hot spots and frameworks – patterns, risks and causes of crime
DESCRIPTION
Hot Spots and Frameworks – Patterns, risks and causes of crimeTRANSCRIPT
Hot Spots and Frameworks – Pa3erns, risks and causes of crime
Paul Ekblom
Discourses for talking about crime problem • Wickedness, blame, criminal responsibility • Offender pathology – not bad but sick or mad • Societal pathology – blame social structure, parents • Empirical – studying pa;erns in crime – to target ac<on
• RaBonal – causes and risk factors – Immediate and remote causes of criminal events – Offender-‐oriented and situaBonal (the view of the offender v the view from the offender)
• Quality of life – percep<ons, amenity, community safety
Discourses for talking about crime problem
• The raBonal discourse, & focus on immediate, situaBonal causes, is most aligned with those design solu<ons, which centre on reducBon of risk of criminal events and improving quality of life
• Important therefore to understand pa3erns in crime, percepBons of crime and consequences of both; causes; risk
Pa;erns
Zooming in on crime • Crime preven<on research suggests it’s important to be problem-‐specific and context-‐specific in tackling crime
– Not just crime but theK
– … Not just theK but theK of luggage (target) at airports (place)
– …. At Heathrow T5
• So we need to undertake data collecBon & analysis to discover what crimes occur, where
Time Place
Crime type
Offender
Victim
Crime target
Modus operandi
Problem space: a map of symptoms
Zooming in on crime – concentra<ons and hot spots
• Crimes don’t occur at random but cluster – At certain <mes of day, week, season
– In certain places – On certain vic<ms (repeat vic<misa<on)
– On certain products • Makes sense to concentrate preven<ve efforts on these (80-‐20 rule)
Crime concentra<on – Bag theK in bars
www.grippaclip.com/crime-‐science-‐methodology/risk-‐analysis-‐forms/
Toronto – Assault
Toronto – Stolen vehicle
Toronto – Break and enter
www.cbc.ca/toronto/features/crimemap/
Hot Spots – more detail
Actual and Perceived theK risk in a bar
Hot property – bag theK
Understanding crime – risks and causes
Crime risk has 3 aspects
Possibility – nature of criminal event
Who does what illegal act to whom/what?
Probability of event How likely is it to happen?
Harm from event
What is the harm?
When does it happen – immediate or knock-‐on?
To whom and/or to what?
What is crime risk?
Causes of crime – offender Crimes happen when offenders
• Present in crime situa<on
• Alert to crime opportunity
• Have the right resources (skills, tools, perpetrator techniques etc) to do the crime
• Ready to offend – mo<va<on/emo<on
• Lack the resources to avoid crime (self-‐control, employability for honest jobs)
• Have a criminal predisposiBon
Causes of crime – Situa<on A range of theoreBcal approaches focusing on ‘the view from the offender’
• PragmaBcs – crimes happen when there is nothing to block offender from taking or damaging something/ injuring someone – eg absence of walls, property vulnerable to damage
• RaBonal Choice Theory – psychological opportunity – crimes happen when offender perceives risk, effort sufficiently low and reward sufficiently high
• RouBne AcBviBes Theory – ecological opportunity – crimes happen when likely offender encounters suitable target in absence of capable guardians
– Offender could simply be colliding with opportunity (places as crime generators, eg more pickpocke<ng where more people happen to meet)
– Or ac<vely seeking out favourable places for crime (crime a3ractors, eg places where surveillance is poor, guardianship low, escape easy)
Causes of crime – Situa<on A range of theoreBcal approaches focusing on ‘the view from the offender’
• Pa3ern Theory – ecological opportunity – understanding of nodes and paths in the environment that direct people’s movements and make these encounters happen
• Precipitators – crimes happen when human and physical environment influences immediate offender emoBon and moBvaBon in situa<on –
– Prompt, permit, pressure, provoke criminal behaviour
– Once emo<on/mo<va<on aroused, opportunity factors influence realisa<on of crime
It’s all very complicated…
• Especially where offenders and preventers are engaged in an arms race eg over vehicle security, hacking
