TF Iron Operation Iraqi Freedom

07-09

28 October 2007 – 9 December 2008The overall classification of this briefing is

UNCLASSIFIED/FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYas of 28 Jan 09V2.3

MND-N Provincial Orientation

TURKEY

SYRIAIRAN

•7 Provinces, 4 w/ CF presence•3 International Borders

–180 mi border w/ Turkey–175 mi border w/ Syria–300 mi border w/ Iran

•Population: ~10,200,000 (6.3 in MND-N)•48 Districts (23 in MND-N)

NJNJ

CTCT

MDMD

VTVT

Ninewa (~2.6 mil)Ninewa (~2.6 mil)

Kirkuk (~1.1 mil)Kirkuk (~1.1 mil)

Diyala (~1.5 mil)Diyala (~1.5 mil)

Salah ad Din (~1.1 mil)Salah ad Din (~1.1 mil)

475 km

450 km

JRTC/NTCComparisonJRTC/NTC

Comparison

Sunni/Shia Insurgency in MND-N Categorization of Groups

Sunni Extremists• Driven by Salafist ideology • Anti-Everybody• Non-reconcilable• Indiscriminate targeting of local nationals

Sunni Nationalists• Open to participation in current GoI if conditions are “right”• Willing to reintegrate into GoI security apparatus• Some cells focused targeting of Coalition Forces

Sunni Rejectionists• Desires return of Sunni/Ba’ath government• Rejects current GoI, Coalition “occupation”• Non-reconcilable• Focused targeting of Coalition /Shi’a security forces

Shi’a Extremists• Anti-Coalition• Non-reconcilable• Pursuit of military means to drive out occupation forces, counter / eliminate Sunni influence

•4 River Systems–Tigris River Valley–Diyala River Valley–Uzaym River Valley–Zaab Rivers

•Lake Thar Thar (Man-made)

•2 Mountain Ranges–Hamrins–Sinjar Ridge

•Barren Deserts–Jazirah–Jalam

•10 Major Cities

•Weather–Temps (35oF – 115oF)–Dust (Shamal/Haboob)

MND-N Terrain & Weather

475 km

450 km

Sinjar Ridge

TURKEY

SYRIA

IRANKRG

TAL AFARMOSUL

IRBIL

KIRKUK

HAWIJAH

TUZBAYJI

TIKRIT

SAMARRA

BALAD

BAQUBAH

MUQDADIYAH

KANAQIN

QARA TAPA

JALULA

Hamrin Mountains

Bayji

Dahuk

Salah ad Din

Diyala

Irbil

Ninewa

Tal Afar

Sulaymaniah

Kirkuk

Khanaqin

Hawijah

Mandali

Rabiah

Sinjar

Makhmur

Mosul

Tuz Khurmatu

Kirkuk

Kifri

Hawijah80,000

Mosul1,750,000

Kirkuk850,000

Baqubah350,000

Muqdadiyah84,000

Samarra189,000

Tikrit147,000

Tal Afar130,000

Sulaymaniyah900,000

Irbil900,000

Bayji145,000

Balad122,000

MND-N Demographics

Ethnicities

Kurds

Sunni Arab

Mixed Kurd/Sunni Arab

Shia Arab

Mixed Shia/Sunni Arab

Turkoman/Yizidi/other

• 3 Major religious / ethnic groups

• Turkoman and Yizidi ethnic minorities

• Small minority of Christians

• KRG boundary v Kurdish region

• Most diverse population in Iraq

Iraq Demographics

Iraq Demographics

Kurdish Tribes Barzani Tribe constitutes the majority of KDP leadership. Talabani Tribe constitutes the majority of the PUK leadership

Shammar Confederation:• Shia/Sunni

Janabi Confederation:• Shia/Sunni • Nearly 1 million members total• 8 tribes

Dulaym Confederation:• Shia/Sunni

Al-Jaburi Confederation: • Confederation claims over two million Sunni and Shia confederates

The Obeidi Tribe: • Obeidi Tribe does not currently recognize a single supreme Sheikh

Tikriti tribes:• Sunni

•7 confederations, but over a hundreds sub-tribes

•Tribal identity vs–National identity–Religious identity–Ethnic identity

•Tribal law vs GoI authority

•Cross boundary tribes–Smuggling–FF&E Facilitation

•Tribal feuds –Resources–Honor

•Tribal control of economic centers

MND-N Tribal Overview

LEGEND

Kurdish Influence

Current Green Line (GoI Recognized/TAL)

Kurdish Claims

LEGEND

Kurdish Influence

Current Green Line (GoI Recognized/TAL)

Kurdish Claims

The Kurdish “Factor”Current Status:• Delayed UNAMI Assessment - “Strategic Ambiguity”• Khanaqin Standoff

Concerns:• Continued GoI/KRG tension• Peshmerga/IA coordination • Elections law passed – status of Kirkuk still not resolved• UNAMI DIBs proposal

Expected Flashpoints (IA-Pesh Confrontation):• Khanaqin District• Kirkuk District• Sinjar District• Tal Afar District

SINJAR

TAL AFAR

KIRKUK

KHANAQIN.

. .

.

