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EERI Special Earthquake Report May 2010

This second insert on the Haiti

earthquake covers engineering

failures and the social impacts of

the quake. The rst report in theApril issue covered seismology

and geotechnical aspects, primar-

ily. The EERI team responsible for

this report, including members from

partnering organizations the Net-

work for Earthquake Engineering

Simulation, the Mid-America Earth-

quake Center, Florida International

University, Sherbrooke University,

University of Delawares Disaster

Research Center and Western

Washington Universitys Resilience

Institute visited Haiti from Feb-

ruary 28 through March 7, 2010.

The 18-member multi-disciplinary

team included engineers, social

scientists, city planners, architects,

and geographers. The EERI team

worked with the ASCE Technical

Council on Lifeline Earthquake

Engineering team and, together,

the teams visited over 500 facili-

ties and buildings in the heavily hit

areas of Port-au-Prince, Logne,

Petit Gove, and Jacmel. The EERIteam and its partners consisted of

Reginald DesRoches, Georgia In-

stitute of Technology (team leader);

Susan Brink, University of Dela-

ware; Peter Coats, Simpson Gum-

pertz & Heger; Amr Elnashi, Mid-

America Earthquake Center; Harley

Etienne, Georgia Institute of Tech-

nology; Rebekah Green, Western

Washington University; Martin

Hammer, architect, Berkeley, Cali-

fornia; Charles Huyck, ImageCat;

Ayhan Irfanoglu, Purdue University& NEEScomm; Sylvan Jolibois,

Florida International University;

Anna Lang, University of California,

San Diego; Amanda Lewis, Mid-

America Earthquake Center; Jean-

Robert Michaud, Boeing; Scott

Miles, Western Washington Univer-

sity; Rob Olshansky, University of

Illinois; and Patrick Paultre, Sher-

brooke University.

Learning from Earthquakes

The Mw 7.0 Haiti Earthquake of January 12, 2010: Report #2

The ASCE TCLEE team included

Curt Edwards, Psomas, (team lead-

er); Pierre Alex Augustin, State of

California; Don Ballantyne, MMI; BillBruin, Halcrow; Rick Carter, State of

Oregon; Brucely Joseph, URS Corp;

Aimee Lavarnway, Shannon Wilson;

Nason McCullough, CH2M Hill; Mark

Pickett, University of Toledo; Dave

Plum, URS Corp; and Stu Werner,

Seismic Systems & Engineering.

This report is made possible by

support to EERI provided by the

National Science Foundation under

award #CMMI-0758529.

Introduction

On January 12, 2010, at approximate-ly 5 p.m. local time, an Mw=7.0 earth-quake struck approximately 17 kmwest of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, alongthe Enriquillo fault. The effects of theearthquake were felt over a wide

area, including the provinces(known as departments) of Ouest,Sud-Est, and Nippes. The metro-

politan Port-au-Prince region, whichincludes the cities of Carrefour,Petionville, Delmas, Tabarre, CiteSoleil, and Kenscoff. was hit ex-tremely hard. In the city of Lo-gne, located on the epicenter,80% of the buildings collapsed orwere critically damaged.

Over 1.5 million people (approxi-mately 15% of the national popula-tion) have been directly affected bythe earthquake. The Haitian gov-

ernment estimates over 220,000people lost their lives and morethan 300,000 were injured in theearthquake. It is estimated that over105,000 homes were completelydestroyed and more than 208,000damaged. Approximately 1,300educational institutions and over 50

Figure 1.Georeferenced digital photos taken by the reconnaissanceteam or donated to EERI are available in KML format athttp://www.

virtualdisasterviewer.com/vdv/download_photo_kml.php?eventid=7 .


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EERI Special Earthquake Report May 2010medical centers and hospitals col-lapsed or were damaged; 13 out of15 key government buildings wereseverely damaged.

The Haitian government estimatesthat the damage caused by theearthquake totals approximately

$7.8 billion, which is more than120% of Haitis 2009 gross domes-tic product.

Remote Sensing Data

The Global Earth ObservationCatastrophe Assessment Network(GEO-CAN) response after theHaiti earthquake realized a visionmany years in the making thatrapid and actionable damage as-sessment could be completed withremotely sensed data enabled bydistributed interpretation in a geo-spatial environment. Analysis isdone through a portal that servesas a social networking tool where,after reading a brief training docu-ment, hundreds of engineers andscientists provided an assessmentof damage by comparing before-and-after satellite images of theaffected areas. GEO-CAN allowedfor a comprehensive assessment ofregional damage and was used in

the development of the post-disas-ter needs assessment. It can serveas a successful model for utilizingremote sensing technologies after aregional disaster.

Within a week, close to 30,000buildings had been identied asheavily damaged or collapsed.The data were checked indepen-dently using eld ground surveysconducted by a wide range of or-ganizations. In total, there were

over 600 GEO-CAN volunteersfrom 23 countries representing 53private companies, 60 academicinstitutions, and 18 government ornonprot organizations. Almost 200members from EERI contributedsignicantly to the effort. For a com-plete list of organizations, visit theGEO-CAN community tab at http://www.virtualdisasterviewer.com/

vdv/index.hp?selectedEventId=7.

All data produced have been madepublicly available directly through theWorld Bank and served in the VirtualDisaster Viewer (VDV), alongsidethousands of geo-tagged photo-graphs from the EERI reconnais-sance team and various other post-disaster ground eld teams (Figure 1).

