group 13 - hp_compaq
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The HP- Compaq MergerThe rationale of the merger and implications of value
destruction
April 11th 2012
Catalin Cordos 3451712Kyriakos Malamidis 3738892Stavros Ouzounis 3592634
Mergers, Acquisitions and Restructuring
Utrecht University, Graduate School of Economics
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Introduction
The new millennium signaled some radical changes in the IT sector. Fueled by competition in a constantly
changing market through new product introduction and improvements, firms that were involved in this market
segment had to keep pace in order to be successful. Companies such as HP and Compaq could not make
exception.
In the early 1990s the two companies were struggling with the competition. The information technology
downturn and the transformation of hardware into a commodity convinced the two CEOs of HP and Compaq,
Carly Fiorina1
and Michael Capellas1
respectively, that a drastic change is more than necessary. Fiorina could
not foresee that this transformation implied a more than a within strategic shift. These fa ctors led to HP
announcing, on September 3 of 2001, the acquisition plan for Compaq, in a stock transaction valued at $25
billion2
and exchange ratio of 0.6325 of an HP share per Compaq share. The new entity would have annual
sales of approximately $90 billion and an operating income of about $4 billion3, becoming one of the biggest
players in the IT market.
The actual merger, which primarily included just a licensing agreement and a wide R&D collaboration, was
completed in May 2002, which at that time was the worlds largest corporate IT merger. Neglecting the
questionable growth predictions and the anticipated synergies, the announcement of the merger created a
wave of controversy. Many analysts were wondering whether two struggling companies could create a healthy
one, Todd Kort, principal analyst for Gartner Research said: "This is not a case of 1+1 = 2. It's more like 1+1 =
1.5."Furthermore, many recent examples showed that the most IT transactions were not successful, especially
when the involving parties were large. The difficulty in finding any focused logic behind the merger was
enhanced by the fact that both companies were still adjusting to acquisitions they made in the past and from
the fact that the tie-up would create a cultural clash regarding the divergence in cultural and operational traits
of the two parties.
The rationale behind the merger
Considering the incentives of the merger, one could conclude that the main pillars were the complementarities
in business lines and the synergies the company could realize. Areas were HP was weak would be
complemented by Compaqs stronger presence and vice versa. HP had stronger capabilities on the commercial
side, whereas Compaq was stronger on the consumer side. Combining, also, the presence of Compaq in the PC
industry and HPs dominance on printers, it was anticipated that together would be number one on consumer
products. Moreover, due to high overlap in managed services, the combined overlap and scale advantages
would increase the market presence of the company after the merger.
The clear target for HP was undoubtedly IBM. Fiorina was aiming through this horizontal merger to create a
full service technology company capable of doing everything. Operationally, the merger would eliminate
redundant products and costs by reducing the costs of marketing, shipping and layoffs. The combined
company would have about 145,000 employees, which called for a reduction of about 15,000 jobs, in first
instance.
1See Appendix 2 for further details on the two CEOs
2
HP News Release can be foundhere.3HP and Compaq Combined: In search of Scale and Scope, Stanford Graduate Of Business, Case SM-130, 15 July 2004
http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/newsroom/press/2001/010904a.htmlhttp://www.hp.com/hpinfo/newsroom/press/2001/010904a.htmlhttp://www.hp.com/hpinfo/newsroom/press/2001/010904a.htmlhttp://www.hp.com/hpinfo/newsroom/press/2001/010904a.html -
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This trimming in payroll expenses would count for $1.5 billion annually while other redundant administrative
functions were designed to save almost $3 billion by the end of 20044. According to a press release on
September 2001 the cost synergies were expected to reach approximately $2.5 billion from a rationalization in
the cost structure. The new HP would have annual revenues of $87.4 billion with annual operating earnings of
$3.9 billion, results that would establish them as the number one player on the IT industry. A very important
aspect is that the transaction would be tax-free for the shareholders. For this reason, the establishment of aNewCo, named Heloise Merger Corporation
4, would be necessary to facilitate the merger. With this tax free
reorganization, HP would be able to control all the assets of Compaq via a wholly owned subsidiary.
A fierce battle
Despite the negative perception of the deal by many investors and analysts, the top managerial teams of the
companies seemed quite adamant to finish the deal. Apart from the regulatory criteria that had to be met, the
deal was subject to shareholders approval. This seemed to be the most difficult task the executives had to
face. Considering this acquisition as friendly, the role of the two families, Hewlett and Packard, became a
critical factor in the outcome. Their official opposition to the merger led to a proxy fight, with millions of
dollars spent on advertisements and mailings to shareholders in order to swing their votes to yes or no on
the merger. The controversy has led to a lawsuit from the Hewlett family to the HP management for using HP
corporate assets to entice and coerce certain financial institutions to vote in favor of the proposed merger.