Energy Infrastructure

MND-NE

Ninewa

KirkukSulaymaniyah

Dahuk

Salah ad Din

Diyala

IrbilRabiyah POE

Muntheria POE

Stabilization Plants#1 & #2

NorthernGas Company

Kirkuk Oil Fields

Naft Khana GOSP

IZ-TU Pipeline

Mullah AbdullahPower Plant

Bayji Power Plant

• Both hydroelectric and oil-fired plants produce the region’s power

• Lack of electricity is often the limiting factor in other infrastructure performance •Kirkuk Oil Fields and the Bayji Oil Refinery are the principle means of production in MND-N

• Each piece of the oil infrastructure is critical to the operation of the overall network

Oil & Gas Fields

Processing Treatment

Pumping Stations

Oil Pipelines

Dams

Power Plant Bayji Oil Refinery

Habur Gate POE

Powerlines

1

23

45

6

7

8

11

13

10

14

1516 15

Rail line through Mosul

Lines of Communication

12

Key Bridges in MND-N

Operational

Shillal Bridge

Mosul Dam Bridge

Samarra Dam Bridge

Sarha Bridge

Quwair Bridge

Repairs Underway

Aski-Mawsil Bridge (ongoing, ECD FEB 09)

Quayarah Bridge (ongoing, ECD MAR 09)

Ash Sharqat Bridge (ongoing, ECD MAR 09)

Zekhaiton Bridge (ongoing, ECD FEB 09)

Baqubah Bridge (contracted, ECD TBD)

Samarra Float Bridge (ongoing, ECD DEC 08)

Badush-Siboni Bridge (ongoing, ECD JAN 09)

Fathah Bridge (ongoing, ECDMAR 10)

Unrepaired

Darnajukh Bridge

Fathah Railroad Bridge

Buhriz Bridge

Sindiyah Bridge

1

2

3

7

8

11

12

13

4

5

6

9

10

14

15

16

15

Heavy Railroad Track status:ObstructionsOperationalNeeds to be testedNon-operational (blocked or needs repairs)No GoI plan to openRail is on or next to MND-N base

9

The Threat in MND-N

12-Week Attack Trends by MND/F (Sep – Nov 2007)

TF Iron’s 1st Month

TF Iron TOA

TF Iron TOA

Week Ending Week Ending16-Nov-07 23-Nov-07

MND-BAGHDAD 60 64 4MND-C 66 51 -15MND-CS 1 3 2MND-N 232 270 38MND-NE 0 0 0MNF-W 23 29 6MND-SE 11 16 5

Region # Change

MND-B MND-C MND-CS MND-N MND-NE MNF-W MND-SE

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

Insurgency in Iraq

MNC-I C2 INTSUM31 OCT 2007

1st TF Iron KIA

CPT Timothy McGovern

MNC-I C2 INTSUM31 OCT 2007

1st TF Iron KIA

CPT Timothy McGovern

Diyala

KirkukKirkuk

TikritIRAN

SamarraSamarra

Hit

BaladBalad

BaqubahBaqubah

Kuwait City

KUWAITUmm Qasr

NajafNajaf / Kufah

SulaymaniyaSulaymaniya

An Nukhayb

NasiriyahNasiriyah

Safwan

Qurnah

BasrahBasrah

Al AmarahAl Amarah

SYRIA

Tall Afar

Habur Gate

Ar Rutbah

Al Asad

Al Walid

SAUDI ARABIA

IrbilIrbil

N. Babil

Rabyah

Hawijah

HadithahRawah

Husaybah

Al Qaim

TURKEY

DahukDahuk

MosulMosul

Bayji

BaghdadBaghdadFallujah

RamadiRamadi

Al HillahAl Hillah

IskandariyahKarbala

Hindiyah

Diwaniyah

Al KutAl Kut

Samawah

Muqdadiyah

Baghdad022

MND-NE 0 / 0MND-N 12 / 31MND-B 4 / 9MNF-W 0 / 0MND-C 1 / 13

MND-CS 0 / 1MND-SE 0 / 2TOTAL 17 / 56

EFFECTIVE ENEMY ATTACKS / TOTAL ENEMY ATTACKS

1

1

1

1

1

1

2 21 1

10

Diwaniyah

0

0

0

0

Attack on CF

Attack on ISF

Attack on Civilians

Attack on Infrastr.

Zaab

Triangle

Security• Surge in Baghdad and Anbar driving fight

to MND-N• AQI dominant threat; organized, lethal,

capable• Foreign Fighter and external support

networks a significant influence in MND-N• Enemy finance, media capable & effective• Vast ungoverned areas, limited CF/ISF

presence

Provincial Governance• PGov/GoI disconnect; strong perception

of Shi’a bias and neglect• Lack of PGov capacity in Ninewa, Diyala,

SaD; public confidence in PGov low• IP capacity and capability low; IA

capabilities improving• Kurd concerns over Article 140 deadline

(DEC 07)

Economic Stability• Lack of budget execution and release of

funds across all provinces• High unemployment, lack of capital

generation and opportunities• BOR corruption and poor oil distribution

linked to AQI extortion, funding activities

Reconciliation• Population begins turning away from AQI/violence• CLC (SoIZ) well established in Diyala; indication of tribal/local CLC

interest in Za’ab region, southern Salah ad Din• Indications of insurgent group (JARF-1920s, JM) fledgling interest in

cease-fire, political participation• No DDR or reconciliation measures in place

AQI Presence

AQI Support Zone

JAM Presence

JAM SG Sanctuary

AQI Presence

AQI Support Zone

JAM Presence

JAM SG Sanctuary

MND-N ThreatKey Conditions in Oct ‘07

Al Anbar

Awakening

Baghdad

Surge

SVESTPropane Tanks

IRL’s

8 ft

4ft

Deep Buried IED CraterBBIED (Talon view)BBIED (Talon view)EFP’s

RPG’s

Weapons Cache of Various Ordnance Material

Projectiles encased inconcrete to look like curb MAIED

RKG-3M

UBE

Threat CapabilitiesThreat Capabilities

ExternalInfluence

ExternalInfluence

Mosul Attacks

Attack Trends

TF Iron Operations

Effective 28 OCTOBER 07

XX1

Attached to:

