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July Fourth, in my view, marks the 150th anniversary ofthe climax of the Civil War. On that day in 1863, GENRobert E. Lee retreated from Gettysburg, Pa., with his de-feated Army of Northern Virginia after a gigantic three-daybattle with the Army of the Potomac, commanded by MGGeorge G. Meade. That same day, half a continent away, thefortress city of Vicksburg, Miss., capitulated to MG UlyssesS. Grant’s Army of the Tennessee. In my youth, I oftenheard Pickett’s Charge at Gettysburg referred to as “thehigh tide of the Confederacy,” and a glance at a map revealsthe strategic wisdom of a Mississippi River that “flowedunvexed to the sea.” Elsewhere in this issue of ARMY, my colleagues, Colonels

Cole Kingseed and Kevin Farrell, examine Gettysburg inmore detail and flag up tactical and operational issues thathave excited controversy since the battle ended. Here, Ihope to put Vicksburg and Gettysburg in a strategic contextand underscore the importance of July 4, 1863, as a pivotalpoint in American history.The February and April 2012 “Historically Speaking” arti-

cles examined the critical importance of the Ohio, Cumber-land, Tennessee and Mississippi rivers to communicationswest of the Appalachian Mountains and the revolutionaryadvantages steamboats afforded in travelling the arterieswith or against the current. Union successes in Tennessee at

Forts Henry and Donelson, and also at Shiloh, penetrateddeep into the Confederacy and compromised all but one ofthe rail lines running across it. That final rail line ranthrough Vicksburg and readily connected Louisiana, Texasand Arkansas with the rest of the Confederacy. These west-ern states became an increasingly important source of sup-plies for the Confederacy as the effects of the Union navalblockade deepened. Conversely, arms and ammunitionshipped west did much to assist the western states in con-tinuing the war.President Abraham Lincoln and his generals recognized

the significance of the Mississippi River from the beginningof the war. Union forces assisted by gunboats thrust southfrom Cairo, Ill., in early 1862 to seize New Madrid, Mo.; Is-land No. 10, between Missouri and Tennessee; Fort Pillow,Tenn.; and Memphis, Tenn. Memphis surrendered in June1862, and Union gunboats steamed on to the mouth of theYazoo River. Meanwhile, Union naval forces commandedby Commodore David G. Farragut went up the Mississippifrom the Gulf of Mexico and facilitated amphibious land-ings. New Orleans surrendered on April 27, 1862, and BatonRouge, La., soon followed. Vicksburg proved a harder nut tocrack. Fortified and perched on high bluffs with a maze ofswamps to its north, Vicksburg repelled a thrust from thesouth in May 1862 and a thrust from the north in December.

Gettysburg and Vicksburg at 150By BG John S. Brown

U.S. Army retired

July 2013 � ARMY 35

At year’s end, the Confederacy still held open a 100-milewindow across the Mississippi River extending from Vicks-burg in the north to Port Hudson, La., in the south.

Grant resolved to change all of this. As his subordinateMG William T. Sherman moved north of Vicksburg on

April 30, 1863, Grant amphibiously slipped the bulk of hisarmy past Vicksburg and landed well to the south of its de-fenses, at Bruinsburg, Miss. This simultaneously bypassedthe difficult terrain north of Vicksburg and turned Confed-erate defenses along the river. It also left Grant at the end ofa perilously exposed logistical tether running past the gunsalong the bluffs at Vicksburg. Unfazed, Grant took an over-draft of ammunition with him and abandoned his line ofcommunications altogether. He sped north, interposinghimself between Confederate GEN Joseph E. Johnston’sforces concentrated at Jackson and Confederate LTG JohnC. Pemberton’s forces around Vicksburg. Meanwhile, threeregiments of Union cavalry commanded by COL BenjaminH. Grierson launched a destructive raid deep into Missis-sippi. This drew off cavalry that could have improved thereconnaissance of the separated and increasingly confusedConfederate forces. Living off the land as necessary, Grant first massed

against Johnston and drove him out of Jackson. He then

turned sharply on Pemberton and soundly defeated him atthe Battle of Champion Hill in Mississippi. Pemberton re-treated into the defenses of Vicksburg. Deploying Shermanto screen against Johnston’s return, Grant followed Pember-ton in hot pursuit. Premature assaults on May 19 and 22failed, so Grant settled into a methodical siege. Trench linesand saps worked their way ever closer to the Confederatedefenses. Mines penetrated underneath the fortifications,seeking to bring them down before countermines inter-rupted them. Snipers and artillery fire exacted a daily toll.Starvation and disease beset the isolated Confederates, whonevertheless kept up a gallant defense. Johnston tried tomount a relief but never mustered sufficient strength toachieve one. Pushed to the breaking point, Pemberton sur-rendered on July 4. To his credit, Grant rushed rations to thefamished civilians and prisoners of war in the starving city. While Grant was campaigning in central Mississippi,

