houser aristotle and two medieval aristotelians on the nature of god ipq 2011 copy

7/31/2019 Houser Aristotle and Two Medieval Aristotelians on the Nature of God IPQ 2011 Copy

1/21

International Philosophical Quarterly V. 51, N. 3, I 203 (Smb 2011)

A Tw Mv A N G

R. E. Houser

ABSTRACT: Tm Aq, m m w mm Sentencesg wg Summa of Theology, gz w b A w g Av. A g vg x G

v w, Aq v Av gz g G

b mg Av v g w v-

m . I m, Aq m G

Av m bj Metaphysics 8.37, v m A. T b b mg A, Av, Aq v .

IT SMTIMS IS SAId TAT Av f Aq, w m- wk k De ente Scriptum in Sententiis, w w g m kw A x m .1 I

1S G w I m b:Aristotle on God: L ,A Commentary onBk. of the Metaphysics (A: V Gm, 1972); Gv R, The Concept of First Philosophyand the Unity of the Metaphysics of Aristotle, . J R. C (Ab NY: SUNY P, 1980); J.w, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 3 . (T N: PIMS, 1978); T. Iw,Aristotles First Principles (Nw Yk NY: x Uv. P, 1990); S M, A P G N G, Review of Metaphysics 45 (1992): 54373; A C, I- dv C A, Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (2005): 2539; L G,Aristotle and other Platonists (I NY: C Uv. P, 2006).

Avicenna on God: A.-M. G,La distinction de lessence et de lexistence dapres Ibn Sina (Avi-cenne) (P: d Bw, 1937); M . Mm, Av Pm C M -S Logos Islamikos: Studia Islamica in honorem Georgii Michaelis Wickens, .R. Sv A. d (T N: PIMS, 1984), . 21939; J. Jv, Ax g g

Ib S tudes sur Avicenne, . J. Jv R. R (P: 1984), . 1928; d. G,Avicennaand the Aristotelian Tradition (L: B, 1988); I. N, Ib S N Bv d Allah Transcendent, . I. N (L Nw Yk, Rg, 1989), . 149202; M. . Mm,Q Uv Av, Neoplatonism and Islamic Thought, . Pvz Mwg (NwYk NY: SUNY P, 1992), . 7787; B. M, L m Av, Sapienza 52 (1999):25779; Rb Wvk, N Av C Tg (Shayiyya),Arabic Sciences andPhilosophy 10 (2000) 181221; Rb Wvk,Avicennas Metaphysics in Context(I NY: CUv. P, 2003), . 17380, 24565; P Am, Kwg P, Proceedings of theAristotelian Society 105 (2005): 25778; T-A d, M Cambridge Companionto Arabic Philosophy, . P. Am R. C. T (Cmbg UK: Cmbg Uv. P, 2005), .32748; Am B, The Reception of Aristotles Metaphysics in Avicennas Kitb al-Shif (L,B: B, 2006).

Aquinas on God: G, Thomism: the Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, . L. K. Sk A. M, m x Le thomisme (T: PIMS, 2002), . 84126; J A,Nature and Creature: Thomas Aquinass Way of Thought(L Nw Yk: B, 1988); J. F. X. K,The Preface to Thomistic Metaphysics (Nw Yk: Lg, 1990); J A,Medieval Philosophy and the


2/21

356 R. E. HoUSER

tat tis stuy Aristtl, Avicnna, an Aquinas n Gs natur gs sm

way twar swing w als tis intrprtatin is. evn at t lat pint in is

carr wn was writing t Summa thelgiae (12661273), is tratmnt

t ivin natur was muc clsr t Avicnnas tan it was t Aristtls. In rrt sw w tis is s, t prsnt cnsiratin is st arun tr tms tat

lp t trmin wat is cmmn an wat is irnt amng t ctrins, an

t principls us t stablis tm, cncrning t natur G in t tugt

Aristtl imsl an tw grat mival Aristtlians: Avicnna (Ibn Sina)

an Tmas Aquinas. Ts tms ar (1) t cnclusins rawn abut t natur

G, (2) t rr us t prsnt ts cnclusins, an (3) t infunc

mnstrativ mtapysical principls n t cnclusins rawn.

Aristtle. Ratr tan using Physics 8, lt us cncntrat n AristtlsMeta-

physics (12), is metaphysical cnsiratin t ivin. In accr wit is

try scinc, Aristtl tr lays ut in captrs n t v t principls

n t vlp t tlgy prsnt in captrs six t tn. T scintic

subjct unr cnsiratin is substanc.2 Tat t existence snsibl an

prisabl substancs is manist is n t prpr principls mtapysics,

t kin Aristtl calls an yptsisa unamntal prpsitin in a sci-

nc. Aristtl cuss n t tr kin prpr principl, t nitins r

unamntal ntins tat ns in rr t prv t xistnc an natur

immvabl substanc.3

Aristtls argumnt r t xistnc immvabl substanc is built arun

is nitin cang (metabolhv): vryting cangs rm tat wic is

Transcendentals: the Case Thmas Aquinas (Lin an Nw Yrk: Brill, 1990); Nrman Krtzmann,

The Metaphysics Theism: Aquinass Natural Thelgy in Summa cntra gentiles I(oxr an Nw Yrk:

Clarnn, 1997); Brian davis, The Thught Thmas Aquinas (oxr UK: Clarnn Prss, 1992);

elanr Stump, Aquinas (Lnn an Nw Yrk: Rutlg, 2003); Bnict Asly, The Way tward

Wisdm: An Interdisciplinary and Intercultural Intrductin t Metaphysics, Cntr r Tmistic Stuis

Sris (Ntr dam IN: Univ. Ntr dam Prss, 2006).

The inuence Aristtle and Avicenna n Aquinas: e. M. Macirwski, ds G hav a Quiity Ac-

cring t Avicnna? Thmist52 (1988): 7987; J. F. Wippl, T Latin Avicnna as a surc r Tmas

Aquinass mtapysics, Freiberger Zeitschrit r Philsphie und Thelgie (1990): 5190; Raim Acar,

Talking abut Gd and Talking abut Creatin: Avicennas and Thmas Aquinas Psitins (Lin: Brill,

2005), pp. 79130; R. e. husr, T Ral distinctin an t Principls Mtapysics: Avicnna anAquinas inLaudemus virs glriss: Essays in Hnr Armand Maurer C.S.B., . R. e. husr, Cntr

r Tmistic Stuis Sris (Ntr dam IN: Univ. Ntr dam Prss, 2007), pp. 75108.2Aristtl,Metaphysics 12.1 (1069a1), . W. d. Rss (oxr UK: oxr Univ. Prss, 1958), . W.

Jagr (oxr UK: oxr Univ. Prss,1957). hratrMet. All translatins rm primary txts ar my

wn, unlss inicat trwis.3Aristtl, Psterir Analytics 1.2 (72a1523), 1.10 (76b1216). An Aristtlian scinc cnsists

tr main parts: subjct, principls, an attributs mnstrat t subjct. Tr ar tr

kins principls: cmmn axims an prpr yptss an nitins. on Aristtlian try

scinc an scintic principls, s: William A. Wallac, The Rle Demnstratin in Mral Thel-

gy: a Study in Methdlgy in St. Thmas Aquinas (Wasingtn, d.C.: Tmist Prss, 1962); William

A. Wallac, Causality and Scientifc Explanatin (Ann Arbr MI: Univ. Micigan Prss, 19721974);

J. Barns,Aristtles Psterir Analytics (oxr UK: Clarnn, 1975); Ricar d. McKiraan, Principlesand Prs: Aristtles Thery Demnstrative Science (Princtn NJ: Princtn Univ. Prss, 1992); Cm-

mentary n Aristtles Psterir Analytics, trans. Ricar Brquist, dumb ox Bks Sris (Ntr dam

IN: St. Augustins Prss, 2009).


3/21

ARISToTLE AND TWo MEDIEvAL ARISToTELIANS oN THE NATURE oF GoD 357

potentially to tat wic is actually.4 Te principles presente in capters two to

fve are organize aroun tis efnition. Cange requires matter, in aition to

orm an privation, because in cange matterunerstoo as potencyreceives a

new orm o wic it was eretoore eprive. For example, cange rom poten-tially wite to actually wite requires some matter tat goes rom non-wite to

wite.5 Wile eartly sensible substances are generate an estroye, teir orm

an matter are not generate or estroye in temselves, because tey o not exist

in temselves, but only as principles o beings (o[vnta). For wen a man is ealty,

te ealt also exists; an te sape o a bronze spere exists at te same time as

te bronze spere.6 dierent beings ave ormsweter acciental orms, as

ere, or substantial orms.

