higher school of economics€¦ · web viewbelarus. bhutan. bosnia and herzegovina. cape verde....

WT/ACC/10/Rev.3Page 4

WT/ACC/10/Rev.3

Page viii

World Trade

Organization

WT/ACC/10/Rev.3

28 November 2005

(05-5640)

TECHNICAL NOTE ON THE ACCESSION PROCESS

Note by the Secretariat

Revision

The present paper has been updated by the Secretariat to reflect recent accessions. This paper was originally produced in response to a request by the General Council for a Technical Note on the Accession Process (WT/GC/M/32).

This paper contains information on completed accessions. Information on current accessions applications and Working Parties is contained in document WT/ACC/11 and subsequent revisions.

_______________

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1I.OVERVIEW

3II.RELEVANT WTO PROVISIONS

4III.THE ACCESSION PROCESS

41.General

4(a)Procedures

5(b)Status of Accession Working Parties

82.Establishment of Working Party

93.Collection of Factual Information

9(a)Memorandum

9(b)Copies of legislation

10(c)Data on applied duty rates

10(d)Data on agricultural domestic support and export subsidies

10(e)Data on services

11(f)Questions and Replies

11(g)Examination of the trade regime

124.Negotiation of Terms of Accession

13(a)Rules

15-Transitional arrangements

15(b)Market access for goods

16-Schedule of Concessions and Commitments on Goods, tariff concessions

17-Sectoral initiatives

24-Agricultural commitments

28(c)Services

315.Completion of the Working Party Mandate

316.Adoption of Working Party Report by General Council, Entry into Force of Protocol of Accession

317.Invocation of Article XIII of the WTO Agreement

31IV.LEAST-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

33V.TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

36VI.DISCUSSIONS ON THE ACCESSION PROCESS - RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

40ANNEX 1 – List of Documents Dealing with Accession to the WTO

41ANNEX 2 – General Council Decisions and Protocols of Accession

46ANNEX 3 – Commitments on Rules

46- ECONOMIC POLICIES

59- FRAMEWORK FOR MAKING AND ENFORCING POLICIES

65- POLICIES AFFECTING TRADE IN GOODS

70- IMPORT REGULATION

118- EXPORT REGULATION

126- Internal Policies Affecting Foreign Trade in Goods

172- TRADE-RELATED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME

179- POLICIES AFFECTING TRADE IN SERVICES

185- TRANSPARENCY

193- TRADE AGREEMENTS

196- CONCLUSIONS

197ANNEX 4 – Commitments on Services

197(a)Horizontal commitments

200(b)Sector specific commitments

2001. BUSINESS SERVICES

2062.Communication services

2093. Construction services

2104. Distribution services

2125. Educational services

2136. Environmental services

2157. Financial services

2188. Health and social services

2199. Tourism And travel-related services

22010. Recreational services

22211. Transport services

225MFN EXEMPTIONS

227ANNEX 5 – Transitional Arrangements

i.Overview TC "I.OVERVIEW" \l 1

This Technical Note reviews the process of WTO accession and updates the information contained in document WT/ACC/10/Rev.2. The aim of this paper is to assist in discussion of the accession process as a whole, rather than to provide specific analysis of particular cases.

Part II of this Note reproduces the relevant WTO provisions that govern the accession process – in particular Article XII of the WTO Agreement. Negotiating accession to the WTO under Article XII is much more complex compared to accession to the GATT 1947, largely due to the increased scope and coverage of the WTO Agreement. The WTO process is also more structured and transparent.

Part III describes the modalities of the accession process. The Secretariat, in consultation with WTO Members, has drawn up a set of procedures to be followed during the accession process (outlined in documents WT/ACC/1, 4, 5, 8 and 9).1 This Note examines experience with their operation since the WTO Agreement entered into force on 1 January 1995 using, as a reference point, the experience of Working Parties that have concluded their work.2

The first substantive phase of the accession process begins with collection of factual information on the acceding government's trade regime. During this fact-finding stage, the submission of a Memorandum, describing in detail the Applicant's foreign trade regime, is essential for activating the work of the Working Party. On the basis of this document, Members examine the trade and legal regime of the Applicant, asking for clarifications or additional data where necessary, and identifying areas of possible inconsistency with the WTO Agreements. This examination continues through written exchanges of Questions and Replies between members of the Working Party and the Applicant. As the information-gathering stage advances, and in order to ensure the transparency of the process, the Secretariat is requested to circulate a Factual Summary of Points Raised – an informal document summarizing discussions in the Working Party. This document gradually develops into a draft Working Party Report.

The next stage of the accession process, which often overlaps with the fact-finding stage, is the negotiation of the Applicant's terms of accession. Negotiations fall into two main categories - negotiations on multilateral rules, and bilateral market access negotiations.

Multilateral negotiations on rules relate to goods (including systemic agricultural issues), TRIPS and systemic issues in services. Acceding governments are expected to observe the rules set out in the WTO Agreement, as well as the binding commitments negotiated and finally agreed in their Protocol of Accession or in the relevant commitment paragraphs of the Working Party Report, which are incorporated in the Protocol of Accession. Annex 3 reproduces the commitments on rules undertaken in completed accessions.

Bilateral market access negotiations begin following the Applicant's submission of offers on concessions and commitments in the goods and services sectors. As the negotiations advance, these initial market access offers are revised to take account of the progress achieved or expected. The results of the negotiations on goods are annexed to the Applicant's Protocol of Accession in the Goods Schedule. This Note examines, in particular, the tariff concessions granted on agricultural and non-agricultural products by new Members. It also surveys agricultural commitments on domestic support and export subsidies, as well as tariff rate quotas and special safeguard provisions. As for services, the results of the bilateral market access negotiations are attached to the Applicant's Protocol in the Schedule of Specific Commitments on Services. This Note provides a synoptic overview of the specific commitments undertaken by new Members, followed by a more detailed summary of commitments on services contained in Annex 4.

Acceding governments usually hold plurilateral meetings with interested members of the Working Party on issues such as agricultural support measures, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical standards and regulations, etc. These help towards paving the way for a multilateral agreement on the systemic issues in agriculture as well as in other WTO agreements, as needed.

Transitional arrangements have been the subject of considerable discussion in accession Working Parties. The transition periods granted to original WTO Members during the Uruguay Round are not automatic to governments acceding under Article XII. However, transitional arrangements have been granted in some accessions in a limited number of areas and for specific periods of time, following submissions by Applicants of detailed action plans ensuring WTO consistency in all other related areas by the date of accession. Transition periods have been extended more readily to least-developed country (LDC) Applicants, allowing them greater flexibility for bringing their foreign trade regime into WTO conformity (see Annex 5).

Annex 2 briefly examines the texts of new Members' Protocols of Accession. These incorporate the relevant commitment paragraphs of the Working Party Report, as well as the Goods and Services Schedules. A Protocol sets out the terms which WTO Members agree with an acceding government in a single package. All the obligations in this package are enforceable through the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO.

Part IV of this Note surveys the situation of LDC Applicants, which has been the subject of particular attention.( In December 2002, recognizing the special needs of acceding LDCs, the General Council adopted Guidelines4 to facilitate and accelerate negotiations with acceding LDCs in accordance with paragraph 42 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration5 and the mandate in paragraph 18(iii) of the WTO Work Programme on LDCs.6 The Guidelines made provisions for simplified and streamlined accession procedures for LDCs, while reaffirming the role of technical assistance and capacity building. Representatives from all LDC Applicants participate regularly in intensive training courses and seminars organised by the Secretariat. In addition, the Integrated Framework for coordination and delivery of trade-related technical assistance to LDCs links the WTO with UNCTAD, ITC, IMF, the World Bank and UNDP. Following the adoption of the Guidelines, Nepal and Cambodia became the first LDCs to accede successfully to the WTO under Article XII.

Part V provides information on the technical co-operation activities of the WTO Secretariat, as well as those of national governments and other international organisations. The Secretariat provides technical assistance to all acceding governments on request, within the limit of available resources. All governments in the process of accession have received such assistance in various forms – regional or Geneva-based courses or seminars; focussed assistance in the provision of information needed by the Working Party; assistance in the drafting of legislation; tabling of offers; training courses, etc. In addition, the Secretariat takes all possible steps to co-ordinate technical assistance related to accessions provided by other organisations and WTO Member governments.

