getting coin in helmand- reassessing coin adaptation in the british army by sergio catignani

8/2/2019 Getting COIN in Helmand- Reassessing COIN Adaptation in the British Army by Sergio Catignani

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Dr. Sergio Catignani - University of Sussex

WARDIG-RMAS Presentation


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Reassessment of the extent to whichthere has been bottom-up innovationwithin the British Army [Farrell (2010),Farrell & Gordon (2009)].

Thesis: several instances of top-downand bottom-up innovation have

occurred, but innovation as majorreconceptualisation of how to conductCOIN has been rather limited at

tactical levels.


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Based on above assumptions, militaryinnovation literature has focusedsignificantly on top-down approaches: Civil-military interactions;

Competitive inter and intra-servicebureaucratic interactions;

CultureGrissom (1996) & Cohen (2004)

dissatisfied with top-down approaches& called for a new research agenda.


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Military innovation defined as majorchange that is institutionalized in new

doctrine, a new organizationalstructure and/or new technology.

Military adaptation: bottom-upchange to tactics, techniques, orexisting technologies to improveoperational performance.


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Adaptation may occur throughexploitation:

The enhancement or modification ofestablished competencies and capabilities.Adaptation may occur through

exploration:Through the development of new modes and

means of operations.Explorative bottom-up adaptation

engenders bottom-up innovation


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Farrell provides clear definition of bottom-up adaptation leading to innovation.

However, his level of analysis issomewhat misguided.

Farrells tactical level of analysis reliesalmost entirely on Task Force level PORs& POIs.

His research doesnt incorporateexperiences & understandings of those

that operate on the ground.


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Whilst PORs contain lower levelcommand information, they aremediated, filtered & interpreted byseveral levels of command.

Thus, Farrells tactical level analysisdoesnt integrate experiences &

accounts of the implementers ofbrigade plans and CONOPs.

Implementation is taken for granted.

Such an assumption may be incorrect.


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Assumption that planning guidesexecution Planners outline setting in which ops happen, the

scope of approved instruments for action, and

provide the resources and then the executorsexecute!However, Majone & Wildavsky (1978:

109):Policies are continuously transformed by

implementing actions that simultaneously alterresources and objectives.

Van Creveld (1985: 7):The presentation of the process of command as a

cycle oversimplifies things.... Far from being

governed solely by the objective requirements ofthe situation, the interact and influence each


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It was the companies that reallyconducted counterinsurgencyoperations, whilst I and my HQ

[headquarters] set the conditions forthem to do so. We conducted BG

[battlegroup] operations, but, routinely,

it was the companies that delivered theeffect on the ground

Lt. Col. Frazer M. Lawrence, Commanding a CombinedForce (CF) Some Personal Insights.


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Data originating from both semi-structured individual and groupinterviews with 67 combat infantrypersonnel (lance corporal to battalionCO) who served in Herricks 11-13 (Oct2009-April 2011).

Classified PORs and other materialconsulted to corroborate or rectifyinformation.

Quotes: heuristically representative of


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Tactical implementation of COINoperational campaign and TFH level planswithin lower levels of command werealtered or frustrated.

Cause: inability of lower-ranking officers &NCOs to have fully assimilated thepopulation-centric COIN approachparticularly in two areas:

1) Conduct of pop-centric approach with specialemphasis on protecting population by avoidingexcessive force;

2) Exploitation of influence and intelligence inenabling pop-centric COIN operations.

Lack of appropriate training.


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Neglect in training has clearimplications:Those lower ranks, which have a greater

combined effect on COIN campaign, arebeing left to improvise pop-centricoperations, which may give opportunities toadapt.

Such adaptation though is often ad hoc andtransient.

Units are, thus, left to reinvent the

wheel and relearn lessons learned


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Force preparation, AFT (12 monthsttraining for a war): Conventional maneouvre and basics emphasized. Late 2009 AFT changed to HFT still conventionally-

focused.Force generation, PDT/MST (6 months

training for the war).PDT overseen by OPTAG:

OPTAG advises on most recent TTPs and theatre-specific training through train-the-trainerprinciple.

Battlegroups responsible for training.Confirmatory Field Exercise: sub-units

tested on TTPs and mission survival skills.


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OPTAG doesnt have time & resourcesto develop a conceptual & deeperunderstand of the nature of COIN

warfare and how to conduct pop-centric ops.

Young platoon commander:OPTAG tends to be focused more onall the mission-critical skills that youneed to practice, and you do need topractice under pressure and under

simulated fire, but its not really, its


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Creation of Afghan COIN Centre in late2008.

Subsequent development of COINCadres (Conceptual and TCC).

