thoughts are on how the newest law on disaster

risk management may affect their work. Finally, I consider how other actors in society might be

able to use the existing legal framework around climate change and risk reduction to encourage

government to incorporate disaster risk reduction into policy and decision-making.

Climate  Policy  in  Honduras  

Honduras has submitted one official National Communication to the UNFCCC

presenting their climate policies (República de Honduras 2000), and had planned to submit a

second National Communication by 2010, but has not done so yet (World Bank 2009b,

UNFCCC 2010c). However, Honduras recently developed a Climate Change Strategy and

included its second greenhouse gas inventory in this document (SERNA and UNDP 2010).

Honduras’ National Climate Change Strategy focuses on identifying areas of vulnerability and

includes the following sections: an analysis of climate change scenarios and variability, analysis

of the vulnerability of key sectors, and identification of adaptation and mitigation approaches

(SERNA and UNDP 2010). Since the climate projections for the region are poorly understood,

and in some cases the models give contradictory signs for key variables such as precipitation, it

is reasonable for Honduras to be focusing considerable attention on better understanding the

nature of climate impacts (Magrin et al. 2007). Not surprisingly, considering the country’s

vulnerability and low emissions (apart from deforestation), the Climate Change Strategy focuses

more heavily on adaptation than mitigation. The Strategy explicitly states that efforts should

focus on adaptation and reducing vulnerability, although options that additionally provide

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opportunities for sustainable development and low carbon emissions should be emphasized

(SERNA and UNDP 2010).

Although the report is 159 pages long, only seventeen pages are dedicated to describing

potential adaptation and mitigation strategies, demonstrating the early stages of development of

climate policy in the country. In addition, the approaches included are not concrete policy

proposals, but a summary of analysis done by a group of experts convened for a two-day

workshop. The analysis presents 45 distinct impacts of climate change for the country. It then

lists potential mitigation and adaptation options for each impact. It is important to note that

while these are divided into mitigation and adaptation, mitigation refers to mitigating the hazard,

not mitigating climate change. No specific climate mitigation actions are discussed in the

strategy, with the exception of forest and soil management practices, which play a dual role in

adaptation and mitigation. The only direct mention of greenhouse gas mitigation is included in a

background section summarizing the IPCC recommendations on global mitigation strategies.

While it is difficult to determine which of the numerous options Honduras will ultimately

pursue, the proposals suggest that water management, soil management and reforestation will

play a key role in Honduras’ adaptation strategies. Although having a national climate change

strategy is an important component of a national policy, to be effective, the strategy needs to be

backed up with funds and specific laws and policies, and should include mechanisms to facilitate

local adaptation by providing space and flexibility in planning and budgeting (Raijan et al.

2010). As of now, the National Climate Strategy does not contain specific policy

recommendations, and as such, is not ready to be implemented.

Although the National Climate Strategy is just being developed, Honduras does have

some experience with implementing climate policy through the Clean Development Mechanism

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(CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol. The Program on Climate Change in Honduras is under the Office

of Clean Development in the Secretary of Natural Resources and Environment, highlighting the

importance placed on the CDM (SERNA 2010). Honduras has the most CDM projects

registered in Central America with sixteen projects to date, and an additional fifteen projects

validated and waiting for registration. Of the registered projects, 9 are hydro projects, 4 are

biomass energy, and 3 are methane avoidance (UNEP 2010). In addition, the first two projects

registered with the CDM took place in Honduras (UNFCCC 2010b). Government capacity and

organization are viewed as key to the success of registering CDM projects, and Honduras’

success indicates a reasonably high capacity and priority placed on this mechanism (Ellis and

Kamel 2007). For additional information on implicit climate policies, please see footnote

below.13 While explicit climate policies would be most helpful for facilitating a transition to a

13 Apart from explicit climate policies addressed in the Climate Strategy, Honduras has numerous implicit policies that help to address both mitigation and adaptation. In terms of mitigation, the three major sectors are: Land Use Change and Forestry (LUCF), energy and agriculture. According to the Center for International Forestry Research, Honduras has the highest rate of deforestation in Latin America (Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Kongphan-apirak 2009), which is confirmed in Honduras’ National Strategy (SERNA and UNDP 2010). In an effort to address this, Honduras adopted a new Forest Law in 2007, which includes a Forest Reinvestment Fund for management plans in state forest areas, a Plantation Development Fund to promote plantations in deforested areas, a Municipal Forest Management Fund to implement plans in municipal areas and a fund for the management of national protected areas, which may have helped to reduce the deforestation rates (World Bank 2009b). The success of the program to date is not clear, although deforestation rates have been declining (Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Kongphan-Apirak 2009).

The GHG Inventory shows that while LUCF was the largest source of emissions in 1995, by 2000 the energy sector had overtaken it (SERNA and UNDP 2010). This was in part due to increasing attention to the forestry sector and the development of its Forest Action Plan (World Bank 2009b), but also due to rapidly increasing energy consumption. Overall, Honduras’ emissions declined between 1995 and 2000 due to improvements in the LUCF sector even while energy and agriculture emissions rose, demonstrating the critical role of LUCF emissions and the necessity of addressing energy and agriculture (SERNA and UNDP 2010). Therefore, one of the key indirect climate policies is the Program for Cleaner Production, which seeks to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of industry while reducing the environmental impacts and which includes measures for both energy-intensive and agricultural industries. Efforts began in 1994 as part of a UNEP pilot program. The program continues to receive support from USAID as part of the DR-CAFTA free trade agreement. The government has identified 8 priority sectors and produced best practice guidelines for these sectors, including: textiles, tourist hotels, swine, poultry, tilapia, forestry, sugarcane, and biodiesel from African palm oil. The program consists of voluntary agreements between the government and private enterprises to engage in best practices for cleaner production and provides incentives for corporations that meet targets (SERNA 2010). African palm oil plantations are a growing concern in the country, and threaten to reverse some of the progress Honduras has made on addressing LUCF issues, especially in light of the low efficiency of African palm oil and the rising demand for biodiesel (Elvir 2008, Fargone et al. 2008). In terms of energy policy, Honduras has prioritized both the development of renewable energy and energy

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culture of adaptation, other policies that address climate change may help to raise the profile of

climate change in the country.

Climate  Policies  in  La  Ceiba:  Is  climate  change  being  incorporated  into  planning?  

Although nationally Honduras does have a climate change strategy, it does not contain

specific policies. However, it is possible that, like in many other parts of the world, more action

is occurring at the municipal level than nationally. In this section I examine whether any

municipal departments or regional agencies are incorporating climate change into their planning.

SERNA, the Secretariat for Natural Resources and the Environment, has a regional headquarters

in La Ceiba. Particularly as SERNA is the agency responsible for the national climate strategy, it

would make sense for them to be leaders on climate change. However, SERNA is not currently

involved in any projects related to climate change. A staff member explained that SERNA is

primarily an administrative agency, and does not implement projects itself. Instead, its role is to

assist municipalities and NGOs in their work. In terms of climate change, he saw SERNA’s role

primarily to provide capacity-building trainings to municipal governments, implementing

agencies and NGOs (Interview, staff member, SERNA, July 7, 2010).

Not only was SERNA not directly involved in climate projects, but also staff were not

aware of many climate change-related efforts happening in the region. The only climate-related

project that a staff member could think of was a project by Bosque Pico Bonito (Interview, staff

member, SERNA, July 5, 2010). Bosque Pico Bonito is a company that practices sustainable

timber harvesting in the buffer zone of Pico Bonito National Park and sells certified timber. In

efficiency. A new law is in the works to promote energy efficiency and establish an Institute for Rational Use and Energy Efficiency (Flores et al. 2010). In addition, the government is almost ready to release its new energy plan for 2030. The key aims of the new energy policy are to reduce reliance on foreign energy, increase access for rural areas, and improve the transport system through fuel efficiency standards and road improvements. Renewable energy is seen as one method to improve energy security, but is not a focus point of the policy (Flores et al. 2010).

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addition, it has many social and environmental projects designed to improve the ecosystem and

livelihoods of communities in the buffer zone. Bosque Pico Bonito’s current largest project is a

reforestation project generating certified carbon offset credits under the CDM. The project

methodology was the fourth globally to be approved and offsets are purchased by the World

Bank BioCarbon Fund. Although the company focuses on mitigation, through their community

agroforestry projects and watershed management, they see many ways that their work relates to

adaptation (Interview, Director, Bosque Pico Bonito, July 21, 2010).

