the ploughshares monitor

The Ploughshares Monitor | Summer 2011 1

Ploughshares MonitorThe

Efforts to ban cluster bombs

A view from PakistanIran’s nuclear ambitions

as seen from next door

Keeping track of armsCanada’s exports to Sudan

reveal challenges of the ATT

Nuclear disarmamentIt is time for Canada

to take a leading role

After GadhafiIs Libya poised to be

the new Afghanistan?

AUTUMN 2011 | VOLUME 32 | ISSUE 3

A quarterly publication of Project Ploughshares • Available online: www.ploughshares.ca

by Earl Turcotteare under threat

Long-term menace

Long-term menaceEfforts to ban cluster munitions are under threat.by Earl Turcotte

The Ploughshares Monitor

Volume 32 | Issue 3

The Ploughshares Monitor is the quarterlyjournal of Project Ploughshares, the peace centre of The Canadian Council of Churches.Ploughshares works with churches, nongovernmental organizations and governments, in Canada and abroad, to advance policies and actions that preventwar and armed violence and build peace. Project Ploughshares is affiliated with the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies,Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo.

Office address: Project Ploughshares57 Erb Street WestWaterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2 Canada519-888-6541, fax: [email protected]; ww.ploughshares.ca

Project Ploughshares gratefully acknowledgesthe ongoing financial support of the many individuals, national churches and church agencies, local congregations, religious ordersand organizations across Canada that ensurethat the work of Project Ploughshares continues.

We are particularly grateful to The Simons Foundation in Vancouver for its generous support.

And we gratefully acknowledge the specialfinancial contribution of Mersynergy CharitableFoundation in 2011.

All donors of $50 or more receive a complimentary subscription to The Ploughshares Monitor. Annual subscription rates for libraries and institutionsare: $30 in Canada; $30 (U.S.) in the UnitedStates; $35 (U.S.) internationally. Single copiesare $5 plus shipping.

Unless indicated otherwise, material may be reproduced freely, provided the author andsource are indicated and one copy is sent to Project Ploughshares. Return postage is guaranteed.

Publications Mail Registration No. 40065122.ISSN 1499-321X.

The Ploughshares Monitor is indexed in the Canadian Periodical Index.

Photos of staff by Karl Griffiths-FultonPrinted at Waterloo Printing, Waterloo, Ontario.Printed with vegetable inks on paper with recycled content.

We acknowledge the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Canada Periodical Fund of the Department of Canadian Heritage.

Contents

Cover story

COVER: An unexploded BLU-97 cluster submunition lies on the ground in Afghanistan,near Bagram. John Rodsted/Cluster Munitions Coalition

A legacy for the takingThe time is now for Canada to make anti-nuclear history.by Cesar Jaramillo

PhotosFarewell Reception for Nancy Regehr

Iran, Pakistan and nuclear ambitionsWhat do Iran’s nuclear ambitions mean to Pakistan?by Nicole Waintraub

South Sudan’s unsteady startThe newborn nation faces daunting challenges. by John Siebert

Detour through DarfurCanada’s exports reveal the trouble with tracking arms.by Kenneth Epps

3

7

10

15

16

Autumn 2011Kenneth Epps

Maribel Gonzales

Debbie Hughes

Tasneem Jamal

Cesar Jaramillo

Anne Marie Kraemer

Matthew Pupic

Wendy Stocker

John Siebert Executive Director

PROJECT PLOUGHSHARES STAFF

more

23

Familiar opening scenesAre Canadian Forces in for another Afghanistan? by John Siebert

20

The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 2011 3

Long-termmenaceInternational efforts

to ban cluster munitions

are under threat

By Earl Turcotte

The extensive use of cluster

munitions during the last

three days of the conflict

between Israel and

Hezbollah in southern

Lebanon in the summer of 2006 provided

new impetus for the international commu-

nity to work toward their ban.

Cluster munitions are conventional

weapons designed to release or disperse

explosive submunitions over a wide area.

Each weapon typically contains hundreds

of submunitions; an average cluster bomb

can cover one square kilometre. In addi-

tion to causing often extensive “collateral

damage” at the time of use, many submu-

nitions fail to detonate on impact and re-

main a potent threat to civilians for

decades after peace has been restored.1

For years, the international community

was unable to secure a mandate to negoti-

ate a legally binding instrument on cluster

munitions in the traditional UN forum for

conventional arms discussions, the Con-

vention on Certain Conventional

Weapons (CCW). As a result, Norway,

with strong support from Austria, Ireland,

New Zealand, Mexico, and the Holy See,

ABOVE: MohammadAbd el Aal, 12, waswalking in the mountainsof Southern Lebanon inMarch 2009 when hestepped on an unex-ploded cluster submuni-tion. The resultingexplosion tore off his leg.Cluster Munition Coalition

The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 20114

led a process outside the CCW, beginning

in early 2007, which resulted in the negoti-

ation of the Convention on Cluster Muni-

tions. This process mirrored the model

Canada had established a decade earlier

with anti-personnel mines. In both in-

stances, the weapon in question has been

banned and States Parties have assumed

obligations to destroy stockpiles and clear

contaminated areas within a specific pe-

riod of time, and to rehabilitate victims.

States Parties are also required to im-

pose legal penalties for the commission of

acts forbidden by the Convention. Coun-

tries including France, Ireland, and the

U.K. have legislated prison sentences of

10 years or more.