IGFC IGFC

32

XX XX 4

XX

II 3 1/3

MND-B

II 3 2/2

II 4 2/4

II 3 2/4

557 USAF

TENANT UNIT

431 CAOPCON

MP728OPCON

EASOS25

DS

I I

25 STB

I I

5 5

TF Iron MND-N

(-)

DS184

EOD

IGFC

II 3 3/2

X

3 2

(-)

ooo4 2X (-)

ooo4-9

ooo2-1

BTB

202

2-12

BSB

115 MPAD

717th EOD

DS

B/401 CA

EASOS 5-25

10511001

(-)

18 EOD

DS

X

4

SPECTRE TACON

5-82(-)

1-9(-)

2-7

STBSTBSTB4

BSB27

1000

(-)

B/431OPCON

CA

DS

IFSB237

EASOS9-25DS

3

xx

I

TACON ALB

2

xx

Partnered6, 7, 13 SIB

x

SIB

x

SIB

x

SIB

2

IIIMTR

TACON

X

142

TABTABTAB

1-4/A/1-14 TAB

HHB/142

HQ/C/1-14 TAB

FSE25ID

TAB

TABTABTABTAB

1-6/C/1-14 TAB

1-3/H-26

TABTABTAB

X

2 9

(-)

Partnered

II 3 2/5

X

4 9

8, 12, 18, 20 BN

C/431OPCON

CA

X

3 1

725EOD

DS

TACON

BLUE

5-73

6-9

BTB3(-)

BSB215(-)

1060

1-12

(-)xx 5

Partnered

II

2/12

EASOS9-25DS

2-23 ooo

1-38 ooo

B/425

506 EOD

DS

3-6

1-87

BSB325

1040

CA

BTB3(-)

2-22

X

1 10

EASOS25-25DS

Partnered

SIB 1BDE 1,2,3,4,5, BN

(-)x

2 4

x 3 4

x 1

(-)

5

XX

IGFC

DOC

(-)

111

19 CH

1 CE

I I

5 5

ADCON

I I

1AD STB

X

ADCON FOR UCMJ

I I

CA 431

(-)x

2 SIB

NP NP

6 2 NP

X

9,10 BN

x 1 4

4 4

X

EASOS14-25DS

A/431OPCON CA

1-327

2-327

2-320

X

1 101

BSTB101

1050

(-)

7-9EOD

DS

332EOD

EASOS

NP NPAA

X

1-32

BSB426

1-71

ODIN

1

ATTACHED

1-1

X

1

ASB601

4-6

3-1

1-6

2-1

AH

GS

ASLT

5 x US BCTs21 x US BNs

TF Iron StanceOctober 2007

Ninewa

KirkukSalah ad Din

Irbil

Sulaymaniyah

Diyala

TURKEY

SYRIA

IRAN

Dahuk

4

3

XXXX

33

XXXX

55

XXXX

22

XXXX

44

PRT

PRT

RRT

ePRTPRT

PRT

MND-North MissionTransitions

OLD IRONSIDESOLD IRONSIDES

Operation Iron Resolve (January 2008):TF Iron in partnership with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Northern Provincial Leaders, and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), conducts counterinsurgency operations by supporting the security of the population and by assisting in the development of a legitimate GOI throughout MND-N in order to transition to a stable and self-reliant Iraq.

Operation Northern Law (October 2007):TF Lightning conducts counter-insurgency operations to enhance population security and governance throughout MND-N IOT: develop credible and capable ISF; defeat terrorists and insurgents and neutralize extremists; legitimize provincial and local governments; and contain political and sectarian violence.

December January February MarchNovemberOctober April May June July August September DecemberNovemberOctober

Ramadan HajjHajj

28 OctMND-N

TOA

03 Dec3/1 CD to 4/2 ID

TOA

2-23

6-9

2-82

11 Dec4/1 CD(-) to 3 ACR(-)

TOA

AO Lightning

2-71-9

5-82

TAO Mameluke

4-6A

L

(+)

OPCON to TF714OPCON to TF714

15 Mar142 FiB to 75 FiB

TOA

01 AprTAO Mameluke Active (MNF-W)

29 May111 EN to 18 EN

TOA

01 Jun4/2 ID to 2 SCR(-)

TOA

IIooo2 2

II25

IIooo4 2

2

From MND-BFrom

MND-B

26 Aug4-6 CAV to 6-17 CAV

TOA

1-24

1-5

3-21

5-1

251

2-8

15 Oct•1-67 AR

Arrive FOB McHenry•18 EN to

Kirkuk (KLE)

27 Oct•2 SCR to 1/25 ID

TOA •2/3 ACR to Mosul

05 Nov•TAO Tripoli Active (MNF-

W)•AO Ligtning and TAO

Mameluke Inactive

07 Nov1/10 MTN

Depart(No Backfill)