Part VI summarises the discussions on the process of accession to the WTO, which have taken place at Ministerial Conferences and at meetings of the General Council. Specifically, the discussions have focused on the procedures laid down for accession under Article XII; the transparency and pace of the accession process; whether the fact-finding stage overburdens Applicants, particularly the smaller economies; the terms and conditions of accession, in particular the availability of special and differential treatment and transition periods; the special needs of acceding LDC Applicants; the provision and co-ordination of technical assistance; and the relationship between accessions and the multilateral trade negotiations.

The Accessions dossier remains a major priority for the WTO. Ongoing accessions are at different stages of the process and WTO Members would like to see these concluded as soon as possible. On their side, the acceding governments are keen to participate in the work of the WTO as full and effective players. This would also ensure that these governments maintain the momentum of their domestic reform processes and that the evolution of domestic reform remains consistent with evolving WTO rules and disciplines.

II.Relevant WTO Provisions TC "II.RELEVANT WTO PROVISIONS" \l 1

Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization deals with accession. The full text of this provision reads as follows:

"1.Any State or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements may accede to this Agreement, on terms to be agreed between it and the WTO. Such accession shall apply to this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed thereto.

2.Decisions on accession shall be taken by the Ministerial Conference. The Ministerial Conference shall approve the agreement on the terms of accession by a two-thirds majority of the Members of the WTO.

3.Accession to a Plurilateral Trade Agreement shall be governed by the provisions of that Agreement."

Perhaps the most striking feature of WTO Article XII is its brevity. It gives no guidance on the "terms to be agreed", these being left to negotiations between the WTO Members and the Applicant. Nor does it lay down any procedures to be used for negotiating these terms, the latter being left to individual Working Parties to agree. These procedures have evolved separately as will be discussed in the next part of this Note. In this, it follows closely the corresponding Article XXXIII of GATT 1947.

A number of other WTO provisions are relevant to the accession process:

-Article XVI:1 lays down that "Except as otherwise provided under this Agreement or the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the WTO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and customary practices followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 and the bodies established in the framework of GATT 1947";

-Article XII:2 states that "Decisions on accession shall be taken by the Ministerial Conference", Article IV:2 makes it clear that "In the intervals between meetings of the Ministerial Conference, its functions shall be conducted by the General Council";

-Article IX deals with decision-making. On 15 November 1995 the General Council agreed to procedures regarding decision-making under Articles IX and XII of the WTO Agreement which clarified the relation between these two provisions (WT/GC/M/8, page 6); and

-Article XIII, paragraphs 1 and 3, state that:

"1.This Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annexes 1 and 2 shall not apply as between any Member and any other Member if either of the Members, at the time either becomes a Member, does not consent to such application.

[...]

3.Paragraph 1 shall apply between a Member and another Member which has acceded under Article XII only if the Member not consenting to the application has so notified the Ministerial Conference before the approval of the agreement on the terms of accession by the Ministerial Conference";

iii.The Accession Process TC "III.THE ACCESSION PROCESS" \l 1 1.General TC "1.General" \l 1 (a)Procedures TC "(a)Procedures" \l 1

The organization and pursuit of accession negotiations in each Working Party follow a well-established pattern based on procedures set out in a note by the Secretariat – document WT/ACC/1 of 24 March 1995. These procedures were modelled on those followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947, including the Complementary Procedures on Accession Negotiations agreed by the Council of GATT 1947 on 27 October 1993 (L/7317) and the statement by the Chairman of the Council of GATT 1947 on the Management of Accession Negotiations on 10 November 1994 (C/COM/4). Before issuing document WT/ACC/1, the Secretariat consulted extensively with interested WTO Members and took the views expressed into account. During these consultations an understanding was reached that document WT/ACC/1 would not be submitted to the Ministerial Conference/General Council (hereinafter referred to as the General Council unless specific reference to the Ministerial Conference is required) or to individual Working Parties for formal endorsement but that it would be prepared as a practical guide for delegations of both WTO Members and acceding governments and not as a general policy statement on accession negotiations (see document WT/ACC/1, paragraph 2).

Document WT/ACC/1 sets out the different stages in the accession process. The General Council considers applications to accede under WTO Article XII and decides on the establishment of a Working Party. The essence of the multilateral work of the Working Party begins with the submission of a Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime by the Applicant government. The Working Party first conducts a factual examination of the trade regime of the acceding government on the basis of the Memorandum, as well as replies to Members' questions on the Memorandum. At an appropriate moment, it moves on to negotiate the terms of accession, which relate to three main areas - WTO rules on goods, TRIPS and systemic issues in the area of services. Bilateral market access negotiations on goods and services, between interested Members and the acceding government, proceed in parallel to the multilateral work. When agreement is reached, the Report of the Working Party, including a draft Decision and Protocol of Accession, is forwarded to the General Council. The Protocol - which contains a single package of agreed commitments on rules, concessions and commitments on goods, and specific commitments on services - sets out the terms on which the Applicant is invited to join the WTO. Following the General Council's adoption of the Report and approval of the draft Decision, the acceding government becomes a Member of the WTO thirty days after it formally accepts its Protocol of Accession by domestic ratification.

Document WT/ACC/1 is supplemented by four Technical Notes by the Secretariat:

· WT/ACC/4 - Information to be provided on Domestic Support and Export Subsidies in Agriculture. This document is designed to identify agricultural policy measures under the Agreement on Agriculture on which such information is required;

· WT/ACC/5 - Information to be Provided on Policy Measures Affecting Trade in Services. This document is designed to facilitate the description of policy measures maintained by acceding governments and which are relevant to the provisions of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS);

· WT/ACC/8 - Information to be Provided on Policy Measures with Respect to SPS and TBT Issues. This document is designed as a questionnaire to assist acceding governments in the provision of information, which will facilitate discussion on SPS/TBT issues; and

· WT/ACC/9 (and Corr.1) - Information to be Provided on Implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. Designed as a questionnaire, this document is prepared to assist acceding governments in the provision of information, which will facilitate discussion on TRIPS-related issues.

The Accessions Division of the Secretariat has regular consultations with acceding governments, WTO Members and Chairpersons on the programme of meetings and agenda of accession Working Parties.

(b)Status of Accession Working Parties TC "(b)Status of Accession Working Parties" \l 1

More than fifty governments have applied to accede under Article XII since the WTO Agreement entered into force on 1 January 1995. A number of applications consisted of requests made earlier to accede to GATT 1947, which were converted into requests for accession to the WTO. Pursuant to the decision adopted by the General Council on 31 January 1995, GATT 1947 Working Parties were converted into WTO Working Parties.

Twenty-one of these have completed the accession procedures and have become WTO Members. These are, in the order in which they acceded:

1. Ecuador;

2. Bulgaria;

3. Mongolia;

4. Panama;

5. Kyrgyz Republic;

6. Latvia;

7. Estonia;

8. Jordan;

9. Georgia;

10. Albania;

11. Oman;

12. Croatia;

13. Lithuania;

14. Moldova;

15. China;

16. Chinese Taipei;

17. Armenia;

18. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM);

19. Nepal;

20. Cambodia; and

21. Saudi Arabia.

Table 1, Timetable of Completed Accessions, provides information on the dates of application, circulation of key documents, and the dates of accession of the governments that have negotiated their WTO accession under Article XII. It also presents a timeline of events between the presentation of the Memorandum (which marks the beginning of the substantive work of the Working Party) and accession. The shortest accession process has overall taken 2 years 10 months (Kyrgyz Republic) and the longest 15 years 5 months (China).