Troubling questions about Canada

Although Canada was not among the six

states that led what became known as the

Oslo Process on Cluster Munitions, it par-

ticipated actively from the first formal

meeting in Oslo in February 2007 and was

among the first states to sign the Conven-

tion on Cluster Munitions when it opened

for signature on December 3, 2008. To

date, Canada has not ratified the Conven-

tion and so is not yet legally bound by its

provisions.

Throughout negotiations Canada

worked closely with likeminded states to

ensure the highest possible humanitarian

standard in the Convention while, at the

same time, ensuring that Canada and par-

ticipating allies could continue to engage

effectively in combined military opera-

tions with allies who have chosen not to

become party to the Convention. This last

concern led to the development of Article

21 of the Convention, which makes ex-

plicit provision for continued military in-

teroperability with non-party states.

Paragraph 3 of this Article states:

Notwithstanding the provisions of

Article 1 of this Convention and in

accordance with international law,

How cluster bombs work

Cluster bombs come in a variety of different forms

and are usually dropped from an airplane or fired

in artillery shells.

The spinning shell breaks away to release multiple

bomblets, known as submunitions, which disperse

over a wide area. An average cluster bomb can

cover one square kilometre.

Unexploded ordnance continues to kill and

maim, decades after bombs are dropped.

CLUSTER MUNITIONS


CLUSTER MUNITIONS

States Parties, their military person-

nel or nationals, may engage in mili-

tary cooperation and operations with

States not party to this Convention

that might engage in activities pro-

hibited to a State Party.

At least 77 states, including several

NATO members, possess cluster muni-

tions. Although Canada currently has clus-

ter munitions in its military arsenals, it has

never used them.

Other countries such as the U.S., which

used cluster munitions most recently in

the early days of the conflict in

Afghanistan, believe that these weapons

have great military utility and will likely

continue to use them in certain circum-

stances for the foreseeable future.

Given this reality, Article 21 is an es-

sential element of the Convention. It pre-

serves military alliances between States

Parties and non-party states that are vital

to Canada’s national interest and to global

peace and security. Without this Article,

NATO and similar military alliances

would be at some legal risk and it would

not have been possible for many states to

ban cluster munitions and to assume the

many other legally binding obligations

contained in the Convention.

However, Article 21 clearly does not

allow activities during combined military

operations with non-party states that

would diminish the object and purpose of

the Convention. Significant prohibitions

are still in place, as are positive obligations

of States Parties, including: to notify non-

party states of obligations under the Con-

vention, to encourage non-party states to

become party to the Convention, to pro-

mote the norms it establishes, and to

make best efforts to discourage states not

party to this Convention from using clus-

ter munitions. Article 21 is intended

mainly to ensure that the armed forces of

States Parties are not held legally liable for

activities contrary to the Convention that

may be carried out by the forces of non-

party states, despite the best efforts of

States Parties to discourage them.

Canada will likely ratify the Convention

during the next session of Parliament.

The process has been delayed since 2008

by an intense and protracted debate

among government officials to determine

which military activities would be legal or

politically and morally acceptable during

combined military operations with non-

party states.

To ratify the Cluster Munitions Con-

vention, the government is preparing leg-

islation that, among other things, will

specify penalties for the commission of

acts prohibited by the Convention. Al-

though I cannot disclose the specific rec-

ommendations that have been agreed by

the Department of Foreign Affairs and

International Trade and the Department

of National Defence, it is my considered

judgment that if the legislation as recom-

mended is adopted, some of the activities

that would be permitted during combined

operations with non-party states would be

At least 77 states, including several NATO members, possess cluster

munitions. Although Canada currently has cluster munitions

in its military arsenals, it has never used them.


CLUSTER MUNITIONS

inconsistent in the extreme with the ob-

ject and purpose of the Convention. In

some instances, Canada would be deliber-

ately and significantly aiding and abetting

the use of cluster munitions.

If these recommendations are passed

into Canadian law, I believe that Canada

will be isolated among the 109 signatories

for its unacceptably broad interpretation

of what is permitted under the Conven-

tion. Should Canadian Forces personnel

undertake the activities in question, they

would be vulnerable to prosecution in

other jurisdictions and by the Interna-

tional Criminal Court. Most disturbingly,

Canada could be complicit, if not respon-

sible, for more civilian deaths from the

use of this indiscriminate and inhumane

weapon.

Threat on another front

Numerous members of the Convention

on Certain Conventional Weapons, includ-

ing the U.S., Russia, China, India, Pakistan,

and Brazil have expressed no interest in

becoming party to the Convention on

Cluster Munitions. The CCW established

a Group of Governmental Experts that

has been negotiating a separate instru-

ment on cluster munitions for almost four

years, but with no agreement to date. As

the CCW operates on the basis of consen-

sus decision-making, any one state can,

and often does, prevent agreement on

substantive measures.

Unlike the Convention on Cluster Mu-

nitions, the latest Chair’s draft text under

consideration in the CCW contains:

i) a complete ban only of cluster muni-

tions produced before 1980;

ii) no required technical measures to

ensure greater accuracy of such

weapons, beyond a general statement

that states should strive for greater ac-

curacy;

iii) only one fail-safe feature to ensure

greater reliability (that has proven inad-

equate to date);

iv) no limitation on the number or

weight of submunitions;

v) no deadline for stockpile destruction;

vi) no definition of a cluster munition

victim;

vii) a deferral period of up to 12 years,

during which any cluster munition pro-

duced after 1980 can be used.

If widely adopted, this text could lead

to the fragmentation of international hu-

manitarian law and possibly undermine

the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Moreover, it will be of negligible humani-

tarian benefit.