Many lessons have been learnedfrom the GEO-CAN effort, amongthem that very high-resolution imag-ery can be used to provide rapiddamage estimates of severely dam-aged structures where it is difcult todeploy in the eld. This has enormousimplications for future events whereaccess is restricted or not feasibleand immediate information is re-quired. During reconnaissance, it be-came clear that more damage was

visible in the imagery than could beseen on the ground, because dam-aged structures were behind walls,deep within blocks. Mobilizing hun-dreds of engineers requires signi-cant resources. Much of GEO-CANssuccess is attributable to the generos-ity of Google, Microsoft, Digital Globe,and GeoEye and the San Diego StateUniversity VisualizationCenter, which not onlyfreely distributed data,but actively served imag-

ery for interpretation.

Most importantly, GEO-CAN is a model for mobil-izing volunteers with pro-fessional expertise. TheGEO-CAN communityhas conclusively demon-strated that professionalswill volunteer in largenumbers if the proper ITinfrastructure is available.

Social-networking canbe used to establish aframework of massivelydistributed but collabora-tive environments thatcan reduce the commu-nication gridlock commonin disasters. Future suc-cessful deployments willhinge upon harnessingthis framework.

Performance of Historic

Structures

Historic buildings dating from thetime of French colonization to the1920s predate the concrete-framedconcrete block construction thatcomprises most of the building in-

ventory of Port-au-Prince. Historicbuildings fall into three distinct cat-egories: timber frame, unreinforcedmasonry (URM), and reinforcedconcrete.

Timber Frame: In Port-au-Princeand other urban areas of Haiti,these buildings were generallyconstructed between 1890 and1925. Built typically as residences,the buildings were generally either1) timber frame with exterior wood

siding, or 2) timber frame with ma-sonry inll (known by the Frenchterm colombage) (Figure 2). Themasonry is either red brick withlime mortar, or irregular shapedlimestone with earthen mortar anda lime plaster nish. In all observedcases, the timber frame includeddiagonal members and interior

Figure 2. Timber frame with colombage (photo:

Martin Hammer).


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wooden planks horizontally acrossthe wall framing.

These buildings were either onestory or two, with mortared brickor limestone foundations, wood-framed oors, and corrugated steelroofs framed with wood. The mostprominent timber frame buildingsexhibit ornate carpentry details,and are commonly referred to asgingerbread, but many simpler

buildings utilize the same methodsof construction.

Both types of timber frame con-struction are inherently resistant toearthquakes. The all-wood build-ings are light and exible, andutilize the diagonal members andwood-sheathed walls to resist lat-eral loads. The colombage build-ings are heavier, but dissipate en-ergy through friction between themasonry panels and the timber

members, and between the mason-ry units after their weaker mortar

joints fracture. The diagonal woodmembers provide resistance aswell (Figure 2).

The timber frame buildings in Port-au-Prince, Petionville, and thesouth coastal city of Jacmel per-formed well, and were often seenadjacent to the site of a collapsed

masonry or concrete struc-ture (Figure 3). However,many sustained moderateto serious damage due tothe deterioration of woodmembers from termites orrot. The colombage build-ings sometimes expelled masonrypanels under out-of-plane loading.Additions made of unreinforcedmasonry or reinforced concrete

usually suffered the most damage(Figure 4).

Unreinforced Masonry (URM):Unreinforced masonry constructionpredominates among buildings con-structed between the late 1800s andthe 1920s, often combined with thetimber construction described above.The EERI team observed URM res-idential, academic, religious, andgovernment buildings (Figure 5). Thebuildings were a combination of roughstone masonry and red clay brick,with little or no smooth steel reinforc-ing along building corners or windowand door heads. The stone masonryappeared to be the light coloredlimestone that is commonly acquiredin the La Boule quarries in the hillsaround Port-au-Prince. Some URMbuildings, such as the Haitian Minis-try of Interior, failed catastrophically(Figure 5) even though the neighbor-

ing Ministry of Finance (also URM)suffered far less damage and didnot collapse.

The failures we observed generallyranged from diagonal cracking inwall sections to absolute collapse;modes of failure included 1) lack ofbrick ties or brick headers betweenbrick withes, 2) lack of adequatesteel reinforcing, 3) weak stonemasonry where it was necessaryfor structural support, and 4) poormortar quality due to poor aggre-gate quality, inadequate cement orlime, or poor maintenance.

For those URM buildings that re-main intact or that can be salvaged,it is advisable for an historic pres-ervation and/or structural engineer-ing professional to inspect them ingreater detail to determine appro-priate preservation and structuralretrot measures. These measuresmay include doweled through-wallanchors, parallel lateral bracing, orrepairs to mortar.

Figure 3. Wood frame building next to collapsed concrete and

masonry building (photo: Martin Hammer).

Figure 4. Colombage performed well, though

the unreinforced masonry wall collapsed (photo:

Martin Hammer).


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Reinforced Concrete: Many turn-of-the-20th-century structures builtin the manner prevalent in Europeat the time were precursors to whatis now the most common form ofconstruction in Haiti. At the timethese were built, it was unique toconstruct an entire building withpoured-in-place concrete. Thisbuilding type included two of thebest known landmarks in Haiti, theNational Presidential Palace andthe National Cathedral (Figure 6),both of which collapsed catastrophi-cally.