Union forces pushed up the Mississippi River from thesouth and invested Port Hudson, La., the southern termi-nus of Confederate holdings on the river. After the news ofVicksburg reached them, the defenders of Port Hudson ac-cepted the inevitable and surrendered on July 9. In easternTennessee, a Union thrust reached Chattanooga, whichthreatened to split the Confederacy along yet another axisthrough Atlanta and Savannah, Ga. A strangulation first en-

Gettysburg (Pa.) National Military Park by Dennis Steele

36 ARMY � July 2013

visioned by GEN Winfield Scott was taking effect, shred-ding the Confederacy and threatening to crush its con-stituent parts like an anaconda.

Facing disintegration in the West, the Confederacy’sonly real hope for victory was a knockout blow in the

East. With so many vital strategic objectives so close to thecommon border in the East, perhaps a Napoleonic battle ofannihilation could induce a war-weary Union to makepeace. The Army of Northern Virginia, commanded by Lee,seemed the ideal instrument to strike such a blow. ARMY’sJuly 2012 “Historically Speaking” examined Lee’s defeat ofMG George B. McClellan in the Virginia Peninsula Cam-paign. The September 2012 “Historically Speaking” discussed

Lee’s defeat of MG John Pope at the Second Battle of BullRun (Second Manassas, Va.) and his moral victory over Mc-Clellan at Antietam (Sharpsburg, Md.). In December 2012,“Historically Speaking” described the devastation Lee in-flicted upon MG Ambrose E. Burnside’s Army at Freder-icksburg, Va. In May, Lee’s striking victory over MG JosephHooker at Chancellorsville, Va., was discussed. When MGGeorge G. Meade took over on June 28, 1863, he became thefifth commanding general of the Army of the Potomac.

All four of his predecessors had been defeated despitetheir general superiority in numbers, and three of them hadbeen defeated by Lee. Having built up a strike force of 76,000 following Chan-

cellorsville, Lee resolved to take the war into Maryland andPennsylvania. He would seek the knockout victory the Con-federacy so desperately needed and also replenish his sup-plies from the Union’s ample stocks—civilian and military.While Grant was tightening his siege lines around Vicks-burg, Lee slipped the bulk of his army up the ShenandoahValley. The Union forces sensed the move and confirmed itduring a chaotic cavalry battle around Brandy Station, Va.,on June 9—the largest single cavalry collision in the war.The Confederates stole a march on the Union forces guard-ing the lower Shenandoah Valley, badly mauling them be-fore crossing the Potomac and progressing along an axisrunning through Hagerstown, Md., and Carlisle, Pa. Minimally opposed and with the 115,000-man Army of

the Potomac far behind them, the Confederates spread outto exploit the countryside. Commandeering wagons in ad-dition to those they brought with them, they forced pur-chases with Confederate dollars or formal “requisitions.”They demanded $100,000 in U.S. currency from York, Pa.,but settled for the $28,000 that the city had on hand. As theirwagons filled up, their forces became less nimble. One Con-federate cavalry brigade under BG John D. Imboden tookoff on a western arc to ravage the Baltimore & Ohio Railroadand gather livestock. More consequentially, MG J.E.B. Stuartinterpreted discretionary orders broadly enough to swinghis division on a wide arc to the east, which effectively puthim on the opposite side of the Union Army from Lee. Tomake things worse, he captured an opulent 125-wagonUnion supply train and could not bring himself to part with

BG John S. Brown, USA Ret., was chief of military history atthe U.S. Army Center of Military History from December 1998to October 2005. He commanded the 2nd Battalion, 66th Armor,in Iraq and Kuwait during the Gulf War and returned to Kuwaitas commander of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, in1995. Author of Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of theU.S. Army, 1989–2005, he has a doctorate in history from Indi-ana University.

