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Ploughshares MonitorThe

AUTUMN 2017 | VOLUME 38 | ISSUE 3

Project Ploughshares is an operating division of The Canadian Council of Churches

The Kalashnikov Is an autonomous version in the works?

Refugees at risk?A look at the Safe Third Country Agreement

Armed Conflicts Report Highlights, plus a look at the politics of aid in Syria

Nuclear disarmament Report from the 62nd Pugwash conference

How secure is outer space?

The Ploughshares MonitorVolume 38 | Issue 3

The Ploughshares Monitor is the quarterlyjournal of Project Ploughshares, an operating division of The Canadian Council of Churches. Ploughshares works with churches, nongovernmental organizations, and governments, in Canada and abroad, to advance policies and actions that prevent war and armed violence and build peace. Project Ploughshares is affiliated with the KCU Centre for Peace Advancement, Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo.

Office address: Project Ploughshares140 Westmount Road NorthWaterloo, Ontario N2L 3G6 Canada519-888-6541, fax: [email protected]; www.ploughshares.ca

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We are particularly grateful to The Simons Foundation in Vancouver for its generous support.

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ContentsAutumn 2017 PROJECT PLOUGHSHARES STAFF

Debbie HughesTasneem JamalBranka Marijan Sonal Marwah

Matthew PupicMaria SkinnerWendy StockerBarbara WagnerJessica West

Cesar Jaramillo Executive Director

3

5

12

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From the Director’s deskPugwash continues its work on global security.by Cesar Jaramillo

Armed Conflicts Report 2017Highlights.by Sebastian Murdoch-Gibson

Aid as a weapon?The politics of humanitarianism in Syria.by Sebastian Murdoch-Gibson

The Safe Third Country AgreementIs the bilateral agreement putting refugees at risk?by Sonal Marwah and Michelle Ball

19 Outer spaceThe latest security assessment.by Laura Grego

Q&AA conversation with an “irregular” refugee claimant.by Sonal Marwah and Michelle Ball

“and they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation; neither shall they learn war any more.” Isaiah 2:4

The Ploughshares Monitor, the quarterly publication of Project Ploughshares, is available online at www.ploughshares.ca.

10

Funded by the Government of Canada

16Autonomous Kalashnikovs?The Russian arms manufacturer is developing weapons that can identify and kill targets.by Branka Marijan

COVER: This NASA image shows the Orion Nebula in infrared light.

cover story

The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 2017 3

From August 25-29, inter-national security experts from more than 45 countries con-

vened in Astana, Kazakhstan, for the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs. Under the theme “Confronting New Nuclear Dan-gers,” the conference reflected on some of the most pressing challenges to global security.

The event in Astana marked the 60th anniversary of the first Pugwash Conference, held in the small Can-adian fishing village of Pugwash, Nova Scotia. Two years earlier, the Russell-Einstein manifesto had been issued by prominent British social activist and Nobel laureate Bertrand Russell, and signed by 11 leading scientists, including Albert Einstein. Pointing to the grave dangers of nu-clear war and the need for peaceful solutions to international conflict, it called for a response by a conference of scientists. Canadian industrialist Cyrus Eaton offered to finance that first conference. The venue was a small house—eventually known as Thinkers Lodge—in Pugwash, the town of Eaton’s birth.

That conference was attended by 22 scientists from the United States, the Soviet Union, the United King-dom, Japan, Canada, Australia, China, Austria, France, and Poland. From it evolved an international movement,

which has not only provided meas-ured analysis on major security crises, but has helped to open up avenues for communication when traditional channels were blocked.

The Nobel Committee awarded the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize to the Pugwash Conference and its first sec-retary-general, Joseph Rotblat. Today, Pugwash has international offices in Rome, London, Geneva, and Wash-ington, DC. There are approximately 50 national groups, including the Canadian Pugwash Group, which held its own conference last July in Halifax.

Multiple global security flashpoints were examined at the Astana confer-ence. Included were the following.

The nuclear weapons ban treatyThe July 7 adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was a key focus of discussions. Widely believed to have dramatically altered the multilateral nuclear dis-armament landscape, the ban treaty has caused a deep division between the majority of states, which have no nuclear weapons and strongly sup-port the treaty, and nuclear-armed states and their allies, which have openly sought to undermine it.

In Astana, the president of the conference that negotiated the treaty, Costa Rican Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gomez, described the two related, yet different, dimensions to the goal of nuclear abolition—one

From the Director’s desk:

By Cesar Jaramillo

Sixty years on, the Pugwash work on global security continues

Cesar Jaramillo was a representative of the Canadian Pugwash Group at Astana.

The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 20174

related to the normative framework and the other to the actual measures to eliminate existing arsenals. The ban treaty, in her view, was an im-portant effort to advance the first.

As one Pugwash participant noted, the ink on the ban treaty is barely dry. But it seems clear that the humanitarian movement, which served as a key catalyst of the negotiation of the ban, and the widespread frustration over the lack of progress toward nuclear disarma-ment by states with nuclear weapons will help to sustain the treaty’s polit-ical momentum.

Tensions grow in the Korean peninsulaThe two North Korean missile tests conducted while the Pugwash conference was taking place were the latest in a series of escalating rhetoric and actions that have prompted international condemnation, elicited inflammatory—if often contradictory—responses from the Trump administration, and stoked serious concerns among security specialists and the general public.

There was general agreement at the Pugwash conference on the seriousness of the current situation and on the dire consequences for the region and the world should armed conflict develop. As one expert said, even if North Korea does not fire a nuclear weapon on Seoul, it has enough artillery aimed at the South Korean capital to inflict that level of damage. And it is widely believed that North Korea’s nuclear weapons pro-gram, including far-reaching delivery vehicles, is advancing rapidly.

There was no consensus on the exact measures required to defuse this crisis. But the number of options available to the international com-munity is limited.

WMD-free zone in the Middle EastThe outcome document from the 2010 NPT Review Conference con-tained the decision to convene a Mid-dle East regional conference by 2012 to develop a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). That conference has never been held.

Before that, a 1995 resolution called for “practical steps” toward a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. (Jayantha Dhanapala, who presid-ed over the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and has just finished his tenure as Pugwash Presi-dent, was at Astana.)

The draft outcome document of the 2015 NPT Review Conference called for UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to convene a Mideast conference by March 2016. But the document was never adopted. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada blocked the required consensus, over concerns by Israel (not a state party to the NPT) related to the timeline for the conference. The next opportunity to address this topic will come at the 2020 NPT Re-view Conference.

Ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)Kazakhstan has been active in vari-ous areas of nuclear disarmament. A former member of the Soviet Union, it voluntarily gave up nuclear weapons on its territory. More re-cently, it has been a strong supporter of the nuclear weapons ban treaty. But for Kazakhstan, nuclear testing is at the heart of its commitment to pursue a nuclear-weapons-free world.

Between 1949 and 1989, the Semi-palatinsk nuclear test site in northeast Kazakhstan was the primary testing grounds for Soviet nuclear weapons. During that time, the Soviet Union conducted 456 nuclear detonations.

The long-term health and environ-mental effects only started to be understood after the site closed in 1991.

Radioactive fallout has caused mutations and other birth defects for generations of victims. The Kazakh government has made drawing atten-tion to the perils of nuclear testing a national priority. It is pushing for the prompt entry into force of the CTBT, which has not been ratified by eight states (China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and the United States) more than 20 years after its adoption.

The Pugwash spirit The spirit of the first Pugwash con-ference was very much alive this past August, as scientists, scholars, diplomats, and civil society repre-sentatives grappled with these and other complex concerns. The sci-entific approach that informed and inspired the Russell-Einstein mani-festo still underpins contemporary evidence-based discussions. Argu-ments—however diverse—are as-sessed solely on their merits and not on national or ideological affiliation.

The core Pugwash conviction is that conflict can and should be ad-dressed through dialogue and mutual understanding. But an openness to diversity and the encouragement of a scientific approach does not ob-scure a shared and profound concern about the destructive nature of war, especially wars involving weapons of mass destruction.

The most quoted line in the Rus-sell-Einstein manifesto provides a succinct rationale to the work of the Pugwash movement: “Remember your humanity, and forget the rest.” At Project Ploughshares, we can fully relate to this humanitarian spirit, which has long been a core founda-tion for our work. □

FROM THE DIRECTOR’S DESK


In December 2016, Razak Iyal (35) and Seidu Mohammed (24) attempted to cross irregularly into Manitoba from North Dakota. Before being rescued by a passing

transport truck, they suffered severe frost-bite that cost them their fingers. By June of this year, both men, originally from Ghana, had applied for refugee status in Canada.

Why did Iyal and Mohammed under-take such a perilous journey? The simple answer: to avoid Canada’s practice of retuning certain refugee claimants at bor-der points to U.S. immigration authorities under the Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA).

The STCA, a bilateral agreement be-tween Canada and the United States, came into effect in December 2004. It requires

Is the Safe Third Country Agreement putting refugee claimants at risk?

By Sonal Marwah and Michelle Ball


refugee claimants to make a claim in whichever of the two countries they reach first. Thus, those who are in the United States can only legally make a claim in the United States. Since the STCA came into effect, there has been a sharp decline in the number of refugee claims made at entry points to Canada (Arbel & Brenner 2013, p. 3).

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has pub-licly declared that Canada welcomes all those fleeing persecution, war, and terror. We argue that immigration policies such as the STCA are a type of extraterritorial measure that attempts to prevent refu-gee claimants from entering Canada and, indirectly, forces them to take illegal and risky measures to enter Canada.

Such policies are at odds with our im-age of ourselves as a country “generous” to refugees and with our obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention to not re-turn asylum seekers to a third country if they will risk deportation to their home country. Canadians need to re-examine the

legitimacy of immigration tools such as the STCA.

Why undocumented residents are fleeing the United StatesSince the election of President Trump, a number of draconian immigration meas-ures have been introduced in the United States. On January 25, 2017, Executive Orders “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States” and “Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements” called for the implementa-tion of policies and practices that “prevent asylum seekers from meaningfully pur-suing their claims” (Harvard Law School 2017, p. 1) and undermine legal protec-tions for asylum seekers.

On January 27, Executive Order “Pro-tecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States” suspended the national refugee admissions program for 120 days and imposed a travel ban on nationals of designated Muslim-majority states (Iran, Libya, Syria, Somalia, Sudan,

above: This Canadian Press photo of Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers helping a Somali family at the Canada-U.S. border near Hemmingford, Que., on Friday, February 17, 2017, went viral when the news agency tweeted it. Paul Chiasson/Canadian Press

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and Yemen) (Parlapiano, Park & Peçanha 2017).

“The substance of…recent executive orders highlights [the Trump] administra-tion’s hostility toward refugees and asylum seekers” (Harvard Law School 2017, p. 1), in particular Muslim refugees. Even though legal objections have been made to these measures, there is broad consensus among civil society actors, refugee lawyers, and academics that the United States was not, and certainly is not now, a “safe coun-try of asylum” or “safe third country” for those fleeing persecution and violence in their homelands.

Paths to refugee protection in CanadaThere are essentially two main ways in which asylum seekers can find protec-tion as refugees in Canada. Outside our borders, Canada engages in a refugee re-settlement process, in which refugees from asylum countries are admitted to Canada, up to the resettlement cap, which is decid-ed by Canada. Canada’s resettlement cap for 2017 is 7,500 Government-Assisted Refugees (GARs), which is even below its annual average of 7,600 from 2000 to 2015 (CCR 2017a). Globally, less than one per cent of refugees have been resettled.

Canada also operates a refugee deter-mination process for asylum seekers who make refugee claims at Canadian border points, or at an airport or seaport. But asy-lum seekers encounter many barriers. Due to Canada’s geographical distance from most refugee-producing countries, most refugee claimants will arrive by airplane. However, strict visa regulations, policies of airline carriers that prevent potential asylum seekers from boarding planes, and other immigration and security policies mean that many potential asylum seekers are intercepted before they reach Canada’s borders. Access to Canada via the United States is prevented by the STCA.

In section 101(1)(e) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), a per-son entering Canada from a “designated country” is ineligible to have a claim for

refugee protection considered by the Refu-gee Determination Division of the Immi-gration and Refugee Board (IRB). Canada has designated the United States the first and, to date, the only safe third country for refugee claimants. This means that claimants who attempt to cross from the United States to Canada at a U.S-Canada point-of-entry will be denied access to the refugee determination process in Canada and returned to the United States; excep-tions may be made for those with docu-mentation to enter Canada, those with family in Canada, unaccompanied minors, and those subject to the death penalty in the United States or a third country.

Measures such as the STCA, combined with Canada’s remoteness from most refu-gees, allow Canada the luxury of choosing the refugees who come here, but force refugee claimants in desperate situations to consider alternative migration channels to seek safety and protection here.