Each of these buildings had unusu-al footprints that militated againstany effort to sustain seismic forces.Each building also included largeconcrete domed structures, whichapparently contributed to their col-lapse. In the case of the NationalPresidential Palace, an eyewitnessreported that the second storyrocked until the central core col-

lapsed vertically, followed by thefront section of the east and westwings. This indicates that the sec-ond story acted as the soft storybetween the rigid rst oor and themassive concrete dome and roofstructures. The strength and hard-ness of these domes was evi-denced by their showing no appar-ent cracking after falling one story.

While the National Cathedral did havea light steel roof structure, it also hadtwo large concrete domes on top ofits towers, making them top heavy.In addition to collapses, the damagethat we observed included severeshear cracks in columns and out-of-plane collapses of concrete walls.

Petrographic testing of concrete fromboth samples (services donated by

Simpson, Gumpertz and Heger) re-vealed that the concrete aggregateis of relatively high quality and con-tains approximately 30% volcanicmaterials. There is no evidencethat marine aggregate was in eitherof these buildings. We observedexcessive corrosion of the steel

reinforcement in both buildings, butgiven the results of the petrographictesting, it appears that it was the re-sult of the carbonation of the agedconcrete rather than the use of pooraggregate.

According to our observations, thefollowing are possible primarymodes of failure: poor weight andwall distribution for seismic loading;corroded steel reinforcement as aresult of aged carbonated concrete;and inadequately ductile concretemembers to sustain repetitivestressing.

Engineered Buildings

Given the absence of buildingcodes and record keeping, and thewidespread practice of uncontrolledconstruction, it was not always pos-sible to establish whether a spe-

Figure 5. Unreinforced masonry Ministry of Interior building (photo: Martin

Hammer).

Figure 6. Collapsed roof, interior of National Cathedral, Port-au-Prince

(photo: Martin Hammer).


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cic building was engineered. Wedecided that modern engineeredbuildings were those with regularstructural framing layouts, estimat-ed to be built after the 1950s, anddeemed to have received some de-gree of care by a structural engi-neer during design and construc-

tion. Engineered does not meandesigned for seismic loading. Whilemodern commercial, industrial, andessential buildings are the mostlikely structures to be engineered,several low to mid-rise ofce, resi-dential, and school buildings werealso considered to be engineered.

Most of the early generation Hai-tian engineers and architects wereeducated in France and were fam-iliar with the French building design

codes (AFNOR). By the 1960-70s,these engineers were teaching atthe university level using theFrench code. Earthquake provi-sions were not present in thesecodes, and moment-resistingframes were the favored structuralsystem. A small number of Haitian

engineers were educated and trainedin North America, and were familiarwith the Canadian and U.S. designcodes.

Since the 1950s, reinforced concretehas been the material of choice andmany construction practices that do

not consider seismic loads were es-tablished at that time. Concrete isusually hand-mixed on site for smallerengineered buildings and is typicallyof poor quality. Lately, in prominentengineered buildings such as thoseat the Digicel compound (Figure 7),ready-mix concrete is used. There isonly one Haitian contractor who usesready-mix concrete consistently; noinformation is available about thepractice of international contractors.

In older engineered buildings, smoothreinforcing bars were used, andtransverse reinforcement was ob-served to be 5-6mm diameter wireswith unacceptably large spacing, par-ticularly in columns. In newer con-struction, deformed bars were alsoobserved. Ductile detailing was ab-sent in the damaged and exposed

structural members in botholder and more recent con-struction.

In the past, the Ministry of

Public Works controlledbuilding permits, along withplan and design reviews,but the jurisdiction now lieswith municipalities. Localengineers indicated thatthis transfer of jurisdictionled to reduced control overdesign and construction.

Reinforced Concrete

Buildings: Reinforcedconcrete buildings with

moment-resisting framestructural systems (RC-MRF) and unreinforcedhollow concrete masonryunit (CMU) inll wallsdominate the engineeredbuildings. A small numberof dual-system buildingswith RC MRF and structuralwalls were also observed.

The typical oor system is RC slabwith beams. RC dual-systems areobserved to have sustained lessdamage, on average, than theRC-MRF buildings. In several build-ings recently constructed, seismicdesign guidelines such as thoseprovided in U.S. design codes and

ACI-318 were followed. However,the application of seismic designprinciples was due to individual ini-tiative and not because of consen-sus or governmental action.

Critical structural damage wasmainly due to absence of properdetailing in the structural elements,with failure of brittle columns asthe main cause of collapse. Somestructures had soft-story issues.The quality of concrete varied from

weak (typical) to good (rare), veri-ed by preliminary tests. Bothsmooth and deformed reinforcingbars were observed in structuralelements exposed due to damage.

The Digicel building is the tallestengineered building in Port-au-Prince. One of its L-shaped struc-tural walls can be seen along theleft corner in Figure 7. Three suchwalls are present at as many cor-ners of the building. The fourth cor-

ner has a large atrium with deepbeams. An elevator core wall isnear the atrium corner. The buildingperformed well with light structuraland some nonstructural damage.Spalling of concrete was visible insome columns, top and bottom;some beams in the upper oorssuffered severe spalling and, in afew places, buckling of longitudinalbars. Adjacent three-story RC-MRFbuildings were severely damaged.