2-221-873-6

2-12

1-38

2-1

1-122-320

IIooo3 2

1-327

3-8

1-6A

L

(-)

1-71

4-9

IIooo1 2

1-1

A

H

2-1 GS

3-1 ASLT

X

1

142

111

1-32

22 Nov1/101 ABN to

3/25 ID TOA

2-35

2-27

3-4

3-7

3 25

28 Nov1 ID CAB to

10 MTN CAB TOA

3-3

A

H

2-10 ASLT

3-10 GS

6-6A

L

X

10

01 DecMND-NE

EOM

XX

1-8

1 3

3 3

3

6-17A

L

75

18

1-67

TAO Tripoli

09 DecMND-N

TOA

2-327

125

20xBN 18xBN 17xBN 16xBN 15xBN 14xBN

Iron Hammer Iron Harvest Iron PursuitVoter

RegistrationIron Reaper

01 AprAO Lightning

Active (TF 525)

MND-N Stance06 Dec2/3 ACR to Diyala

15 Dec3/2 SCR to Diyala

05 Jan1-8 IN to Mosul

15 Jan4-9 IN TOA with

2/25 IDBattlespace

Realignment with MND-B

01 Feb1-71 CAV(+) OPCON to

TF 714

2008200820072007

TAO Striker

15 JulTAO

Striker

15 Aug1/2 SCR to

MosulTAO

Striker Ends

2 3

(-)

OIF 07-09

MND-N Stance

728 MP448 CA

2/1 AD(-)

DDR508 518 565 1k 1.5k 2.5k 2.5k 3k

8k 15.5k

SoIZ8.5k 15k 16.5k 20k 24.5k 32k 31.5k 30.5k 30k 29.5k 27.5k

Att

ac

k T

ren

ds

Secure Environment

Capable

ISF

Economic Stability

Functioning Provincial

Government

3k 3k

27.5k 27.5k

HAMMER

REAPER

IRAQI VOICE PHASE I PHASE II PHASE III

IRON MAMMOTH

MoTS IIMoTSLION’S ROAR GToB

United & Prosperous

United &Strong I U&S II U&S III

U&J III

Rule of Law

U&J II

Energy Conf #5

Energy Conferences

United & Healthy Women’s Conference

HAJJ HAJJRAMADANASHURANOV 07 DEC 07OCT 07 NOV 07 DEC 07OCT 07 MAR 08 APR 08JAN 08 FEB 08 MAR 08 APR 08JAN 08 FEB 08 JUL 08 AUG 08MAY 08 JUN 08 JUL 08 AUG 08MAY 08 JUN 08 NOV 08 DEC 08SEP 08 OCT 08 NOV 08 DEC 08SEP 08 OCT 08

MROC

OIF 07-09

MND-N STANCEMND-N

STANCE

Drought Relief

NiOC

HYDRA

HARVEST PHASE II PH II PH III

En

du

rin

g E

ffe

cts

IRON PARTNERSHIP

IRON MUSALAHA

CLC Contracts

MI-17Crash

TF IronBDA

Energy Conf #4#3#2#1

TAOTripoli

Qayarrah Bridge

Assessments

Zanjili Explosion

Enabling TF IronTF Iron Remembers

IA/IP Soccer

Khanaqin StandoffPGOV’s Son

Archbishop Kidnapped

GEN Petraeus Testimony

TAOMameluke AO Lightning

Rabiyah POE SVEST

ROUNDUP

ISF/CFOPs

3IA Air AssaultRegional Tng Ctr Kirkuk IP GraduationMPSA

IRON RHYTHM

Shi’a Pilgrimage (Samarra)

DoI Graduation

PURSUIT

Hood HarvestFratricide

PB Bushmaster VBIED

United & Just I

Salah ad Din Visit

COP Inman SVBIED

MND-NE

Kirkuk Demonstration/IED

OH-58DCrash

Water TankerAttack

Iron Observations

OIF 07-09Operational Assessment

Challenges to “Hold” and “Build”• Effects of surge in Baghdad/southern Iraq and

awakening movement in Al Anbar pushed AQI east and north into MND-N.

• MND-N remained an economy of force during surge in Baghdad.

• Many key population centers were “unsecure” in northern Iraq.

• AQI retained freedom of maneuver in northern provinces.

• CLC (Sons of Iraq) recruiting still immature in MND-N.• Weak government institutions – provincial and GoI.

What Changed+ 80% decline in attacks + 79% reduction in improvised explosives+ 43,000 increase in Iraqi Security forces+ Sons of Iraq growth 26,415+ DDR - CF cease fire ~3000Challenges transitioning to “Build”- Only 73% 07 budget received; only 19% 08 budget received- Slow economic expansion - Police primacy (hiring/training) 16,000 IPs still untrained- Sons of Iraq transfer to GoI progressing slowly- Border focus- Elections issues- Kurd influences

Operational AssessmentsOctober 2007 December 2008

Public Perceptions

Confidence in Prov Gov’t to provide security?

Public Confidence in IP in MND-N ?

Public Confidence in IA in MND-N?

Current Household financial status (have enough)?

Is the Govt making efforts to improve job opportunities?

Is the sewage disposal system working?

Is there trash collection in your neighborhood? Does your family get the electricity you need?

Likelihood to Vote?

