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Lookout Communications Escape Routes Safety Zones

GREEN SHEET

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection(CAL FIRE)

Informational Summary Report of Serious CAL FIREInjuries, Illnesses, Accidents and Near Serious Accidents

Valley Fire Shelter Deployment and Serious Burn Injuries

September 12, 2015

Valley SART

15-CA-LNU-00867015-CA-CDF-000580

California Northern Region

A Board of Review has not approved this Informational Summary Report. It is intendedas a safety and training tool, an aid to preventing future occurrences, and to informinterested parties. Because it is published on a short time frame, the informationcontained herein is subject to revision as further investigation is conducted andadditional information is developed.


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Valley SART - Green SheetPage 2of 9


SUMMARY

This Informational Summary Report references, on Saturday, September 12, 2015, atapproximately 1402 hours, one helitack fire captain and three helitack firefighters

suffered serious burn injuries after becoming entrapped and then deployed their fireshelters on the Valley Incident, in Lake County, California.

CONDITIONS

WeatherKonocti Remote Automated Weather Station, approximately 5.5 miles north east ofthe burnover location at 1400 hours;

Temperature: 88

Relative Humidity: 12%

Wind: West 18 mph, gusts of 30 mph Fuel Moisture: Chamise 51%, fine dead fuels 3% (unshaded)

Probability of Ignition: 89%

Fuel TypeConifers intermixed with hardwoods, pockets of Manzanita and Chamise. Size ofbrush: 6 foot plus, south of the deployment site.

Road ConditionsClear, dry

TopographyMultiple intersecting drainages with short, moderate to steep, slopes.

Fire BehaviorApproximately 110-130 acres with multiple spot fires resulting in understory burningwith group tree torching and short crown runs driven by wind and/or slope alignment.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

On Saturday, September 12, 2015, at approximately 1323 hours, a helitack crew wasdispatched to a vegetation fire as part of an initial attack wildland response. Thevegetation fire was reported at 8015 High Valley Road, in Kelseyville, California. At

approximately 1330 hours, the helicopter (C1) with two fire captains, six firefighter Is,and one pilot lifted off from the Sonoma-Lake-Napa-Unit (LNU) helitack base. The frontseat fire captains (FC1) report on conditions was: two acres in grass and oakwoodland, a moderate rate of spread, with one structure immediately threatened andthe potential to burn 20 acres. C1 crew observed short range spotting with someisolated tree torching. FC1 and FC2 determined the left flank of the fire would be theirpriority. C1 landed in a field near an access road which led to the fires left flank. Whenthe helitack crew started a direct attack on the left flank towards a structure (RES1),


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FC2 advised FC1 they should stay mobile and provide structure defense.

At 1332 hours, a battalion chief arrived at scene and assumed Valley IncidentCommander, (IC). Shortly after, the Air Attack (AA) and two air tankers responded fromthe local airbase. The AA immediately requested three additional multi-engine type 3 airtankers.

FC1 told FC2 he was going to bump ahead of the helitack crew to scout. FC1 hikedacross the black using a deer trail. After some time, FC1 told FC2, over the radio, tobump up. FC2 and helitack firefighters could see FC1 ahead of them as theyapproached a second residence (RES2). FC2 observed several spot fires and directedthe helitack firefighters to assist FC1 in extinguishing the spot fires in the grass and onthe wood deck surrounding RES2.

FC2 started hiking up the driveway and told FC1 that he was going to bump furtherahead. Without direction, FF1 and FF6 followed FC2 up the driveway (Helitack B) insearch of more structures to defend. FC2 observed a spot fire spreading near RES2 onthe west side of the driveway, and advised FF6 to watch the spot fire. FC2 also yelled

to FF1 to hustle up to their location due to the additional spot fires which spotted overthe driveway. At approximately this time, FC1 directed FF2 to remain at RES2 forstructure defense and told him to call on the radio if there were any issues. FC1, FF3,FF4 and FF5 (Helitack A) hiked cross country to the southeast toward a structure thatwas to their right on a ridge top. When they reached the ridge top FF3 observed spotfires advancing up the slope toward them. FF3 stood at the top as a lookout for a fewminutes then met up with FC1, FF4 and FF 5.

The ridge top was under a canopy of pines and oaks but had very little low surface andground level vegetation. Around the steel garage, was a 58 foot by 30 foot gardenalong the northwest (D) side of the steel garage, a 53 foot by 73 foot goat pen, and an

eight foot wide dirt road running northwest/southeast separating the goat pen andgarden. Soon after reaching the ridge top, FC1 directed FF5 to scout the southern sideof a goat pen. FF5 hiked to the southwest side of the goat pen and observed a steepbrush covered slope with no visible smoke or fire; the brush was approximately six toseven foot tall manzanita and chamise. Helitack A observed increased spot fires in thepine needles and leaf litter along the southwest side of the goat pen. They started toextinguish the spot fires but there were too many. FC1 directed FF3, FF4 and FF5 toget into the goat pen, which was clear to bare mineral soil. While in the goat pen theyobserved the fire behavior changing. There was an increase in the wind speed, and anincreased number of spot fires in the pine needle duff and leaf litter surrounding them.FF3 saw fire sheeting and swirling across the dirt driveway on the northwest side of the

goat pen; several pines torched on the west side of the steel garage.From the location of RES2, FF2 observed increased fire behavior advancing towardHelitack As location. FF2 communicated the increased fire behavior using the radio;FC1 acknowledged FF2s observation.