Substantial orm is te primary cause o a tings being. Pysical tings ave

matterte principle o potency an cangein aition to orm. Tis means tat

an iniviual pysical substance must inclue matter in orer to exist. But wat

makes it actual an efnite is its substantial orm. Consequently, orm is tat in

virtue o wic a ting is call a tis (tovde ti).7 It is te union o te substantialorm, a tis in te primary since, or it is te source o actuality an efniteness in

tings, wit matter tat prouces an iniviual substance, a tis in te seconary

sense o a particular ting (kaq' eJkavston). For Aristotle, tere are no abstract ormsare iniviuate by matter unctioning as a principle o iniviuation, as later

Aristotelians will ol. Rater, tere are tree kins o substances: matter, wic

is a tis only in appearance . . . ; nature [= orm] wic is a tis an a kin o

isposition towar wic [motion tens]; an te tir is substance compose otese, an iniviual, suc as Socrates or Kallias.8

Substantial cange also requires efcient an fnal causes. Tereore analogically

tere are tree elements an our causes an principles; but te elements are ierent

in ierent tings, an te proximate mover is ierent or ierent tings. healt,

isease, boy; te mover is te meical art.9 Finally, te notions o act an potency

are use analogously to efne cange an to unerstan te our causes. An in

yet anoter way, analogically ientical tings are principles, tat is, actuality an

potency (ejnevrgei kai; duvnami~); but tese also apply in ierent ways to tem.10By te en o capter fve, ten, te principles or ealing wit eternal substances

are set in place, aving been mae clear rom an analysis o sensible substance.Aristotle evotes capter six to emonstrating te existence o separate or im-

movable substance, using a sort argument tat in two steps raws out implications

rom is efnition o cange. Te frst step concerns matter. Cange requires a pre-

existing subject (as well as a post-existing one), because cange is actualization o a

4Aristotle,Met. 12.2 (1069b16).5Ibi., 12.2 (1069b18).6Ibi., 12.3 (1070a234).7Aristotle, on the Sul 2.1 (412a89).8Aristotle,Met., 12.3 (1070a1013). Inserting lines 2021 between 10 an 11 is incorrect; it comes rom

ollowing te orer o Aristotles text in te commentary o Alexaner o Aproisias. But te coices oAristotle correctly put te inserte lines ater l. 19.

9Aristotle,Met. 12.4 (1070b268). Trans. Ross.10Ibi., 12.5 (1071a45).


4/21

358 R. E. HoUSER

potency ound in someting tat pre-exists te cange. Witout tat potency, cange

is impossible, as Parmenides well understood. It ollows tat sensible canging

substances, weter taken individually or considered globally, can ave no absolute

beginning; tey always come into being rom someting prior, weter te same ora dierent type o substance. Te reason is tat every supposed beginning would

itsel be acieved troug a process o cange tat requires pre-existing matter.

And tey likewise cannot be anniilated, since cange always produces some ac-

tual result. Consequently, tere always were and always will be perisable sensible

substances. In sort, te pysical world is eternal.11 Sensible perisable substances

on eart are eternal only in teir species, wile te eavenly bodies are sensible

substances eternal as individuals.

Te second step in Aristotles argument concerns te act tat cange requires

a cause or mover (kinoun). An eternal pysical world requires an eternal actualmover, or i tere is more tan one mover, an ultimate mover tat is equally eternal

wit te eect. Tis is true or te pysical universe conceived globally, toug

Aristotle was more directly concerned wit te cause o eac o te distinct eavenly

speres tat move continuously in a circle. But to be an eternal cause, an ultimate

mover cannot be in any way in potency, but must be unmoved, a principle wose

very substance is actuality (hJ oujsiva ejnevrgeia).12 It ollows tat tese substancesmust be witout matter. We sould note ere tat Aristotle uses te plural (sub-

stances), wic e will explain later, and tat since suc an ultimate cause must

be a substance witout matter, it must be a pure orm, toug Aristotle does not

explicitly say tis ere.Aristotle devotes capters seven to ten to describing te nature o separate

substance. Capter seven describes teir nature as suc, and capters eigt to ten

attempt to resolve tree problems (ajporivai) tat arise rom Aristotles description.his presentation o divine nature in capter seven refects is searc or causes, so it

begins wit an extrinsic description o separate substance in relation to te eects it

produces. Ten Aristotle adds an intrinsic denition o divine nature. Avicenna and

Aquinas sarply distinguis tese two alves o Aristotles tougt. his extrinsic

consideration begins wit te eternal circular motion o te rst eaven, te

outermost eavenly spere. Tis movement requires a mover tat moves witout

being moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality. Tis description summarizeswat e as gleaned about te nature o separate substance rom is argument or

its existence. Ten e abruptly adds: And te object o desire and te object o

knowledge move in tis way; tey move witout being moved.13 Separate substance,

ten, does not exercise ormal or ecient causality, but is afnal cause and tereore

a kind o good. Tere are sound reasons or tis conclusion. Aristotle as already

sown tat a god cannot be a material cause, because tis would involve potentiality.

Were it te substantial orm or soul o a eavenly spere it would move at least

per accidens, along wit te motion o its spere. I a separate substance were an

11Ibid.,Met. 12.6 (1071b612).12Ibid., 12.6 (1071b20).13Ibid., 12.7 (1072a267).


5/21


efcient cause, it could not be pure, unchanging actuality; or efcient causes, as

Aristotle conceived them, are ming causes that introduce orm into some other

matter. Consequently, they themselves must change in exercising their actuality.

So none o these three kinds o causes could move without being moved. But iseparate substance is a fnal cause, then the frst mover exists o necessity; and in

so ar as it exists by necessity, its mode o being is as a gd, and it is in this way

afrst principle.14

Aristotles second major conclusion in chapter seven is an intrinsic description

that tries to get at the essential character o divine nature. A god is liing, living the

best lie, which is that ointelligence, one wholly separate rom the world o change.

And it is a lie such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy only or a short time . . .

since its actuality is also pleasure. . . . And knowing in itsel concerns that which in

itsel is best, and that which is knowing in the highest sense with that which is best

in the highest sense. And knwing knws itsel, . . . so that knowledge and object

o knowledge are the same.15 This second consideration o divine nature leads

Aristotle to use the term god or the frst time in his argument and to sum up his

results this way: We say, thereore, that a god (tojn qi;on) is living, eternal, best,

so that lie and duration continuous and eternal belong to a god, or this is a god

(oJ qeov~).16 Aristotle ends chapter seven by repeating that such a substance must

be separate rom sensible substance, with no internal parts.

In the fnal three chapters o book twelve, Aristotle solves three problems that

arise rom chapter seven. Unlike Platos one good, there must be many separate

substances or gods, though the number is not certain, since it depends uponthe number o the heavenly spheres whose circular rotation they cause.17 In order

or separate substance to be knowledge knowing itsel, there must be identity

o knowing substance, the act o knowing, and the object known, all o which are

ontologically dierent in human knowers. Consequently, or the gods the normal

ontological distinction between the frst act o being a substance and the second

act o knowing breaks down, and so do the normal distinctions among knower,

his knowing, and object o knowledge.18 Finally, Aristotle clarifes how a separate

substance is good.There is no separate good itsel like Platos good, nor is

a gods good confned to the good ound in its eects, like the good ound in the

order o the parts. Rather, a separate substance is likely good in both ways, goodas being a substance separate rom the parts that make up the world, but its good

causes the good ound in the order o the parts. Its good, Aristotle adds, is like that

o the general o an army or the reemen o a household that also includes slaves

and cattle.19

Aristotle, in sum, used the philosophical principles he employs throughout his

works to address the existence and nature o a god: his ten categories, our causes,

14Ibid., 12.7 (1072b1112).15Ibid., 12.7 (1072b1422).16

Ibid., 12.7 (1072b2728).17Ibid., 12.8 (1073a134b14).18Ibid., 12.9 (1074b155a11).19Ibid.,Met. 12.10 (1075a1276a7).


6/21

360 R. E. HoUSER

and t ntins bing (o[n), act, and ptncy. his argumnt r t xistnc

a gd is clsly tid t t astrnmical csmlgy is ag. on tis basis,

Aristtl munts an argumnt rm t trnal mtin t avnly sprs t

t xistnc tir unmvd mvrs. Tis kind argumnt sws a gd t btrnal, substanc, and actuality, t last pint nsuring tat a gd is immatrial

and uncanging. In causal trms, a gd is a fnal caus, in dfnitinal trms, a spiri-

tual substanc cntmplating itsl. A gd is frmly cntaind witin t catgry

substanc, albit t igr, immatrial kind, and s nt infnitly prct, but

is limitd in prctin. Tis is wy tr can b many suc gds, ac living a

sl-cntaind intllctual li unawar a wrld tat dpnds upn it. In srt, a

gd is an dd srt gnral, n w inspirs is trps wil blivius tm.