It seems, then, that the Convention on

Cluster Munitions is under some threat,

from within and without. People of con-

science must do everything possible to

ensure that States Parties and countries

such as Canada, which aspire to become

a state party to the Convention, reflect

their very real international legal obliga-

tions in their national laws, policies, and

actions. They must also ensure that lesser

international instruments such as the

draft text under negotiation in the CCW

do not weaken the high standards

achieved in the Convention on Cluster

Munitions. The innocent victims of war

deserve nothing less. �

Notes

1. More information on cluster munitions can be found in the Autumn 2007 Ploughshares Monitor at www.ploughshares.ca.

2. Further information about this event and cluster munitions can be found on the Group of 78 website: www.web.net/~group78.

Earl Turcotte

was the Senior

Coordinator for

Mine Action at

the Canadian

Department of

Foreign Affairs and Interna-

tional Trade (DFAIT) from 2005

to early 2011. He led the Cana-

dian delegation throughout

the negotiation of the Conven-

tion on Cluster Munitions. In

February 2011, he resigned on

principle from DFAIT to

protest what he believes are

seriously flawed joint recom-

mendations from DFAIT and

the Department of National

Defence on legislation de-

signed to enable Canada to

ratify the Convention on Clus-

ter Munitions. This article is

based on a June 2011 presen-

tation by Turcotte to the

Group of 78 in Ottawa.2

[email protected]

Aremarkable conflu-

ence of circumstances has

opened up a window of

opportunity for Canada to advance

what is arguably the most important

international security issue in history:

the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Not since the heyday of Canada’s

contributions to peacekeeping opera-

tions and its championing of the Ot-

tawa Treaty to ban landmines has this

country had such a propitious oppor-

tunity to make a lasting mark on the

global stage as it does now with nu-

clear disarmament.

This month Canadian civil society

leaders sent Prime Minister Stephen

Harper a set of recommendations on

the role that Canada should play to

advance the objective of a nuclear

weapons-free world. (See page 9.)

Copies were also sent to members of

all federal political parties; key gov-

ernment officials at the Department

of Foreign Affairs, the Canadian Nu-

clear Safety Commission and the De-

partment of National Defence;

Members of Parliament; and Sena-

tors and over two dozen diplomatic

missions in Ottawa.

Specifically, the Canadian Gov-

ernment is being asked to take con-

crete steps to implement a historic

motion passed unanimously by the

House of Commons and Senate in

2010. The motion urges the govern-

ment “to engage in negotiations for

a Nuclear Weapons Convention as

proposed by the United Nations

Secretary-General” and “to deploy a

major world-wide Canadian diplo-

matic initiative in support of pre-

venting nuclear proliferation and

increasing the rate of nuclear disar-

mament.”

Canada is uniquely positioned to

assume such a leadership role. Be-

sides enjoying well-earned interna-

tional credibility as an honest broker,

the country is a member of NATO,

an active player in the global nuclear

energy industry, a state party to the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,

and a member of the G8 and G20.

Yet the Harper government has

failed to make nuclear disarmament a

top foreign policy priority.

Could it be because there is a lack of

domestic support for nuclear disarma-

ment?

No. Civil society organizations

across the country, as well as former

diplomats and government officials,

and more than 550 recipients of the

Order of Canada are urging the

Canadian Government to respond

to the groundswell of support for

concrete steps toward nuclear disar-

mament. Polls have shown that

more than 88 per cent of Canadians

would support an enforceable

agreement to eliminate nuclear

weapons.

Might the Canadian government be re-

luctant to support a cause that does not

resonate with the international public?


A legacy for the taking

Cesar Jaramillo

The stars are aligned for Canada to take a leading role

in the movement to eliminate nuclear weapons

Nuclear Free

Zone

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

8 The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 2011

No. In more than 20 countries, includ-

ing the five major nuclear powers,

polls show that more than 75 per cent

of people are in favour of a nuclear

weapons ban. The organization May-

ors for Peace, with a membership of

more than 5,000 mayors from around

the world, is rigorously campaigning

for a ban. The UN Secretary-General

has made nuclear disarmament a key

priority, and more than two-thirds of

UN members have voted in favour of

negotiating a convention to prohibit

nuclear weapons.

Could it be, then, that the government

does not want to antagonize the United

States?

No. In a departure from past U.S.

policy, President Barack Obama has

publicly committed to the goal of a

world free of nuclear weapons. In

Prague, in 2009, he called upon the

international community to take

concrete steps toward this end.

Since the emergence of nuclear

weapons over 60 years ago, there

has been no more opportune time

for Canada to take up the cause of

nuclear disarmament without fear

of upsetting its influential neigh-

bour to the south.

It is hard to find a compelling reason

why the Canadian government has

not made nuclear disarmament a top

priority. Fortunately, the window of

opportunity is still open. But just

barely. The U.S. presidential race will

soon be in full swing and there is no

guarantee Mr. Obama or his position

on nuclear weapons will remain intact.

Canada could show its unequivo-

cal resolve to play a key role in this

process, for instance, by heeding the

first of six specific recommendations

that have just been sent to the Prime

Minister:

Canada should support UN res-

olutions calling for formal nego-

tiations toward a nuclear

weapons convention to begin in

2014, and should offer to host in

2012 a preparatory committee

meeting of states and civil soci-

ety representatives to begin plan-

ning for that negotiation process.

The process of nuclear disarma-

ment will be complex and the road to

an actual convention that eliminates

nuclear weapons will have obstacles.