The other local institution that would make sense to be involved with climate change was

the Municipal Environment Unit (UMA). However, the Director of UMA was not aware of

climate policies, although he said he imagined that at the national level, they were working on

these issues (Interview, Director, UMA, June 2, 2010). For the most part, the UMA focused

addressing local environmental issues, including contamination, trash, and deforestation. With a

small staff, longer-term issues such as climate change were not on the agenda. Technical staff

members appeared more knowledgeable on the topic, but explained that coordination between

the UMA and other departments was not well established, and although the CODEM and

COPECO were working on risk management, UMA was not in direct communication with them

(Interview, technical staff, UMA, May 26, 2010). While staff could see potential to link the

work of other departments to climate change, this is not currently being done.

Although it was quickly evident that climate change was not being incorporated into

planning by any institutions or agencies, I wanted to understand if public officials understood

climate change and its implications for their work. For the most part, local officials had a similar

understanding of climate change as residents. Officials tended to have a better understanding of

the science, but still had similar misconceptions regarding tsunamis and earthquakes. Although

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they could explain how climate change affected their work, it was clear from interviews that for

many officials this was the first time they had thought about the issue, and most directly

acknowledged that they have not begun to incorporate climate change into their planning.

Interestingly, other studies have found that government officials tend to emphasize climate

change much more than local residents, and commonly draw attention to global concerns, such

as the melting of the Greenland ice sheets, that have little applicability to their local constituents

(Raihan et al. 2010, Predo 2010). However, I found that government officials, like residents,

focused on local drivers of flooding, and were much less likely to discuss climate change. As

others have argued that officials use climate change as an excuse to not take responsibility for

local problems (Raihan et al. 2010), it is perhaps encouraging that government officials in La

Ceiba remain focused on local drivers. However, recognizing the role that climate change will

play in exacerbating some of the local drivers will be critical for adaptation. In addition, better

coordination across departments, as advocated by the technical staff of the UMA, is a necessary

step to improve the likelihood of incorporating climate change into planning.

Disaster  Risk  Reduction  Policies  

Perhaps even more directly relevant than the national climate policies are national

policies designed to address disaster risk reduction. While climate change is only just beginning

to be addressed in national policies, Honduras has been dealing with natural disasters for a long

time, so it is possible that policies are more advanced in this area. However, Honduras’ disaster

preparedness and response system has been strongly critiqued because the legal structure does

not facilitate risk management and preparedness, and the government has not prioritized risk

reduction (UNDP and CEPREDENAC 2003, Telford et al. 2004, Newborne 2008). Although it

is clear from the analysis of activity on risk reduction at the local level that significantly more

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effort is needed, it is interesting to consider the progress that Honduras has made nationally on

risk reduction.

After Hurricane Mitch, considerable effort has been made to improve the government’s

focus on risk management and risk reduction. The Master Plan for Reconstruction and National

Transformation (1999) included multiple objectives focused on reducing risk from natural

disasters, including rehabilitating and diversifying the productive sector, repairing and improving

infrastructure, strengthening macroeconomic stability, establishing transparent and efficient

management of resources and institutionalizing a new type of risk management to prevent and

mitigate disasters (Reyes Chirinos and Lara Pineda 2007). However, five years after Mitch, a

government assessment stated that although some progress had been made incorporating risk

management into policy, the topic was not a high priority on the government platform, nor was

there much money allocated for risk reduction in the national budget (UNDP and CEPREDNAC

2003).

In addition to national efforts, many of which have been supported by donors and

international NGOs as part of the recovery process, regional programs have been developed to

facilitate risk management throughout Central America. A year after Hurricane Mitch, the

Presidents of Central American nations met and established the Coordination Center for Natural

Disaster Prevention in Central America (CEPREDENAC) to facilitate regional efforts and

develop the “Strategic Framework for Vulnerability and Disaster Reduction in Central America”

(UNDP and CEPREDENAC 2003). This organization has been active in coordinating risk

reduction efforts throughout the region.

In 2006 COPECO established a new Institutional Strategic Plan for 2006-2010 that

presented its vision to “be the institutional leader on the National System of Risk Management,

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promoting a culture of prevention in the population and contributing to the national

development.” COPECO also initiated a plan to involve NGOs in its efforts and enhance

coordination of action among all actors (Reyes Chirinos and Lara Pineda 2007). Perhaps

indicative of the success of this initiative, Honduras recently adopted a new law, known as the

Ley de SINAGER (Law of the National System of Risk Management) in order to encourage the

integration of disaster risk reduction into planning. The law went into effect in December 2009,

and it is not yet clear what the practical implications of the law will be, but in theory it helps to

prioritize risk management among all public entities and employees throughout the country.

Interestingly, the law is explicitly related to climate change and the vulnerability of Honduras to

climate impacts. The first consideration mentioned in the preamble is climate change,

specifically the vulnerability of the country to hurricanes on the Atlantic coast (Republica de

Honduras 2009). This is one of the few places where the link between climate change and

disaster risk reduction has been made explicit in Honduras, demonstrating how legal approaches

can sometimes be on the forefront of new approaches.

The law is intended to bring together prevention and emergency response, with a specific

focus on spatial planning. The law includes a recognition of the “right to protection” of every

individual against threats such as flooding or natural disasters. One of the goals of the law is to

bring all of the institutions responsible for disaster risk reduction together and increase the

accountability among them and between them and citizens (Newbourne 2008). If the law can be

implemented, it could form the foundation for serious changes in the way that Honduras

approaches disasters. By addressing the linkages between disasters and climate change,

focusing on risk reduction, and emphasizing institutional linkages and accountability, the law

contains many of the building blocks of an approach that would lead to a resilient city as well as

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flexible, resilient institutional arrangements. Departments and programs that are already

working on issues relating to flooding and disaster response could use the new law as a tool to

strengthen the profile of their work and integrate risk reduction into planning, allowing these

issues to be addressed more comprehensively.

While the law has the potential to facilitate a change from reactionary responses to

disaster to a proactive risk reduction and adaptation approach, the important question remains as

to whether the law has any impact on the work or attitudes of the public officials and institutions

it is designed to influence. Without prompting, the law came up in interviews with numerous

public officials, particularly at COPECO and the Department of Urban Planning. They

suggested that the law does shift their responsibilities, primarily from responding to disasters to

incorporating risk management into planning and prevention. One of the strongest motivators is

that the law holds individual officials accountable if they do not incorporate risk assessments into

their work. The Director of the Department of Urban Planning in La Ceiba was particularly

articulate discussing her motivations for incorporating risk management into urban planning.

“If I grant a construction permit in a vulnerable area, in an area of risk or vulnerability, and God allows a natural phenomenon, a flood, a catastrophe, or an earthquake to occur, or if a hurricane arrives, and the project suffers some harm, or the property or the people are injured or die, I will go to jail. If they look at the permit and see that I authorized it knowing that the place was high risk, the mayor is going and so am I [to jail]….Therefore, we are very worried because this is a very serious obligation and it is very risky to give a permit knowing that in the future it is going to affect someone.” (Interview, Director, Department of Urban Planning, June 1, 2010).

While officials were good at talking about the impact that the Ley de SINAGER will have on

their offices, it remains to be seen whether the law will actually make a difference in practice.

Much of this will depend on whether the law is enforced. Considering the historically low levels

of accountability in Honduras, it is unlikely to have an immediate, large impact. However, the

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law could serve as a good catalyzing force for incorporating climate change impacts and risk

assessment into planning and broaden disaster responses to address prevention.

Legal frameworks can also be leveraged by other actors in civil society, either to

encourage government officials to follow through with their legal commitments, or by providing

a framework for their own work. The human rights movement has very successfully leveraged

the legal nature of the commitments to human rights made by governments to address human

rights violations. By serving as human rights watchdogs, NGOs have been able to protect

vulnerable populations from their own governments and hold governments accountable. As we

saw earlier and will see in the following chapter, local communities, NGOs, and international

organizations have an important role to play in La Ceiba, and they could help to enforce the Ley

de SINAGER and hold the government accountable for its actions, or lack of action. A rights-

based approach to climate change is gaining in prominence, and emphasizes that vulnerable

populations should not be left waiting for their government to serve them, but as citizens, they

have rights to government services and should participate in determining how those services are

used (Raihan et al. 2010). In addition, the law may help some NGOs or donors who have not

thought about risk reduction to incorporate this into their own work. Many donors and

international NGOs are committed to working on national priorities and following government

initiatives. The existence of the Ley de SINAGER could allow these NGOs and donors to align

their own work with the government priority on risk reduction as expressed in the law.