% October 07

5.3%

Positive Response 49.1%

Positive Response 51.3%

51.2%

3%

14.9% Yes

10.5% Yes

15.4% Yes

39.3%

% December 08

64.3%

Positive Response 84.5%

Positive Response 81.7%

73.4%

25.7%

26.4% Yes

36.6% Yes

32.6% Yes

71.0%

Change (Oct-Dec)

59.0%

35.4%

30.4%

22.2%

22.7%

11.5%

26.1%

17.2%

31.7%

Changes in Public Perception

Source: MNC-I National Public Opinion Poll

• 80% reduction in total attacks– 79% reduction in IEDs; 76% reduction in Direct Fire attacks; 86% reduction in

IDF attacks– 89% reduction in CF KIA; 74% reduction in ISF KIA; 42% reduction in Civ KIA

• (S/MCFI) The enemy isolated and off balance – Driven from population centers / support zones– Finance and recruiting efforts disrupted

• (S/MCFI) Enemy no longer a threat to legitimacy and survival of GoI– High-level captures has left AQI fractured and decentralized– Targeting of Shi’a extremists has degraded their operational capability– While disrupted, Sunni rejectionists continue attempts to infiltrate GOI, ISF

and other Iraqi institutions

Security

MND-N Attacks: Oct 07 - Oct 08

16511488 1548 1555

1301

854

635

470

882806 864 909 857 812

739580

484 518607 562

382273

179326

753908

14121376

814879

0

500

1000

1500

2000

Oct NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Total Attacks IED Events

Operations Iron Harvest II, Lion’s

Roar, MoTS I

Operations Iron Harvest II, Lion’s

Roar, MoTS I Operation Iron Pursuit

Operation Iron Pursuit

Operation Iron HammerOperation

Iron Hammer

Operation Iron ReaperOperation Iron Reaper

Operation Iron Harvest I

Operation Iron Harvest I

Operation Iron MusalahaOperation Iron Musalaha

Mother of Two Springs II

Mother of Two Springs II

MND-N EOF Trends

Number of LNs Injured or Killed in MND-N EOFs

MND-N Total and Serious Injury, Death, or Damage (SIDD) EOFs

• 8 EOFs for OCT 08 is a decrease of 2 from SEP 08; the lowest month of incidents; and a 86% decrease since TOA.

• Two SIDD incidents resulted in two LNs wounded and one killed.

86%

14%

Shot to Kill First Step

Shot to Disable/Warn as First Step

One Non-Lethal

Two or More Non-Lethal Graduated Steps

Graduated Measures Employed in October

10

25

65

8

1913

8

20

32

2429

43

56

3112315877 5 5

20

10

20

30

4050

60

70

80

90

100

OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT

Total EOFIncidentswithWeaponsDischarged

Total EOFresulting inSIDD

NOV

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 1

0

3

9

55

3

10

1123

1

6

10

2

6

03

1113 1

5

2

46

11

2

0

444

21 01

22

000

5

10

15

OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT

OverallWND/KLD

LN WND

LN KLD

PropertyDamage

NOV

EOF Incidents by Weapon Type (%)

• Nearly half of all EOF incidents in October involved the use of individual weapons.

• No crew-served weapons incidents in October resulted in a SIDD.

• Bastogne had a slight increase in EOF incidents. Brave Rifles had a significant decrease.

MND-N EOF Trends

Trends by BCT AO

1

16

35

7

18

9 10

11

47

38

7 5

01

0

210

21

1710

7

7

1416

13212

55

12 0

33

12

66

4

76

1 36

2 11

130

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT

Salah ad Din

Kirkuk

Diyala

Ninewa

80

61

70

5549

626567

59

53

6360

75

2838

37

20

47

3137

2020

27 3238

29

12140

7

3

8

4

77

10

5 00

OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT

INDIVIDUAL

CREWSERVED

UNKNOWN

NOV

NOV

MND-N Detainee Trends

•Captured: 5,370 detainees•BCT Releases: 1,541 detainees•Transfer to ISF: 894 detainees•Sent to Theater Internment Facility: 2,920 detainees•Released from Theater Internment Facility: 5,711 detainees

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

Captures 453 439 532 408 383 353 403 367 396 294 436 392 329 185

BCT Release 151 173 127 109 115 56 92 137 117 79 110 83 112 80

Transfer to ISF 95 53 125 136 63 69 66 51 43 31 50 45 41 26

Sent to TIF 312 178 214 215 216 183 206 248 177 210 238 222 224 77

Release from TIF 328 485 258 289 95 315 255 504 441 450 460 884 510 437

CCCI Referals 129 95 144 101 94 100 70 97 121 90 62 132 113 0

Oct Nov DecJan-08

Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov

ISF Service October ’07 December ‘08 Change

43,000 63,800 +20,500

56,000 76,000 +19,200

3,500 5,500 +2,000

5,600 5,500 -100

9,300 10,750 +1,450

NP

Iraqi Army (IA)

Iraqi PoliceService (IPS)

National Police (NP)

Dept of Border Enforcement (DBE)Strat.InfrastructureBNs (SIBs)

MND-N Iraqi Security ForcesOctober 2007 – December 2008

• Fielding's:• M16’s – 19,150 fielded • M1114s (UAH) – over 900 fielded • Badgers W/ILAV – 16 fielded• Symphony (IA CREW System) – 12 systems fielded• Radios’ – 55 SINCGARS/ 45 ASIPS fielded