Avicenna: In isHealing,Metaphysics (Shif, Ilhiyyt), Avicnna dvlpd is

frst sustaind and ex prfess mtapysical tratmnt t xistnc and natur

Gd, n tat wuld b translatd int Latin and av a prund impact n tinkrs

in t Latin wrld rm Gundissalinus nwards. In accrd wit t structur an

Aristtlian scinc, Avicnna sts ut in bk n t subjct and principls

scintifc mtapysics. T subject divin scinc is bing (mawjd; ens)

cnsidrd in its univrsality.20 T cmmn principls r axims mtapysics ar

t law t xcludd middl and t principl nn-cntradictin, cncivd as

tw sids n and t sam principl.21 Unlik Aristtl, Avicnna tn st ut t

prperprincipls mtapysics quit xplicitly. Its dfnitins r undamntal

ntins ar ts a bing (mawjd; ens), ting (shay; res), ncssary (darr;

necesse) (alng wit pssibl and impssibl), and fnally xistnc (wuj

d;esse).22 Its tw hyptheses r undamntalprpsitins ar ts: pssibl bings

ar ntlgical cmpsits ting (r quiddity r trut) and xistnc; xistnc

ncssary in itsl is ntlgically n, nly xistnc.23 T frst yptsis assums

t xistnc t snsibl bings ur vryday xprinc, just as Aristtl ad

dn. But Avicnnas dscriptin is dirnt rm Aristtls; ty ar pssibl

xistnc ratr tan snsibl substanc. Avicnnas scnd yptsis ds nt

assum t xistnc xistnc ncssary in itslit will b dmnstratd

in bk igt, but it ds st dwn crtain rquirmnts r suc a bing, namly,

Gd. T cnclusins drawn in mtapysics all int tw grups. In bks tw t

svn Avicnna xplains pssibl bings, dividing tm int t quasi spcis bing as bingt tn catgris (bks tw and tr)and t quasi prpr-

tis bing as bing, suc as t n and t many, t ptntial and t actual,

t univrsal and t particular, and t pssibl and t ncssary (bks ur

20Avicnna,The Healing,Metaphysics (Al-Si;Al-Ilhiyt), trans. and d. Mical e. Marmura (Prv

UT: Brigam Yung Univ. Prss, 2005);Avicenna Latinus: Scientia divina, d. S. Van Rit (Luvain: Ptrs,

1977), 1, c. 2, sc. 12 (Arabic: 10.23; Latin: 1: 13.368). hratr, Avicnna, Met. Translatins ar my

wn. Sinc Aquinas rad t Latin txt, my translatins ar takn rm t Latin, unlss trwis indicatd.

Arabic txt usd is t Cair txt cntaind in Marmura. Sctin numbrs ar Marmuras. Imprtant tcni-

cal trms ar givn in Arabic and Latin.21Ibid., 1.8, sc. 2 (Arabic: 39.6; Latin: 1: 56.7374).22Ibid., 1.5, sc. 1 and 9 (Arabic: 22.1112, 24.913; Latin: 1: 31.0203, 34.5435.61).23Ibid., 1.7, sc. 1314 (Arabic: 38.111; Latin: 1: 54.3855.55).


7/21


t svn).24 In bks igt t tn Avicnna turns t G, t unamntal caus

pssibl r crat bings. Bk igt cnsirs G in imsl, frst is xistnc

an tn is natur; bk nin lks at craturs manating rm G; an bk

tn cnsirs tir rturn t G.In t frst tr captrs bk igt Avicnna rs an argumnt r t exis-

tence G (using is pilspical nam, ncssary xistnc) tat taks ,

nt rm Aristtl,Metaphysics 12, but rmMetaphysics 2.2, wr Aristtl a

n t pssibility scintifc knwlg, by swing tat infnit rgrss

in any t ur lins causality is impssibl. Avicnna uss Aristtls argu-

mnts as t frst al is argumnt r t xistnc G. Lking at ac

t ur lins causality las t t cnclusin tat tr must b a frst, tat

is, a csmic frst caus, staning at t a ac lin causality. In t scn

al is argumnt, Avicnna must fn uniy amng t frsts, itr by fning

n tm tat is G r smw intiying all ur frsts wit G. Avicnna

llws t frst ptin an, as w sall s, Aquinas t scn.

Atr stablising ur frsts, Avicnna turns t t frst fcint caus an

simply rps rm cnsiratin t tr tr lins causality. T rasn tat

s s is bcaus t frst fcint caus clarly must b n in numbr an it must

b ncssary xistnc. Nw ts wr t tw critria r G tat Avicnna a

st ut in t scn hypthesis amng is mtapysical principls. A frst efcient

caus is in accr wit tis yptsis, wras tis ft is nt s raily apparnt

r t tr tr frstst frst rmal, matrial, an fnal causs. having cn-

clu tat a frst fcint caus xists, sinc tis caus ulflls t rquirmnts rbing G, tat is, it is ncssary xistnc an als n in numbr, Avicnna

can appily cnclu tat is argumnt r t xistnc a frst fcint caus is

nting tr tan an argumnt r t xistnc G. Avicnna tn runs ut

captr tr by cntrasting G wit craturs: It is vint tat watvr is tr

tan im, i cnsir in itsel, ispssible in its xistnc an trr it is caus,

an it is sn tat causality witut ubt trminats in im.25 T pririty G

t cratin is ntlgical, nt tmpral, r G is ncssary xistnc, wras

pssibl bings r cratursvn prptual bings lik t intlligncsar

cmpsits quiity an xistnc.

Avicnna tn turn t t natur G. An vt captrs ur anfv bk igt t vlping cnclusins abut Gs intrinsic natur, based

n his wn metaphysical principles. his mtapysical yptsis abut G sai

tw tings: G, i can b prvn t xist, must b ncssary xistnc an

must b n. Avicnna a us bt ts critria t vlp is argumnt r

t xistnc G. S, in accr wit tis apprac, Avicnna trats t ivin

natur in captr ur by rawing ut t cnsquncs G bing ncssary

xistnc, wil in captr fv raws ut t cnsquncs G bing n.

24Ibi., 1.2, sc. 13 (Arabic: 10.411; Latin: 1. 13.3846). on t rganizatin Avicnnas Met.,

Bk. 1, an t ivisin t rst t bk int ntlgy (Bks. 27) an ratinal tlgy (Bks. 810),s R. e. husr, T Ral distinctin an t Principls Mtapysics: Avicnna an Aquinas. in

Laudemus irs glriss (2007): 75108.25Ibi., 8.3, sc. 56 (Arabic: 271.14272.3; Latin: 2: 395.12396.21).


8/21

362 R. E. HoUSER

Tn in captrs six an svn Avicnna turns t a mr Aristtlian apprac,

cnsiring ivin gnss an knwlg, tpics Aristtl a trat. In ct,

btwn prving Gs xistnc an trating Gs natur causally, in captr ur

an fv Avicnna insrts smting quit nwcnsiratin Gs intrinsicnatur st ut, w migt say, fnitinally ratr tan causally.

Avicnna bgins captr ur wit t scriptin Gs natur tat cms ut

is argumnt r Gs xistnc, wic as swn tat, unr t scriptin

ncssary xistnc, G actually xists an is n. Nw n t aspcts

unity is bing frst. S, G is frst in rank in cmparisn wit all tr tings,

an tis in turn mans tat G is t caus ncssity r all tr tings.26 A

scn aspct ivin unity mrgs wn w lk witin Gs natur an s

tat it is cmpltly n, purly tru (aqq; vera). Nw trut is but antr nam

r quiity r ssnc. S Avicnnas argumnt r Gs xistnc as uncvr

t languag will us t scrib t ivin natur: bing, n, ncssary, s-

snc, an xistnc, t vry trms a intruc as t cnceptual principls

mtapysics. Avicnna tn caps t prliminaris t is cnsiratin t

ivin natur by pinting ut tat tr ar tw ways r t mtapysician t knw

Gs natur. evn tug uttrly n, G still cms t b knwn by rrnc

t tr tings, in tw ways: by way ngating crtain ms bing im;

an by way is rlatin twar tr bings. S, Avicnnas intrinsic cnsi-

ratin Gs ssnc llws t ways ngatin an rlatin, an Tmas

will llw tm, as wll.27

Atr ts imprtant prliminaris, Avicnna unrlls t natur G by uc-ing a sris tss abut t ivin natur. In rr t unrstan tm, w must

istinguis tr aturs any bing: t individual ting r subjct, suc asZayd;

its ssnc r quiity, suc as uman; an its xistnc, wtr ral r imaginary.