Table 1: Timetable of Completed Accessions(

Ecuador

Bulgaria

Mongolia

Panama

Kyrgyz Republic

Date

Time Since Memo

Date

Time Since Memo

Date

Time Since Memo

Date

Time Since Memo

Date

Time Since Memo

Application

09/1992

09/1986

07/1991

08/1991

02/1996

Working Party Established

10/1992

02/1990

10/1991

10/1991

04/1996

Memorandum

05/1993

07/1993

01/1992

06/1993

08/1996

1st Meeting of Working Party

07/1993

2 months

07/1993

1 month

06/1993

1 year

04/1994

10 months

03/1997

7 months

5 months

Draft Working Party Report

10/1994

1 year

05/1994

10 months

12/1994

2 years

05/1996

2 years

04/1998

1 year

5 months

11 months

11 months

8 months

Report Adopted by Working Party

07/1995

2 years

09/1996

2 years

06/1996

4 years

09/1996

2 years

07/1998

1 year

2 months

2 months

5 months

3 months

11 months

Report Adopted by Council

07/1995

2 years

10/1996

3 years

07/1996

4 years

10/1996

3 years

10/1998

2 years

2 months

3 months

6 months

4 months

2 months

Membership

01/1996

2 years

12/1996

3 years

01/1997

5 years

09/1997

4 years

12/1998

2 years

8 months

5 months

3 months

4 months

Total Time

3 years 4 months

10 years 3 months

5 years 6 months

5 years 1 month

2 years 10 months

Latvia

Estonia

Jordan

Georgia

Albania

Date

Time Since Memo

Date

Time Since Memo

Date

Time Since Memo

Date

Time Since Memo

Date

Time Since Memo

Application

11/1993

03/1994

01/1994

07/1996

11/1992


12/1993

03/1994

01/1994

07/1996

12/1992

Memorandum

08/1994

03/1994

10/1994

07/1997

01/1995


03/1995

7 months

11/1994

8 months

10/1996

2 years

03/1998

11 months

04/1996

1 year

3 months


12/1996

2 years

11/1998

4 years

04/1999

4 years

02/1999

1 year

07/1999

4 years

4 months

8 months

6 months

10 months

6 months


09/1998

4 years

04/1999

5 years

11/1999

5 years

10/1999

2 years

07/2000

5 years

1 month

1 month

1 month

6 months

6 months


10/1998

4 years

05/1999

5 years

12/1999

5 years

10/1999

2 years

07/2000

5 years

2 months

2 months

2 months

6 months

6 months

Membership

02/1999

4 years

11/1999

5 years

04/2000

5 years

06/2000

3 years

09/2000

5 years

6 months

8 months

6 months

2 months

8 months

Total Time

5 years 3 months

5 years 8 months

6 years 4 months

4 years 1 month

7 years 10 months

Oman

Croatia

Lithuania

Moldova

China

Date

Time Since Memo

Date

Time Since Memo

Date

Time Since Memo

Date

Time Since Memo

Date

Time Since Memo

Application

04/1996

09/1993

01/1994

11/1993

07/1986


06/1996

10/1993

02/1994

12/1993

03/1987

Memorandum

06/1996

06/1994

12/1994

12/1996

02/1987


04/1997

10 months

04/1996

1 year

11/1995

11 months

06/1997

6 months

10/1987

8 months

10 months


03/1999

2 years

08/1998

2 years

06/1997

2 years

07/1999

2 years

12/1994

7 years

9 months

2 months

6 months

7 months

10 months


09/2000

3 years

06/2000

6 years

10/2000

5 years

12/2000

4 years

09/2001

14 years

3 months

10 months

7 months


10/2000

3 years

07/2000

6 years

12/2000

6 years

05/2001

4 years

11/2001

14 years

4 months

1 month

5 months

9 months

Membership

11/2000

3 years

11/2000

6 years

05/2001

6 years

07/2001

4 years

12/2001

14 years

5 months

5 months

5 months

7 months

10 months

Total Time

4 years 7 months

7 years 2 months

7 years 5 months

7 years 4 months

15 years 5 months

Chinese Taipei

Armenia

FYROM

Nepal

Cambodia

Saudi Arabia

Date

Time Since Memo

Date

Time Since Memo

Date

Time Since Memo

Date

Time Since Memo

Date

Time Since Memo

Date

Time Since Memo

Application

01/1992

11/1993

12/1994

05/1989

12/1994

06/1993


09/1992

12/1993

12/1994

06/1989

12/1994

07/1993

Memorandum

10/1992

04/1995

04/1999

08/1998

06/1999

07/1994


11/1992

1 month

01/1996

9 months

07/2000

1 year

05/2000

1 year

05/2001

1 year

05/1996

1 year

3 months

9 months

11 months

10 months


03/1998

5 years

03/1997

1 year

05/2002

2 years

06/2003

4 years

03/2003

3 years

01/2000

5 years

5 months

11 months

11 months

10 months

9 months

6 months


09/2001

8 years

11/2002

6 years

09/2002

3 years

08/2003

5 years

07/2003

4 years

10/2005

11 years

11 months

7 months

5 months

1 month

3 months


11/2001

9 years

12/2002

6 years

10/2002

3 years

09/2003

5 years

09/2003

4 years

11/2005

11 years

1 months

8 months

6 months

1 month

3 months

4 months

Membership

01/2002

9 years

02/2003

6 years

04/2003

4 years

04/2004

5 years

10/2004

5 years

12/2005

11 years

2 months

10 months

8 months

4 months

5 months

Total Time

10 years

9 years 3 months

8 years 3 months

14 years 11 months

9 years 10 months

12 years 6 months

Working Parties are currently established to examine the requests presented by:

1. Afghanistan

2. Algeria

3. Andorra

4. Azerbaijan

5. Bahamas

6. Belarus

7. Bhutan

8. Bosnia and Herzegovina

9. Cape Verde

10. Ethiopia

11. Iran

12. Iraq

13. Kazakhstan

14. Lao People's Democratic Republic

15. Lebanese Republic

16. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

17. Montenegro

18. Russian Federation

19. Samoa

20. Sao Tomé and Principe

21. Serbia

22. Seychelles

23. Sudan

24. Tajikistan

25. Tonga

26. Ukraine

27. Uzbekistan

28. Vanuatu*

29. Vietnam

30. Yemen

* The final Working Party on the Accession of Vanuatu was held on 29 October 2001.

A Working Party has not yet been established to examine a request from Syria (documents WT/ACC/SYR/1, 2 and 3 refer).

Document WT/ACC/11, and subsequent revisions, contains information on the status of ongoing accessions (as of the date of the document)8.

2.Establishment of Working Party TC "2.Establishment of Working Party" \l 1

Governments wishing to accede to the WTO as a State or as a separate customs territory write to the Director-General of the WTO, indicating that they wish to do so under Article XII of the WTO Agreement. The Director-General verifies these requests and transmits them to the General Council, which normally considers them at its next meeting. At this stage, discussion in the General Council is usually general in nature. Normally, the acceding government presents its application, Members welcome this and the General Council establishes a Working Party with standard terms of reference:

"to examine the application of the Government of [name of Applicant] to accede to the World Trade Organization under Article XII and to submit to the General Council/Ministerial Conference recommendations which may include a draft Protocol of Accession."

These terms of reference are modelled on those previously used for GATT Accession Working Parties. All Working Parties have been given the standard terms of reference.

When the Working Party is established, it is standard practice for the Chairman of the General Council to be given the authority to nominate its chairperson after consulting with the Applicant and members of the Working Party.

Membership of the Working Party is open to all interested WTO Members. In addition, all acceding governments can participate as observers in formal Working Party meetings. This ensures that the multilateral part of the accession process is conducted in a transparent manner. The size of Working Parties varies considerably. As of the date of this document, of the Working Parties that have held their first meeting, the largest has 58 members (the Russian Federation), and the two smallest 9 (Bhutan and Montenegro). 9

The IMF, the UN, UNCTAD and the World Bank have observer status in accession Working Parties by virtue of their Agreements with the WTO. The list of requests from other International Organisations is contained in the latest revision to document WT/GC/W/51. Pending the outcome of broad informal consultations conducted by the Chairperson of the General Council, these requests are considered on a case-by-case basis by each Working Party, based on the criteria contained in the guidelines outlined in document WT/L/161, Annex 3, paragraph 4 (see Minutes of the General Council of 22 October 1998, WT/GC/M/23, page 23).

3.Collection of Factual Information TC "3.Collection of Factual Information" \l 1

The next phase in the process is one of fact-finding, designed to give WTO Members an understanding of the Applicant country or territory, its economy and, in particular, its trade regime. This phase is usually also one of mutual education during which the Applicant gains a better understanding of the WTO and its requirements. This process is inevitably demanding, especially on the Applicant, but is an essential preliminary to, and basis for the negotiation of the terms of accession.

(a)Memorandum TC "(a)Memorandum" \l 1

The Applicant submits a Memorandum describing in detail its foreign trade regime and providing relevant statistical data for circulation to all WTO Members according to the outline format attached to document WT/ACC/1. This outline has been prepared based on the experience gained in GATT Working Parties, greatly expanded to reflect the coverage of the WTO Agreements.