Effects of the STCA

Impact #1: Asylum seekers and refugee claimants stay in the United StatesLegal challenges in the past have questioned whether the United States can be considered a “safe” country for asylum seekers. In 2007, the STCA was success-fully challenged in Federal Court, but the decision was overturned in the Federal Court of Appeals the following year. This past July, Amnesty International Canada, the Canadian Council for Refugees, and the Canadian Council of Churches (CCR 2017b) announced that they were launch-ing a new legal challenge of the designa-tion of the United States as a safe third country for refugees.1

Canada’s Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Ahmed Hussen continues to uphold this designation, argu-ing that the UN Refugee Agency recog-nizes the legitimacy of the refugee deter-mination systems of both Canada and the United States, and that “there’s absolutely

Sonal Marwah is a Program Officer with Project Ploughshares.

[email protected]

Michelle Ball has a Master’s degree in International Migration and Public Policy from the Lon-don School of Economics.

She works in the Violence Against Women sector in Toronto, and also assists groups engaged in private refugee sponsorship.

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no need to tinker with the Safe Third Country Agreement” (Rose 2017).

In any case, the first and most obvious impact of the STCA is that those who might otherwise claim asylum in Canada are staying in the United States or are be-ing returned to the United States, to go through the U.S. refugee determination system. But many refugee advocates see the U.S. system as flawed and deficient. For example, asylum seekers who have been in the United States for more than one year are banned from making a claim; immigration detention is not used as a last resort but as punishment; gender-based claims are not consistently recognized. Thus, it seems likely that more claimants in the U.S. system will be returned to their home countries.

We cannot know how many refugee claimants are choosing not to present themselves at entry points to Canada, but we do know that there was a significant drop in claims at the border after the STCA came into force. Statistics from the Canada Border Services Agency show that claims dropped from 6,000-14,000 per year before the STCA, to an average of 4,000 claims per year after. In 2011, there were only 2,500 claims (Arbell & Brenner 2013, p. 7).

While criticism of the U.S. refugee pro-tection system is not new, recent events in the United States have led some to believe that protection for refugee claimants will not improve under the current system and may indeed deteriorate.

Impact #2: The STCA increases irregular crossings and vulnerability Evidence is emerging to indicate that, since the election of Trump in 2016, there have been more irregular crossings into Canada and a greater need to protect refugee claimants.

In the first six months of 2017, there were 4,345 irregular border crossings into Canada, significantly more than the 2,464 crossings for all of 2016 (Markusoff 2017; Bruemmer 2017). When compared

with the more than 300,000 immigrants welcomed into Canada each year and the hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers given refugee protection by developing countries in the Middle East and Africa, this number can seem insignificant. But we must remember that every number is a real person at risk.

There is also evidence that irregular migrants are making greater use of human smugglers. Not only does this practice cost a significant amount of money and cause much hardship, but it also puts individuals in more precarious situations.

Extraterritorial measures such as the STCA lead to escalations in dangerous be-haviours, according to Janet Dench, Exec-utive Director of the Canadian Council for Refugees; “the higher the fences creat-ed by interdiction,” the more migrants are “forced to turn to smugglers to help them overcome the barriers” (Arbel & Brenner 2013, p. 98). A 2012 report found that human smuggling into Canada from the United States had increased in 2011 by as much as 58 per cent over the previous year (Arbel & Brenner 2013, p. 2).

Impact #3: The “human costs” of the STCAMany Canadians question if the STCA is a humane way of determining the right of an individual to claim asylum. Is for-cing refugee claimants to risk their lives by crossing at irregular points of entry in line with Canada’s image and values of fairness?

During this past winter, asylum seek-ers found themselves in almost impos-sibly dangerous situations. In March, Mamadou, an Ivorian refugee, attempted to enter Canada at the Lacolle crossing in Quebec, but was denied because of the STCA. Mamadou then attempted an irregular crossing into Canada to file an asylum claim. Walking at night, Mamadou became disoriented and waded through deep water, eventually collapsing beside a road in Lacolle. If not for the intervention of an RCMP constable, Mamadou would

REFUGEES


likely have succumbed to already severe hypothermia and frostbite. This story illus-trates two fundamental points about the STCA: it forces refugee claimants to make perilous attempts to cross the border and it punishes those who try to enter Canada through official channels.

Another story: Two Somali refugees made a long journey from Brazil, crossing many borders on foot, and arriving in Manitoba many months later. Usually such irregular migrations would end in a place such as Minnesota, where there is a large Somali community, but the Somali com-munity in the United States fear depor-tation and urged the men to continue to Canada. “I am a black man, I am a Mus-lim, and I am a Somali. So in three ways, it is not possible for me to go to the United States,” one of the men, Ahmed Omar, told CBC News in February (Laventure 2017). Ultimately, Canada’s inland refugee claims system will decide whether these two Somali men have a legitimate refugee claim and can stay in Canada, but the two men were exposed to many dangers before

they could access Canada’s refugee deter-mination system.

Canada’s responsibility to protect vulnerable people Canada is currently able to exert consider-able control over the number and kind of immigrants who come here and, therefore, gain access to our refugee protection sys-tem. The STCA is only one in an array of tools that intercepts would-be refugees and excludes them from potential protec-tion. With more individuals attempting irregular migration into Canada from the United States, and with refugee claimants fearful of the U.S. refugee determination system, we must carefully consider our responsibilities to these vulnerable individ-uals. If we want to be a country that pro-vides safety to those in desperate need, we must question whether an agreement such as the STCA is fair or appropriate. □

Thanks to Project Ploughshares intern Sebastian Murdoch-Graham for assistance with research.

Note

1. For more detail on the challenge, see AI & CCR 2017.

References

Amnesty International Canada & Canadian Council for Refugees. 2017. Contesting the Designation of the US as a Safe Third Country, May 19.

Arbel, Efrat & Alletta Brenner. 2013. Bordering on Failure: Canada-U.S. Border Policy and the Politics of Refugee Exclusion. Harvard Immigration

and Refugee Law Clinical Program, Harvard Law School, November.

Bruemmer, René. 2017. No need to fear influx of refugees into Quebec, UN says. Montreal Gazette, July 24.

Canadian Council for Refugees. 2017a. 2017 Immigration levels – comments.

-----. 2017b. Legal challenge of Safe Third Country Agreement launched. Media release, July 5.

