ploughshares monitor

PLOUGHSHARES MONITOR

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2018VOLUME 39 | ISSUE 3

Crowded, congested, and contested

Customers or allies?The dilemma of Canada’s Automatic Firearms Country Control List

Fractured by war A look at the destructive and divisive conflict in Syria

In algorithms we trust? Diminishing human control over military systems concerns experts

Irregular migration• Untangling the U.S.

refugee program• Examining the violent

journeys of Central American migrants

Saudi crisisA legacy for Canada?

THE

New challenges for outer space governance

The Ploughshares MonitorVolume 39 | Issue 3

The Ploughshares Monitor is the quarterlyjournal of Project Ploughshares, an operating division of The Canadian Council of Churches. Ploughshares works with churches, nongovernmental organizations, and governments, in Canada and abroad, to advance policies and actions that prevent war and armed violence and build peace. Project Ploughshares is affiliated with the KCU Centre for Peace Advancement, Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo.

Office address: Project Ploughshares140 Westmount Road NorthWaterloo, Ontario N2L 3G6 Canada519-888-6541, fax: [email protected]; www.ploughshares.ca

Project Ploughshares gratefully acknowledges the ongoing financial support of the many individuals, national churches and church agencies, local congregations, religious orders, and organizations across Canada that ensure that the work of Project Ploughshares continues.

We are particularly grateful to The Simons Foundation Canada in Vancouver for its generous support.

All donors of $50 or more receive a complimentary subscription to The Ploughshares Monitor. Annual subscription rates for libraries and institutions are: $35 in Canada, $45 (U.S.) in the United States, $50 (U.S.) internationally. Single copies are $5 plus shipping.

Unless indicated otherwise, material may be reproduced freely, provided the author and source are indicated and one copy is sent to Project Ploughshares. Return postage is guaranteed.

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The Ploughshares Monitor is indexed in the Canadian Periodical Index.

Printed at Waterloo Printing, Waterloo, Ontario.Printed with vegetable inks on paper with recycled content.

Autumn 2018

PROJECT PLOUGHSHARES STAFF

Julia BanduraTasneem JamalBranka Marijan Sonal Marwah

Matthew PupicBenjamin SkinnerWendy StockerBarbara WagnerJessica West

Cesar Jaramillo Executive Director

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From the Director’s deskIn Saudi crisis, a legacy for Canadaby Cesar Jaramillo

Customers or allies?The dilemma of Canada’s Automatic Firearms Country Control Listby Paul Esau

Inaccessible?Untangling the U.S. refugee programby Sonal Marwah

A perilous journeyCentral American migrants face increasing violenceby Carla Angulo-Pasel

In algorithms we trust?Diminishing human control over military systems concerns expertsby Branka Marijan

Ploughshares abroadA glance at some of the international work carried out by staff this summer

Crowded, congested, and contestedNew challanges for outer space governanceby Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan

Syria: Fractured by warAn examination of the divisive conflictby Nizar Mohamad

“and they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation; neither shall they learn war any more.” Isaiah 2:4

The Ploughshares Monitor, the quarterly publication of Project Ploughshares, is available online at www.ploughshares.ca.

Funded by the Government of Canada

Cover image: An illustration of space debris. NASA

autumn 2018 The Ploughshares Monitor 3

A routine tweet in August from Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland, calling for the release of imprisoned activists

in Saudi Arabia, has presented the Trudeau government with a golden opportunity to cement its human rights legacy and to affirm Canada’s principled stand globally. The incident could mark a defining political moment for Mr. Trudeau.

Minister Freeland was right to call for the release of the activists. She was also right to voice concern about a female activist sentenced to death by the Saudi regime. But Saudi Arabia has turned what could have been one more expression of concern by Ottawa into a high-profile diplomatic crisis that will test Canada’s commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights.

The impasse has wide-ranging political and economic implications. But it also represents low-hanging fruit for the Trudeau Liberals. A spat with Saudi Arabia over human rights? Talk about being on the right side of a dispute. Still, if the government is to seize this remarkable opportunity, it must realize that a firm position on human rights goes beyond mere expressions of concern.

A free ride for Saudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia is a well-documented human-rights violator that merits persistent and strong condemnation by all states. However, Saudi officials have come to count on the acquiescence of Western governments. And it is not hard to

see why. The

catastrophic humanitarian crisis in Yemen is known to be the direct result of a Saudi-led military intervention, now into its fourth year. A UN panel has denounced

the “widespread and systematic targeting of civilian targets.” Recently, a Saudi airstrike killed dozens of children coming home from a summer camp in northern Yemen. Yet the crisis continues to unfold as the international community looks on with disconcerting and shameful timidity.

Saudi Arabia’s treatment of its own citizens is also dire. The imprisonment of activists that prompted Minister Freeland’s tweet was only the latest incident in a consistent pattern of human rights violations by one of the most repressive regimes on Earth.

Still, Western governments—including Canada’s—continue to authorize arms exports

From the Director’s Desk

Written by Cesar Jaramillo

In Saudi crisis, a legacy for Canada


The Ploughshares Monitor autumn 20184

to Saudi Arabia. They reject repeated warnings that these arms might be misused and refuse to recognize the demonstrable incompatibility of certain deals with the human-rights safeguards

of relevant export control regulations. For Ottawa, the key concern must be whether

there is a risk of misuse of Canadian-made goods by Saudi Arabia against its own citizens or other civilians. Because there is indeed a clear and present risk, Canada should not be exporting arms to Saudi Arabia.

Moreover, the growing accumulation of weapons in one of the most volatile regions in the world will inevitably have long-term effects for regional and international security. And make no mistake: Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy is sustained by billions of dollars of Western weaponry.

Where are the champions of human rights?

