health economics - demand for health capital - · pdf filehealth economics demand for health...
TRANSCRIPT
Health EconomicsDemand for health capital
Gerald J. Pruckner
University of Linz &
Lecture Notes, Summer Term 2010
Demand for health capital 1 / 31
An individual’s production of health
The Grossman model: how do age, education, health status andincome influence the production of health through the demand forhealth capital?
Special features: deviations from traditional demand approaches
People want health – they demand medical care inputs toproduce it
Health is not passively purchased from markets – it isproduced in combining time with purchased medical inputs
Health is a capital good – it does not depreciate instantly
Health can be treated both as a consumption and aninvestment good
consumption: health makes people feel betterinvestment: it increases the number of healthy days to workand to earn income
Demand for health capital 2 / 31
Health capital
The stock of health capital provides the output of “healthydays”
Consumers apply a set of inputs to make investments inhealth capital
market inputs of health carediet, exercise, time, . . .
The health stock may grow, decline, or remain constant overtime (depending on age, illness or injury)
Optimal resource allocation
We will see how much time and money people will invest in theirhealth capital. The prices of health care, people’s wages and theirproductivity in the production of health will determine howresources are to be allocated between health capital and othergoods and services that people buy.
Demand for health capital 3 / 31
Investing in health capital
Demand for health capital 4 / 31
Grossman model: health investment & the home good
I = I (M,TH) (1)
B = B(X ,TB) (2)
I : health investmentM: market health inputs (medical services, drugs, . . . )TH : time spent improving healthB: home good production (reading, playing, preparing
meals, watching television, . . . )X : market goods necessary for the production of the ho-
me goodTB : time spent in producing the home good
Demand for health capital 5 / 31
Time constraint
T = 365 days = TH + TB + TL + TW (3)
T : total time available (365 days per period)TW : working time (income is necessary to buy medical care
goods M and other goods X)TL: time lost to illness (some of the time is taken over by
ill health)
Time available for work or leisure = 365−TH0−TL0 = TW +TB (4)
TB : is now called leisure timeTH0: fixed health enhancing timeTL0: fixed time lost to illness
Demand for health capital 6 / 31
Labor-leisure trade-off
The slope of the VS line (the labor-leisure trade-off) reflectsthe wage rateIndividual preferences according to income and leisure:optimal choice (0A/0Y2)
Demand for health capital 7 / 31
Investment in health-improving activities I
TH increases: TH0 → TH1; as a consequence
TL decreases: TL0 → TL1
two effects: (1) less time available for other activities; (2) theincreased health stock reduces time lost to illness
If the net effect is positive: the pure investment effect ofhealth demand
Health investments add to potential leisure and
increase potential income
Demand for health capital 8 / 31
Investment in health-improving activities II
Demand for health capital 9 / 31
Investment in health-improving activities III
The income-leisure line is shifted outward: VS → RQ
Utility is increased (E → E′)
more (future) incomemore leisure (see figure)and the individual is feeling better
The improved health status might also increase a person’sproductivity at work (higher wages and a steeperincome-leisure curve)
The investment aspect of health demand
An individual wishes to invest in her health even if the only valueof health is its effect on earning future income.