(1) Avicnnas frst cnclusin plays t act tatZayd, wn cnciv as an

iniviual subjct, is nt t sam as is ssnc, bcaus tr ar many iniviuals

w av t sam uman ssnc. But G, cnsir as an iniviual subjct,

is n wit is ssnc: Wn w say is n in ssnc an is nt multipl w

man tat is suc [n] in his essence (fdhti-hi; in sua essentia). Tr is n

ntlgical istanc, tn, btwn t iniviual subjctGan is ssnc.28

(2) having cmpar G t is ssnc, Avicnna nxt cmpars is ssnct is xistnc: t First as n quiity (mhyyatu; quidditatem) tr tan

is iniviual xistnc (al-inniyyati; anitatem). T trm inniyya mpasizs

iniviuality an can man itr iniviual quiity r iniviual xistnc. But

Avicnna as just intif G as iniviual subjct wit is ssnc, s as

26Ibi., 8.4, sc. 1 (Arabic: 273.611; Latin: 2: 397.55398.64).27Ibi., 8.4, sc. 2 (Arabic: 273.1216; Latin: 2: 398.6572). In scribing t way w knw G, Aquinas

nrmally rrs t t tr ways dinysius (De divinis nminibus, 7.3): t ways ngatin, minnc,

an causality. Bt minnc an causality ar bas upn rlatins btwn G an craturs, trby

crrlating t dinysian an Avicnnian ways t G.28Ibi., 8.4, sc. 2 (Arabic: 273.1617; Latin: 2: 398.7274): ipsum st sic [unum] in sua ssntia. C.

Aquinas, Summa Thelgiae, Lnin ., 411 (ottawa oN: Cllg minicain, 1941), 1.3.3: utrum sit

im us qu sua ssntia vl natura. hratr ST.


9/21


already made the point that the divine essence is not pluriable but unique. So, i the

present thesis is a new claim, inniyya must mean individual existence. So taken,

Avicennas second thesis advances his argument by adding that Gods essence is

one with his existence.29 Taking Avicennas rst two theses about the divine naturetogether shows the complete unity o God; or when he is considered as individual

subject, God is absolutely the same as his essence, which in turn is absolutely the

same as his necessary existence. The contrast with creatures could not be greater;

orZayds individuality, nature, and existence are all ontologically distinct rom

each other. This is why he is an individual who has a nature in common with other

humans, none o whom have to exist, but all o whom are intrinsically contingent,

and become necessary only when their quiddities are caused to exist.

(3) Based on his rst two theses, Avicenna then refects on what we know about

God. We know the nature o a creature, say, a human or some other substance

through knowing its quiddity. This is dierent rom knowing its existence,

because the two are ontologically distinct eatures o a creature. But they are the

same in God. For this reason, necessary existence is understood intellectually as

necessary existence itsel, because Gods essence just is necessary existence, these

two eatures o God being absolutely identical. Indeed, their identity is what makes

Gods existence necessary in the rst place30

(4) From his third thesis, Avicenna then draws a negative conclusion that urther

contrasts God with creatures. An individual created being must be an ontological

composite o quiddity and existence, a bestowed existence that makes the creature

necessary in a qualied way. Avicenna describes existence and unity as occurringaccidentally (yaraa li-hi; cui accidit) to the quiddity. But necessary existence

cannot be the sort that involves composition, so that there is some quiddity . . . such

that this quiddity would have a notion other than its truth (aqqiqati-h; certitudinem

eius), that is, its truth as necessary existence. In short, God cannot involve onto-

logical composition o quiddity and existence, while every creature must involve

such composition.31

To support and clariy his ourth thesis, Avicenna oers a series o dialectical

arguments. Among them is one that will strike the ancy o Thomas o Aquino. It

concerns the two logical possibilities or a being, unlike God, whose essence is not

identical with its existence:

(11) So we say that whatever has a quiddity other than existence is caused. . . . So its

existence must be a concomitant. (12) Consequently, either it [existence] is a concomi-

tant o the quiddity because it is that quiddity, or it would be a concomitant because o

something else. Now the meaning o our saying concomitant is to ollow existence. . . .

And or everything that in existence ollows an existence, what it ollows must exist prior

29Ibid., 8.4, sec. 3 (Arabic: 274.4; Latin: 2: 398.83399.84): primum non habet quidditatem nisi anitatem.

C. Aquinas, ST1.3.4: utrum in deo sit idem essentia et esse.30

Ibid., 8.4, sec. 4 (Arabic: 274.710; Latin: 2: 399.8690): dico quod necesse esse iam intelligit ipsumnecesse esse.

31Ibid., 8.4, sec. 67 (Arabic: 274.1519; Latin: 2: 399.9802). occurring accidentally is Marmuras

translation o the Arabic.


10/21

364 R. E. HoUSER

t it. Cnsequently, te quiity as t exist in itsel prir t its existence; wic is a

cntraictin. Te alternative is tat its existence is ue t a cause. Terere, everyting

tat as a quiity is cause. All te tings ter tat necessary existence ave a quiity.

An it is tese quiities tat in temselves are pssible in existence, existence ccuringt tem rm utsie.32

Avicennas argument, in srt, is tis. Apart rm a being wse existence is sme-

w ientical wit its essence, tere are nly tw pssibilities: eiter existence fws

as a prperty rm its essence, r existence is like a preicable accient t te extent

tat is cmes rm an extrinsic cause. Te rst alternative is impssible because it

wul require tat te quiity exist bere it exists, wile te secn alternative

is nt just pssible, it is necessary r all creatures. Fr tem, existence can nly

cme rm an extrinsic ecient causeG.

(5) Frm tis argument, Avicenna immeiately raws anter cnclusin abutG: Terere, te First as n quiity (mhyya; quidditatem). Bt te

alternatives Avicenna as cnsiere rest n te assumptin tat a tings quiity

is istinct rm its existence. Te rst alternative is impssible r any kin being,

an te secn is impssible r G, w cannt be cause. S Avicenna enies

te initial assumptin. G cannt ave a quiity istinct rm is existence; s

Avicenna urter cnclues G cannt ave a quiity at all. Tis strng state-

ment es ntmean tat G as n essence (dht; essentia), tat e is empty

intelligible cntent. Te reasn Avicenna enies quiity t G is because, as

e uses te term quiity expresses te kin nature tat cul be multiplie

in mre tan ne iniviual. It is tis kin pluriable quiity tat G canntave, because is essence is unique. T clariy is use quiity e as anter

cmparisn wit creatures: over tse tings aving quiities, existence fws

rm im. But e is pure existence, wit te cnitin negating privatins an

all ter prperties im.33

Frm te act tat G es nt ave a pluriable quiity (mhyya; quidditas),

several urter cnsequences llw. (6) Te First as n genus, because e as

n quiity. Sul G all uner a genus, e wul sare tat genus wit ter

tings, all wic are cmpsites quiity an existence.34 (7) An te First

as n ierentia tat wul serve t istinguis im rm ter tings uner a32Ibi., 8.4, sec. 1112 (Arabic: 276.615; Latin: 2: 401.33402.47). Te argument is uller in te Arabic;

te Latin translatin seems t ave let ut sec. 10 te Arabic text. C. ST 1.3.4c, rst argument: Quia

quiqui est in aliqu, qu est praeter essentiam eius, prtet esse causatum: vel a principiis essentiae,

sicut accientia prpria cnsequentia speciem, ut risiblile cnsequitur minem et causatur ex principiis

essentialibus speciei; vel ab aliqu exteriri, sicut calr in aqua causatur ab igne. Si igitur ipsum esse rei sit

aliu ab eius essentia, necesse est qu esse illius rei vel sit causatum ab aliqu exteriri, vel a principiis

essentialibus eiusem rei. Impssiblile est autem qu esse sit causatum tantum ex principiis essentialibus

rei, quia nulla res sucit a c qu sit sibi causa esseni, si abeat esse causatum. oprtet erg qu

illum cuius esse est aliu ab essentia sua, abeat esse causatum ab ali. hc autem nn ptest ici e de,

quia deum icimus esse primam causam ecientem. Impssiblie est erg qu in de sit aliu esse et aliu

eius essentia. Als,De ente, c. 4. Aquinass superb interpretive skills allwe im t clariy te argumentan a te examples, but te argument itsel is Avicennas.