At this point it is important to address the significant role of the founding families in shaping strategy, even if
they do not owe majority stakes in the company. The two siblings became fully autonomous in their emotional
stewardship of HP only last year after the death of the last surviving parent, William Hewlett, in January 2001.
As a result, they had apreconceived bias to any strategic change that would diverse or modify the status quo in
their fathers company.
The merger meets with the opposition
There were several issues that rose concern regarding the necessity of the merger. Analysts were skeptic
about the competitiveness of the merged entity causing stock prices of HP and Compaq to fall significantly in
the period following the announcement of the deal. Moreover it was anticipated that the merger could not
enhance the competitive position of HP vis-a-vis IBM, who is a leader in the high margin server, consulting and
service segments. Other opponents believed that competitors would try to swoop in and persuade solution
providers and customers to switch allegiances and product lines
5
. According to the integrationannouncements, the Compaq logo would be phased out, raising concerns about the responsiveness of the
former Compaq customers. Furthermore, blending the two companies, that were operating in different
manners, was a very difficult task, raising issues for a successful cultural due diligence6. HP culture was based
on consensus while Compaqs culture was characterized by rapid decision making.
According to W. Hewlett, Fiorinas confidence about the future growth estimates of the computer business
was exaggerated. The acquisition of Compaq could not create a competitive environment for HP, but rather,
would expose HP to the low-profit PC business, during a period in which PCs were on the road to becoming
4
The proxy filing of the HP Special meeting of Shareholders 2002. For the Edgar online document access the linkhere.5The Hewlett-Packard and Compaq Merger: A case study in Business Communication, Brigham Young University
6Culture Due Diligence based on HP/Compaq, Agata Stankowicz-Stanusch, Journal of Intercultural Management, pp. 66-67
http://google.brand.edgar-online.com/EFX_dll/EDGARpro.dll?FetchFilingHtmlSection1?SectionID=1739747-862474-865961&SessionID=hmZFH6nEJqtBjP7http://google.brand.edgar-online.com/EFX_dll/EDGARpro.dll?FetchFilingHtmlSection1?SectionID=1739747-862474-865961&SessionID=hmZFH6nEJqtBjP7http://google.brand.edgar-online.com/EFX_dll/EDGARpro.dll?FetchFilingHtmlSection1?SectionID=1739747-862474-865961&SessionID=hmZFH6nEJqtBjP7http://google.brand.edgar-online.com/EFX_dll/EDGARpro.dll?FetchFilingHtmlSection1?SectionID=1739747-862474-865961&SessionID=hmZFH6nEJqtBjP7 -
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low margin commodities. Finally Hewlett addressed the danger of value dilution with respect to the companys
lucrative printing business7.
David Packard, the oldest son of the other co-founder was sharing the same concerns. Driven by sentimental
factors, he was claiming that this strategic shift was running counter the established core values if the
company. His major concern was the massive layoffs that were scheduled in order to achieve the operationalsynergies: Bill and Dave never developed a premeditated business strategy that treated HP employees as
expendable.8
Stock price performance
Figure 1 below illustrates the stock prices of the two companies from January 1999 till July 2001. It is obvious
that both companies experienced high decreases after mid-2000, following the decrease of S&P500 and this of
Dell, their main competitor (in personal computers and servers) as we can see in Appendix 3, but HP still
outperforms both for almost all of the year 2000.
Figure 1: Stock prices before merger
In terms of percentage change, as we observe in Figure 1 in Appendix 4, there are significant fluctuations with
most notable the increase of 21% in 18/11/99 for HP and the one of 16.55% in 3/1/01 for Compaq. As far as
the decreases, the most significant are -13% in 13/11/00 for Hp and the one of - 22.5% in 12/4/99 for Compaq.
For the same period, S&P 500 was fluctuating between 1215 and 1222 units with daily changes very close to 0 .
A couple of months before the merger and through half year after it, as we see in figure 2 below, the stock
prices kept decreasing. As of 2002, a relative stability is observed. A closer look in the percentage changes
(Figure 2 in Appendix 4) reveals that in 3 cases there are noticeable fluctuations. Firstly, a 10% decrease for
Compaq and a 18% decrease for HP on 4/9/2001, the day after the merger was announced (Monday
announcement). Secondly, a sharp decrease of 15% for Compaq and 10% for HP in 17/9/2001, the day that
markets reopened after the tragic incident at World Trade Center. Finally, on 6/11/2001 when William Hewlett
announced his opposition, there is a 17.5% increase for the HP stock and a decrease of 5.5% for Compaq,
revealing that markets agreed with W. Hewlett that HP would be better without Compaq, but on the other
hand the scenario of cancelling the merger was very bad news for Compaq. Overall, the cumulative decreases
in the prices of the two firms were around 30% till the moment of the announcement. This pattern, confirms
7Hewlett family opposes Compaq deal, CNET, November 6, 2001, for the fill article presshere.