All the more reason to start laying the

groundwork for a Nuclear Weapons

Convention now, before the acciden-

tal or deliberate detonation of a nu-

clear weapon—by a state or non-state

actor—reminds the world of just

how urgent this matter is.

The Canadian Government could

play a critical role in ridding the

world of the most destructive

weapons ever conceived. At the same

time, it would illustrate the response

of a democratic government to the

explicit desires of its citizens and

elected representatives. And it is hard

to think of a more valuable legacy

for the Prime Minister than paving

the way to a world free of nuclear

weapons. �

Cesar Jaramillo is a Project Officer

with Project Ploughshares.

[email protected]

LEFT: U.S. PresidentBarack Obama publiclycommitted to the goal ofa world free of nuclearweapons in April 2009.He is pictured here withUN Secretary-GeneralBan Ki-moon at the Se-curity Council Summit onnuclear non-proliferationlater that year. Mark Garten/UN

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

9The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 2011

Recommendations of the Sponsoring Groups

The Ottawa Experts Seminar on a Nuclear Weapons Convention, held April 11 and 12, included participants from the

academic community and civil society, as well as diplomats, parliamentarians, and government officials. The discussions addressed

a broad range of legal, political, security, and verification requirements for progress toward a global legal ban on nuclear weapons.

Taking into account the deliberations at the seminar, the sponsoring groups—Canadian Pugwash, Physicians for Global Survival,

Project Ploughshares, and World Federalist Movement – Canada—put forward the following recommendations:

1.Canada should support UN resolutions calling for formal negotiations toward a nuclear weapons convention to begin in 2014 and

should offer to host in 2012 a preparatory committee meeting of states and civil society representatives to begin planning for that

negotiation process.

2. The Minister of Foreign Affairs should welcome the unanimous motions in the Senate and House of Commons calling for a new

Canadian diplomatic initiative in support of nuclear disarmament and request that a special joint committee of the Senate and

House of Commons hold hearings and prepare a report on how best to implement those unanimous motions.

3.The Government of Canada should re-establish a special disarmament verification unit within the Department of Foreign Affairs

and International Trade. Significant human and financial capital should be directed toward building Canadian expertise with regard

to nuclear disarmament, drawing on lessons learned from verification regimes related to nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear testing,

and chemical weapons. An urgent priority is the development of verification procedures and technology in support of the still to be

negotiated fissile materials treaty. The overall focus of the new unit should be to develop and implement credible verification mecha-

nisms, procedures, and technology to ensure compliance with a nuclear weapons convention.

4.Canada should continue its efforts within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to promote transparency and accountability

and to address the NPT’s “institutional deficit.” Such measures include proposals for annual decision-making meetings of the NPT,

for the establishment of an ongoing administrative support unit, and for more consistent and comprehensive reporting by States

Parties regarding national efforts toward full compliance with the NPT.

5. In support of the NPT Review Conference’s call on states "to further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all

military and security concepts, doctrines and policies," Canada should initiate discussions within NATO with a view to ending the Al-

liance’s reliance on nuclear deterrence. Such discussions should include the call for an immediate no-first-use pledge by NATO, as

well as increased attention to transforming the security relationship between Russia and NATO. Canada should also insist on the re-

moval of NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons from the territories of non-nuclear weapons states in Europe, and encourage discussions

to begin leading to a global legal ban on nuclear weapons.

6.Canada should restore the practice of an inclusive approach to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to take advantage of the

expertise within the NGOs, for example, by restoration of the annual government-civil society consultation and by naming represen-

tatives of civil society organizations to the Canadian delegation to the First Session of the NPT Preparatory Committee, 2012. In this

regard, we are pleased to note Canada’s endorsement of the “Berlin Statement by Foreign Ministers on nuclear disarmament and

non-proliferation” of April 30, 2011, which includes this promise: "We will actively promote disarmament and non-proliferation edu-

cation, based on our conviction that education is a powerful tool for mobilizing further disarmament and non-proliferation efforts

globally by enhancing awareness and understanding among our citizens.”


Detour through Darfur


The different methods Canada used to export armsto Darfur expose the challenges of tracking weapons

Canada has made laudable

efforts in recent years to

support African security

forces conducting peace-

keeping operations under

adverse conditions in Sudan’s Darfur re-

gion. Contributions have included dona-

tions of security equipment and services.

The different methods and routes Canada

has used to send equipment to peacekeep-

ing troops in Sudan illustrate the complexi-

ties of arranging and monitoring

international arms transfers. They also ex-

pose one of the core challenges to negoti-

ating an effective global Arms Trade Treaty.

Since 2004 the Canadian government

has provided transportation and other

equipment to the security forces of the

African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)

and the subsequent African Union/

United Nations Mission in Darfur (UN-

AMID). The largest equipment ship-

ments1 have been:

• Armoured vehicles, shipped from

Canada in 2005 to Senegal, and then

to Sudan. Surplus Canadian Forces

vehicles—100 Grizzly personnel car-

riers and five Husky recovery vehi-

cles manufactured by General

Motors Canada—were supplied on

loan to the armed forces of Nigeria,

Rwanda, and Senegal. Under Opera-

tion Augural, Canada’s Department

of National Defence (DND) pro-

vided training for the troops operat-

ing the armoured vehicles. The

vehicles were used for Darfur peace-

keeping operations until June 30,

2009.