33Ibi., 8.4, sec. 13 (Arabic: 276.1617; Latin: 2: 402.4850).34Ibi., 8.4, sec. 14 (Arabic: 277.4; Latin: 2: 402.61).


11/21


common genus. (8) Since e as neiter genus nor dierence, e as no defnition.

(9) And lacking a defnition, tere is no demonstration o im, because tere is

no cause o im. here Avicenna is speaking o te stronger demonstration o te

reasoned act tat proceeds rom cause to eect; e as already used demonstrationo te act to prove Gods existence by proceeding rom eect to God as cause.35

(10) Avicenna rounds out is existential consideration o Gods nature in te

ourt capter o book eigt wit wat is peraps is most istorically signifcant

tesis. he as an objector note tat e as avoided saying God is a substance; and

Avicenna answers tat it is true tat God is not a substance. Te reason is tat in

is metapysics o essence and existence, te very notion (mana; intenti) o sub-

stance as canged in an important way, one tat limits substance to te realm o

creatures. Were Aristotle ad defned substance as being not in a subject,36 or

Avicenna substance is a thing wit an establised quiddity, wose existence is not

in a subject, or example, a body and a soul.37 Te category o substance is limited

to tose beings composed o quiddity and existence, all o wic are limited in

teir perection. So, only creatures are substances. Te metapysical description o

Gods nature Avicenna as set out purely in trans-categorical, tat is, transcendental

terms, or only suc terms can describe a supremely one and necessary existence.

In capter fve Avicenna goes over muc o te same material as capter our,

wic is wy it is entitled a confrmation and recapitulation o wat as previ-

ously been said.38 But tere is one major dierence. In is ontology o creatures,

Avicenna conceives o existence and unity as correlatives, bot o wic are added

to a possible quiddity to produce an actual being. Wen considering Gods nature,since e concentrated on Gods existence in capter our, e concentrates on te

eature correlative to existenceGods unityin capter fve. Te capter ocuses

on te act tat te divine essence cannot be multiplied in te way tere can be

many individual creatures aving a common species, or as many species can ave

a common genus, or as te ten categories all under te common notion o be-

ing. Avicenna caps o capter fve by reiterating te two ways we can attempt to

understand te divine nature, te way o negation and te way o relation: ater

is individual existence, e is only described by negating all similarities to im and

by afrming relatins to im. For every ting tat exists is rom im, and tere is

noting common between im and wat is rom im.39Avicennas God, owever, does ave some o te kinds o eatures tat Aristotle

ad attributed to a god. Avicenna lays tem out in capters six and seven o book

eigt. here Avicenna describes God in relation to creatures and in terms o is

primary activities. First, God is perect and more tan perect, wic sets God

at te top o te scale o being, a position occupied by Aristotles igest god.40

35Ibid., 8.4, sec. 16 (Arabic: 1011; Latin: 2: 403.7073).36Aristotle, Categries 2 (1b3), 5 (21112).37Avicenna,Met. 8.4, sec. 1718 (Arabic: 277.1217; Latin: 2: 403.7380): intentio eius [substantiae] est

quod est res abens quidditatem stabilem, cuius esse est esse quod non est in subjecto, corpore vel anima.38Ibid., 8.5, title (Arabic: 278.1415; Latin 2: 405.1).39Ibid., 8.5, sec. 14 (Arabic: 283.23; Latin: 2: 411.4448).40Ibid., 8.6, sec. 1 (Arabic: 283.1014; Latin: 2: 412.5561). C. Aquinas, ST1.3.7; 1.4.13.


12/21

366 R. E. HoUSER

Second, this means that God is pure good, a divine name that or Avicenna ocuses

on the benecent side o goodness rather than on the desirability o goodness.41

Consequently, or Avicenna goodness connotes in the rst instance God as ree

bestower o existence on creatures rather than God as end, which was the onlyway in which Aristotle had conceived o God. Third, God is Truth.42 For Avicenna,

truth has an ontological sense, which is why it is a synonym or thing and quid-

dity. Gods quiddity is that o pure intellect.43 As such, God knows himsel,

as Aristotle had said. But unlike Aristotles god, Avicennas creative God knows

all things through knowing himsel.44 Again refecting Aristotle, in God knower,

knowing, and known are one.45 As intellect, Avicennas God knows universals, to

be sure, but he also knows particulars, albeit universally. Finally, in the seventh

chapter Avicenna looks at the objects o divine knowledge more careully, in order

to ensure that neither the many objects o divine knowledge nor the many divine

attributes themselves introduce multiplicity into God.46 Avicenna ends book eight

with a brie consideration o joy and happiness in God. Since Gods knowledge

does not introduce multiplicity, the divine splendor, majesty, and glory characterize

a joy and happiness that are undivided in God himsel. Such an end humans can only

imitate, both in the present lie and in the lie humans will have upon returning

to God.47

Avicennas views about God do exhibit a ew similarities with Aristotles. In

proving the existence o God, Avicenna does ollow Aristotles lead in oering a

demonstration o the act argument by reasoning rom eects to cause. And in his

views about the nature o God Avicenna incorporates certain Aristotelian doctrines,such as that God is unchangeable, good, a sel-knower, and supremely happy.

Far more striking, however, are the ways in which Avicenna goes beyond Aristo-

tles positions, which no doubt explains why he was unwilling to ulll al-Juzanis

request or a commentary on Aristotle, but in his Healing was willing to write

out his wn thughtor his disciple. First, Avicenna draws his conclusions rom

principles that are quite dierent rom Aristotles. Second, Avicenna concludes to

the existence o God as ecient cause, not as nal cause. Third, Avicennas God

is cause oexistence, not o motion. Fourth, Avicenna develops his most important

conclusions in a completely original section (chapter our and ve o book eight)

inserted between his argument or Gods existence and the more Aristotelianconclusions developed in chapters six and seven. Where an Aristotelian god is a

separate substance, Avicennas metaphysical principles lead him to doctrines that

surpass Aristotles: Gods primary name is necessary existence. God is unique,

one in number, contrary to Aristotles polytheism. Finally, Gods essence is unique:

God is the same as his essence; Gods essence is identical with his existence; God

41Ibid., 8.6, sec. 2 (Arabic: 283.1518; Latin: 2: 412.6267). C. Aquinas, ST1.6.2.42Ibid., 8.6, sec. 5 (Arabic: 284.1216; Latin: 2: 413.8394). C. Aquinas, ST1.16.5.43Ibid., 8.6, sec. 6 (Arabic: 284.17; Latin: 2: 414.95).44

Ibid., 8.6, sec. 1516 (Arabic: 288.213; Latin: 2: 418.91419.9).45Ibid., 8.6, sec. 816 (Arabic 285.11288.13; Latin: 2: 415.19419.9).46Ibid., 8.7, sec. 114 (Arabic: 291.1297.2; Latin: 2: 422.1431.49).47Ibid., 8.7, sec. 1518 (Arabic: 297.3298.13; Latin: 2: 431.50433.02).


13/21


has n quiddity; and cnsequently Gd has n genus, species, dierentia, and is

nt a substance, thrugh which he culd be defned.

Aquinas: Let us cnsider the frst part the Summa f Thelgy (written 1265

1268), rather than Summa cntra gentiles (12591265) r his Scriptum in Sententiis(12521256), because this part was Thmass latest and mst mature treatment

the divine nature and diers imprtantly rm the earlier tw wrks in the rder

Aquinas presents the tpics invlving the divine nature.