In the Petionville area, severalmodern engineered buildings wereinspected. One of the hotels, aRC-MRF with reinforced CMU inllwalls, suffered damage in its inllwalls and a few captive columnsat the ground story (Figures 8 and9). Another RC-MRF hotel underconstruction (with three storiescompleted and three more to go)sustained no damage (Figure 10),

Figure 7. The 12-story Digicel building with

RC dual (frame-wall) structural system (photo:

Anna Lang).


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while an older construction RC-MRF multi-story hospital buildingadjacent to it collapsed totally.

The new U.S. Embassy building,located near the airport in north-eastern Port-au-Prince and report-edly designed to load levels equiv-alent to those for U.S. seismic zone

4 with near-source consideration,did not sustain any structuraldamage.

Steel Buildings: A small numberof steel industrial buildings wereinspected. A single story steel build-ing with corrugated roof and sidesheathing at the fuel port sus-tained no damage. In another steelbuilding that houses an apparelmanufacturing company, neitherthe structural steel framing nor the

CMU block inlls sustained anydamage. The structure had a light,corrugated sheet metal roof. Thesteel framed warehouse at themain port of Port-au-Prince sus-tained heavy damage due to lateralspreading. When the seaside sup-ports of the transverse frames weredisplaced outward, the framesbuckled at the roof (typical) as didthe seaside columns.

Figure 8. Reinforced CMU wall from a hotel in

Petionville (photo: Amanda Lewis).

Figure 9 (left). Damage in a column due to captive condition,

Petionville hotel (photo: Ayhan Irfanoglu).

Figure 10. Garage of hotel under construction, sustained no damage (photo:

Ayhan Irfanoglu)


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Low-Rise Buildings and

Homes

The most prevalent building typein Haiti, particularly in the Port-au-Prince region, consists of non-engi-neered, lightly reinforced concreteframe structures with concrete

masonry block inll. They are con-structed with unreinforced concreteblock walls framed by slender,lightly reinforced concrete columns.Other types of masonry, includingred clay brick, are not used.

Floors and roofs are reinforcedconcrete slabs, typically four to sixinches thick with a single layer ofbi-directional reinforcement. Con-crete blocks are commonly cast in-to the slab to minimize the use of

concrete. Corrugated steel or ber-glass over a sparse wood frame isalso a common roong method.

These buildings are used for singlefamily dwellings and small busi-nesses, and are usually one or twostories, though three stories are not

uncommon. The familiar soft-storydesign, whereby the ground levelis dedicated commercial space andupper oors are residential apart-ments, is not prevalent in Haiti, asmost people live and work in differentgeographical areas. Soft stories area problem, however: large openings

for windows and reduced wall areacaused numerous oor collapses,both at the ground level and at oorlevels above.

Many residences are constructedover a signicant length of time asthe homeowner acquires funds orthe familys needs expand. Most aredesigned and constructed by theowner or a local mason. Residentssometimes squat on land, public orprivate, to be near family, friends, or

their employment. These unauthor-ized developments, known by theFrench term bidonville, are found onhillsides surrounding Port au Princeand Petionville, as well as in low-lyingcoastal areas such as Cite Soleil(Figure 11).

Perimeter foundations are typically1m deep and assembled with stoneor rock rubble and lightly cementedmortar. Because the bidonvilleresidences are usually constructedon hillsides, stone foundationscommonly serve as either a retain-ing mechanism on the upslope or

are elevated on the down-slope tocreate a level oor. These founda-tional elements regularly exceed2m height on steep inclines. A layerof concrete is poured over the foun-dation to provide a nished surfaceupon which the buildings walls areconstructed.

Construction Materials and Pro-

cedures: Concrete masonry blocksare commonly manufactured at ornear the construction site. Type I

Portland cement is used for all con-struction elements, including ma-sonry blocks, foundation and wallmortars, roof and oor slabs, andcolumns and beams. Concrete mixproportions regularly lack sufcientcement and have a high water con-

Figure 11. Typical residential bidonville in the hillsides above Port-au-Prince (photo: Anna Lang).


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tent for workability and reducedcost (see Figures 12 and 13).

Aggregate is obtained from nearbylimestone quarries and gradatedon-site. The largest quarry, LaBoule, produces a light coloredweak limestone. Despite a recentban on the this aggregate for itsweaknesses, its use persists.Other stronger smooth aggregateoriginates in riverbeds in the hillsaround Port-au-Prince. While theuse of corrosive beach sand wasprevalent in the past, we observedno evidence of its present day use.

Masonry walls are typically 2.5 mhigh with a single-wythe staggeredblock arrangement. Walls are con-structed directly on top of a nished

foundation or oor slab; no me-chanical connection is made. Typ-ical block dimensions are 40 cmlong, 18.5 cm high, and 14.5 cmwide. Mortar for the block walls ismixed on-site, typically on theground. Horizontal bed joints arecommonly 2 cm thick; vertical bedsvary from 0-2 cm. Walls vary inlength from 2-4 m and are common-ly bordered by lightly reinforced

concrete columns. Wall slendernessdid not appear to be problematic:most have a height-to-width ratio lessthan 1.0. Slender reinforced con-crete columns that border the wallsare typically 25-35 cm wide. Column

depth is no less than the masonryunit width. Longitudinal reinforce-ment usually consists of four #3 or#4 bars; transverse reinforcement istypically #2 bars, spaced between6-12 inches with no decrease inspacing at column ends. Transverseties are not bent beyond 90 degrees

and smooth or ribbed reinforcementis used. The use of smooth bars innew construction was largely aban-doned after the year 2000.