Conclusion  

The analysis of national policies demonstrates that Honduras does have some polices and

laws that may help to facilitate a transition to a culture of adaptation, but many of these policies

are not yet well-formulated. Policy on risk management, as evidenced by the new Ley de

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SINAGER, is more advanced than the climate policy, providing additional evidence that disaster

risk reduction may be the most appropriate focus for building a culture of adaptation. The Ley

de SINAGER has the potential to provide the framework for a well-integrated risk reduction and

adaptation strategy. However, implementation of the law will be critical to success. In addition,

in order for this law to facilitate a culture of adaptation, climate change will need to be taken into

account when considering risk. As the analysis of local government’s integration of adaptation

into their work demonstrates, this is not yet happening in La Ceiba. The lack of attention paid to

the impacts of climate change and its implications for policy at the local government level is a

barrier to developing a successful adaptation strategy. Perhaps if the National Climate Strategy

progresses beyond an assessment of vulnerabilities and potential adaptation strategies, and real

policies are put in place to address climate impacts nationally, this would help to facilitate action

at the local scale. Finally, there is potential that other actors, including NGOs and donors, may

be able to utilize the existing legal framework (including the Ley de SINAGER) to encourage

local government to incorporate climate change into planning. The following chapter begins by

examining in more detail the potential role of NGOs and donors.

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Chapter  7:  From  local  to  global:  bridging  across  scales  The  Role  of  NGOS,  Donor  Organizations  and  the  Climate  Negotiations  

Although many of the building blocks that will help La Ceiba transition to a culture of

adaptation need to take place at the local or national level, Honduras does not need to make this

transition on its own, and in fact, outside forces can play an important role in helping to shape

this transition. Adaptation is something that must be viewed at all scales, from the very local,

individual responses to climate impacts, to the global responses to the issue. When looking for

potential facilitators of a culture of adaptation, it is important to look across scales. While the

international discourse may not directly influence the activities at the municipal level in La

Ceiba, it can influence the priorities of international actors who do act directly in La Ceiba, and it

can shape national priorities. If adaptation is seen as a global funding priority, then it is more

likely that La Ceiba will receive support for adaptation. In addition, Honduras is heavily reliant

on donor funding, so if the development policies of donor organizations shift, this could play an

important role in the policies and activities in La Ceiba.

In order for NGOs and donor organizations to facilitate a transition to adaptation in La

Ceiba, several things need to be in place. First, NGOs and donors need to have a strong presence

in La Ceiba and the ability to influence policy and activities in the area. Second, they need to

specifically be involved in areas related to flooding and natural disasters. Finally, they need to

have a culture of adaptation themselves, and be committed to addressing climate change. If

these components are present, NGOs and donors can facilitate a transition to adaption in several

ways: directly through their own work or projects, by funding government policies and projects,

and by facilitating learning and providing examples of best practices that may be adopted by

other actors. This chapter looks at the work that NGOs and donor organizations are currently

doing to see whether these criteria are met and identifies gaps that need to be addressed.

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In order for the international climate negotiations to facilitate adaptation in La Ceiba, the

Parties need to make substantive progress in the negotiations, both in general and specifically on

adaptation. Secondly, concrete sources of funding for adaptation need to be developed, and

finally, these resources need to be available for Honduras. If all of these components are in

place, it could help shift the focus towards adaptation throughout the world, including in La

Ceiba. However, even without complete success, it is possible that the negotiations can facilitate

adaptation if they are able to shift the global discourse, and this discourse is meaningfully

adopted either by Honduras’ national government or by donors active in the region. This chapter

therefore takes a critical look at how adaptation is approached in the international negotiations,

how the discourse on adaptation is shifting, and what the implications are for Latin America. It

also includes some analysis of the potential for the negotiations to better incorporate adaptation

and some of the limitations of the negotiations.

From  Local  back  to  Global:  The  Role  of  International  NGOs  and  Donors    

In Honduras, like many developing countries, foreign aid plays a large role in many of

the policies and projects undertaken. As a country highly dependent on foreign aid, much of the

work done in Honduras is supported by international development agencies. Some of these are

international nongovernmental organizations and some are bilateral aid organizations, but for the

purposes of this analysis, I will consider them together. The prominence of these organizations

was very clear in La Ceiba, and they appeared to be highly influential. Although being highly

dependent on foreign assistance is not ideal, it may be very helpful for engaging La Ceiba on

adaptation issues.

One advantage of the presence of international development agencies and donors in La

Ceiba is that they can assist with knowledge-sharing, which is of critical importance given the

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emerging nature of adaptation and the lack of experience that the municipal government or local

NGOs may have with climate change issues. As international NGOs begin to integrate

adaptation into their work throughout the world, they can share best practices and lessons learned

that may be applicable in Honduras as well. Another advantage is that they may be more likely

to view adaptation and preventative measures as a priority compared to local or national actors

due to cultural differences on acceptable levels of risk, or their own national or organizational

policies.

Many international development agencies and donors are beginning to recognize the

importance of climate change adaptation and its connections to their work, and have developed

explicit climate policies.14 However, recognizing the importance of adaptation and its

connections to development is not the same as implementing adaptation at the project or program

level. A Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research report examined the degree to which six

development agencies had incorporated adaptation into their projects. The report found that

although all agencies sought to incorporate adaptation into their programming, few individual

projects actually addressed climate change, and rarely was the impact of climate change

considered in the planning of projects (Klein et al. 2007).

Klein et al.’s findings resonate with my experience with international development

agencies and donors in La Ceiba, which were working on issues highly related to climate change

14 Examples of climate statements from international development organizations include: CARE: “CARE International promotes a pro-poor approach to poverty-environment-climate change programming that maximizes social justice and poverty reduction impacts on a sustainable basis, and protects more vulnerable social groups from the negative impacts of environmental change”. (CARE Climate Change Information Centre 2009), Oxfam: “Our experience as a development and emergency relief organization is instrumental in assisting communities to build their resilience to more frequent and extreme droughts, floods and weather events. We do this through new technologies, diversifying livelihoods, disaster risk reduction and by helping people organize themselves to get help and determine solutions.” (Oxfam International 2009), and USAID: “To respond to the threat that global climate change poses, USAID investments are working to spur reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions and to promote climate change adaptation in vulnerable countries and communities.” (USAID 2011).

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adaptation, but climate change was not being incorporated explicitly into the programs.

However, based on the projects that NGOs and donors are working on, there is a strong potential

for this to shift. Of the large international NGOs, the only one with a presence in La Ceiba was

CARE. CARE works in two areas: humanitarian relief and development. As such, they could

serve as a key facilitator for disaster risk reduction, but they are not currently incorporating

climate change into their work in La Ceiba. In an interview with a staff member, he explained

that CARE’s number one priority is emergencies. During an emergency, they provide logistical

support, both in terms of staff and transportation. They also have funds to help with housing and

sheltering. In terms of development, they currently have two large projects, one focusing on

water and sanitation, which includes trainings on the care and management of drinking water

supplies and reforestation of watersheds. Their second project addresses agroforestry, tourism

and artisanal market access. Although neither project addresses climate change, the staff

member did comment that all the work CARE does is highly linked to climate change and

explained that they are currently working to develop a new project explicitly addressing climate

change. This project would work on agroforesry and providing alternative livelihoods to people

living in areas vulnerable to climate impacts. The key challenges they see are gathering the

information to make the proposal, as they do not appear to have much expertise in this area

(Interview, staff member, CARE International, July 2, 2010).

By far the largest international actor in La Ceiba was the European Union, which is in the

middle of a large seven-year project based in La Ceiba called PROCORREDOR.

PROCORREDOR is a broad project addressing the sustainable development of natural resources

and watersheds of the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor on the Honduran Atlantic coast. The

specific objectives of the project are to enhance the administration of protected areas, to increase

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the sustainable management of watersheds in the region, to map the territorial boundaries within

the project area, and enhance the capacity of governmental and non-governmental organizations

in the environmental sector. Almost all departments and all NGOs that were interviewed were

involved in the PROCORREDOR project, and PROCORREDOR was supporting a large portion

of their work. Since the project was still in the early stages, it is hard to judge the outputs of the

project, but its influence is clear.