• Capabilities: : • Minimized CF support /expenditures to the ISF by 85% saving roughly $385,000• Improved Class IX parts distribution (PLL established at unit level)• Enhanced Code-Out procedures; over 400 packets pending approval with MoD• Class III (B) self sustain without any CF support

ISF Logistics

Provincial Government Capacity

• Significant progress, but a long way to go:– Provincial governments and GoI improving ties and

cooperation

– Reconstruction efforts critical to stability

– Delivery of essential services remains inadequate• Sewage, trash collection, and electricity viewed as

unavailable

– Budgeting and cash flow challenges remain

– Improved perceptions of provincial governments:• OCT 07 – 5.3% favorable; Oct 08 – 61.3% favorable

JAN 08 FEB 08 MAR 08 APR 08 MAY 08 JUN 08 JUL 08 AUG 08 SEP 08 OCT 08 NOV 08 DEC 08

U&S IU&S II

U&S III

U&P I Mosul Security Conf.

PM to Mosul U&P II

Rule of Law

Energy Conf.

U & S IVUnited & Healthy

Women’s Conf.

Energy Conf.

U&J II

U&J I

Economics Environment• Unemployment remains high – 68.7%• Lack of investment capitol• Drought

– MND-N coordinated for $8.5 M in drought relief efforts to purchase modern irrigation systems, seed, and “hoop houses”

• Some Successes– Coordinate for $28.7 Million in small business

grants and loans (MoIM/MoLSA)– Civil Service Corps – produced 50,000 jobs

• Banking system improving with new branches opening, some with ATM and Electronic Funds Transfer capabilities

• More people have positive perception of individual financial status– OCT 07 – 51.2% (had enough); DEC 08 – 61.1%

Enabling & SustainingTF Iron

TF Iron ISR SupportMISSION. Provide multi-discipline Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance to TF IRON and partnered Iraqi Security Forces to enable support to ground operations and to enable the Government of Iraq, Provincial and Local Leaders to provide essential services, improved governance, and economic revitalization.

Collection Priorities1. Ground Operation2. CIED/CIDF/Cache3. Target Development4. Sectarian Activity5. Infiltration Routes

Full Motion Video (hours)•Ground Operations – 14,159.5•CIED/CIDF – 14,567.25•Target Development – 14,226.5•Total hours – 42,953

Still Imagery (images)•U2 – 21,068•Global Hawk – 20,495•TACRECCE – 1,069

HUMINT Reporting

SPOT Reports:  316DIIR: 10500SIR:  6711KB:  1190Sources evaluated:  80

SIGINT Reporting

TACREPS – 6,762KL – 7558 Tippers – 186

DOMEX Reporting

Documents – 2744Media – 2562 itemsCELLEX – 1022 items

SYNC MATRIX

AIR ASSETS

TIKRIT- SPEICHER  

1-1 (AH-64D) 17

1-6 /6-17(OH-58D) 20

3-1/2-1 (UH-60L) 34

2-1 (CH-47D) 12

2-1 (HH-60A MED) 4

MOSUL - MAREZ  

1-1 (AH-64D) 7

6-17 (OH-58D) 10

2-1 (UH-60L) 3

2-1 (HH-60A MED) 3

KIRKUK  

1-6 (OH-58D) 20

6-17 (UH-60L) 5

2-1 (HH-60A MED) 3TAL AFAR - SYKES  

6-17 (OH-58D) 10

6-17 (UH-60L) 6

2-1 (HH-60A MED) 2

Operations

Hours FlownType Hours

AH-64D 27,287OH-58D 64,922UH-60 42,146CH-47 7,849HH-60 2,158

SAFIRESUnit SAFIRES Effective

4-6 CAV 73 14 TF 1-6 11 1 TF 1-1 24 1

2-1 GSAB 14 2 TF 3-1 35 4

TF 6-17 9 1TF ODIN 4 0

TST 613Air Assaults 199

BFC 4,248Personnel moved 127,012Cargo Moved (TONS) 5,875Total Missions 27,153AMRs Supported 40,389MEDEVAC Missions 1,288Patients EVACd 2194

MND-N Aviation SupportOCT 07 – DEC 08

Total Hours by MNDDivision Hours

MND-N 144,362MND-B 61,314MND-C 91,127CORPS 53,584

MND-N MRAP Fielding

MND-N Units

MRAP Type Issued

O/H

1/10 (IBCT)

AH I Caiman

357 357

1-67 AR Caiman + 87 87

Div Trps/ 18 EN

BAE IICougar II

115 2 117

MND-N Total

Mixed 1288 1288

3 ACR (HBCT+)

IMG I

50BAE II 50

305

3721/101 (IBCT)

AH I Caiman

1/25(SBCT)

372

305

MRAP fielding began 5 Nov 07 for MND-N

MND-N Units

MRAP Type Issued

O/H

18 EN RG-33L 1 1

1-67 AR RG-33L 3 3

MND-N Total

Mixed 85 85

4 21

RG-33LMP+

12 14

25

12 18

3 ACR (HBCT+)

RG-33L MP+

30

261/101 (IBCT)

1/25(SBCT)

RG-33L MP+

HAGA – Heavy Armored Ground Ambulance(RG-33L & Maxx Pro + Amb)

Good Stewardship

DIRECTIVE

Reduce and clean upthe MND-Nfootprint

RECOMMENDED WAY AHEADAs troop reductions occur, requirements todetermine disposition of commercial off theshelf (COTS) and government purchasedItems (i.e. ICOMs, computers, UGSs)

How do we draw down equipment in theaterICW troop drawdowns?

