georgian anti-corruption legislation: implementation in ... · • the activities of the...

GeorgianAnti-CorruptionLegislation:ImplementationinPractice

TransparencyInternationalGeorgia

2015

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ThePublicationhasbeenpreparedwiththefinancialsupportoftheSwedishInternationalDevelopmentCooperationAgency(Sida).TheviewsexpressedinthereportdonotnecessarilyrepresentthoseofSida.TransparencyInternationalGeorgiaissolelyresponsibleforthereport’s

content.

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ContentsI.Introduction........................................................................................................................................4

II.ExecutiveSummary............................................................................................................................4

III.OverviewofAnti-CorruptionLegislation...........................................................................................5

TheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService......................................................5

TheLawonCivilService.....................................................................................................................7

TheCriminalCode..............................................................................................................................8

LawonLobbyingActivities.................................................................................................................9

LawonNationalRegulatoryAuthorities............................................................................................9

IV.ImplementationofAnti-CorruptionLegislationinPractice............................................................10

LawonCivilService..........................................................................................................................10

ThelawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService.....................................................15

CivilServiceBureau..........................................................................................................................21

GeorgianNationalEnergyandWaterSupplyRegulatoryCommission............................................22

GeorgianNationalCommunicationsCommission............................................................................23

LobbyingActivities...........................................................................................................................24

ParliamentaryCommitteeonProceduralIssuesandRules.............................................................25

MinistryofInternalAffairsandChiefProsecutor’sOffice...............................................................26

V.Conclusion........................................................................................................................................27

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I.Introduction Anti-corruptionprovisionshavelongexistedintheGeorgianlegislationandhavebeenconstantlyundergoingchangeandimprovement.Forexample,theLawonCivilService1andtheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService2haveexistedsince1997.Theformerhasundergone104differentamendmentssinceitsadoption,andthelatter-50.In1998,GeorgiaadoptedtheLawonLobbyingActivities3.Thecountry’sCriminalCode4providesforcriminalliabilityforcorruptionandmalfeasance.Finally,conflictofinterestandprinciplesofintegrityofvariousregulatorybodiesandtheirmembersareregulatedbyanumberofotherlaws.

However,ofequalimportancetoimprovingthelegalframeworkisitseffectiveenforcement.Thelatteristhesubjectofthisresearch.

TransparencyInternationalGeorgiarequestedstatisticsfrompublicagencies(ministries)onviolationsandresponsestotheviolationsoftheLawsonCivilService,LobbyingActivities,andConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService.WealsorequestedstatisticsoninvestigationslaunchedandcriminalprosecutionscarriedoutunderrelevantarticlesoftheCriminalCode.

Thereportalsopresentsseveralcasestudies(identifiedthoughdeskresearch)thatillustrateshortcomingsintheimplementationofanti-corruptionlegislation.

II.ExecutiveSummaryEffectiveimplementationoftheanti-corruptionlegislation,includingcrimedetectionandprevention,intheGeorgianpublicsectorishinderedbyanumberofproblems.Theseproblemsaremultifacetedandcomplexinnature.Oneofthemainobstaclesforthisresearchwasincompleteinformationprovidedbypublicagencies.Severalagenciesdidnotprovideanyanswer,while,insomecases,wehadtheimpressionthatapublicagencydeliberatelyavoidedansweringcertainquestions.

KeyFindings:

• Mostministrieshaveadepartment(usuallytheInternalAuditDepartment)thatisresponsibleforidentifying,investigatingandrespondingtoviolationsofnormsestablishedbytheLawonCivilServiceandtheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService.

• Thesedepartmentsaremostlyineffective.Thisisevidencedbythefactthattheyhavefailedtodetectviolationsrelatedtoconflictofinterestandcorruption,whichhavebeenidentifiedbymediaandnon-governmentalorganizations.

• Independentregulatorycommissionsdonothavedepartmentstaskedwithinvestigatingcasesofpossibleconflictofinterest.

• Themajorityofpublicagenciesdonothaveaclearinternalwhistleblowingmechanism.Theexistenceofsuchamechanismisnotrequiredbylaw,whichisasignificantobstacleforthe

1LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,see:https://goo.gl/kKXQHv2LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,see:https://goo.gl/jB09YT3LawofGeorgiaonLobbyingActivities,see:https://goo.gl/fn1NJ54TheCriminalCodeofGeorgia,see:https://goo.gl/fCL02E

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implementationoftheexistinglegislationonwhistleblowerprotectionandfailstomeetbestpracticerequirements.

• TheMinistryofInternalAffairs,theMinistryofDefenseandtheStateSecurityServicehaveyettofulfilltheirobligationtodevelopaspeciallegislationonwhistleblowerprotection.

• TheactivitiesoftheAnti-CorruptionDepartmentoftheStateSecurityServicearenottransparent.

• AnumberofinaccuracieshavebeenidentifiedinassetdeclarationssubmittedbyMPsinrecentyears.

• The‘revolvingdoor’provision(Article65-restrictionofemployment)oftheLawonCivilServiceisthemostproblematicofanti-corruptionprovisions.Thelawdoesnotapplytolocalgovernmentofficials,anddoesnotspecifywhichgovernmentbodyisresponsibleforitsenforcement.

Basedonthesekeyfindings,TransparencyInternationalGeorgiahasdevelopedthefollowingrecommendations:

• ThedepartmentswithinpublicagenciesresponsibleforenforcingtheLawonCivilServiceandtheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicServicemustintensifytheireffortstodetectandpreventviolations.Thecapacityofthesedepartmentsmustalsobestrengthened,includingthroughtrainingofemployees.

• Independentregulatorycommissionsmustbeobligatedbylawtosetupinternaldepartmentschargedwithinvestigatingpossiblecasesofconflictofinterest.

• Publicagenciesmustbeobligatedbylawtodevelopclearandsimpleinternalproceduresforwhistleblowingthatwillbeproactivelyintroducedtotheiremployees.

• Aneffectivelegislationonwhistleblowerprotectionmustbeadoptedforlawenforcementagencies.Alternatively,theexistinglegislationmustbeextendedtotheemployeesoftheseagencies.

• Article65(restrictionofemployment)oftheLawonCivilServicethatcontainsregulationson‘revolvingdoor’mustbeextendedtolocalgovernmentemployees.Othershortcomingsofthisprovision(e.g.,thelackofaresponsibleagency)mustalsobeaddressed.

• TheactivitiesoftheAnti-CorruptionDepartmentoftheStateSecurityServicemustbecomemoretransparent.

• TheProceduralIssuesandRulesCommitteeofParliamentmustpaygreaterattentiontoexaminingtheassetdeclarationsfiledbyMPs.

• Inordertoeffectivelyimplementanti-corruptionlegislation,anindependentanti-corruptionagencymustbecreatedthatwillhavewithproperauthority,resourcesandpoliticalindependence.

III.OverviewofAnti-CorruptionLegislation

TheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicServiceTheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicServicedeterminesthebasicprinciplesofprevention,discoveryandeliminationofconflictofinterestandcorruptioninpublicagencies,and

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basicprinciplesofresponsibilityofperpetratorsofcorruption.5Thislawalsoregulateswhistleblowerprotectionandassetdeclarationsfiledbypublicofficials.

Thelawdefinescorruptioninpublicserviceas“theabuseofthepositionortheopportunitiesrelatedtothepositionbyapublicservantinordertoobtainpropertyorotherassetsprohibitedbylaw,andthetransferoftheseassetstohim/her,orsupportinobtainingandlegalizingthem.”6Accordingtothelaw,acorruptionoffensemayinvolvedisciplinary,administrativeandcriminalliability.Thelawdefines“conflictofinterestinpublicservice”astheconflictofpropertyorotherprivateinterestsofapublicservantwiththeinterestsofstateservice.7Thelawalsoregulatesgiftsreceivedbypublicservantsandtheirfamilymembersandthesubstantiationoftheoriginoftheirproperty.8Ifapublicservantorhis/herfamilymemberreceivesagiftthatisprohibitedbylaw,theyareobligatedtotransferittotheLEPLServiceAgencyoftheMinistryofFinancewithinthreeworkingdays.9

TheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicServicesetsrestrictionsandbanspublicofficialsfrommakingpropertytransactionswithapublicinstitutioninwhichtheyholdaposition.Publicofficialsarealsoprohibitedfrommakingpropertytransactionsaspublicservantswiththeircloserelativesortheirrepresentatives.10Incaseapublicservant’spersonalorpropertyinterestispresentduringadecision-makingprocess,he/sheisobligatedtodeclareself-recusal.11Thislawalsoregulatestheincompatibilityofdutiesinpublicservice.Accordingtothelaw,anofficialorhis/herfamilymembermaynotholdaposition,performanykindofworkin,holdanystocksorashareintheauthorizedcapitalofanenterpriseregisteredinGeorgia,ifthecontrolofitsentrepreneurialactivitiesfallswithinthepowersofthisofficialorhis/heroffice.Officialsarealsoprohibitedfromholdingapositioninanyenterprise.12

Accordingtothelaw,publicofficialsshallbedismissedfromtheirpositionif:

• TheyortheirfamilymembershaveviolatedtheincompatibilityprovisionsunderthisLaw.• Itisconfirmedbyacourtdecisionthattheofficialownsillegaland/orunsubstantiated

property.13

Thelawobligatespublicofficialsandtheirfamilymemberstoannuallyfileassetdeclarationsandimposessanctionsincaseofnoncompliance.14

Thelawalsodeterminesthemechanismsofwhistleblowerprotection,disclosureprocedureandotherrelatedissues.15Accordingtothelaw,disclosuremaybemadeinwriting,orally,electronically,bytelephone,fax,throughthewebsiteadministeredbytheCivilServiceBureauorothermeans.At

5LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,Article16LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,Article37LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,Article38LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,Article59LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,Article5210LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,Article1011LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,Article1112LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,Article1313LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,Article1314LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,ChapterIV15LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,ChapterV

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thesametime,disclosurecanbeanonymous.Ifawhistleblowerdoesnotexpressinwritinghis/herconsenttoreleasehis/heridentity,thebodyinchargeofthereviewofwhistleblower'sapplicationsshallnotdisclosethewhistleblower'sidentity.16Article204ofthelawdeterminestheguaranteesofwhistleblowerprotection.Forexample,itprohibitstheintimidationofawhistleblowerorhis/herrelatives.