Harvard Law School. 2017. The Impact of President Trump’s Executive Orders on Asylum Seekers.

Laventure, Lisa. 2017 “It was the happiest moment”: Asylum seekers who took risky Central American corridor cross into Canada. CBC, July 10.

Markusoff, Jason, Nancy Macdonald, Aaron Hutchins & Meagan Campbell. Down on the border. Twenty-four hours. Four provinces. Seven towns.

What one day on the Canada-U.S. line says about refugees, Canadian tolerance and Trump’s America. Maclean’s, July 11.

Parlapiano, Alicia, Haeyoun Park & Sergio Peçanha. 2017. How Trump’s Executive Order will affect the U.S. refugee program. The New York

Times, January 27.

Rose, Brenna. 2017. Safe Third Country Agreement to stay, pledges immigration minister. CBC News, March 29.

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Sonal Marwah/Michelle Ball: Where are you and your children from?

Mary: We have come to Canada from Columbus, Ohio and we are originally from Guinea. I moved to the United States when I was 14 years old with my mom and she raised me.

SM/MB: Why did you leave your home in Guinea?

M: When I was eight years old, I was subjected to female genital mutilation (FGM) without my mother’s know-ledge or permission, and I didn’t have a choice either. One day, my grandmother sent my mother to do some chores. When my mother was gone, my grandmother had the FGM done to me. Despite so many years, till this date, it’s something that still plays on my mind. When my mother came back and it was done, she was angry and disappointed in herself that she could not save me from this, as she went through it and did not want this for me. She could not go to the police as they would not help her.

When I turned 14 years, our family then wanted me to get married and that’s when my mother decid-ed we had to escape, as she would not be able to save me in Guinea. She found a way for us to reach the United States.

SM/MB: Tell us about your life in the United States.

M: My mother did not have any legal status when she arrived in the U.S. She was uneducated and did what she could do to support us. She remained as an undocumented person in the States as she did not have anyone to guide her through the immigration process and show her the proper channels to seek refugee status. I was also only 14 years old at that time and did not know anything about immigration or what ‘status’ was or its importance.

When I grew up, I learned a bit about the immigration process. In my 20s I tried to file for asylum. The person at the immigration office asked me why I had not filed for asylum all these years. I replied I was young and did not know anything about the U.S. refugee system, but once I found out what I needed to do to file for asylum in the U.S., I did it, but it was too late. I had missed the one-year-bar, which requires asy-lum-seekers to apply for asylum with-in one year of entry to the United States.

In high school, I met the father of my children. In the beginning, every-thing was fine. As time went by, he started to control all my actions, the way I dressed, where I went out and when, and started to become abusive and hit me. In 2010, I became preg-nant. I could not leave my partner because he threatened me that if I called the police, they would simply deport me back to Guinea as I had no legal status in the U.S. I stayed with him because I had to raise my

child. I thought of returning home to

Guinea, but I quickly learned that that was not an option. My family back home threatened to kill me as I had had children out of wedlock. As a Muslim girl, this was unacceptable.

So in many ways, I felt very trapped. In 2015, I lost my mother and this was difficult for me. Right after this I found out I was pregnant again.

SM/MB: What made you decide to leave the United States and come to Canada?

M: My chances of getting refugee status in the U.S. were becoming in-creasingly difficult. As the domestic abuse became worse, I had to leave for my safety and that of my chil-dren. An aunt and I brainstormed what options I had to find safety. Given that any refugee claim in the U.S. was looking very difficult, we decided on trying for Canada, as it was within driving range and so I could take my children with me. But I didn’t know how we were going to cross the border, since I could not apply for asylum in Canada because of the existing STCA [Safe Third Country Agreement].

SM/MB: Tell us about your journey from the U.S. to Canada. What was your biggest concern when you de-cided to make the irregular crossing into Canada?

Q&A:The journey of an ‘irregular’ refugee claimant to Canada

‘Mary” is a mother of three and a refugee claimant currently living in Toronto. Originally from Guinea, she went to the United States with her mother as a teenager, but never gained legal status there. After some years, she paid a smuggler to bring her and her children to Canada, to escape an abusive partner. She is currently awaiting a refugee hearing. She recently spoke with Sonal Marwah and Michelle Ball.

REFUGEES


M: I was very scared and didn’t know if I wanted to put myself and my children in a situation where we were crossing the border illegally. What if we got caught? But looking at my situation, I didn’t have any options. My aunt did some research and found out about human smug-glers, who drive people across the border for some money. So my aunt met with this person and planned the journey. From the time that we decided I would come to Canada with my children to the time I left, it took six months. Because I had to save up enough money to pay the smuggler.

The day I was leaving I almost did not go ahead with the plan. I was thinking: How will I feed my kids once in Canada since I will not be working. At least I had a job in the U.S., even though I didn’t have status. And what if I get caught? Then my fears of staying in the U.S. will ac-tually come true because I would be handed back to the U.S. immigration and will be deported. What would happen to my children? Who will then take care of them?

I hid in the trunk of the car and the kids were sitting in the back. I came in March this year and it was so cold, even though there was heat-ing in the car. I was scared about the smuggler being in the car with my children as I did not know this person and wondered if he would actually drive me and my children across the border as promised. All I could do was hope for the best out-come and pray because all I wanted was for my children and me to be safe.

My biggest concern while making this journey was the safety of my children. I didn’t want anything bad happening to them because I won’t be able to live with that because I have put them in that situation.

I managed to get into Canada safely with my children.

The STCA makes it very difficult for people to ask for help. I could not go to the Canada border and say I am fleeing domestic abuse, because I did not have status in the U.S. I risked being sent back to the U.S. and then deported to my country, where I will be killed.

SM/MB: Did you know about the STCA when you decided to come to Canada?

M: All I knew was that I could not go to the border legally and ask for help. I didn’t know any details about the Agreement’s implications or why it’s been put in place.

SM/MB: What effect has the STCA had on your ability to stay in Canada?

M: I did not have any legal status when I came to Canada. I had to first submit my refugee claim here before my life could really start. For example, for my children to be able to go school, I had to have submitted my refugee claim.

All the while, at the back of mind was: Are they going to use the fact that I was in the U.S. first? What will that mean in terms of Canada grant-ing me refugee status?

SM/MB: If you could tell Canadians one thing about the impact of the STCA on your family, what would you want them to know?

M: I would tell them to advocate for the many women and children that are in a similar situation to mine and that need help, but cannot access proper assistance because of the regulations of the U.S. refugee sys-tem.

