heating and cooling degree days

8/12/2019 Heating and Cooling Degree Days

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/heating-and-cooling-degree-days 1/4

N A V I G A T I N G T H E N U M B E R S : G R E E N H O U S E G A S D A T A A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A L C L I M A T E P O L I C Y — P A R T I32

While the scientific certainty underlying these

alternative methodologies varies significantly,41

therelative results they yield are quite similar for mostcountries (Table 4). For several countries, the calcu-lated share of historic contribution is nearly identicalin all three approaches.

When CO2 from land-use change is also taken intoaccount, the picture changes considerably. Looking atdata for all emissions since 1950 (earlier country-levelestimates for land use-related emissions are not avail-

able42), the historic share for most industrialized (andsome developing) countries drops sharply (Figure 6.2and Table 5). The United States’ cumulative contribu-tion, for instance, drops from 26.6 percent to 16.7percent. The most dramatic increases in historic shareare for tropical countries with large forest sectors. Bra-zil and Indonesia, with 0.9 percent and 0.6 percent

of cumulative fossil fuel emissions, respectively, jumpto 6.1 percent and 7.2 percent, respectively, with theinclusion of CO2 from land-use change. Overall, thedeveloping country share of cumulative emissionssince 1950 rises from 29 to 49 percent. As discussedin Chapter 17, however, this is in part due to the factthat periods of rapid deforestation in (present-day)developed countries pre-dates 1950, and thus is notreflected in the available data.

A second major factor influencing the calculationof historic contribution is the time period chosen.Going back only to 1990, the baseline year for emis-

sion targets in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol,yields very different results than going back a century-and-a-half (Figure 6.3 and Table 6). The historic sharefor developed countries drops from 76 percent to 61percent, while the share for developing countries risesby a commensurate amount.

Implications for InternationalClimate Cooperation

Data constraints will likely prevent interna-tional climate agreements based on cumulativeemissions or “responsibility.” The relevance ofhistorical responsibility for climate change is noted

in the Climate Convention and generally acknowl-edged to be an important factor in shaping responsestrategies that are widely acceptable. This concept hasalso become noteworthy since, in the run-up to the1997 Kyoto Protocol negotiations, the Governmentof Brazil advanced a specific proposal that wouldhave apportioned GHG emissions targets accordingto each (Annex I) country’s historical responsibilityfor the global temperature increase.43 Although thisproposal did not prevail, the topic has continued tobe studied under the UNFCCC.44

Proposals that rely on historical emissions prior to1990, however, are unlikely to garner widespread sup-

port, in part due to data constraints. As shown above,the country-level contributions to climate change areextremely sensitive to two factors: (1) the time periodchosen and (2) inclusion of LUCF (and non-CO2)

Figure 6.1. Cumulative CO2 Emissions, 1850–2002

Country % of World (Rank)

United States 29.3 (1)

EU-25 26.5 (2)

Russia 8.1 (3)

China 7.6 (4)

Germany 7.3 (5)

United Kingdom 6.3 (6)

Japan 4.1 (7)

France 2.9 (8)

India 2.2 (9)

Ukraine 2.2 (10)

Canada 2.1 (11)

Poland 2.1 (12)

Italy 1.6 (13)

South Africa 1.2 (14)

Australia 1.1 (15)

Mexico 1.0 (16)

Spain 0.9 (20)

Brazil 0.8 (22)

South Korea 0.8 (23)Iran 0.6 (24)

Indonesia 0.5 (27)

Saudi Arabia 0.5 (28)

Argentina 0.5 (29)

Turkey 0.4 (31)

Pakistan 0.2 (48)

Developed 76

Developing 24

Source: WRI, CA IT.



C H A P T E R 6 — C U M U L A T I V E E M I S S I O N S 33

emissions. Even if countries could agree on whichtime period to adopt, no official country-level dataexists prior to 1990. Unofficial data for CO2 fromfossil fuels extends back to the 1800s.45 However, thecertainty of data covering such distant time periods islikely to be disputed. Historical data is also geo-graphically biased, as earlier data is more likely to be

available for Europeancountries. Equallysignificant is theabsence of virtuallyany country-level datafor non-CO2 gases andLUCF prior to 1990.The one country-leveldataset that is availablefor LUCF covers only1950 to 2000, and itis understood to be

highly uncertain (seeChapter 17). The lackof LUCF data in his-torical responsibilitycalculations will havehighly varying effectsat the country level.

This is not tosuggest that theconcept of histori-cal responsibility is

irrelevant, only that it is unlikely that this concept canform the core of an agreement, or could be assessed

in a manner reliable enough to be the basis for legalobligations. It should also be noted that other factors,unrelated to data issues, have also led to politicalobjections pertaining to proposals to base the interna-tional climate change regime on historical emissions,including concerns over equity and the potential lackof required action by some Parties.

Figure 6.2. Cumulative CO2 Emissions, 1950–2000With and without land-use change & forestry

Sources & Notes: WRI, CAIT. CO2 from fossil fuels includes CO2 from cement manufacture.

Figure 6.3. Cumulative CO2 Emissions, Comparison of Different Time Period

Sources & Notes: WRI, CAIT. CO2 includes emissions from fossil fuels and cement manufacture.

Two major factors

may influence

assessments of

a country’s

contribution to

climate change:the time period

analyzed and

the gases and

sources included.

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

BrazilIndonesiaChinaRussiaEU-25U.S.

CO2 from Fossil Fuels

CO2 from Fossil Fuels & Land-use Chang

P e r c e n t o f W o r l d T o t a l

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

IndiaJapanChinaRussiaEU-25U.S.

1850–2000

1990–2000

P e r c e n t o f W o r l d T o t a l



N A V I G A T I N G T H E N U M B E R S : G R E E N H O U S E G A S D A T A A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A L C L I M A T E P O L I C Y — P A R T I34



C H A P T E R 7 — S O C I O E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T 35

GHG emissions can only be understoodproperly within the broader socioeconomiccontext. Such a context gives a sense not just

of emissions, but the degree to which countries havethe financial and institutional capacity to address thecauses and consequences of climate change. Similarly,an understanding of different levels of developmentprovides a sense of the context within which climatechange competes for political attention. In particu-lar, in many countries other issues are likely to takegreater priority over considerations of GHGs in manypolicy-making spheres. For these reasons, this chapterexamines the major emitters across a range of non-emissions issues.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the majorGHG emitting countries is the disparity in develop-ment levels. One measure of development, whichprovides a clear picture of the disparity, is per capita

income figures (Figures 7.1 and 7.2). Figure 7.3depicts the relationship between income and emis-sion levels. In 2002, annual per capita income amongthe top emitting countries ranged from over $34,000in the United States (4th globally) to under $2,000

in Pakistan (138th globally).46 Other measures of acountry’s capacity to address climate change or othercomplex social challenges include life expectancy,educational achievement, and quality of governance(for example, political stability, level of corrup-tion). As might be expected, the disparities in thesemeasures largely mirror those for per capita income,although there are exceptions (Table 7).

Certain patterns and observations are notable:■ China and India, the world’s largest countries,

have per capita incomes that are six to eighttimes lower than those in industrialized countries

when measured in purchasing power parity.47

Some 550 million people in these two countries(16 percent of China’s population and 35 percentof India’s) subsist on less than $1 a day.48

■ Per capita income is lower in the two largest EITs(Russia and Ukraine) than in several advanced

developing countries (Argentina, Brazil, South

Socioeconomic Development

CHA P T E

heating and cooling degree days

Documents