harihar vs. us bank et al. cites “fraud on the court”, calling for defendant default in $42b...

7/25/2019 Harihar vs. US Bank et al. cites Fraud on the Court, calling for Defendant default in $42B Lawsuit

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Harihar vs. US Bank et al.cites Fraud on the Court,calling for Defendant default in $42B Lawsuit

Boston, MA, July 4, 2016 A Motion was filed yesterday in the US District Court (Boston, MA,Docket No: 15-cv-11880, Harihar vs. US Bank et al) by the Plaintiff , Mohan A. Harihar, citing Fraudon the Court against 14 Defendants.

That cheaters should not be allowed to prosper has long been central to the moral fabric ofour society and one of the underpinnings of our legal system.

In his Motion, Harihar states, The basic standards governing fraud on the court are reasonablystraightforward. As set forth in Cox v. Burke, 706 So. 2d 43, 47 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998):

The requisite fraud on the court occurs where it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that aparty has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicialsystems ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier of fact or unfairlyhampering the presentation of the opposing partys claim or defense. Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir. 1989) . . .

The same is true here as it pertains to clear title. All fourteen defendants were aware that clear title didnot exist with the Plaintiffs property and collectively participated in a scheme to defraud the Plaintif f

of his HOMESTEAD.The Court is well aware that this is not an isolated incident. The Plaintiff is ableto conservatively provide 4.2 million other examples of this scheme, as described by the DOJ andFederal Bank Regulators.A summary overview of the scheme begins with the RMBS Trust which, as detailed in the Plaintiffsopposition, has no legal standing to the Plaintiffs property. Every action following is impacted andtherefore is moot/void:ranging from collecting monthly mortgage payments, to foreclosure, resale,etc... As previously detailed, ALL Defendants have benefited from the alleged scheme against thePlaintiff, either personally or financially; Litigation privilege should not apply when there is no legalstanding, nor should sovereign immunity. The Defendant Trust, Bank Defendants, attorney and lawfirm Defendants, Defendant Real Estate Brokers and Defendant Homebuyers have benefittedfinancially f rom the alleged schemewhen they had no legal standing to do so; resulting insevere detriment to the Plaintiff . The Plaintiff believes the Commonwealth has refused toprosecute and correct erred judgments (at minimum) out of fear of setting a precedent for the

Nation. Regardless, their failure to hold parties accountable is unacceptable. The Plaintiff callsfor the Commonwealth to either waive its right to sovereign immunity, or for this Court to allow thePlaintiff to appeal to Congress to abrogate the states sovereign immunity.

As a general proposition, substantive misconduct provides grounds for default with prejudice becauseit more clearly and directly subverts the judicial process. The Plaintiff respectfully calls for this Court toschedule the required evidentiary hearing to determine whether the conduct forming the basis forDefendant default was willful or done in bad faith or was deliberate and in contumacious disregard ofthe courts authority.(Scroll down to view a copy of Harihars filed Motion, in its entirety.)


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For Further Media Information Contact: Mohan A. HariharEmail:[email protected]: 617.921.2526 (Mobile)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTDISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

MOHAN A. HARIHAR Docket No: 2015-cv-11880

Plaintiff

v.

US BANK NA, et al.

Defendants

PLAINTIFF MOTION REQUESTING CLARIFICATION AND RECONSIDERATION,PURSUANT TO FED. R. OF CIV. PROCEDURE, RULE 60 (b)(1,2, AND 3)

After reviewing this Courts order issued on June 23, 2016, the

Plaintiff, Mohan A. Harihar, respectfully files this Motion in

effort to further clarify his position, and to prevent

potential misunderstanding (by the Court, and/or the

Plaintiff). The Plaintiff does not wish to delay, or prolong

these proceedings any longer than necessary. However, it is

critically important to have ALL of the relevant facts

accurately presented before this court prior to forming an

opinion or judgment. Understanding that the Court is currently

reviewing eight motions to dismiss and their respective
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


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oppositions, the Plaintiff fears that there may exist some

misunderstanding of the issues at hand.

