Group C’s Group C’s Diagnostic Techniques Summary Diagnostic Techniques Summary

of Secretary Powell’s Presentation of Secretary Powell’s Presentation to the UN Security Council to the UN Security Council

February 10, 2011

OutlineOutline

Introduction/Summary – Antonia ShullIntroduction/Summary – Antonia Shull

Key Assumptions Check – Amber MarriottKey Assumptions Check – Amber Marriott

Quality of Information Check – Brandon PayneQuality of Information Check – Brandon Payne

Indicators or Signposts of Change – Hadis DashtestaniIndicators or Signposts of Change – Hadis Dashtestani

Analysis of Competing Hypotheses – Chuck BarberAnalysis of Competing Hypotheses – Chuck Barber

Diagnostic TechniquesDiagnostic Techniques Diagnostic techniques allow analyst to identify key theories, uncertainties, intelligence gaps, Diagnostic techniques allow analyst to identify key theories, uncertainties, intelligence gaps,

and consider multiple hypotheses (even the unlikely ones) in order to make a sophisticated and and consider multiple hypotheses (even the unlikely ones) in order to make a sophisticated and credible intelligence assessment. The four techniques are:credible intelligence assessment. The four techniques are:

Key Assumptions Check Key Assumptions Check – listing the key assumptions that underlie the analysis by thinking – listing the key assumptions that underlie the analysis by thinking critically about each assumption and making the assumption stronger or weakercritically about each assumption and making the assumption stronger or weaker

Quality of Information Check Quality of Information Check – evaluating the completeness and soundness of available – evaluating the completeness and soundness of available information sources in order to detect possible deception or intelligence gapsinformation sources in order to detect possible deception or intelligence gaps

Indicators or Signpost of Change Indicators or Signpost of Change – identifying a set of competing hypotheses by listing – identifying a set of competing hypotheses by listing supporting evidence, reviewing, and identifying the most likely hypothesessupporting evidence, reviewing, and identifying the most likely hypotheses

Analysis of Competing Hypotheses Analysis of Competing Hypotheses – weighing of alternative explanations that involves – weighing of alternative explanations that involves identifying a complete set of alternative explanations or outcomes then systematically identifying a complete set of alternative explanations or outcomes then systematically evaluating each and selecting the best fitevaluating each and selecting the best fit

Preface of the Address Preface of the Address Nov. 8, 2002 - U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 was passed (unanimously)Nov. 8, 2002 - U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 was passed (unanimously)

• Offered Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations” that they had Offered Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations” that they had been found guilty of for over 12 yearsbeen found guilty of for over 12 years

• Iraq was in material breach of its obligation under previous resolutions, which included:Iraq was in material breach of its obligation under previous resolutions, which included: Manufacturing WMDManufacturing WMD Violating ceasefire termsViolating ceasefire terms Construction of prohibited types of missilesConstruction of prohibited types of missiles Purchases and import of prohibited armamentsPurchases and import of prohibited armaments Refusal of Iraq to compensate Kuwait for the widespread lootingRefusal of Iraq to compensate Kuwait for the widespread looting

Goals of Resolution 1441 were to:Goals of Resolution 1441 were to:• Give Iraq one last chance to be compliant or they will face serious consequencesGive Iraq one last chance to be compliant or they will face serious consequences

• To verify the existence or destruction of Iraq’s remaining unaccounted for WMDTo verify the existence or destruction of Iraq’s remaining unaccounted for WMD

• Allow inspectors from UNMOVIC/IAEA to perform inspections with full Allow inspectors from UNMOVIC/IAEA to perform inspections with full cooperationcooperation

November 13, 2002 – Iraq agreed to Resolution 1441November 13, 2002 – Iraq agreed to Resolution 1441

November 27, 2002 – UNMOVIC/IAEA inspectors returned to IraqNovember 27, 2002 – UNMOVIC/IAEA inspectors returned to Iraq

Key Assumptions CheckKey Assumptions Check

Intelligence gathered from human sources is accurate and true.Intelligence gathered from human sources is accurate and true.

Experts (imagery analysts, translators, etc.) provided accurate Experts (imagery analysts, translators, etc.) provided accurate representations.representations.

Iraq has a “Duty to Comply” with the UN’s resolution 1441 and inspectors.Iraq has a “Duty to Comply” with the UN’s resolution 1441 and inspectors.

Iraq’s actions have been in “bad faith” rather than more benign reasons.Iraq’s actions have been in “bad faith” rather than more benign reasons.