8New York Times, HewlettPackards Destiny, November 25, 2001
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1001-275466.htmlhttp://news.cnet.com/2100-1001-275466.htmlhttp://news.cnet.com/2100-1001-275466.htmlhttp://news.cnet.com/2100-1001-275466.html -
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the pessimistic view of the markets when big technological firms are merged. Markets did not believe in the
success of the merged entity.
Figure 2: Stock prices around the announcement of merger
Valuation
The valuation method used here is based on an Event Study Analysis. We are going to look at daily changes in
the stock price9
in our effort to point out potential abnormal returns. In general, when there is speculation of a
merger, the price of the concerned companies change as a respond to the expectations of the market. As a
result, the price of the buyer usually drops, when targets price increases.
The analysis consists of the capturing of the trend of the changes of both companies against the S&P 500. In
other words, the regression equation is:
Rit = + i*Rmt, where: Rit is the actual returns of firm i at time t;Rmt is the actual change of S&P 500 at time t;
After obtaining the estimates for and , we are going to substitute them in the Abnormal Return estimation:
ARit = Rit ( + * Rmt).
The time period used, begins on 16/7/01, two months prior to the merger and two years after Fiorina was
hired, and ends in 07/05/02, when the firms officially combined. In total there are 201 daily observations. The
results of the regressions are illustrated in Appendix 1, who also provides details on share price changes and
the abnormal return during the period analysed and links them to specific events that might have triggered
them. In Table 1 below, three chosen dates are illustrated for the determination of abnormal returns.
Table1: Determining the Abnormal Return
No of sharesPrice/share
($)
Market cap
(07/01)
Change in Market value
$ billions (based on AR)
(billion) 16/7/2001 $ billion 3/8/2001 4/9/2001 7/5/2002
HP 2,2 23,15 50,93 -4,58358% -21,3555% -0,1511%
-2,33442 -10,8764 -0,07696
COMPAQ 1,7 15,4 26,18 1,685447% -21,4056% 0,04088%
0,44125 -5,60399 0,010702
COMBINED -1,89 -16,5 -0,067
9Data for HP stock prices are from Yahoo Finance and for Compaq from Datastream.
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The shaded area in the table above indicates that from one and a half month before the merger till the first full
trading day the shareholders of both companies lost $16, 5 billion. Pre and Post takeover the loss was not that
significant and especially the months following the merger the combined entity seems to start recovering,
following the increase of S&P500 and Dell.
In conclusion, the AR-Event study analysis shows that the transaction did not create value for theshareholders, but it deducted the (16.5 out of 77) of the market value of the combined entity in the short
run. It is important to mention that this loss is attributed in a high degree, to the timing of the merger (just
before the incident of the World Trade Center), because as we observe in Appendix 3 that the HP stock
performance follows more or less the performance of S&P500 during the whole period analyzed.
Conclusion
The merger of HP and Compaq has put forth concerns from the beginning. The intuitive synergies and
complementarity of products for a computer manufacturer and a printer manufacturer would bring economiesof scale and the possibility of bundling. HP weaknesses would have been complemented by Compaqs
strengths and vice-versa. This was not the case for the merger of these two companies. By going through the
above analysis we see that it was met with opposition from the beginning, failing to bring shareholder value
and the much expected synergies. The main challenger of the deal was Walter Hewlett, son of the co-founder
Bill Hewlett, who said: "The Compaq merger is a dangerously risky, a very costly, step... The risk is great that
trying to meld two disparate companies and cultures together in the computer business will come to grief."This
was also the case when it came to the analysts: Todd Kort, principal analyst for Gartner Research, said, "This is
not a case of 1+1 = 2. It's more like 1+1 = 1.5."and also IDC analyst Roger Kay said, "Dell must be totally gleeful,
because these guys are going to spend all their time untangling themselves.", completed by Michael Dell, CEO
of Dell Computer, who called it "the dumbest deal of the decade."
Typically, a merger is announced on Friday after the closing of the stock markets in order to allow the
investors time to process the information and reflect it as best as possible in the price once the merger is
completed. This was not the case for HP-Compaq, the announcement was made on Monday 3rd
of September
2004, which might reflected the concerns that the management had regarding the market reaction and the
price it paid for the acquisition10
.
So, if the signals from the stock market (stock price drop on the announcement of the merger and stock price
increase on the date when Hewlett family announced a law suit against the management of HP) and so many
opposing voices, why did it go through? The first answer comes from the determination of then architect of
the merger and CEO of HP, Carly Fiorina, to make the deal. Hubris, empire building and huge bonuses were
stimuli that she could not overlook. She lacked the skills to manage one of the largest technology companies in
the world. The second reason is the poor integration and execution of the merger, who lead to poor
performance and loss of key people from Compaq. This losing battle against past mistakes went on for three
years until the board of HP decided to get rid of Fiorina and bring Mark Hurd as CEO. This was a determinant
step that changed things around for HP. The new CEO was better equipped with the challenge of leading such
a company.