However,thislawdoesnotapplytotheMinistryofDefense,MinistryofInternalAffairsandtheStateSecurityService.Whistleblowerprotectionissupposedtoberegulatedthroughaspeciallegislationinthesepublicagencies.17

TheLawonCivilServiceTheLawonCivilServiceestablishesthelegalbasisfortheorganizationofcivilserviceinGeorgia,regulatesrelationsrelatedtotheperformanceofcivilserviceanddeterminesthelegalstatusofpublicemployees.Thelawdistinguishesbetweenthefollowingcivilservanttypes:astate-politicalofficial,anofficial,amemberofthesupportstaff,apart-timeemployee.

TheLawonCivilServiceestablishesthecriteriaunderwhichapersonwillnotbeacceptedintocivilservice.18Thelawalsodistinguishesbetweenpoliticalpartyactivitiesandpublicservice,andprohibitscivilservantsfromusingtheirofficialpositionforpoliticalpartyactivities.19Thelawsetsrestrictionsonofficialsupervision.Forexample,acivilservantisnotallowedtosuperviseanorganizationwherehis/herfamilymembersholdmanagerialpositions.20Civilservantsarealsonotallowedtoparticipateinentrepreneurialactivities,andonlyhavetherighttoholdsharesorownershipstakes.21Inaddition,civilservantsmaynotreceiveprofitfromorganizationswhosesupervisionispartoftheirofficialduties.

Thelawintroducestheconceptofincompatibilityofofficeandplacescertainrestrictionsforcivilservantsonconcurrentlyperformingotherpaidwork.22

Adismissedcivilservantmaynotstartworkingforapublicinstitutionthathe/shesupervisedduringthepastthreeyears.Inaddition,forthreeyearshe/shealsomaynotreceiveincomefromsuchinstitutionorenterprise.23

Stateemployeesarenotallowedtomaketransactionswithpoliticalparties,theirbusinessentities,aswellaswithfamilymembersandrelatives.24

16LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,Article20417LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,Article201118LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article1719LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article6120LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article6221LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article6322LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article6423LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article6524LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article66

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Article73oftheLawonCivilServicedefinesthegeneralrulesofconduct,theirpurposeandscope,andimposescertainrestrictionsandobligationsoncivilservants.25Thisarticlealsoestablishesgeneralrulesofconductforpreventingconflictofinterestandcorruptionincivilservice.26

Article734,Paragraph4ofthelawdefinestheconceptof‘apersonrelated’toacivilservant,whichmayinclude‘afamilymember’and‘acloserelative’undertheLawonConflictsofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,aswellasanyotherpersonwithwhomthepublicemployeemaintainsacommonhousehold,i.e.aspecialrelationshipthatmayaffectconditionsoreconomicoutcomesoftheiractivity.Paragraph3ofthesamearticleobligatesapublicservanttoprovideinformationtorelevantauthoritiesabout‘relatedpersons’employedatthesamepublicagencywithinonemonthafterjoiningcivilservice,andlaterbyFebruary1ofeachsubsequentcalendaryear.27

Inordertopreventcorruptionoffenses,Article735,Paragraph2ofthelawobligatescivilservantstoinformtherelevantdepartmentofthepublicagencyaboutreceivingagift.28Ifapublicservantisofferedanunduebenefit,he/shemustnotifyhis/herimmediatesuperiorinwritingoftheattemptedofferwithinthreeworkingdays.29

Articles78and79ofthelawregulatedisciplinaryviolationsandrelatedsanctions.Thelatterinclude:30

• Reproval• Warning• Deductionofnomorethantenworkingdays'salary• Suspensionfromworkwithoutpay–fornomorethantenworkingdays• Transfertoalowersalarygrade–fornomorethanoneyear• DismissalonthebasisofthisLaw.31

TheCriminalCodeTheCriminalCodeofGeorgiaprovidesforresponsibilityofdifferentseverityforcorruptionorcorruption-relatedcrimes.Accordingtothislaw,thefollowingoffensesarecriminallypunishable:votebuying32;unlawfulappropriationorembezzlementofanotherperson'spropertyorpropertyrightsthroughuseofone’sofficialposition33;crimesagainsttheinterestsofserviceinentrepreneurialorotherorganizations,suchasabuseofpower34andcommercialbribery35;officialmisconduct,specifically,abuseofofficialpowers36,exceedingofofficialpowers37,illegal

25LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article731,Article73226LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article734,Article73527LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article734,Paragraph428LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article735,Paragraph229LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article735,Paragraph3,Subparagraphf)30LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article7931LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article7932TheCriminalCodeofGeorgia,Article164133TheCriminalCodeofGeorgia,Article18234TheCriminalCodeofGeorgia,Article22035TheCriminalCodeofGeorgia,Article22136TheCriminalCodeofGeorgia,Article33237TheCriminalCodeofGeorgia,Article333

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participationinentrepreneurialactivities38,bribe-taking39,bribe-giving40,tradeininfluence41,acceptinggiftsprohibitedbylaw42,andforgerybyanofficial43.

LawonLobbyingActivitiesGeorgianlawdefineslobbyingasanyinfluencenotprohibitedbylawofapersonregisteredasalobbyistonarepresentativeoranexecutivebodyforthepurposeofachievinglegislativechange.44AnycapablecitizenofGeorgiamayregisterasalobbyist,withsomeexceptions,includingwhenthecitizen’sworkpositionisincompatiblewithconductinglobbyingactivitiesorwhenacitizenhasbeenconvictedforacrimeagainstthestateorofficialmisconduct.45

Afterregistration,lobbyistsaregrantedtherighttoenterandfreelymoveinsidethebuildingsofadministrativebodies,totakepartindiscussionsofdraftnormativeacts,topresenttheircommentsinwriting,torequestinformationfromapublicagencyforthepurposeofcarryingouttheiractivities,andtomeetwithamemberoftherepresentativebody.46Atthesametime,lobbyistsareobligatedtofileactivityreportsbetweenthefirstandtenthdaysofeachmonthaftertheirregistration,andnolaterthan10daysafterterminationoftheirlobbyiststatus.47

LawonNationalRegulatoryAuthoritiesTheLawonNationalRegulatoryAuthoritiesensurestheindependenceofnationalregulatorycommissionsfrompoliticalpressure,fromimproperinfluenceandillegalinterferenceofStateAuthoritiesorotherpersons,andfromanyactsthatmayinfringeontheirindependenceandactivities.

Thelawalsoregulatesthenormsofethicsandconflictofinterestissuesofthemembersofthenationalregulatorycommissions.48Accordingtothelaw,commissionmembersmustsuspendtheirpoliticalpartymembershipforthewholeperiodoftheiractivityascommissionmembers.Inaddition,commissionmembers,membersoftheirfamilyandemployeesofregulatorybodyadministrationdonothavetherighttohaveanydirectorindirecteconomicinterestsinrespecttoalicenseholder,ortoholdanyofficeinalicenseholdingenterprise.Finally,commissionmembersandmembersoftheadministrativestaffarenotallowedtoreceivegiftsfrompersonsororganizationsthataresubjecttothesphereofauthorityoftherelevantregulatoryauthority.

38TheCriminalCodeofGeorgia,Article33739TheCriminalCodeofGeorgia,Article33840TheCriminalCodeofGeorgia,Article33941TheCriminalCodeofGeorgia,Article339142TheCriminalCodeofGeorgia,Article34043TheCriminalCodeofGeorgia,Article34144LawofGeorgiaonLobbyingActivities,Article245LawofGeorgiaonLobbyingActivities,Article646LawofGeorgiaonLobbyingActivities,Articles10and1147LawofGeorgiaonLobbyingActivities,Article1348LawofGeorgiaonNationalRegulatoryAuthorities,Article15;see:http://goo.gl/64WgKT

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IV.ImplementationofAnti-CorruptionLegislationinPractice

LawonCivilServiceOfthe19publicagencies(ministries)reviewedwithinthescopeofthisresearch,15haveaninternalstructuralunit(department)thatisresponsiblefordetecting,investigatingandsanctioningtheviolationsoftheLawonCublicService.(twooftheremainingfouragenciesdidnotrespondtoourrequesttoprovidetheinformation,whiletheothertwoarenotrequiredbylawtohavesuchaunit).