The preparation of the Memorandum requires a considerable investment of resources from the Applicant. As a result, acceding governments have sometimes taken extended periods of time to prepare this document (see Table 1). The presentation of a complete and accurate document, however, greatly facilitates the subsequent stages of the accession process.

Some of the Memoranda presented have not been fully consistent with the outline format of document WT/ACC/1. In some cases, Working Parties have started by considering information on certain main sections of the Memorandum. In others, an Applicant may be asked to supplement and complete the Memorandum.

Generally, the outline of the Memorandum on the Applicant's foreign trade regime provides the framework for the whole accession process.

(b)Copies of legislation TC "(b)Copies of legislation" \l 1

Document WT/ACC/1 states that laws and regulations relevant to accession are to be made available to members of the Working Party at the same time as the Memorandum. It goes on to state that "the customary practice in this respect has been that the Applicant send a complete and comprehensive copy of the relevant laws and regulations to the Secretariat. If the textual material is short, it should be entirely translated by the Applicant into one of the WTO official languages (English, French and Spanish), if it is long, the Applicant should provide a detailed summary in one of the official languages."

The purpose of this arrangement is to enable Working Party members to check relevant sections of the Memorandum and to ensure that the laws and regulations conform to WTO requirements. As stated in document WT/ACC/1, only laws and regulations that are relevant to the particular accession process should be submitted.

In practice, many laws and regulations are supplied to the WTO after the Memorandum has been distributed, especially since many acceding governments are in the process of economic transition or are undertaking reforms which require major changes in their legislation. Experience has shown that detailed summaries of laws and regulations are of limited use, as some Members have insisted that they need to receive the full text of laws and regulations relevant to accession in one of the WTO working languages.

It has now become standard practice for Applicants to submit "legislative action plans", outlining the legislative work programme underway, as well as target dates for implementation. As the accession process advances, governments are often requested to revise and update their legislative action plans.

(c)Data on applied duty rates TC "(c)Data on applied duty rates" \l 1

The procedures provide that copies of the Applicant's currently applicable tariff schedule in the Harmonized System (HS) nomenclature should be made available to members of the Working Party at the same time as the Memorandum. Applicants are requested to supply this in electronic format. The expectation of WTO Members has been that the applied rates would be taken as the base rates in the negotiations on tariff concessions to be included in the Goods Schedule of the Applicant. Members also request that import data be supplied in electronic format on a tariff line level, including a break-down by country.

As these data are mainly used in the negotiations on the Goods Schedule, in practice detailed information has often been provided to the WTO only when these negotiations are about to begin.

(d)Data on agricultural domestic support and export subsidies TC "(d)Data on agricultural domestic support and export subsidies" \l 1

Document WT/ACC/1 foresees that the Memorandum contains a description of the range of policies affecting foreign trade in agricultural products. In addition, a Technical Note by the Secretariat (WT/ACC/4) has been circulated "to allow acceding Governments to present factual information on their domestic support and export subsidy measures actually in place in agriculture […] in a manner consistent with the notification requirements of the Agreement on Agriculture". Document WT/ACC/4 indicates that information is required "normally for each of the three most recent years".

Technical Note WT/ACC/4 has been drawn up in consultation with Members. It sets out their expectations in this regard and provides details on the information to be provided in the supporting tables that form a basis for the negotiations on the commitments limiting subsidization of agricultural products to be included in the Goods Schedule.

The preparation of the supporting tables involves a thorough grasp of complex WTO requirements and detailed technical work. Working Party members have also made clear the importance that they attach to the full and accurate presentation of support actually granted and not, for instance, of budgetary estimates. It is therefore not surprising that these tables are sometimes presented at a fairly advanced stage of the accession process. The tables are often revised several times before they are acceptable to members of the Working Party and their revision becomes a part of the process of negotiation described below. Acceding governments often hold plurilateral meetings, chaired by the Secretariat, with interested WTO Members to assist in the revision of these tables.

(e)Data on services TC "(e)Data on services" \l 1

The outline format attached to document WT/ACC/1 provides some guidance on the information, which should be included in the Memorandum on the Applicant's trade-related services regime. The Secretariat has put together a Technical Note (WT/ACC/5) in consultation with Members, which is designed "to assist acceding Governments in submitting factual information on their policies affecting trade in services relevant to their economy".

In certain cases acceding governments have experienced difficulties in collecting and presenting the information called for in the Technical Note. In practice, some Working Party members have shown understanding of this problem and have indicated that they would be prepared to open negotiations on specific commitments to be included in the Services Schedule of the Applicant on the basis of a detailed offer, rather than a full response to document WT/ACC/5. The response to document WT/ACC/5 is, in any case, aimed at helping them put together a services offer as soon as possible.

(f)Questions and Replies TC "(f)Questions and Replies" \l 1

The procedures outlined in document WT/ACC/1 provide that, following the circulation of the Memorandum, members of the Working Party be invited to submit questions in writing. Replies are submitted in writing by the acceding government to the Secretariat, which consolidates them and arranges them by topic under the headings of the Memorandum.

The headings of the Memorandum have, on the whole, provided a good framework for the Questions and Replies documents; Members have posed questions on other topics in only a few instances.

Questions on the Memorandum are submitted by Members and in a few cases more than one round of questions and replies have taken place before the first meeting of the Working Party. The number and diversity of questions, and the number of rounds preceding the first meeting, have varied considerably from one accession to another.

(g)Examination of the trade regime TC "(g)Examination of the trade regime" \l 1

The first meeting of the Working Party is scheduled once an adequate documentary basis is available (the submission of a Memorandum, followed by the circulation of a Questions and Replies document is essential). Document WT/ACC/1 stresses that a minimum of four to six weeks should elapse between the formal circulation of the documentation in the three working languages (English, French and Spanish) and a meeting of the Working Party to allow adequate time for delegations to prepare. This amount of time has normally been provided.

Document WT/ACC/1 foresees that at the first meeting, representatives from the Applicant government and members of the Working Party examine the Memorandum and the Questions and Replies provided, with a view to seeking any further clarifications that may be required in light of the various provisions of the WTO Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements. After the meeting, members of the Working Party submit their comments and questions posed during the meeting (as well as any additional points that they may want to raise) in writing. The Applicant government provides written replies to the Members' questions and forwards them to the Secretariat, which consolidates them into a single Questions and Replies document prior to formal circulation. Further fact-finding meetings may be held as necessary before the Working Party begins to negotiate the terms on which the Applicant will accede. The written Questions and Replies documents distributed after each meeting of the Working Party constitute a record of the discussions and are invariably channelled through the Secretariat. In accordance with the agreed procedures set out in document WT/ACC/1, at the conclusion of each meeting of the Working Party, the Chairman sums up the state of play and next steps to be taken.

The number of fact-finding meetings that have been held in each Working Party has varied considerably, depending on a number of factors including the interest generated by a particular accession, the complexity of the policies examined and the adequacy of the information supplied. In order to accelerate the process and ensure that time is used most productively, acceding governments are encouraged to submit sufficiently in advance supporting information on agriculture in the format of document WT/ACC/4, and on services in the format of document WT/ACC/5.

The practice has emerged since the circulation of document WT/ACC/1 of requesting the Secretariat, at an appropriate stage, to prepare a Factual Summary of Points Raised in order to consolidate the information contained in the Memorandum, the supplementary documents, and the Questions and Replies documents. The Factual Summary is arranged by topic following closely the headings of the Memorandum. The purpose of this Summary is to facilitate the work of the Applicant, and the members of the Working Party, by identifying the points that are established and those that require further clarification, as well as to generally make the process more transparent. As work proceeds and as negotiations on multilateral commitments advance, the Factual Summary of Points Raised gradually evolves into a Report of the Working Party. During this process, further revisions, as necessary, are prepared and circulated to Working Party members. The final version of the Report contains the results of the work completed by the Working Party.

4.Negotiation of Terms of Accession TC "4.Negotiation of Terms of Accession" \l 1

Once the fact-finding work is sufficiently advanced, the Working Party begins to negotiate the terms on which the Applicant will accede to the WTO (in practice, the fact-finding and negotiating phases often overlap).

Multilateral negotiations relate to the rules established in the WTO Agreements, including rules on goods, TRIPS, and issues of general systemic interest relating to services. The results of the multilateral negotiations are either set out in the Protocol of Accession or in the relevant Working Party Report's commitment paragraphs. These commitment paragraphs are incorporated by reference in the Protocol of Accession.