• 24 MRAP (Mine resistant and am-

bush protected) vehicles for police

forces from Burkina Faso, Senegal,

and Uganda to use in Darfur. The

MRAP vehicles were built in South

Africa and shipped to the three

African states in 2009 and 2010.

When related equipment and opera-

tor and maintenance training are in-

cluded, the MRAP vehicles cost

more than $35-million (Pugliese

2009).

• Helicopters and fixed wing aircraft,

leased from private operators.

Canada spent over $95-million on

the charter of up to 25 helicopters

and two AN 74 transport aircraft

from September 2004 to early 2007.2

The aircraft were manufactured in

Russia, Canada, and elsewhere and

their transfer to Sudan was arranged

by the operators. Although the air-

craft provided airlift capacity for

AMIS and UNAMID troops, they

were piloted by civilians. The

arrangement is an example of pri-

vate sector provision of military sup-

port equipment and services.

By Kenneth Epps

OPPOSITE: CanadianGrizzly armoured vehi-cles arrive in August2005 at the Port ofDakar in Senegal enroute to Sudan. Marc Lacourse/DND


CANADIAN MILITARY EXPORTS

Reporting and monitoring shipments

In submissions to the UN Register of

Conventional Arms from 2005 to 2008,

Canada reported “100 Grizzly APC [ar-

moured personnel carriers] are on loan to

African Union mission in Darfur, Sudan”

as part of the background information on

Canadian military holdings. When the pe-

riod of their loan ended in 2009, the ar-

moured vehicles—98 Grizzlies and five

Husky armoured recovery vehicles—were

shipped from Sudan to Uruguay. (Two

Grizzlies were destroyed during the peace-

keeping missions.) Canada reported the

transfer to Uruguay (via Sudan) to the UN

Register.3

Canadian shipments of the armoured

vehicles thus were made transparent by

the reports to the UN Register. From the

Register records it is possible to independ-

ently monitor reported arms transfers,

even if this must occur after the fact.

In the case of the MRAP vehicles,

Canada appears to have operated like an

arms broker, arranging financing and

shipment details without producing or

holding the shipped equipment. Although

the vehicles are military armoured vehi-

cles, Canada did not report the donated

vehicles to the UN Register or in Cana-

dian reports on military exports. As the

supplier, South Africa documented the

transfer of six GILA MRAP vehicles to

Burkina Faso and 12 vehicles to Senegal

in its submission to the UN Register for

2009. (The six vehicles for Uganda may

yet be reported by South Africa in future

submissions to the UN Register.)

The three recipients have not reported

the import of the MRAP vehicles from

South Africa. Nor have they reported

their subsequent shipment to Sudan, al-

though the UN Register does not require

reports of transfers if the exporting state

retains title and control of the equipment.

(If the vehicles were left in Sudan and title

transferred to another state, however, this

would constitute an export.) It is also un-

likely that the African states will report the

return of the MRAP vehicles to their

home territory. As a result, the move-

ments of the armoured vehicles from

South Africa to the three African opera-

tors and then to and from Sudan have

been, at best, only partially transparent.

According to a 2010 release from the

Canadian government, following the six-

month deployment of Ugandan police

and vehicles to Sudan that year, “the Gov-

ernment of Uganda will have the choice

of using the vehicles and equipment to

extend the deployment or take part in

other peacekeeping missions around the

world” (Government of Canada 2010).

For the moment, the vehicles remain in

Sudan with the security forces of the

three African states, all of which have re-

newed their peacekeeping commitments

in Darfur. Despite the conditions set by

the Canadian government, however, it is

not clear how future use or repatriation of

the vehicles will be monitored and re-

ported.

There are important concerns about

repatriation of the MRAP vehicles in par-

ticular. In Uganda, for example, there is a

significant risk that following repatriation

the GILA vehicles will be used by security

forces to repress legitimate political oppo-

sition to a less-than-democratic govern-

ment. Human rights monitors have

reported the recent use of armoured vehi-

cles by Ugandan police and soldiers to at-

Canada may provide equipment to protect

human rights in one country, only to risk

subsequent human rights violations with

the same equipment in another country.



tack demonstrators (Human Rights Watch

2011). Canada thus may provide equip-

ment to protect human rights in one

country, only to risk subsequent human

rights violations with the same equipment

in another country.

Concurrently with the armoured vehi-

cle shipments, Canada chartered aircraft in

Darfur to supply troops and to assist mili-

tary medical evacuation. (DFAIT has cited

at least one occasion in 2007 when a Mil

MI-8 helicopter was used to evacuate

Nigerian AMIS peacekeepers that had

been wounded during an attack on their

camp by rebels.) Because the aircraft were

leased, they will be removed from Sudan

by their operators when the contracts are

completed. The chartered aircraft do not

fall within the categories of the UN Regis-

ter. Canada also does not document leased

equipment in its report on Canadian mili-

tary exports, particularly if, as in this case,

the equipment is certified as civilian, re-

gardless of military end-users.

Indeed, Canada has no mechanism to

report the transfer of chartered helicop-

ters for military end-use. In the case of

Darfur, Canada reported the costs to hire

helicopters and fixed wing aircraft to sup-

port the African Union peacekeeping

troops, but did not report the number or

nature of the cross-border transfers in-

volved. This is not unusual. Currently,

there is little to no transparency in the in-

ternational movement of equipment

owned by private security firms.

Transfer transactions

The equipment provided by Canada for

peacekeeping missions in Darfur illus-

trates some of the many types of transac-

tion used to transfer equipment between

and among states for military end-use.