Information outside of existence of WMDs, precursors, or other related Information outside of existence of WMDs, precursors, or other related items is indicative of Iraq’s possession of WMDs.items is indicative of Iraq’s possession of WMDs.

Key Assumptions CheckKey Assumptions Check

Precursors, parts, past possession and current knowledge translate into Precursors, parts, past possession and current knowledge translate into possession of physical WMDs.possession of physical WMDs.

Iraq’s “Higher Committee for Monitoring the Inspection Teams” is there to Iraq’s “Higher Committee for Monitoring the Inspection Teams” is there to inhibit the inspectors.inhibit the inspectors.

The 12,200 page declaration is poor in information and devoid of new The 12,200 page declaration is poor in information and devoid of new evidence.evidence.

Link to terrorist cells relates to possession of WMDs.Link to terrorist cells relates to possession of WMDs.

Quality of Information (QoI)Quality of Information (QoI)

““My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we are giving you are facts and sources. These are not assertions. What we are giving you are facts and

conclusions based on conclusions based on solid intelligencesolid intelligence.”.”

- Colin Powell, February 5 2003- Colin Powell, February 5 2003

Secretary Powell’s 4 Justifying Forces:Secretary Powell’s 4 Justifying Forces: Chemical weaponsChemical weapons Nuclear WeaponsNuclear Weapons Iraqi Ties to Al-Qaida - TerrorismIraqi Ties to Al-Qaida - Terrorism Human Rights ViolationsHuman Rights Violations

QoI - ObservationsQoI - Observations Conviction and confidence of presentation – Persuasive languageConviction and confidence of presentation – Persuasive language

Perceptual Bias (expectation) Perceptual Bias (expectation) • e.g., because Saddam Hussein is doing e.g., because Saddam Hussein is doing aa, , bb and and cc, that , that mustmust imply imply zz..

Intelligence Acquisition:Intelligence Acquisition:1.1. Variety of Sources?Variety of Sources?

2.2. Reliable Sources??Reliable Sources??

• Web of lies?Web of lies?

““The intelligence…was primarily through overhead imagery The intelligence…was primarily through overhead imagery and signals and signals intercepts of limited valueintercepts of limited value and from Iraqi and from Iraqi defectors, often defectors, often single sources of unknown credibilitysingle sources of unknown credibility that that were provided by the now suspect Iraqi National Congress, were provided by the now suspect Iraqi National Congress, a group a group promoting the use of U.S. military forcepromoting the use of U.S. military force to to overthrow Saddam Hussein.” overthrow Saddam Hussein.” -Additional Views of Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, Additional Views of Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, Senator Carl Levin and Senator Richard Durbin Senator Carl Levin and Senator Richard Durbin ((http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/congress/2004_rpt/iraq-wmd-intell_john-rockefeller.htm))

• “There can be no doubt” • “Solid sources…not assertions”

• “There is only one answer…” • “…ample evidence”

QoI - InterpretationQoI - Interpretation The Price of AmbiguityThe Price of Ambiguity

A “decade of proof that [Saddam] remains determined to acquire nuclear A “decade of proof that [Saddam] remains determined to acquire nuclear weapons.” weapons.” ““If we knew today or knew then what we know today that there were no WoMD…If we knew today or knew then what we know today that there were no WoMD…

the justification would not have been there.” – Colin Powell on the justification would not have been there.” – Colin Powell on Meet the Press, Meet the Press, June June 10, 200710, 2007

The “sinister nexus between Iraq and the al-Qaida terrorist network.”The “sinister nexus between Iraq and the al-Qaida terrorist network.” According to Secretary Powell, there had been a “decades long experience with According to Secretary Powell, there had been a “decades long experience with

respect to ties between Iraq and al-Qaida” … respect to ties between Iraq and al-Qaida” … ……Even though Al-Qaida had only been formed between 1988 and 1989, and these Even though Al-Qaida had only been formed between 1988 and 1989, and these

ties were not what he was led to believe.ties were not what he was led to believe.

And once again on sources…And once again on sources… Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi – Referred to as “Senior terrorist operative” currently Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi – Referred to as “Senior terrorist operative” currently

being held in detention.being held in detention. Libyan national, apprehended in Pakistan in 2001Libyan national, apprehended in Pakistan in 2001 Subjected to torture at US base in AfghanistanSubjected to torture at US base in Afghanistan Fabricated story?Fabricated story?

