Heterodox Currents in China’s Cultural Revolution:

A Case Study of Guangzhou

by

Heng Ge

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Department of East Asian Studies University of Toronto

© Copyright by Heng Ge 2012

ii

Heterodox Currents in China’s Cultural Revolution:

A Case Study of Guangzhou

Heng Ge

Master of Arts

Department of East Asian Studies University of Toronto

2012

Abstract

This thesis aims to explore heterodox ideological currents that developed in the

Cultural Revolution, focusing on the background and writings of the “August 5” activists

and the Li Yizhe group in Guangzhou. While the Cultural Revolution produced

catastrophic consequences in many regards, this thesis intends to show that there are still

ways in which young participants exercised their independent thinking and developed

novel political ideas that significantly diverged from the official ideology. Beginning

with an overview of the development of the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou, I study

the analyses of the “August 5” activists and the Li Yizhe group as well as examine how

their heterodox views about China’s social and political system were inspired by their

participation in the movement.

iii

Table of Contents

Introduction ......................................................................................................................1

The Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou ...........................................................................4

Emergence of Heterodox Voices—The “August 5 Theory” .........................................11

The Foshan Conference .........................................................................................12

Voices from the Opposition ...................................................................................14

“Stillness before a Fierce Combat” .......................................................................16

“Guangzhou Must Undergo More Turmoil” .........................................................20

The End: Suppression and Demobilization ............................................................23

Socialism, Democracy, and Legality—The Li Yizhe Manifesto ...................................26

The Group and Its Members ..................................................................................28

The Manifesto ........................................................................................................31

The Fate of the Li Yizhe Group .............................................................................43

Conclusion .....................................................................................................................47

Bibliography ..................................................................................................................50

1

Introduction

In 1981, fifteen years after the eruption of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese

Communist Party (CCP) leadership officially declared this period to be a “catastrophe,”

one that had led the nation to chaos. The Red Guard rebels, once enthusiastically devoted

to the movement, were now described as the “lost generation.” These young rebels had

been called to attack, criticize, and struggle, in the name of proletarian revolution, against

the party’s élites and institutions. As described by Anita Chan in her book Children of

Mao, they were the “political activists” who sincerely believed that China could be made

into a prosperous and politically pure society through widespread commitment on the part

of the masses.1

But after less than three years of tumult, many of the young rebels already had

become disillusioned with the power struggles among the élites and turned politically

inactive. There were, however, a number of Chinese youth who persisted with their

critical attack of the party leaders and political system, and they held firm in their belief

that the battle was worth fighting. The Cultural Revolution, to which these activists were

devoted, vastly broadened their intellectual and political horizons, teaching them that

dissent is possible. Although couched in language burdened by the cult of Mao, their

writings were often thought-provoking and moved beyond the official ideology of the

CCP. A common characteristic among authors of these “heterodox” writings is that they

were often veteran rebels who had been activists in the Cultural Revolution. They were

1 Anita Chan, Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation (London: Macmillan, 1985), 6.

2

among those who most enthusiastically responded to Mao’s call “to rebel against

authority” and who were suppressed severely by the Party authorities during the

subsequent factional struggle and demobilization campaigns. In 1967–1968, for example,

rebel groups such as the Shengwulian in Hunan, the “Bei, Jue, Yang” in Wuhan, the

Anti-Restoration Society in Shanghai, and the Bohai Battle Regiment in Shandong all

produced critical analyses of China’s political system and suffered similar fate. These

groups and their writings were regarded as “heterodox” by many of their contemporaries

and often were labeled “reactionary” by the Party authorities.

As elsewhere in China, some young rebels in Guangzhou attempted to exercise

their independent thinking, and they developed novel interpretations of the meaning of

the Cultural Revolution—and in ways that significantly diverged from the official

ideology. The so-called “August 5 Theory” (ba wu lilun) and “On Socialist Democracy

and the Legal System”—the big-character poster produced by the Li Yizhe group in 1974,

were among the heterodox currents of thought which emerged in the city. This paper will

examine their writings as they derived from the development of the Cultural Revolution. I

intend to show that even though many consequences of the Cultural Revolution could

with good reason be characterized as catastrophic, there are still ways in which young

participants exercised their individual thinking and developed independent political and

social analyses.

In the first section, I will describe the development of the Cultural Revolution in

Guangzhou, and in particular, the rebels’ participation in and response to the movement.

The second section will introduce the background of the “August 5 Theory” and examine

the writings of “August 5” activists. While focusing on two representative works of the

3

episode, “Stillness before a Fierce Combat” and “Guangzhou Must Undergo More

Turmoil,” in this section I try to show how the “August 5 Theory” was developed and to

explain why it was both “heterodox” and at the same time also significant to the main

current of Guangzhou’s rebel movement. Then, in the third section, and in discussions of

the Li Yizhe’s “On Socialist Democracy and the Legal System,” I will try to sketch out

the distinctive features of their writings and to evaluate their perspectives. The section

will center on the activities of key members of the Li Yizhe group and on the

development of their manifesto. I will examine the exposition of the writers’ political

analyses as well as their demand for democracy and legality. In doing so, I hope to

provide a better understanding of the political and ideological differentiations that

emerged in the Cultural Revolution.

4

The Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou

The students’ involvement in the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou started in

August 1966, as Mao received tens of thousands Red Guards at Tiananmen Square.

Inspired by the movement in Beijing, Guangzhou’s students began to form their own Red

Guard organizations. When the students from Beijing on “exchange of experience”

missions (chuanlian) arrived in Guangzhou, the local students were encouraged and

began to leave the city to network with the Red Guards in other provinces. The chuanlian

movement broke regional boundaries, and reinforced the communication and mutual

understandings among people from different areas. A far-reaching implication was that

the experience allowed young students to obtain a better understanding about the

characteristics of the CCP, and provoked doubts that would later undermine their faith in

the Chinese Communist regime.2 From this moment and onward, instead of an activism

performed under institutional pressures, political participation now was left to one’s own

choice. This shift, according to Anita Chan, was accompanied by changes in the young

people’s conception of themselves, of the party and, later, even of Mao.3

By October 1966, students from different backgrounds took the opportunity to

join or establish their own Red Guard organizations. The groups were of different sizes,

ranging from as small as a couple of members to large groups consisting of thousand of

members. Many student leaders sought to strengthen their organization by expanding and

2 Hai Feng, Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe [An Account of the Cultural Revolution in the Canton Area] (Xianggang: Youlian Yanjiusuo, 1971), 51. 3 Chan, Children of Mao, 125.

5

consolidating internally and externally, eventually forming inter-school coalitions.4 The

most active organizations included: Zhongshan University August 31, South China

Engineering Institute Red Flag, Zhongshan University Red Flag, and Guangzhou Medical

College Red Flag.5 These organizations were to become the core of the Red Flag faction,

a rebel coalition that would be formed later in Guangzhou.

As the Guangzhou’s movement proceeded, conflicts among rebel and

conservative groups started to emerge. The first major incident in the development of

factionalism was the closure of the Red Guard News (hongwei bao), formerly known as

Yangcheng wanbao. The debates and conflicts over whether or not the newspaper should

be closed down were the beginning of the growing factional division in Guangzhou’s Red

Guard movement.6 The incident took place on December 13, 1966 attended by twenty-

four rebel organizations from Guangzhou and other regions such as Beijing, Harbin,

Hunan, and Hubei provinces. Opponents of the action clashed with the rebels. In the

violent conflicts between the rebels and the supporters of the newspaper, the incipient

factional alignment that would dominate Guangzhou’s Cultural Revolution movement

was born. Opponents of the closure organized into two large workers organizations, the

Red General Headquarters (hong zong) and the District General Headquarters (di zong),

joining the conservative alliance.

4 Stanley Rosen, Red Guard Factionalism and the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou (Canton) (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 126. 5 Hai Feng, Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe, 54. 6 Ibid., 66-68.

6

With the “power seizure” in January 1967, the splits of Guangzhou’s mass

movement worsened, especially with the division within the rebel groups. On January 22,

eight local and nine outside organizations participated in the “power seizure” and

together they formed the “Guangdong Provincial Revolutionary Alliance” or

Shenggelian. While the conservative organizations made no move to prevent its

implementation, the “power seizure,” however, encountered oppositions from other rebel

organizations which believed that the time was premature.

With the involvement of the local military, the rebels who initiated the “power

seizure” soon came under pressures. After a series of “power seizures” by the

Shenggelian, the conservatives staged a counter attack supported by the People’s

Liberation Army (PLA).7 On February 8, 1967, the Shenggelian organizations raided the

Guangzhou Military Region (GMR) with the cooperation of the rebels inside the PLA.

The incident, which opened the conflicts between the rebels and the military, was a

significant turning point. It provided Huang Yongsheng, the commander of the GMR, the

opportunity to abandon his public neutrality and start taking actions against the rebels.8

At the same time, the conservative organizations obtained support from the military and

shifted their allegiance from the provincial and municipal Party Committees to the PLA.

In the following month, the military in Guangzhou started cracking down on the

rebels. On March 1, the GMR banned the August 1 Combat Corps (bayi zhandou

bingtuan), a rebel organization consisted of disgruntled veterans and workers, accusing it

7 Hai Feng, Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe, 83-84. 8 Rosen, Red Guard Factionalism, 133.

7

of being a reactionary organization. The military also banned several other important

rebel organizations such as Pearl River Film Studio East is Red as well as many small

organizations under the Shenggelian. Thousands were arrested. Although Shenggelian’s

student organizations including Zhongshan University Red Flag and Zhongshan

University August 31 were not banned, they were forced to stop staging public activities.

This period was condemned by the rebels as the “March Black Wind.”