•Drawdown troops or contractors first?-Drives equipment pushes out of theater-Drives CONUS-based RESET programs

•The “pipe” out of theater is only so big!

Programs to ease complexity to retrogradeequipment in theater, such as mobile one-stopTeams for CDRs/supply SGTs to turn-in equipment

ACCOMPLISHMENTSOver 220,000 excess CL II,III(P), IV, V, VI, VII, and IXreturned to the DoD systemDollar value returned = over $88 million

IMPLEMENTATION OFCommand emphasis on commandsupply discipline in combat Quarterly FRAGOs directing inventories/excess scrubs of CL VII(major end items)Implementation of Mobile Redistribution Teams (MRTs) forCL II, III(P), IV, VI, and IX items

OCT 07

DEC 08

Only the tip of the iceberg!

LOG Metrics

MND-N Fire Missions = 4372 - HE = over 17,200 rds - GMLRS = 66 - Excalibur = 7

Kinetic Strike Packages = 47 - Executed 30 (22 x CAS, 8 x GMLRS, 3 x both)

ASRs = 7200 were supported

24

581671

3096

4372

Fire Missions by Province

Excalibur

GMLRS

MND-N Fire SupportOCT 07 – DEC 08

Multiple Launch Rocket System

M109A6 Paladin 155mm Howitzer (SP)

MND-N Sorties ISO TICs: 676TICs w/ Drops: 145TIC’s w/ SOF: 68

BDACACHE: 14EKIA: 156EWIA: 9VBIED: 18HBIED: 74IED: 11

Munitions DroppedGBU-38: 284GBU-31: 68GBU-12: 74

Close Air Support Roll-upOCT 07 – DEC 08

MND-N Base CampsMND-N Engineers constructed 22 Coalition bases across northern Iraq since OCT 07.

MND-N Bases

135 Total

COB

COS

COL

Corps

IA w/MiTT

** IA & ISF bases not shown

HESCOs of FreedomHESCOs of Freedom

Engineer Mobility ReserveTF Iron Engineers established an Engineer Mobility Reserve (EMR) for MND-N. The EMR consists of 2 x AVLBs, 1 x MV-4, 2 x Panthers, 2 x MICLICs, 4 Wolverines, 4 x REBs, and 1 HET. The reserve is maintained by the Division Engineer Brigade (111th and 18th) and is used as the Division Reserve Mobility package. BCTs can request the reserve equipment and personnel ISO breaching and clearing operations where BCTs have limited internal capabilities. The reserve has been used for Operation Iron Harvest, Operation Iron Pursuit, and clearing operations along ASR Golden and the Siniyah Berms.

WOLVERINE Employment - Diyala

AVLB - Mosul

MICLIC employment - Diyala

Panther in use - Diyala

Culvert Denial & Crater Repair

• MND-N Construction Engineers since TOA:– repaired 2820 craters on MSRs, ASRs, and BCT and BN routes– Denied 365 culverts on MSRs, ASRs, and BCT and BN routes

Crater repair – 326thEN BN, 18th EN BDE

Culvert Denial Mission – 94th EN BN, 18th EN BDE

Route Clearance

Route Clearance Patrols across MND-N from Oct 07 – Dec 08:– Found and Cleared 1,300 IEDs

– Cleared over 1 million kilometers of ASRs, MSRs and BCT and BN routes

– EOCA qualified SAPPERs reduced over 1,000 UXOs and IEDs

Buffalo Interrogating suspected IED

Husky

AN/PSS 14

Sustain Soldier QOLsustaining, maintaining and optimizing a viable quality of life for MND-N Soldiers

• 41 Division QOL team site assessments

• Weekly QOL Assessments by BDE and BN Teams at 67 + Contingency Operating Locations across MND-N

7 Focus Areas• Living Conditions

• Shower and Latrine

• Food Service

• Commo (Spaware)

• MWR (Gym, AFN)

• Health (Medical Care, Field Sanitation)

• Other (REL SPT, Force Protection, Safety)

Casualties TrendsOCT 07 – NOV 08

• RTD for WIA: 68%• RTD for DNBI: 74%• 4,720 hours of rotary wing MEDEVAC flown in MND-N carrying 2011 patients

• RTD for WIA: 68%• RTD for DNBI: 74%• 4,720 hours of rotary wing MEDEVAC flown in MND-N carrying 2011 patients

Dec

MND-N Casualties

CASUALTY

MONTH KIA DOW DNBD VSI SI NSI TOTAL

OCT 07 1 2 0 0 1 12 16NOV 07 14 3 0 2 18 37 74DEC 07 7 2 0 4 13 93 119JAN 08 19 2 1 2 12 70 106FEB 08 5 1 1 2 8 64 81MAR 08 5 0 1 2 5 53 66APR 08 5 4 2 1 10 60 82MAY 08 0 3 0 1 2 63 69JUN 08 7 1 1 1 9 64 83JUL 08 0 3 1 1 6 80 91AUG 08 0 0 2 1 7 55 65SEP 08 0 1 1 2 2 49 55OCT 08 0 3 1 0 1 36 41NOV 08 2 1 5 3 7 24 42DEC 08 2 0 0 0 2 3 7