Poured-in-place concrete is nottypically consolidated, so there arelarge air pockets and a lack of bondwith the reinforcement. Further, thelack of sufcient cement in the con-crete mix reduces bond strength.

Roof and oor slabs are commonlypoured after the wall panels are al-

ready constructed and, regrettably,the walls are typically not assem-bled to the full height of the roof oroor. Rock or masonry debris isadded later to ll in the gap be-tween the top of the walls and thebottom of the slab. Subsequently,masonry walls are typically notload-bearing gravity load is car-ried only by the slender concretecolumns. For future construction of

Figure 12. Typical construction of a residence, showing a rock rubble founda-

tion, conned masonry construction technique, and reinforced concrete slab.

Note blocks added to the top of the walls and reinforcement emerging from

the slab, ready for construction of another level (photo: Anna Lang).

Figure 13. Lack of sufcient cement bond, smooth reinforcement, and insuf-

cient detailing (photo: Anna Lang).


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additional levels, longitudinal rein-forcement of the columns common-ly extends through the slab thick-ness, but without additional con-nection detailing.

Performance of Inll Masonry:

When these building types wereexcited during the earthquake, lat-eral load transfer primarily occurredat the column-slab connection. Thewalls are typically not load-bearing,and their strength capacity was re-duced by a lack of friction betweenthe blocks. Interaction betweenwall panels and columns resultedin localized damage, notably in thecolumns. Lateral capacity of theslender columns was generally in-sufcient to resist acceleration de-

mands on the structure. P-deltaeffects ensued, proliferating col-lapse. Overturning and out-of-planefailures of wall panels were com-monplace and caused the majorityof complete structural collapses(Figure 14). Even when they didntcontribute to building collapse,these out-of-plane wall failurescaused innumerable injuries anddeaths.

Performance of Conned Masonry:Conned masonry structures gener-ally sustained little or no damageduring the earthquake (Figure 15).A seemingly minor variation in theconstruction sequence resulted in

very different behavior. The con-ned masonry construction tech-nique is similar to inll masonry,but walls are assembled rst andthen used to form the columns.If masonry blocks are staggeredwithin the column cavity, a secureconnection develops between the

masonry wall and the columns.Instead of two structural systemsacting independently, connedmasonry performs as a singularsystem whereby lateral load istransferred from the column-slabconnection to the walls directly.Though the walls are not load-bear-ing and therefore do not developfull capacity, they still contribute tothe lateral resistance of the overallstructure through the mechanicalconnection with the columns.

Though of poor quality, this con-nection was sufcient to developone-way bending and arching of thewall, greatly reducing out-of-planefailures during the earthquake.

Hospitals

According to the World Health Or-ganization (WHO) and Pan Ameri-can Health Organization (PAHO),

Figure 15. In foreground, new wall under construction shows staggering of

blocks within the column cavity; this mechanically locks the masonry wall to

the columns, causing them to act as a unit. In background, a typical one-

story CM residence (photo: Anna Lang).

Figure 14.Typical out-of-plane failure of an inll masonry construction (photo:

Anna Lang).


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prior to the earthquake there were594 primary health care centers;30 reference communal hospitals(30-60 beds each); six centers forintegrated diagnostics; ten depart-ment hospitals (with 150 beds each);and three university hospitals(1,500 beds total. See Figure 16).In addition, numerous nongovern-

mental organizations (NGOs) inHaiti provided health care services,training for health care providers,and advice to Haitian health careadministrators. PAHO had a corestaff of 52 before the event, andsent an additional 60 people withexpertise in disaster management,logistics, epidemiology, communi-cable disease control, and waterand sanitation.

Hospitals suffered damage similar

to that sustained by other engi-neered structures mentioned above.In addition nonstructural damage,many hospitals were unusable dueto a lack of power and water. In theaftermath of the earthquake, therewere approximately 91 functioninghospitals in Haiti. Of these, 59 werein the metropolitan Port-au-Princearea and included four public hos-pitals, 34 NGO or private hospitals,

and 21 eld hospitals. Fifty-six of the59 hospitals had surgical capacity.In a Special Report dated 16 Febru-ary 2010, PAHO stated that, HaitisMinistry of Health lost more than 200staff members in the earthquake,many of them in the collapse of theMinistry of Health building.

It was reported that patients were re-luctant to enter hospital buildings, dueto fear of collapse during aftershocks.Consequently, almost all healthcareservices were provided in tents, evenseven weeks af-ter the event. Allfacilities (publicand private) wereproviding ser-vices to patients,free-of-charge.At least one pri-

vate hospitalwas not payingits staff, due tolack of income.Both public andprivate hospitalswere eager forwritten recom-mendations re-garding seismicretrot and up-

grade. They intended to use therecommendations, along with dataregarding patients served for free,in proposals written to NGOs forfuture funding.