10For a short analysis on overpayment see Appendix 5.
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Appendix 1 Cumulative percentage changes - AR regression results
Date Compaq* HP* dCompaq dHP AR-HP AR_Cpq Notes
16-07-01 15.4 23.2
17-07-01 15.81 23.2 2.662 0 -1.22 0.923
18-07-01 15.66 23 -0.949 -0.605 0.145 -0.004
19-07-01 15.78 23.3 0.766 1.043 0.32 -0.29520-07-01 14.7 23.2 -6.844 -0.344 0.138 -6.264
23-07-01 13.6 23 -7.483 -0.863 1.262 -4.665
24-07-01 13.85 22.6 1.838 -1.698 0.415 4.639
25-07-01 14.12 22.5 1.949 -0.266 -2.262 -0.846
26-07-01 14.5 21.1 2.691 -6.528 -7.809 0.869 Issue of mid-term bonds
27-07-01 14.28 21.4 -1.517 1.473 1.214 -1.947
30-07-01 14.5 21.2 1.541 -0.609 -0.426 1.713
31-07-01 14.94 21.6 3.034 1.837 1.176 2.057
01-08-01 15.39 22.4 3.012 3.469 3.022 2.327
02-08-01 15.83 22.7 2.859 1.565 1.107 2.159
03-08-01 15.85 22.2 0.126 -2.377 -1.665 1.019 1 month before merger
06-08-01 15.6 22.1 -1.577 -0.271 1.226 0.385
07-08-01 14.98 22 -3.974 -0.407 -0.776 -4.553
08-08-01 14.6 21.7 -2.537 -1.498 0.749 0.447
09-08-01 14.69 21.7 0.616 -0.184 -0.128 0.617
10-08-01 15 22 2.11 1.616 0.94 1.112
13-08-01 14.85 21.8 -1 -0.909 -0.983 -1.178
14-08-01 14.5 21.8 -2.357 -0.046 0.486 -1.709
15-08-01 13.97 21.1 -3.655 -3.073 -2.095 -2.399
16-08-01 13.99 21.2 0.143 0.142 -0.204 -0.405
17-08-01 14.11 21.1 0.858 -0.331 1.831 3.726
20-08-01 13.98 21.7 -0.921 2.845 1.859 -2.341
21-08-01 13.55 21.7 -3.076 -0.138 1.442 -1
22-08-01 13.36 21.5 -1.402 -0.831 -1.668 -2.62
23-08-01 13 21.1 -2.695 -2.002 -1.605 -2.231
24-08-01 13.65 22 5 4.703 2.253 1.586
27-08-01 13.27 21.9 -2.784 -0.454 0.205 -1.963
28-08-01 13.32 21.6 0.377 -1.641 0.311 2.96
29-08-01 13.13 21 -1.426 -2.688 -1.226 0.488
30-08-01 12.69 20.5 -3.351 -2.286 -0.08 -0.423
31-08-01 12.35 20.4 -2.679 -0.828 -1.294 -3.39 The day before the merger is announced04-09-01 11.08 16.7 -10.283
-18.133
-18.015
-10.2 The day after the merger is announced (div)
05-09-01 10.41 16 -6.047 -4.142 -3.961 -5.878
06-09-01 10.35 15.5 -0.576 -2.818 0.072 3.283
07-09-01 10.59 15.9 2.319 2.126 4.539 5.529
10-09-01 10.35 15.7 -2.266 -1.009 -1.754 -3.357
17-09-01 8.75 14.1 -15.459 -10.07 -3.774 -6.959Reopening day of markets post 9/11HP and Compaq unveil stock buyback plans for $1.8 billionand $550 million, respectively
18-09-01 8.52 14.3 -2.629 1.134 1.917 -1.638
19-09-01 8.13 13.6 -4.577 -4.975 -2.883 -1.804
20-09-01 7.85 12.8 -3.444 -5.826 -1.835 1.915 Low point after the merger
21-09-01 7.99 13.2 1.783 3.211 5.674 5.062
24-09-01 8.54 14.2 6.884 7.587 2.682 0.126 Acquisition of StorageApps
25-09-01 8.85 14.1 3.63 -0.564 -1.634 2.095
26-09-01 8.4 14.1 -5.085 -0.071 0.631 -4.205
27-09-01 8.56 14.3 1.905 1.278 -0.136 -0.097
28-09-01 8.31 14.1 -2.921 -0.911 -3.649 -6.727
01-10-01 8.33 13.7 0.241 -2.829 -2.491 0.624
02-10-01 8.16 13.4 -2.041 -2.256 -3.773 -4.184
03-10-01 8.65 14.1 6.005 4.914 2.43 2.544 Compaq scores storage software win
04-10-01 8.85 14.1 2.312 0 0.36 2.726
05-10-01 8.82 14.5 -0.339 2.839 2.677 -0.636
08-10-01 9.05 14.9 2.608 3.037 4.142 4.037
Heirs of HP co-founder William Hewlett and the William R.Hewlett Revocable Trust say they'll vote against the mergerHP's board, except Walter Hewlett, reaffirms its support forthe merger and Fiorina's leadership.David Packard, son of HP co-founder David Packard, tellsCNBC he plans to vote against the merger.