Inmostcases,thisstructuralunitisthepublicagency'sInternalAuditDepartment;however,inrarecases,theresponsibilityisentrustedtotheGeneralInspectorateorisdistributedamongseveraldepartments.

Accordingtotheinformationreceived,casesofviolationoftheLawonCivilServicein2010-2015weredetectedinonlythreeministries:25casesintheMinistryofForeignAffairs,36casesintheMinistryofHealth,andfourcasesintheMinistryofEnvironmentProtection.

ViolationsdetectedbythedepartmentsoftheaboveministrieswereassociatedwiththefollowingarticlesoftheLawonCivilService:Article52(obligationtoperformofficialdutiesandtoobservelegalacts)–35cases;Article66(restrictiononconclusionofdeals)–1case;andArticle732(generalrulesofconduct)–5cases.

16outof19examinedministriesprovideduswithinformationaboutthenumberofstatementssubmittedbypublicservantsabouttheir‘relatedpersons’.14ofthese16ministrieseitherreportedhavingreceivednostatementsrelatedtoArticle734,Paragraph3oftheLawonCivilService,ordidnotincludethisinformationintheirresponseletters.Statementsonrelatedpersonsweresubmittedinonlytwoministries:422statementsintheMinistryofForeignAffairsand2intheMinistryofRegionalDevelopmentandInfrastructure.

15ministriesprovideduswithinformationaboutthestatementssubmittedbycivilservantsongiftsandservicesofferedtothem(Article735,Paragraph2oftheLawonCivilService).Oneministryreportedthatithadnotconductedsuchaninvestigation.Theinternalauditdepartmentofanotherministrydoesnothaveinformationonthematter.Meanwhile,12ministriesreportedreceivingnostatementsunderthisarticle.OnlytheMinistryofEducationreportedhavingreceivedonesuchstatementin2010-2015.

Also,14ministriesprovideduswithinformationaboutthestatementssubmittedbypublicservantsregardingunduebenefitsofferedtothem(Article735,Paragraph3,Subparagraphf)oftheLawonCivilService),while11ministriesreportedhavingreceivednosuchstatements.TheMinistryofPrisonshadnotconductedsuchaninvestigation,whiletheinternalauditdepartmentoftheMinistryofEnvironmentProtectiondoesnothaveinformationonthematter.OnlytheMinistryofEconomyreportedhavingreceivedonesuchstatementin2010-2015.

AsfordisciplinarysanctionsoutlinedinArticle79oftheLawonCivilService,onlyoneoutof19ministries(OfficeoftheStateMinisteronEuropeanandEuro-AtlanticIntegration)hadnotusedonlyin2010-2015.

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StatisticsrelatedtotheLawonCivilService

Responsibledepartment Statisticsonviolationsofthe

law

Numberofsubmittedstatementson‘relatedpersons’

(Article734,Paragraph3)

Numberofsubmittedstatementsongiftsorbenefits

(Article735,Paragraph2)

Numberofsubmittedstatementsonthe

attemptstooffergifts(Article735,Paragraph3,Subparagraph

f))

Statisticsontheuse

ofdisciplinarysanctionsin2010-2015

(Article79)

MinistryofForeignAffairs

InternalAuditDepartment

25 422 0 0 46

MinistryofEnergy


0 0 0 0 6

MinistryofEconomy

HumanResourcesDivisionoftheHumanResourcesManagementandAdministrationDepartment

0 0 0 1 28

MinistryofHealth


1caseofviolationofArticles66and732in2015.AllotherviolationswereofArticle52,Paragraph1.

0 - - 36

MinistryofRefugees

InternalAuditDepartment;DepartmentofHumanResourcesManagementandDevelopment

0 0 0 0 105

MinistryofEducation

InternalAuditDepartment;andtheDepartmentofHumanResourcesManagement

- - 1 - 7

MinistryofAgriculture


0 0 0 0 19

MinistryofRegionalDevelopmentandInfrastructure

AdministrativeDepartment(atthecompetitionstage).InternalAuditDepartment(detectionandresponse)

- 2 0 0 16

MinistryofFinance


0 0 - - 6

MinistryofCulture

InternalAuditandMonitoringDepartment

0 - 0 0 51

MinistryofSport

Sharedbyseveraldepartmnets

0 0 0 0 16

MinistryofDefense

GeneralInspectorate 0 0 0 0 42

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MinistryofJustice

- - - - - -

MinistryofInternalAffairs

- - - - - -

MinistryofPrisons

GeneralInspection 0 0 0 0 532

MinistryofEnvironmentProtection

InspectionDivisionoftheInternalAuditDepartment

4 0 0 0 61

OfficeoftheStateMinisterofEuropeanandEuro-AtlanticIntegration

AdministrativeDepartment

0 0 0 0 0

OfficeoftheStateMinisterofReconciliationandCivicEquality


0 0 0 0 1

OfficeoftheStateMinisterofDiaspora

Notobligatedbylawtohavesuchadepartment

0

0 0 0 9

ApartfromreceivingstatisticsfromministriesonviolationsoftheLawonCivilService,wealsoidentifiedseveralcasesthroughdeskresearchthathelpillustratetheproblemsofpracticalimplementationoftheabovelaw.Thesecasessuggestthatthe‘revolvingdoor’regulationsandtheirenforcementarestillveryweakand,inmanycases,ineffectiveintermsofpreventingcorruptionrisks.

The‘revolvingdoor’phenomenon,orthekindofmovementofofficialsbetweenthepublicandtheprivatesectorsorbetweensupervisorandsupervisedagenciesthatgivesrisetotherisksofconflictsofinterestorcorruption,isregulatedbyArticle65(restrictiononentryonduty)oftheLawonCivilService.

“Article65-RestrictionofEmployment:

Foraperiodofthreeyearsafterleavingpublicservice,acivilservantmaynotstartworkingataninstitutionorenterprisewhichwasunderhis/hersystematicofficialsupervisionduringtheprecedingthreeyears.Inaddition,he/shemaynotreceiveincomefromsuchinstitutionorenterpriseduringthisperiod.”

OurresearchrevealedsignificantproblemswiththeLawonCivilService.Firstly,thelawdoesnotspecifythepublicagencyresponsiblefordeterminingwhichcaseofmovementofpublicservantsbetweenthepublicandprivatesectorsconstitutesaviolation.Itisalsounclearwhattheresponsemechanismisforcaseswhenaperson’srelocationfromthepublictotheprivatesectorhasbeenidentifiedasaviolationofArticle65.

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Inrecentyears,non-governmentalorganizationsandmediarepresentativeshaveidentifiedanumberofpossibleviolationsofthisarticle.Forexample:

• MiningcompanyRMGwasandperhapsisstillheadedbypersons,whowerepreviouslyemployedinpublicserviceandwereresponsibleforgrantinglicensestothiscompanyandoverseeingitscompliancewithlicenseconditions.ThesepersonsareZurabKutelia(formerheadoftheMineralResourceProtectionandMiningDepartmentoftheMinistryofEnvironmentProtection,andchairmanoftheMinistry’sInteragencyCouncilofExpertsonMineralResourceLicensesuntil2004)andSolomonTsabadze(headoftheDepartmentofEnvironmentalPermitsandStateEnvironmentalAssessmentattheMinistryofEnvironmentProtectionuntil2003).49

• DarialiEnergyLtdDirectorZurabAlavidzeheldthepositionofdeputyministerofeconomyin2009-2010.TheMinistryofEconomyissuespermitsfortheconstructionofmediumandlargehydropowerplantsandisresponsibleforoverseeingtheircompliancewithpermitconditions.50

• Thefollowingpersonsheldhigh-rankinggovernmentpositionsbeforebecomingaffiliatedwithacompanysetuptoallowhuntingofanimalsincludedintheRedListofEndangeredSpecies:SabaKiknadze(formerchairmanoftheTourismandResortsDepartmentoftheMinistryofEconomy)andDatunaRakviashvili(formerdeputystateministerofreintegration,laterdeputyambassadorofGeorgiatotheUnitedStates).51

• “ThemostnoteworthyexampleisZviadCheishvili’s“movement”betweenthelargestcompanyinvolvedintimberbusinessandtoppositionsregulatingthisveryfield(headoftheDepartmentofLicensesandPermits;headoftheForestryDepartment;deputyministerofenvironmentprotection;deputyministerofeconomyandsustainabledevelopment.)”52

Themechanismforrespondingtoviolationsidentifiedduringthemovementofcivilservantsbetweensupervisorandsupervisedpublicagenciesisalsoproblematic.Ifacivilservantappliestoworkatapublicagencythattheyhadsupervisedduringtheirserviceinthepublicsectorovertheprecedingthreeyears,therecipientpublicagencymustrefusethememploymentonthebasisofArticle65.However,itisunclearwhattheresponsemechanismiswhentherecipientpublicagencyviolatesthisnorm,asitwaslikelythecasewiththeGeorgianPublicBroadcaster(GPB),whenKakhaberSonishviliwasappointedasitsDeputyFinancialDirector.