I. Assistance to Retain CounselIt remains unclear as to

why the Court has yet to assist the Plaintiff with

requestingthe appointment of legal counsel, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(1). Doing so would certainly reduce

the risk of procedural missteps by the Plaintiff; and

would certainly level the playing field with litigating

the serious issues brought before this Court. The

Plaintiff understands that Section 1915(e) does not

authorize a court to appoint an attorney to represent an

indigent litigant, but instead merely to request one to

do so. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of

Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 300-09 (1989). Additionally, when

sought by a Plaintiff in a civil matter who is unable to

afford counsel, courts may appropriately involve

themselves in the securing of counsel only in

extraordinary circumstances with severe potential

consequences (As is the case here, to both the Plaintiff,

and ultimately to the Nation as a whole). There should be

no question, that the issues brought before this Court are

extraordinary, and that the Court would be justified in

requesting an attorney to represent Mr. Harihar. The

Plaintiff respectfully reminds the Court, that indigence


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is not the only issue here; The MANY qualified/experienced

law firms who have been contacted - either have a conflict

of interest; are not equipped to handle a case of its

magnitude; or are fearful of any negative consequences (to

their firm) should they decide to take on this case. The

Plaintiff makes clear that he is willing to enter into a

contingencyagreement with a qualified/experienced (and

willing) firm, to ensure compensation for their services,

pending the outcome after trial.

Securing counsel will benefit ALL parties including the

Court, as it will undoubtedly assist with reducing

unintended procedural delays, while litigating the complex

issues that are before this Court. The Plaintiff

respectfully requests that the Court reconsider its

position here.

II. Plaintiff should be allowed to amend, pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. Proc. 60 (b)(1,2, and 3)

A.Per Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 60(b)(1),the Court should

consider both surprise and/or excusable neglectin

granting the Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. The

Plaintiff CLEARLY had the absolute expectationthat there

would be alignment with Federal Prosecutors, in bringing

criminal charges alongside the clearly evidenced civil

allegations within this complaint. Their failure thus far


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to do so comes as a complete surpriseto this Plaintiff,

and further supports COLOR OF LAW allegations that appear

to extend beyond the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. It

additionally aligns with a scheme to DEFRAUD the Plaintiff

of his homestead. The Plaintiff would not havewasted his

time (or the Courts)seeking alignment in the first place

- If he had known that the Federal Government and the

Commonwealth of Massachusetts would ultimately refuse to

protect him from evidenced criminal misconduct. This

impacts the portions of the complaint which require the

alignment of Federal Prosecutors, and presents a matter of

justice if the Plaintiff is not allowed to amend. As

detailed in the filed opposition, an amended complaint is

necessary to draw comparison to Coursen vs. JP Morgan

Chase, Docket No: 8:12-cv-690-T-26EAJ, US District Court,

Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division.

B.Similarly, Per Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 60(b)(1),the

Plaintiff should be allowed to amend, as he has been

surprised by the challenges faced in securing counsel. The

Plaintiff fully expected to encounter law firms who had a

conflict of interest, or those firms who would not

consider taking on as a contingency. He did not anticipate

a firmsfear of negative repercussion, as a reason to

stay away from this case. It is not that the issues raised


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are futile it is exactly the opposite. They are

considered too big.

C.Per Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 60(b)(2),The Plaintiff has

uncovered newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable

diligence, could not have been discovered in time to

include in the original complaint, amended complaint, or

second amended complaint:

1.NEW CASE INFORMATION/EVIDENCE- The recent judgment

from the Northeast Housing Court dated 6/1/2016,

12H77SP002683 US Bank, NA vs. Milan, Steven L et al,

finding Summary Judgment in favor of the Defendant

homeowners, Karen and Steven Milan. The Plaintiff

will draw similar comparisons to the Milan case,

referencing fraudulent assignments, etc.

2.NEW CASE INFORMATION/EVIDENCEthat has recently come

forth revealing that the Defendant Wells Fargo NA

hasADMITTEDTO FRAUDULENT MISCONDUCT involving

thousands of mortgages,in a $1.2B settlement with

the United States Department of Justice (DOJ). The

case is the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. WELLS FARGO

NA and KURT LOFRANO,Docket No: 1:12-cv-07527-JMF, US

District Court, Southern District of New York, dated

April 8, 2016. ThisADMISSION TO MORTGAGE FRAUDby

the Defendant WELLS FARGO NA must be added in a


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third amended complaint. Additional case references

will include (but not be limited to): Corvello v.