The Grizzly and Husky armoured vehicle

RIGHT: Master CorporalGilles Laplante, a driverinstructor, stands withAfrican Union troops inThies, Senegal, after aday of driver training onthe Grizzly armoured ve-hicle in August 2005.Marc Lacourse/DND


shipments are illustrative of government-

to-government transfers as loaned equip-

ment. Canada retained ownership of the

armoured vehicles in Sudan, and subse-

quently transferred title when the vehicles

were shipped to Uruguay.

The MRAP shipments also were gov-

ernment-to-government transfers, but as

donated equipment. Titles to the MRAP

vehicles were transferred to Burkina Faso,

Senegal, and Uganda. Canada sponsored

the use of the vehicles in Sudan.

The chartering of aircraft illustrates the

growing use of equipment owned and op-

erated by private contractors for military

missions. Private security actors within

military operations have created many

grey areas of responsibility, particularly in

situations involving armed conflict. This

includes responsibility for authorizing and

reporting transfers of military equipment.

States use many types of transaction to

legitimately transfer military goods to

other states. These include imports, ex-

ports, transit and transshipment of goods

through intermediate states, as well as

transfers arising from sales, gifts, loans,

leasing, and military aid. Actors include

state officials as well as private agents such

as brokers, transporters, and financial

backers. Illicit and irresponsible arms

traders may rely on parallel or even over-

lapping actors and agencies to conduct

arms transfers. To reduce criminal

weapons transfers and better control the

international trade in military goods, all

transactions and actors must be effectively

regulated, and decisions to authorize arms

transfers, as well as arms deliveries, should

be reported in a transparent manner.

Preliminary meetings to negotiate a

global Arms Trade Treaty have included

discussions of scope, which is taken to in-

clude not only the range of weapons,

components, ammunition, and services to

be included in the treaty, but also the

range of transactions used to transfer mil-

itary equipment among states. As illus-

trated by Canada’s equipment transfers to

support peacekeeping operations in

Sudan, the type, source, and route of mili-

tary equipment from one state to another

can vary widely. To prevent loopholes that

will be used by criminal and irresponsible

arms traders, Arms Trade Treaty negotia-

tions must reach a comprehensive inter-

pretation of scope. Treaty provisions must

ensure that all equipment transferred for

use by security forces is appropriately au-

thorized, tracked, and reported. �

Notes

1. DND also supplied other equipment such as

helmets.

2. This does not include $23-million spent by the

Canadian International Development Agency

(CIDA) on aviation fuel and temporary police sta-

tions near IDP camps. Sources of cost estimates

are from a Government of Canada press release,

November 25, 2004 and CIDA Project Browser.

3. The figures reported to the UN Register do not

correspond to the data from Report on the Export

of Military Goods from Canada 2007-2009 by For-

eign Affairs and International Trade Canada

(DFAIT). Although DFAIT reported recent ship-

ments of Item 2-6 goods (ground vehicles and

components) to Uruguay, they were valued at

$1,256,960 during 2007 and $150,000 during

2008. The report identified no shipments of mili-

tary goods to Uruguay in 2009.

References

Government of Canada. 2010. Canada and the

Netherlands supplies vehicles and equipment to

Uganda Police for Darfur Peacekeeping. Press re-

lease, February 9.

Human Rights Watch. 2011. Uganda: Launch In-

dependent Inquiry into Killings. May 8.

Pugliese, David. 2009. David Pugliese’s Defence

Watch, Ottawa Citizen, October 7.

Kenneth Epps

is Senior

Program

Officer

with Project

Ploughshares.

[email protected]



The world welcomed its

newest state on July 9, 2011.

The Republic of South

Sudan became the 54th country in

Africa, in the culmination of the six-

year process outlined in the Compre-

hensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

signed in January 2005 between the

Government of Sudan and the Sudan

People’s Liberation Army/Movement

(SPLA/M). The celebrations by South

Sudanese at home and abroad have

been exuberant, but it is hard to shake

a lingering sense of foreboding.

The act of creating a new country

from the territory of an existing coun-

try is generally a recipe for more con-

flict rather than part of the resolution

of a decades-long civil war. In this

case, however, there can be no argu-

ment with the outcome. In January the

people of South Sudan overwhelm-

ingly voted to create their own country

in an internationally recognized refer-

endum on self-determination. With

considerable international pressure

being applied to Sudan to recognize

the referendum outcome, Sudanese

President Omar al-Bashir complied

and subsequently attended the inde-

pendence ceremonies in Juba, the in-

terim capital of the new Republic.

Even if the prospect of war be-

tween the two states has receded, both

still face disruptive internal conflicts.

Sudan’s President, who came to

power in a coup, stands indicted by

the International Criminal Court for

crimes committed against civilians in

Darfur. While continuing to engage in

violence in Darfur, al-Bashir’s govern-

ment recently renewed armed assaults

in the Sudanese states of South Kord-

ofan and Blue Nile. The majority pop-

ulations of these states are aligned

tribally, politically, and militarily with

the SPLA in the south. The border

state of Abyei, claimed by both Sudan

and South Sudan, was recently over-

run by Sudan’s military. Behaviour in

Sudan is no longer moderated by

southern participation in the national

government, which marked the six-

year interim period of the CPA.

South Sudan starts life as an inde-

pendent state as one of the poorest

and least developed countries in the

world. Despite a pressing need for so-

cial services, roads, schools, and hos-

pitals, emerging government

structures are weak and still unable to

deliver. An estimated 40 per cent of

the annual national budget is commit-

ted to military and police forces. Such

a concentration of funds on security

is not compatible with longer-term

sustainable development.