Although currently in between projects, the other large international actor in La Ceiba is

USAID. From 2005 to 2009, USAID had a 23 million dollar project called MIRA (Integrated

Management of Environmental Resources). Similarly to PROCORREDOR, the project focused

on capacity-building for watershed management and policy reform to enable integrated natural

resource management. In fact, for many stakeholders, it was difficult to describe the difference

between MIRA and PROCORREDOR.15 Although many components focused on technical and

scientific mapping of watershed resources, one component of the project focused on disaster

preparedness. MIRA worked with many municipalities to develop disaster preparedness plans,

strengthen the institutional arrangements for disaster preparedness and response, and build the

15 Having two large projects with similar objectives could be beneficial for La Ceiba, in that it could allow for continuity and follow-through across projects. While there does appear to be some coordination, especially on the part of several senior consultants, there also appears to be considerable overlap. The presence of these two similar projects also provided an opportunity to compare the approaches of the two donors. One of the major differences between the approach that the EU has taken with PROCORREDOR and the approach that USAID took with the MIRA project is that the EU is strongly committed to implementing the program through local NGOs and governmental organizations, and not implementing programming directly. USAID, on the other hand, implements much of its programming directly, and did so in the MIRA project. Although this more heavy-handed approach of USAID is generally criticized heavily, there was very little negative feedback from stakeholders regarding the MIRA project, and the general sentiment appeared to be that USAID was able to accomplish a lot with the MIRA project and that it was very helpful at the municipal and local level. Stakeholders explained that although they had previously thought that USAID was challenging to work with, in comparison with the EU, USAID was much less bureaucratic. Although the EU is more hands-off in that they implement through partners, they have much higher administrative requirements, and the first two years of the project were spent setting up all of the contracts. The level of administrative burden and complicated accountability has hindered the success of the project to date, although it remains to be seen if it will have payoffs in terms of capacity-building and local project ownership.

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capacity of local communities for disasters through the establishment of CODELS and

vulnerability mapping exercises. Most of the documents, plans, and maps that government

officials, both at the municipal and regional levels, are using were produced by USAID for the

MIRA project, demonstrating the large impact the project had and continues to have, but also the

lack of capacity of the government, which has not modified or updated any plans or maps since

they were made, up to five years ago.

The MIRA project also included one component where adaptation was explicitly

considered. USAID chose three pilot projects throughout the world to help develop their climate

mainstreaming policy, and the MIRA project in La Ceiba was chosen to pilot adaptation to

flooding (USAID 2008). Climate change scenarios were developed, and numerous adaptation

options for the city (focusing primarily on infrastructure) were identified. Unfortunately,

funding for the project was reduced and the implementation components of the project were cut

(USAID 2008). However, a follow-up project to MIRA called PROPARQUE is scheduled to

begin in 2012 and will include a more substantial climate change component (Email

Communication, Director MIRA, September 28, 2010). The project will focus on sustainable

economic growth, biodiversity conservation and climate change, and one of the project’s

objectives is to address natural disaster adaptation (USAID 2010). In addition, a World Bank

initiative is now looking to build one of the primary adaptation options recommended by MIRA

as part of an urban renewal project, and are communicating with MIRA staff in order to

incorporate climate change into the project plans (Email Communication between World Bank

and MIRA staff, September 22, 2010).

Based on the experience of CARE, the MIRA project and PROCORREDOR, there is

strong potential for international NGO and donor-driven projects to help La Ceiba transition

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from disaster response to adaptation, but it is not yet happening as much as it could be.

International NGOS and donors have a strong influence in the city and are highly involved with

many departments, agencies and local NGOs. Interestingly, integrated watershed management

appears to be a primary focus of projects and is an area where adaptation would fit easily.

Integrated natural resource management projects help to reduce the vulnerability of the city to

flooding and other climate impacts and increase the resilience of the city. However, unless these

projects specifically consider climate change and incorporate this into the project goals and

objectives, the benefits of the project for adaptation will continue to be indirect, and

opportunities to address this more explicitly may be lost. In addition, in order to facilitate a

transition from disaster response to adaptation, the linkages between natural disasters and the

integrated watershed management or development projects being promoted need to be made

more explicit. Although project staff could explain how their work related to flooding and

natural disasters, this was not clearly expressed as part of the project goals, making it difficult for

the connection between adaptation and disaster response to be clear. This could be particularly

important for organizations like CARE, that have both humanitarian and development goals.

Adaptation  in  the  context  of  the  international  climate  negotiations  

As the venue where the world is attempting to address adaptation globally, it is

interesting to consider whether the international climate negotiations can facilitate adaptation in

La Ceiba. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has

served the official venue for international negotiations on climate change since its inception at

the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992. The negotiations have proven extremely challenging, and after

almost twenty years, less has been accomplished than was originally imagined. After

Copenhagen in 2009, much of the world lost faith in the UN process, but the Climate Conference

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in Cancún in December 2010 has helped to restore some faith in the process, although the

outcomes remain very modest (UNFCCC 2010d). Global emissions continue to rise and the

chances of meeting the target of limiting temperature increases to two degrees are small (Project

Catalyst 2010). However, it is possible that it may still be able to contribute to adaptation

(Harmeling et al. 2010).

The  Discourse  on  Adaptation  

The first issue to consider is how adaption is placed within the UN negotiations.

Although the UNFCCC negotiations address both mitigation and adaptation, historically there

has been significantly more emphasis on mitigation. Efforts to address adaptation are still in

their infancy and both the conceptual understanding of adaptation and the commitment of

resources to address adaptation lag far behind mitigation. One reason is the traditional North-

South divides and power imbalances in the negotiations that mean that the interests of vulnerable

developing countries have not been well represented (Muller 2007). The lack of progress on

adaptation, however, goes beyond North-South issues, and reflects a more fundamental

reluctance to address adaptation. Historically, addressing adaptation was viewed as admitting

defeat on mitigation efforts. If we plan for adaptation, the argument went, then we are settling

for a world with climate change instead of working to ensure that there is not a need to adapt. It

also implied a lack of interest in mitigating the problem (Pielke 1998). Another common

viewpoint was that adaptation will be necessary, but should be dealt with after mitigation has

been tackled. Efforts to address adaptation now were seen as diverting scarce resources and

focus away from the primary task of stabilizing carbon emissions. Mitigation was viewed as

urgent, while adaptation remained something to be dealt with in the distant future. Pielke (1998)

also argues that the focus in the Convention on “limiting dangerous anthropogenic interference

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with the climate system” (UNFCCC 1992), has encouraged a prioritization of mitigation by

focusing on human actions, rather than the combined natural and human interferences which are

the focus of adaptation (Pielke 1998).

As our understanding of climate science has improved and our progress addressing

mitigation has been much slower than originally anticipated, this perspective on adaptation has

shifted. Now it is generally acknowledged that efforts to address adaptation should be given

equal priority as mitigation efforts. In light of the increasing certainty of climate change and

greater awareness of impacts that will occur regardless of future mitigation efforts, there is

greater agreement that both mitigation and adaptation are necessary (Burton et al. 2002). While

the rhetoric has begun to shift, the vast majority of resources and efforts remain focused on

mitigation.

Funding  for  Adaptation  

Within the UNFCCC, several potential sources of adaptation funding have been

established. Most of these flow through the multilateral organizations, either the development

banks or UN agencies such as UNDP or UNEP, but some are administered directly by the

UNFCCC. One of the critiques of the UNFCCC process on adaptation is the obscurity and

complexity of the institutional framework. Within the UNFCCC, funding for adaptation comes

from multiple different sources, each of which is designed for different purposes, but it is not

always apparent which source is most appropriate for different projects (Mohner and Klein

2007). Within the UNFCCC, the primary funding mechanisms are: the Least Developed

Countries Fund, the Special Climate Change Fund, and the Adaptation Fund. The Least

Developed Countries Fund finances the development and implementation of National Adaptation

Programmes of Action (NAPAs) for the least developed countries (LDCs). The Special Climate

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Change Fund is designed to support long-term adaptation measures to increase the resilience of

development to climate impacts (UNFCCC 2010a). The latest of the funds, the Adaptation

Fund, is designed to fund concrete adaptation projects. It is the only multilateral adaptation

funding mechanism that developing countries can access directly (without the World Bank or an

UN agency acting as the implementing body), and thus its establishment was hailed as a major

success from the perspective of developing countries (Muller 2007). The first round of funding

was dispersed to Senegal in November 2010 (Caravani et al. 2010a). Honduras is poised to be

the second country to receive project funding, as it is currently the only other full project

proposal that has been approved (Adaptation Fund 2010). The other major funding mechanism to

note is the Pilot Program on Climate Resilience under the World Bank’s Climate Investment

Funds. Designed to demonstrate the feasibility of integrating climate resilience into national

development plans, this funding is scheduled to conclude in 2012. However, with the absence of

a comprehensive framework for adaptation financing, it is possible that the program will be

extended (Caravani et al. 2010a).