• Designers don’t want to mess around with all these theories, which have different focus, different terminologies, different coverage of phenomena
• But we can simplify the causes and put them in a single unified framework, which helps you to ‘think thief’
– ie to combine user-‐centred with abuser-‐centred approach and to be user-‐friendly/abuser-‐unfriendly
Map of causes of crime: the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity
CCO framework helps you flip between understanding causes and designing preven<ve interven<ons based on high-‐level principles
(hence design freedom)
A Crime PrevenBon/ Community Safety IntervenBon
Reduced crime
Intervention in cause
Disruption of Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity
Decreased risk of crime events
Wider benefits
Map of Crime Prevention Principles – from situational to offender-oriented intervention
Misdeeds and Security framework goes from crime in general to
specific kinds of risk associated with some product, place or service
Misdeeds & Security framework – Types of criminal behaviour associated with
some product, place or service
Mistreatment (damage)
Misappropria<on (theK)
Mishandling (eg fraud, counterfeit)
Mistake (false alarm)
Misuse (eg as tool)
Misbehaviour (nuisance, conflict)
‘Hot Products’ approach takes you from par<cular crime risks to the
risk factors that underlie it
Zooming in on Misappropria<on – Targe<ng the targets of theK
• Important to direct our preven<ve effort to where it makes most difference – cost effecBveness
• Various approaches have been developed to forecast which types of product (for example) are at greatest risk of theK – then build in security into
– Packaging and marking
– Sales or user environment
– Protec<ve behaviour and alertness of users – Product itself
Hot Products – Characteris<cs of TheK Prone Goods
• Concealable (no<ce if large items are being taken)
• Removable (easy to remove)
• Available (burglars do not spend much <me in a house)
• Valuable (some targets are more valuable)
• Enjoyable (burglars do not tend to steal kitchen items)
• Disposable (sold or traded)
Risky facili<es • Documented examples of risky facili<es (from 60 Steps guide)
– Convenience stores – US na<onal survey found 6.5 percent of convenience stores experience 65 percent of all robberies
– Gas StaBons – 10% of Aus<n, Texas gas sta<ons accounted for more than 50% of calls for driveoffs and drug crimes in 1998-‐1999.
– Banks – 4% of U.K. bank branches have rates of robbery four to six <mes higher than other banks
– Schools – 8% of Stockholm schools suffered 50 percent of the violent crimes reported in the 1993-‐4 school year
– Bus stops – 9% of the shelters at bus stops in Liverpool experienced more than 40 percent of the vandalism incidents
– Parking – in Nomngham, just one car park (The Royal Moat House) accounted for about 25% of the 415 crimes reported for all 19 city centre car parks in 2001
Risky facili<es – why?
• Random Varia<on – fluke • Repor<ng prac<ces – some places report oKen
• Many targets inside the facility
• May specialise in selling hot products – e.g. Electronics store
• Loca<on – in high crime area
• Repeat vic<misa<on
• Crime a;ractors – favourable condi<ons for crime
• Poor management
Hot Services?
A bit more complicated...
• Legality of service
• Access to customers
• Ease of tracking offenders
• Scale of opera<on
Mistreatment – Target buildings for Terrorism – Risk factors (Clarke and Newman 2006)
• Exposed • Vital • Iconic • Legi<mate • Destruc<ble • Occupied • Near • Easy
More Risk/Protec<ve Factor Acronyms – theK again
• Criminocclusive proper<es: Mobile phone design
• IN SAFE HANDS – Iden<fiable – Neutral – Seen – A;ached – Findable – Executable – Hidden – Automa<c – Necessary – Detectable – Secure
Whitehead et al. 2008
• Criminogenic proper<es: Fast moving consumer goods
• Expansion of ‘Disposable’ in CRAVED: AT CUT PRICES – Affordable – Transportable – Concealable – Untraceable – Tradeable – Profitable – Reputable – Imperishable – Consumable – Evaluable – ShiKable
Gill and Clarke 2012
From describing risk to analysing it more systema<cally – Combining CCO and M&S
Every design is a bet on the future
• Can product be made?
• Will it work?
• Will it last or fall to bits?
• Will it sell at a profit – what’s the compe<<on?