While Shenggelian rebels withdrew from their dissolved units, the conservative

organizations accelerated their expansion with the support of the military. These

organizations, which owed the strength to their ties with the PLA, raised the slogan

“March’s east wind blows with mighty power; the military control achieves glorious

victories” (sanyue dongfeng haodang, junguan chengji huihuang) and named themselves

East Wind faction. They became the major forces later in the armed conflicts and the

suppressions of the rebels with the support of the local military.

The events in April brought about a sharp turn in the fortunes of the rebels when

the central leadership in Beijing provided its support. On April 6, the Central Military

Affairs Commission issued a ten-point directive that severely limited the power of the

PLA in its dealings with Red Guard organizations.9 The most visible support the rebels

received at this time came from Zhou Enlai’s visit to Guangzhou in mid-April. During his

short stay, Zhou received several times the representatives from the Red Guard

organizations. He declared that Zhongshan University Red Flag, South China

9 “Zhongyang junwei shitiao mingling” [Central Military Affairs Commission 10 Point Directive], April 6, 1967, collected in Song Yongyi, Wenhua Dageming Wenku [The Chinese Cultural Revolution Database], (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006).

8

Engineering Institute Red Flag, and Guangzhou Medical Institute Red Flag were all

leftist organizations and praised them as the “Three Red Flags” (sanmian hongqi). Since

then, the rebels named themselves Red Flag faction or Flag faction.10 During the same

meetings, Zhou pointed out the Red General Headquarters and the District General

Headquarters, two leading East Wind faction organizations, leaned towards

“conservatism.” Encouraged by Zhou’s speeches, on April 22, the Red Rebel

Headquarters (hongsi zaofan silingbu), also called Red Headquarters (hongsi), were set

up under the leadership of Zhongshan University Red Flag.

Even though the local military retreated, it nevertheless still exerted influence. A

series of notices were issued by the Guangzhou’s PLA against the Flag faction. The most

important of these was issued on May 30, and hinted broadly that the responsibility for

the current confusion in the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou was due to actions of

some organizations affiliated with the Flag faction.11 As a result, the Flag faction became

more and more openly opposed to the GMR and to its leader, Huang Yongsheng. The

tensions between the rebels and the PLA-supported conservatives finally led to violent

confrontations. On April 22, Guangzhou’s Doctrine Guards (zhuyi bing), a conservative

organization led largely by children of high-level cadre and military background, stirred

up the first violent conflict, opening the prelude for the “armed struggle” between two

10 Liu Guokai, Guangzhou Hongqipai de Xingwang [The Rise and Fall of the Guangzhou Red Flag Faction] (Xianggang: Boda Chubanshe, 2006), 87-88. 11 Rosen, Red Guard Factionalism, 202.

9

factions for the following months.12 In August, the month that the violence reached its

highest peak, the city of Guangzhou was almost at a scene of civil war.13

The violent clashes in Guangzhou caught the attention of the Party leaders in

Beijing. In mid-August 1967, Zhou Enlai received Flag faction representatives in Beijing

and reviewed various Guangzhou’s issues with them. These meetings, under Zhou’s

direction, opened a series of meetings known as the “Beijing Peace Talks.” The talks

began in late August and lasted until mid-November and involved representatives from

both the Red Flag and the East Wind factions. At first, Zhou not only supported the

positions espoused by the Flag faction organizations but also made it clear that they were

the key to the success of the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou.14 The task of

maintaining public order and safety was to be placed in large part in the hands of the

rebels. At the same time, the local military was under pressure to issue a written self-

criticism which admitted its mistakes in denouncing the Shenggelian.

Starting in October, however, the development of Cultural Revolution took a

different turn and support to the rebels waned. Nationwide, the emphasis was on unity.

Although it was Mao who inspired the Chinese people to rebel against authority, by this

time he was anxious to put an end to the “nationwide civil war” through forging “great

12 Hai Feng, Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe, 144. 13 Ibid., 177. 14 Rosen, Red Guard Factionalism, 207.

10

alliances” by all mass organizations and establish a new order in China.15 The

revolutionary committees, essentially a traditional CCP-style bureaucracy, were

established throughout provinces in response to Mao’s call to “forge great alliances.”16

As the national direction changed, the support from the Central Committee that

Guangzhou’s rebels received soon faded. The focus at the moment was to restore order

and establish the alliance between Guangzhou’s two factions under the leadership of

revolutionary committees.

15 Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 239. 16 Ibid., 239-240.

11

Emergence of Heterodox Voices—The “August 5 Theory”

It is against this background that the “August 5” activists developed ideas which

diverged from the guidelines that the authorities were promoting. The changing policies

in Guangzhou compelled the young participants to think through issues on their own and

to come up with their own standpoints. From the military’s self-criticism to the alliance

with the PLA-supported East Wind faction, some Flag faction members began to

question the policies issued by the CCP Central Committee. Their distrust of political

leaders, developed through more than a year of participation in the tumultuous mass

movement, taught them how to deal with the situation with caution.

Based on the new direction of the Cultural Revolution set by the central

leadership, the Preparatory Provincial Revolutionary Committee of Guangdong led by

General Huang Yongsheng was established on November 12, 1967.17 The Flag faction

leaders dutifully shifted their focus to accommodate the moderate policies being pursued

by the Beijing leadership. The emphasis on unity, however, caused concerns and

confusion within the Flag faction. Many Flag faction members cast doubts on the

military. A significant number of the rebels questioned both the central leadership and

their own leaders in Guangzhou. As the politics of moderation continued throughout

autumn and winter, these Flag faction members, in effect the “radical rebels” in the

Cultural Revolution, began to take the initial steps toward formulating a heterodox

17 “Guanyu Guangdong wenti de jueding” [The Decision’s on Guangdong’s Issues], November 12, 1967, collected in Hai Feng, Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe, 1971, 284-285.

12

analysis of Chinese society, arriving at an explanation of the successes and failures of the

Cultural Revolution to date that was far removed from official accounts.18

The Foshan Conference

In order to ease the doubts and unify the Flag faction, a conference was held in

the city of Foshan attended by most of its major units. The meeting, held from December

12 to December 19, was called to sum up the situation as the Flag faction leaders viewed

it by that time, and to arrive at a unified policy for the future. The main points of the

conference were the self-criticism of the previous attitudes towards the PLA and

advocacy of the alliance with the East Wind faction. The Flag leaders expressed their

support for Huang Yongsheng as well as the newly established Provincial Revolutionary

Preparatory Small Group. The meeting issued a statement entitled “Minutes of the

Foshan Conference,” claiming that “the general situation has already become fixed and

power has been grasped” (daju yiding, daquan zaiwo) as well as reaffirming Flag

faction’s support for the policy of consolidation.19

Rather than developing a unified policy for the Flag faction, however, the Foshan

meeting only worsened the split within the group. The “Minutes of the Foshan

Conference” immediately suffered resistance and accusations. The conference was

severely denounced through big-character posters put forward by the groups which

charged that the conference “completely denied the two line struggles and blamed all the

18 Rosen, Red Guard Factionalism, 198. 19 Hai Feng, Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe, 324.

13

responsibilities to factionalism.”20 In place of the slogan “the general situation has

already become fixed and power has been grasped,” they substituted “the general

situation is still undecided and power is still in dispute” (daju weiding, daquan

zaizheng).21

The theme of unity was echoed in a speech by Huang Yongsheng, the head of the

Preparatory Provincial Revolutionary Committee. On December 12, the committee held a

meeting at Zhongshan Memorial Hall attended by the representatives from both the

conservative and rebel factions. At the meeting, Huang delivered an important speech in

which he stated:

Some organizations and some people have a debate of principle on the question of who should be the core of the alliance. ... It is incorrect to appoint any of our organizations to be the core. ... [It is] necessary to eagerly and patiently help those comrades who had been influenced by “ultra-left” ideas.

Recently, the atmosphere in Guangzhou has become tense and factionalism is serious. Some people do not act according to Chairman Mao’s instructions and yet they accuse other organizations of being “Right” and “conservative” and hinder them by all possible means.22

In his speech, Huang pointed out that the most important thing at the moment was to end

armed conflicts and obtain unity. He also urged the return of all those still in Guangzhou

on chuanlian missions to their own provinces. In particular, he singled out Xiang River

20 Hai Feng, Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe, p. 328. 21 Ibid., p. 328. 22 “Huang Yongsheng tongzhi dui Guangzhou ge geming qunzhong zuzhi fuzeren de jianghua (zhaiyao)” [Comrade Huang Yongsheng’s Speech to Responsible Persons of Revolutionary Mass Organizations of Guangzhou (Excerpt)], December 12, 1967, collected in Hai Feng, Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe, 1971. English translation is quoted in Survey of China Mainland Press, #4098, January 12, 1968, p. 5-6.

14

Storm (xiang jiang feng lei) from Hunan province. Composed largely of dissatisfied

students, white-collar personnel, and workers, the organization spawned the development

of Shengwulian, which would become nationally famous through the writings of Yang

Xiguang as the best-known “ultra-left” groups in China.23

Voices from the Opposition

The Foshan conference and Huang’s speech were immediately criticized by some

of the rebels. Slogans such as Huang Yongsheng’s report “aimed at breaking up the

rebels” and “was a huge poisonous weed” were posted all over Guangzhou’s streets. The

oppositions reflected the conflict between the Flag’s militant and moderate wings. The

widely adopted “reformism” (gailiang zhuyi) within the Flag faction generated a force of

resistance from the “ultra-left” members who advocated the theory of “a thorough

revolution” (chedi geming).24 One of the most influential radical groups was the August 5

Commune (ba wu gongshe). The group published a newspaper named August 5. Along

with Red Guard publications such as August 1 Combat Bulletin, Commentary on the

Cultural Revolution, and October Torchlight, the writings from these “ultra-left” groups

were often called “August 5 Theory.”