Thmas cnceived thelgy (r sacred dctrine) as an Aristtelian science

in which cnclusins are demnstrated rm principles. Frm his Scriptum nward

he recgnized thelgy cntains bth demnstratins based n revealed principles

and purely ratinal demnstratins. In his Scriptum he set ut bth explicitly. The

revealed principles are the articles aith as cntained in the ancient creeds,48

while at d. 8, q. 1, a. 13 he set ut his Avicennian metaphysical principles, which

were als presented in hisDe ente. In the Summa cntra gentes he did nt g s

ar as t identiy thelgys revealed principles with the articles aith, because

its frst three bks are limited t ratinal arguments; but he did say that what has

been passed n t us in the wrds sacred Scripture may be taken, as it were, as

principles.49 Cncerning the ratinal principles that thelgy uses, Aquinas did nt

explicitly present Avicennian principles, as he had in the Scriptum; but he did nte

that t ratinally make the divine truth knwn, we must prceed thrugh demn-

strative arguments,50 which depend upn principles that are naturally knwn. And

he added that the knwledge the principles that are knwn t us naturally has

been implanted in us by Gd; r Gd is the authr ur nature. These principles,therere, are als cntained by the divine Wisdm.51 At the utset the Summa

thelgiaeAquinas explicitly sets ut the prper principles thelgythe articles

aith52because he uses bth ratinal demnstratins and arguments rm revela-

tin thrughut Summa thelgiae, unlike the Summa cntra gentes. As in Summa

cntra gentes, he des nt explicitly list the philsphical principles that thelgy

uses in its ratinal demnstratins. But he des make extensive use philsphical

principles that he had set ut in tw very early wrks: the Avicennian metaphysical

principles he had laid ut inDe ente and the dierent principles natural science,

which, thugh basically Aristtelian in cntent, he had laid ut inDe principiis na-

turae, as he knew them rm the frst bk Avicennas Physics. The philsphicalprinciples he uses can be inerred rm the ratinal demnstratins he ers.53

48Aquinas, Scriptum in Sententiis, Bk. 1, Prl., 1.3.1c and 1.3.2 ad 2m, in Adrian oliva, Les dbuts de

lenseignement de Thmas dAquin et sa cnceptin de la Sacra dctrina: aec lditin du prlgue de

sn cmmentaire des Sentences (Paris: Vrin, 2006).49Aquinas, SCG 4.1.10.50Ibid., 1.9.2.51Ibid., 1.7.2.52Aquinas, ST, 1.1.2, 3, 7.53Aquinas makes use Avicennian metaphysical principles rm early n in STat 1.2.3 (secnd way

efcient cause is cause existence, third waypssible and necessary existence, urth waytranscendentalperectins being), 1.3.1c (third argumentthe transcendentals), 1.3.2 (the ntins participated and

essential gd), 1.3.4 and 5 (the ntins essence and existence). In this way ne can see that he has nt

changed his mind rm his earlier cmmentary n the Sentences.


14/21

368 R. E. HoUSER

Wen treating te existence Gd in Summa thelgiae 1.2.3, Tmas emplys

a versin Aristtles argument rm mtin in is rst way, but te ter ur

ways are mdeled n te rst step Avicennas argument, namely, prving tat

tere is a csmic rst in eac te ur lines causality. But were Avicennapted r ne amng te rstste rst ecient causeas cause te ter tree

rsts, Tmas argues in ways tw trug ve tat all urlines Aristte-

lian causality lead inevitably t ne and te same rst causeGd. S, Gd is te

rst efcientcause giving existence t all creatures; all pssible beings, bt tse

cnstituted matterand even purely spiritual creatures, require a necessary Gd;

Gd is te mstrmally perect being; and Gd is te fnal cause tat prvides

gvernance trug imparting natural ends t creatures.

In bt is Summa cntra gentes and is Summa thelgiae, ater prving te

existence Gd Aquinas addresses te nature Gd. In te Summa cntra gentes

is tugt still refected a mre Aristtelian rder in treating te divine nature.

Immediately ater prving Gds existence (SCG 1.13), e began is treatment

te divine nature, nt as Avicenna ad dne, but wit a sectin devted t sme

te same attributes wit wic Aristtle ad begun is cnsideratin divine

nature: Gd as eternal (1.15), an active pwer (1.16), immaterial (1.17), incmps-

ite (1.18), and cmpletely natural (1.19). Tese tpics preceded te Avicennian

eatures divine nature (1.2127). Tmas ten tk up Gds perectin and

gdness (1.2841), divine knwledge (1.3071), will (1.7299), and ended wit

divine beatitude (1.100102). In te Summa thelgiae, wever, Aquinas canged

te rder tpics signicantly, and in an Avicennian directin.Intent n sining te ligts revelatin and reasn tgethern te issue

Gds nature, in Summa thelgiae Tmas treats rst te nature te ne Gd,

knwn primarily trug natural reasn (ST1.326), ten turns t te Trinitarian

nature Gd, knwledge necessarily based n revelatin (1. 2743), smeting

e ad put t bk ur in Summa cntra gentes. In treating te divine nature

ratinally Tmas llws Avicennas general plan, rst treating te Avicennian

eatures Gd based n unity (ST1.311), ten treating tse eatures Gd

recgnized by bt Aristtle and Avicenna (1.1225). Te rst al tis plan

llws quite Avicennas rder in is Metaphysics 8.47. o premier imprtance

is tat Tmas begins is treatment Gds nature just were Avicenna ad, witdivine ntlgical simplicity; tug even ere e adapts Avicenna t is wn way.

Were te Vizier ad laid ut cnsequences deduced rm Gds necessity and unity

in a syntetic manner, Tmas llws Avicennas negative apprac by arguing

deductively, but in an empirical and analytic manner. he denies dierent kinds

ntlgical multiplicity Gd, beginning wit strnger senses multiplicity (and

weaker senses unity) and prceeding gradually t lesser senses multiplicity

(and strnger senses unity). Tis rder is designed t rce te mind is reader

t recgnize tat Gd is nt multiple in even a minimal way, but cmpletely and

abslutely ntlgically simple.

Tmas, terere, argues in turn: Gd is nt a pysical bdy wse parts are

extended in space (ST1.3.1). Gd is nt cmpsed matter and rm, as are all

material substances (1.3.2). Cnceived as an individual subject, Gd is same as is


15/21


essence (1.3.3), unlike sublunar creatures, where there are many individuals o one

species. Most importantly, Gods essence is identical with his existence (1.3.4)

which was Avicennas premier metaphysical claim about God. Since God does not

have a quiddity or essence distinct rom existence, God has no genus (1.3.5). Nordoes God have any accidents (1.3.6), or God is completely simple (1.3.7). Conse-

quently, in no way does God enter into the composition o things, even though God

is the direct efcient cause o the existence o all creatures (1.3.8).

From his thoroughly Avicennian starting point in question three, Aquinas then

develops a number o other eatures o Gods nature, again drawing heavily upon

AvicennasMetaphysics 8.45. Since God is ontologically simple, he is most actual,

and thereore most perect. And as creator, God pre-possesses all the perections

o his creation.54 God is not just good but the highest good.55 Where Aristotles

highest god was the highest good onlyper accidens, because the fnal cause o the

highest sphere, Aquinass God, like Avicennas, is not the highest good or some

extrinsic reason, but God alone is good through his essence, . . . or whom alone

essence is his existence.56 This conception o goodness as a transcendental attribute

o being (ens), leads Aquinas to re-introduce a new kind o participation that makes

all things good by the divine goodness. For although

it seems unreasonable to posit species o natural things subsisting separately through

themselves [as Plato did and Aristotle rejected] . . . still it is absolutely true that something

is frst which, through its own essence is a being (ens) and good, which we call God.

. . . Thereore, by the frst, through its own essence a being and good, everything can be

called good and a being, in as much as it participates in it by way o a kind o assimila-

tion, albeit remotely and defciently. . . . Thereore, in this way everything is called good

by the divine goodness, as by a frst principle that is the exemplar, efcient, and fnal

cause o all goodness.57

It also ollows that God is essentially and absolutely infnite, a status that

can only be true o one God and thereore is beyond Aristotles many gods, who

were limited in perection by the immaterial orms they are.58 And God is omni-

present in creatures, not as part o their essence, nor as an accident, but as an

agent is present to that on which it works, or God is in all things as causing the

existence (esse) o all things.59 God does this directly, a departure rom Avicennasmediated creation.

Moreover, God is utterly unchangeable. Aquinas oers three reasons or this

conclusion, only the frst o which Aristotle could (and did) accept: God is pure

act, without the admixture o any potency. But Aquinas adds two more arguments.

Change requires composition, but in God there is no composition, or he is alto-

gether [ontologically] simple, a clear reerence back to his Avicennian explanation

54Aquinas, ST1.4.1.55Ibid., 1.6.2.56

Ibid., 1.6.3c.57Ibid., 1.6.4c.58Ibid., 1.7.2c.59Ibid., 1.8.1c and ad 1m.


16/21

370 R. E. HoUSER

o divine simplicity in te tird question. Also, since God is infniteanoter non-

Aristotelian tesisit would be impossible or im to acquire a new perection

troug cange, indeed, impossible to cange at all.60 God is also truly eternal, e

does not merely persist troug all time, as Aristotle tougt.61Finally, Aquinas completes te circle o is reasoning by returning to were it

began. To is earlier consideration o divine simplicity, Aquinas now makes clear

tat in addition to true and good, since one is also a transcendental attribute o

being (ens), God must be one to te igest degree, as e is being, true, and good

to te igest degree. Aquinas oers tree reasons or Gods unity, wic stand as

a kind o coda or te Avicennian section o is treatment o Gods nature. God

is one, frst, rom is simplicity, second, rom te infnity o is perection,

and fnally, rom te unity o te world tat is bestowed by te frst, wic is

completely perect and troug itsel, not troug anoter.62 None o tese reasons

could Aristotle ave accepted in te way in wic Tomas explains tem, because

e ad borrowed all o tem rom Avicenna.