Both the previous Conservative and the present Liberal governments have offered explanations that avoid the basic question around risk of misuse of Canadian arms exports. Some are devoid of ethical considerations: “If we don’t sell them these arms, somebody else will.” Some scare taxpayers: “Canada may be on the hook for hefty fines if we cancel.” Some rely on believing the very party that might be misusing the goods: “Saudi authorities said proper procedure is followed in security operations

involving our arms exports.” Canada’s response to this high-profile row will

be closely scrutinized every time Saudi Arabia commits another human-rights violation. The

Trudeau government will either renounce or affirm its prerogative to speak out on human rights. And Riyadh has made it very clear that even expressions of concern are considered unacceptable interference in domestic affairs.

International support for Canada has been feeble, with friends and allies reluctant to step up, perhaps themselves fearing the wrath of Riyadh. And so it will not be easy for Canada, perhaps standing alone, to draw a line in the sand. But Mr. Trudeau ought to know that doing the right thing is often not easy.

Canada promotes a feminist international assistance policy and claims to support a rules-based multilateral order. At the same time, it is arming one of the world’s worst oppressors of women and contravening domestic and international norms aimed at regulating unscrupulous arms transfers. It is simply untenable for Canada to continue arms exports to Saudi Arabia. And if the recent spat is what brings them to an end, Minister Freeland’s tweet will have a more positive impact on human rights in Saudi Arabia than she could have ever anticipated.

Canada must remain open to the pursuit of common interests with Saudi Arabia. Every effort must be made to keep wheat and barley, nurses and students, oil and investments flowing between the two countries. But not arms.

How many political leaders can define their legacy by standing up for their principles before an attentive domestic and international audience? Mr. Trudeau’s opportunity has been served up on a silver platter. The question is whether he will seize it.


Cesar Jaramillo is Executive Director of Project Ploughshares. He can be reached at [email protected].

Canada’sresponsetothishigh-profile rowwillbecloselyscrutinizedeverytimeSaudiArabiacommitsanotherhuman-rightsviolation.“


Outer Space Security

Over the past two decades, outer space has seen significant changes. To use the most clichéd phrase, space has become even

more crowded, congested, and contested. But like many clichés, it is also true.

New players A domain that was once dominated by the two Cold War superpowers has today more than 80 actors, including commercial ones, making outer space a lot more crowded and congested. Space exploration and growing dependence on outer space for development will increase the number of players many-fold in the coming years. A growing number of countries, especially from the developing world in Africa and Latin America, are starting their space programs to meet their social, economic, and developmental needs. Countries in Asia are looking to outer space for applications to deal with climate change and disaster management, among other tasks. As more states pursue space to satisfy a wide variety of requirements, regional and

international cooperation is going to gain further ground.

Space cooperation is also a function of demand and supply. On the supply side, growing prosperity means that states have greater resources for space programs. Also, as countries progress, industrialization and technology spread almost organically. On the demand side, there are competitive pressures working to further proliferation of space technology and collaboration.

In some cases, greater cooperation in outer space utilization has come through regional space agencies. In both Africa and South America, regional institutions have played a role in creating more cooperative ventures. This has not been the case with Asia. In Asia, there are two regional space cooperation mechanisms: APRSAF (Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum) under Japanese aegis and APSCO (Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization) under China’s lead, with no institutional arrangements for the two to coordinate or collaborate. This is partly a reflection of regional geopolitical

Crowded, congested,and contested New challenges for outer space governance

Written by Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan


competition, with space one more arena in which this competition is playing out.

A second important phenomenon has been the growth of private sector participation in outer space ventures. While primarily a Western phenomenon, such activity could travel to Asia and other regions. There is a growing recognition of a capacity gap on the part of state agencies in meeting large-scale demand across different spectrums, which raises many questions about the complex roles of space actors. Other questions relate to the new satellite mega-constellations, which are mainly put up by commercial players. How might these affect the space environment? How will they impact on the long-term sustainability of outer space? These are real concerns. Thus, commercial actors are adding to the woes of global governance.

Space debris The challenge of space debris has grown enormously in the last decade. The number of pieces of space debris floating in outer space is enormous. There are more than 21,000 items larger than 10 cm, an estimated 500,000 items between one and 10 cm, and more than 100 million smaller than one cm.

Because space debris is a problem for all actors who use outer space, there is greater common interest in managing the problem. However, the enormity of the problem and the division of responsibilities and costs are still significant barriers to solutions.

Strategic competitionSpace is once again becoming the sphere of international political rivalry and potential conflicts, another domain in which the geopolitical competitions of Earth are beginning to play out. Dependence on outer space obviously creates vulnerabilities. The growth in the last decade in counterspace capabilities—kinetic means such as direct ascent antisatellite missiles, co-orbital systems (satellites that sidle up to their targets and detonate to kill both) that create permanent and irreversible destruction, and even electronic or cyber means to create temporary disruptions and/or destruction—is a major emerging problem. While none of these capabilities is new, there is a renewed determination and push to develop them. The temptation to use them could be irresistible. Jamming and use of cyber means to damage and destroy outer space assets could become more popular measures for states to target their adversaries.

Of course, militarization of outer space has already happened. Militaries around the world have been using space assets for such passive military applications as communications, surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence gathering. But the task must be to prevent the expansion to weaponization. Early steps toward weaponization have been taken, but the major powers have not made any feasible and realistic efforts to curb them.

What is the way forward? Given the growing number of threats and challenges, the need for regulation of outer space is real. Efforts must be made to determine the ideal approach and end-state, but also what might be feasible in the near term. Space is truly a global commons and a limited commodity; hence, it is incumbent upon every state to join in preserving it for future generations. One state’s action can affect others. Debris, to mention only one example, does not distinguish among the



assets of different states. All will be affected. Moving forward also means learning some

lessons from recent failed efforts so that new efforts do not suffer the same fate. For one, new efforts should not make the mistake that the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation did. Though generally considered a successful transparency and confidence-building measure (TCBM) with many members, the code does not include critical missile powers China, Pakistan, Iran, and Israel. It must be remembered that the value of TCBMs is a function not just of the number of members, but also the membership of critical actors.