The “August 5” activists began their discussions on the current political situations

soon after the Preparatory Provincial Revolutionary Committee was established. First, the

“August 5” activists began to question the optimistic views promulgated within the Red

23 For more details about Xiang River Storm please reference Unger, “Whither China,” 1991. 24 Hai Feng, Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe, 329.

15

Flag faction. On the crucial issue of power, they argued that the great alliance did not

guarantee that the power was in the hands of the rebels:

Some of the heads said that “the power is now in our hand” and “the founding of the Guangdong Provincial Preparatory Group for the Revolutionary Committee has announced the complete collapse of the black headquarters of Tao and Zhao and announced that the proletarian headquarters has held firmly the political power in Guangdong.” First of all, let us see whether or not the power is in our hand! The Provincial Preparatory Group is trusted by the Central Committee, and of that there should be no doubt. However, it is still a preparatory group. What is there to prepare? To prepare two responsible teams, is it enough to rely on only two responsible comrades of the Central-South Bureau and five from the military region? Exceedingly few of the provincial and municipal leading cadres have been outstanding, and none of the principal leaders’ character can be confirmed! Furthermore, power cannot be an empty framework. It should include the power of all districts and units at the basic levels and all the departments. This power should be seized from the bottom up. It is impossible for the Provincial Preparatory Group to give power to them one by one from the top down. Is power now entirely in the hands of proletarian revolutionaries in all units? You may count the great number of factories from the People’s Brigade onward. Can you point out any one of them “holding power in it hand?!”25

The Red Headquarters Call-to-Arms Combat Group (hong si nahan) led by Li Zhengtian,

a leading member of the later Li Yizhe group, was one of these organizations that also

advocated the attacks on this optimist view. In the article “Ten Differences—Criticism of

the Current Reformism in Guangzhou,” the group asserted, “the belief that ‘we hold the

power’ is the opium that poisons our fighting spirit; we must criticize it.” The article also

pointed out that some Flag faction leaders “betrayed the revolutionary principles for their

immediate interests.”26

25 Sansi zhanbao [Bulletin of The Third Headquarters], Issue 38, August 24, 1967, quoted in Rosen, Red Guard Factionalism, 215-216. 26 Liu Guokai, Guangzhou Hongqipai de Xingwang, 161.

16

The “August 5” activists turned harsh criticism against the “Minutes of the

Foshan Conference” and Huang Yongsheng’s speech. They pointed out that with the

rising power of the conservatives, the so-called “level off mountain strongholds”

(chanping shantou) and “unconditional great alliance” (wu tiaojian dalianhe) was, in

fact, a counterattack used by the conservatives through a seemingly peaceful method

against the rebels. They warned that suppression and bribery were the new strategies

adopted by the conservatives. In addition to criticism on political issues, the “August 5”

activists also addressed social problems. Some activists attempted to re-define class in

ways based on the traditional Marxist concept of ownership. They proclaimed, “We

should re-divide the class at this moment!” They believed that current contradictions

were between those who had climbed up to the throne of power and those rusticated

youth, contract workers and temporary workers who lived under the worst social

conditions and suffered the most.27

Two of the most representative works among these critics were Yu Hong’s

“Stillness before A Fierce Battle” and an anonymous article “Guangzhou Must Undergo

More Turmoil.” Both articles warned that the rebels who advocated the great alliance

were being too optimistic, and urged the rebels to continue to fight for themselves.

“Stillness Before A Fierce Combat”

In February 1968, August 5 published its most representative article entitled

“Stillness before a Fierce Combat—A Comment on Problems Concerning Guangzhou’s

27 Hai Feng, Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe, 329-330; Liu, Guangzhou Hongqipai de Xingwang, 160.

17

Current Political Situation.” The article urged the rebels who embraced optimistic views

for the great alliance to abandon their over-confidence and to analyze the situation with

caution. The author was Yu Hong, a student at Guangzhou Labour University. Also

known by his birth name Deng Yanrong, Yu Hong was born to a “black five categories”

family.28 Despite the excellence in high school study, upon graduation he was assigned to

Guangzhou Labour University, a school held in relative low reputation in the region.

From June 1966 to March 1967, Yu Hong participated in the closure of Guangzhou Red

Guard News, the “power seizure” as well as other political events, and had earned his

reputation as a rebel leader due to his political vision and organizational capability.

In April 1967, Yu Hong and some like-minded activists founded the first

Marxism–Leninism Study Group in Guangdong.29 During the group’s first meeting, Yu

Hong pointed out the importance and urgency to establish a party based on the principles

of a genuine Marxism-Leninism. The fruit of the meeting was a programmatic document

entitled “The Manifesto of the Marxism-Leninism Group.” Unlike most of their

contemporaries, whose accusations of the Party leaders saw a strong influence of

Maoism, the authors of the Manifesto not only challenged the leadership of the CCP but

reportedly also questioned the authority of Mao.30 In the introduction, they pointed out

28 The following account is drawn from Zuo Shiyi, “Hongweibing yundong zhong yige bei yiwang de ren he shi: Yu Hong yu Guangdong diyige ma lie zhuyi xiaozu” [A Forgotten Man and His Stories during the Red Guard Movement: Yu Hong and The First Marxism-Leninism Group in Guangdong], Guancha Jia [The Observer] 18 (April 1979): 47-53. “Black five categories” refers to landlords, rich farmers, counterrevolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists. 29 Zuo Shiyi, “Yige bei yiwang de ren he shi,” 49. 30 Ibid., 50.

18

that the CCP could not be counted as a proletarian political party either in terms of its

structure or what it had done to the people. The CCP had implemented the feudal one-

party dictatorship from the very beginning, forming a massive bureaucracy to suppress

the demand for democracy. The leader in the throne of this massive bureaucracy was

Mao who, like an emperor, held the power of final judgment. They also suggested that in

order to achieve proletarian democracy and socialism, it must undergo political

revolutions to overthrow the rule of the “fascistic-feudalistic party of the CCP.” They

divided the path to takeover the rule of the CCP into three stages: the first stage was the

ongoing Cultural Revolution that weakened the rule of the bureaucratic class, forcing the

privileged to make concessions to the people; the second stage should further weaken the

bureaucratic class and defeat its leadership; the third stage should overthrow the

bureaucratic class and establish a new society. The document was only circulated within

the very small group, and this perhaps saved Yu Hong from political troubles.

In later May, Yu Hong and other two group members went secretly on a

chuanlian mission in Hunan to meet with the group founded by Yang Xiguang, later a

key member of the Shengwulian and a renowned author due to his article “Whither

China?” After coming back from Hunan, Yu Hong established several organizations,

among them, the August 5 Commune became the most militant Red Guard organization

in Guangzhou.

In late January 1968, Hunan’s Shengwulian group was denounced by the leaders

of the CCP as a counter-revolutionary organization because it advocated the complete

eradication of the privileged stratum and the state apparatus. It was labeled as “ultra-left,”

and deemed dangerous. Its members were arrested and the theories articulated in article

19

such as “Whither China?” were denounced. In spite of foreseeing dangers, on February

14, Yu Hong republished “Whither China?” on the first page of the August 5 without a

word of denunciation. In order to invite discussions, he also published the criticism of the

Shengwulian by Kang Sheng, a top party leader, as well as republished another article

“Warning for Guangdong’s Shengwulian—From the Fall of Hunan’s Shengwulian” by

Jin Hou, a Red Flag member.

Yu Hong soon published an article “Stillness before a Fierce Combat,”

challenging the optimistic views reflected in the Foshan conference towards the future of

the Red Flag faction. Yu Hong depicted the dangers that the rebels were facing. As he

claimed, “In such an intense volume of the sounds from gongs and drums, it is not

difficult to sense, on both sides of the Pearl River, an atmosphere of political silence

prevailed before a surge of fierce fighting.”31 The author warned of the dangers to forge

the alliance with the conservatives and the military and reminded that the enemy was

applying a strategy of “bribery and repression” to deal with the rebels. Further, Yu Hong

argued that charges such as “damaging great alliance,” “disrupting the Chairman’s

strategic plan,” “adverse current,” “ultra-leftist,” and “Guangdong’s Shengwulian”

intimidated many rebels. The number of “bystanders” or “wanderers” (xiaoyao pai), who

were deterred by these charges, increased sharply, and people became politically

apathetic. The rebels’ current situation was that the revolution was not yet successful but

the fighting spirit had already fallen apart. He warned: “An invisible political pressure

has taken away the rebels’ right to fight against the reactionary line. The rebels are on the

31 Zuo Shiyi, “Yige bei yiwang de ren he shi,” 52.

20

way of losing their power, and they are on the verge of political and organizational

collapse.”32 “If we don’t fight back because we are afraid of being labeled as ‘ultra-

leftists,’” Yu Hong warned again, “the rebels, in the end, will have to pay the price and

will be thrown into jail as ‘ultra-leftists.’”33 Yu Hong’s warning, however, was not

accepted by most of his comrades from the Flag faction, and his article was denounced as

“pessimism.”

“Guangzhou Must Undergo More Turmoil”

“Guangzhou Must Undergo More Turmoil—Where Guangzhou’s Movement Is

Going,” an anonymous article appearing in the August 1 Combat Bulletin in January

1968, was another representative work that echoed the ideas of the “August 5” activists.

The author was rumored to be Wu Youheng, a writer and former municipal official who

had been denounced as a “rightist” in the late 1950s. The article discussed many

important issues. The author reminded the rebels, many of whom were hoping to attain a

united leadership through the great alliance, that the time for this was still premature. The

article advocated the continuation of the kind of turmoil that prevailed in Guangzhou

during “January Power Seizure” in early 1967, and called for the expansion of mass

mobilization. The author pointed out that the turmoil fomented in the past was not

32 Hai Feng, Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe, 331; Zuo Shiyi, “Yige bei yiwang de ren he shi,” 52. 33 Zuo Shiyi, “Yige bei yiwang de ren he shi,” 52.