Above: A panoramic view of the Civil War battlefield at Vicksburg,Miss., shows the Illinois Memorial (left) and the Shirley House.Right: Union soldiers built shelters around the Shirley House toprotect themselves against artillery fire.

Library of C

ongress

Library of C

ongress

July 2013 � ARMY 37

it for the sake of operational mobility. With his cavalry scat-tered and forces dispersed in hostile territory, Lee foundhimself in the unusual situation of knowing less about hisopponents’ whereabouts than they did about his.Once launched, the Union pursuit of Lee was reasonably

efficient, if neither breakneck nor daring. By June 28, Uniontroops had accumulated in a great mass around Frederick,Md., and by June 30 were similarly massing south of Get-tysburg. Two brigades of Union cavalry under MG JohnBuford Jr. pushed north through Gettysburg and clashedbriefly with a Confederate brigade marching south, ostensi-bly to secure a supply of shoes reported to be in the town.Alarmed by belated news of the Union concentration, Leehurriedly ordered a concentration at Cashtown, Pa., aboutsix miles northwest of Gettysburg, starting the night of July28–29. Buford recognized the strength of successive posi-tions dominated by Seminary Ridge and flanking hillsnorth and west of Gettysburg, and by Cemetery Ridge andflanking hills south and east of the town. He occupied theformer position and sent for help.The battle that ensued was a colossal engagement, with

one division after another marching in to join the fray. On thefirst day, July 1, the Confederates massed enough force tooutflank and overpower the Union right, forcing the Unionoff Seminary Ridge. The Union rallied on Cemetery Ridge,where a stream of reinforcements arriving through the nightbroadened and thickened their line. On the second day, theConfederates sought to turn the Union left but were barelyhalted by the hasty and gallant defense of Little Round Top.The Confederates penetrated the Union line elsewhere butwere ultimately repulsed. By the third day, the ever-strongerUnion line resembled a fishhook firmly anchored aroundCulp’s Hill in the north and by the formidable Round Top in

the south. Lee gambled on a breakthrough in the center, at-tacking in the wake of a massive artillery barrage. The attackfailed and the Union line held.

Confederate losses in three days of savage fighting were3,903 killed, 18,735 wounded and 5,425 missing. Union

losses were 3,155 killed, 14,529 wounded and 5,365 missing.The Union could afford such a butcher’s bill, but the Con-federacy could not. Lee had to win a decisive victory if theConfederacy were to survive. Meade could win by not los-ing. By and large Lee punched, and by and large Meadecounterpunched. Lee’s dispersal and distractions before thebattle worked against concentrating overwhelming force ata decisive place and time. Meade, hugely assisted by ableCorps commanders, survived the punches and held theline. So awesome was Lee’s reputation that Meade declinedto attack him in the aftermath of his defeat. Lee’s beatenarmy retreated back across the Potomac without much in-terference. He would fight again, but never again at thesummit of his strength.Vicksburg’s fall and Lee’s retreat marked a decisive pivot

point. The Confederacy would continue to disintegrate inthe West, and Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia would con-tinue to be ground down. In a few months’ time, Grantwould assume overall command in the West. A few monthsafter that, he would assume military command of the waras a whole. Meade would continue on as the capable—al-beit methodical—commander of the Army of the Potomac.The Confederacy still had some fight and a few offensivesleft in it, and Lee would continue to muster his tactical bril-liance, but the writing was on the wall. The overwhelmingmanpower and materiel advantages of the Union would in-evitably be brought to bear upon the estranged countrymenof the Confederacy. �

Recommended Reading

Carter III, Samuel, The Final Fortress: The Campaign forVicksburg 1862–1863 (New York: St. Martin’s Press,1980)

Coddington, Edwin B., The Gettysburg Campaign: AStudy in Command (Norwalk, Conn.: Easton Press, 1989)

Esposito, Vincent J., The West Point Atlas of AmericanWars, Volume I: 1689–1900 (New York: Frederick A.Praeger, 1959)

McPherson, James, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil WarEra (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988)

Williams, T. Harry, Lincoln and His Generals (NewYork: Gramercy Books, 2000)

View of a rocky nest within Devil’s Den, a boulder-ridden hill usedby both Confederate and Union artillery and infantry during thesecond day of the Battle of Gettysburg.

Dennis Steele