Bilateral negotiations relate to market access concessions and commitments in goods and specific commitments in services sectors. The results of the acceding government's bilateral market access negotiations on goods and services are consolidated by the Secretariat into Schedules of concessions and commitments on goods (including negotiated levels of agricultural domestic support and export subsidies) and services.

The procedures set out in document WT/ACC/1 contain fewer details concerning the negotiating phase of the process than about the earlier fact-finding phase and the last phase in which the results of the negotiation are formalised and put into effect, the main aim of that document being to define the framework for the negotiations between WTO Members and the acceding government. Paragraph 12 of document WT/ACC/1 indicates that "when the examination of the foreign trade regime is far enough advanced, members of the Working Party may initiate bilateral market access negotiations on goods and services and on the other terms to be agreed. It is understood that the fact-finding work on the foreign trade regime and the negotiating phase can overlap and proceed in parallel".

The following sections describe how the process has worked in practice, by providing some information on the procedures followed and by analysing the terms contained in the Reports of the Accession Working Parties which have so far completed their work. These sections are general in nature, but nevertheless specific enough to demonstrate that the negotiations on the terms of accession reflect the particular requirements of each accession process.

The terms of accession of Applicants that have negotiated their WTO accession under Article XII are contained in the documents listed in Table 2 below.

Table 2

Working Party Report

Goods Schedule

Services Schedule

Ecuador

WT/L/77 & Corr.1

Add.1 & Add.1/Corr.1, 2

Add.2

Bulgaria

WT/ACC/BGR/5 & Corr.1

Add.1

Add.2

Mongolia

WT/ACC/MNG/9 & Corr.1

Add.1 & Add.1/Corr.1

Add.2

Panama

WT/ACC/PAN/19 & Corr.1

Add.1

Add.2

Kyrgyz Republic

WT/ACC/KGZ/26 & Corr.1

Add.1

Add.2

Latvia

WT/ACC/LVA/32


Add.2

Estonia

WT/ACC/EST/28

Add.1


Jordan

WT/ACC/JOR/33 & Corr. 1

Add.1

Add.2

Georgia

WT/ACC/GEO/31

Add.1

Add.2

Albania

WT/ACC/ALB/51 & Corr.1

Add.1

Add.2 & Add.2/ Corr.1, 2

Oman

WT/ACC/OMN/26

Add.1

Add.2

Croatia

WT/ACC/HRV/59

Add.1

Add.2 & Add.2/ Corr.1, 2

Lithuania

WT/ACC/LTU/52


Add.2

Moldova

WT/ACC/MOL/37 & Corr.1-4

Add.1

Add.2

China

WT/ACC/CHN/49 & Corr.1

WT/MIN(01)/3

Add.1

Add.1

Add.2

Add.2

Chinese Taipei

WT/ACC/TPKM/18

WT/MIN(01)/4

Add.1

Add.1

Add.2

Add.2

Armenia

WT/ACC/ARM/23 & Corr.1

Add.1

Add.2

FYROM

WT/ACC/807/27

Add.1

Add.2

Nepal

WT/ACC/NPL/16

WT/MIN(03)/19

Add.1

Add.2

Cambodia

WT/ACC/KHM/21

WT/MIN(03)/18

Add.1

Add.2

Saudi Arabia

WT/ACC/SAU/61

Add.1

Add.2

(a)Rules TC "(a)Rules" \l 1

The discussions on the Applicant's conformity with WTO rules arise from the fact-finding stage of the work. The decision to move to examine the commitments that the Applicant should undertake in the rules area has been taken less formally than in the past. In some cases, the move has initially been made only in certain areas, in which work has been relatively far advanced.

While bilateral meetings with some Members may deal with commitments on rules, discussions on these are generally conducted multilaterally in the Working Party, since the application of WTO rules is a matter of common concern.

The main aim of the discussions on WTO rules is to establish if the Applicant's regime conforms to WTO rules and, in particular, how it is to be brought into conformity where necessary. It is the position of some Members, however, that acceding governments do not have the automatic right to the treatment laid down in the WTO Agreements for original Members of the WTO, in particular with respect to transition periods. Article XII simply provides that accession shall be "on terms to be agreed between [the Applicant] and the WTO".

An issue that has been raised frequently in Working Parties is the application of Special and Differential Treatment provisions for developing and least developed countries (LDCs) in the WTO Agreements. In practice, the situation of each Applicant has been considered on a case by case basis, while taking into account individual development, financial and trade needs. The Guidelines on LDCs' accession (document WT/L/508) have further indicated that provisions for Special and Differential Treatment are applicable to all acceding LDCs (see part IV below).

Each of the Protocols, which follow a common format, makes the acceding government a Member of the WTO and binds it to observe the rules contained in the Agreement establishing the WTO, as rectified, amended or otherwise modified as of the date that the relevant Protocol entered into force. Each of these Protocols also binds the new Member to observe specified commitments. These specific commitments are either set out in the text of the Protocol itself or, more frequently, in the commitment paragraphs of the relevant Working Party Report (which are incorporated by reference in the Protocols). Both sets of rules are integral parts of the Protocol and have the same status and legal effect. They are enforceable through the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the WTO. The entire package of Report, Protocol of Accession and Schedules of Concessions and Commitments in Goods and Services constitutes the conditions under which the acceding government is permitted to join the WTO Agreement.

The relevant commitment paragraphs of the Working Party Reports, which contain the rules accepted by the governments that have acceded to date, are set out in full in Annex 3, grouped together by subject for purposes of comparison. The Working Party Report of Ecuador, the first country to accede to the WTO under Article XII, incorporates 21 such commitments. Comparable figures for the other governments which have acceded are:

Mongolia: 17

Bulgaria: 26

Panama: 24

Kirguiz Republic 29

Latvia: 22

Estonia: 24

Jordan: 29

Georgia: 29

Albania: 29

Oman: 26

Croatia: 27

Lithuania: 28

Moldova: 28

China: 82

Chinese Taipei: 63

Armenia: 39

FYROM: 24

Nepal: 25

Cambodia: 29

Saudi Arabia: 59

It should be noted that the early sections of Working Party Reports (i.e. Economic Policies) are included in the Memorandum mainly, but not exclusively, as background information on the Applicant's foreign trade regime for the consideration of the Working Party. In these sections specific commitments have been required of some of the acceding governments on the following subjects: foreign exchange and payments; investment regime; state ownership and privatisation; and pricing policies. Moreover, China has undertaken commitments in two additional specific areas: non-discrimination (including national treatment) and balance of payments measures.

It can also be noted that the commitment paragraphs are of different types:

-statements of fact rather than commitments;

-obligations to abide by existing WTO rules, sometimes specifying national measures to be amended in order to be brought into conformity with WTO provisions, or sometimes elaborating on the WTO provisions relating to the subject in question;

-obligations not to have recourse to specific WTO provisions (such as transition periods on Customs Valuation and TRIPS);

-specific identification of transition periods that may be used;

-authorisations to depart temporarily from WTO rules or from commitments in the Goods Schedule; and

-obligations to abide by terms defined by the commitment paragraph and not contained in WTO Multilateral Agreements (e.g. timeframe for accession to Plurilateral Trade Agreements).

In addition to the commitments contained in the Working Party Report (which are incorporated by reference into the Protocol of Accession) some governments have also undertaken specific commitments, which have been included in the body of their Protocol. These specific commitments are equally binding and have the same legal status as the commitment paragraphs of the Working Party Report. Annex 2 provides a detailed description of the Protocols of Accession of new Members.

-Transitional arrangements TC "-Transitional arrangements " \l 1

Acceding governments sometimes request that they be granted transition periods of the kind provided in the Uruguay Round Agreements for developing-country Members and, in some instances, for Members in the process of transition from a centrally-planned to a market economy. The transition periods provided in the Uruguay Round had formed part of the Single Undertaking and had been intended to allow the negotiators time to become accustomed to the new rules and to move to address in legislation their new responsibilities. Therefore, time had been provided for full implementation.

Throughout the accession process, conformity with the WTO Agreements is the standard against which acceding governments' trade policies are measured. In addition, maintaining a standstill on WTO-inconsistent measures, as well as on tariff increases, is a generally agreed principle in WTO accession negotiations. Therefore governments coming through the accession process after years of negotiations are generally well-equipped to participate as full and effective players in the WTO from the day of accession, thus strengthening the rules-based multilateral trading system.