21

enough, as the conservatives were still quite strong.34 In many work units, the power that

was once seized by the rebels was recaptured by the conservatives during the “March

Black Wind.” He thus stated, “The actual situation which prevails at present is that the

rebels are not holding any power at all ... [and] to alter this situation it is necessary to

foment as much chaos as possible.” 35

The turmoil or “chaos” that the article advocated referred to an earlier period, a

time when the rebels were under much less restraints in their political activities:

At the time the rebels were exuberant while the sworn partners of Tao and Zhao and the capitalist roaders were so panic-stricken that their entire front was on the verge of virtual collapse. At the time people debated in the street as to who was revolutionary and who was conservative, work units competed with one another in the seizure of power, the masses were never so conscious as they were then while the situation progressed at an accelerated pace.36

To foster such “chaos,” the author claimed, it would be necessary to mobilize the wider

public, particularly the vast numbers of workers and cadres, and to continue or expand

the mass movement.37 All revolutionary organizations should promote mass criticism and

repudiation, mass debates, the great alliance and extensive democracy. And, the general

populace should be consulted as much as possible.

34 “Guangzhou haixu daluan—Guangzhou xiang hechu qu?” [Guangzhou Must Undergo More Turmoil—Where Guangzhou’s Movement Is Going], Bayi Zhanbao [August 1 Combat Bulletin] 4 (January 1968), Translation is quoted in Survey of China Mainland Press, # 4121, February 19, 1968: 5. 35 Ibid., 6. 36 Ibid., 6. 37 Ibid., 9-10.

22

The article targeted those individuals within the rebel organizations who were

willing to capitulate to the pressure from above, as they were afraid of being accused of

opposing the great alliance and harboring factionalism. The author believed it was their

action that resulted in “widespread disillusionment, in the paralysis of organizations, in

internal rifts and in the weakening of the fighting power, letting slip opportunities to

expand organizations and step up activities.”38 The great alliance in its present form, from

the author’s point of view, was, in the main, an alliance in name only. As a matter of fact,

the present alliance between the two factions was far from playing the part of unified

leadership but was merely a union for consultative and liaison purposes. The key to

achieving the role of unified leadership was that the rebel organizations win superiority.

As the author pointed out:

... the final victory of the great cultural revolution movement shall be determined by the relative strength between the revolutionary forces and the conservative forces. In other words, it will be determined by the expansion and growth of the mass organizations comprising the revolutionary rebels and the weakening and disintegration of the conservative forces. This is an extremely important factor which by no means should be overlooked.39

The author’s call for the continuation of the “turmoil” and the expansion of mass

mobilization deviated from the policies of consolidation and moderation that the Beijing

leadership was implementing. Although the author foresaw the dangers of a premature

alliance and offered suggestions, his ideas, by this time, were impossible to realize.

38 “Guangzhou haixu daluan,” 11. 39 Ibid., 11.

23

The End: Suppression and Demobilization

The “August 5 Theory” caused serious concerns not only for the Preparatory

Provincial Revolutionary Committee and the East Wind faction, but also for many

leaders from the Flag faction. From January to March 1968, with the nationwide attack

on factionalism and the denunciation of Hunan’s Shengwulian, many of both the East

Wind and the Red Flag factions attacked the “August 5 Theory,” including Zhongshan

University Red Flag, once one of the most militant Flag organizations.

Although the “August 5 Theory” encountered pervasive opposition, it proved to

be influential with the further development of the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou.

After the Provincial and Municipal Revolutionary Committees were established, the Flag

faction lost its once superior position, and its fate was now in the hands of the PLA. The

dangers warned of earlier by the “August 5” activists had been proved true. The Flag

leaders who had laid their hope in the alliance were taught a lesson. In the spring months

of 1968, various units in the Flag faction confronted the military.40 Some members even

put forward a so-called “Theory of the Second Revolution” (erci geming lun), which was

in all likelihood influenced by the “August 5 Theory,” emphasizing that the Cultural

Revolution was not yet completed and must be carried out to the end.

As the “August 5” activists and their supporters had warned, the military, which

held the real power in the revolutionary committees, began to prepare for the suppression

of the Flag faction organizations.41 Spearheaded by the military and aided by its ally the

40 Hai Feng, Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe, 332. 41 Ibid., 356.

24

East Wind Faction, the attack was launched in March 1968, in parallel with the

nationwide campaigns against “ultra-leftism” and factionalism.

The increasing pressure drew the rebels closer together. In late June, the Flag

faction held a meeting attended by many of its leaders. The participants concluded that

the Flag faction must break away from its past blind optimism and resolutely fight against

the suppression.42 However, the meeting could not save the Flag faction from defeat. In

the following month, the military in Guangzhou hit hard at the rebels. In early July, the

Provincial and Municipal Revolutionary Committees called for an end to all armed

confrontations, and demanded all participants to return to their original work units and

schools. Ending support for the rebel groups, they also called for absolute support for the

PLA and the officially sponsored worker militia.43 In mid-July, the Guangzhou Military

Region took action against the Flag faction and seized control of several of its important

bases. The worker militia and police forces, both under the control of the conservative

East Wind faction, were deployed. Mass arrests were made against members of the Flag

faction, essentially ending the mass-mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution in

Guangzhou. The crackdown of the Flag Faction in Guangzhou was parallel to the

suppression of rebels nationwide, which already had become an unmistakable trend.

In July, the CCP Central Committee, State Council, and Central Military

Commission, and Central Cultural Revolution Group repeatedly issued directives

42 Liu Guokai, Guangzhou Hongqipai de Xingwang, 201. 43 Rosen, Red Guard Factionalism, 242.

25

prohibiting armed conflicts and permitting the use of lethal force against the rebels.44

This was brought home most forcefully to Guangzhou’s Flag faction by the mass exodus

from the neighboring province of Guangxi, where the local rebels were brutally

suppressed by the PLA and militia forces and tens of thousands were killed.45 The

suppression continued throughout the summer of 1968. Even though members of the Flag

faction continued holding meetings and discussing strategies, little success was achieved.

By the end of July, the demobilization of the Red Guard movement accelerated

nationwide. In Guangzhou, many rebel leaders were arrested, and denounced as “bad

heads” (huai toutou) at massive rallies. By late August, the Flag faction had been largely

dismantled.46 While some of the unyielding elements continued to battle, by the early fall,

it was all but over.

44 “Zhonggong zhongyang, guowuyuan, zhongyang junwei, zhongyang wenge bugao” [Public Announcement of the CCP CC, the SC, the CMC, and the CCRG], July 3 and July 24, 1968, in Song Yongyi, Wenhua Dageming Wenku. 45 Hai Feng, Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe, 384; Rosen, Red Guard Factionalism, 242. 46 Rosen, Red Guard Factionalism, 243.

26

Socialism, Democracy, and Legality —The Li Yizhe Manifesto

Throughout 1968, much of the Cultural Revolution revolved around the Beijing

leadership’s attempts to overcome indiscipline and factional divisions within the mass

movement. The rebuilding of party and state organizations from the wreckage of the

political upheaval required taming the fragmented and often-violent mass movement. The

demobilization and suppression of the mass movement, however, frustrated and

antagonized many of the rebel activists who once enthusiastically had responded to

Mao’s call for rebellion. While a small number attempted to keep going, many dropped

out of a political movement of which they had grown increasingly weary.

In the process of restoring stability, new power structures were formed, both in

Guangzhou and nationwide. The Cultural Revolution came to an anticlimactic close when

the CCP’s Ninth National Congress officially concluded the upheaval in the spring of

1969, and a restructured party was restored to its dominant position. With the effective

termination of the Cultural Revolution’s mass movement, the political space in which

independent Red Guard organizations once flourished no longer existed. However, while

the Cultural Revolution brought no profound changes in China’s political system, it did

inspire important changes in popular political consciousness and expression. The Cultural

Revolution bred intellectual and political activism among China’s young generation,

youth whose lives were decisively shaped by their experiences during the upheaval.

Throughout much of the 1970s, some of the critical currents that first emerged in

the Cultural Revolution survived the demobilization and suppression, and serious

political discussions continued in various underground spaces, drawing many

27

disenchanted former Red Guards and other disenfranchised youth.47 While many

withdrew from political activism, others were disillusioned not with politics per se.

Despite the highly repressive political environment, heterodox ideas continued to be

pursued. The Cultural Revolution idea of mass democracy was a critical influence on

many young people. Such ideas, wrote the former rebel activist Liu Guokai in a

manuscript he secretly penned in 1971, were “like a heavy bombshell in the field of

ideology ... [that] struck a responsive chord in the hearts of many people.” Although such

ideas made only a brief appearance, Liu observed, “the ideas were spread far and wide.

Many people hid copies of writings reflecting such ideas and passed them around among

those they trusted, holding lively discussions. The big suppression of 1968 infuriated

many people and caused them to change their outlook. ... They lost interest in factional

struggles and turned their attention to the bigger issues of the existing system.”48

Popular political skepticism and discontent culminated after the Lin Biao Incident

in the fall of 1971. On September 13, 1971, Lin Biao, once Mao’s officially designated

heir and “closest comrade-in-arms,” died in an airplane crash while trying to escape to

the Soviet Union. The affair shocked tens of millions in China. As Wang Xizhe described

in his autobiography, “this event’s impact on the Chinese people, whether we describe it

47 For a rich study of underground intellectual and literary activities during the Cultural Revolution, see Yang Jian, Zhongguo Zhiqing Wenxueshi [A Literary History of the Rusticated Youth] (Beijing: Zhongguo Gongren Chubanshe, 2002), Chapters 4-6. 48 Liu Guokai, A Brief Analysis of the Cultural Revolution, trans. Anita Chan (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1987), 144-45. For Liu’s recollection of his experience during the Cultural Revolution, see Liu Guokai, Jiceng Wenge Nining Lu [The Muddy Path of the Cultural Revolution from Below] (New York: Boda Chubanshe, 2006).