Another lesson is about the need for inclusivity. Including many countries, even if

the measure being developed is not ideal, gives those states a sense of ownership that can have a far-reaching impact. A measure developed by Western countries without involvement of the developing world may not go down very well.

There is an additional lesson in the failure of the International Code of Conduct developed almost exclusively by the European Union. It unintentionally created the perception that it would lead to limiting or even denying technologies to some. Many developing countries that were just starting their space programs were wary of signing a code that they believed would restrict their programs’ development.

Such a misperception could have been laid to rest by earlier and wider consultation.

Another lesson concerns the feasibility of a legally binding instrument. Treaty-making and consensual decision-making worked well in the past. Today, great power politics has become so contentious that developing consensus on any global security issue is problematic. This crisis in decision-making could deepen in the future. Thus, there is a need to develop more innovative approaches to common problems, beyond insisting on legally binding treaties. Multilateral confidence-building measures might be a useful starting point.

We should also recognize the importance of multilateral negotiations to prevent the

emergence of its alternative, the deterrence model, in managing outer space. If there is no success in multilateral negotiations, states will be forced to rely on deterring others from undertaking undesirable activities in outer space by threatening to retaliate with similar activities. Such threats could spiral out of control. Multilateral negotiations present a possible

way to prevent such an occurrence. Space traffic management is vital. We need

to make progress toward a global authority on space situational awareness. The creation of such a body would be an important step in understanding the space environment that we are operating in, and essential for safe, secure, and uninterrupted access to outer space. And it could have an impact on further cooperation between states. Global cooperation in outer space is an absolute must, but the way forward may be to agree on a common minimum program, rather than to hold out for the most ideal solution.


Militariesaroundtheworldhave beenusingspaceassetsforsuchpassivemilitaryapplicationsascommunications,surveillance,reconnaissance,andintelligencegathering.Butthetaskmustbetopreventtheexpansiontoweaponization.

Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is a Distinguished Fellow and Head of the Nuclear and Space Policy Initiative at Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, India and Technical Advisor to the Group of Governmental Experts on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). This article is excerpted from the “Global Assessment” in Space Security Index 2018.

“


Syria

No war in recent history has been as divisive as the war in Syria. In addition to fracturing Syrian society, it has

galvanized, polarized, and even radicalized those who have reported on it. While President Bashar al-Assad’s cheerleading squad has brought together an amalgamation of unlikely supporters, ranging from White Nationalists to Shia militants, the advocates of regime change have at times forged a confusing coalition that has combined Muslim Brotherhood supporters with liberal New York Times readers. Several varieties of leftists, also known as “anti-imperialists,” have even united with elements of the far right in defence of Assad’s regime.

A fresh round of violence brings more displacement

According to the United Nations, in 2018, Syria has experienced the largest and most rapid displacement of persons since the start of the war in 2011, with nearly a million displaced in the first four months.

From June 18 to July 31, following a Russian-backed offensive, the Syrian army began a campaign that retook virtually all southwest

Syria. In the first two weeks, close to 270,000 civilians were uprooted, resulting in the war’s most intense displacement. By the end of the first month, the total was 320,000. The displaced were turned away by Israel and Jordan, both of which have played distinct roles in protracting the Syrian conflict.

Jordan has, for years, trained and equipped rebels at a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency outpost in Amman. Israel has allegedly supported more than seven different rebel factions. But now, due to Russian diplomacy and U.S. indecisiveness, these states have decided to align with Russia and end their support for opposition groups. They have concluded that Russia, which has heavily invested in the war, is the prime global broker of Syrian affairs and is intent on preserving the Assad regime. This is in stark contrast to

Written by Nizar Mohamad

Fractured by war

Syria

Amnesty International Canada


the United States, which has shifted its stated priority from toppling Assad to defeating the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Except for Idlib in the northwest and areas controlled by the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in eastern Syria, the Assad regime, with the help of Russia, Iran, and a host of pro-regime militias, has retaken most of the territory lost over the course of the war.

Extensive destructionThe UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia recently estimated that the civil war has cost Syria $388-billion in economic damages. In 2017, the World Bank stated that a third of the country’s residential structures and close to half of its medical and educational facilities had been damaged or destroyed in the war.

Syrian and Russian airstrikes on rebel-held areas have intensified in recent years, allowing the regime to recapture several opposition strongholds, including many areas that had been subjected to sieges. Operations conducted by the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS have also caused considerable destruction. In November 2016, U.S. airstrikes drastically escalated following an offensive to capture Raqqa from Islamic State militants. During an 11-month campaign, aerial raids damaged or destroyed more than 11,000 buildings in Raqqa.

All parties to the conflict have contributed to the destruction of a once functional state. From airstrikes to mortar fire, rival sides have destroyed homes, churches, mosques, hospitals, schools, and businesses. Entire neighbourhoods have been levelled across the country.

The Syrian regime has turned a blind eye to the actions of those fighting alongside it. In the “liberation of every inch” of the country from “terrorists” (read: all armed opposition to the regime), pro-regime militias have subjected previously rebel-held areas to mass lootings, stealing everything from couches to refrigerators and selling them in makeshift markets in nearby towns.

Demographic reengineering Neighbourhoods once inhabited by people thought to be sympathetic to the opposition are being gentrified after their recapture by the government. These efforts, often funded by Iranian, Russian, and Chinese construction firms, are meant to ensure that the Syrian regime can rule over populations loyal to Assad.