Wells Fargo Bank NA et al, 9th U.S. Circuit Court of

Appeals, No. 11-16234;Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A., United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit

No. 11-1423.

D.Per Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 60(b)(3) - fraud (whether

previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),

misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.

That cheaters should not be allowed to prosper has long

been central to the moral fabric of our society and one of

the underpinnings of our legal system.1

The basic standards governing fraud on the court are

reasonably straightforward. As set forth in Cox v. Burke,

706 So. 2d 43, 47 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998):

The requisite fraud on the court occurs where it can be

demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has

sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme

calculated to interfere with the judicial systems ability

impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly

influencing the trier of fact or unfairly hampering the

1Florida Bar Journal, February, 2004 Volume LXXVIII, No. 2,

p.16


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presentation of the opposing partys claim or defense.

Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir.

1989) . . .

Fraud on the court as described in Coxtypically refers to

substantive, not procedural, misconduct. The same is true

here as it pertains to clear title. All fourteen

defendants were aware that clear title did not exist with

the Plaintiffs property and collectively participated in

a scheme to defraud the Plaintiff of his HOMESTEAD. The

Court is well aware that this is not an isolated incident.

The Plaintiff is able to conservatively provide 4.2

million other examples of this scheme, as described by the

DOJ and Federal Bank Regulators.

A summary overview of the schemebeginswith the RMBS

Trust which, as detailed in the Plaintiffs opposition,

has no legal standing to the Plaintiffs property. Every

action following is impacted and therefore is moot/void:

ranging from collecting monthly mortgage payments, to

foreclosure, resale, etc... As previously detailed, ALL

Defendants have benefited from the alleged scheme against

the Plaintiff, either personally or financially;

Litigation privilege should not apply when there is no

legal standing, nor should sovereign immunity. The


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Defendant Trust, Bank Defendants, attorney and law firm

Defendants, Defendant Real Estate Brokers and Defendant

Homebuyers have benefitted financially from the alleged

scheme when they had no legal standing to do so;

resulting in severe detriment to the Plaintiff. The

Plaintiff believes the Commonwealth has refused to

prosecute and correct erred judgments (at minimum) out of

fear of setting a precedent for the Nation. Regardless,

their failure to hold parties accountable is unacceptable.

The Plaintiff calls for the Commonwealth to either waive

its right to sovereign immunity, or for this Court to

allow the Plaintiff to appeal to Congress to abrogate the

states sovereign immunity.

As a general proposition, substantive misconduct provides

grounds for default with prejudice because it more clearly

and directly subverts the judicial process. The Plaintiff

respectfully calls for this Court to schedule the required

evidentiary hearing to determine whether the conduct

forming the basis for Defendant default was willful or

done in bad faith or was deliberate and in contumacious

disregard of the courts authority.

III. Core issues of the complaint remain unchanged The

Plaintiff clarifies that, should the Court grant leave to


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amend, the core issues remain unchanged: 1. Plaintiff

damages resulting from an illegal foreclosure, and 2.

Plaintiff damages to his Intellectual Property rights.

IV. Revised CAUSES OF ACTIONbased on the reasons stated

within, amending the causes of action is a matter of

justice. The causes of action stated in the second amended

complaint would be stricken, and replaced with the

following:

A.Deceptive Trade Practices Laws in Massachusetts (Count

I)As with Coursen vs. JP Morgan, here the Plaintiff

similarly alleges Deceptive Trade Practices under the

Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act M.G.L. 93A 21

against the Bank Defendantsand the Defendant

Citigroup Global Realty Corp; Plaintiff is allowed to

Bring Suit (per Ch. 93A 9); Remedies Available

Injunction, double or treble damages, attorney's fees

and costs (Ch. 93A 11). These Deceptive Trade Practice

allegations are exemplified (in part) in the recorded

conversations between the Plaintiff and the Mortgage

servicer (Defendant Wells Fargo NA) during the 22-

month loan modification attempt(s). The recorded

conversations between mortgage servicer and the

Plaintiff will reveal (at minimum) that: 1. The

servicer stated a 90-day default was a requirement to


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qualify for a loan modification under HAMP,2.) The

Plaintiff DID IN FACT QUALIFY for a loan modification

under HAMP guidelines, as many as six (6)times over a

22-month period, but was denied due to a calculation

error that could not, or would not be corrected. Court

must find that Plaintiffs allegations present a

question of fact as to whether the Bank Defendants

activities violated Deceptive Trade Practice Laws, and

he must be allowed the opportunity to establish those

facts through the course of discovery.