28

as sky falling or land subsidence, can only express one thousandth of it.”49 Many who

once fervently and earnestly threw themselves into the Cultural Revolution to follow Mao

and Lin suddenly felt disenchanted or awakened. The Lin Biao incident brought an

increasing number of Chinese youth to develop a strong mistrust of official politics and to

analyze for themselves the social and political problems surrounding them.

It was under such a circumstance that the article “On Socialist Democracy and the

Legal System,” produced by a small group of young activists under the pseudonym of Li

Yizhe, appeared in late 1974. For the first time in six years, wall posters appeared once

again in Guangzhou’s streets. Developed in the article was a proposal for widening

democracy among the Chinese people and institutionalizing the rule of law.

Appropriating the official rhetoric from the Party’s campaign against Lin Biao, members

of the Li Yizhe group continued to explore the critical themes that first emerged during

the Cultural Revolution upheaval, developing a scathing critique of China’s state-socialist

system in the name of criticizing the “Lin Biao system.”

The Group and Its Members

Li Yizhe was a name formed from abbreviations of the major figures of the group,

Li Zhengtian, Chen Yiyang, and Wang Xizhe. The membership of the Li Yizhe group

reached about a dozen at its height, and most of the participants were members of the Red

Flag faction during the Cultural Revolution. The four key figures of the group included

Li Zhengtian, Chen Yiyang, Wang Xizhe and Guo Hongzhi. The group began to operate

49 Wang Xizhe, Wang Xizhe Zizhuan, 70.

29

in the summer of 1973, and their activities were forced to stop after arrests of the

members starting in July 1975.

Born in 1944, Li Zhengtian was the son of a Guomingdang military officer who

crossed over to the Communists during the civil war and had risen high in their ranks. Li

Zhengtian was in his senior year at the Guangzhou Fine Arts Institute when the Cultural

Revolution erupted in 1966. Li disapproved of the heavy-handed methods employed by

the work teams in the early stage of the Cultural Revolution such as declaring school

administrators and faculty members to be “black gangs,” “capitalist roaders,”

“reactionary academic authority,” and naming them “reactionaries” and “rightists”

without evidence.50 At the university, Li was a leading figure in a small rebel group

called the Red Headquarters Call-to-Arms Combat Group, an organization affiliated with

the Red Flag faction. He also made his name among Guangzhou’s young people for

writing provocative posters and speaking with a compelling oratorical style.51 In August

1968, Li wrote a wall poster protesting against the harsh suppression of the rebels by the

military in Guangzhou.52 He was arrested soon after for participating in the rebel

movement and was not released till 1972.

50 Yin Hongbiao, Shizongzhe de Zuji: Wenhua Dageming Qijian de Qingnian Sichao [The Footprints of the Missing People: The Thought of Youth during the Cultural Revolution] (Xianggang: Zhongwen Daxue Chubanshe, 2009), 375. 51 Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen, and Jonathan Unger, ed., On Socialist Democracy and the Chinese Legal System (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1985), 2. 52 David L. Shambaugh, The Making of A Premier: Zhao Ziyang’s Provincial Career (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 68.

30

Chen Yiyang was a senior at the No. 17 High School when the Cultural

Revolution started. Chen’s father was a veteran who once served as the Director of

Academic Affairs at Huangpu Military Academy.53 Chen was a leader of a rebel

organization in his school, the Jianggangshan Commune, founded in April 1967 under the

leadership of the Red Flag faction. Later, Chen was rusticated and did not return to

Guangzhou until the spring of 1974.

Wang Xizhe, a junior student at the No. 17 High School when the Cultural

Revolution started, was a schoolmate and a good friend of Chen. Born in Sichuan

province in 1949, Wang was raised in Guangzhou after moving around cities with his

father, a professional in the film production industry.54 Wang was also a leader of the

Jianggangshan Commune. He was rusticated at a tea farm at the end of 1969. In 1972, he

was able to return to the city and worked at the Guangzhou Aquatic Production Factory

as a boiler worker.

Although his name was not part of the collective pseudonym Li Yizhe, Guo

Hongzhi’s contribution to the group by no means can be underestimated. Born in 1929,

Guo joined the PLA at the age of 16, and then joined the CCP a year later. During the

Korean War, he suffered severe frostbite and lost all of his toes. Because of his criticism

against Lin Biao during the Cultural Revolution, Guo was put into jail in 1968, and was

not released until Lin’s fall. He was a middle-level cadre at Guangdong People’s Radio

Station when he became an active participant of the Li Yizhe group.

53 Yin Hongbiao, Shizongzhe de Zuji, 24. 54 Wang Xizhe, Wang Xizhe Zizhuan, 1.

31

The Manifesto

When the Cultural Revolution was still under way, Li Zhengtian, Chen Yiyang,

Wang Xizhe and Guo Hongzhi reflected on the movement and studied the Marxist-

Leninist ideas and theories. As early as September 1967, Li and Guo initiated frequent

discussions with some friends on contemporary political issues as well as political

theories.55 After his release in 1972, Li began to ponder on the reasons for the failure of

the rebel movement in the Cultural Revolution. He turned his attention to social and

political issues, and read a large number of books. According to his reading notes, he first

focused on Mao’s works and Marxism-Leninist theory and then extended his study to

history and theory of international socialism and communism, works of the

Enlightenment, and the constitutions of various countries.56 As for Wang Xizhe, after

witnessing Mao’s repeatedly shifting policies during the Cultural Revolution, he started

to question what it meant to “carry the Cultural Revolution to the end.”57 He frequently

discussed the issue with his best friend Chen Yiyang. They struggled to find answers in

the writings of socialist theorists but with little success.

Li Zhengtian and Wang Xizhe had known each other since 1967, but it was not

until they met again on a summer day in 1973 that Wang and Li began to have a closer

55 Li Zhengtian, “Li Yizhe zhong de wuming yingxiong, tiegu zhengzheng de sixiangzhe—huainian Guo Hongzhi” [An Anonymous Hero, An Upright Thinker—In Memory of Guo Hongzhi]. In Li Yizhe Shijian Jishi: Wenge zhong Yichang Zixia Ershang de Minzhu yu Fazhi de Suqiu [A Documentary of the Li Yizhe Event: A Demand for Democracy and Legal System from Grassroots during the Cultural Revolution] (Xianggang: Zhongguo Jiaodian Chubanshe, 2010), 393. 56 Yin Hongbiao, Shizongzhe de Zuji, 377. 57 Wang Xizhe, Wang Xizhe Zizhuan, 25-28.

32

relationship. After Li introduced his friend Guo Hongzhi to Wang, they started meeting

regularly to exchange ideas on recent readings and to discuss current government policies

and political affairs. After Chen Yiyang returned to Guangzhou in the spring of 1974, he

immediately became an active member of the group. The meetings usually took a free

form of dialogue, but on several occasions, Guo Hongzhi would lead the discussions and

provide different perspectives on the issues. These activities undoubtedly formed a

foundation for the development of the Li Yizhe Manifesto.

In November 1973, after learning about the upcoming Fourth National People’s

Congress, Guo suggested writing an article summarizing the group’s discussions and

dedicating it to the Congress. He asked Li Zhengtian and Wang Xizhe to think over the

topics for this article. The two wrote down their viewpoints, Li addressing the “legal

system” and Wang “democracy.” Soon after, Wang drafted an article discussing socialist

democracy and criticizing “Lin Biao System” while at the same time Li elaborated his

views on the socialist legal system. They put the two pieces together and named the

article “On Socialist Democracy and the Legal System” with the subtitle “Dedicated to

Chairman Mao and the Fourth National People’s Congress.” The second draft of the

article was signed under the name “Li—Zhe.” The dash “—” in the signature is similar to

the Chinese character “One,” pronounced yi. Since Wang felt that he owed many of his

ideas in the writing to the discussions with his friend Chen Yiyang, he proposed to

replace the dash with the word Yi with the approval from Chen.

The article was sent to Beijing via a friend and to Ding Sheng, the head of

Guangdong Provincial Revolutionary Committee. On his way to Beijing, the messenger

was arrested, and the captured document was forwarded to Zhao Ziyang, a member of the

33

Provincial Party Committee and vice-chairman of the provincial government.58 Zhao

ordered the article printed and made available for internal circulation and discussion

among cadres within the province.59 Short of denouncing the authors, there was a reason

for Zhao’s tolerance. Guangzhou had been a stronghold of the Lin clique. With Lin’s fall,

Li Yizhe’s criticism of the “Lin Biao System” fitted well into Zhao’s interest in rooting

out Lin’s followers.

At the same time, the work was distributed for comments among friends.

Although the provincial government took no action against the article, the writing drew

heavy criticism from leaders of the former Red Flag faction, some of whom opposed the

vocabulary of democracy put forward in the article.60 Despite disagreements of their

former rebel comrades, Guo Hongzhi suggested posting the article in public. They added

a preface even longer than the main text. On November 10, 1974, this expanded version

of the original 1973 article entitled, “On Socialist Democracy and the Legal System—

Dedicated to Chairman Mao and the Fourth National People’s Congress,” was posted on

Guangzhou’s downtown streets. It stretched for over 100 yards along the street and

contained about 20,000 characters. During the following days and weeks, the poster

attracted great attention and became known to many among the Red Guard generation.