AccordingtoinformationreceivedfromtheStateAuditOffice(SAO),fromMay6,2010toSeptember20,2012,KakhaberSonishviliworkedasthesupervisingauditorattheEconomicActivitiesAuditDepartmentoftheSAO.AccordingtotheSAO,Sonishviliwasinvolvedincompliance

49NaturalResourceManagementandFactorsConducivetoEliteCorruption,GreenAlternative,2015(revisededition),see:http://goo.gl/xNB9mt50NaturalResourceManagementandFactorsConducivetoEliteCorruption,GreenAlternative,2015(revisededition),see:http://goo.gl/xNB9mt51NaturalResourceManagementandFactorsConducivetoEliteCorruption,GreenAlternative,2015(revisededition),see:http://goo.gl/xNB9mt52NaturalResourceManagementandFactorsConducivetoEliteCorruption,GreenAlternative,2015(revisededition),see:http://goo.gl/xNB9mt

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auditsofthemeasuresagainstpollutionoftheBlackSeaandtheactivitiesoftheLEPLGeorgianPublicBroadcaster.

AccordingtotheLawonStateAuditOffice,complianceauditinvolvesexamination,evaluationandreportingonthereasonabilityandlegalityoftheauditee'sactivities.Article24ofthesamelawstatesthattheSAOisentitledtodeveloprecommendationsbasedonauditfindingsandsubmittheauditreportandrecommendationstotheauditee.TheSAOmustbenotifiedonthemeasuresundertakeninfollowuponitsrecommendationswithintheperiodof1month,unlessanothertimeframehasbeensetbytheSAO.Inotherwords,bytakingpartinthecomplianceauditofLEPLGeorgianPublicBroadcasterKakhaberSonishvilihadconductedofficialsupervisionoverit.Therefore,hisrelocationtotheGPBasitsDeputyFinancialDirectorinMarch2013isaclearexampleofa‘revolvingdoor’andconstitutesaviolationofArticle65oftheLawonCivilService.

TheGPBhasnotrespondedinanywaytothediscoveryofthispossiblelegalviolationbyTransparencyInternationalGeorgia,whichservesasanillustrationoftheabove-mentionedlegalshortcoming.

Finally,thecurrentwordingoftheLawonCivilServicesuggeststhattherestrictionssetbyArticle65donotapplytolocalgovernmentemployees,whichisalsoaproblem.Accordingtothelaw,Article65appliestostateemployees,whichisdefinedbyArticle4,Paragraph2ofthesamelawas“anemployeewhohasworkingrelationswiththestate”,“whileapersonwhohaslaborrelationswithalocalgovernmentunitisalocalgovernmentemployee”.

ThefollowingcasediscoveredbyTransparencyInternationalGeorgiaillustratestheneedtoextendthelawtolocalgovernmentemployees:

• “AnothercaseofnoticeinvolvesLashaPurtskhvanidze,formerdeputymayorofTbilisiandheadoftheOldTbilisiDistrictAdministration.AfterresigningfromtheCityHallin2009,PurtskhvanidzeandhisformerdeputyKobaKharshiladzeeachacquireda50percentshareinGreenserviceLtd.atatokenpriceofGEL200inNovember2010.Bythen,GreenservicewasalreadyamajorrecipientofpublicfundsthroughprocurementandhadbeencontractedbytheCityHalltoimplementanumberofprojectsinthecity(includingthoseimplementedduringPurtskhvanidze’sandKharshiladze’stimeintheoffice).AllegationsweremadethatPurtskhvanidzewasthebeneficialownerofthecompanywhileholdingofficeintheCityHall.AftertheformalacquisitionbythesetwoformerCityHallofficials,GreenservicecontinuedtowinpublictendersandreceivedatleastGEL4millioningovernmentcontractsin2010-2012.InApril2012,TIGeorgiareportedthattheCityHallhadpurchasedtreesfromGreenserviceatasuspiciouslyhighprice.Whenthestorywaspickedupbythemedia,thecitymayorcalledapressconference,accusedGreenserviceofcheating,andannouncedthattheCityHallwouldcancelallofitscontractswiththecompany.Whilethecityauthoritiesdid,indeed,stopworkingwithGreenservice,theycontinuedtocontractGreenservicePlus,acompanywhichisalsoownedbyPurtskhvanidze

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andKharshiladze,andhasthesamelegaladdressasGreenservice.ThecompanyreceivedoverGEL0.5millionfromtheCityHallinthefirstthreemonthsof2013alone.”53

Theaboveproblemspointtotheneedtoimproveandbetterenforcetheanti-corruptionregulationssetbytheLawonCivilService.

ThelawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicServiceOfthe19ministriesexaminedwithinthescopeofthisresearch,15haveadepartmentwhichisresponsiblefordetecting,investigatingandsanctioningviolationsoftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService.SimilartotheLawonCivilService,thisfunctionismostoftenperformedbytheministries’InternalAuditDepartments;however,insomecases,theresponsibilityisassignedtotheGeneralInspectorateorisdistributedamongseveraldepartments.Forexample,theMinistryofSportdoesnothaveadepartmentsolelyresponsiblefordetecting,investigatingandsanctioningthecasesofconflictofinterestandcorruption.However,theMinistryrespondedthat,whennecessary,otherdepartments,suchastheInternalAuditandMonitoringDepartmentandtheResourceManagementDivisionoftheAdministrativeDepartment,mayperformpartofthisresponsibilitywithinthelimitsoftheirmandate.

TheOfficesofStateMinistersrespondedthattheydonothavethelegalobligationtosetupdepartmentsresponsibleforinvestigatingcasesofconflictofinterestandcorruption.However,incaseoftheOfficeoftheStateMinisterofEuro-AtlanticIntegrationandtheOfficeoftheStateMinisterofReconciliationthisfunctionisperformedbytheAdministrativeDepartments.TheOfficeoftheStateMinisterofDiasporadoesnothaveadepartmentwiththisresponsibility.

Accordingtoinformationreceivedfromthese19ministries,noviolationsoftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicServicehavebeendetectedin2010-2015,withtheexceptionoftheMinistryofRegionalDevelopmentandInfrastructure,wherepublicservantsdidreportconflictofinterest;howeverthiswasdoneinaccordancewiththelawand,therefore,didnotconstituteaviolation.Forexample,in2013,acouncilmemberattheMinistryreportedhavingapersonalinterestinthedecisionofthecollegialbody,andrefusedtoparticipateinthedecision-making.In2015,amemberoftheStaffSelectionCommissionattheMinistrydeclaredself-recusalonthebasisofhavingapersonalinterestandrefusedtotakepartinevaluatingajobcandidate.

MinistriesthatdonothavedepartmentsresponsiblefordetectingviolationsoftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicServiceareunawareofpossibleviolations.Theseministriesrespondedtoourrequestsbysayingthattheydidnothaveanycasesofconflictofinterest.Forexample,aresponsefromtheMinistryofSportread:“thereisnoseparatedepartmentofthiskindandtheMinistryhasnostatisticsontheviolationsoftheaforementionedArticlesoftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicServicein2010-2015.”

AsimilarresponsewasprovidedbytheOfficeoftheStateMinisterofDiaspora:“theOfficeoftheStateMinisterdoesnothaveadepartmentresponsibleforinvestigatingthecompliancewithandrespondingtoviolationsoftheprovisionsoftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublic

53BusinessmeninPoliticsandPoliticiansinBusiness:ProblemofRevolvingDoorinGeorgia,TransparencyInternationalGeorgia,2013,http://goo.gl/6xlO5z

16

Service.Therefore,noviolationsoftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicServicehavebeenidentifiedintheOfficeoftheStateMinisterin2010-2015.”

Responsesofthiskindsuggestthatthelawisnoteffectivelyenforcedinthesepublicagencies.

TheremainingministriesrespondedthatthedepartmentsresponsibleformonitoringthecompliancewiththelegalprovisionsoftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptionhaveeitherfoundnoviolationsofthelaworthisinformationisavailableelsewhere.

StatisticsontheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService

Existenceofaresponsibledepartment

Statisticsontheviolationofthelaw

Numberofsubmittedself-

recusalstatements(Article11,Paragraph2)

Numberofcasesof

incompatibilityofduties(Article13)detected

Numberofcorruptionoffensesdetected

Numberofemployeesdismissedonthebasisofcorruptionoffenses



0 - - 0 0

MinistryofEnergy


0 0 0 0 0

MinistryofEconomy


0 - 0 0 0

MinistryofHealth


0 0 0 0 0

MinistryofRefugees

InternalAuditDepartment;DivisionofHumanResourcesManagementandDevelopment

0 0 0 0 0

MinistryofEducation


0 0 - - -



0 0 0 0 0



0 2 0 0 0

MinistryofFinance


0 - - 0 0

MinistryofCulture

InternalAuditandMonitoringDepartment

0 0 0 0 0

MinistryofSport

Nodesignateddepartment,however,ifneeded,severaldepartmentscanconductmonitoring.