B.FDCPA and MCDCA (Count II) - 15 U.S.C. 1692(a)(6)

defines the term debt collector to include any person

who uses an instrumentality of interstate commerce or

the mails in any business the principal purpose of

which is the enforcement of security interests.

Plaintiff alleges

that Bank Defendants knew that they did not possess the

legal right to collect monies from the Plaintiff.

Furthermore, under 15 U.S.C. 1692f, [a] debt

collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to

collect or attempt to collect any debt. Subparagraph

(6) of that section specifically prohibits taking or

threatening to take any non-judicial action to effect

dispossession or disablement of property ... if there


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is no present right to possession of the property

claimed as collateral through an enforceable security

interest. As previously discussed, Plaintiff alleges

that Bank Defendants implemented deceptive practices in

furtherance of a conspiracy to unlawfully divest

Plaintiff of his homestead. Consequently, this Court

must find that Plaintiffs allegations presenta

question of fact as to whether the Bank Defendants

activities violated the FDCPA, and he must be allowed

the opportunity to establish those facts through the

course of discovery.

Questions of fact preclude dismissal of Plaintiffs

claim under the Massachusetts Act at MD COML 14-201-

204, as well, because he plainly alleges that Bank

Defendants and Citigroup Global Realty Corp., knew they

did not have the legal right to collect the alleged

debt and created manufactured evidence, sham pleadings

and deceptive conduct to do so. Massachusetts Statutes

provides that no person shall attempt to collect a

debt which is not

owed or is the result of a manufactured default.

Plaintiff will show that Bank Defendants asserted a

legal right that did not exist, with actual knowledge

that the right did not exist. For these reasons,


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Plaintiffs allegations in support of his MCDCA claim

should be considered sufficient to overcome a Rule

12(b)(6) dismissal.

C.Civil Conspiracy and Abuse of Process (Counts III and

IV)- In a third amended complaint, the Plaintiff will

add a civil conspiracy claim that proves: (a) the

existence of an agreement between two or more parties;

(b) to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by

unlawful means; (c) the doing of some overt act in

pursuance of the conspiracy; and (d) damage to

Plaintiff as a result of the acts done under the

conspiracy. Olson v. Johnson, 961 So. 2d 356, 359 (Fla.

Dist. Ct. App. 2007). A cause of action for abuse of

process requires a showing of willful or intentional

misuse of process for some wrongful or unlawful object,

or ulterior purpose not intended by law. Peckins v.

Kaye, 443 So. 2d 1025, 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

(citing Cline v. Flagler Sales Corp., 207 So. 2d

709(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968)). Plaintiff should be

able to overcome dismissal of his common law claims for

civil conspiracy and abuse of process at this stage of

the proceedings through his factual allegations that

Defendants (at minimum, Bank Defendants) acted

unlawfully, and in agreement, with the intent to


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defraud him through the use of sham documents and

fabricated evidence, and that their actions caused him

damages.

D.For Damages and Declaratory reliefunder 18 U.S.C.

1961, 18 U.S.C. 1962, and 18 U.S.C. 1964(Count V)

E.Prospective injunctive relief against the Commonwealth

under 1983, see Stone v. Caswell, 963 F. Supp. 2d 32,

37 (D. Mass. 2013), (Count VI)

F.ADDITION OF CIVIL RICO CLAIMS (18 U.S.C. 1962), Count

VII) - Since Federal Prosecutors have yet to align with

the Plaintiffs complaint,a third amended complaint is

necessary to add CIVIL RICO Claims under 18 U.S.C.