58 Shambaugh, The Making of A Premier, 69. 59 Ibid., 69. 60 Wang Xizhe, Wang Xizhe Zizhuan, 105.

34

Li Yizhe’s “On Socialist Democracy and the Legal System” criticized the current

political and social circumstances under the pretense of criticizing the “Lin Biao

System,” and put forward the demands for socialist democracy and institutionalized rule

of law in China. What were the characteristics of this “Lin Biao System” under criticism?

Li Yizhe explained in the article:

… this refers to the whole set of policies executed by Lin Biao in opposition to Chairman Mao which poisoned the whole Party and nation during the period in which Lin Biao was chieftain of the opportunist line inside the Party. In the field of philosophy, it was the theory that the will is dominant; in the sphere of historical science, it was the conception that genius is decisive; in the field of politics, it was the theory that political power is the power to oppress; in the field of economics, it was the theory that “[everything should be] public property;” in the sphere of foreign relations, it was big-nation chauvinism, and so forth.61

The essence of the “Lin Biao System,” according to Li Yizhe, was “feudalistic socialist-

fascist despotism.” They argued that the Lin Biao clique “attempted to establish not

ordinary bourgeois dictatorship, but a feudalistic socialist-fascist despotism.”62 The

danger of this system, Li Yizhe warned, was that it could lead to the suppression of

socialist democracy:

Let us recall the kind of emphasis given to (empty) politics which was substituted for everything else and which was praised the lazy and punished the diligent; the religious chanting of the “daily readings”; the increasingly hypocritical “discourses on the application” [of the Thought of Mao Zedong]; the increasingly absurd “explosion of the revolution in the depths of the soul;” the demonstrative “expressions of loyalty,” which

61 Li Yizhe, “Guanyu shehui zhuyi minzhu yu fazhi” [On Socialist Democracy and Legal System], November 10, 1974, collected in Song Yongyi, Zhongguo Wenhua Dageming Wenku. English translation is quoted in Anita Chan et al., ed., On Socialist Democracy and the Chinese Legal System (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1985), 66. 62 Ibid., 61.

35

encouraged political opportunism; the farcical “dances of loyalty;” the unbearably complicated and petty loyalty rituals ...

We have not forgotten the various practices which harmed the basic interests of the workers and peasant masses: the policy to “make all things public property,” ... and what has become prevalent today: “going through the back door.”

We have not forgotten the mechanical “religious preachings” of class struggle, the cow sheds which were Guomingdang prison camps, and the massacres that occurred there which surpassed the historical ones of “March 18th,” “April 12th,” “May 30th,” and “June 23rd.” in the province of Guangdong alone, the revolutionary masses and cadres who were killed numbered close to 40,000. The numbers jailed, under surveillance, or being struggled against amounted to a million.63

What were the causes of what Li Yizhe describes? One of the apparent reasons was its

élite view of history in the realm of ideology. As Li Yizhe pointed out, “the view that

genius creates history [tiancai shiguan] was its theoretical program.”64 This view “in

effect eliminated 800 million brains.”65 Under such ideology, people were not allowed to

ask “why” about anything, let alone to do research or investigation. “The view that genius

creates history” was used to create a system based on a set of modern feudalistic “rituals”

which were employed to rule the Party, the state and the military. The “genius” should be

worshipped endlessly. He could demand absolute loyalty and his will has to be obeyed.

This system, dubbed the “Lin Biao System,” was used to establish a “feudalistic socialist-

fascist despotism” in the name of Mao.

63 Li Yizhe, “Guanyu shehui zhuyi minzhu yu fazhi” collected in Song Yongyi, Wenhua Dageming Wenku. English translation is quoted from Anita Chan et al., ed., On Socialist Democracy and the Chinese Legal System, 40-41. 64 Ibid., 43. 65 Ibid., 43.

36

If the élite view of history or “the view that genius creates history” provided the

ideological basis for the feudalistic and authoritarian state, what would be its social basis?

Li Yizhe argued that there were special privileges in the society that formed the basis of a

“new bourgeois class.” These were the “capitalist roaders” and “opportunists” inside the

Party. As Li Yizhe put it, “the social basis of the capitalist roaders and opportunists inside

the Party evolved from special privileges. Under the social conditions of contemporary

China, the new bourgeoisie can only implement a feudalistic socialist-fascist

despotism.”66 Then where do the special privileges come from? Li Yizhe responded:

The essence of the appropriation of possessions by the new bourgeois class is to “turn public into private” while still maintaining a system of socialist ownership of the means of production. When a leader of the state or of a state enterprise comports himself like a member of the bourgeoisie in redistributing the proletariat’s property and power, he is in reality converting such properties and power into private ownership by the new bourgeois class.67

Li Yizhe observed that this redistribution of properties and power could be found in two

areas. The most common, as they pointed out, was that certain leaders had turned the

special care, provided by the Party and the people, into political and economic privileges

and extended these privileges to their family, friends, and relatives. They thus changed

the socialist direction and sustained a clique of “new nobility,” a force that stood separate

from the people and whose interests came into opposition with the people’s. A more

important fact, Li Yizhe argued, was that in order to protect the acquired privileges and to 66 Li Yizhe, “Guanyu shehui zhuyi minzhu yu fazhi” collected in Song Yongyi, Wenhua Dageming Wenku. English translation is quoted from Anita Chan et al., ed., On Socialist Democracy and the Chinese Legal System, 61. 67 Ibid., 35-36.

37

obtain more privileges, the “new nobility” must attack the revolutionaries who stood firm

in their principles and to suppress the people who opposed their privileges. Thus, Li

Yizhe claimed, “they have completed a qualitative change from being ‘the civil servants

of the people’ [renmin gongpu] to ‘the masters of the people;’ they have become what we

call ‘those in power taking the capitalist road.’”68

Li Yizhe’s poster was not the first heterodox writing that introduces this concept

of “new class.” In early 1968, Yang Xiguang, at the time of his writing a high school

student in Hunan province, proclaimed in his famous essay “Whither China?” that the

major conflict in China was between a “red capitalist class” and the Chinese people.69 In

his essay, Yang states:

At present over ninety per cent of our high-ranking officials have formed into a unique class—the red capitalist class. … It is a decadent class impeding historical progress. Its relationship with the people has changed from that of leaders and followers to rulers and ruled, to exploiters and exploited, from equal, revolutionary camaraderie to oppressors and oppressed. The class interests, prerogatives, and high income of the red capitalist class is built upon repression and exploitation of the masses of the population.70

This pointed observation enlightened Yang’s contemporary like-minded young activists

and was a key element in the development of their own views. Yang’s essay reached a

readership of many hundreds of thousands. Wang Xizhe admitted in his autobiography,

68 Li Yizhe, “Guanyu shehui zhuyi minzhu yu fazhi” collected in Song Yongyi, Wenhua Dageming Wenku. English translation is quoted from Anita Chan et al., ed., On Socialist Democracy and the Chinese Legal System, 36. 69 Jonathan Unger, “Whither China?: Yang Xiguang, Red Capitalists, and the Social Turmoil of the Cultural Revolution.” Modern China 17, no.1 (January 1991): 3. 70 Yang Xiguang, “Zhongguo xiang hechu qu” [Whither China], January 12, 1968, collected in Song Yongyi, Wenhua Da Geming Wenku. English translation is quoted in Unger, “Whither China?,” 3.

38

“Yang Xiguang and other ultra-leftist writers affected me deeply by their courage to

explore and answer independently the theoretical questions about the Cultural

Revolution. They opened a new door for me.”71

However, although both Yang Xiguang and Li Yizhe exposed the rise of a

privileged class in Chinese society, their views differed. In “Whither China,” Yang

believed that this bureaucratic “class of red capitalists” with its military apparatus needed

to be forcibly overthrown. Li Yizhe, on the other hand, not only did not condemn the

veteran Party leaders who were the target of Yang’s writing, but on the contrary,

advocated restoring these leaders to their positions. For Li Yizhe, a “feudalistic

despotism,” rather than capitalism, was China’s main danger. They questioned, “Should

the large number of old cadres who had committed errors of one type or another but

whose loyalty to the Party had been tested and proven over a long period not be utilized

[by the Party] again? Does this mean that comrades like Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang

should never be on the Central Committee?” Wang Xizhe later explained the reasons for

their support of veteran Party leaders:

Same as other rebels, Li Yizhe believed that a large number of the Party leaders, who were denounced and lost their posts during the Cultural Revolution, were the bureaucrats who should be subjected to the criticism from people. Nevertheless, they were not in favor of replacing the veteran Party leaders by the “Gang of Four” .... As they felt rather letting a number of parvenus, a new privileged class or a new bureaucracy, who were full of nonsense, come to power and lead the country to continue with the ultra-leftist policies in the realm of politics and economics, it would be slightly beneficial to the general populace by allowing the old bureaucrats, who held normal judgments, return to power to keep stability and

71 Wang, Wang Xizhe Zizhuan, 29-30.

39

development, and at the same time, to ease, in some degree, the tight political control.72

Li Yizhe did not propose the immediate elimination of all the inequalities in the society

and recognized that the existence of various types of inequalities could not be completely

destroyed by a single decree. A resolution to limit special privileges, in Li Yizhe’s view,

would serve to eliminate gradually these inequalities and prevent them from developing

into entrenched economic and political privileges.