Neighbourhoods “cleansed of terrorists” are repopulated, often by foreigners. Since Assad and many of his supporters are Alawites—a syncretic offshoot of Shia Islam—and most opposition fighters are Sunni Muslim, Shias seen as loyal to Assad and Iran are often imported to Syria.

Assad has essentially sold off large areas of Syrian real estate to Iran in return for its continuing support. Iran, which is ruled by a Shia theocracy, has facilitated this demographic reengineering by incentivizing Shia Muslims from Iraq, Iran, and even Afghanistan to relocate to Syria. In August 2016, more than 300 Iraqi Shia families moved into the Sunni-majority suburb of Darayya, southwest of

Syria

Who controls what?


Damascus. Many Syrians, including residents in the ancient Christian, Sunni, and Jewish quarters of Damascus, have been forcibly evicted to make way for these new populations.

On April 2, 2018, the “Absentee Law” was passed, which allows the government to officially seize land and property from those lacking proper documentation, such as proof of ownership. Many Syrians have lived in shantytowns and informal settlements for decades and have no documents of ownership, while others have been forced by the conflict to abandon their homes and flee the country.

A scattered population Approximately 5.6-million Syrian refugees are scattered across the globe, while roughly 6.1-million are displaced within Syria. Although the greatest concentration of refugees is in the neighbouring countries of Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon, some refugees have been officially resettled in Western countries such as Germany, Canada, the United States, and Australia. According to the UN Refugee Agency, as of May 1, 2018, 259,558 refugees had been officially resettled in 27 different countries. The director of the UN Refugee Agency for the Middle East and North Africa has stated that close to 82 per

cent of Syrian refugees have expressed a desire to return to Syria.

Meanwhile, host states like Lebanon and Jordan are fatigued and are growing increasingly hostile to Syrian refugees.

The Syrian civil war is winding down, with Assad appearing to emerge victorious. But what will the end of the war mean to Syrian refugees?

Returning homeAccording to the UN, by August 2017, close

to 600,000 Syrian refugees had returned to their homes. Thousands more have returned in the last few months. Recently, joint Syrian-Russian initiatives have resulted in separate deals struck with Jordan and Lebanon to expedite their return.

While Syrian and Russian authorities are publicly urging refugees to return, many have reported being harassed, interrogated, imprisoned, and tortured by security forces.

Some have had their passports confiscated. The head of the Syrian air force intelligence service recently stated that three million Syrians, including refugees, are wanted by the government.

The economy has all but collapsed. More than 538,000 jobs have been lost. Youth unemployment levels are as high as 78 per cent. The cost of living has gone up; gas, water, and electricity shortages are routine. Syria’s infrastructure has been devastated by war.

With the country in ruins, it is hard to envision an immediate large-scale return of displaced Syrians. Dealing with the displaced is only one of many problems now facing all Syrians and the larger global community.

Syria

Nizar Mohamad is working on his Master’s degree in Political Science at the University of Waterloo. He was an intern at Project Ploughshares during the Spring term.

Allpartiestotheconflicthave contributedtothedestructionof aoncefunctionalstate.Fromairstrikestomortarfire,rivalsideshavedestroyedhomes,churches,mosques,hospitals,schools,andbusinesses.Entireneighbourhoodshavebeenlevelledacrossthecountry.“


Canadian Arms Exports

In late 2017, the government of Canada added Ukraine to the Automatic Firearm Country Control List (AFCCL) of 40 states

to which Canadian weapons producers can legally export automatic firearms. This decision was made in the fourth year of an increasingly entrenched conflict in Ukraine’s Donbass region involving separatist forces, Russian forces posing as irregulars, and Ukrainian government forces, which, so far, has resulted in more than 25,000 casualties and 10,000 dead.

If Canada claims to closely control all arms shipments to states involved in conflict or with a significant history of human-rights abuses against their own civilians, why does the government believe this is the moment to explore shipments to a country engaged in both?

One reason: Canada is fulfilling NATO and UN obligations by standing firm against aggressive Russian action in the region, the annexation of Crimea, and violations of the 2015 Minsk II agreement. Yet it is difficult to understand how Ukrainian autonomy can be

achieved through the transfer of Canadian automatic weapons to the area, or how the addition of Ukraine to the AFCCL is consistent with Canadian military export policy.

Since the AFCCL amendment, Global Affairs Canada has refused to say if export permit applications for the transfer of automatic firearms to Ukraine have been received or approved. However, in mid-August, a million-dollar deal to export PGW Defence Technologies sniper rifles was announced. Canada also has 200 Armed Forces personnel deployed on Operation UNIFIER in Ukraine, has donated nearly $700-million in non-lethal assistance since 2014, and the Department of National Defence (DND) is allegedly considering the construction of a joint Canadian-Ukrainian ammunition plant in Ukraine.

Another possibility: the Canadian government considers the conflict-ridden state a market ripe for penetration. While Ukraine has not been a significant recipient of military goods in recent years (under $200,000 per year

Customers or allies?

Written by Paul Esau

The dilemma of Canada’s Automatic Firearms Country Control List


since 2014), the AFCCL has often been used as a list of potential customers for military goods.

Exposing the Automatic Firearms Country Control List

Prior to the Mulroney government’s passage of Bill C-6 in 1991, which created the AFCCL, the Canadian Criminal Code prohibited the possession of automatic firearms by all groups or individuals other than Canadian military

and police forces, effectively eliminating the private export of Canadian-made weapons. Bill C-6 amended the Criminal Code and the Export and Import Permits Act to allow the direct export of automatic weapons to countries on a specific list, ostensibly only NATO members and close allies.