Tracking potential for Iraq having Tracking potential for Iraq having weapons of Mass Destructionweapons of Mass Destruction

TopicsTopics IndicatorsIndicators

Iraq deadly behavior Iraq deadly behavior - Using mustard & nerve gas against Kurds- Using mustard & nerve gas against Kurds

- Conducting ethnic cleaning against the Shia Iraqis- Conducting ethnic cleaning against the Shia Iraqis

Iraq terrorist network - Nexus between Iraq & Al-Qaida (terrorist network)Iraq terrorist network - Nexus between Iraq & Al-Qaida (terrorist network)

Deadly weapons history - Biological weapons (confession of having it in 1995)Deadly weapons history - Biological weapons (confession of having it in 1995)

- Producing VX - Producing VX

- Chemical weapons- Chemical weapons

- Nuclear weapons- Nuclear weapons

Satellite images - Housecleaning: banned materials have moved from IraqiSatellite images - Housecleaning: banned materials have moved from Iraqi

weapons of mass destruction facilities (ex. Taji)weapons of mass destruction facilities (ex. Taji)

- Existence of decontamination vehicles - Existence of decontamination vehicles

- Especial security facilities - Especial security facilities

Tracking potential for Iraq having Tracking potential for Iraq having weapons of Mass Destruction weapons of Mass Destruction

TopicsTopics IndicatorsIndicators

Iraq dishonesty Iraq dishonesty - Iraqi’s UAV range (declared 80 Km, actual range: 500 Km) - Iraqi’s UAV range (declared 80 Km, actual range: 500 Km)

- Hiding equipments - Hiding equipments

- Evacuating things- Evacuating things

- Hiding people (displacing weapon experts with other- Hiding people (displacing weapon experts with other

military men)military men)

- Replacing hard drives in weapon’s facility - Replacing hard drives in weapon’s facility

- Train how to deceive inspectors - Train how to deceive inspectors

Iraq violation from its - Refusing to permit U-2 reconnaissance flightsIraq violation from its - Refusing to permit U-2 reconnaissance flights

obligations - Refusing to provide a comprehensive list of scientistsobligations - Refusing to provide a comprehensive list of scientists

- Refusing to allow access to all official persons- Refusing to allow access to all official persons

- Iraq has made no effort to dissarm- Iraq has made no effort to dissarm

Analysis of Competing HypothesesAnalysis of Competing Hypotheses

HypothesesHypotheses H1: Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing efforts to produce WMDH1: Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing efforts to produce WMD

H2: Iraq is attempting to maintain a semblance of power in a threatening H2: Iraq is attempting to maintain a semblance of power in a threatening neighborhood neighborhood

H3: Iraq is simply incompetent of accounting for its weapons with no H3: Iraq is simply incompetent of accounting for its weapons with no malicious intentmalicious intent

Analysis of Competing HypothesesAnalysis of Competing HypothesesEvidenceEvidence

E1: Previous violations E1: Previous violations over 16 previous resolutions and 12 yearsover 16 previous resolutions and 12 years

Iraq has not accounted for the biological agent and Iraq has not accounted for the biological agent and weapons it admitted to havingweapons it admitted to having

Chemical weapons not accounted for and a history of use.Chemical weapons not accounted for and a history of use. Human rights violations and ethnic cleansingHuman rights violations and ethnic cleansing

E2: Attempts to hide information from inspectorsE2: Attempts to hide information from inspectors Two recordings on November 26, 2002 and January 20, Two recordings on November 26, 2002 and January 20,

2003 about evacuating equipment and ammunition, then 2003 about evacuating equipment and ammunition, then hiding the fact.hiding the fact.

Dr. Blix pronounced the 12,200-page declaration rich in Dr. Blix pronounced the 12,200-page declaration rich in volume but poor in information.volume but poor in information.

Orders to hide correspondence with the Organization of Orders to hide correspondence with the Organization of Military Industrialization (oversees WMD activities. Military Industrialization (oversees WMD activities.

Ordered removal of all prohibited weapons from palace Ordered removal of all prohibited weapons from palace complexescomplexes

Hiding items in the homes of government officials, Hiding items in the homes of government officials, scientists and cars driven around the countrysidescientists and cars driven around the countryside

Iraq did not provide a comprehensive list of scientists Iraq did not provide a comprehensive list of scientists associated with its weapons of mass destruction programs. associated with its weapons of mass destruction programs.