0 0 0 0 0

17

MinistryofDefense


MinistryofJustice

- - - - - -


- - - - - -

MinistryofPrisons



InspectionDivisionoftheInternalAuditDepartment

0 0 0 0 0



0 0 0 0 0



0 0 0 0 0


Doesnotexist 0 0 0 0

0

EventhoughtheexaminedministriesreportedhavingdetectednoviolationsoftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,violationsofvariousprovisionsofthislawhavebeenidentifiedbynon-governmentalorganizationsandthemediaatalllevelsofgovernment,aswellasintheexecutiveandthelegislativebranchesandinthelocalgovernmentbodies.Forexample:

• AsofMay5,2015,theGovernorofImeretiregionwasalsoadirectorofacompanyheheldsharesin,whichisaclearviolationoftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService.54

• Forseveralyears,MariamValishvili,DeputyMinisterofEnergysince2008,wasalsothedirectorofTOTEnergy(oneofthecompanieswhereEnergyMinisterKakhaKaladzehadastake),inviolationofArticle13,Paragraph4oftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,accordingtowhich,“apublicservantmaynotholdapositioninanyenterprise”.55

54Georgia'sGovernors:BiographiesandAssets,TransparencyInternationalGeorgia,2015,http://goo.gl/sgr0eG55BusinessmeninPoliticsandPoliticiansinBusiness:ProblemofRevolvingDoorinGeorgia,TransparencyInternationalGeorgia,2013,http://goo.gl/6xlO5z

18

• ChairmanofPotiCityCouncilAleksandreTopuriafiledhisassetdeclarationonDecember2,2014,withoutfullyincludingthebusinesssharesheldbyhisfamilymembersinthedocument.Specifically,asofJune2015,hiswifeEteriTopuriaheld100%sharesintwocompaniesand50%inonecompany.56

• AsofApril2015,DeputyMayorofBatumialsoheld100%sharesofElit-FloraLtd.Inaddition,theDeputyMayordidnotdeclarehissharesintwocompanies.Therefore,hisassetdeclarationdoesnotincludeinformationabouttheincomereceivedfromthesecompanies.57SimilarviolationswereidentifiedinrelationtotheChairpersonandseveralMembersofBatumiCityCouncil.58

TheseexamplesillustratethattheviolationsoftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicServicearenotuncommon,whilethedetectionandpreventionmechanismsareweak.

Theresponsetoviolationsisalsolargelyineffective.Forexample,afterTransparencyInternationalGeorgiainformedtheAnti-CorruptionAgencyoftheMinistryofInternalAffairsaboutanincompleteassetdeclarationfiledbyagovernor,thelawenforcementagencyrespondedbysayingthatArticle355oftheCriminalCode(entryofincompleteorincorrectinformationinanassetdeclaration)hadnotbeenviolated.Itisunclearhowlawenforcementagenciesdeterminewhetherinaccurateorincompleteinformationwasincludedinanassetdeclarationintentionally.ThefactthattheAnti-CorruptionAgencyoftheMinistryofInternalAffairsdidnotlaunchaninvestigationunderArticle355oftheCriminalCodepointstotheweaknessofresponsemechanismsandalackofpoliticalwill.59

Thefactthattheresponsemechanismsareeitherweakornon-existent,eventhoughviolationsofthelawarecommon,isundoubtedlyoneofthemainproblemsofanti-corruptionpolicy.

Thestudyalsorevealedthatalargemajorityofministrieshavenotdevelopedinternalmechanismsofdisclosure(forwhistleblowers)andinsteadfollowthegeneralrulesestablishedbytheLawonConflictofInterestsandCorruptioninPublicService.Onlyafewministrieshaveissuedclarificationsonthemechanismsandproceduresofdisclosure.Forexample,provisionsrelatedtodisclosureareincludedintheEmployeeHandbookthatwasapprovedbytheMinisterofEconomy(OrderN1-1/130,April28,2014);AccordingtoMinistryofFinance,itsInternalAuditDepartmentrunsanelectronicmailbox([email protected])andahotline(226-22-22)thatcanbeusedtodiscloseofficialmisconduct.TheinformationgatheredthiswayisthenpublishedontheMinistrywebsiteandinsideitsadministrativebuilding.TheMinistryalsostatedthatnootherinternalmechanismofdisclosurehadbeendevelopedandnoseparatelegalactshadbeenapproved.TheMinistryofFinanceexplainedthattheadministrativewebsiteoftheLEPLCivilServiceBureauwouldserveasa

56CommercialActivitiesofPublicOfficialsinSamegreloMunicipalitiesandtheirFamilyMembers,TransparencyInternationalGeorgia,2015,http://goo.gl/m9zqC657CommercialActivitiesofBatumiCityHallOfficials,TransparencyInternationalGeorgia,2015,http://goo.gl/mT9W1k58CommercialActivitiesofBatumiCityCouncilMembers,TransparencyInternationalGeorgia,2015,http://goo.gl/E1PHAh59TheAnti-CorruptionAgencyoftheMIAdoesnotrespondeffectivelytoallegedviolationsinassetdeclarationsofpublicofficials,TransparencyInternationalGeorgia,2015,http://goo.gl/thMC8A

19

technicalmechanismofdisclosurebyallowingwhistleblowerstodisclosemisconductandbymakingthisinformationelectronicallyavailabletotheappropriateauthorities.

TheMinistryofEnvironmentProtectionreliesonthestatuteofitsInternalAuditDepartmentwhendealingwithwhistleblowing.AccordingtotheMinistry,theInspectionDivisionoftheInternalAuditDepartmentinvestigatescasesofofficialmisconductbytheMinistrystaffonthebasisofreceivedstatements,complaints,notifications,orotherinformation.AwhistleblowerapplicationmaybereceivedbyanemployeeoftheMinistry,aswellasaformeremployeeorathirdperson.ThefactthatpublicagenciesarenotrequiredbylawtodevelopclearinternalmechanismsofdisclosureisamajorshortcomingofthecurrentGeorgianlegislationonwhistleblowerprotection.Theexistenceofclearandsimpleinternaldisclosureproceduresthatpublicagencyemployeesarefamiliarwithisanimportantcomponentofbestpracticeonwhistleblowerprotection.60

Only3ofthe19examinedministriesreportedhavinghadcasesofdisclosurein2010-2015.TheMinistryofForeignAffairsreported1suchcase.TheMinistryofRegionalDevelopmentandInfrastructurereportedhaving1disclosurecasein2011,2in2012,1in2013and2in2015.AccordingtotheMinistryofEnvironmentProtection,317ofthereportsproducedbyitsInternalAuditDepartmentresultedfromtheinquirieslaunchedonthebasisofstatementsfiledbycurrentandformeremployees:151fromMay4,2013toDecember31,2013;154in2014,and12in2015(todate).TheMinistryexplainedthatitsInternalAuditDepartmentdidnothavetheneedtousethewhistleblowerprotectionlegislationforanyofthereceivedwhistleblowerapplications.Accordingtothereceivedinformation,noneoftheministrieshadusedthewhistleblowerprotectionlegislationsinceitsadoptionin2009.

StatisticsontheWhistleblowerProtectionportionoftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService

Existenceofaninternaldisclosuremechanism

Numberofwhistleblowingcases

Numberoftimesthelegislationonwhistleblower

protectionwasused

Numberoftrainings/informationmeetingson

whistleblowerprotection

Numberofviolationsof

Articles203,204and205detected


- 1 - 2 -

MinistryofEnergy

- 0 0 0 0

MinistryofEconomy

EmployeeHandbook(Minister’sOrder)

0 0 2 0

MinistryofHealth - 0 0 1 0

MinistryofRefugees

- 0 0 2 0

MinistryofEducation

- - 0 1 -


- - - 2 -

60http://www.transparency.ge/sites/default/files/post_attachments/whistleblower_protection_and_georgia_-_policy_brief_july_2015.pdf

20


- 6 0 3 3

MinistryofFinance

E-mailboxandhotline 0 0 - -

MinistryofCulture

- - - 1 -

MinistryofSport - 0 0 1 -

MinistryofDefense

- 0 0 0 0

MinistryofJustice

- - - - -


- - - - -

MinistryofPrisons

- 0 0 0 0


TheInspectionDivisionoftheInternalAuditDepartmentinvestigatescasesofofficialmisconductbytheMinistrystaffonthebasisofreceivedstatements,complaints,notifications,orotherinformation.ThestatementmaybereceivedbyanemployeeoftheMinistry,aswellasaformeremployeeorathirdperson.

317 0 1 0


- 0 0 0 0


0 0 0 1 0


0 0

0 0 0

AccordingtoArticle2011oftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,issuesofdisclosurearetoberegulatedbyspeciallegislationfortheMinistryDefense,theMinistryofInternalAffairsandtheStateSecurityService.Inordertochecktheexistenceofthislegislation,TransparencyInternationalGeorgiarequestedpublicinformationfromtheParliamentaryCommitteeonDefenseandSecurity,theMinistryofDefense,theMinistryofInternalAffairsandtheStateSecurityService.