At approximately 1402 hours, the brush covered slope to their east completely torchedinto a wall of flame. The wall of flame sent a significant wave of radiant heat throughthe goat pen and onto the firefighters. They could feel their faces burning from the


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radiant heat and all four firefighters ran to the fence, climbed over, and ran towards thesteel garage. At the steel garage Helitack A started to deploy their fire shelters.

May-Day was transmitted from FC1 and was heard over the radio. From the locationof a third residence (RES3), FC2 could hear FC1 say over the radio, Four havedeployed their shelters, near a barn on the right flank. FF4 had difficulty opening thefire shelter case from the Chainsaw Pack; the clear plastic covering of the fire shelterwas soft and melted. FF4 had to remove the gloves to tear the plastic away from thealuminum shell of the fire shelter. FF3 couldnt get the fire shelter out of the casebecause the clear plastic cover was melted to the white plastic protective sleeve. FF3looked up and saw FF4 at the north side (D) of the steel garage. FF3 dropped the fireshelter on the ground and ran to FF4s location. FF3 and FF4 shared FF4s fire shelterand stayed together in a crouched position. FC1 and FF5 deployed their fire shelters onthe east side (A) of the steel garage. The heat in front of the steel garage was toointense so they moved to the north side (D) of the steel garage with FF3 and FF4 wherethe atmosphere seemed to be cooler.

Helitack A huddled together shielding the heat away from their already burned facesand hands; each of them could see the visible burns to one anothers faces and hands.FC1 continued to use the radio requesting bucket drops from C1 on their deploymentlocation to cool the atmosphere. FF5 attempted to drink the water from the hydrationpack but the water from the mouth piece was too hot to drink. While crouched in theirfire shelters next to the steel garage, Helitack A suddenly heard explosions coming frominside the now burning structure. As a group, Helitack A moved a safe distance fromthe structure. Helitack A eventually crouched along the dirt driveway, separating the dirtgarden and the goat pen.

From the driveways of RES3 and a fourth residence (RES4), FC2 directed C1 to makebucket drops into Helitack As location at the top of the ridge. C1 orbiting above and

was unable to get near their location at the top of the ridge due to the thick column ofsmoke convecting straight up into the atmosphere.

A Division Chief (Div1) drove in the driveway of 15185 Bottle Rock Road and met upwith Helitack B. Div1 drove up the driveway toward the deployment site approximately200 yards to a fork in the driveway. At the fork, Div1 experienced heavy smoke andheat conditions. Div1 drove back to where Helitack B was standing, Helitack B loadedinto Div1s pick-up and they drove back up the driveway a second time toward thedeployment site. The conditions were very smoky and hot. Div1 continued up thedriveway using the line of trees on the right and left of the driveway as a guide. FC2directed Div1 to stay left at the fork. They could see the shiny aluminum of the fire

shelters ahead of them. Div1 honked the horn and drove up next to the deployed fireshelters. FC2 and FF6 exited the pick-up and assisted Helitack A into the bed of Div1spick-up. To protect them from the heat during the extrication, FF6 draped and held thefire shelters over Helitack A. Div1 drove down the driveway toward Bottle Rock Road toan emergency landing zone. Helitack A firefighters were stripped of their personalprotective equipment and treated for their burns prior to being assisted into C1. C1transported Helitack A to the LNU helitack base. At the helitack base, the treatment ofthe Helitack A firefighters continued. FC1 was transported by a medical helicopter and


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FF5 was transported by another medical helicopter. At approximately 1520 hours, FF3and FF4 were transported by C1 to the University of California Davis (UCD) MedicalHospital in Sacramento, California.

During the time Helitack A was being transported to the helitack base, Div1 and FF6returned to RES2 to locate FF2. FF2 was located at RES2 uninjured and they returnedto the helitack base.

INJURIES/DAMAGES

FC1 suffered second and third degree burns to the head, face, ears, neck, back,arms, hands, legs and feet and has had several surgeries. FC1 remains in criticalcondition and is under the continued care of UCD Burn Center.

FF4 suffered first and second degree burns to the face, head, ears, arms andhands and is under the continued care of UCD Medical Center.

FF5 suffered first and second degree burns to the face, head, ears, arms, footand hands and is under the continued care of UCD Medical Center.

FF3 suffered first and second degree burns to the face, head, ears, arms andhands and is under the continued care of UCD Medical Center.

SAFETY ISSUES FOR REVIEWAND LESSONS LEARNED

Crews must utilize L.C.E.S when engaged in firefighting operations

ALL Ten Standard Fire Orders MUST be obeyed at ALL TIMES

Personnel MUST wear ALL CAL FIRE APPROVED PPE when engaged infirefighting operations

Modifying Personal Protective Equipment can alter the protective properties

Practice and prepare for shelter deployment in adverse and extreme conditions

Be familiar with the WUI guidelines, S-FACTS, and Leaders Intent

Maintain radio discipline and be familiar with Emergency Traffic Procedures

Maintain incident and crew accountability at all times

Correlate topographical features and changing fuel models Recognize the alignment of the three factors that influence wildland fire behavior

Recognize extreme fire behavior indicators and anticipate the unexpected

Utilize proper risk management methods and procedures

Inspect fire shelters according to Handbook 4306.16


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PHOTOS/SITE DIAGRAMS/MAPS

Sketch Map Valley Fire Deployment Site


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Terrain Map Valley Fire


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Terrain Map Valley Fire


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AERIAL PHOTO VALLEY FIRE

green sheet valley fire

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