The government and military of

South Sudan are dominated by one

ethnic group, the Dinka, but long-held

resentments and tensions with the

Nuer and other groups threaten inter-

nal coherence. Tensions, earlier

checked by focusing on a common

northern foe, have increased over po-

litical representation and the negotia-

tion of an interim and then a

permanent constitution. Former SPLA

generals recently launched rebellions in

outlying areas. Intensive pastoralist

raids continue between communities,

leaving hundreds dead and countless

uprooted as people flee for safety.

Sudan and South Sudan, now sepa-

rate countries, have no choice but to

continue to work together as neigh-

bours. They are inextricably linked to-

gether by oil, which is primarily

extracted in South Sudan, but shipped

through Sudan’s pipelines and de-

pendent upon Sudan’s refining and

shipping infrastructure. Oil accounts

for the vast majority of revenues of

both governments.

Negotiations continue between

Sudan and South Sudan on such cru-

cial matters as shared oil revenues, bor-

der demarcation, and citizenship. But

many difficult issues remain unre-

solved. What status will Sudan’s cur-

rency have in South Sudan? Many

people from Sudan in the north live in

South Sudan and vice versa. In which

country will they have citizenship?

How will property ownership be recog-

nized, trade patterns adjusted, and

countless social interactions maintained

along what is now an unmarked but

potentially lethal international border?

The peace promised in the wake of

the birth of the Republic of South

Sudan is most assuredly welcome. It

also is fragile. The international com-

munity will need to stay alert and active

in support of stability and develop-

ment in Sudan and South Sudan if this

is to remain a good news story. �

South Sudan’s unsteady start

John Siebert

Africa’s newest nation is born, but it is poor, weak

and faces internal and external conflicts


Developments in Iran’s

nuclear program are

often viewed from the

perspective of North

American and Euro-

pean policy priorities. Here I explore the

issue from the perspective of one of

Iran’s most embroiled neighbours: Pak-

istan. This article, which draws on a series

of confidential interviews with retired

Pakistani senior military and diplomatic

officials and nuclear scientists, is part of a

larger research project to gauge the per-

spectives of Iran’s neighbours on the pos-

sible development of nuclear weapons by

Iran.

Generally positive relations between

Pakistan and Iran are rooted in a common

history, ethnicity, and language. Neverthe-

less, Pakistan’s relationship with Iran has

vacillated greatly over the past half-cen-

tury. It can be broadly divided into four

periods: the reign of Shah Mohammed

Reza Pahlavi of Iran (1941-1979), the

Khomeini years (1979-1989), the post-

Khomeini period (the 1990s), and post-

9/11 (2001-present).

The time of the Shah was viewed by

many as a period of enlightenment in the

Muslim world because of the leadership

of secular modernists in the formation of

the nascent nation states of Turkey, Iran,

Iran, Pakistan and nuclear ambitions

Interviews with Pakistani officials shed light on the relationship between the neighbours

By Nicole Waintraub


IRAN-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

and Pakistan. Pakistan’s government be-

came a secular military dictatorship under

Ayub Khan and relations with Iran grew

stronger.1 At one point, there were sug-

gestions that Pakistan, Iran, and

Afghanistan could form a confederation

of states, bolstered by oil from Iran and

manpower from Pakistan; this idea, never

developed, lingered in the minds of many

people. Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan

did, however, cooperate with Turkey in

forming the Regional Cooperation for

Development to encourage mutual eco-

nomic and social development. As well,

both Iran and Pakistan were key players in

U.S. alliance politics of the Cold War to

contain the influence of the Soviet Union

in the region.2

Pakistan-Iran relations shifted dramati-

cally in the late 1970s with the revolution-

ary overthrow of the Shah in Iran3 and

the rise to power in Pakistan of President

Zia-ul-Haq, a devout Sunni leader. Not

only did Iran and Pakistan experience

growing ideological friction, they also had

vastly different regional orientations. At

the time, Iran saw its nemesis as Iraq and

the Arab world, while Pakistan was fo-

cused on its rivalry with India and, begin-

ning in 1980, the Soviet Union’s

occupation of Afghanistan. Pakistan’s nu-

clear program developed in this context,

primarily in response to the development

of nuclear weapons by its arch-rival, India.

Although Iran and Pakistan attempted

to rebuild their relationship during the

1990s, their efforts were complicated by

clashing approaches to Afghanistan. While

Iran supported the Shi’a minority in

Afghanistan, Pakistan supported the pre-

dominantly Sunni Taliban. Despite this

important difference, an overwhelming

force in favour of rapprochement was a

common heavy scrutiny and sanction by

the U.S.—Pakistan because of its growing

nuclear weapons program and Iran be-

cause of its open disregard of U.S. policy

directives.4

After the events of September 11, 2001

and the invasion of Afghanistan, the

Afghanistan factor changed completely.

Iran, increasingly antagonistic toward the

U.S. under President Ahmedinejad, saw

the invasion driving the Taliban out of

Afghanistan while at the same time bog-

ging the U.S. down in a counter-insur-

gency war. Meanwhile, Pakistan found

itself ambiguously aligned with the U.S. in

the so-called “war against terror.”