Water/Wastewater

The public water system sufferedonly minor damage to most facili-ties. The day following the earth-quake, most of the pipeline breakswere isolated, and it took less thana week to restore service. TheCentrale Autonome MetropolitainedEau Potable (CAMEP) reportedeight to ten pipeline breaks in their70 km of pipe. This is a very lowbreak rate, considering the extentof other types of damage. The Port-au-Prince water system lost ve

employees in the earthquake, andover 50% of their paying custom-ers. As a result, they have inad-equate revenue to cover payroll.

The biggest issue following theearthquake was getting potablewater to the displaced population,an estimated one million people.People could not stay in theirhouses, either because they hadcollapsed or because they fearedpotential collapse in aftershocks.

Many of these people were intemporary tent camps distributedthroughout the city. At the time ofour visit, foreign emergency re-

Figure 16. Average population covered per hospital by Haiti Departments,from web page www.who.int/hac/crises/hti/maps/haiti_population_per_

hospital_district_4feb2010.JPG.

Figure 17. Emergency water tank (photo: Rebekah Green).


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sponse organizations and NGOshad set up portable treatmentequipment at selected locationsand were treating water drawn fromthe public water system. A Germangroup set up a major temporarytreatment facility near the airport,and distributed potable water bytank trucks supplied by the localcontractors. Starting on January 19,water was being distributed to 500sites that had plastic tanks andbladders (Figure 17).

In general, the earthquake hadlimited direct impact on the drain-age system. In a limited numberof cases, the facilities themselveswere damaged by landslides, col-lapse of embankments, and differ-ential settlement. In some cases,buildings collapsed into drainagechannels and blocked them. In

other cases, garbage and debrislled the channels (Figure 18).There were reports of septic sys-tems that were not working as aresult of differential settlement ofconnecting pipelines.

The only wastewater treatmentplant in the country, located at theNational Hospital, was not operableat the time of the earthquake. There

Figure 18. Sediment and debris (mostly plastic bottles) build-up in drainagechannel at highway overcrossing (photo: Anna Lang)

Figure 19. Liquefaction-induced lateral spreading damage to the APN North

Wharf. Note the barge on the left was used to replace the North Wharf for

post-earthquake recovery efforts. The mobile container crane is shown in the

water at the west end of the submerged wharf (photo: Stu Werner).

was no apparent damage, althoughit was difcult to tell, as it had notbeen in operation. A signicantissue following the earthquake wasdealing with the waste generatedby the large displaced population.

Ports

Autorite Portuaire Nationale (APN)operates several facilities in Port-au-Prince. It is the largest and busi-est container port in Haiti, handlingabout 1,200 containers per day,according to APN ofcials. The port

consisted of two separate water-front facilities designated as theNorth Wharf and the South Pier.These facilities had seven berthsconstructed between 1978 and1980, and included two roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) berths.

The North Wharf was a pile-sup-ported marginal wharf 1,500 feetlong and 68 feet wide, supported on20-inch square pre-stressed con-crete piles with ve vertical and two

batter piles per bent. A 110-foot-by-40-foot Ro-Ro pier was adjacentto the east end of the North Wharf.Both collapsed into the bay duringthe earthquake, primarily becauseof liquefaction-induced lateralspreading of the backll soils (Fig-ure 19). There may also have beencorrosion and prior damage thatcontributed to the damage. Two


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large warehouses (each approxi-mately 500 feet by 135 feet) werelocated in the backland of the wharfand were heavily damaged by thelateral spreading. A gantry containercrane and a mobile container cranealong the North Wharf were partiallysubmerged due to the collapse ofthe wharf structure.

The South Pier was a 1,250-foot-long nger pier connected to asmall island by two small bridgesextending perpendicular to it. It was

supported on 45 bents with 20-inchsquare prestressed concrete piles.Each bent consisted of two verticalpiles and four batter piles. It washeavily damaged during the earth-quake, with the westernmost 400feet collapsing, and with 90% ofthe remaining piles (mostly thebatter piles) requiring repair of thepile-deck connection. There wasevidence that some of the pileswere already damaged before theearthquake due to corrosion oroverloading.

The main access road to the portwas heavily damaged by lateralspreading due to liquefaction ofthe foundation soils. Liquefactioninduced settlement and lateralspreading was seen in many back-land areas, and resulted in differen-tial settlements adjacent to culverts,roads, and utilities.

Recovery efforts

to restore portoperations begantwo days afterthe earthquake,and were carriedout around theclock by a U.S.military task force.Initially, three landing beaches wereconstructed for use in supportingimmediate emergency relief efforts.Shortly thereafter, a fourth beach

was constructed for transport of addi-tional humanitarian and commercialcargoes.

On February 13, a barge with ashoreline access ramp was an-chored offshore just north of theSouth Pier, and was used as a tem-porary wharf to increase cargo un-loading. On February 27, a secondbarge and shoreline access rampwas anchored just south of the NorthWharf to provide an addition tempo-rary wharf facility.

The U.S. military also began effortsto repair the uncollapsed segmentof the South Pier by constructing areinforced concrete cap to encasethe upper few feet of the severelydamaged piles. This was expected tobe completed in early April. APN isplanning to rebuild the North Wharffacilities to bring the port back intofull operation.