So far, much of the funding available to developing countries has been for national

assessments and preparations for the NAPAs (Schipper 2007). While planning is critical, and

many developing nations currently lack the infrastructure to even assess priorities, it is also

important to recognize that there are limited resources available to tackle adaptation, and it may

be more productive to use these resources to actually begin addressing adaptation. Without a

coordinated system in place to plan and fund adaptation, there is a risk that all of the funding will

be used to plan for adaptation and not actually implement changes. With the Adaptation Fund

finally operational, there are finally funds available for project implementation, but the quantity

remains quite small.

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While multiple funds exist, the scale of funding committed through these funds falls far

short of the anticipated adaptation needs, and climate financing remains heavily biased towards

mitigation. The need for adaptation financing above and beyond traditional development

assistance is clear, as the World Bank explains on its website: “Adaptation will require more

resilient infrastructure, broader disaster relief and preparedness measures, and new agricultural

technologies and practices to counter the increased climate risks. This could divert resources

from other development programs unless more funding is made available” (World Bank 2009a).

However, looking at dedicated climate funds, 82% of funding is directed towards mitigation

activities and only 8% for adaptation (Caravani et al. 2010a). Although there is considerable

uncertainty regarding the amount of funding needed, there is little question of scale. It is obvious

that large-scale funding, above and beyond traditional ODA funding or the existing adaptation

mechanisms within the UNFCCC, will be needed to address adaptation. Depending on what

methods are used to estimate yearly costs, different groups, including the World Bank, Oxfam

International and UNDP, estimate that between nine and eighty-six billion dollars will be needed

per year between now and 2050 to address adaptation (Ensor and Berger 2009). Of course, the

carbon dioxide concentration at which the atmosphere stabilizes, as well as the timeframe of

stabilization, will greatly impact the cost of adaptation. Recent analyses suggest, however, that

even the large projections for adaptation financing are likely to be underestimates for multiple

reasons, including that they do not take into account costs associated with ecosystems, as well as

other hard-to-calculate costs, some of the sectors that are included are only partially covered, and

sometimes the additional costs of adaptation have been included simply as a “climate-mark-up”

which does not accurately capture adaptation costs (Caravani et al. 2010a).

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In recognition of these problems, arguably one of the largest outcomes of Cancún was the

establishment of an Adaptation Framework, designed to coordinate adaptation efforts and ensure

greater emphasis on adaptation. The Framework includes a process for the LDCs to implement

their NAPAs and a mechanism for other developing countries to develop their own National

Adaptation Plans based on the experience of the LDCs with the NAPAs. It establishes an

Adaptation Committee that will provide technical assistance to the Parties, assist with

knowledge-sharing, liaise with other international organizations to ensure coordinated action,

and review submissions of Parties on their adaptation needs. The Adaptation Framework also

established a work programme to examine losses and damages from climate change in

particularly vulnerable developing countries. The issue of compensation for losses and damages

(separate from funding to cover adaptation measures) has been a contentious issue within the

climate negotiations, and the establishment of this work programme is intended to address this

concern. Finally, the Framework encourages the establishment of regional centers and national

level institutional arrangements to facilitate knowledge-sharing and capacity (UNFCCC 2010a).

Another important controversial issue was addressed in Cancún: that of compensation for

response measures (a concern raised primarily by the Middle Eastern oil producing states).

These countries demanded compensation for losses from declines in oil consumption due to

mitigation efforts. The Parties agreed that this was an issue to be addressed under mitigation,

and should not be eligible for adaptation funding, distinguishing between adaptation to the

impacts of climate change and adaptation to responses to climate change (Harmeling 2010).

Hopefully the Cancún Adaptation Framework will help to address some of the shortcomings on

adaptation in the UNFCCC process, but there is clearly a long way to go before adaptation

receives an equal footing with mitigation.

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Taking  stock  of  progress:  limitations  for  adaptation  and  reasons  for  optimism  

Although the Cancún Adaptation Framework offers hope for enhancing the profile of

adaptation within the UNFCCC, and will ideally address some of the institutional barriers for

funding, there are still some limitations to the UNFCCC process that will not be addressed.

While there are many reasons to be critical of the UNFCCC process in general, this section will

not address these broader limitations. Instead it will focus on limitations for adaptation in

particular. At the same time, there are certain characteristics of adaptation that might make it

easier to negotiate than mitigation, offering optimism that there is potential to make more

progress on adaptation than might be predicted based on the progress to date.

The key challenge for addressing adaptation within the UNFCCC process stems from the

siloed nature of the negotiations, which artificially separates climate change from other related

topics (Moomaw and Papa 2010). In addition to limiting negotiators’ ability to trade across

issues and find mutual benefits, which could potentially help break the negotiating impasse, the

siloed nature of the negotiations has implications for the way that funds raised under the

convention can be spent and what kinds of adaptation activities are allowable. Because the

mandate of the UNFCCC is to address climate change, measures undertaken under the

convention must demonstrate a direct relationship to climate change, and Parties must be able to

prove that their actions are “additional” in order to count them towards their commitments. This

applies to actions to reduce emissions and commitments to fund adaptation in developing

countries.

In order to address this, within the adaptation discourse, an important distinction has

emerged between spontaneous and planned adaptation. Spontaneous adaptation refers to those

actions that individuals, communities or projects take to adapt to climate change on their own:

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either because they have already felt the impacts of climate change and are reacting, or because

they make sense from a development perspective, irregardless of climate change (McGray et al.

2007). Planned adaptation, on the other hand, refers to specific actions and projects that either

incorporate climate change or are specifically designed to address climate change. Although

both forms can increase adaptive capacity and reduce vulnerability, only planned adaptation is

eligible for certain adaptation-specific funding. Although insisting on additionality is logical

from a negotiation perspective, as developing countries want to be assured that current

development assistance is not diverted away from other urgent development priorities to address

adaptation, it creates a complicated accounting framework, insures a fragmented approach to

adaptation, and confuses the relationship between adaptation and development (Persson et al.

2009). Scholars have acknowledged that additionality in relation to adaptation has proven both

technically and conceptually difficult to demonstrate, and the framework has been widely

criticized (Brown and Kaur 2009, Jones et al. 2010). New proposals call for a separation between

the accounting of funding and the implementation of programs or projects, which would help to

address these concerns and allow funding for development and adaptation to be pooled at the

country level after attributed to their appropriate sources (Muller and Gomez-Echeverri 2009,

Persson et al. 2009, Harmeling et al. 2010). If issues regarding how adaptation funding relates to

development funding and what kinds of activities are eligible can be resolved, it will be much

easier to get buy in from both developed and developing countries for adaptation. The need for

additional funding is clear, but the larger question is how this funding should be delivered, and

whether the climate negotiations are the appropriate venue.

Although to date much more progress (or at least effort) has gone into mitigation, several

characteristics of adaptation provide reason to believe there could be further progress moving

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forward. One of the major advantages for adaptation is the local nature of adaptation measures.

Although solving the challenge of carbon emissions is necessarily a global issue, adaptation

happens at a local scale and can be solved locally. It isn’t necessary to wait for global

cooperation before progress can be made and results become visible. In many ways this makes

adaptation much more achievable than mitigation. Mitigation faces the challenge that

individuals, and even individual nations, feel that their actions are too small to make a difference

in the face of the global challenge. If local adaptation efforts are successful, it will provide

incentives for greater investment in adaptation, and could “trickle up” to the global negotiations.

Another advantage is that adaptation and development goals are complementary, and thus

adaptation is not subject to the same tensions seen in the negotiations on mitigation, where

mitigation is posited as being in conflict with development. Although there are many ways in

which development goals and mitigation goals are complementary (ie increasing energy

efficiency), they are commonly viewed in competition, making it more challenging to move

forward on this issue (Moomaw and Papa 2010). A third advantage of adaptation is that many

adaptation strategies, particularly disaster risk reduction strategies are significantly cheaper than

the humanitarian costs associated with disasters (Jarraud 2005). Many donors may begin to

recognize the benefits, even from a self-interested standpoint, of investing in adaptation.