Pressure on interviewees and hiding persons of interest.Pressure on interviewees and hiding persons of interest. Photo of unusual activity and witness claiming chemical Photo of unusual activity and witness claiming chemical

weapons moved “Al Musayyib”weapons moved “Al Musayyib”

E3: Evidence of Chemical, Biological and Nuclear weaponsE3: Evidence of Chemical, Biological and Nuclear weapons Inspectors found 12 empty chemical warheads on Jan 16, 2003Inspectors found 12 empty chemical warheads on Jan 16, 2003 Satellite photos of weapons facilitiesSatellite photos of weapons facilities Trucks cleaning out close to 30 facilities prior to inspectors Trucks cleaning out close to 30 facilities prior to inspectors

arrivingarriving Creation of transportable production facilities and dispersal Creation of transportable production facilities and dispersal

methodsmethods Intercepted communication about nerve agentsIntercepted communication about nerve agents Repeated covert attempts to acquire high-specification Repeated covert attempts to acquire high-specification

aluminum tubes from 11 different countries for enriching aluminum tubes from 11 different countries for enriching uraniumuranium

E4: Attempts to comply with UN ResolutionE4: Attempts to comply with UN Resolution On Jan 20, Iraq promised inspectors it would search for moreOn Jan 20, Iraq promised inspectors it would search for more General Sadi publicly pledged that Iraq was prepared to General Sadi publicly pledged that Iraq was prepared to

cooperate unconditionally with inspectors.cooperate unconditionally with inspectors. Declaration of December 7, 2002, permitted weaponsDeclaration of December 7, 2002, permitted weapons

E5: Actions of a Sovereign PowerE5: Actions of a Sovereign Power Higher Committee for Monitoring the Inspection TeamsHigher Committee for Monitoring the Inspection Teams Iraq refused to permit U-2 recon flightsIraq refused to permit U-2 recon flights Pressure on interviewees and hiding persons of interestPressure on interviewees and hiding persons of interest ..

E6: Increase Weapons’ CapabilityE6: Increase Weapons’ Capability Possession of missiles and UAVs that violate the 150-km Possession of missiles and UAVs that violate the 150-km

delivery limitdelivery limit

Analysis of Competing HypothesesAnalysis of Competing Hypotheses

UN Violations in IraqUN Violations in IraqWeight H1 H2 H3

Concealing efforts to produce WMD

Semblance of power

Incompetent accountability, no malicious intent

Inconsistency Score -1.0 -1.0 -4.0

E2 Attempts to hide information from inspectors

Medium C I I

E3 Evidence of Chemical, Biological and Nuclear weapons

High C C I

E5 Actions of a Sovereign Power Low C C I

E6 Increase Weapons’ Capability Medium C C I

E4 Attempts to comply with UN Resolution Low I N C

E1 Previous violations of UN Resolutions Medium C C N

Recommend development of indicators to distinguish H1 and H2 H3 is unlikely with majority of evidence pointing to malicious intent

ConclusionConclusionUnfortunately, these diagnostic techniques do not seemed to have been applied.Unfortunately, these diagnostic techniques do not seemed to have been applied. March 17, 2003 - President Bush launched a second Gulf War despite multiple opinions questioning March 17, 2003 - President Bush launched a second Gulf War despite multiple opinions questioning

the integrity of the underlying intelligence informationthe integrity of the underlying intelligence information September 30, 2004 – A report from the Iraq Survey Group came out stating that Iraq had September 30, 2004 – A report from the Iraq Survey Group came out stating that Iraq had

• No deployable WMD as of March 2003No deployable WMD as of March 2003

• No production since 1991No production since 1991

• No proof of any biological weapons since 1991No proof of any biological weapons since 1991

• No nuclear program since 1991No nuclear program since 1991 2008 - Senate Intelligence Committee found that the Bush administration had "misrepresented the 2008 - Senate Intelligence Committee found that the Bush administration had "misrepresented the

intelligence and the threat from Iraq".intelligence and the threat from Iraq". President Bush later said that the biggest regret of his presidency was "the intelligence failure" in President Bush later said that the biggest regret of his presidency was "the intelligence failure" in

IraqIraq

  

If they would have used these diagnostic techniques they would have:If they would have used these diagnostic techniques they would have: Challenged conventional wisdom (thought outside the box)Challenged conventional wisdom (thought outside the box) Identified mental mindsetsIdentified mental mindsets Managed and defined uncertaintiesManaged and defined uncertainties Assessed the impact of information gaps/deceptionAssessed the impact of information gaps/deception