The Bill’s timing was poor. In August 1990, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq had invaded Kuwait, setting in motion a chain of events that culminated in the January 1991 invasion of Iraq by a U.S.-led coalition. During this short war, in which the Iraqi Army was easily defeated, Western forces found themselves fired upon by weapons they had earlier sold to Hussein, especially during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). Only months before Bill C-6 was introduced, Mulroney lectured U.S. President George H.W. Bush on U.S. contributions to the arms trade and proposed an arms-transfer-control initiative that targeted sales to the Middle East.

While the government claimed in 1991 that the AFCCL would be populated only by close

allies and strategic partners, parliamentary debate on Bill C-6 made it clear that the immediate point was to facilitate exactly the sort of arms shipments that Mulroney had condemned. Multiyear efforts by Foreign Minister Joe Clark to arrange the sale of more than a thousand light armoured vehicles from a GM Diesel factory in London, Ontario to Saudi Arabia had finally borne fruit, and the government was desperate to close the deal.

Of the 13 countries on the original 1991 list, three (Saudi Arabia, Sweden, and Australia) were not NATO members. The only criterion for inclusion on the AFCCL was and is an intergovernmental defence, research, development, and production arrangement with Canada. Arrangements might be established shortly before the addition of the country to

the AFCCL, often before the announcement of a large contract.

The AFCCL was originally envisioned as a convenient solution to an immediate dilemma: the need to create a loophole in Canadian law to allow the export of weapons into the Middle East in the aftermath of war. The government has been steadily widening the loophole ever since.

Expanding the clubToday, the AFCCL includes 40 countries (see Figure 1), with Japan and Mexico under consideration. Between 1991 and 2008, only seven countries were added. Since no procedure exists for removing countries from the list, it is likely the AFCCL will continue to grow, further diluting whatever purpose it once served in limiting the Canadian export of automatic weapons.

Still, not all proposed additions make it onto the AFCCL. In 2012, the Canadian government began the ongoing practice of


Countrieshavebeenaddedtothelist despitetheirinvolvementinseriousregionalorcivilconflict,anddespiteegregioushuman-rightsviolationsintherecentpastorpresent.“



eliciting submissions on AFCCL candidates. While Austria, India, Ireland, Kuwait, and Switzerland were considered, only Kuwait was added to the list.

In recent years, the addition of countries to the AFCCL has been generally followed by a substantial transfer of arms. In January 2013, Colombia joined the AFCCL club and a deal to export 24 light armoured vehicles (LAVs) worth $65.3-million from General Dynamics Land Systems (the new iteration of GM Diesel’s London division) was announced a day later, despite continuing armed conflict in the country. Later that year, the government wanted Chile, Peru, Brazil, and South Korea added to the AFCCL. When the first two were added in 2014, the Peruvian armed forces promptly ordered 32 LAVs from General Dynamics.

As the AFCCL expands, its main benefit—exclusivity—becomes increasingly diluted. Because no mechanism exists to remove countries from the list, deteriorating human rights or conflict situations have had little impact upon membership. Countries have been added to the list despite their involvement in serious regional or civil conflict, and despite egregious human-rights violations in the recent past or present.

Recommendations to improve the AFCCL

1. The AFCCL should be expanded to, or replaced by, a “Weapons System Country Control List” that would clearly indicate which countries could purchase any major Canadian weapons systems (including firearms). This would expand the advantages of the AFCCL (transparency and clarity) to all export decisions on small arms and light weapons, weapons systems such as LAVs, and naval vessels or aircraft.

2. Candidacy for the AFCCL should require

Figure 1: Additions to the AFCCL from 1991 to Present

CountryYear added to AFCCL

NATOmember

Ukraine 2017Israel 2015Kuwait 2015Chile 2014Peru 2014South Korea 2014Colombia 2013Albania 2011

Croatia 2011

Bulgaria 2008

Czech Republic 2008

Estonia 2008

Hungary 2008

Iceland 2008

Lithuania 2008

Luxembourg 2008

Romania 2008

Slovakia 2008

Slovenia 2008

Turkey 2008

Finland 2005Latvia 2005

Poland 2005

Portugal 2005

Greece 2002

New Zealand 2002Botswana 2001Australia 1991Belgium 1991

Denmark 1991

France 1991

Germany 1991

Italy 1991

Netherlands 1991

Norway 1991

Saudi Arabia 1991Spain 1991

Sweden 1991United Kingdom 1991

United States 1991



more than an intergovernmental defence arrangement. Criteria such as the risk of weapon diversion, a state’s human rights record, and cooperation with UN Security Council embargoes, as well as Arms Trade Treaty membership, should be considered.

3. The AFCCL should be subject to ongoing review, and a mechanism created to allow the removal of states from the list.

4. The loophole that allows the Canadian Department of National Defence to transfer automatic weapons to states not on the AFCCL should be closed.

In futureThe root incentive for Canadian exports of automatic weapons is economic. DND procurement alone cannot keep Canadian weapons producers in business; weapons exports are a way to subsidize the cost of keeping these companies in Canada.

The AFCCL began as a response to the threat of economic extortion by GM Diesel and Diemaco to slash production or relocate if enough markets were not found for their weapons systems. In the long term, increasing the general transparency and effectiveness of the AFCCL will require that major Canadian military producers no longer depend for survival on export contracts for weapons systems.

Paul Esau is pursuing a PhD in History at Wilfrid Laurier University. During the spring term, he was an intern at Project Ploughshares. His Master’s thesis was entitled Disarming Security: Project Ploughshares, the Just War and the New World

Order.

The Colombian Army displays Canadian-made armoured vehicles. Javier Casella/Mindefensa


Until recently, the United States was the world’s most generous donor of humanitarian assistance to displaced

persons and had the largest resettlement program. But the Trump administration’s new immigration policies appear to be making the United States increasingly less safe and inaccessible for refugees and asylum seekers.