Accessing  Adaptation  Funding:  Challenges  for  Latin  America  

Even if the UNFCCC process is able to overcome some of the limitations it currently

faces and significant global financing becomes available through these mechanisms, a question

remains as to whether small Latin American countries such as Honduras will be able to access

these funds. More than other regions, Latin America faces challenges accessing adaptation

funding within the UNFCCC. Many of these limitations are valid, and represent global

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prioritization in the face of scarce resources. However, they still play an important role when

considering the options for funding and support for adaptation in Latin America.

A specific challenge for Latin America is that much of the funding for adaptation has

been directed through the Least Developed Country Fund or the Special Climate Change Fund,

both of which focus on the least developed countries. Apart from Haiti, none of the countries in

Latin America or the Caribbean qualify as least developed countries, but many are still quite

poor and are highly vulnerable to climate change. A distinctive feature of Latin America is the

high degree of inequality in society, which means that there are high levels of poverty and

vulnerability even within countries with relatively higher per capita incomes. Since funding

eligibility is determined at the national level, Latin American countries are not eligible, and are

less likely to be recipients of the benefits that could emerge from greater financing (Caravani et

al. 2010b).

Traditionally Latin America has not played a key role in the climate negotiations, as most

countries are not major emitters and thus are not targeted for mitigation, nor are they part of the

active blocs advocating for adaptation (either the least developed countries, or the small island

developing states (SIDS))16 (De La Torre et al. 2009, Friedman 2010). This has shifted recently

with the emergence of the ALBA group, consisting of Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and

Venezuela. The coalition blocked the Copenhagen Accord, and members have become strong

advocates for “climate justice,” the rights of Mother Earth and full participation in the climate

negotiations from all countries (Declaration ALBA-TPC 2010). After their surprise role in

Copenhagen, they again emerged as a force to be reckoned with in Cancún, with Bolivia

remaining the sole dissenter to the consensus document produced by the Parties in Cancún

16 The Caribbean SIDs negotiate with AOSIS rather than regionally with other Latin American countries. Notable exceptions include Brazil, which has been quite active on issues of deforestation and biofuels, and Costa Rica, which jointly proposed REDD+.

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(Solon 2010). As a new negotiating bloc, it is not clear whether the ALBA group will shift the

dynamics in the negotiations, or whether they will serve only to block compromise agreements,

but many believe that they may play an important role, and they could help garner additional

resources for the region in the future (The Climate Group 2011).

Another challenge for Latin America is the balance of funding between mitigation and

adaptation that has flowed to the region. Latin America has a large capacity for mitigation

projects due to high inefficiencies in energy consumption patterns and high rates of deforestation

(De La Torre et al. 2009). Rising income levels also mean that emission levels are increasing

rapidly. Although this means that the region receives a substantial amount of mitigation funding,

particularly through the Clean Development Mechanism, it has led to comparatively little

adaptation funding going to the region (Caravani et al. 2010b). In addition, the high profile of a

few countries in the region, notably Brazil and Mexico, largely overshadow the smaller

countries, particularly in Central America, and means that regional profiles hide the lack of

funding going to the majority of countries.

Although Latin American countries have not been major contributions to the international

negotiations, many countries are extremely vulnerable to climate change, including the Andean

countries with their dependence on glacial run-off for drinking water, the drying of the Amazon

region, and droughts, floods and hurricanes in Central America (Magrin et al. 2007). Latin

America is going to need to adapt, but it remains to be seen if international funds will be

available to fund the efforts that hopefully begin to be undertaken.

Conclusions  

While overall the climate negotiations have failed to provide comprehensive solutions to

climate change, adaptation is gaining prominence in the negotiations, and is likely to continue to

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play a more central role moving forward. Although current funding is far from sufficient, new

funding mechanisms are being proposed that may help to address the barriers for access and

resolve some of the challenges between adaptation funding and development funding and

hopefully more funding will become available moving forward. However, Latin America is not

currently poised to be able to receive much of this potential funding. Latin American negotiators

will need to become more engaged in the negotiations to ensure that the region is not left out of

options for adaptation. In many ways, it is more likely that La Ceiba and Honduras will benefit

more from the negotiations indirectly, rather than directly through adaptation funding

mechanisms. By shaping national priorities and donor agendas, La Ceiba may benefit from the

progress made internationally in the climate negotiations even if Honduras is not eligible for

funding.

 

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Chapter  8:  Conclusion  

Already vulnerable to natural disasters and flooding, climate change will exacerbate these

threats in La Ceiba. The city has two options: it can continue to approach these hazards as it has

in the past: by preparing for and responding to disasters when they come, or it can adopt a

comprehensive adaptation strategy that seeks to reduce the risks of flooding and damages from

natural disasters, incorporating the projected impacts of climate change. In this thesis I contend

that La Ceiba should choose the second option and take measures to transition to this approach.

The critical question, however, is how, collectively, to make this decision and transition from a

culture of disaster response to a culture of adaptation. Through an analysis of the conceptual

differences between disaster response and climate change adaptation and the potential of

numerous building blocks to contribute to a transition to a culture of adaptation, a clearer picture

emerged of both the opportunities and challenges for climate change adaptation in La Ceiba.

When thinking about how La Ceiba can transition to a culture of adaptation there are

several things to consider: what overarching framework will support this transition, what are the

important components of a comprehensive adaptation strategy, and who can facilitate this

transition? This thesis explored all of these questions, and can provide insight into different

elements for adaptation in La Ceiba. These elements are by no means comprehensive, but they

may form the foundation for an adaptation strategy.

Based on my analysis, a disaster risk reduction framework will help La Ceiba transition

from a culture of disaster response to a culture of adaptation. Both in the academic fields and

communities of practice, disaster risk reduction is proving to be a useful lens to bring the disaster

management and climate adaptation communities together. Disaster risk reduction is a broad

enough concept that it can encompass the priorities of each, but by placing a strong emphasis on

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risk and prevention, it forces both fields to look outside of their traditional approaches to natural

disasters and view them more holistically. More specifically for La Ceiba, disaster risk reduction

is an appropriate framework for several reasons. First of all, natural disasters are recognized as a

key priority by both government and residents. Incorporating climate change into an issue that is

already of importance to stakeholders will be much more effective than if attempts were made to

introduce adaptation in areas of lesser priority. In addition, disaster risk reduction has been

identified by the government as an important area for improvement, so it is likely to get traction

with stakeholders as an important policy agenda. Finally, a disaster risk reduction strategy could

address many of the challenges that La Ceiba faces with flooding, and effectively help La Ceiba

adapt to both the current flooding it experiences and the increased pressures associated with

climate change.

In terms of the components of a comprehensive adaptation strategy, it is encouraging to

recognize that La Ceiba has many resources available with which to build an adaptation strategy

because flooding and natural disasters are a frequent challenge faced by the region, and

something the region has extensive experience with. This will prove invaluable in a transition to

an adaptation strategy. In the introduction, I proposed that a building block approach may help

in the development of an adaptation strategy. After examining numerous potential building

blocks, I believe that this is a realistic approach for La Ceiba. It capitalizes on the strengths of

current coping strategies and disaster response mechanisms, while recognizing the limitations at

both the local and national level. Because adaptation requires integrating risk and climate

impacts into all aspects of planning, it is particularly well-suited for a building block approach.

I analyzed seven potential building blocks and their ability to contribute to a

comprehensive adaptation strategy and facilitate a transition to a culture of adaptation. The

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seven potential building blocks I identified were: local coping strategies, knowledge of climate

change, the current disaster management strategy in La Ceiba, national climate policies, national

policies on disaster risk reduction, donors and international NGOs, and the international climate

negotiations. These building blocks represent an extremely broad range of potential components

on an adaptation strategy and contributors to a transition to a culture of adaptation. While this

breadth made it challenging to analyze any one component in detail, it also demonstrates the vast

wealth of resources available to La Ceiba. After evaluating the current status in each potential

building block, I conclude that all of these building blocks are necessary for a comprehensive

approach to adaptation. Each one offers essential elements of the strategy and can contribute in

significant ways. While La Ceiba can reduce its risk of flooding and resilience to natural

disasters without all of these building blocks, it is unlikely to be successful unless a significant

number of these components are included.

The analysis of these building blocks also demonstrates, however, that this transition will

not be easy, and will require dedicated effort on the part of all stakeholders. The current culture

of disaster response is deeply entrenched, and cultural practices are extremely difficult to change.