In the case of the STCA, it puts

you into a very difficult position where you have no choice. You put yourself in harm’s way because you are in the hope of finding something better, something safer. If the STCA did not exist, a person could come to the border and say, “I need help.” And if they let you in, at least you can take the proper channels to claim asylum.

I wish governments could make is easier for people to be able to ask for help in a proper and safe way, and not feel that they have to do things illegally. It would be good for the government as they would know who is coming into their country and for what purpose.

Coming in through the irregular channels is very difficult and even once we got here, there were many unknowns about a new place, how to navigate the immigration process, where to live, access to basic resour-ces.

SM/MB: What are your hopes for you and your children in Canada?

M: My hope is that the Canadian immigration system does not focus so much on how I got here, but rec-ognizes what I am running from and why. I only hope they will give me a safe home for my children and me.

Ultimately it is your life and you have to find a way to make it better for you and, if you have children, for them, too. I used to look at others who would cross illegally and think they are crazy to take so many risks. But when you are in that situation of desperation and there is no other way, you do whatever you have to do to save yourself.

I have no regrets of the way I entered Canada, because it was for my safety and for the safety of my children. It was the only chance I had and I took it. □

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From January to December 2016, 28 armed conflicts were waged in 26 countries.

For the purposes of the annual Armed Conflicts Report, Project Ploughshares defines an armed conflict as: a political conflict in which armed combat involves the armed forces of at least one state (or one or more armed factions seeking to gain control of all or part of the state), and in which at least 1,000 people have been killed by the fighting during the course of the conflict.

The United States, China, and Saudi Arabia led in world military spending. Once again, the United States outspent all countries by a wide margin, accounting for 40 per cent of global military spending.

United States

Africa led in contributions to peacekeeping missions with 49,164 military, police, and observer deployments. By contrast, North America provided 198.

Armed Conflicts Report

The continent of Africa hosted of the world’s armed conflicts.

43%

$145-billion

Saudi Arabia

$56.9-billion $604.5-billion

United States

China


The Syrian conflict, with almost 50,000 fatalities, was the deadliest in 2016. According to unofficial United Nations figures, total fatalities in Syria—since the conflict began in 2011—have exceeded 400,000.

2017 Highlights

Armed conflicts continued to displace people at an alarming rate. According to the United Nations Refugee Agency, 65.6 million people remained displaced worldwide at the end of 2016.

In Colombia, FARC rebels and the government reached an agreement to end the country’s 52-year-long civil war. While this agreeement was narrowly rejected in a popular referendum, a revised agreement was approved by Colombia’s congress on November 24, 2016.

Despite the peace agreement, Colombia remained on the 2016 Armed Conflicts Report. An armed conflict is deemed to have ended if:• there has been a formal ceasefire or peace agreement and, fol-

lowing which, there are no longer combat deaths (or at least fewer than 25 per year); or

• in the absence of a formal ceasefire, a conflict is deemed to have ended after two years of dormancy (in which fewer than 25 com-bat deaths per year have occurred).

In August 2016, after over 40 years of conflict, the National Democratic Front (NDFP) and the government of the Philippines agreed to a ceasefire and resumed peace talks. Fewer than 25 conflict deaths were reported in each of 2014, 2015 and 2016. This particular conflict was thus removed from the ACR in 2016. The Philippines Mindanao conflict remains on the report.

No new conflicts were added to this year’s report, and one conflict was removed.

By Sebastian Murdoch-Gibsonand Maria Skinner


In 2011, forces loyal to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad oc-cupied the public hospital in

the Syrian town of al-Qusayr. When suspected rebels arrived at the hos-pital in need of medical attention, regime forces detained, interrogat-ed, tortured, and often executed them. In response, private citizens established an underground clinic to provide medical care in secret. Dr. Abd ar-Rhim Amir provided care in that clinic. When he was eventually tracked down by Syrian intelligence forces, Amir was summarily executed (Littell 2015).

In 2014, the pro-opposition town of Beit Sahem agreed to a truce with the Assad regime following a months-long siege. After the truce, Syrian Arab Red Crescent food aid began arriving in the starving city. Residents subsequently expelled re-maining opposition fighters from the city out of fear that their presence could jeopardize the truce and inter-rupt the flow of aid (Martinez and Eng 2016).

Humanitarian aid: A tool of warWhat do these stories have in com-mon? They show armed forces using the basic needs of a local population to consolidate control over that population. This approach has led the Assad regime to use what are traditionally viewed as humanitarian

goods—emergency food aid and medical care, for example—as stra-tegic tools. If the regime can ensure that it remains the only agent capable of providing—or permitting—reli-able supplies of food and medicine, then civilians will capitulate to its rule out of physical necessity.

There is evidence to support the belief that the regime thinks in these terms. The events that unfolded in al-Qusayr and Beit Sahem are far from exceptional. The regime has pursued an aggressive program of targeted assassination of doctors operating in rebel-held areas; it has even made illegal the practice of providing medical care to rebels (Fouad et al, 2017). The regime has used its capacity to distribute food and, more importantly, its capacity to withhold food, to break down the strength of opposing factions.

Of a total besieged population in Syria of 624,000, approximately 509,000 are besieged by forces loyal to the regime (UN 2017). Assad’s prolific use of siege tactics that choke off the flow of food and medicine to opposition-held towns is known as the “kneel or starve” policy. This strategy is comple-mented by the targeting of rebel bakeries to undermine autonomous food production and by the regime’s generous food subsidies in compliant territories. The calculus the regime

seeks to impose is brutal in its sim-plicity: surrender and eat.

The regime’s attempts to restrict access to humanitarian services have inspired opposition parties to invest in preserving capacity for humani-tarian assistance. All these actions indicate the value of aid in armed conflict.

As the Assad regime attempts to preserve its monopoly on medical care through a campaign of attacks on hospitals and doctor assassin-ations, the Islamic State releases well-produced recruitment videos asking foreign doctors to assist the “Islamic State Health Service” and promises free medical training to foreign volunteers. As blockades and sieges choke off the flow of medical supplies to Eastern Ghouta, residents have organized a “factory” for the production of normal saline. The city of Deir Ezzor, encircled and besieged by the Islamic State since 2014, has been sustained to a large extent by an ambitious pro-gram of humanitarian airdrops car-ried out by the United Nations. A UN humanitarian convoy en route to the opposition town of Urem al-Kubra came under attack from three Syrian helicopter gunships and was largely destroyed.