1962alleging facts that, at least for the purposes of

a Rule 12 (b)(6) dismissal, are adequate to support

each of the statutory elements for the predicate acts

that allegedly divested him of his homestead. See

Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A.,

119F.3d 935, 949 (11thCir. 1997) (holding that in order

to survive a motion to dismiss, a Plaintiff must allege

facts sufficient to support each of the statutory

elements for at least two of the pleaded predicate

acts) (citing Central Distribs. Of Beer, Inc. v. Conn,

5 f.3d 181, 183-184 (6thCir. 1993)). Plaintiff alleges

that Bank Defendants, Harmon Law Offices PC, and Nelson


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Mullins LLP unlawfully employed the United States Mail,

Massachusetts State Courts, and perjured and fabricated

evidence to divest him of his homestead. He alleges

that Defendants were the principals of or participated

in the operation or management of the enterprise itself

and that the pattern of racketeering included at least

two acts, transmission through the use of the mail of

fake assignments of Mortgage and fictitious corporate

signatures. Furthermore, Plaintiffs civil RICO claim

is not time-barred inasmuch as Plaintiff asserts that

he was prevented from discovering that he was the

victim of fraud by Defendants concealment of the

alleged fraud.

Plaintiff has alleged that Bank Defendants, Harmon Law

Offices PC and Nelson Mullins LLP,fabricated documents

in furtherance of a conspiracy to unlawfully divest him

of HIS homestead.Consequently, this CourtMUSTfind

that the Plaintiffs allegations present a question of

FACTas to whether the Defendants activities violated

Massachusetts and Federal Law, and he MUST be allowed

the opportunity to establish those facts through

discovery.

G.SECOND CIVIL RICO CLAIM (18 U.S.C. 1962) (COUNT VIII)

In a third amended complaint, the Plaintiff will add


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a second CIVIL RICO violation CLAIM, and expand upon

the facts of improper relationships between Defendants

Nelson Mullins LLP, the US Attorneys Office, the MA

Office of the Attorney General, the Boston BAR

Association, and Attorney Jeffrey S. Patterson. The

relationships in question references the West LegalEd

Center course entitled, After the BubbleBursts

Mortgage and Foreclosure issues in Criminal and Civil

Litigation. Here, the United States, the Commonwealth

of Massachusetts, and former counsel to Bank Defendants

(Nelson Mullins and Jeffrey Patterson), have together

colluded, contributed to and/or taught a class on how

to defend lender clients against illegal foreclosure.

These improper relationships CLEARLY exemplifies

COLLUSION and (at minimum) shows cause to allege why

criminal complaints filed by the Plaintiff have not

been brought as charges before the Court(s). The

Plaintiff must be allowed the opportunity to establish

these facts through discovery.

H.HAMP and False Claims Violations (COUNT IX)A third

amended complaint is necessary to add HAMP and False

Claims violations by the Defendant mortgage servicer,

Wells Fargo NA. The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals

said Wells Fargo was required under the federal Home


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Affordable Modification Program to offer loan

modifications to borrowers who demonstrated their

eligibility during a trial period (The case is Corvello

v. Wells Fargo Bank NA et al, 9th U.S. Circuit Court of

Appeals, No. 11-16234). The Plaintiff has consistently

stated that the Bank Defendantsrefused to modify the

Plaintiffs mortgage over a 22-month effort (ALL

conversations recorded), even though the Plaintiff

clearly met the requirements set forth by HAMP (and

other) loan modification programs. The Plaintiff must

be allowed the opportunity to establish the facts

through discovery.

I.Tampering allegations, per 18 U.S. Code 1519) (COUNT

X)In a third amended complaint, the Plaintiff will

add one Count (each Defendant) of Tampering

allegations, per 18 U.S. Code 1519 against DEFENDANTS

FIALKOW, PATTERSON, and HALEY. The tampering allegation

of a Middlesex Superior Court file has been well

documented with Massachusetts State Courts and has been

completely ignored by the Commonwealth. The Plaintiff

is not aware of any other parties (other than Court

employees) to have accessed the referenced file, or who

would have reason to alter/displace its contents. Court

must find that Plaintiffs allegations present a


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question of fact as to whether these Defendants

tampered with the Superior Court file, and he must be

allowed the opportunity to establish those facts

through the course of discovery and further

investigation (if necessary). As managing partner of

the Boston Office, Peter Haley is on record in an email

communication to the Plaintiff, stating that both he

and the firm fully support ALL actions taken by

Attorney Fialkow in representing the client(s).