Ater is consideration o wat pertains to te divine substance, tat is, Gods

nature considered intrinsically, Tomas next turns to divine operation (1.1226),

wic explains Gods nature extrinsically troug is relation to creatures, te second

o Avicennas two modes o knowing te divine nature. Tomass prologue to tis

next section (1.1213) covers our uman knowledge o God and sets appropriate

limits on wat we can know wit unaided uman reason about Gods nature. Ten

e considers a series o topics tat bot Aristotle and Avicenna ad treated. here

Avicenna ad not struck out completely on is own, but ad radically emended tetougt o Aristotle; and Tomas again ollows is lead.

Te frst operation tat Tomas considers is Gods knowledge. Aristotle ad said

tat te object o divine knowledge is a god imsel, so tat knower, knowing, and

object known are one. Avicenna ad adopted tis Aristotelian and later neoplatonic

model, and Tomas ollows im. But Aristotle ad concluded tat a god knows nly

imsel, noting else. Avicenna ad said tat God knows all o creation in knowing

imsel, but indirectly, since in knowing imsel God knows creatures only by way

o knowing teir causes. Tomas develops tis line o reasoning urter. In knowing

imsel, God directly knows all creation. Te reason is tat i Gods knowledge is

completely perect, e must know not only imsel but all te consequences tatollow rom imsel as te frst efcient cause o all tings. But unlike Avicennas

God, wose creative act is mediated by intervening creative causes, Tomas says

God is te direct creative cause o eac and every creature. So, God must know

directly eac and every creature e creates. And tis conclusion appears still more

plainly i we add tat te very existence o te frst efcient cause, tat is, God, is is

own act o understanding, an argument based on Aquinass Avicennian doctrine o

existence (esse), as outlined earlier in te tird question. Te ontological identity

o God wit is act o understanding and wit imsel as object o understanding

60Ibid., 1.9.1.61Ibid., 1.10.12.62Ibid., 1.11.3.


17/21


does not prevent Tomas rom saying tat tere are many divine ideas. For te

divine ideas unction in Gods productive knowledge as creator, not in te specula-

tive order; so teir multiplicity derives rom te multiplicity o tings e knows and

creates. For te divine ideas are multiple, ten, not as tey are Gods internal meanso understanding, but as tey are te many bjects Gd knws. Tereore, in so ar

as God knows is own essence as imitable by some kind o creature, e knows it as

te proper type and idea o tat creature; and te same is true or oter creatures.

And in tis way it is clear tat God understands many proper types o many tings,

wic are te many ideas.63

Ater treating divine knowledge Tomas turns to te allied topics o trut and

alsity (1.1617). Wile Aristotle recognized only te epistemological trut tat is

present in a knowing mind, Avicenna ad added an ontological sense o trut, one

tat ollows on being, as does goodness, and is te oundation o epistemological

trut. Aquinas recognizes bot senses o trut:

As good is in a ting so ar as te ting is ordered to te appetite, or tis reason te

aspect o goodness alsopasses errom te ting desired to te desire itsel, so ar as

te appetite is called good to te extent it is o te good; so likewise, since te true is in

te intellect in so ar as it is in conormity to te ting understood, it is necessary tat te

aspect o te truepass errom te intellect to te ting understood, so tat te ting

understood is also called true, so ar as it as some order to te intellect.64

Just as epistemological trut is ound in Gods mind as perect knower, so also te

ontological sense o trut is ound in God imsel as te perect being. here Aquinassmain ocus is to develop is account o te ontological sense o trut, to complement

te transcendentals being (ens), one, and good e ad already introduced. Te

transcendentals e drew rom Avicenna, by way o Pilip te Cancellor and Albert,

are exceedingly important or is rational teology, or unlike categorical terms

tey do not intrinsically imply imperfectin, and tereore are most appropriate or

describing God scientifcally rater tan metaporically.

Ater considering te tings belonging to divine knowledge, we consider wat

belongs to te divine will,65 since willing is te desiderative operation tat ac-

companies intellectual knowledge. Tomass account o Gods will is modeled on

is Avicennian account o Gods understanding, were in knowing imsel God

also knows is creatures. Likewise, God wills bot imsel and oter tings, but

imsel as te end, oter tings as ordered to te end, in so ar as it befts te divine

goodness tat oter tings also participate in it.66 For tis reason, Gods will is

totally unconditioned by anyting else. Consequently, it is necessary to say tat

te will o God is te cause o tings, and tat God acts by will, not by a necessity

o nature, as some ave supposed.67

63Ibid., 1.15.2c.64

Ibid., 1.16.1c.65Ibid., 1.19.prologue.66Ibid., 1.19.3c.67Ibid., 1.19.1c.


18/21

372 R. E. HoUSER

Tomas ends is consideration o Gods operations wit divine love, justice,

mercy, and providence (1.2024). Arguing empirically rom te uman case, Aquinas

notes tat in te appetitive part o te soul tere are ound in us bot passions o

te soul, suc as joy, love, and tings o tis sort, and abits o te moral virtues,suc as justice, courage, and te like.68 Consequently, tere must be someting in

God akin to te passions and virtues in umans. Te analogue o passion in God

is love: it is necessary to posit love in God, or te frst movement o te will and

o every appetitive power is love.69 I God loves because all willing involves love,

ten all divine actions in relation to is creation involve te virtues o justice and

mercy. Aquinas summarizes:

Communicating perections considered absolutely pertains to goodness . . . ; but so ar

as perections are given to tings by God based on proportion among tem, tis pertains

tojustice . . . ; but as God does not bestow perections on tings or is own use but onlybased on is own goodness, tis pertains to liberality; and so ar as te perections given

to tings by God expel every deect, tis pertains to mercy.70

Ater considering Gods acts o intellect and will separately, Aquinas ten brings

tem togeter in considering Gods providence in relation to all tings, and pre-

destination and reprobation and teir consequences, in relation to umans.71

Aquinas ad ended is treatment o te divine substance in itsel (1.311) by

returning to were it ad begunwit Gods ontological simplicity. In a similar way

Tomas completes te circle o Gods intellectual and voluntary operations by turn-

ing to teir sourceGods powerand teir resultGods appiness (beatitud).About Gods power, Aquinas ocuses on is power in relation to oter tingsis

creative power. Gods power is active, not passive, and is power is infnite. Tis

makes God omnipotent, but we must understand tis term rigtly. I one considers

te issue correctly, since power is said in relation to tings tat are possible, wen

God is said to be able to do all tings, noting else is correctly understood tan

tat e is able to do all pssible things, and or tis reason is called omnipotent.72

Finally, Tomas ends is treatment o Gods nature wit divine beatitude. he takes

o rom te traditional Boetian defnition o appinessa state perected by te

aggregation o all goods. As usual, tis defnition, wic Boetius ad devised

wit an eye to uman appiness,73 as to be altered analogically wen applied to

God: Aggregation o goods is in God, not in te manner o composition but in te

manner osimplicity; because tings tat in creatures are multiplied in God pre-exist

in a manner tat is simple and unifed.74 Wit tis backward reerence to divine

simplicity and unity (1.3 and 11), Tomas completes te circle o is treatment o

Gods nature. Toug is consideration was initially inspired by Aristotle, to be

68Ibid., 1.20.prologue.69Ibid., 1.20.1c.70Ibid., 1.21.3c.71

Ibid., 1.2224.72Ibid., 1.25.3c.73Boetius, Cnslati, 3 prose 2.74Aquinas, ST1.26.1 ad 1m.


19/21


sure, t Tmass mind te tpics e treated and te cnclusins e drew ad been

muc mre develped by Avicenna, using is metapysics te transcendentals,

being, and essence and existence. And it was upn by te Persian, muc mre tan

te Greek, tat e was guided.Clse cmparisn Aristtle, Avicenna, and Aquinas des reveal pilspical

develpment in several aspects teir dctrines divine nature.