These events illustrate the efforts to selectively restrict and preserve the flow of humanitarian goods that

Aid as a weapon?

By Sebastian Murdoch-Gibson

The politics of humanitarianism in Syria


ARMED CONFLICTS REPORT

have become a major characteristic of the Syrian conflict. We might even say that Syria is host to parallel conflicts: parties contend for a mon-opoly on the provision of care while they compete for a monopoly on the use of armed force. The victor in the contest for superior humanitarian assistance will enjoy greater popular legitimacy, will be able to more easily control the areas under its influence, and will have an advantage in com-bat.

International responsesIn such a context, aid organizations must carefully examine the influence of their activities on the course of the war. In 2013, Médecins Sans Frontières released a statement con-demning what they called an imbal-anced distribution of aid: “The areas under government control receive nearly all international aid, while opposition-held zones receive only a tiny share” (MSF 2013).

Subsequent UN Security Coun-cil resolutions have authorized the delivery of humanitarian assistance across the Turkish and Jordanian borders to improve access to parts of Syria controlled by opposition groups. However, many commenta-tors continue to allege that the dis-proportionate allocation of UN hu-manitarian aid to regime-held areas

is handing a military advantage to Assad, enabling him to divert funds and resources from the provision of essential services to the conduct of war (Martinez & Eng 2016).

The boundary between humani-tarian assistance and military assist-ance has become blurry in the Syrian conflict. States, nonprofit groups, and individuals motivated by the desire to alleviate human suffering often inadvertently support the military objectives of parties to the conflict.

An accountable humanitarianism must dispense with the fantasy that

intervention to mitigate suffering can be devoid of political content. Con-ditions on the ground and the polit-ical preferences of those providing aid structure decisions on who is as-sisted, when, and how. In a state of civil war, these decisions play a role in determining military outcomes. An accountable humanitarianism would seek to openly justify these decisions rather than cling to the pretense that they can be avoided. □

Sebastian Murdoch-Gibson was an intern with Project Ploughshares in Summer 2017.

References

Fouad, Fouad M. et al. 2017. Health workers and the weaponisation of health care in Syria: A preliminary inquiry for The Lancet–American

University of Beirut Commission on Syria. The Lancet, 14 March.

Littell, Jonathan. 2015. Syrian Notebooks: Inside the Homs Uprising. London: Verso.

Martínez, José Ciro & Brent Eng. 2016. The unintended effects of humanitarian food aid: Neutrality, sovereignty, and politics in the Syrian civil war,

2012-2015.” International Affairs 92:1, pp. 153-173.

Médecins Sans Frontières. 2013. Syria: MSF criticises aid imbalances, 29 January.

United Nations. 2017. Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191

(2014), 2258 (2015) and 2332 (2016).

Syrian Arab Red Crescent volunteers arrive in Madaya, Syria, in January 2016. Zaher Barazi/Syrian Arab Red Crescent


Russian arms manufacturer Kalashnikov is best known as the producer of the in-famous assault rifle, the AK-47. The AK-47, as journalist

C.J. Chivers (2010) notes, has “fundamen-tally rewritten the rules of modern war-fare,” mainly due to the “ease of use, cost,

reliability, and readily available parts and ammunition.” With these features, what Chivers calls “the everyman gun” became the most widely available weapon in the world. According to some estimates, there are approximately 200 million AK-47s, or roughly one for every 35 people (Laville et al. 2015).

Autonomous Kalashnikovs?

By Branka Marijan

above: The Kalashnikov Group recently announced the development of a fully automated combat module with the capacity to make decisions and identify targets. Kalashnikov Group

The Russian manufacturer is developing weapons that can identify targets using artificial intelligence


CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

Now it appears that Kalashnikov is looking to the future and developing weapons with artificial intelligence (AI), with no humans involved in such critical aspects of decision-making as the decision to kill. In July 2017, it announced that it has developed weapons that are capable of identifying, selecting, and killing tar-gets with the use of AI. Moreover, these are only the first of the neural network weapons, essentially computer-directed, that the manufacturer plans to develop.

These are precisely the types of weapons that the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, to which Project Ploughshares belongs, has sought to ban.

How worried should we be? Kalash-nikov has provided little detail and there is significant doubt among political analysts and technological experts that the com-pany can deliver on its promises.

Still, the announcement raised again the crucial issue: without a ban on the de-velopment of fully autonomous weapons, we could see a race to create them. In an open letter, leading scientists and tech entrepreneurs such as theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking and Tesla and SpaceX CEO Elon Musk highlighted the danger of military applications of artificial intelli-gence and, specifically, the concern regard-ing autonomous weapons. Most notably, they stated, “If any major military power pushes ahead with AI weapon develop-ment, a global arms race is virtually inevit-able, and the endpoint of this techno-logical trajectory is obvious: autonomous weapons will become the Kalashnikovs of tomorrow” (Future of Life Institute 2015).

Past lessons and new developmentsThe general view is that the new Kalash-nikov weapons will likely be capable of performing certain functions on their own, but will have humans controlling such key functions as engaging the target. Stephanie Carvin, professor of inter-national security at Carleton University, notes that the Russian arms maker is

better known for low-tech products. And it is true that Russia has lagged behind other key military powers in the develop-ment and deployment of autonomous systems. For example, the United States Air Force has been deploying drones since the mid-1990s and began arming them in the early 2000s (Axe 2017). The Russians have some drones, but have not yet armed them.

Peter W. Singer, Strategist and Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation in Washington, D.C., believes that Russia is working on more autonomous systems, but does not believe Kalashnikov’s claims of full autonomy (Axe 2017). Patrick Lin, a roboticist at California Polytechnic State University, calls the Kalashnikov claims “vague” (Axe 2017); he asks, “What exact-ly is [the weapon] learning to do? It could be as simple as recognizing humans, or as complicated as recognizing an adversary who’s carrying a weapon.”

For almost a decade, militaries have been using neural network technology—essentially computer systems that learn from analyzing data. The more data the system is given, the better the system be-comes at discerning certain items or ob-jects (Gilbert 2017).

So far, neural networks have been used to recognize targets and map infra-structure, as well as in search-and-rescue missions. Facebook uses this technology to recognize faces in posted photos. How-ever, neural networks can make mistakes and can be manipulated (Metz 2017).