Transitional arrangements have been granted in certain accessions, generally on a limited number of areas and for specific periods of time. The experience of governments that have negotiated their accession under Article XII of the WTO Agreement shows that Members are not, a priori, opposed to transitional arrangements, but that Applicants must demonstrate that they have done as much as possible to bring their system in line with WTO requirements before making a request for a transition period. Acceding governments normally present a plan and timetable showing what steps they have taken towards achieving conformity, what remains to be done and how and when they would expect to complete this process. This becomes subject of negotiations in the Working Party on the terms to be included in the Protocol. The commitment paragraphs providing for transitional arrangements, as contained in the Applicants' Working Party Reports, are reproduced in Annex 5.

Transition periods have been extended more readily to least-developed country (LDC) Applicants. The Guidelines on LDCs' accession (document WT/L/508) state that transitional arrangements contained in the WTO Agreements "shall be granted in accession negotiations taking into account individual development, financial and trade needs". Some Members have urged further flexibility on this matter, especially in the case of small, vulnerable economies (see part IV of this Note for a further discussion on the specifics of LDC accession).

(b)Market access for goods TC "(b)Market access for goods" \l 1

Paragraph 13 of document WT/ACC/1 states that the negotiations on concessions and commitments on goods and specific commitments on services may begin either on the basis of requests from WTO Members or, as a means of expediting the work, on the basis of offers from the Applicant. Experience to date shows that, usually, it is the Applicant that initiates the market access negotiations by presenting both basic factual information and offers on goods (including agriculture) and/or services. The offers are generally circulated in WTO documents, except in a few cases in which the offer has been made available to interested Members on request.

Negotiations on tariffs and services are conducted bilaterally, but it now appears to be accepted that the draft commitments on agricultural domestic support and export subsidies are dealt with from a relatively early stage in plurilateral meetings with interested WTO Members. These commitments are of more general systemic interest than concessions on specific tariff lines of interest to individual Members. The results of bilateral negotiations with interested WTO Members are compiled in bilateral agreements that are subsequently used by the Secretariat to put together draft Schedules. Paragraph 13(iii) of document WT/ACC/1 adds that the draft Schedules on both goods and services are formally circulated to all members of the Working Party and reviewed multilaterally. This provides an opportunity for WTO Members to verify that the concessions contained in the draft Schedules conform to the results of their bilateral negotiations with the acceding government. It also presents an opportunity to ensure that the contents are in accordance with the relevant WTO provisions.

-Schedule of Concessions and Commitments on Goods, tariff concessions TC "-Schedule of Concessions and Commitments on Goods, tariff concessions " \l 1

The Schedule of Concessions and Commitments on Goods (Goods Schedule) contains the concessions and commitments made by the acceding government. These take the same form as the Schedules of all other WTO Members – Part I containing most-favoured-nation tariff concessions (often referred to as "bindings"), Part II containing any preferential tariff concessions, Part III containing any non-tariff concessions and Part IV containing commitments limiting subsidisation of agricultural products. All WTO Members must undertake most-favoured-nation tariff bindings and agricultural commitments but concessions on the preferential tariff and non-tariff measures are seldom made. None of the governments which have completed their WTO accession processes have made bindings in Part II of their Goods Schedules. Only China, Chinese Taipei and Saudi Arabia have made concessions in Part III of their Schedules.

While Ecuador, Bulgaria and Panama have submitted their original Schedules in the HS 1992 nomenclature and FYROM, Nepal and Saudi Arabia in the HS 2002 nomenclature, all remaining governments have submitted their Schedules in the HS 1996 nomenclature.

Table 3 analyses the most-favoured-nation bindings that the new Members have made in Part I of their Schedules. It is divided into three parts - Table 3(a) on tariff commitments on agricultural products; Table 3(b) on tariff rate quotas (TRQs) and special safeguard provisions (SSGs); and Table 3(c) on tariff commitments on non-agricultural products. Calculations for the table have been made on the basis of the concessions contained in the Accession Goods Schedules and might therefore differ from figures published in other WTO documents.

Pursuant to the Agreement on Agriculture, all tariff lines in the agricultural sector have been bound. The simple average of new Members' agricultural final bound rates (Table 3(b)) varies from a low of 9.4 per cent (Albania and Croatia) to a high of 41.4 per cent (Nepal). For a number of countries the final bound rates are significantly lower than the bound rates at the date of accession. Bulgaria, the Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Jordan, Georgia, Croatia, Lithuania, Moldova, Chinese Taipei, FYROM and Saudi Arabia have also bound a number of items at non-ad valorem rates. The ad valorem equivalent of these has not been calculated and has, therefore, not been included in the calculation of the simple average of tariff bindings. Most governments have listed and bound all agricultural items individually. Mongolia, Panama and Latvia, however, have listed and bound only some of their agricultural tariffs individually. The remaining items, for which no specific requests had been received during the negotiation, have been bound at a single rate (ceiling binding) in a headnote. For Mongolia, a ceiling rate of 20 per cent ad valorem, effective from the date of accession, has been applied to all items bound in the headnote. For Panama, the headnote binding has been set at 40 per cent at the date of accession, and at 30 per cent after a five year implementation period. Latvia has bound its tariff schedule on agricultural products at a ceiling rate of 50 per cent, effective from the date of accession, with the exception of the specific tariff concessions indicated in the schedule. The headnote bindings have been taken into account for the calculation of the simple averages of tariff bindings.

Table 3(b) contains information on TRQs and SSGs. About one half of all newly acceded Members have designated TRQs in Part I, Section I-B of their Schedules. Some have also designated SSGs (Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture).

Table 3(c) shows that, in the non-agricultural sector, the simple average of final bound rates of newly acceded Members varies from 4.8 per cent (Chinese Taipei) to 23.7 per cent (Nepal). For a number of countries the final bound rates are significantly lower than the bound rates at the date of accession. The Kyrgyz Republic, Jordan, Chinese Taipei, and FYROM have bound a number of items at non-ad valorem rates in the non-agricultural sector too. Again, the ad valorem equivalent of these has not been calculated and has not been included in the calculation of the simple average. Most governments have listed and bound all non-agricultural items individually. Mongolia, Bulgaria and Panama, however, have listed and bound only some of their non-agricultural tariffs individually, the remaining items being bound in a headnote. For Mongolia and Panama the headnote bindings in the non-agricultural sector are the same as the headnote bindings in the agricultural sector (see above). For Bulgaria a ceiling rate of 35 per cent ad valorem, effective from the date of accession, has been applied to all non-agricultural items bound in the headnote. The headnote bindings have been taken into account for the calculation of the simple average of tariff bindings.

-Sectoral initiatives TC "-Sectoral initiatives " \l 1

Table 3 also shows the number of zero (duty-free) bindings made by new Members. This reflects the fact that most of them have undertaken commitments commensurate with those of Members participating in the so-called "zero-for-zero" and "harmonization" sectoral tariff initiatives, negotiated on a plurilateral basis by some participants in the Uruguay Round10. Almost all new Members have formally joined the Information Technology Agreement (ITA)

· Mongolia, chemicals;

· Bulgaria, ITA (after accession);

· Panama, ITA;

· Kyrgyz Republic, agricultural equipment, chemicals, most construction equipment, ITA, most medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, paper, steel, toys and most furniture;

· Latvia, beer, chemicals, distilled spirits, furniture, ITA, paper, toys, most agricultural equipment, construction equipment, most medical equipment, and steel;

· Estonia, agricultural equipment, beer, chemicals, aircraft, construction equipment, distilled spirits, furniture, medical equipment, chemicals, paper, pharmaceuticals, steel, toys and ITA (before accession);

· Jordan, agricultural equipment, most chemicals, most medical equipment, ITA, most steel and toys;

· Georgia, agricultural equipment, most chemicals, most construction equipment, ITA, furniture, most medical equipment, paper, steel and toys;

· Albania, agricultural equipment, beer, chemicals, construction equipment, distilled spirits, furniture, most medical equipment, paper, pharmaceuticals, most steel, toys and ITA;

· Oman, chemicals, construction equipment, pharmaceuticals and ITA;

· Croatia, most agricultural equipment, beer, chemicals, most construction equipment, distilled spirits, most medical equipment, most paper, some steel, toys and ITA;

· Lithuania, agricultural equipment, beer, most chemicals, construction equipment, distilled spirits, medical equipment, most paper, steel, toys and ITA;

· Moldova, chemicals, most medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, toys and ITA;

· China, beer, furniture, some paper and toys and ITA;

· Chinese Taipei, agricultural equipment, beer, most chemicals, construction equipment, distilled spirits, furniture, most medical equipment, paper, most steel, toys, pharmaceuticals and ITA (before accession);

· Armenia, agricultural equipment, chemicals, most construction equipment, medical equipment, most paper, pharmaceuticals, steel and ITA;

· FYROM, agricultural equipment, beer, most chemicals, construction equipment, distilled spirits, medical equipment, most paper, toys and ITA; and

· Saudi Arabia, ITA, chemicals and pharmaceuticals.