Principles: Te demnstrative principles tat tey use clearly separate Aristtle

rm tese tw medieval Peripatetics. Te Pilsper used te same principles

trugut is teretical pilspyis ten categries, ur causes, and te

ntins being, ptency, and act. Tis is wy e amusly said tat unless separate

substance can be prven t exist, tere will be n dierence between pysics and

metapysics.75 Since tey ave te same principles, tey dier in teir subjects

r nt at all. Avicenna clearly distinguised te principles pysics,76 wic are

te same as Aristtles pilspical principles, rm te principles metapys-

ics. Aquinas used bt te Aristtelian principles natural pilspy and te

Avicennian principles metapysics in all is telgical writings. Abut te

nature Gd in te Summa thelgiae, e depends mre n Avicennian meta-

pysical principles, because metapysics, as te igest uman science, is clsest

t sacred dctrine.77

Existence f Gd: Aristtles argument rm mtin presuppsed te eternity

te pysical universe and led t a multiplicity unmved mvers, dened pil-

spically as separate substances and religiusly as gds. Avicenna accepted

Aristtles eternal universe, but is prperly metapysical argument rst prceededalng all ur lines causality, ten were narrwed dwn t ecient causality,

were ecient cause means cause existence, nt mving cause.78 Finally,

Aquinas cmbined Aristtles argument rm mtin wit Avicennas argument

rm te ur lines causality t create is ve ways. his argument rm mtin

n lnger depended upn te eternity te wrld. And e develped Avicennas

multi-causal apprac int ur separate arguments, eac prceeding causally all

te way t Gd.

order: Te rder tpics ur tree pilspers llw in treating divine nature

reveals anter pilspical prgressin. Fr Aristtle, a gd is a separate sub-

stance, eternal, purely in act, and terere a nal cause. In its intrinsic nature, agd is a spiritual and intellectual substance tat knws itsel. Avicenna saw clearly

tat Aristtles descriptin divine nature was prly rganized, refecting w

little Aristtle ad understd Gd is te ne transcendent creatr te wrld. S

ater cncluding tat Gd exists, and bere turning t Gds activity knwing,

Avicenna inserted a new, metapysical descriptin Gds intrinsic nature as nec-

essary existence and ne. once Tmas nally brke ut te sclastic rder

Peter Lmbard and te Aristtelian rder is wn Summa cntra gentes, in te

Summa thelgiae e llwed Avicenna, is intrinsic treatment divine nature

75

Aristtle,Met., 6.1 (1026a2733).76See Avicenna,Healing, Physics 1 (Shifa,Al-Tabiiyyat 1;Liber primus naturalium).77See Aquinas, Super Bethium de trinitate, q. 5, art. 4.78Avicenna,Met., 6.1, sec.2.


20/21

374 R. E. HoUSER

beginning wit ivine simplicity, an culminating in ivine unity (1.11). only ten

i e turn t te traitinal Aristtelian tpics inclue uner ivine peratins.

Divine Nature: In escribing a gs intrinsic nature, Aristtle evelpe a

view e tugt superir t Plats cnceptin a single g tat was be-yn being an terere nt itsel a persn, knwer, r g. Aristtle sai te

igest tings were persnal gs an te igest beings (o[nta), immaterial

substances (oujsivai). Tis is w tey wul be exemplars te delpic injunctin

t knw tysel. Fr Avicenna, G is ne means nt nly tat tere is but

ne G, cntrary t plyteists, but als tat G is intrinsically ntlgically

simple necessary existence (al-wjib al-wujd; necesse esse), an nly tat.

on Avicennas autrity, Aquinas rppe te term necessary as un-necessary;

s G became r im existence (esse) r existence itsel (ipsum esse) r,

mst accurately put, subsistent existence itsel (ipsum esse subsistens). Tis

is a prgressin in te cnceptin te ivine nature central imprtance t

pilspy an telgy.

Divine Causality: Fr Aristtle, a g cul be nly ne kin cause, a fnal

cause. A separate substance cannt be te internal matter r rm smeting,

nr can it be an efcient cause, since all efcient causes are cange in exercising

teir causality; r s Aristtle tugt. A g can als inirectly cause ter tings,

by way a meiate fnality. Witin te uman realm, a g can prvie plitical

leaers wit a remte mel r teir practical an plitical lie evte t attaining

a secn class appiness, wile r te ew pilspers a g can prvie a mel

r te appiness tat cmes rm living te igest intellectual lie.Fr Avicenna, G is abve all te frst efcient cause: te irect cause te

igest angel r intelligence, an te ultimate cause te existence all creatures,

trug is ctrine meiate creatin. G is efcient cause, but als te ulti-

mate fnal cause, r a creatr G is te ultimate, i never irectly attaine, en

all creatures. Fr umans, teir irect an ultimate en is unin wit te tent r

agent intelligence w, as giver rms, als bestws teir rmal quiity n

all tings in te sublunar wrl.

Fr Aquinas, G is te irect an prximate efcient cause te existence

all creatures. But t be s, G must als be teir ultimate rmal an fnal cause.

As creatr, e irectly bestws existence n eac an every creature. S e mustcntain witin imsel all perectins creatures, tug in a iger me tan

un in creatures; an e must imsel be te ultimate en all creatin, in rer

tat creatures exibit actin twar teir respective ens. An especially G must

be te irectly attainable fnal en r umans, wse intellectuality makes it ps-

sible r tem t see G ace t ace.

Divine Knwledge: Tese tree ierent accunts ivine causality, eac

wic built n te previus ne, are irectly cnnecte wit tree ierent

accunts Gs knwlege. Fr Aristtle, a g knws nly imsel. Avicennas

great breaktrug was t see tat i G es knw imsel, as te bject is

wn knwlege G must als knw te create cnsequences is knwlege.

his explanatin was t say tat G, like all intelligences, knws universally,

an e likene G t a uman astrnmer: i [e] were t knw all te eavenly


21/21


mvmnts, wul tn knw vry clips an vry particularcnjunctin

an isjunctin in its cncrt xistnc, but in a univrsal way.79 Aquinas accpt

Avicnnas cnclusintrug knwing imsl G knws all tings, wn t t

particularsbut rvrs Avicnnas mpasis, by cmparing G as gvrnr all tings t a uman gvrnr. T uman gvrnr knws wat sul

univrsally but must apply is knwlg t particulars trug prunc, wic

is wy tn maks mistaks. But G nvr maks mistaks, bcaus knws

ac an vry part is cratin in its all particularityis crativ knwlg

in itsl is practical an prunt.80 S, G can manag all t tails, wil a king

r gnral can knw nly t big pictur an always lacks imprtant tails.

Diine will: Sinc t vry ntin t will, as pps t sir, was nt wll

vlp by Aristtl r any Grk pilspr, t Pilspr was cntnt t

psit an all-purps apptit (o[rexi~) tat can b jin t any srt cgnitin.Tus ruc ivin will t ivin intllct an i nt tak up t ivin will

as a istinct tpic. evn tug Avicnnas G was a cratr an is rligin was

call islamsubmissin t t ivin willis pilspical accunt t will i

nt prgrss muc byn Aristtl. S sai, t will t ncssary xistnc

s nt ir in essence rm is knwlg, nr s it ir in meaning rm

is knwlg.81 on tis crucial pint, Aquinas llw t la Augustin an

Jn damascn mr tan Aristtl an Avicnna. h rslutly rus t ruc

t uman will t t intllct: in vry intllctual bing tr is will, just as in

vry snsitiv bing tr is animal apptit. Trr, tr must b will in G,

sinc tr is intllct in im.82

Fr Aquinas, tn, Gs will s nt ir inssnc rm is knwlgcnsquntly, as is intllct is is wn xistnc, s

is is willbut it s ir in meaning. S t G w is ntlgically simpl

is als a rly crating an rming G.

Frm t tim wrt is cmmntary n t Sentences trug writing t

Summa f Thelgy, Tmas Aquin rcgniz w ar byn Aristtls was

t ratinal tlgy Avicnna. Nt cntnt just t rpat Avicnna, imprv

upn im. h simpli Avicnnas tn cnvlut tugt an languag, an

urtr vlp Avicnnas cntnt an rr. Aquinass trminatin t sw is

cllagus an cnrrs tat Aristtls tugt cul b intrprt in a way cm-

patibl wit Cristianity in n way unrmin t nging infunc Avicnnan is tugt. In mtapysics, t way tat Aristtls tugt cul b swn

cmpatibl wit Cristianity was t tak a rslutly Avicnnian intrprtatin

Aristtl, nt an Avrristic n. Tis is swn in is tratmnt t ivin natur

in Summa thelgiae 1.226, wic pns t min t mtapysical tlgian

t t Cristian ctrin t Trinity, at Summa thelgiae 1.2743. In ts txts,

tr is n ubt tat Tmas r is wn cnsir tugt n a tpic at t

cntr is tacing, is knwlg, an is li.

79

Avicnna,Met. 8.6, sc. 18.80Aquinas, ST1.14.11c an a 1m.81Avicnna,Met. 8.7, sc. 12.82Aquinas, ST1.19.1c.

houser aristotle and two medieval aristotelians on the nature of god ipq 2011 copy

Documents