Moreover, neural network technologies learn from example and use past mis-


CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

takes to improve future decision-making. Deploying these weapons in warzones is incredibly problematic as the mistakes are “permanent and irreversible” (Mizokami 2017). As journalist Kyle Mizokami points out, a robot that mistakenly kills a civilian because it misidentifies the pitchfork the person is holding as a rocket launcher might learn from that mistake. But the civilian is dead.

Still, advancements in technology are occurring. Trends in technology, such as the move to open-source software, power-ful processors, and cheap sensors, all allow small teams of builders to create more autonomous machines (Brewster 2016). And more money is going into robotics. According to some estimates, the world will spend $135.4-billion on robotics and related services in 2019, up from $71-bil-lion in 2015 (Brewster 2016).

The chief concern is not that robots will take over, but that humans will put a flawed technology into dangerous systems (McKay 2017). In military applications, the results could be catastrophic.

On regulationAt the United States Governors Asso-ciation summer meeting, Elon Musk re-emphasized the need for proactive regulation, because “by the time we are

reactive in AI regulation, it’s too late” (Gibbs 2017).

So far, discussions at the global level, particularly at the Convention on Con-ventional Weapons (CCW), have often become mired in disputes over defin-itions, including what “meaningful human control” means. Russia has called dis-cussions on lethal autonomous weapons “premature” (Emery 2017). Some gov-ernments are concerned that a preemptive ban could stifle the development of tech-nology with civilian as well as military ap-plications. (Such a concern is unwarrant-ed, according to a local robotics expert.)

The Canadian government has not indicated that the issue of lethal autono-mous weapons systems is a pressing one. However, 55 per cent of Canadians, according to a 2017 IPSOS poll, oppose autonomous weapons, while another 25 per cent are uncertain. Only 5 per cent expressed support. The Canadian gov-ernment should heed the concerns of the Canadian public and develop a national position that rejects the development of autonomous weapons.

Leading military powers are in a race to develop new high-tech weapons that will transform warfare. The Kalashnikov an-nouncement reinforces our belief that the time to ban these weapons is NOW. □

References

Axe, David. 2017. How worried should you be about the AK-47 company’s new killer robots? Motherboard, July 17.

Brewster, Signe. 2016. The age of autonomous robots is upon us. Fortune, May 29.

Chivers, C.J. 2010. How the AK-47 rewrote the rules of modern warfare. Wired, January 11.

Emery, David. 2017. Robots with guns: The rise of autonomous weapons systems. Snopes.com, April 25.

Future of Life Institute. 2015. Autonomous weapons: An open letter from AI & robotics researchers, July 28.

Gibbs, Samuel. 2017. Elon Musk: Regulate AI to combat “existential threat” before it’s too late. The Guardian, July 17.

Gilbert, David. 2017. Russian weapons maker Kalashnikov developing killer AI robots. Vice News, July 13.

Laville, Sandra et al. 2015. Why has the AK-47 become the jihadi terrorist weapon of choice? The Guardian, December 29.

McKay, Tom. 2017. No, Facebook did not panic and shut down an AI program that was getting dangerously smart. Gizmodo Australia, August 1.

Metz, Cade. 2017. Uncle Sam wants your deep neural networks. The New York Times, June 22.

Mizokami, Kyle. 2017. Kalashnikov will make an A.I.-powered killer robot. Popular Mechanics, July 19.

Branka Marijan is a Program Officer with Project Ploughshares.

[email protected]


For a small but increasing number of states, space services provide the capability to deploy military personnel globally and apply force more efficiently and effect-

ively. Increasingly, these states view space as a sphere to be dominated and defended. Space is not insulated from conflict on Earth, and it can unpredictably escalate crises on the ground or be the spark that starts one.

China’s arrivalIn 2016, the United States and China were tied for the greatest number of space launch attempts (22), and China pulled ahead of Russia in the number of operat-ing satellites. This year saw the successful maiden flights of China’s heavy-lift Long March 5 and Long March 7, which will be the “workhorse” launcher for China. China now fields a complement of com-munications satellites; intelligence, surveil-

Outer space

By Laura Grego

above: China’s heavy-lift Long March-5 rocket blasts off from its launch center in Wenchang, in southern China’s Hainan province, on Thursday.AFP-JIJI.

The latest security assessment


SPACE SECURITY

lance, and reconnaissance satellites; and position, navigation, and timing satellites. It has announced ambitious plans for space exploration and has sought regional and international cooperative relationships for space activities.

While not one of the Outer Space Treaty’s founding states, China did become a signatory a decade later. In international forums and in domestic declaratory policy, it has frequently urged that limits be ne-gotiated on space weapons. China cooper-ated with Russia to draft and promote the Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT).

Anti-satellite weapons develop and proliferateStates—and, increasingly, sub-state ac-tors—have been developing technologies that can be used to interfere with satellites. Not all such technologies are equally dan-gerous, and it may be possible to prioritize appropriate limits. Signals jamming, for example, is relatively low-tech, but is also limited temporally and spatially in its ef-fects; identification of the perpetrator is straightforward, even if remedies for the interference are less so. More concerning are technologies with a strategic-sized cap-ability, or which are stealthy and hard to attribute, or which make intent difficult to discern; these technologies can take new and unpredictable paths to crisis escala-tion. The inventories of such weapons are growing and relevant technology is prolif-erating.

Midcourse missile defence systems are of particular concern. Long-range ballis-tic missiles and satellites travel at similar speeds on similar trajectories, so the heart of these systems—the “kill” mechan-ism—can be used against either missiles or satellites. In fact, they’re likely to be much more effective against satellites, which travel on repeated, predictable orbits.

The United States has an enormous advantage in missile defence capacity and sophistication. It has two missile defence systems that use hit-to-kill interceptors

that could target satellites. The current fleet of Aegis interceptors can reach only satellites at the very lowest altitudes, at which satellites are very nearly de-orbiting. But the next generation of interceptors, the SM-3 IIA, should be able to reach any satellite in low Earth orbit (Grego 2011).

China has reportedly tested hit-to-kill interceptors a number of times, both against a satellite in 2007 and subsequently against ballistic missiles. China has also demonstrated a high-altitude rocket that could potentially bring those interceptors in reach of satellites in geosynchronous orbits. Little is known publicly about the state of its development program and the numbers and types of interceptors China plans to field.

While Russia has long had a modest missile defence system for Moscow, it has begun work on another ground-based system, “Nudol,” which reportedly has an anti-satellite mission. Russia upped the tempo on this system, reportedly flight testing it three times in 2016. (It is not clear whether it was tested against a tar-get.)