J.Wrongful Foreclosure and Eviction Practices (Count XI)

The Plaintiff will seek civil damages and injunctive

relief (and any additional relief deemed appropriate by

the Court) against Bank Defendants, Harmon Law Offices

PC and Nelson Mullins LLP for wrongful foreclosure and

eviction practices against the Plaintiff. Defendant

Harmon Law offices PC has already been under

investigation (for over three years) by the MA Attorney

General for these same allegations. The Plaintiff has

already brought to the Courts attention, that Harmon

is identified with DISBARRED FORECLOSURE KINGPIN

DAVID STERN (FL). Harmon Law Offices PC is identified

with over 50,000 illegal foreclosures in the

Commonwealth alone.


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Here, the Plaintiff alleges that these Defendants knew

that they had no legal standing to foreclose or

displace the Plaintiff, but decided to act illegally

and unethically for the purpose (at least) of financial

gain.

V. Damages to Plaintiffs Intellectual Property Rights(Count

XII) - Referencing the Testimony of the Honorable Grant D.

Aldonas before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S.

House of Representatives July 19, 2012.2The Topic(s)

addressed in the Justices testimony include: Unfair

Trading Practices Against the United States: Intellectual

Property Rights Infringement, Property Expropriation, and

Other Barriers. While the Plaintiffs complaint does not

raise claims involving trade, it does bring allegations of

unfair practices that undermine intellectual property

rights; which, if left unaddressed and uncorrected,

ultimately prohibits a successfully implemented FCS Model

from delivering substantial economic growthto the United

States, estimated in the trillions of dollars.

For example, in order for the FCS economic framework to be

implemented as intended, an already identified illegal

foreclosure would have to be recognized by a Court, and

2Testimony of the Honorable Grant D. Aldonas before theCommittee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of RepresentativesJuly 19, 2012.


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may require corrective action if prior decisions failed to

do so. This case is a prime example of that.In fact, by

seeking corrective action here with his illegal

foreclosure, the Plaintiff will demonstrate by personal

example how the model will work to better the economy, and

ALL parties, including Bank Defendants.

ANY party, whos actions prevent an illegal foreclosure

from being recognized, will have contributed to damages

against this economic model, and is therefore, liable. The

Plaintiff alleges that every defendant listed in complaint

bears a portion of responsibility for these damages. A

third amended complaint will be necessary - the Court must

find that Plaintiffs allegations present a question of

fact, enough to overcome a 12(b) dismissal, and he must be

allowed the opportunity to establish those facts through

the course of discovery.

The implementation of the Plaintiffs Intellectual

Property is critical to restoring US economic growth,

fostering a more dynamic US economy, and delivering a more

broadly shared prosperity, particularly to those who have

been damaged by the US Foreclosure Crisis, and who live at

the bottom of the economic pyramid.


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But, the more profound strategic reason for confronting

these practices is that our failure to do so will result

in a far less dynamic U.S. economy, which will weaken the

moral solvency of the example we set as a free society.

- Honorable Grant D. Aldonas

VI. Adding as a Defendant, Citigroup Global Realty Corp.who

is recognized as the parent company to the RMBS Trust,

Defendant CMLTI 2006 AR-1. A third amended complaint

will draw similar comparison to the case example provided

in Coursen vs. JP Morgan Chase. Plaintiff alleges that

Citigroup Global Realty Corp., collectively with CMLTI

2006 AR-1, and the Bank Defendants, are responsible for

employing the individuals whose illegal acts proximately

caused him to suffer the loss of HIS homestead, and

additional damagesresulting from an illegal foreclosure.

Wherefore, for the reasons stated within, the Plaintiff

respectfully requests that this Court: 1. Schedule the required

evidentiary hearing to determine whether the conduct forming

the basis for Defendant default was willful or done in bad

faith or was deliberate and in contumacious disregard of the

courts authority; 2. Reconsider the Plaintiffs request to

assist with counsel; and 3. Reconsider the Plaintiffs request

to amend.


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Respectfully submitted,

Mohan A. Harihar

harihar vs. us bank et al. cites “fraud on the court”, calling for defendant default in $42b...

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