09-10-01 9.01 14.7 -0.442 -1.34 -0.613 0.471
10-10-01 9.5 15 5.438 1.629 -1.238 1.456
11-10-01 9.89 15.9 4.105 6.48 4.594 1.46
12-10-01 9.92 16.2 0.303 1.38 2.095 1.20115-10-01 9.8 16 -1.21 -1.238 -0.997 -0.959
16-10-01 10.18 16.3 3.878 2.13 1.295 2.664
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17-10-01 9.76 15.9 -4.126 -2.699 -0.287 -0.916
18-10-01 9.52 15.5 -2.459 -2.27 -1.224 -1.111
19-10-01 9.8 16.1 2.941 3.935 3.403 2.139
22-10-01 9.65 16.1 -1.531 0.062 -1.835 -4.191
23-10-01 9.4 15.8 -2.591 -2.109 -1.467 -1.792
24-10-01 9.74 15.9 3.617 0.57 0.567 3.536
25-10-01 9.78 16 0.411 0.693 -1.003 -1.977
26-10-01 9.5 15.7 -2.863 -1.627 -2.103 -3.588
29-10-01 9.2 15.3 -3.158 -2.481 0.59 0.949
30-10-01 9 15 -2.174 -2.479 -0.253 0.782
31-10-01 8.75 14.8 -2.778 -0.87 -0.822 -2.79
01-11-01 9.15 15.2 4.571 2.834 -0.034 0.587
02-11-01 9.11 14.9 -0.437 -2.231 -2.548 -0.946
05-11-01 8.99 14.9 -1.317 -0.134 -1.915 -3.82
06-11-01 8.5 17.5 -5.451 17.272 15.473 -7.978 Hewlett family announces its opposition
07-11-01 7.99 16.9 -6 -3.209 -2.816 -5.541
08-11-01 7.99 16.2 0 -4.322 -4.588 -0.439
09-11-01 7.73 16.7 -3.254 3.527 3.372 -3.542
12-11-01 7.66 17 -0.906 1.614 1.884 -0.614
13-11-01 8.8 17.8 14.883 4.824 2.512 11.657 HPTelefonica-Samsung agreement
14-11-01 10 19.5 13.636 9.147 8.957 13.3 4th quarter results
15-11-01 10.7 19.5 7 0.051 -0.017 6.83
16-11-01 10.3 18.9 -3.738 -2.672 -2.227 -3.209
19-11-01 10.35 19 0.485 0.211 -1.127 -1.41420-11-01 9.63 18.5 -6.957 -2.792 -1.82 -5.708
21-11-01 9.67 18.1 0.415 -2.06 -1.388 1.254
23-11-01 9.8 18.4 1.344 2.048 0.607 -0.695
26-11-01 9.94 18.6 1.429 0.922 0.186 0.35
27-11-01 9.52 17.9 -4.225 -3.923 -3.008 -3.056
28-11-01 9.06 17.8 -4.832 -0.615 1.749 -1.688
29-11-01 9.6 18.9 5.96 6.078 4.809 4.156Walter Hewlett officially launches anti-merger effort by filingpapers with the SEC
30-11-01 10.15 19.4 5.729 2.759 2.888 5.829
03-12-01 10.15 18.9 0 -2.272 -1.161 1.436
04-12-01 10.79 19.8 6.305 4.702 3.073 4.01
05-12-01 11.65 20.5 7.97 3.633 0.844 4.095
06-12-01 11.11 20.6 -4.635 0.049 0.447 -4.169
07-12-01 11.32 20.7 1.89 0.827 1.83 3.179Compaq and HP issue join statement addressing PackardFoundations opposition
10-12-01 9.7 20.3 -14.311 -2.22 -0.159 -11.5811-12-01 9.49 19.4 -2.165 -4.393 -3.994 -1.698
12-12-01 9.79 19.2 3.161 -0.826 -0.815 3.1
13-12-01 9.39 18.6 -4.086 -3.384 -1.362 -1.408
14-12-01 9.48 18.5 0.958 -0.323 -0.698 0.371
17-12-01 9.49 18.4 0.105 -0.757 -1.985 -1.645 Dividends
18-12-01 9.11 18.1 -4.004 -1.253 -2.165 -5.324
19-12-01 9.02 18.3 -0.988 0.938 0.246 -2.007Fiorina and Capellas send letter to HP and Compaqshareholders to urge their support of the merger.