21

TheParliamentaryCommitteeonDefenseandSecuritystatedthatthequestionfelloutsideitsmandateandredirectedittotheMinistriesofDefenseandInternalAffairsandtheStateSecurityService.

TheStateSecurityServicedidnotrespondtothisrequest,asitdidwithallotherrequestswesentaspartofthisresearch.BothMinistries(DefenseandInternalAffairs)statedthattheyareworkingondevelopingthespeciallegislation,butdidnotprovideanyinformationonspecificdeadlines.

SeveralrecentwhistleblowingcasesdemonstratedthenecessityfortheMinistriesofDefenseandInternalAffairsandtheStateSecurityServicetodeveloptheirspeciallegislationonwhistleblowerprotection.Forexample,onSeptember27,2015,themediareportedonavideowhichGiorgiBabunashvili,aformerseniorlieutenantofthepolice,hadobtainedfromtheMinistryofInternalAffairs.ThevideorevealedpossibleviolationsinsidetheMinistry.Accordingtomediareports,theformerpoliceofficeriscurrentlyinEuropeandisseekingpoliticalasylum.Also,inMarch2015,theMinistryofInternalAffairsdismissedapoliceofficerRuslanBaziashvili,whohadprovidedinformationaboutpossibleviolationsintheMinistrytoaMemberofParliamentfromtheUnitedNationalMovement,GiviTargamadze.Moreover,theChiefProsecutor’sOfficelaunchedaninvestigationoverpossibleabuseofpoweragainstnineemployeesoftheMinistryofInternalAffairs.BothGiorgiBabunashviliandRuslanBaziashviliareformerpoliceofficerswhodisclosedinformationthatrevealedpossibleviolationsthatharmedpublicinterest.61Despitethis,andbecauseoftheabovementionedlegalshortcomings,thesepeoplecannotcurrentlyenjoyprotectionaswhistleblowers,whichobstructssuccessfulpreventioncorruptionandotheroffenses.

CivilServiceBureau TransparencyInternationalGeorgiarequestedinformationfromtheCivilServiceBureauoncasesofconflictofinterestidentifiedin2010-2015.AccordingtotheCivilServiceBureau,itdoesnothaveinformationonanyviolationsrelatedtoconflictbetweenapublicservant’spropertyorotherpersonalinterestandtheinterestofpublicservice,illegalpropertyandincompatibilityofduties.TheBureaualsodoesnothaveanyinformationoncasesofpublicservantsortheirfamilymembersreceivinggifts,thevalueofwhichexceedsthelimitsetbylaw.TheCivilServiceBureauprovidedTIGeorgiawithinformationontheviolationbypublicofficialsofdeadlinesforfilingassetdeclarationandinformationmeetingsonwhistleblowerprotectionorganizedin2009-2015.In2010-2015theBureauidentified39casesofpublicofficialsfailingtofiletheirassetdeclarationswithintwomonthsofappointment(Article14,Paragraph1),fivecasesofofficialsfailingtofileannualdeclarationsduringtheirservice(Article14,Paragraph2),and12casesofthemfailingtosubmitdeclarationswithintwomonthsofleavingtheirposition.

61GovernmentMustEnsureProtectionofWhistleblowersinInteriorandDefenseMinistries,TransparencyInternationalGeorgia,2015,http://goo.gl/h9M8UO

22

TheCivilServiceBureaureportedthatforeachoftheaboveviolations,theofficialswerefinedforGEL1,000throughindividualadministrative-legalacts.15oftheseactswerechallengedincourt,ofwhich:

A) 7claimswerefullygranted;B) 1claimwasnotgranted;C) 1claimwasleftunexamined;D) 1claimwasrecalledbytheplaintiff.E) 4claimsarecurrentlybeingconsideredbythecourt.

TheCivilServiceBureaualsoreportedthattherehasnotbeenasinglecaseofcriminalliabilityhavingbeenimposedonanofficialforafailuretofileanassetdeclarationaftertheinitialfine(Article20,Paragraph4).In2015,theCivilServiceBureauconductedthreetrainingsfortheemployeesofall19ministriesandtheirInternalAuditDepartmentsonthestrengtheningofwhistleblowerprotection.However,thesetrainingswerenotmentionedintheresponsesfromtheMinistriesofEnergy,Prisons,FinanceandDiaspora.Inaddition,theNationalAnti-CorruptionStrategyinvolvestrainingtworepresentativesofeachlocalgovernmentbodyontheissuesofethicsandwhistleblowerprotectionin2015.Inmanycases,attendancetothewhistleblowerprotectiontrainingswaslow,whichsuggeststhatthesetrainingswereprobablynotveryeffectiveinsupportingtheimplementationofthelegislationonwhistleblowerprotectioninthepublicsector.Therefore,inthefuture,itisnecessarytoincreasethenumberofparticipantsinthesemeetings.

GeorgianNationalEnergyandWaterSupplyRegulatoryCommission TransparencyInternationalGeorgiadecidedtodeterminewhethertheGeorgianNationalEnergyandWaterSupplyRegulatoryCommission(GNERC)hasadepartmentresponsibleforinvestigatingconflictofinterestofitsemployees.WealsoinquiredabouttheattemptsatimproperinfluenceorillegalinterferenceasdefinedbytheLawonNationalRegulatoryAuthorities,andrequestedinformationonviolationsofnormsofethicsdeterminedbyArticle15ofthislawin2010-2015.TheCommissionrespondedthatthelawdoesnotrequireittosetupadepartmentresponsibleforinvestigatingconflictofinterestsamongitsemployees.OnApril8,2003,GNERCapprovedResolutionN2ontheRulesofEthicalBehaviorofCommissionMembersandEmployees,Article4,Paragraph6ofwhichrequirescommissionmembersandemployeestodeclareself-recusalwhendealingwithcircumstancesdescribedinArticle92oftheGeneralAdministrativeCode(ineligibilitytoparticipateinadministrativeproceedings)orothercircumstancesthatmayaffecttheimpartialityoftheirwork.TheCommissionreportedthat,in2010-2015,therewerenocasesorattemptsofimproperinfluenceorillegalinterference,andnoviolationsofethicsnorms.Therefore,duringthesameperiod,noneofthedecisionsmadebytheGNERCwerebeenoverturnedduetoimproperinfluenceandillegalinterference.

23

DespitethisresponsefromtheCommission,non-governmentalorganizationshaveraisedquestionsaboutconflictofinterestwithinGNERC,specificallyinrelationtoitsformerchairmanGuramChalagashvili.Accordingtohisassetdeclaration,Chalagashvili’swifeworksatGeorgianWaterandPower,thecompanyoperatingTbilisi’swatersupplysystem,wheresheearnedatotalofGEL25,024in2012.Thisappearstobeaviolationofthelegalprovisionwhichprohibitsfamilymembersofindependentregulatorsfrominvolvementinprivatecompaniesoperatinginrespectivesectorsand,onceagain,pointstothepoormonitoringandenforcementofexistingrestrictions.62

GeorgianNationalCommunicationsCommissionTheGeorgianNationalCommunicationsCommission(GNCC)respondedthatitdoesnothaveadepartmenttaskedwithreviewingconflictofinterestamongitsemployees.ThisisbecauseGNCCmembers(5intotal)alreadyhavethestatusofpublicofficials,meaningthattheirconflictofinterestisexaminedbythePresident,theGovernmentandParliamentpriortotheirappointment,whileotheremployeesdonothavethesamestatus.Therefore,theCommissionhasneithertheneednortheobligationtoinvestigateconflictofinterestofitsemployees.Inaddition,accordingtotheCommission,ithasnotidentifiedanyviolationsoftheLawonNationalRegulatoryAuthorities.Consideringthiscontext,thecaseofformerGNCCchairmanIrakliChikovaniisworthmentioning.63Accordingtotheinformationobtainedbythemediaandnon-governmentalorganizations,aswellasareportpreparedbytheTemporaryParliamentaryInvestigativeCommission,IrakliChikovanihadaconflictofinterestduringhisserviceasmemberandchairmanofGNCC.Specifically,Chikovaniheld35%sharesintheMagiStiliMediacompany,whichwasmainlyinvolvedintelevisionadvertising.TheParliamentaryInvestigativeCommissionconcludedthat,whileperforminghisofficialduties,Chikovaniwasguidedbyhisbusinessinterestsratherthanthelaw.TheTemporaryParliamentaryInvestigativeCommissionalsoestablishedthatanotherformerGNCCChairmanKarloKvitaishvilihadaconflictofinterestaswell:Specifically,politicalincompatibility.FromAugust6,2005untilApril24,2013,KvitaishvilihadservedasarepresentativeoftheUnitedNationalMovementpoliticalpartyintheCentralElectionCommission.ThiswasconfirmedbytheUnitedNationalMovement.Basedonthisinformation,theInvestigativeCommissionconcludedthatduringhisserviceasamemberoftheGNCCKvitaishviliconcurrentlyrepresentedapoliticalpartyinanotherpublicagency.64TheInstituteforDevelopmentofFreedomofInformation(IDFI)alsoidentifiedsignsofnepotismintheGNCC.Accordingtotheorganization,GNCCveryrarelyannouncedvacanciespublicly.IDFI