A culture of adaptation will not be built quickly, but through small measures, this transition can

be encouraged.

Based on my analysis of each building block, I recommend several areas to strategically

focus in order to utilize these building blocks.

1) Local Coping Strategies: Community-based adaptation projects should begin by

focusing on the coping strategies that residents already use and encourage knowledge-

sharing of best practices among households facing similar threats and across

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communities. There are many innovative strategies being used, but not widespread

adoption of some of the more innovative of these strategies.

2) Knowledge about Climate Change: Additional information about climate change is

needed both in La Ceiba and in rural communities. Although everyone had heard of

climate change, it was difficult for people to distinguish between climate change and

weather patterns. Information about climate change could help residents and local

government plan more realistically for climate change, but before providing this

information, careful attention must be paid to the way climate change is presented so that

it does not disempower local communities and the adaptive capacity that they have.

3) The Current Disaster Management System in La Ceiba: Although the current disaster

management system in La Ceiba is heavily focused on disaster response, there is a well-

developed institutional arrangement in place for managing natural disasters and floods,

and an adaptation strategy should utilize this institutional framework. Efforts to

introduce disaster risk reduction should focus on COPECO and the CODEMs, as these

institutions are already responsible for natural disasters and play a leadership role in this

area. While these institutions do not have the resources to implement disaster risk

reduction directly, they can play a key coordinating role.

4) National Climate Policies: Honduras’ national climate strategy has the potential to place

climate change on the agenda of local and regional government agencies and public

officials, but it has not yet developed any specific implementing policies. Until the

strategy is more concrete, it will be difficult for it to influence practice at the local level.

However, the strategy includes numerous potential areas of focus on adaptation and

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disaster risk reduction. Efforts should concentrate on translating the current broad

strategy goals into specific implementing policies.

5) Disaster Risk Reduction Policies: The establishment of the new Ley de SINAGER on

disaster risk management, which holds public officials accountable for incorporating risk

into their work, has the potential to be a real breakthrough in the way Honduras handles

risk, but only if it is implemented. Efforts should focus on encouraging key agencies and

departments, namely COPECO and Departments of Urban Planning, to implement risk

reduction strategies. The law also provides the opportunity for civil society actors to hold

government accountable for risk reduction, and efforts should be made to use this legal

framework to ensure that government follows through with risk management practices.

6) NGOs and Donor Organizations: International NGOs and donor organizations play an

important role in La Ceiba and are highly influential. While current donor projects

address issues closely related to climate change, most have not explicitly incorporated

climate change. By incorporating climate change, international NGOs and donor

organizations can facilitate a transition through both their own projects and programs and

their ability to influence policy and decision-making at the local level. NGOs and donors

should think critically about how they can incorporate climate change into their current

and future projects.

7) International Negotiations: The international negotiations help to set the global

discourse on adaptation, influencing both the funding and resources available for

adaptation and the priority placed on adaptation by national governments. Adaptation is

gaining prominence in the negotiations, which is encouraging, but specific implementing

frameworks are needed, as was recognized with the establishment with the Adaptation

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Framework in Cancún. Efforts should focus on measures to make the Adaptation

Framework concrete. In addition, Latin American countries should work to ensure that

their needs are addressed in the negotiations, particularly on adaptation, as Latin America

is not prioritized for funding and may not receive the benefits when funding becomes

available.

If progress is made on any of these building blocks, it will help to decrease La Ceiba’s

vulnerability to flooding and facilitate the transition to a culture of adaptation. As progress is

made on any component, it will become easier to make progress on each of the others, and

eventually La Ceiba may be able to transition to a culture of adaptation. Much more research is

needed, however, to determine exactly what this culture of adaptation should look like, and how

exactly La Ceiba can get there. This analysis demonstrates, however, that such a transition is

needed and that there are many potential avenues to address the transition.

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Appendix  

Figure  1:  Map  of  Honduras  and  the  Department  of  Atlántida  

Figure  2:  Map  of  neighborhoods  in  La  Ceiba  included  in  the  study  

Figure  3:  Map  of  all  communities  included  in  the  study  

Source:  Google  Maps  2011

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Figure  4:  Drivers  of  Flooding  in  La  Ceiba  There are many drivers of flooding in La Ceiba. This diagram explores some of the common explanations for flooding in the city and the reasons that they are problems. As is evident from this diagram, flooding in La Ceiba is very complex. Any adaptation strategy will need to take into consideration La Ceiba’s current challenges with flooding in addition to the impact of climate change.

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Table  1:  Key  Partners  with  COPECO.      Each organization listed below has a designated liaison with COPECO. When a state of emergency is declared, all liaisons are contacted and stay in constant contact with COPECO. For codes yellow and red, all liaisons must report to COPECO’s headquarters to aid in logistics and coordination, and ensure their organization is ready to help in any way possible (not limited to their primary responsibilities, listed below).

Organization   Responsibility  CODEM-­‐  Municipal  Emergency  Committee  

Coordination  of  the  municipal  response  and  communication  between  COPECO  and  local  communities.    Coordination  of  delivery  of  aid.  

Hondutel-­‐  National  Telecommunications  Service  Provider  

Repair  of  phone  lines    

ENEE-­‐  National  Electricity  Provider   Repair  of  electrical  services    SANAA-­‐  Sanitation  and  Wastewater  Management  Agency  

Maintenance  and  repair  of  water  and  sewer  systems    

SOPTRAVI-­‐  Public  Works  and  Transportation  Infrastructure  Agency  

Maintenance  and  repair  of  roads,  bridges  and  other  infrastructure  

SAG-­‐  Secretary  of  Agriculture  and  Livestock  

Assessing  damages  to  agriculture  and  livestock  and  estimating  needs  

Batallon  Infanteria  Marina  (BIM)-­‐  Marines  

Evacuation  and  search  and  rescue  by  boat  and  logistical  support  

Armed  Forces    

Evacuation  and  search  and  rescue  by  land  and  logistical  support  

Air  Force   Evacuation  and  search  and  rescue  by  air  and  land  and  logistical  support  

SERNA-­‐  Secretary  of  Environment  and  Natural  Resources  

Assessing  environmental  damages    

Firefighters   Evacuation  and  search  and  rescue  PMA  (World  Food  Program)   Distribution  of  food  aid    Health  Department   Sheltering  and  health  services  Department  of  Education   Evacuation  from  schools  Red  Cross  of  Honduras   Logistical  support,  search  and  rescue,  aid  distribution,  

assistance  in  sheltering  Medical  Delegation  of  Honduras   Assistance  with  medical  care    Colegio  de  Ingenieros-­‐  Engineering  Association  of  Honduras  

Assistance  with  public  works  and  engineering  

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Figure  5:  Early  Warning  System  in  La  Ceiba  Since Hurricane Mitch, Honduras has worked to develop a better system of disaster preparedness and response. This diagram illustrates the way the early warning system is supposed to function between COPECO, the CODEMs (Municipal Emergency Committees, upstream CODELs (Local Emergency Committees) and downstream CODELs. Although in theory, the system is well organized, in reality there are many challenges and many improvements could be made to the communication system.

 

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Interviews  Conducted  During  Fieldwork  in  Honduras,  May-­‐July  2010  

1. Coordinator of the Integrated Watershed Management component of USAID-MIRA (Integrated Management of Environmental Resources) project, May 25, 2010

2. USAID MIRA Employee, Risk Management (field staff who directly with communities in capacity training), May 25, 2010

3. Director, Department of Tourism, La Ceiba, May 26, 2010 4. Technicians, UMA (Environment Department), La Ceiba, May 26, 2010

5. Administrator, Fire Department, La Ceiba, May 26, 2010 6. Deputy Director of COPECO (Permanent Commission for Contingencies), La Ceiba

Regional Office, May 26, 2010 7. Ecotourism Guide for FUCSA (Fundación Cuero y Salado) and Presidente of the CODEL

(Local Emergency Committee) in Salados Barra, May 27, 2010 8. Fishseller, Member of CODEL in charge of the radio, and husband of the Community

President, Salados Barra, May 27, 2010 9. Priest, cathedral of San Isidro, La Ceiba, May 28, 2010

10. Director, Unidad Technica (Department for International Assistance), La Ceiba, May 28, 2010

11. Ecotourism Guide for FUCSA and member of the CODEL, Salados Barra, May 31, 2010 12. Older female resident who lived next to the river, Salados Barra, May 31, 2010