Cadres deemed unable to make up forthe lack of a more systematic training

and education program required forpersonnel to prepare for thecomplexities of COIN warfare.


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Army Field Manual CounteringInsurgencypublished in late 2009:

Importance of understanding local

population and of conducting pop-centric influence operations basedon intelligence are not new.

This was already present in 2001 COINAFM.

Developing and safeguarding thepopulations support through influence

clearly argued in both manuals.


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Development of CULADS in early 2009and employment of theses at BRIG &BG levels seen as signs of innovation.

But why at these higher levels ofcommand?


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The Army way, the conventional thinking,would be to say, Well, well give one to the

brigade commander, and well give one[CULAD] each to one of the commandingofficers. Whereas youve got twenty-sixcompanies out there on the ground, you

should probably say, Whos got theknottiest problems in terms of

understanding the cultural nuances? andyou should say, I will give the five of themto companies 1, 8, 16, 23 and 24.

Author interview with Lt. Col. Lincoln Jopp,Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion Scots Guards,

Catterick, 11 Mar 2011.


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Cultural awareness training essential,but.

Subject to gross macro-levelgeneralizations:

We got told a lot to be very wary of

children, dont touch them, dont talk tothem, dont look at young females in theeye and all that, and that just wasnt the

case at all.Author interview with Serg. Cameron MacDougall,


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Appointment of soft-effectspersonnel done at last moment(usually during MRX or even ondeployment).

Quality of personnel: Non-conventional appointments usually

filled by less capable or left-fieldindividuals.

This is encouraged by the fact that OJAAR isfocused on conventional metrics still.


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Culture & self-identity not appreciative of pop-centric operations:

The good macho military man doesnt want tobe sitting in sangers and watching cameras,and sort of chatting to his neighbour for the

15th time that day. He wants to be going out ina big macho platoon or company fighting

patrol and in his rather simplistic view of lifeif you kill all the enemy then the problem goesaway. Well, in counterinsurgency as we mustsurely know that is the wrong answer. How do

you instil that within your subordinates?

Author interview with Lt. Col. Nick Kitson,Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion The Rifles,

Ministry of Defence, London, 4 February 2011.


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Concerns over how Herrick tours were framedand represented:

I was very conscious as we force generated forAfghanistan, that my battalion had beenbrought up, fed on a diet of Ross Kemp in

Afghanistan and the YouTube shootem up.And so a lot of time and effort was invested in

pointing people at population-centric COINrather than the kinetic, the shootem up or

the whack-em-all, end of the spectrum

Author interview with Lt. Col. Lincoln Jopp, CommandingOfficer, 1st Battalion Scots Guards, Catterick, 11 Mar 2011.


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Hard to implement courageousrestraint, because suppressive firewas seen as the best way to protectones own forces.

COMISAF July 2009 and August 2010Tactical Directives tried to stifle the

negative repercussions of suchpractices.

However, implementation of such

directives was more varied.


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The way commanders interpreted theROE directives intent: a function ofwhether or not they believed that notalienating the population through theexcessive use of force could improvetheir combat units force protection.

This interpretation, in turn, a functionof the level of command.


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At the BG command level, onecommander came to interpret morerestrictive ROE positively and basically as

a force protection mechanism:My view was that courageous restraint is

a force protection measure. If you treatthe locals with respect, then they will tellyou where the IEDs are, they will tell youwhat the insurgents are doing: it is force

protection.


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A rapid rate of fire allows you to dowhatever you want. If you get a

sustained period of rapid fire for even

ten/fifteen seconds, no matter if theywantJihad. If that fire comes in, theywill just hit the deck and nothing will

come back.

Author interview with Cpl. George Scott, SectionCommander, B Company, 3rd Battalion Parachute

Regiment, Colchester, 27 April 2011.


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Courageous restraint is a very, very difficultone and Im sorry, but when the shit hits the

fan so to speak, all that goes out thewindow.

Author interview with Serg. Neil Harvey, Platoon Sergeant,Right Flank Company, 1st Battalion Scots Guards, Catterick,

11 March 2011.

The only time tactical patience had anythingto do with me honestly is when we had justenough to man-pack ammunition-wise, we

couldnt sit there and just hose them down.Author interview with Cpl. Carl Jackson, Section

Commander, C Company, 3rd

Battalion Parachute Regiment,Colchester, 27 A ril 2011.


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Main lessons incorporated into new COINdoctrine & other publications, into neworganizational constructs and in new COIN

training and staff jobs.However, training progression has nothelped reconceptualise the way the Armyfundamentally operates at the tactical

levels.By focusing on ground level implementers

understandings and experiences, one can

understand how bottom up innovation has

getting coin in helmand- reassessing coin adaptation in the british army by sergio catignani

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