Nepal and Cambodia, the first two LDCs to accede to the WTO under Article XII, have not joined any of the "zero for zero" or "harmonization" initiatives.

Table 3: Market Access Concessions and Commitments in Goods of Members that have Acceded to the WTO under Article XII11

Table 3a: Agricultural Products – Bound Tariffs

Reduction commitments

Simple average of ad valorem tariff bindings (%)

Distribution of ad valorem tariff bindings (%)

Share of non ad valorem tariff bindings (%)

Min. ad valorem duty

Max. ad valorem duty

0 (duty-free)

0.1-5.0

5.1-10.0

10.1-15.0

15.1-20.0

20.1-30.0

30.1-40.0

40.1-50.0

50.1+

Ecuador

Bound rate at accession 1995

26.2

0.0

2.0

1.4

9.0

28.5

44.5

6.9

5.1

2.4

0.0

5.0

95.0

Final bound rate 2001

25.5

0.0

2.0

1.4

9.0

28.2

45.1

7.4

4.5

2.3

0.0

5.0

85.5

Bulgaria


52.3

0.1

2.5

5.5

3.8

7.2

10.6

17.1

1.3

38.1

15.8

0.0

135.0


35.5

5.0

6.6

9.3

10.3

2.4

13.1

9.9

0.9

28.6

15.8

0.0

98.0

Mongolia


19.0

0.7

0.7

0.7

23.2

72.4

0.6

1.0

0.3

0.3

0.0

0.0

75.0


18.9

0.7

0.7

0.7

23.5

72.4

0.6

1.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.0

75.0

Panama


36.9

0.3

7.2

4.7

4.5

2.0

4.2

69.4

1.2

6.3

0.0

0.0

320.0


27.7

0.3

7.2

4.8

5.1

6.0

70.0

1.1

0.8

4.5

0.0

0.0

260.0

Kyrgyz Republic


12.4

1.2

6.0

56.3

12.4

21.8

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

2.4

0.0

30.0


12.3

1.2

7.1

56.0

11.7

21.8

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

2.4

0.0

30.0

Latvia


35.8

1.5

1.6

16.7

9.6

2.4

5.9

2.9

57.5

1.5

0.4

0.0

100.0


34.6

2.1

1.6

19.0

9.1

3.2

3.5

5.3

54.3

1.3

0.4

0.0

55.0

Estonia


19.2

8.1

7.8

23.6

11.5

15.5

18.3

7.2

7.4

0.6

0.0

0.0

59.0


17.5

17.0

6.2

21.5

11.1

12.5

17.7

6.2

7.1

0.6

0.0

0.0

59.0

Jordan


25.8

0.9

13.1

11.9

12.2

10.5

46.2

1.0

0.0

3.5

1.0

0.0

200.0


23.7

0.9

13.1

12.7

15.5

23.6

29.2

0.9

0.0

3.5

1.0

0.0

200.0

Georgia


13.3

0.0

0.9

0.1

85.4

6.6

4.4

0.0

0.0

0.0

2.5

4.0

30.0


11.7

8.3

1.5

7.4

69.5

6.9

4.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

2.5

0.0

30.0

Albania


10.8

0.4

17.8

59.4

3.4

18.9

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

20.0


9.4

10.9

17.3

54.9

1.8

15.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

20.0

Oman


28.1

0.0

6.9

5.2

76.3

0.1

0.0

0.0

1.2

10.3

0.0

5.0

200.0


28.0

0.0

8.0

6.6

73.7

0.1

0.0

0.0

1.2

10.3

0.0

5.0

200.0







0 (duty-free)

0.1-5.0

5.1-10.0

10.1-15.0

15.1-20.0

20.1-30.0

30.1-40.0

40.1-50.0

50.1+

Croatia


13.0

13.0

24.6

13.1

15.9

9.7

3.7

3.8

3.1

3.2

18.3

0.0

90.0


9.4

15.1

27.4

15.5

16.4

8.7

2.4

4.4

0.1

0.0

18.3

0.0

55.0

Lithuania


16.3

9.1

13.6

31.7

14.7

4.0

11.5

6.0

4.6

1.5

3.4

0.0

100.0


15.2

9.7

13.7

31.9

16.1

5.2

12.2

4.0

3.4

1.0

3.0

0.0

100.0

Moldova


18.1

0.4

6.9

28.5

11.2

11.4

25.2

8.0

0.0

0.0

8.3

0.0

40.0


12.2

3.0

8.3

32.7

35.7

11.8

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

8.3

0.0

25.0

China


20.6

2.7

9.4

14.3

16.5

14.7

26.1

8.6

3.1

4.6

0.0

0.0

74.0


15.8

2.8

11.1

25.2

24.9

18.6

12.1

2.2

0.6

2.5

0.0

0.0

65.0

Chinese Taipei


17.2

22.9

16.5

10.9

8.3

18.4

12.1

1.6

0.7

3.8

8.6

0.0

800.0


15.3

24.6

15.9

11.5

10.3

17.6

9.9

1.5

0.1

3.8

8.6

0.0

500.0

Armenia


14.7

1.3

0.4

1.0

97.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

15.0


14.7

1.3

0.4

1.0

97.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

15.0

FYROM


13.7

31.0

16.1

7.7

7.2

6.1

6.8

6.1

7.7

2.6

10.1

0.0

60.0


11.3

34.0

15.9

8.2

8.7

6.7

7.7

5.1

4.3

0.6

10.0

0.0

60.0

Nepal


50.1

0.0

0.0

2.3

0.3

0.7

3.6

3.6

77.4

12.0

0.0

10.0

200.0


41.4

0.0

0.7

2.3

0.4

4.2

28.7

33.7

21.4

8.5

0.0

5.0

200.0

Cambodia


28.2

0.0

2.8

6.9

17.1

11.4

16.4

43.5

0.9

0.9

0.0

5.0

60.0


28.1

0.0

2.8

7.1

17.6

11.2

16.4

43.1

0.9

0.9

0.0

5.0

60.0

Saudi Arabia


12.5

0.0

3.6

32.3

51.6

2.3

1.7

0.1

0.0

0.1

10.7

0.0

200.0


12.4

0.0

3.6

32.4

52.4

3.0

0.6

0.1

0.0

0.1

10.1

0.0

200.0

Table 3b: Agricultural Products - Tariff Rate Quotas and Special Safeguards

Number of Tariff Rate Quotas

Number of Tariff Lines with Tariff Rate Quotas

Tariff Lines with Special Safeguards

Ecuador

14

17

(HS 6 and 8 digit level)

0

Bulgaria

73

90

(HS 8 digit level)

21

(HS 6 and 8 digit level)

Mongolia

0

0

0

Panama

19

57

(HS 8 digit level)

6

(HS 8 digit level)

Kyrgyz Republic

0

0

0

Latvia

4

4

(HS 4, 6, 8 digit level)

0

Estonia

0

0

0

Jordan

0

0

0

Georgia

0

0

0

Albania

0

0

0

Oman

0

0

0

Croatia

9

9


0

Lithuania

4

4


0

Moldova

0

0

0

China

10

46

(HS 8 digit level)

0

Chinese Taipei

22

117

(HS 8 digit level)

32

(HS 8 digit level)

Armenia

0

0

0

FYROM

1

1

(HS 10 digit level)

0

Nepal

0

0

0

Cambodia

0

0

0

Saudi Arabia

0

0

0

Table 3c: Non-agricultural Products – Bound Tariffs







0 (duty-free)