All of this is happening in Canada’s backyard. One direct effect is an escalation in irregular border crossings from the United States into Canada. On the border between the United States and Canada, for the period January-June 2018, there were 10,744 interceptions (refugee claimants apprehended between the official ports of entry) of people trying to get into Canada. In 2017, 20,000 people made irregular crossings into Canada to claim asylum.

As Canadian policymakers, civil society organizations, and immigration attorneys scramble to navigate the new and frequently altering immigration landscape to the south of us, it is worth placing some key elements of the current refugee program in the United States in context.

Slashing the U.S. refugee resettlement cap The Trump administration has capped the resettlement of refugees at 45,000 refugees for

FY2018, a decrease from the previous year’s total of 53,700. This is the lowest cap since the passing of the Refugee Act of 1980, which created the Federal Refugee Resettlement Program. During the last year of the Obama administration, the cap was 110,000.

Only about 20,000 refugees are expected to arrive in FY2018, which ends September 30.

Criminal prosecution of people who seek refuge

Both the Bush and Obama administrations detained families that made unauthorized crossings at the U.S.-Mexico border. So, President Trump is not the first president to detain families. The difference is in scale.

On January 25, 2017 President Trump issued two Executive Orders; the net effect was to impose greater burdens on undocumented immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.

In April 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced a zero-tolerance policy on adults deemed to have entered the United States irregularly from Mexico. Under this policy, anyone without prior authorization to enter the United States is arrested by the U.S. Border Patrol, charged with unauthorized entry, referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution, and placed in detention.

Untangling the current U.S. refugee program

Written by Sonal Marwah

Irregular Migration

Inaccessible?


Irregular Migration

Adults are treated as criminals, while their children are labeled “unaccompanied minors,” and placed in the care of Health and Human Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement. Approximately 3,000 children, including 102 under the age of five, have been separated from parents.

Under intense domestic and international pressure, on June 20, Trump issued an Executive Order that ended family separations. But reuniting families has been difficult and expensive. In some cases, parents have already been deported. Other parents are not eligible to be reunited with their children.

Refugee claimants who present at the border are considered “arriving aliens” and are subject to the Department of Homeland Security for “parole” determinations. However, there is evidence that some border officials are turning people away, stopping them from even setting foot in the United States.

Rolling back protections for women refugees

According to the United Nations, a refugee is someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.

The U.S. interpretation of the term “refugee” is narrower than international standards,

including Canada’s. It is also more contentious, with groups unable to agree, for decades, on what constitutes a “particular social group.”

Still, according to the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, in recent years, women fleeing gender-based violence have been able to obtain asylum in the United States by claiming

persecution as members of a “particular social group.” Such cases have succeeded when they have demonstrated that the applicant’s country was unable or unwilling to offer them protection.

However, this past June, Attorney General Jeff Sessions reversed an immigration appeals court ruling in the case Matter of A-B-, seeking to narrow the legal basis for a

credible fear of persecution needed to make an asylum claim.

Ms. A-B- arrived in the United States from El Salvador seeking asylum. A victim of extreme spousal abuse, she had first made many unsuccessful attempts to secure protection from the Salvadoran authorities before she decided to flee the country. Her asylum case was sent to the Charlotte Immigration Court, where her claim was rejected.

Ms. A-B- then appealed her case to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which unanimously found that her claim met the requirements for asylum. The case was returned to the judge who was to grant her asylum, in accordance with their decision.

Attorney General Sessions unilaterally decided to adjudicate the case himself. He determined that private activity is not grounds for asylum, including in cases of domestic violence. This interpretation goes against advisory opinions from the UN Refugee Agency that victims of domestic violence are potentially members of a “particular social group.”

TheU.S.interpretationof the term‘refugee’isnarrower than internationalstandards,includingCanada’s.Itisalsomorecontentious,withgroupsunabletoagree,fordecades,onwhatconstitutesa‘particularsocialgroup’.“


Irregular Migration

The regional context

Why so many Central American asylum seekers? Between 2011 and 2016, 161,742 people

from Central America’s northern triangle —El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—applied for asylum in the United States and other countries in the region. Forced internal displacement also appears to be widespread, although data is fragmented.

They were fleeing

• some of the world’s highest rates of ho-micide for countries not at war

• gang violence or forced recruitment• crime• poverty• domestic abuse and gender-based vio-

lence • a police force they distrusted and feared.

Governments at home were either unwilling or unable to protect their most vulnerable citizens.

The international context

The 1951 Refugee Convention Article 31 of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees prohibits penalizing refugees for unlawful entry or presence. It acknowledges that desperate people sometimes take desperate measures. Prosecuting asylum seekers for irregular entry before determining if they are entitled to asylum violates this Convention. By detaining migrant families, the United States is subverting its treaty obligations.

The rights of childrenAccording to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, a policy of separating children from their families “amounts

to arbitrary and unlawful interference in family life, and is a serious violation of the rights of the child.”

International instruments, including the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child mandate that states act in the “best interest of the child.” Specific Convention provisions address the rights of children to be with their parents and family:

• Article 7 - the right to know and be cared for by one’s parent

• Article 8 - the right to family relations without interference

• Article 9 - bans separation of parents from children except when it is necessary to ensure the best interest of the child.

The United States, the only country in the world NOT to ratify this Convention, is separating children from their parents as a deterrent and punishment; such an action is incompatible with the “best interest of the child.” The policy is having devastating effects on children and parents.

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has also called on the United States to stop family separation because children should never be detained for reasons related to their migration status or that of their parents.

Sonal Marwah is a Program Officer with Project Ploughshares. She can be reached at [email protected]. Thanks to Professor Alexander Vernon for his valuable feedback and to intern Selena Jones for her research assistance.

For more detail, see the website version of this article.