Demand for health capital 10 / 31
Production of healthy days
Demand for health capital 11 / 31
Investment & consumption aspects of health
Demand for health capital 12 / 31
Production of health and home goods
The production possibility trade-off between H and B giventhe total amount of time available
A → C : health improvements increase the amount of BH > Hmin: a minimum health capital stock is necessary toobtain income and leisure time necessary to produce BE → C : more time is made available for health → more leisuretime and income for the production of the home good
Suppose the utility from health is solely the ability to produceincome and leisure time to produce the home good
vertical indifference curvesutility-maximizing choice in C
If instead utility is not only derived from producing B but alsodirectly from health itself (the consumption feature)
the more familiar indifference curve U2
utility-maximizing choice in Da higher health stock is chosen (B1 < B0)
Demand for health capital 13 / 31
Investment over time
Cost of capitalPeople make choices for the many periods over their life cycles (westart with the pure investment model; point C in the figure)
Example: investment in an X-ray equipment
Cost of the X-ray machine: AC 100,000
Annual income attributable to the machine: AC 20,000
Alternat. savings account: i = 0.05→ Yt = 100, 000× (1 + i)t
Depreciation: AC 50,000 in five years
Capital cost for any one year:interest foregone (r) + depreciation rate (δ0: 10 %)
Demand for health capital 14 / 31
Demand for health capital
Marginal efficiency of investment (MEI)
MEI for investments in health is downward sloping
The production function for healthy days exhibits diminishingmarginal returns
The cost of capital reflect the interest rate plus the rate ofdepreciation in health
Optimal demand for health: intersection of the MEI curve andthe cost of capital curve (r + δ0)
Demand for health capital 15 / 31
Optimal health stock
Demand for health capital 16 / 31
Equilibrium: the role of age, wage, and education
Thus far
an equilibrium level of health stock has been chosen
how much to workhow much time spent on healthwhat kind of diethow much exercising, . . .
resources are allocated such that a person maintains aconstant health stock every year
How do the investments in health change with age, wage, andeducation?
Demand for health capital 17 / 31
Age and the optimal health stock
Cost
Depreciation rate is expected to increase with age (health ofolder people deteriorates faster than health of younger ones)
δ0 → δ1 → δD (see the figure on slide 16): The optimal healthstock decreases with age (H1 < H0)
Consistent with the observation that elderly people purchase agreater amount of medical care though
Returns from investment
As the expected length of life decreases the MEI curve shiftsto the left: the returns from an investment will last for ashorter period of time (e.g. an older person may choose not toundergo a complicated knee surgery)
This reinforces the decrease in investment due to increaseddepreciation
Demand for health capital 18 / 31
Health stock over the life cycle
Predictions
The pure investment model predicts that health will declinewith age
If health is also valued for consumption reasons (people feelbetter): if people increase their valuation of healthy days asthey age → partial offset of the predicted health stock decline
Demand for health capital 19 / 31
Wage and the optimal health stock
Increased wage rates increase the returns from healthy days
MEI shifts to MEI’ (see the figure on slide 16)
Higher-wage workers will tend to increase their optimal healthcapital stock (H2 > H0)
The result may be ambiguous, however: increased opportunitycost of time in producing health investment → a downwardshift of the MEI curve is possible
Retirement drops the wage to zero
no further investment in health under the pure investmentversion → health capital would depreciate until deathunder consumption effects: health stock would not necessarilydrop to Hmin directly upon retirementeven if we include consumption effects: retirees would reducetheir health stock since the investment motive has vanished
Demand for health capital 20 / 31
Education and the optimal health stock
Education is assumed to improve the efficiency to producehealth investments (better knowledge of harmful effects ofsmoking; better ability to follow medical instructions, . . . )
Education raises the marginal product of direct inputs →given investments in health capital can be generated at lesscost for educated people → higher rates of return to a givenhealth stock
MEI → MEI’ (H2 > H0)
Apart from this supply side effect a demand effect may existas well – difficult to disentangle