As veteran rebels, Li Yizhe still had faith in the spirit to fight against the

bureaucracy inspired by the Cultural Revolution. Li Yizhe regarded the movement as a

way to resolve the problem of the “new class” within the party. As Li Yizhe argued:

We know that the socialist system has to be improved. It is not perfect. In many countries, it failed to combat the new bourgeois class. The restoration of capitalism in so many countries and the necessity for a “second revolution” in China is clear evidence [of socialism’s imperfection]. The proletariat must pursue many a Great Cultural Revolution during this “fairly long historical period” in order to constantly perfect the social system.73

Li Yizhe believed that during the Cultural Revolution, “freedom of speech, freedom of

the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association, which are all incorporated in

the Constitution, and the freedom to travel to meet other people (chuanlian), which is not

72 Wang Xizhe, “Guanyu Li Yizhe sichao” [On the Thought of Li Yizhe], Zhongguo Zhichun [China Spring] (December 1994). 73 Li Yizhe, “Guanyu shehui zhuyi minzhu yu fazhi” collected in Song Yongyi, Wenhua Dageming Wenku. English translation is quoted in Anita Chan et al., ed., On Socialist Democracy and the Chinese Legal System, 34.

40

yet in the Constitution, have been truly practiced.”74 They claimed that the Cultural

Revolution was a time of “most comprehensive revolutionary mass people’s democracy”

and a time the people enjoyed the right to give speeches, to publish, and to assemble

freely. The movement, in their view, openly and totally mobilized “the broad masses

from the bottom upward to expose our dark sides,” and it served “as a weapon to prevent

and oppose socialist-fascism.”75 They further affirmed that instead of exposing and

destroying Liu Shaoqi, the foremost task of the Cultural Revolution was to forge the

revolutionary democratic spirit of the masses for self-emancipation. However, they also

saw the limitations and problems of the movement: “the Great Proletarian Cultural

Revolution has not completed its task because it has not enabled the popular masses to

grasp tightly the weapon of the broad people’s democratic dictatorship.”76 They argued

that the so-called “class struggle” promoted during the Cultural Revolution often became

a senseless factional struggle among the people. If, in 1968, the “August 5” activists still

worried about the fate of the rebels, Li Yizhe went beyond factionalism and turned their

focus on a democratic approach to solve the problems in the existing system. To end the

factional conflicts, Li Yizhe suggested, the solution was to grant the two sides the same

democratic rights. The suppression of one faction by another could not work. To prevent

violent factional conflicts and to realize the freedoms that appeared for a short time

74 Li Yizhe, “Guanyu shehui zhuyi minzhu yu fazhi” collected in Song Yongyi, Wenhua Dageming Wenku. English translation is quoted from Anita Chan et al., ed., On Socialist Democracy and the Chinese Legal System, 63. 75 Ibid., 62. 76 Ibid., 63.

41

during the Cultural Revolution, the solution for Li Yizhe was no longer another power

seizure or expanding the strength of the rebels, but, instead, calling for democracy and

the rule of law.

It should be noted that Li Yizhe’s “democracy” does not refer to the Western

democracy that the contemporary political dissidents pursued in today’s China, nor to the

populist democracy, meaning the direct mass democracy with direct elections following

the model of the Paris Commune, advocated by the “ultra-leftists” at the time of the

Cultural Revolution.77 For achieving democracy in China, Li Yizhe proposed the

people’s right to manage the country and society. They claimed, “the most fundamental

right of the people under a socialist society is the power of the people to manage the state

and society.”78 They further emphasized, “Whether [our cadre] can maintain his spirit to

serve the people, depends ... mainly on the revolutionary supervision of the masses;”79

therefore, the right of the supervision over the Party’s and country’s various levels of

leadership was crucial. At the same time, Li Yizhe believed the voice of oppositions

should not be eliminated by force. They challenged the principle “Down with whoever

oppose Mao Zedong Thought,” which they viewed as feudalistic. They argued that even

though some people’s opinions might be wrong or excessive, they should not be

suppressed. They also saw problems inherent in the CCP’s centralized leadership: 77 Baogang He, The Democratization of China (London: Routledge, 1996), 17-18. 78 Li Yizhe, “Guanyu shehui zhuyi minzhu yu fazhi” collected in Song Yongyi, Wenhua Dageming Wenku. English translation is quoted from Anita Chan et al., ed., On Socialist Democracy and the Chinese Legal System, 39. 79 Ibid., 80.

42

This is an extremely large contradiction. On the one hand, the centralized leadership of the Party cannot be shaken. On the other hand, “the focus of the campaigns is to rectify the capitalist-roaders in the Party,” at the same time that these capitalist-roaders are the concrete expressions of the centralized leadership in the places and the departments under their control.

Under the conditions of proletarian dictatorship, how can the people’s rights, under the centralized leadership of the Party, be protected in the struggle against the capitalist-roaders and incorrect lines in the Party?80

However, the authors of “On Socialist Democracy” had been mature enough also to

realize that the constitution by itself could not guarantee the rights of the people. They

therefore encouraged the people to fight for their rights, not through violent revolution

that they had experienced during the chaotic years of the Cultural Revolution, but through

enforcement of the law and protection of the rights of the people.

Although Li Yizhe proposed the means to achieve democracy in China, their

understanding of democracy was still ambiguous and incomplete. They did not provide

the readers with a clear definition of the democracy they strived for. Nor did they

recognize the dangers that mass democracy could raise. Their appeal for democracy

originated more or less from their consciousness to revolt against the political élites who

maintained dictatorial leadership of the country. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the Li

Yizhe poster was significant. The ideas expressed reflected the standpoints of many Red

Guards who became disillusioned with the Cultural Revolution after 1967.81 More

80 Li Yizhe, “Guanyu shehui zhuyi minzhu yu fazhi” collected in Song Yongyi, Wenhua Dageming Wenku. English translation is quoted from Anita Chan et al., ed., On Socialist Democracy and the Chinese Legal System, 76. 81 Stanley Rosen, “Guangzhou’s Democracy Movement in Cultural Revolution Perspective,” China Quarterly 101, no.101 (1985): 2.

43

importantly the authors made criticisms not only of the political and social reality, but

also put forward a number of recommendations with practical implication. Although their

recommendations could not be tolerated at a time of tight ideological control, their appeal

for democracy and legality was compelling to many young minds who held like views.

The Fate of the Li Yizhe Group

The Manifesto and its authors did not escape the fate of being denounced by the

government. The poster was declared counter-revolutionary by both municipal and

provincial authorities soon after its appearance. In Beijing, Jiang Qing even accused it of

being “the most reactionary article yet since Liberation.”82 The provincial government

responded immediately by organizing a group of propagandists who churned out essay

after essay accusing the Li Yizhe group of deliberately propagating a false image of a

bureaucratic stratum. The Manifesto’s real purpose, in advocating “mass democracy,” the

propagandists charged, was, in fact, a call to discard the leadership of the Party and to

undermine the revolution.

Members of the Li Yizhe group were charged with various political crimes, and a

massive “Criticize Li Yizhe” campaign was launched in Guangdong. The original

“Socialist Democracy” poster and the Party’s accusatory materials were mass reproduced

and distributed to various provincial organizations, including government offices,

factories, and schools for use at political study sessions, and work units were instructed to

82 Chan, Rosen, and Unger, ed., On Socialist Democracy, 12.

44

organize writing campaigns to condemn the Li Yizhe.83 Members of the Li Yizhe group,

particularly Li Zhengtian, were paraded in mass denunciation meetings throughout

Guangzhou. From January 1975 to January 1976, Li Zhengtian was subjected to over a

hundred such meetings, the largest of which was attended by over ten thousand at

Zhongshan University.84 Interestingly, in contrast to normal meetings in which the

accused were deemed guilty by the authorities and had no opportunity to defend

themselves, members of the Li Yizhe group were allowed to debate with their critics and

even were provided with drinking water, chairs, and a microphone. These occasions,

ironically, brought more supporters and sympathizers for Li Yizhe’s ideas. The Li Yizhe

manifesto was spread to readers nationwide as well as abroad through visitors from Hong

Kong, Macau, and foreign countries.85

The limited leniency the group had enjoyed, however, did not last long. Several

major provincial and municipal leaders considered the Li Yizhe’s view about the rise of a

“new ruling class” within the CCP and the Li Yizhe’s advocacy for mass democracy as a

direct challenge to the Party that could not be tolerated. Li Yizhe sympathizers were

weeded out in one work unit after another, and hundreds were accused of ideological

connections with the “Li Yizhe counter-revolutionary clique.” In July 1975, Li Zhengtian

was exiled to a tungsten mine in north Guangdong and Chen Yiyang was sent to work at

83 Chan, Rosen, and Unger, ed., On Socialist Democracy, 13. 84 Yin, Shizongzhe de Zuji, 380. 85 Ibid., 380.

45

a rural farm. Only Wang Xizhe was allowed to remain in his factory to be “re-educated”

by cadres and his coworkers.86

It was not until two and a half years later, when Deng Xiaoping was restored to

power, that local governments throughout the country were ordered to reinvestigate cases

that involved people convicted of political offenses. The Li Yizhe members were released

in December 1978. Owing to the celebrity of the group, their rehabilitation seemed a first

step for a government now seeking to project a public image of commitment to economic

modernization, political liberalization and rebuilding of the country’s legal system.87

However, the Li Yizhe members had now become politically sophisticated enough to

understand the reasons for the government’s seeming support, and they deliberately

delayed cooperation until Guangdong’s leadership agreed to rehabilitate other people

implicated in their case.88 They met several times with Xi Zhongxun, Guangdong’s newly

appointed party boss, before they agreed to attend a public rehabilitation ceremony. The

event was held in February 1979, attended by tens of thousands. Official endorsement of

the “On Socialist Democracy” poster appeared in national propaganda organs such as the

86 Chan, Rosen, and Unger, ed., On Socialist Democracy, 14-15. However, this was not the end of their misfortune. In March 1977, six months after the downfall of the Gang of Four, all Li Yizhe members were arrested and thrown into prison. See Chan, 113. 87 Ibid., 16. 88 Wang, Wang Xizhe Zizhuan, 179-198.