Irregular Migration

Irregular migration through Mexico to the United States has occurred for decades. However, the growing number of Central

American migrants (mainly from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras) crossing Mexico and the evolution of border controls and

enforcement require further scrutiny. The hard security policies implemented at the U.S.-Mexico border are diligently being enforced throughout Mexico and are extending to the southern Mexican border with Guatemala. This extension of U.S. border politics into Mexico benefits the United States, with Mexico acting as an extra U.S. border enforcer. The results for

migrants have been dangerous journeys and heightened risks of human-rights violations.

Irregular migration through MexicoAccording to the Instituto Nacional de Migración (INM), approximately 80,500 irregular migrants from Central America were detained in Mexico in 2017. Although official statistics cannot account for all irregular migrants, given their clandestine nature, these numbers help to highlight the violence in the so-called Northern Triangle of Central America, which, according to Amnesty International, has resulted in “one of the world’s most invisible refugee crises.”

Most irregular migrants are fleeing palpable violence in their countries of origin and seek asylum in either Mexico or the United States. They must travel approximately 1,500 kilometres to reach Texas (the shortest route to the United States) and close to 3,500 kilometres to arrive in California. During their arduous journeys through Mexico, they face more violence, with extortion, kidnapping, physical and sexual assault, and human trafficking all potential realities.

Those irregular migrants from lower socioeconomic strata, who do not have

A perilous journeyCentral American migrants are threatened with extortion, kidnapping, and sexual assault

Written by Carla Angulo-Pasel


Irregular Migration

sufficient funds to travel via more conventional modes of transportation, board a network of cargo freight trains, known as ‘La Bestia.’ Migrants travel on top of these trains; many fall off, dying or losing limbs. Others travelling on ‘La Bestia’ are targeted by criminal gangs, who board the trains and charge travellers a $U.S.100 “fee.” Migrants who do not pay can be beaten and/or thrown off the train and left for dead. With corruption common among authorities and train operators, these gangs operate with impunity.

The dangers for migrants, especially women

Because they need to remain hidden to avoid apprehension and detention, migrants tend to travel in more secluded, wooded areas, avoiding authorities and/or checkpoints. These areas are typically also targeted by criminal elements that can subject migrants to physical violence, which can be combined with rape, kidnapping. and human trafficking.

Migrants who are kidnapped are taken to “safe houses” and typically held for ransom. Migrant women, who are taken for human trafficking, are used for prostitution, typically in the border zones with Guatemala and the United States. The state of Chiapas, especially Tapachula, is well known for its brothels and bars in which prostitution takes place.

Exploitation combined with sexual violence is too often becoming a norm for migrant women. Although official statistics are inaccurate, as few crimes are reported by

migrants, members of civil society groups estimate that approximately 80 per cent of women transiting through Mexico will experience sexual violence. Sexual violence is so prevalent that women take contraceptives in preparation for the journey.

The role of Mexico and the United StatesIn the summer of 2014, the Mexican government implemented Programa Frontera Sur (Southern Border Plan). This policy, on paper, seeks to regulate the flow of Central American migrants, guarantee their human rights, and protect the region’s security. In reality, it has increased human-rights violations and the vulnerability of those seeking to move to the United States.

Implementation of this policy was at least partly a response to political pressure by the Obama administration, which was attempting to resolve the “border crisis” created when thousands of

unaccompanied minors overwhelmed the U.S. Border Patrol along the southern U.S. border. On the ground in Mexico, however, this policy justified the securitization of key internal migration corridors (train routes and highways), increasing police and military raids and adding checkpoints. It also prompted the escalation of abuse and the detention of hundreds of thousands of migrants. According to the INM, the number of irregular migrants from Central America detained in 2014 was 119,714, an increase of approximately 67 per cent from the previous year (80,757).

Not only did abuses by government authorities intensify, but migrants were more


Irregular Migration

easily targeted by criminal gangs, because migration routes and patterns had to change to avoid authorities. These changes took migrants away from established routes, often away from migrant shelters that intentionally operate along these corridors.

Evidence of heightened danger can be seen in the increase in the number of Humanitarian Visas that have been granted since 2014 (see chart). The Humanitarian Visa grants a foreigner temporary status for one year if that foreigner suffers a crime while on Mexican territory.

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights condemned the human rights violations that resulted after Programa Frontera Sur

was implemented and urged the Mexican government to adhere to international standards regarding the use of force in immigration enforcement operations.

How does the future look?The future of irregular migrants travelling through Mexico remains dangerous and uncertain.

The Trump administration’s anti-immigrant rhetoric has made it abundantly clear that the United States is not interested in providing asylum to Central American migrants,

despite its responsibilities under international conventions.

The U.S. Department of Justice has recently created further barriers to accessing legal claims of refugee status by prohibiting the use

of gang violence and gender-based violence as grounds for such claims.

The U.S. government has even proposed the negotiation of a bilateral agreement with Mexico that would designate Mexico as a “safe” country. This option would be like the Safe Third Country Agreement between Canada and the United States. But designating Mexico as a “safe” country for migrants clearly does not

consider the severe human-rights violations taking place throughout Mexico. Such a measure would be very controversial.

We can’t be sure how the newly elected Mexican president, Andreas Manuel Lopez Obrador, will handle irregular migration. Although he is a leftist politician, he is also considered a nationalist who is primarily interested in governing for the benefit of Mexicans, not foreigners. His comments on Twitter and various media reports indicate that he will aim to lower immigration and improve security. In other words, more of the same can be expected.

Dr. Carla Angulo-Pasel has a PhD in Global Governance from the Balsillie School of International Affairs in Waterloo, Ontario. She can be reached at [email protected].