• Will people use it as intended?
• Will it be involved in crime?
Analysing risk to/from products – eg caMden bike stand (Adam Thorpe)
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Designed object –
bike stand/s
Mistreatment
Mistake
Crime risks to designed object – bike stand
Wrecking
Defacement by ink, paint or s<cker
Defacement by scratching/ abrasion
MisappropriaBon Stolen for resale/scrap
Mishandling Counterfeit for sale
Accidental damage mistaken for tampering
False alarm from any security sensors fi;ed
Increased crime risks to object – as target
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Designed object – bike stand
Increased crime risks from object – as resource for offender
Misuse
Misbehaviour
Mistake
Crime risks from designed object – bike stand
Climbing aid for burglary or escaping pursuing police
Decep<ve placing of bomb
Climbing onto; simng on
Bashing to make noise
False alarm of terrorism (suspicious object leaning / hanging on stand)
The difficulty of forecas<ng • Non-‐linear futures
• Crime-‐proofing – domes<c electronics – In prac<cal predic<on of which new products will be at high risk of theK, it’s hard to reliably operaBonalise the proper<es/ features which will make them hot (Project Marc, crime proofing of domes<c electronic products, Armitage 2012)
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The difficulty of forecas<ng
Next <me – From products, places and
services to people
References • Armitage, R (2012) ‘Let’s be brave! Making the transi<on from research to reality’. In: Design Against Crime: Crime Proofing
Everyday Products. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers
• Clarke, R. V. (1999) Hot Products: understanding, anCcipaCng and reducing demand for stolen goods. Police Research Series, 112, Home Office
• Clarke, R. and Newman, G. (2006) OutsmarCng the Terrorists. London: Praeger Security Interna<onal
• Cornish, D (1994) ‘The Procedural Analysis of Offending and its Relevance for SituaConal PrevenCon’, in R. Clarke (ed), Crime Preven<on Studies, 3 151-‐196. Monsey, NY:Criminal Jus<ce Press
• Eck, J., R.V. Clarke and R.T. Guere;e (2007). ‘Risky Facili<es: Crime Concentra<on in Homogeneous Sets of Establishments and Facili<es.’ In G. Farrell, K.J. Bowers, S.D. Johnson & M. Townsley (eds.), ImaginaCon for Crime PrevenCon: Essays in Honour of Ken Pease. Crime PrevenCon Studies, Vol. 21, pp. 225-‐264. Monsey, N.Y.: Criminal Jus<ce Press
• Ekblom, P (2005) ‘How to Police the Future: Scanning for Scien<fic and Technological Innova<ons which Generate Poten<al Threats and Opportuni<es in Crime, Policing and Crime Reduc<on’, in M. Smith and N. Tilley (eds.), Crime Science: New Approaches to PrevenCng and DetecCng Crime. Cullompton: Willan
• Ekblom, P and Sidebo;om, A. (2007). ‘What do you mean, ‘Is it secure?’ Redesigning language to be fit for the task of assessing the security of domes<c and personal electronic goods.’ European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, Vol. 14, pp. 61–87
• Gill, M. and Clarke, R. (2012) ‘Slowing TheKs of Fast-‐moving Goods’ in P. Ekblom (Ed.), Design Against Crime: Crime Proofing Everyday Products. Crime Preven<on Studies 27. Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner.
• Su;on, M. (1998) Handling stolen Goods and theQ: a market reducCon approach. Home Office Research Study 178, London: Home Office
• Harris, C., C. Hale and S Uglow (2003) Theory into PracCce: implemenCng a market reducCon approach to property crime In Bullock K. and N Tilley (eds) Crime ReducCon and Problem-‐oriented Policing Willan
• Wellsmith, M. and A. Burrell (2005) The Influence of Purchase Price and Ownership Levels on TheQ Targets Bri<sh Journal of Criminology, 45, 741-‐764
• Whitehead, S., Mailley, J., Storer, I., McCardle, J., Torrens, G. and Farrell, G. (2008). “IN SAFE HANDS: A Review of Mobile Phone An<-‐theK Designs.” European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 14(1): 39–60