likely to recognize the benefits of improved health, may enjoy feeling and looking good ,greater taste for health
Demand for health capital 21 / 31
Grossman model: a dynamic optimization problem I
Utility
W =
∫ T
0e−ρτU(tk(H(τ)); X (τ))dτ (I)
∂U
∂tk< 0,
∂2U
∂(tk)2> 0,
∂U
∂X> 0,
∂2U
∂X 2< 0,
∂tk
∂H< 0
Health capital
H(τ) = I (M(τ), t I (τ))− δ(τ)H(τ) {µ(τ)} (II)
∂I
∂M> 0,
∂I
∂t I> 0,
∂δ
∂τ> 0
∂2I
∂M2< 0,
∂2I
∂(t I )2< 0, H(τ) =
dH
dτ
Demand for health capital 22 / 31
Grossman model: a dynamic optimization problem II
Wealth
A(τ) = rA(τ)+Y [tk(H(τ))+t I (τ)]−P(τ)M(τ)−D(τ)X (τ) {λ(τ)}(III)
∂Y
∂tk=∂Y
∂t I< 0, A(τ) =
dA
dτ
Boundary values
H[0] > 0, A[0] > 0, H[T ] ≥ Hmin, A[T ] ≥ 0 (IV)
Demand for health capital 23 / 31
Grossman model: a dynamic optimization problem III
Maximization problem (I)-(IV)
Lagrange: maximize (I) under constraints (II)-(IV)
Control theory – dynamic optimization
Solution[ ∂U∂tk (τ)
e−ρτ
λ[0]e−rτ+∂Y (τ)
∂tk(τ)
]∂tk(τ)
∂H(τ)=
[r + δ(τ)− q(τ)
q(τ)
]q(τ)
Demand for health capital 24 / 31
Grossman model: a dynamic optimization problem IV
Marginal revenue of an investment into health must be equalthe marginal cost
The left-hand side expression is positive (−)× (−)
Health – a consumption good: marginal utility in point of timeτ due to better healthHealth – an investment good: the reduction of days spent
increases labor income by ∂Y (τ)∂tk (τ)
Marginal cost of holding an additional unit of health capital
foregone interest per monetary unitdepreciation per monetary unit
Demand for health capital 25 / 31
Grossman model: list of variables
W : individual welfareU: utility per periodH: health capitalδ: depreciation rate of health capitalA: financial wealthr : interest rateY : labor incomeX : consumption goodsD: price per unit of consumption goodsM: medical serviceP: price per unit of medical serviceI : health investment (quantities)q: price per unit of investment in healthτ : timetk : time spent illt I : time for preventive actionsρ: time preference rateµ, λ: Lagrange multipliers
Demand for health capital 26 / 31
Demand for health
Assuming specific functional forms for the Grossman modellogarithmic demand functions for health (H(τ)) and health services(M(τ)) can be derived from the pure investment model
Health demand (lnH(τ))
Wages → increasing returns of health capital → +
Price of medical services → more expensive investment → –
Age → increasing depreciation rate → –
Education → higher productivity of health investment → +
Demand for health capital 27 / 31
Demand for health services
Demand for health services (lnM(τ))
An increase of the optimal health capital stock increases thedemand for health services → +
Wage → increases the opportunity cost of preventive actions→ substitution by medical services +
Price of medical services → substitution by preventive actionst I (τ) → –
Age → demand for health services increases to compensatefor higher depreciation rates → +
Education → increases the productivity of medical services →less medical services are necessary for a given stock ofhealth capital → –
Demand for health capital 28 / 31
Empirical evidence in support of the Grossman model
Many predictions of the Grossman model can be supported byempirical evidence
Leu & Doppmann (1986) and Leu & Gerfin (1992) confirm adecrease of health capital with age
Strauss et al. (1993) find that health based on activitylimitation decreases with age and that higher education leadsto improved health
Sickles & Yazbeck (1998) find that health care and leisureconsumption tend to improve health
Gerdtham and Johannesson (1999) find that demand forhealth increases with income and education, and decreaseswith age, urbanization, being overweight, and being single.
. . .
Demand for health capital 29 / 31
Empirical evidence . . . unexpected regression results
Health
Wagstaff (1986) and Leu & Gerfin (1992) find a negativecorrelation between demand for medical services and health
Age
The prediction of an increase in the demand for medicalservices with age is rejected comprehensively by the empiricalliterature (Duan et al. 1984, Newhouse & Phelps 1974, Zweifel1985)
Education
Estimating a structural demand function for medical servicesWagstaff (1986) finds a positive correlation between educationand the demand for medical services
Demand for health capital 30 / 31
Conclusion
The Grossman model
The GM has yielded considerable insight into thedeterminants of health and into the allocation of time andmoney into health production.
Empirical studies reveal, however, a negative correlationbetween health status and the demand for medical services.
This challenges the perception that expenditure for medicalservices can be unequivocally derived from (health) demand.
Demand for health capital 31 / 31