20-12-01 9.12 18.3 1.109 0 1.11 2.544HP's and Compaq's Canadian subsidiaries announce thatthe Canadian Competition Bureau has reviewed the mergerdeal and found no anti-competitive concerns.
21-12-01 9.94 18.6 8.991 1.475 0.969 8.224
24-12-01 9.67 18.4 -2.716 -1.131 -1.058 -2.694
26-12-01 9.78 18.5 1.138 0.654 0.176 0.41
27-12-01 9.93 18.4 1.534 -0.487 -1.298 0.352
28-12-01 9.89 18.4 -0.403 0.109 -0.272 -0.998
31-12-01 9.76 18.2 -1.314 -1.358 0.104 0.6
02-01-02 10.48 19.1 7.377 5.396 4.713 6.37 Introduces new wireless products
03-01-02 10.96 20.3 4.58 6.061 4.941 2.978
04-01-02 11.39 20.5 3.923 0.887 0.144 2.834
07-01-02 11.68 20.4 2.546 -0.635 0.237 3.656
In response to a "Dear Walter" letter that the HP board filedwith the SEC, Walter Hewlett issues statement saying thathe was advised by company counsel that the merger wouldbe approved with or without his board vote and that he couldOK the deal as a director and still reject it as a stockholder.Hewlett also stated that the merger "is clearly bad forstockholder value."
08-01-02 11.29 20.1 -3.339 -1.032 -0.53 -2.732
09-01-02 10.8 20.7 -4.34 2.979 3.635 -3.524
10-01-02 11 20.6 1.852 -0.53 -0.645 1.619
11-01-02 11.5 20.2 4.545 -1.939 -0.685 6.177
14-01-02 11.14 19.9 -3.13 -1.582 -0.739 -2.059
15-01-02 11.4 20.4 2.334 2.511 1.689 1.138 Walter Hewlett sends letter to HP stockholders saying thathe and the William R. Hewlett Revocable Trust don't supportthe merger and that shareholders should nix the deal.
16-01-02 11.1 19.8 -2.632 -2.891 -0.782 0.165
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17-01-02 11.8 20.8 6.306 4.945 3.717 4.557HP and Compaq report that company shareholders ofrecord as of Jan. 28, 2002, will be eligible to vote on theproposed merger.
18-01-02 11.52 20 -2.373 -3.894 -2.588 -0.67
HP board sends letter to shareholders saying that theplanned merger with Compaq makes sense because it willcreate a stronger company that better reflects the evolvinghigh-tech industry.
22-01-02 10.94 19.3 -5.035 -3.552 -2.574 -3.78
23-01-02 11.37 19.6 3.931 1.608 0.647 2.546
24-01-02 12.05 20 5.981 2.144 1.743 5.358
25-01-02 11.95 19.9 -0.83 -0.7 -0.78 -1.017
28-01-02 11.88 19.5 -0.586 -1.812 -1.741 -0.566
29-01-02 11.22 18.5 -5.556 -5.126 -1.446 -0.62
HP launches Web site, www.votetheHPway.com, to conveyinformation about the merger to the public. The movecounters www.votenohpcompaq.com, a site launched byWalter Hewlett.
30-01-02 11.99 19.4 6.863 4.916 3.47 4.816
Strategic alliance with DreamworksWalter Hewlett files report with SEC that's titled "LargeComputing Mergers Have Consistently Failed." He statesthat the report "clearly illustrates the extreme risk involved inthe proposed HP-Compaq merger."
31-01-02 12.35 19.6 3.003 0.669 -1.181 0.405 EC clears merger
01-02-02 12.1 19.5 -2.024 -0.512 0.433 -0.814
04-02-02 12.2 19.5 0.826 0.206 3.393 5.092
05-02-02 12 18.9 -1.639 -2.976 -2.417 -0.955
HP schedules shareholder vote on the merger for March 19.Compaq sets its shareholder vote on the deal for March 20.
HP files registration statement with SEC that contains adefinitive joint proxy statement/prospectus regarding themerger.Walter Hewlett begins mailing definitive proxy materials toshareholders plus a letter urging them to vote against themerger.HP unveils new channel initiative called partnerOne, whichintegrates all of its disparate channel contracts and partnerdesignations into a single program.
06-02-02 11.93 18.4 -0.583 -2.485 -1.682 0.434
07-02-02 11.66 18.4 -2.263 -0.271 0.168 -1.742
08-02-02 11.59 18 -0.6 -1.903 -3.744 -3.185
11-02-02 11.54 18.4 -0.431 2.217 0.441 -2.928
12-02-02 11.12 18.4 -3.64 -0.434 0.12 -2.961
13-02-02 11.4 18.6 2.518 1.035 -0.183 0.783
14-02-02 11.4 18.5 0 -0.485 -0.208 0.302
15-02-02 10.95 18 -3.947 -2.492 -1.047 -2.055
19-02-02 10.56 17.5 -3.562 -2.944 -0.501 -0.31
In a study submitted as part of an SEC filing, Walter Hewlettsays new investment in HP's printing/imaging, midrange andhigh-end computing businesses could boost the company'sshare price by $14 to $17 without a Compaq merger.Responding to Hewlett's filing, HP issues a statementsaying that "the merger with Compaq represents the singlebest way to create sustainable shareowner value across ourbusinesses."