CATEGORY TOTAL 67 26 16 22 103 763 997TOTAL

DECEASED WIA

109 888

Distinguished Service Cross – 1Silver Star – 8

Distinguished Flying Cross – 5Soldier’s Medal – 3

Bronze Star for Valor – 54Bronze Star – 4,210Purple Heart – 702

Air Medal for Valor – 37Air Medal – 813

Army Commendation Medal for Valor – 13Army Commendation Medal – 1,131

Combat Infantry Badge (2nd Award) – 12Combat Infantry Badge – 2,035

Combat Medic Badge – 229Combat Action Badge – 3,628

TF Iron Observations

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUOUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Division Observations fromthe 07-09 Fight (1 of 4)

•Role of the DIV HQ–In operations, MND-N, Task Force Iron served as an operational level HQ.–In line with FM 3.0/FM 3.07, DIVs promote economics, governance, and rule of law, but do so without having subject matter expertise in key areas.–There is a requirement for the integration of all non-DoD actors within the DIV HQ staff through an MOU with the particular agency.

•Organization of the DIV HQ–There is a distinction between the DIV & BCT “fight” in lethal versus non-lethal operations.–Must integrate PRT at DIV (as well as BCT) levels.–Division/Task Force requires augmentation of G8, EWO, SJA, Medical, CA, and Engineers, based on mission load beyond unit support.

Division Observations fromthe 07-09 Fight (2 of 4)

•MND in a “steady-state” environment–Consider a rotational construct to maintain continuity, relationships, memory (section, individual)–Embed a staff team early (90-150 days) to gain better situational understanding

•Training–Redesign the BCTP training model.–Integrate PRT/SOF/CIA/OCFI (interagency) into DIV train-up…NOT replication, but duplicate.–Critical requirement to gain understanding of HN governance, economics, infrastructure, and rule of law systems beyond what is presented at the BCTP seminars. (“REACH FORWARD” with SVTC and current TF)–Incorporate “value chain analysis for dummies” for economic advancement.–IO/PA training to shape conditions in the environment (must change the way we prepare for this critical task).–EWO requirement as an Army-specific task (no longer AF/USN).–MRAP training for both home station and CTCs.

Division Observations fromthe 07-09 Fight (3 of 4)

•ISF Development–Senior ISF leader development and enabler process development will be driving the ISF focus of the future (potential for mini Marshall Center?). –DIV/BCT staffs are not designed to “mentor” provincial Operations Commands (rank structure).–Attending Phoenix/COIN Academy in theater is too late. Need to understand ISF organization, personalities, and processes prior to deployment. (“REACH FORWARD”)

•Modular DIV/BCT Structure–LNOs and Rear Detachment not part of the MTOE; must establish beyond MSE.–UAS company at AVN BDE (CAB) unsupported. Recommend build within CAB due to safety and standardization issues.–Requirements for enhanced logistics, engineers, fires, and intel for surge at Division level.–Policy on females below the BCT level must change.–Dissimilar Intel capabilities at different types of BCTs defeats modular capability (different MICOs in HBCT, IBCT, CAV REGT, and STRYKER).

Division Observations fromthe 07-09 Fight (4 of 4)

•Training Core/Directed Mission Tasks –Must train with other non-DoD government agencies.–Directed tasks will focus on Baghdad scenario while core tasks are oriented on traditional Division C2 roles. Must do both.–Plug into MND-B Battle Rhythm early. Regularly schedule events/SVTCs with MND-B staff (real world vignette). –Gain directed METL from higher HQ (I and/or III Corps) beginning in AUG 09.–DIV Annual Training Guidance directed at Division staff and sent to BCTs joining us in the fight.

The FRSA program is excellent but could be improved:

Allocation should be based on number of soldiers in a unit, not task organization.

There should be two FRSAs at the BCT level.

The hiring process needs simplification.

1 AD FRG Observations

Modularization of the Army Structure has significantly hampered effective FRG and Rear Detachment operations and in particular the Chain of Command responsibilities and Chain of Concern effectiveness.

Currently there is no consistent standard from post to post.

Recommend DA must create a rear detachment / FRG certification process.

Recommend regional FRG leaders develop programs for coaching and mentoring BCT senior FRG leaders. The traditional structure of the chain of concern no longer exists.

USAREUR FRG / Rear Detachment Observations

Sustain current certifications and directives for rear detachments and family

readiness groups.

USAREUR has provided detailed instructions on the training and tasks of rear detachment and family readiness groups. This is not the sameacross the entire Army.

Due to legal and medical issues with stay behind Soldiers, the cadre of rear detachments must be enhanced or chapter and medical boards must be Expedited prior to deployment.

USAREUR / CONUS FRG Observations

There are some unique differences between a OCONUS and CONUS FRG:

Geographically disbursement of family support services – in CONUS almost all family support services can be found at one convenient location. In USAREUR this support may be dispersed over multiple locations and hours Apart.

Civilian Support Agencies - In USAREUR the support services offered by the Army are all that exist. In CONUS there are other available civilian support agencies by city, county and state.

Direct family support for critical issues – in USAREUR, child care provided by direct family members is not readily available in most cases because of thegreat distances, money involved for travel, and housing limitations.

Family Support Agencies supporting each other - In USAREUR, family support services can easily cover down on alternate locations, while in CONUS the installations are too far apart to provide assistance support for surge periods.

Summary