Social Impacts

The earthquake affected all seg-ments of Haitian society: the gov-ernment, the commercial sector,

churches, civil society, United Na-tions operations, and internationalNGOs. Approximately 150,000 Hai-tians left the country; some neededsupport from government and civilsociety services in the countriesto which they emigrated. At least500,000 people abandoned dam-aged urban areas to nd shelter inthe more rural departments (juris-dictions) of the country. This inuxof people exacerbated already criti-

cal demands for food and services.About 1.3 million people now live intents and informal shelters in thePort-au-Prince metro area. Onecount estimates 465 camps forinternally displaced persons (IDP),which ll most public and privateopen spaces. Residents havealso pitched tents in their yards orblocked off some streets to allowtents adjacent to their damaged

Figure 20 (a) and (b). Residents living in or next to

damaged homes (photos: Rebekah Green).


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homes (Figure 20). Most IDP campswere created spontaneously byindividuals, with subsequent water,food, sanitation, and shelter sup-port from NGOs (Figure 21). Manyin the Port-au-Prince metro areaare still without weather-resistantshelters.

A damage assessment of 140 hous-ing units conducted by an NGOfound that 30-40% of the units weresafe for re-occupation, but residents

did not want to re-occupy theirhomes, either because of after-shocks or a desire for better accessto service distribution points. Theresistance to re-occupying struc-turally sound residences placedadditional pressure on the IDPcamps. At the same time, the UNand Haitian government indicatedthat a substantial proportion of thepopulation continues to live in oradjacent to unsafe buildings.

The earthquake exacted heavy cas-ualties on the Haitian national gov-ernment and UN personnel, whichreduced the institutional knowledgeneeded for the recovery process. Inthe 13 severely damaged or col-lapsed government buildings werelost innumerable government docu-ments and an undetermined num-ber of government ofcials. The UNheadquarters building collapsed,

Figure 21. Champ de Mars IDP camp near the Presidential Palace (back-

ground) in downtown Port-au-Prince (photo: Rob Olshansky).

killing over 100 employees, includingthe UN mission chief.

Approximately 50% of schools inPort-au-Prince were damaged (Fig-ure 22); an estimated 400 or moretents are needed for temporary learn-ing spaces.

Much of Haitis economic activity islocated in Port-au-Prince, where themajority of the earthquakes impactwas felt, and the city also generates

about 85% of the governmentsrevenue. About 30,000 commercialbuildings collapsed or were severe-ly damaged by the earthquake.Many businesses have had to moveinto tents or operate on the streets,adding to or replacing street vend-ing that was common prior to theearthquake. Nearly all of Haitis gar-ment plants, which account formost of the countrys exports, are inPort-au-Prince. One factory em-ploying 4,000 collapsed, while oth-ers suffered severe damage. Many

jobs have been lost, increasing thepre-earthquake estimate of roughly70% unemployment.

Organized religion is an essentialand central component of Haitianculture and social service provision.

The earthquake destroyed manychurch buildings, including two ofHaitis most important cathedrals:Holy Trinity Church and CathdraleNotre Dame in central Port-au-Prince. The principal churches inLogne and Petit Gove St.Rose de Lima and Notre Dame were also destroyed. A number ofkey church ofcials, including theCatholic Archbishop and Vicar Gen-eral, and volunteers were killed.

Figure 22. Damaged school in Port-au-Prince (photo: Rebekah Green).


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EERI Special Earthquake Report May 2010A signicant number of church-afl-iated schools, universities, and hos-pitals were destroyed or damaged,and numerous additional undam-aged structures have been evacu-ated as a precaution. Many culturalinstitutions operated by these orga-nizations are now closed, including

museums, music centers, libraries,historic sites, and community activ-ity centers.

Because churches are among themost trusted institutions in Haiti,many of them became sites of IDP

camps. Churches have also ex-panded their social services andbecome focal points for the deliveryof food, water, medical care, andshelter materials, sometimes throughafliated international aid and devel-opment organizations. Because ofdamaged buildings, services are

being held outdoors in difcult cir-cumstances. Importantly, churchescontinue to support rural Haitiansbut are hampered by impacts in thePort-au-Prince area and damage tobuildings in their rural centers.

Recovery Efforts

Following the earthquake, lead UNand NGO agencies initiated regularcluster meetings across a varietyof sectors involved in relief andrecovery activities. This clustermethod developed by the UN

and non-UN humanitarian partnersin 2005 as a means of improvingcoordination, predictability, andaccountability in humanitarian re-sponse has helped to designateresponse standards and better co-ordinate activities in Haiti regard-ing such matters as food, shelter,sanitation, and debris removal.For example, the UN Shelter Clus-ter has set the goal of providingweather-resistant shelter materialby May 1, 2010, through coordi-

nation of over 50 agencies. TheShelter Cluster has also identieda common transitional housingdesign and has worked with theHaitian government to identify vesites for transitional housing or IDPcamp relocation.

The Haitian government asked theUN to institute a post-disasterneeds assessment (PDNA) processto develop a reconstruction planand estimate associated funding

requirements. This process, coordi-nated by the UN, World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, andEuropean Commission, had begunat the time of our reconnaissance.The PDNAs proposals for recoverywere presented to an internationaldonors conference on March 31 inNew York, and a multi-donor trustfund was requested to facilitaterecovery. At the same time, the Hai-tian government is proposing a Hai-tian Reconstruction Commission,

chaired jointly by the Haitian PrimeMinister and a foreign governmentrepresentative, who was conrmedon March 31 to be Bill Clinton.