20-02-02 10.65 17.5 0.852 0.286 -1.384 -1.5
21-02-02 10.29 17.2 -3.38 -1.769 0.246 -0.711
22-02-02 10.5 17.1 2.041 -0.872 -1.87 0.604
HP board sends letter to shareholders stating that WalterHewlett's arguments against the merger containinconsistencies and that he offers no viable alternative forboosting HP shareholder value. The letter came as Hewlettran ads in major U.S. newspapers with the heading, "TheMore You Know About the HP-Compaq Merger, the MoreYou'll Want to Vote No."
25-02-02 10.6 17.7 0.952 3.576 1.339 -2.171
26-02-02 10.4 17.7 -1.887 0.113 0.165 -1.893
27-02-02 10.2 17.7 -1.923 0.113 0.101 -2.017
28-02-02 10.14 17.8 -0.588 0.452 0.859 -0.11
HP and Compaq issue statements to deny claims by WalterHewlett, made in an SEC filing, that Fiorina and Capellaswould receive lavish pay packages if the merger goesthrough.
01-03-02 10.44 17.9 2.959 0.45 -2.379 -0.971
04-03-02 10.65 18.2 2.011 2.071 -0.359 -1.375
DividendsReuters reports that L.A. law firm Weiss & Yourman said itasked a judge to stop the shareholder vote on the HP-Compaq merger, and HP denied that an injunction had beenfiled to stop the vote.
05-03-02 10.58 18.3 -0.657 0.274 1.168 0.483Proxy firm Institutional Shareholder Services endorses theproposed HP-Compaq merger. Institutional investors standas the swing vote in the merger battle.
06-03-02 10.98 17.9 3.781 -2.078 -3.874 1.257Federal Trade Commission approves HP-Compaq merger,saying the deal wouldn't impair competition.
07-03-02 11.15 17.8 1.548 -0.893 -0.276 2.312
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08-03-02 11.8 18.3 5.83 2.986 2.289 4.804
California Public Employees Retirement System (Calpers),the biggest U.S. pension fund, says it will vote against theHP-Compaq merger. Calpers owns 7.6 million HP sharesand 6.5 million Compaq shares, or less than 1 percent of theoutstanding shares of each company.
11-03-02 11.27 18.6 -4.492 1.86 1.475 -5.092
12-03-02 11.12 18.3 -1.331 -1.987 -1.647 -0.944
13-03-02 11 17.9 -1.079 -2.192 -0.897 0.608
Putnam Investments, Compaq's largest single shareholderand one of HP's biggest shareholders, says it will vote forthe merger. Putnam owns 3.99 percent of Compaq's sharesand 2.5 percent of HP's shares.Banc of America Capital Management, one of HP's largestshareholders, says it will vote against the merger. The Bankof America investment arm owns about 6 million HP shares.
14-03-02 10.7 17.2 -2.727 -3.529 -3.368 -2.584
15-03-02 10.33 16.9 -3.458 -1.8 -3.21 -5.455
In an SEC filing, HP said that if the merger is approved, itexpects to incur charges of $450 million to $700 million "forseverance or relocation costs related to Compaqemployees, costs of vacating some facilities (leased orowned) of Compaq, or other costs associated with exitingactivities of Compaq" plus another $450 million to $700million in charges for similar issues involving HP employeesand facilities.The New York State Common Retirement Fund, the nation'sthe second-largest state pension fund, said it would vote its6 million HP shares against the merger. The fund's stakerepresents about 0.36 percent of HP's outstanding shares.
18-03-02 10.36 17.1 0.29 1.064 1.188 0.382
19-03-02 11.14 16.7 7.529 -2.341 -2.811 6.811
Fiorina claims victory for merger deal in unofficial HPshareholder vote. Hewlett calls result too close to call.Independent firm to issue certified ballot count in severalweeks.
20-03-02 10.82 16.2 -2.873 -3.176 -1.128 -0.161 By a 9-1 margin, Compaq shareholders approve the merger.