0.1-5.0

5.1-10.0

10.1-15.0

15.1-20.0

20.1-30.0

30.1-40.0

40.1-50.0

50.1+

Ecuador


21.1

0.0

1.9

15.8

12.4

21.3

48.2

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

5.0

40.0


21.1

0.0

1.9

15.8

12.4

21.3

48.2

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

5.0

40.0

Bulgaria


25.7

0.3

4.0

15.2

9.2

4.8

16.6

49.9

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

40.0


23.6

1.8

5.9

18.2

15.3

3.4

5.7

49.6

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

40.0

Mongolia


19.2

0.6

0.0

1.1

19.7

74.5

3.9

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

30.0


17.3

1.6

0.0

19.8

0.0

74.5

3.9

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

30.0

Panama


31.6

1.2

3.7

4.6

6.1

12.8

5.0

66.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

90.0


22.9

2.2

3.6

18.7

4.6

2.6

68.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

81.0

Kyrgyz Republic


11.8

2.4

4.8

64.1

11.6

15.3

1.2

0.0

0.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

50.0


6.7

22.5

10.5

58.9

7.8

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

20.0

Latvia


10.8

3.4

9.1

59.3

18.0

6.8

2.1

0.1

0.9

0.3

0.0

0.0

55.0


9.4

16.1

6.6

51.5

17.5

6.7

0.3

0.0

0.9

0.3

0.0

0.0

55.0

Estonia


7.6

12.6

15.1

61.3

9.9

0.3

0.8

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

30.0


7.3

18.5

11.2

59.3

9.9

0.3

0.8

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

30.0

Jordan


19.2

3.0

20.1

11.2

6.8

12.8

43.2

2.8

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

35.0


15.2

6.3

19.5

16.3

11.1

24.1

22.7

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

30.0

Georgia


10.2

1.3

22.6

1.6

73.8

0.6

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

20.0


6.5

23.6

20.6

23.4

32.0

0.3

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

20.0

Albania


10.1

3.9

44.4

23.1

0.3

28.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

20.0


6.6

28.4

34.5

19.1

2.4

15.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

20.0

Oman

Bound rate at accession

14.7

1.5

0.9

2.7

92.7

2.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

20.0

Final bound rate

11.6

4.1

8.5

24.4

60.7

2.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

20.0







0 (duty-free)

0.1-5.0

5.1-10.0

10.1-15.0

15.1-20.0

20.1-30.0

30.1-40.0

40.1-50.0

50.1+

Croatia


6.7

22.9

34.4

23.0

12.7

6.7

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

38.0


5.5

26.5

36.9

22.9

13.3

0.3

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

25.0

Lithuania


8.7

24.5

7.0

31.9

28.4

6.7

1.4

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

35.0


8.4

24.5

7.1

36.0

24.7

6.7

1.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

30.0

Moldova


11.1

22.7

11.7

31.4

7.5

11.9

6.9

7.9

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

40.0


6.0

25.6

16.9

46.4

11.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

20.0

China


12.7

1.8

10.4

35.2

21.0

12.1

17.7

1.3

0.2

0.3

0.0

0.0

61.7


9.1

6.2

18.1

47.0

15.3

8.7

3.9

0.5

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

50.0

Chinese Taipei


6.4

13.2

44.7

25.3

12.0

2.5

0.9

0.3

0.1

0.5

0.9

0.0

106.0


4.8

29.0

39.9

21.0

7.8

0.7

0.5

0.1

0.0

0.3

0.9

0.0

90.0

Armenia


7.7

38.6

7.6

10.4

43.4

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

15.0


7.5

39.2

7.8

11.1

41.8

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

15.0

FYROM


9.5

23.4

23.8

18.7

11.4

7.4

8.9

6.5

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

32.2


6.2

36.2

20.3

21.2

13.9

7.5

1.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.0

25.0

Nepal


39.4

0.1

1.2

0.7

1.4

2.4

20.6

39.4

28.0

5.4

0.0

0.0

130.0


23.7

3.1

1.1

2.9

5.3

34.5

48.6

3.5

0.2

0.1

0.0

0.0

60.0

Cambodia


17.7

0.7

0.0

28.9

29.9

17.0

8.8

14.6

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

42.5


17.7

1.0

0.0

28.8

29.7

17.1

8.8

14.6

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

42.5

Saudi Arabia


10.9

1.7

9.8

32.2

55.2

1.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

20.0


10.5

5.6

6.6

34.4

53.0

0.4

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

20.0

-Agricultural commitments TC "-Agricultural commitments " \l 1

Acceding governments need to conform to the framework established through the Agreement on Agriculture for making commitments in respect of domestic support and export subsidies. The Secretariat has prepared a Technical Note (document WT/ACC/4) to guide acceding governments in the preparation of the initial set of supporting tables. Although this information may be examined and further clarified on a bilateral basis, systemic discussions relating to the definition of measures and the calculation of the value of domestic support and export subsidy will typically take place in plurilateral meetings between the acceding government and interested Members. As a result of these discussions, the acceding government will present a set of final tables which forms the basis for future commitment levels in relation to the Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (Total AMS) and Export Subsides, recorded in Part IV of the Schedule of Concessions and Commitments on Goods. The relevant supporting tables are also incorporated by reference in Part IV of the Schedule. A summary of the commitments undertaken by governments which have negotiated accession under Article XII of the WTO Agreement is contained in Table 4.

In presenting the initial information, document WT/ACC/4 indicates that acceding Governments should calculate the support "normally using the average of the most recent 3 year period". As accession negotiations take several years to accomplish, more recent data will normally become available in the course of an accession process. Whereas a fixed period (1986-1988) was established for commitments on domestic support and export subsidies undertaken in the Uruguay Round, the base periods for Members acceding under Article XII of the WTO Agreement have been determined on an individual basis (see Table 4). Although the base period for Bulgaria corresponds to that of the Uruguay Round, Bulgaria's Working Party Report notes that "an earlier period than the most recent three year period was accepted by WTO Members only because the latter was not regarded as representative due to the United Nations embargo applied to the former Republic of Yugoslavia". A deviation from the most recent three-year period principle was also agreed for Chinese Taipei (1990-1992). However, Chinese Taipei also agreed to reduce its Total AMS commitments over the period 1995-2000, i.e. prior to accession. Thus, the final bound commitment level (year 2000) is 20 per cent less than the Base Total AMS (1990-1992) for Chinese Taipei.

Document WT/ACC/4 does not provide guidance with respect to the currency to be used in the preparation of the supporting tables. The majority of the governments acceding under Article XII have presented their supporting tables in national currency. In some accessions, however, it has been accepted that particular circumstances have warranted the supporting tables and the corresponding commitments to be expressed in a foreign currency (US dollars or Euro) or in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).

-Domestic Support

Domestic support measures in the "green box" should have no or at most minimal trade effects or effects on production. Support provided for measures in this category is not limited nor subject to reduction commitments as long as the programmes meet the specific criteria stipulated in Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Developing countries providing support to programmes encouraging agricultural and rural development corresponding to Article 6.2 of the Agreement, may also exclude such support from any reduction commitments.

Product-specific and non-product-specific domestic support falling within the "amber box" must be included in the Total AMS, unless the support can be considered de minimis and thus be excluded from the calculation of a Member's Total AMS. Article 6.4 of the Agreement establishes a de minimis percentage of 5 per cent for developed countries and 10 per cent for developing country Members. The Total AMS is calculated for each year of the base period, and the average Total AMS over the three years constitutes an acceding Member's Base Total AMS. The Base Total AMS may be subject to a reduction commitment over an agreed implementation period. The annual and final bound commitment levels recorded in Part IV of the Goods Schedule establish a ceiling on the new Member's "amber box" support in any given year in the future (Current Total AMS).

Programmes extending direct payments under production-limiting programmes (i.e. "blue box" support) were not identified for any of the 21 new Members covered in Table 4. Moreover, 13 of these 21 members have no Base Total AMS. Thus, all domestic support provided by these 13 countries during the base period either satisfied the "green box" criteria, was provided in accordance with Article 6.2 (development programmes), or any type of "amber box" support provided did not exceed the de minimis levels for such support.

In this respect, it should be noted that

· China agreed to include support through government measures meeting the criteria of Article 6.2 (development programmes) in its AMS, while having recourse to a de minimis exemption of 8.5 per cent for product-specific and non-product specific support (document WT/MIN(01)/3, paragraph 235);

· Latvia negotiated a transition period (4 years after accession) during which an amount equal to SDR 24 million would constitute Latvia's annual de minimis exemption under Article 6.4(a