Other countries continue research and development of these systems. As ballistic missiles proliferate, more states may seek defences.

More complex, but just as concerning, are technologies that can be used both for peaceful and aggressive purposes. A prime example is satellites that are nimble on orbit and can closely approach another satellite without that satellite’s cooper-ation. These “proximity operations” can be peaceful—inspecting or repairing a satellite, or salvaging or bringing a failed satellite safely out of orbit. But they can also facilitate interference with a satellite, since damaging a satellite is easier at close ranges and low relative speeds.

Small satellitesThe miniaturization of relevant technol-ogies has led to the possibility of using smaller, lighter, and cheaper satellites to provide useful capability. Increasingly,


SPACE SECURITY

Without a renewed commitment by state actors, global governance will not be up to the task of shaping trends to ensure that space remains sustainable and secure, with its benefits equitably enjoyed.

small satellites are taking up significant parts of the payload of large launches; in February 2017, India launched 103 small satellites along with a larger payload. Launchers dedicated to launching multiple small satellites are being developed. Small satellites are likely to play an increasing role in any number of space endeavours.

Commercial space innovationsA number of constellations of huge numbers of satellites are being planned, primarily to provide broadband internet globally, some to collect Earth observation data. In 2016, commercial companies filed for U.S. Federal Communications Com-mission licences for 8,731 non-geostation-ary communications satellites, including 4,425 for SpaceX, nearly 3,000 for Boeing, and 720 for OneWeb. (The total num-ber of operating satellites today is about 1,500.)

Other transformative satellite-based capabilities now provided by private companies include the publicly available, constant imaging of Earth; timely weather forecasting; and better maritime tracking. A number of new companies are devel-oping commercial synthetic aperture radar (SAR) capabilities, which can provide high-resolution Earth imagery at night or during cloud cover.

Global governance under stressGovernance is becoming less global and is fracturing into smaller domains as ac-tors respond to their perceived needs. For example, some states, such as the United States, Luxembourg, and the United Arab Emirates, seek to create a favourable legal and regulatory environment for private

companies to pursue resource extraction on celestial bodies.

Should trends continue, the traditional balance of civilian-governmental-military uses of space will be shifted heavily to-ward commercial space, with militaries a significant part of the customer base. But companies are unlikely to wait for slow-moving bureaucratic processes to catch up and will exert pressure to shape the legal regime to their preferences.

The venue where space security and arms control initiatives are to be discussed, the UN Conference on Disarmament, has been moribund for two decades, and little serious effort has been made to bridge the divides between groups of states parties. Efforts to negotiate and sign an Inter-national Code of Conduct for Space have derailed, despite the successful assembling of relevant parties in New York in 2015 for the negotiation of the Code’s language. While a UN Group of Governmental Experts completed their work in 2015 on a draft set of transparency and confi-dence-building measures for space, little has been done to implement them.

Without a renewed commitment by state actors, global governance will not be up to the task of shaping trends to ensure that space remains sustainable and secure, with its benefits equitably enjoyed. Judging from the slow progress of recent years, the going will be tough. However, there are bright spots, as well as reasons to think that robust engagement from the civil sec-tor will play an important role.

Positive signsThe UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) has been


SPACE SECURITY

23,000Approximate number of

pieces of catalogued space debris larger than 10 cm in diameter as of December 2016

Number of dedicated military satellites (excluding dual or multipurpose)

248

3

1,459Number of operational satellites

States with anti-satellite capabilities (China, United States, Russia)

Facts & Figures

Source: Space Security Index 2017


SPACE SECURITY

steadily making progress on a number of issues. In 2016, COPUOS concluded ne-gotiations on a set of 12 draft Long Term Sustainability Guidelines, and was poised to agree on more. COPUOS shepherded 84 states to agreement on seven themes for a formal marking of UNISPACE+50 in 2018. COPUOS identified clearly how important a secure and sustainable space environment is by connecting it to the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, creating an important shared vision that resonates deeply with the original princi-ple of the Outer Space Treaty, that space activities should be “to the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development.”

The importance of initiating high-level bilateral and multilateral dialogues on civil and security aspects of space should be noted, as should the accession of India to the Missile Technology Control Regime and The Hague ballistic missile code of conduct.

Last year saw the inception of an effort to clarify what existing law says about mil-itary uses of outer space. The McGill Cen-tre for Research in Air and Space Law and The University of Adelaide Research Unit on Military Law and Ethics have spearheaded a project to draft the Manual on the International Law Applicable to the Military Use of Outer Space (McGill University 2017), in the vein of the Tallinn Manual on Cyber Operations (NATO CC-DCOE).

Looking forwardThe global governance regime is being stressed by rapid technological innovation and geopolitical realities. If disparate inter-ests carve out their own fragmented areas of influence, the most advanced and rich-est could reserve the benefits of space for themselves and leave the rest behind. But a different future is possible.

The golden anniversary of the Outer Space Treaty is a prime opportunity for the three depository states (United States, United Kingdom, Russia) to provide leadership and to convene a meeting, such as a review conference to provide clarify-ing discussions about how different states view the balancing of freedom to use space for peaceful purposes, due regard to other actors, and the use of space to benefit all humankind. Or perhaps a new generation of space states or civil society will take the lead. The sense that space is fundamentally for peaceful purposes and that its use must be for the benefit of all humankind needs to be reaffirmed by practice and rhetoric, and the Treaty’s basic principles must be elaborated to gov-ern new challenges. □

Dr. Laura Grego is Senior Scientist, Global Security Program, with the Union of Concerned Scientists. This article is taken from Dr. Grego’s Global Assessment, “50 years after the Outer Space Treaty: How secure is space?” found in Space Security Index 2017.

References

Grego, Laura. 2011. The AntiSatellite Capability of the Phased Adaptive Approach Missile Defense System, Federation of American Scientists

Public Interest Report, Winter.

McGill University. 2017. What is the MILAMOS Project?

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. 2017. Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable

to Cyber Operations to be launched. February 2.

available now

Space Security Index 2017The Space Security Index project produces the first and only annual, comprehensive, and integrated assessment of space security. SSI seeks to provide a policy-neutral fact base of trends and developments in space security, using primary, open-source research.

The objective is to facilitate dialogue on space security challenges and potential responses by providing the necessary facts and focus to inform an important debate that has become unnecessarily polarized.

Space Security 2017 covers the period January to December 2016.

Project Ploughshares manages the Space Security Index project.

To order or download: www.spacesecurityindex.org

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