21-03-02 10.77 16.4 -0.462 1.609 1.463 -0.737
22-03-02 10.65 16.1 -1.114 -1.888 -1.304 -0.395
25-03-02 10.63 16.1 -0.188 -0.124 1.783 2.333
26-03-02 10.85 16.1 2.07 -0.249 -0.945 1.044
27-03-02 10.6 15.8 -2.304 -1.745 -2.378 -3.244
28-03-02 10.45 15.9 -1.415 1.015 0.749 -1.854
01-04-02 10.42 15.9 -0.287 -0.251 -0.111 -0.173
02-04-02 10.2 15.5 -2.111 -2.517 -1.388 -0.65
03-04-02 9.82 15.4 -3.725 -0.452 0.863 -2.011
04-04-02 9.58 15.3 -2.444 -0.713 -0.773 -2.602
05-04-02 9.56 15.1 -0.209 -1.502 -1 0.39908-04-02 9.59 15.2 0.314 0.796 0.502 -0.163
09-04-02 9.28 15.5 -3.233 1.645 2.536 -2.095
10-04-02 9.76 15.7 5.172 1.812 0.419 3.197
11-04-02 9.86 15.9 1.025 1.017 4.072 5.109
12-04-02 9.98 15.8 1.217 -0.566 -1.363 0.056
15-04-02 10.1 15.9 1.202 0.443 1.456 2.506
16-04-02 10.4 16.5 2.97 4.033 1.105 -1.095
17-04-02 10.68 16.6 2.692 0.303 0.608 3.031
18-04-02 10.82 16.2 1.311 -2.415 -2.189 1.543
19-04-02 11.13 16.6 2.865 2.661 2.628 2.743
22-04-02 10.73 16.2 -3.594 -2.23 -0.227 -0.942
23-04-02 10.2 16 -4.939 -1.295 -0.461 -3.881
24-04-02 10.36 15.3 1.569 -4.56 -3.612 2.783
25-04-02 10.46 15.4 0.965 0.982 1.221 1.214
26-04-02 10.15 15.1 -2.964 -2.398 -0.588 -0.575
29-04-02 10.3 15.1 1.478 0 1.329 3.211
30-04-02 10.15 15.2 -1.456 0.797 -0.524 -3.333
01-05-02 10.65 15 4.926 -1.383 -2.462 3.38
02-05-02 10.76 15.2 1.033 1.336 1.604 1.321
03-05-02 11 15.5 2.23 2.044 3.393 3.992
06-05-02 11 16.2 0 4.457 6.96 3.332
07-05-02 11 16.3 0 1.051 1.481 0.509 Combination day
* Source: HP-Compaq: The Merger Saga,crn.com
Date dCompaq dHP AR-HP AR_Cpq
Cumulative till 1 month before merger (3/8/01) 3.6869 -3.902 -4.58358 1.68544678
Cumulative till first day of full trading (4/9/01) -21.3555 -21.405633
Cumulative all period (7/5/02) -18.32 -24.88 -0.1511 0.04088038
http://www.crn.com/news/channel-programs/18818769/hp-compaq-the-merger-saga.htm;jsessionid=ezgNLKCURBljXy1JQ+QjEw**.ecappj03http://www.crn.com/news/channel-programs/18818769/hp-compaq-the-merger-saga.htm;jsessionid=ezgNLKCURBljXy1JQ+QjEw**.ecappj03http://www.crn.com/news/channel-programs/18818769/hp-compaq-the-merger-saga.htm;jsessionid=ezgNLKCURBljXy1JQ+QjEw**.ecappj03http://www.crn.com/news/channel-programs/18818769/hp-compaq-the-merger-saga.htm;jsessionid=ezgNLKCURBljXy1JQ+QjEw**.ecappj03 -
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Regression results
ERHP = - 0.051 + 1.278 RSP50
(0.19) (0.17) R2
= 0.22
ERCQ = 0.014 + 1.73 RSP500
(0.23) (0.20) R2
= 0.265
Appendix 2 HP and Compaq CEOs background information
Carleton S. (Carly) Fiorina was president and chief executive officer of Hewlett-Packard Company from 1999 to
2005. She served as chairman of the board from 2000 to 2005. Prior to joining HP, Fiorina spent nearly 20
years at AT&T and Lucent Technologies, where she held a number of senior leadership positions and directed
Lucent's initial public offering and subsequent spin-off from AT&T.
Capellas was President of Hewlett-Packard Company from May 2002 to November 2002. Before the merger of
Hewlett-Packard and Compaq Computer Corporation in May 2002, Mr. Capellas was President and Chief
Executive Officer of Compaq, a position he had held since July 1999, and Chairman of the Board of Compaq, a
position he had held since September 2000. Mr. Capellas held earlier positions as Chief Information Officer
Appendix 3 HP, SP500 and Dell stock price comparison chart
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Appendix 4 HP and Compaq percentage daily changes in stock prices
Figure 1
Figure 2
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Appendix 5 Did HP overpay for Compaq?
In order to see if HP overpaid in this acquisition, we compared the share exchange rate used in the merger
(0.6325 HP share to one Compaq share) to an average for 3 periods: 3 months, 6 months and 1 year. We usedthe average stock price of the HP and Compaq shares for the above mentioned periods multiplied with the
number of outstanding shares at the time of the merger. In the table below we can see that the overpayment
is 0.1442 higher when we look at a 3 months interval and it drops to 0.1047 for 1 year.