62BusinessmeninPoliticsandPoliticiansinBusiness:ProblemofRevolvingDoorinGeorgia,TransparencyInternationalGeorgia,2013,http://goo.gl/6xlO5z63BusinessmeninPoliticsandPoliticiansinBusiness:ProblemofRevolvingDoorinGeorgia,TransparencyInternationalGeorgia,2013,http://goo.gl/6xlO5z64ReportoftheTemporaryParliamentaryInvestigativeCommissionontheActivitiesoftheGeorgianNationalCommunicationsCommission,ParliamentofGeorgia,reportingperiod:May1,2013-November1,2013,http://goo.gl/WUvvWU

24

believesthatthelegalamendmentsthatrecentlyintroducedarequirementforpublicagenciestoconductrecruitmentonlythroughpubliccompetitionhaveresultedintheGNCCalmostexclusivelyhiringsupernumeraryspecialists.TheproblemisthattheGNCCdoesnothavealimitonitssupernumerarystaff,meaningthat,theoretically,itcanhireunlimitednumberofemployeesthroughanontransparentprocess.IDFIfoundthat,in2012-2015,theGNCChadhired51newemployees,someofthembeingtherelativesofMPs.Forexample,brother-in-lawofMPAnaMirotadzeandson-in-lawofMPIrakliTripolskihadstartedworkingattheGNCCassupernumeraryspecialistsaftertheelections.TheappointmentofTamtaTepnadze,formeremployeeoftheParliamentaryCommitteeonEconomics,astheGNCCPublicDefenderalsoraisedquestions.ThecommissiontaskedwiththeselectingofthePublicDefenderwasheadedbyMPZurabTkemaladze,chairmanoftheParliamentaryCommitteeonEconomics,whosegrandchildTamtaTepnadzelaterhiredinherdepartmentattheGNCC,togetherwithherbridesmaidandthesonofMPDimitriKhundadze,chairmanoftheHealthandSocialIssuesCommittee.65SuchstaffingpolicygivestheimpressionthatGNCCisnotimmunetoexternalinfluenceandraisesquestionsaboutitsindependence.Thefactthat,inrecentyears,Parliament,mediaandnon-governmentalorganizationshaveidentifiedpossiblecasesofconflictofinterestandnepotismintheGeorgianNationalCommunicationsCommissionillustratesthattheexistingmechanismsandlegalframeworkcannoteffectivelypreventofconflictofinterest,corruptionandnepotism.

LobbyingActivitiesTransparencyInternationalGeorgiarequestedpublicinformationonregisteredlobbyistssince1999fromtheGovernmentAdministration,Parliament,andlocalgovernmentbodiesofKutaisi,BatumiandTbilisiAccordingtotheinformationreceivedfromParliament,therewereatotalof27casesoflobbyistregistrationin2003-2015,while7personsweredeniedregistration.Duringthisperiod,atotalof19personshaveexercisedtheirrighttoregisteraslobbyistsinParliament.TbilisiCityCouncilreportedthatonlyonepersonhadregisteredasalobbyistin2014,andthatnonehadbeenrefusedregistrationin2003-2015.TbilisiCityHallreportedthatitsdatabasedoesnotholdinformationaboutregisteredlobbyists.ThelocalgovernmentbodiesofBatumiandKutaisireportedhavinghadnocasesoflobbyistregistrationeither.TheaboveinformationshowsthatlobbyinginGeorgiaisnotawidespreadpractice.However,thisissuestillrequiresattentionsince,withoutappropriateregulationsandenforcement,itmaygiverisetoseriouscorruptionrisks,specificallyinrelationtotheso-called‘revolvingdoor’phenomenon.Forthepurposeofpreventingcorruptionrisks,theLawonLobbyingActivitiesdetermines‘workposition’asoneofthebasesfordenyinglobbyistregistration.Article6,Paragraph1,Subparagrapha)ofthelawstatesthat“alobbyistregistrationshallbedeniedif:a)acitizen’sworkpositionis

65SignsofNepotismintheGeorgianNationalCommunicationsCommission(GNCC),InstituteforDevelopmentofFreedomofInformation(IDFI),2015,https://goo.gl/f4PTny

25

incompatiblewithconductinglobbyingactivities”.66AccordingtoArticle65(restrictiononemployment)oftheLawonCivilService,“foraperiodofthreeyearsafterleavingcivilservice,acivilservantmaynotstartworkingataninstitutionorenterprisewhichwasunderhis/hersystematicofficialsupervisionfortheprecedingthreeyears.Inaddition,he/shemaynotreceiveincomefromsuchinstitutionorenterpriseduringthisperiod.67Duringlobbyistregistering,properattentionmustbegiventotheaboveregulationsandincasesof‘revolvingdoor’,thepersonmustbedeniedregistrationasalobbyist.

ParliamentaryCommitteeonProceduralIssuesandRules

TheProceduralIssuesandRulesCommitteeofParliamentisresponsibleforexaminingthecompatibilityofofficialandentrepreneurialactivitiesofMPswiththestatusofaMemberofParliamentandrespondingaccordingly.In2012-2015,theCommitteehadexaminedatotalof19casesofMPstakingincompatiblepositionsandineachcasehadrequestedtheParliamentBureautoterminatetheirmandatebeforetheendoftheirterm,towhichParliamenthadcomplied.TheCommitteestatedthatitsystematicallycontrolstheMPs'participationinentrepreneurialactivities,althoughitleftourquestionsonspecificproceduresandfrequencyofinspectionunanswered.TheCommitteereportedthat,in2012-2015,therewere69casesofMPsgivinguptheircompanysharesand10casesofthemleavingthepositionofcompanydirector.AccordingtotheCommittee,itrequeststheinformationabouttheMPs'assetdeclarationsperiodicallyandwherevernecessary,andanalyzesitonthebasisoftheParliamentaryRulesofProcedureandtheStatuteoftheCommittee.Nosuchrequestshavebeensentduringthereportingperiod.However,theCommitteedoesretrievetheMPs'assetdeclarationsfromtheCivilServiceBureauandexaminesthemforlimitedpurposes,suchasprovisionofaccommodationfortheMPsoranalysisoftheincompatibilityofentrepreneurialactivitieswiththeMPs'status.Forthispurpose,theCommitteehasexaminedtheassetdeclarationsofalmostallMPs.TheCommitteealsooverseesMPcompliancewiththeobligationssetbytheParliamentaryRulesofProcedure.However,itdoesnotkeeprecordofitsresponsestotheseviolations,becauseitismainlyinvolvedinpreventingsuchviolationsandoftenrespondstotheminwaysotherthaninwriting.DespitethefactthattheProceduralIssuesandRulesCommitteeofParliamentmonitorstheMPs'assetdeclarations,TIGeorgiaidentifiedseveralcaseswhereMPshadprovidedinaccurateand/orincompleteinformationintheirdeclarations.Forexample,asofJanuary27,2014,anumberofMPshadincludedincompleteinformationabouttheircurrentandpastbusinessactivitiesintheirassetdeclarations.68Also,asofDecember2014,anumberofSamegrelo-ZemoSvanetimajoritarianMPs

66LawofGeorgiaonLobbyingActivities,Article667LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article6568UndisclosedBusinessActivitiesofMembersofGeorgianParliament,TransparencyInternationalGeorgia,2014,http://goo.gl/ZqlL99

26

hadnotfullydeclaredtheirpropertyandbusinessactivities.69Casessuchastheseillustratethatcertainnormsoftheanti-corruptionlegislationarenotbeingimplementedeffectively.Inaddition,violationsthatarebeingdetectedareoftenleftunaddressedbytherelevantauthorities.

MinistryofInternalAffairsandChiefProsecutor’sOfficeTheMinistryofInternalAffairsreportedthat,since2010,ithaslaunchedinvestigationsonjustasinglecaseofacceptingagiftprohibitedbylaw(Article340oftheCriminalCode)andasinglecaseofillegalparticipationinentrepreneurialactivities(Article337).TheChiefProsecutor'sOffice,however,haslaunchedinvestigationsonsevencasesbasedonArticle340andninecasesbasedonArticle337inthesameperiod.ItshouldbenotedthattheinformationprovidedbytheMinistryofInternalAffairsandtheChiefProsecutor'sOfficeincludesviolationsdetectedinallpublicagenciesoperatinginGeorgiaandnotjusttheministriesexaminedaspartofthisresearch.TheMinistryofInternalAffairsalsoreportedthatitsAnti-CorruptionAgencyhadnotlaunchedanyinvestigationsonArticle355oftheCriminalCode,whichinvolvesfailuretosubmitanassetdeclarationorentryofincompleteorincorrectinformationtherein.