Numerous foreign governmentshave been involved in relief andrecovery activities. Those we ob-served included debris clearanceand security by the U.S. and Cana-dian military; damage assessment

Figure 23. Displaced Iron Market vendors selling goods in downtown Port-

au-Prince (photo: Scott Miles).


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Figure 24. Cash-for-work for clearing debris from neighborhood school in the

Nerette neighborhood of Petionville (photo: Rebekah Green).

by the U.S. Army; management ofIDP camps by Canada, Colombia,and Germany; tarps provided byUSAID, Canada and France; andcash-for-work programs jointly sup-ported by the UN, USAID and theGovernment of Haiti.

Many NGOs have been operating inHaiti for years and have been ableto apply their local experience torelief and recovery activities. How-ever, while some NGOs are partici-pating in cluster meetings, relativecoordination between NGOs andwith other stakeholders was difcultto assess.

Despite the widespread damage inthe Port-au-Prince metro area, theformal and informal economy isoperating, albeit at reduced levels.

Street markets survived the quake,and many new markets have ap-peared in and adjacent to tentcamps (FIgure 23). In the Port-au-Prince metro area, it was commonto see street vendors selling every-thing from art, clothing, and babyproducts to salvaged constructionmaterial, tarps, and mobile phonecharging services. We observeduse of social networks outside of

Haiti to obtain tents or tarps and re-mittances. About a third of Haitiansrelied on remittances before theearthquake. Subsequently, one micro-nance institution reported a doublingof processed remittances.

Figure 25. Limited equipment available for debris removal (photo: Rebekah

Green).

The formal commercial sector isengaged in business continuityactivities. Additionally, some foreignbusinesses are supporting recov-ery. For example, a major cellphone service provider was report-edly organizing volunteers andproviding resources such as limited

free service to all Haitian custom-ers. This commercial enterprisewas also paying a former marketvendor to organize the repair ofPort-au-Princes historic Iron Mar-ket (Marche de Fe), with marketvendors as volunteers and usingcompany-procured materials. Thiscompany and associated NGOswere involved in community devel-opment work prior to the earth-quake.

Micronance institutions (MFI) hada prominent role in Haiti prior to theearthquake, with about 20 institu-tions operating about 250 branchesor credit centers. MFIs will play animportant role in post-earthquakerecovery. The majority of MFI creditcenters are located outside of Port-au-Prince and thus can assist withrural recovery issues and migrationpressures. MFIs were up and run-


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Figure 26. Canadian forces clearing debris of church in the town square of

Logne (photo: Rob Olshansky).

ning within a few days after theearthquake, reportedly faster thancommercial banks. One particularMFI is currently offering mobilebanking, micro-loan restructuring,micro-loans to new clients, cash-for-work towards shelters, and adulteducation opportunities.

Signicant Recovery Issues

Through interviews and eld obser-vation, we identied several endur-ing recovery issues, four of whichare presented below.

Debris removal and manage-

ment: The Early Recovery Clusteris actively planning and implement-ing a plan for debris removal, with acurrent focus on roads and drain-

age ditch clearance. However, theamount of debris exceeds availableresources for removal (Figures 24and 25). The availability of heavyequipment is extremely limited inHaiti, with only two Haitian govern-ment agencies operating it; privatesector equipment is very expensive.Foreign militaries provided heavyequipment for early debris removal(Figure 26), but many are now pull-ing out of Haiti. Although someheavy equipment is being donated

locally and internationally, the prob-lem of disposal remains.

Safe shelter: The most immediateshelter issues are fourfold.

First, a wide range of responseactors are calling for continuedprocurement of weather-resistantshelter materials tarps andplastic sheeting for emergencyand temporary housing.

Second, the U.S. Army estimates

that about 9,000 people are ex-posed to high ood hazard; im-mediate mitigation is required forthe roughly 150 IDP camps thatare exposed to some ood and/orlandslide hazard during the cur-rent and next rainy season.

Third, over 20 IDP camps havebeen identied as congested,exacerbating safety and security

concerns for residents. Some shel-ter transition has begun to one UNcoordinated site.

Lastly, it is critical to better under-stand how many houses can bere-occupied and how to supporttheir re-occupation. The importance

of assessing longer-term shelterneeds and the costs of providingthem will increase as recoverycontinues.

Land tenure: Government ofcialsacknowledged that the earthquakemay have destroyed the already in-complete set of land ownership rec-ords in their possession. Squattingwas common before the earthquakeand has expanded considerablysince, with tent camps and new

homes set up on property owned byother private individuals, organiza-tions, and the government.

Land ownership issues will becomplicated by a paucity of mortalityrecords for residents and landlordsand difculty in assessing whetherproperties have been abandoned.As a result, not only will it be difcultto identify owners and renters in order

provide them with reconstructionassistance, but it will also be dif-cult for the government to acquireand redevelop land parcels. Iden-tication and purchase or lease ofsites to support transitional or per-manent housing in areas of heavydamage will be challenged by legaland funding constraints, as well asa shortage of suitable sites.

Capacity building: Signicantknowledge and skills were lost withthe many people killed in the earth-quake. Schools, universities, gov-ernment agencies, and NGOs weredamaged physically and socially.Regaining human capacity remainsa critical issue.

A wide range of stakeholders are

planning various training programsfor Haitians. For example, the Hai-tian government and NGOs aretraining locals to assess buildings.These efforts will need to expand toother areas, such as safe buildingconstruction, marketable job skills,and education.

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