46

People’s Daily and the China Youth Daily, which lavishly praised the Li Yizhe members

as “brave warriors.”89

89 Chan, Rosen, and Unger, ed., On Socialist Democracy, 17. After their rehabilitation, the members of the Li Yizhe group gradually parted their ways. Chen Yiyang and Guo Hongzhi sought a private life and remained politically inactive. Both Li Zhengtian and Wang Xizhe continued to be politically active, yet they moved into different directions. While Li Zhengtian preferred to write for the official press, Wang Xizhe quickly turned his interest to the unofficial “people’s publications” which flourished during the democracy movement of 1979-81. See Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard, “The Democracy Movement in China, 1978-1979,” Asian Survey 21 no.7 (1981): 747-774.

47

Conclusion

We have seen that shifts in the thinking of young participants were closely tied to

the ebbs and flows of the Cultural Revolution, though in the end they followed widely

divergent streams. The Cultural Revolution and the movements which followed out of

and in response to it provided a space in which heterodox thoughts could develop. The Li

Yizhe group, in “On Socialist Democracy and the Legal System,” while ostensibly

attacking only the “Lin Biao System,” criticized the overall state organism. The

dictatorial system, however, created a popular reaction from below, as they put it:

The Lin Biao System reached its apex during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, but this was only one side of the story. What was more important was that it created its own reaction. It created a new and rising social force encompassing people who, through the course of this great revolution and under the inspiration of Chairman Mao, have gradually come to understand Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Mao Zedong.90

Li Yizhe believed that a new and rising social force was created during the Cultural

Revolution as a reaction to the authoritarian rule of the Party apparatus. This social force

described by Li Yizhe, was the people who—like themselves—participated in the

Cultural Revolution and gradually developed an independent thinking through the

experience of their involvement in the movement.

In 1980, six years after making public their famous manifesto, Wang Xizhe came

to a more precise description of this “reaction” which was more pointedly critical:

90 Li Yizhe, “Guanyu shehui zhuyi minzhu yu fazhi” collected in Song Yongyi, Wenhua Dageming Wenku. English translation is quoted from Anita Chan et al., ed., On Socialist Democracy and the Chinese Legal System, 66.

48

[The Cultural Revolution] brought two results. The first was that Mao Zedong accomplished his goal of individual autocracy; the second was that on the other hand the masses, especially the youth, broke away from the millennia-old tradition of fearing officialdom. They will never again feel inferior in front of officials, and this is precisely the spiritual precondition necessary for carrying out democratic reforms. They even dared to study all kinds of problems in Chinese society from the angle of questioning the system itself. It appears that the Cultural Revolution has created a generation of youth that dares independently to ponder state affairs and is brave enough to assume responsibility for the society.91

The question of whether Mao took advantage of the Cultural Revolution as an

instrument to render his ideals in concrete practicable form or instead simply to purge his

political enemies was not discussed in this essay; however, we must admit that the

Cultural Revolution, for the first time since 1949, allowed the Chinese people to openly

challenge the authority of the CCP and its leaders. It provided the general populace

opportunities to criticize the power held by the Party officials and organizations, though

perhaps exempting Mao himself. At the early stages of the movement, Mao’s instruction

to “rebel against authority” by means of the “four big freedoms”—the right to speak out

freely, air views fully, hold great debates, and write big-character posters—encouraged

the Chinese youth to engage in the Cultural Revolution and inspired them to challenge

political authority. This created a political environment favorable to the rise of various

trends of independent thinking. At no other time in the history of the PRC were the young

people exposed to such a largely unrestrained atmosphere in which they could freely

express and exchange their ideas. The Cultural Revolution disrupted the state-socialist

91 Wang Xizhe, “Mao Zedong yu wenhua dageming” [Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution], in Wang Xizhe Lunwen Ji [Collected Essays of Wang Xizhe] (Xianggang: Qishi Niandai Zazhishe, 1981), 127. English translation is quoted in Anita Chan et al., ed., On Socialist Democracy and the Chinese Legal System, 238.

49

institutions characteristic of the post-1949 Chinese society and provided a space in which

the participants could produce “heterodox” ideas which both embraced and then went

beyond Mao’s original thinking.

Both the “August 5” activists and the Li Yizhe group represented some of the

most critical minds that emerged amidst the tumult of the Cultural Revolution in

Guangzhou. The “August 5” activists were courageous to challenge not only the views of

a majority of their contemporaries but also the policies enforced by the Party leaders.

Further, six years after the turmoil, members of the Li Yizhe group continued to be

inspired by their participation in the Cultural Revolution and developed more systematic

views about China’s social and political system. Their call for democracy and a reformed

legal system stood out in a time of tight political control. Their indictment of the “Lin

Biao System” which, they argued, had “suppressed the democratic rights of the masses,”

later prompted some to label the city of Guangzhou as the cradle of the democracy

movement of 1978-1979.92

The ideas which emerged during the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou certainly

can be seen as both as heterodox and “ahead of their time.” It remains to be studied just

when and in what way both the ideas and ideals of the Guangzhou youth will help to

define the notion of “a better society” and how demands will be shaped both inside and

outside China in a coming direction toward democracy and political legitimacy.

92 Rosen, “Guangzhou’s Democracy Movement,” 2.

50

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chan, Anita. Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the

Red Guard Generation. London: Macmillan, 1985.

Chan, Anita, Stanley Rosen, and Jonathan Unger, ed. On Socialist Democracy and the Chinese Legal System. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1985.

“Guangzhou haixu daluan—Guangzhou xiang hechu qu?” [Guangzhou Must Undergo More Turmoil—Where the Guangzhou Movement Is Going?.” Bayi Zhanbao [August 1 Combat Bulletin] 4 (January 1968). Translated by Survey of China Mainland Press, # 4121, February 19, 1968: 5-14.

Hai Feng. Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe [An Account of the Cultural Revolution in the Canton Area]. Xianggang: Youlian Yanjiusuo, 1971.

He, Baogang. The Democratization of China. London: Routledge, 1996.

Li Yizhe. “On Socialist Democracy and Legal System.” In On Socialist Democracy and the Chinese Legal System, edited by Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen, and Jonathan Unger, 31-86. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1985.

Li, Zhengtian. “Li Yizhe zhong de wuming yingxiong, tiegu zhengzheng de sixiangzhe—huainian Guo Hongzhi” [An Anonymous Hero, An Upright Thinker—In Memory of Guo Hongzhe]. In Li Yizhe Shijian Jishi: Wenge zhong Yichang Zixia Ershang de Minzhu yu Fazhi de Suqiu [A Documentary of Li Yizhe Event: The Demand for Democracy and Legal System from Grassroots during the Cultural Revolution], 390-406. Xianggang: Zhongguo Jiaodian Chubanshe, 2010.

Liu, Guokai. A Brief Analysis of the Cultural Revolution. Translated by Anita Chan. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1987.

Liu, Guokai. Guangzhou Hongqipai de Xingwang [The Rise and Fall of the Guangzhou Red Flag Faction]. Xianggang: Boda Chubanshe, 2006.

MacFarquhar, Roderick, and Michael Schoenhals. Mao’s Last Revolution. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006.

The Party Committee of the Guangzhou Military District Command. “An Examination of Mistakes Made in the Work of Supporting the Left in the Guangzhou Area.” Translated by Survey of China Mainland Press, #4082, December 18, 1967.

Rosen, Stanley. “Guangzhou’s Democracy Movement in Cultural Revolution Perspective.” China Quarterly 101, no. 101 (1985): 1-31.

51

Rosen, Stanley. Red Guard Factionalism and the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou (Canton). Boulder: Westview Press, 1982.

Shambaugh, David L. The Making of A Premier: Zhao Ziyang’s Provincial Career. Boulder: Westview Press, 1984.

Song Yongyi. Zhongguo Wenhua Da Geming Wenku [The Chinese Cultural Revolution Database]. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006.

Unger, Jonathan. “Whither China?: Yang Xiguang, Red Capitalists, and the Social Turmoil of the Cultural Revolution.” Modern China 17, no.1 (January 1991): 3-37.

Wang, Xizhe. “Mao Zedong yu Wenhua Dageming” [Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution]. In Wang Xizhe Lunwen Ji [Collected Essays of Wang Xizhe], 87-141. Xianggang: Qishi Niandai Zazhishe, 1981.

Wang, Xizhe. “Guanyu Li Yizhe sichao” [On the Thought of Li Yizhe]. Zhongguo Zhichun [China Spring] (December 1994).

Wang, Xizhe. “Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution.” In On Socialist Democracy and the Chinese Legal System, edited by Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen, and Jonathan Unger, 177-260. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1985.

Wang, Xizhe. Wang Xizhe Zizhuan: Zouxiang Hei’an [An Autobiography of Wang Xizhe: Towards Darkness]. Xianggang: Minzhu Daxue, 1996.

Yang Jian. Zhongguo zhiqing wenxueshi [A Literary History of the Rusticated Youth]. Beijing: Zhongguo gongren chubanshe, 2002.

Yin, Hongbiao. Shizongzhe de Zuji: Wenhua Dageming Qijian de Qingnian Sichao [The Footprints of the Missing People: the Thought of Youth during the Cultural Revolution]. Xianggang: Zhongwen Daxue Chubanshe, 2009.

Zuo Shiyi. “Hongweibing yundong zhong yige bei yiwang de ren he shi: Yu Hong yu Guangdong diyige Ma Lie zhuyi xiaozu” [A Forgotten Man and His Stories during the Red Guard Movement: Yu Hong and The First Marxism-Leninism Group in Guangzhou]. Guancha Jia [The Observer] 18 (April 1979): 47-53.