13. Older couple who lived near the beach, Salados Barra, May 31, 2010 14. Fisherman and his wife, who works in the garden with Falls Brook Center (Canadian NGO

working in Salados Barra), Salados Barra, May 31, 2010 15. Oldest woman in the community, May 31, 2010

16. Member of the Patronato and used to be a member of the CODEL, Salados Barra, May 31, 2010

17. President of the community, Salados Barra, May 31, 2010 18. Doctor, Honduran Red Cross, June 1, 2010

19. Director, Department of Urban Planning, La Ceiba, June 1, 2010 20. Coordinator for PROCORREDOR (EU funded project for the sustainable development of

natural resources and watersheds of the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor on the Honduran Atlantic) for the city of La Ceiba, June 1, 2010

21. Regional Coordinators, World Food Program, June 1, 2010 22. Director, UMA, La Ceiba, June 2, 2010

23. Priest, La Ceiba, June 2, 2010

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24. Program Manager, RECOUTOUR (Danish funded project to promote ecotourism), June 2, 2010

25. Program Officer, CARE International, June 2, 2010 26. Environmental technician, UMA, La Ceiba, June 2, 2010

27. Director, FUCSA, June 3, 2010 28. Epidiemoligist, Hospital Atlantica, La Ceiba, June 3, 2010

29. Liaison between SOPTRAVI (Secretary of Public Works, Transport and Housing) and COPECO and Director, Public Works, SOPTRAVI, Regional Office, La Ceiba, June 3, 2010

30. Sectretary, CODEM (Municipal Emergency Committee), La Ceiba, June 3, 2010 31. Director, OMASAN (Municipal Office of Water and Sanitation), La Ceiba, June 22, 2010

32. Director, CODEM, La Ceiba, June 22, 2010 33. Liaison with COPECO, Naval Academy, La Ceiba, June 23, 2010

34. Liaison with COPECO, Hondutel (Honduran Telecommunicans Company), June 23, 2010 35. Liaison with COPECO, ENEE (National Electric Energy Company), June 23, 2010

36. Liaison with COPECO, Batallon Infanteria Marina (Marines), June 23, 2010 37. Director, ODECO (Organization of Ethnic Community Development), June 24, 2010

38. Liaison with COPECO, Gobernacion Politica, June 24, 2010 39. Instructor, Risk Management, CODEM, La Ceiba, June 24, 2010

40. Liaison with COPECO, Red Cross, June 24, 2010 41. President, Red Cross, La Ceiba, June 24, 2010

42. Director, Public Services, La Ceiba, June 24, 2010 43. Liaison with COPECO, Honduran Medical Delegation, June 24, 2010

44. Risk Assement Project Officer, Red Cross, June 24, 2010 45. Risk Management Specialist, Red Cross, June 25, 2010

46. Liaison with COPECO and Journalist, Regional Education Department, June 25, 2010 47. Liaison with COPECO, SAG (Secretary of Agriculture and Livestock)- June 25, 2010

48. Liaison with COPEO and Coordinator of Education and Capacity-building, SANAA (Autonomous National Service for Wataer and Wastewater), June 28, 2010

49. Liaison with COPECO and Coordinator of Watersheds and Protection, ICF (Forest Conservation Institute), June 28, 2010

50. Director, Department of Community Development, La Ceiba, June 28, 2010 51. Program Manager, RECOUTOUR, June 28, 2010

52. President, Patronato, Boca de Toro, June 29, 2010

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53. Coordinator and Secretary of the CODEL, Fiscal of the CODEL, Vocal 1 of the Junta de Agua (Local Water Board), President of the CODEL, the Society of Fathers of the Family, and the Society of the Citizen Security, and the Secretary of the Patronato, Boco de Toro, June 29, 2010

54. Vice-Presidente of the Patronato and Security for the CODEL, Boco de Toro, June 29, 2010 55. Older couple, parents of the informal leader, Boco de Toro, June 29, 2010

56. President, Patronato, Micely, June 29, 2010 57. Director, Fundacion Cayos Cochinos, June 30, 2010

58. Liaison with COPECO, Fourth Battalion, Armed Forces, June 30, 2010 59. Commander, Fourth Battalion, Armed Forces, June 30, 2010

60. President, Patronato, Neighborhood of Colonia Sarmiento, La Ceiba, July 1, 2010 61. President, Treasurer and Vocal, Patronato, Neighborhood of Colonia Pinanza, La Ceiba, June

1, 2010 62. Director, Cooperacion Espanola (Spanish Development Agency), July 5, 2010

63. Program Officer, SERNA (Secretary of the State for Natural Resources and the Envioronment), Regional Office, La Ceiba, July 5, 2010

64. Liaison with COPECO, Colegio del Ingenieros (Engineers Professional Society) and Coordinator, Rural Water Supply, SANAA, Juy 5, 2010

65. Presidents, Patronato, Junta de Agua and CODEL, Neighborhood, Colonia Primero de Mayo, La Ceiba, July 5, 2010

66. Resident, Neighborhood of Colonia Primero de Mayo, La Ceiba, July 5, 2010 67. Field Technician, COPECO, July 6, 2010

68. President, Patronato, Neighborhood of Colonia Las Delicias, La Ceiba, July 6, 2010 69. Liaison with COPECO, SERNA, July 7, 2010

70. Engineer of Urban Water Supply, SANAA, July 7, 2010 71. Liaison with COPECO, CODEM, Porvenir, July 7, 2010

72. Businessman and Environmentalist, Porvenir, July 7, 2010 73. Mayor and President of the CODEM, and Vice-Mayor and Liaison with COPECO, San

Fransisco, July 7, 2010 74. President, CODEL, Neighborhood of Colonia Miramar, La Ceiba, July 8, 2010

75. Fisherman, Neighborhood of Colonia Miramar, La Ceiba, July 8, 2010 76. President, Patronato, Secretary, CODEL, Secretary of Public Relations, Patronato, Vocal,

CODEL and Health Committee, Communications, CODEL, Treasurer, CODEL, President, CODEL and Fiscal, Patronato, Former President and y Founder, Junta de Agua, community member, Security, CODEL and Collaborator, Junta de Agua, Neighborhood of Las Rodas, La Ceiba, July 13, 2010

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77. Coordinador, CODEL, Neighborhood of Colonia Sarmiento, La Ceiba and Employee, Regional Health Center, July 14, 2010

78. Commandor, Air Force, Regional Center La Ceiba, July 14, 2010 79. Executive Director, Fundación Nombre de Dios, July 15, 2010

80. Businessman and Environmentalist, Porvenir, July 15, 2010 81. President, Patronato, Wife of the Coordinator, CODEL, Secretary, CODEL, Neighborhood

Colonia Narciso, Porvenir, July 15, 2010 82. Coordinator, CODEL and President, Junta de Agua, Nueva Armenia, July 16, 2010

83. Subdirector, Centro Basico (1-9th grade school), Nueva Armenia, July 16, 2010 84. President, CODEL, Nueva Armenia, Juy,16, 2010

85. Technician of Environmental Health, Regional Health, July 19, 2010 86. President, Patronato, Treasurer, Patronato, Vocal III, Patronato, Vocal I, Patronato, President,

CODEL, Vocal II, Patronato, Neighborhood of Armenia 87. Assistant Watersheds, Technical Director Watersheds, International Technical Assistence,

PROCORREDOR, July 19, 2010 88. Secretary, Patronato, Volunteer in the school and daughter of the community leader, Salados

Barra, July 21, 2010 89. Fiscal, Junta de Agua, Salados Barra, July 21, 2010

90. Director, Bosque Pico Bonito, July 21, 2010 91. Tecnician, Regional Department of Environmental Health, July 22, 2010

92. Coordinador, Environmental Health, La Ceiba and Former Chief of Operations, Regional COPECO, July 22, 2010

93. Fiscal, Tourism Committee and President, CODEL, Boca Cerrada, July 23, 2010 94. Informal Leader, Boca Cerrada, July 23, 2010

95. Wife of the President of the Patronato, Boca Cerrada, July 23, 2010 96. President, Patronato, Boca Cerrada, July 23, 2010

97. President, Tourism Committee and President, Junta de Agua, Boca Cerrada, July 23, 2010 98. Fish buyer and seller, Boca Cerrada, July 23, 2010

99. Park Ranger, FUCSA, Boca Cerrada, July 23, 2010 100. President, Patronato, RECOTOUR, Junta de Agua, Secretary of RECOUTOUR and

Director of the school, Las Mangas, July 29, 2010