Source: Secretaría de Gobernación

TheTrumpadministration’santi- immigrantrhetorichasmadeitabundantlyclearthattheUnitedStatesisnotinterestedinprovidingasylumtoCentralAmericanmigrants,despiteitsresponsibilitiesunderinternationalconventions.“

2014 2015 2016 2017

Humanitarian visas granted 623 1,481 3,971 9,642


Technology companies, governments, and militaries all want the rest of us to trust new systems and emerging technologies

that employ artificial intelligence to provide services, assist in policing, and even wage war more effectively and efficiently. They want us to feel “safer” with emerging technologies and artificial intelligence (AI). Do we? Should we?

The trust deficit The notion of a “trust deficit” in emerging tech and AI is getting a lot of attention these days According to a 2018 study by Proof Inc., only 37 per cent of Canadians trust that AI will improve their experience with consumer goods and 39 per cent trust that AI will be good for the economy.

The figures are even lower among Canadian women: 34 and 36 per cent, respectively. Higher distrust could be a response to evidence that some emerging technologies discriminate against women.

So, tech companies are developing principles and practices that ensure that their products contribute to the public good. To address concerns about the type of content that is promoted on some platforms, tech companies

are pushing for more AI, rather than human, oversight. For example, YouTube is increasingly using algorithms to remove problematic content before it can be viewed by anyone.

Facebook is giving users a “trustworthiness” score, which is designed to curb the spread of “fake news” and the reporting of information as fake simply because the user disagrees with it. To determine the credibility of an individual, Facebook, too, is relying on algorithms. We don’t know how these algorithms work, because Facebook claims that revealing more information would give malicious actors the means to thwart these measures.

Many critics are worried about the increasing use of algorithms to make decisions and provide scores about individual behaviour. They are most concerned about the ability of security and defence technologies to both dehumanize and surveil individuals.

Security and defence Militaries are investing heavily in autonomous systems that employ artificial intelligence and robotics. According to The Guardian, approximately 381 partly autonomous systems have been deployed or are being developed in

Autonomous Weapons

In algorithms we trust?

Written by Branka Marijan

Diminishing human control over military systems concerns experts

AI


Autonomous Weapons

12 countries, including the United States and Russia. The most notable public response has been revulsion, often referred to as the “ick factor.”

The number and sophistication of autonomous systems are bound to increase in the next few years. Already, countries are working to address the “trust deficit” of their citizens, so that they will come to accept and, yes, trust these new military and security applications as safe and beneficial.

The Canadian contextThe Canadian government is among those interested in developing autonomous systems for security and defence applications. The Department of National Defence (DND) is already focusing on solving the issue of public trust. Recently, DND put out a call for proposals on the theme of “Autonomous Systems for Defence and Security: Trust and Barriers to Adoption.” In the proposal, autonomous systems are defined as “systems with the capability to independently compose and select among various courses of action to accomplish goals based on its [information] and understanding of the world, itself, and the situation.” Essentially, these are systems which would be able to take actions without human input.

This diminishing human control over military systems is exactly what tech experts and international civil society organizations are flagging. But members of the military are also wary of using these systems, which rely on programming instead of hard-earned human expertise and experience—and empathy.

So, it is yet another cause of concern for both civil society and the military that the DND call for proposals appears to be aimed not at addressing the real weaknesses and problems with autonomous weapons systems, but achieving public acceptance of them.

It states, “Gaining trust in autonomous systems is problematic and requires solutions to encourage acceptance by the general public and defence and security sectors alike. Finding ways to maintain that trust is equally important.” The focus is not on building trust, but gaining trust.

This focus is telling. It seems to illustrate an already settled decision to commit to these new systems. The only problem that is considered is how to make the public go along with it.

Recognizing ethical concernsThe DND call for proposals not only disregards the numerous concerns related to emerging technologies and autonomous weapons, but seeks to circumvent them. These attempts to gain trust, rather than to fully respond to the reasons for distrust, only add to the deficit column when calculating public trust.

Canada is making large investments in research on artificial intelligence. It is in the interests of us all to ensure that diverse stakeholders are involved in discussions regarding governance and application of these technologies. Recognizing ethical concerns and funding research to better understand how autonomous systems would impact diverse individuals, contexts, and environments is crucial.

Canada has largely remained silent on the topic of autonomous weapons at global forums. If the call for proposals is any indication, Canada is failing to address the numerous concerns—humanitarian, technological, governance—that have been brought forward by leading Canadian tech experts, civil society groups, and concerned individuals.

Instead, the mantra seems to be “in algorithms we trust,” with the expectation that public opinion can be swayed to accept the idea of machines killing people. But how safe will we really be?

Branka Marijan is a Program Officer with Project Ploughshares. She can be reached at [email protected].


Ploughshares abroad

austria

japan

switzerland

Jessica West participated in UNISPACE+50, which marked the 50th anniversary of the first United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, on June 18 to 21 in Vienna, Austria.

Branka Marijan attended the Group of Governmental Experts meeting at the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in Geneva, Switzerland, held August 28 to 31. The CCW focused on emerging technologies, in particular the development of lethal autonomous weapons systems.

Cesar Jaramillo, second from right, attended the 4th Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), held in Tokyo, Japan, August 20 to 24. The ATT is the first international agreement to set rules on measures to regulate export and import controls of conventional weapons.

Cesar Jaramillo, second from left, participated in civil society workshops with the International Network on Explosive Weapons and the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots on July 17 to 20 in Santa Marta, Colombia.

colombia

Summer 2018

Project Ploughshares is pleased to announce that Program Officer Jessica West successfully defended her PhD thesis at the end of August, thereby completing her Global Governance program at the Balsillie School of International Affairs in Waterloo, Ontario.

Jessica joins Program Officer Branka Marijan, who was awarded a PhD from BSIA in 2015.

Congratulations, Dr. Jessica West!

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