ArticleoftheCriminalCode Numberoflaunchedinvestigationsin2010-2015

Numberoflaunchedcriminalprosecutions2010-2015

1641(votebuying) - 11

182(unlawfulappropriationorembezzlementofanotherperson'spropertyorpropertyrightsthroughuseofone’sofficialposition)

1818 1533

192(illegalentrepreneurialactivities) 193 -

194(legalizationofillegalincome(moneylaundering))

216 7

194’(use,purchase,possessionorsaleofpropertyacquiredthroughthelegalisationofillegalincome)

1 -

205’(concealmentofpropertyusingfraudulentand/orshamtransactions)

8 -

220(abuseofpowers) 79 68

220’(Negligence) 1 -

221(commercialbribery) 98 81

69UndeclaredPropertyofMPsRepresentingSamegrelo-ZemoSvanetiMunicipalities,TransparencyInternationalGeorgia,2014,http://goo.gl/ArWMJL

27

332(abuseofofficialpowers) 825 356

333(exceedingofofficialpowers) - 205

337(illegalparticipationinentrepreneurialactivities)

1 9

338(bribe-taking) 520 456

339(bribe-giving) 136 159

339’(influencepeddling) 23 25

340(acceptinggiftsprohibitedbylaw) 1 7

341(forgerybyanofficial) 180 287

355(failuretosubmittheassetdeclarationorentryofincompleteorincorrectinformationtherein)

- 0

Theabovestatisticsarenotenoughtodrawanydefinitiveconclusionsregardingtheeffectivenessofimplementationoftheanti-corruptionlegislation.However,theproblemsdescribedinthisreport,specifically,thoseconcerningassetdeclarationsandthe‘revolvingdoor’phenomenon,indicatethatgreaterattentionneedstobepaidtotheimplementationoftheexistinglegislationinpractice.Thiscanbeachievedbystrengtheningtheexistingcontrolmechanisms(e.g.,morefrequentandcomprehensiveinspectionsofcivilservantsbyresponsibleinternalstructuralunits)aswellasbycreatingnewmechanisms,suchasanindependentanti-corruptionagency.

V.ConclusionAnti-corruptionprovisionshavelongexistedintheGeorgianlegislationandhavebeenconstantlyundergoingchangeandimprovement.However,effectiveimplementationoftheanti-corruptionlegislationintheGeorgianpublicsector,includingcrimedetectionandprevention,remainsachallenge.Ourresearchrevealedanumberofproblemareas.Oneofthemainobstaclesforthisresearchwasincompleteinformationprovidedbypublicagencies.Insomecases,wehadtheimpressionthatpublicagenciesdeliberatelyavoidedansweringcertainquestions.Thefollowingarethekeyfindingsofourresearchandthecorrespondingrecommendations:

Findings:

• Mostministriesexaminedduringthisresearchhaveadepartment(usuallytheInternalAuditDepartment)responsibleforidentifying,investigatingandsanctioningtheviolationsofnormsestablishedbytheLawonCivilServiceandtheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService.However,inmanycases,thesedepartmentsareineffective,sincetherearenoclearregulationsonthefrequencyandscaleofrelevantinspections.

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• Thefactthatpublicagencydepartmentsresponsiblefordetectingviolationshavenotfoundanyreinforcesourdoubtsabouttheireffectiveness,especiallysincemanyindependentstudiesconductedbynon-governmentalorganizationsandthemediahaverepeatedlyshownthatviolationsoftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicServicearecommononalllevelsofgovernment,inthelegislative,theexecutiveandthelocalgovernmentbodies.

• SomepublicagenciesdonothavedepartmentsresponsiblefordetectingviolationsoftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicServiceand,therefore,areunawareofpossibleviolations.Thesepublicagenciesrespondedtoourrequestsbysayingthattherewerenocasesofconflictofinterest.

• Underthecurrentlaw,nopublicagencyisresponsibleforverifyingandreviewingtheassetdeclarationsfiledannuallybypublicofficials.Thefactspresentedinthisreportpointtotheneedforsystematicmonitoringofassetdeclarationsandverificationoffiledinformationinordertoeffectivelyenforcetheconflictofinterestandanti-corruptionregulation.WewelcometheamendmentstotheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,hereby,startingJanuary1,2017,theCivilServiceBureauwillmonitorthecomplianceofassetdeclarationswiththelawandverifyingtheaccuracyandcompletenessofthedeclaredinformation.However,theproblemwillremainunaddressedfortheremainingone-yearperioduntiltheamendmententersintoforce.

• Themajorityofpublicagenciesdonothaveaclearinternalwhistleblowingmechanism.Theexistenceofsuchamechanismisnotrequiredbythelaw,whichisasignificantobstaclefortheimplementationoftheexistinglegislationonwhistleblowerprotection.

• Publicagenciesthatareobligatedbylawtodevelopspeciallegislationonwhistleblowerprotection(theMinistryofInternalAffairs,theMinistryofDefenseandtheStateSecurityService)haveyettodoso.BothMinistrieshavestatedthattheyareworkingondevelopingthislegislation,buthavenotdisclosedanyinformationabouttheprocessoritsdeadlines.

• SeminarsandinformationmeetingsonwhistleblowerprotectionlegislationconductedbytheCivilServiceBureauarebeingattendedbyonlyahandfulofemployeesfrompublicagencies.Thisfailstomeetthegoalofhavingpublicservantsbethoroughlyinformedabouttheissue.

• The‘revolvingdoor’provision(Article65-restrictiononentryonduty)oftheLawonCivilServiceisthemostproblematicanti-corruptionprovision.Theregulationsincludedinthisprovisionarequiteweakandoftendonotaddresscorruptionrisks.Morespecifically:

o ThelawdoesnotspecifywhichpublicagencyisresponsiblefordeterminingwhetherArticle65hasbeenviolated.Itisalsounclearwhattheresponsemechanismisforthecaseswhereapublicservant’srelocationfrompublictotheprivatesectorhasbeenidentifiedasaviolationofArticle65.

o Themechanismforrespondingtoviolationsidentifiedduringthemovementofpublicofficialsbetweenthesupervisorandsupervisedpublicagenciesisproblematic.Ifacivilservantappliesforajobatapublicagencythattheyhadsupervisedduringthepast3years,therecipientpublicagencymustrefusethememploymentonthebasisofArticle65.However,itisunclearwhattheresponsemechanismiswhentherecipientpublicagencyviolatesthisnorm.

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o Finally,thecurrentwordingoftheLawonCivilServicesuggeststhattherestrictionssetbyArticle65donotapplytolocalgovernmentemployees,whichisalsoaproblem.

• TheStateSecurityServicedidnotreplytoanyofourfreedomofinformationrequests,whichpointstoitslackoftransparencyandaccountability.Thisisespeciallyalarming,consideringthefactthattheAnti-CorruptionAgencyispartoftheStateSecurityService.

BasedonthesekeyfindingsTransparencyInternationalGeorgiahasdevelopedthefollowingrecommendations:

• ThepublicagencydepartmentsresponsibleforenforcingtheLawonCivilServiceandtheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicServicemustintensifytheireffortstodetectandpreventviolations.Thelawmustclearlysetthisobligationandmustdeterminethefrequencyandthescopeoftherelevantinspections.Thecapacityofthesedepartmentsmustalsobestrengthened,includingthroughthetrainingoftheiremployees.

• AccordingtoanamendmenttotheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,onJanuary1,2017,theCivilServiceBureauwillstartmonitoringthecomplianceofassetdeclarationswiththelawandverifyingtheaccuracyandcompletenessofthedeclaredinformation.However,theproblemwillremainunaddressedfortheremainingone-yearperiod.WebelievethatthepartoftheamendmentthatgrantstheCivilServiceBureautherighttorespondtoviolationsofassetdeclarationmustenterintoforcebeforeJanuary1,2017,sothatthereisalegalmechanismofrespondingtoinaccuraciesestablishedbynon-governmentalorganizationsandthemedia.

• Publicagenciesmustdevelopclearandsimpleinternalproceduresforwhistleblowingandprovidedetailedinformationabouttheseprocedurestotheiremployees.

• TheMinistryofInternalAffairs,theMinistryofDefenseandtheStateSecurityServicemustadopteffectivelegislationonwhistleblowerprotectionthatwillbebasedontherelevantbestpractice.Alternatively,theexistinglegislationmustbeextendedtocovertheemployeesoftheseagencies.

• TheCivilServiceBureaumustcontinueitsinformationcampaignonwhistleblowerprotectionand,totheextentpossible,mustwidenthegroupofpublicservantsattendingitsinformationmeetingsandseminars.Theinformationcampaigncouldincludethepreparationanddistributionofinformationbooklets,videos,flyersandguidebooks.

• Article65(restrictionofemployment)oftheLawonCivilServicewhichregulatesthe‘revolvingdoor’mustbeextendedtolocalgovernmentemployees.Othershortcomingsofthisprovisionmustalsobeaddressed.

• TransparencyInternationalGeorgiabelievesthatanindependentanti-corruptionagencymustbecreatedinordertoeffectivelyenforceanti-corruptionlegislation.Thecreationofthisagencyispartofthebestpracticeincombatingcorruption.Amongotherthings,thisagencymustbetaskedwithimprovingthelegislationandmonitoringitsimplementation.Thiswouldsolvetheproblemsdiscussedinthisreportarisefromtheabsenceofabodyresponsibleforenforcinganti-corruptionlegislation.

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