Commentators acknowledge the prob-

lematic dealings that Pakistan has main-

ABOVE: Shah Mo-hammed Reza Pahlaviand his wife, Farah, arepictured in Tehran in1968. Relations betweenIran and Pakistan werestrong during the Shah’sreign. UN Photo


tained with the Taliban. Nevertheless, it is

understood that Pakistan’s cooperation is

fundamentally important to U.S. objectives

in the region. This tenuous relationship

between Pakistan and the U.S. has harmed

Pakistan’s relations with Iran.

To be sure, other factors have a bearing

on the relationship between Pakistan and

Iran. Most notable of these is the rise of

China and the economic opportunities it

creates for both countries. Iran and Pak-

istan have independently formed ties with

China based on economic interests and, in

Pakistan’s case, to counter-balance India’s

role in the region. Relations of these four

countries are and will remain complicated.

For example, China’s development of the

Gwadar Port in Pakistan is an important

component of its sea connections to

North Africa.5 However, this port is in di-

rect competition with the Chabahar Port

in Iran, an Indian initiative that is seen in

Pakistan as an attempt by India to deny

China its foothold in the region and to

undermine Pakistan’s longstanding role in

transit trade with Afghanistan.

On the nuclear issue

Many of the experts I interviewed think

that the Western press has radically over-

stated the nuclear relationship between

Iran and Pakistan. They believe that A.Q.

Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist who,

between 1980 and 2000, covertly sold de-

signs and technology to support nuclear

weapons development in Libya, Iran, and

North Korea, was personally greedy, but

not working for the political and military

leadership in Pakistan when selling

abroad. Although elements of Pakistan’s

military establishment supported nuclear

proliferation in Iran, the Pakistani govern-

ment did not take this position officially

or publicly. Pakistan staunchly supports

every country’s right to nuclear energy, but

only for peaceful purposes.

When asked to outline perceptions held

by the general public on the possible mili-

tarization of nuclear development in Iran,

my sources listed the following:

1. Anti-American – Some believe that

the U.S. is trying to ensure that no fur-

ther Islamic countries develop a nuclear

weapon. Iraq and Libya figure promi-

nently here. Many Pakistanis hold that

the more weapons Pakistan produces,

the more difficult it will be for the U.S.

to dismantle its nuclear weapons pro-

gram. This view tends to be more sym-

pathetic to further development of

Iran’s nuclear program.

2. Balance of power in the Middle East –

Some feel that Israel’s nuclear weapons

monopoly in the Middle East is prob-

lematic. Thus, it would not necessarily

be a bad thing for Iran to balance the

power dynamic in the region with nu-

clear weapons of its own. Such a devel-

opment would not, however, have a

direct impact on Pakistan.

3. Sunni vs. Shi’a rivalry – Others be-

lieve that an Iranian nuclear bomb

would be a Shi’a bomb, which could

provide sufficient grounds for the pre-

dominantly Sunni Saudi Arabia and the

United Arab Emirates to acquire their

own nuclear weapons. Such a develop-

ment is undesirable, as it would place a

significant amount of pressure on Pak-

istan.

4. Nuclear weapons nonproliferation –

Some feel that the nonproliferation

regime is a coalition of the likeminded.

Friends with nuclear weapons are given

support and a seat at the table, while

others are vilified and sanctioned. In

this view, countries with a nuclear-

weapons capability that capitulate to

outside pressure leave themselves vul-

nerable.

Official thinking in Pakistan focuses on

the dire consequences at domestic, re-

Nicole

Waintraub

was an intern

with Project

Ploughshares

from September

2010 to August

2011.

[email protected]




gional, and international levels should Iran

develop nuclear weapons:

1. Nuclear proximity – If Iran were to

develop nuclear weapons, Pakistan

would be flanked by two nuclear-armed

countries—Iran on the west and India

on the east. At best, relations with Iran

have been mixed. Relations with India

have degenerated into war on several

occasions. Being sandwiched between

two nuclear-armed states would make

Pakistan very uncomfortable.

2. Sunni-Shi’a tensions – There is con-

cern that the Shi’a minority in Pakistan

(approximately 15-20 per cent of the

total population) would be emboldened

if Iran were to develop a nuclear

weapon, a ‘Shi’a Bomb’. Saudi Arabia, a

Sunni country with a significant Shi’a

minority, might also decide to develop a

nuclear weapon, also increasing pres-

sure on Pakistan.

3. Reaction of U.S. and other interna-

tional partners –Pakistani officials are

keenly aware of the public debates in

the U.S. and Israel on pre-emptive

strikes against Iran. Were they to occur,

Pakistan would find itself in an impos-

sible position. Not only could it suffer

in the crossfire of such pre-emptive

strikes, Pakistan would come under a

great deal of pressure to pick a side.

Official thinking in Pakistan is also

driven by concern about increasing ties be-

tween India and Iran,6 although India’s nu-

clear deal with the U.S. and a vote against

Iran by the International Atomic Energy

Agency’s Board of Governors have compli-

cated that relationship. Many commentators

feel that India will continue to orchestrate a

strategic encirclement of Pakistan. The im-

plications for Pakistan of a relationship be-

tween a nuclear India and a nuclear Iran are

unclear, but must be of concern.

Emboldening the minority

Commentators in Pakistan do not believe

that Iran poses a direct threat to Pakistan,

with or without nuclear weapons. Never-

theless, the development of nuclear

weapons in Iran would present serious im-

pediments to long-sought stability in Pak-

istan by potentially emboldening its Shi’a

minority, and would place tremendous

pressure on its foreign policy. Many Pak-

istanis also wonder how such a develop-

ment would affect its longstanding

conflict with India. The result of the de-

velopment of nuclear weapons by Iran

would likely be a further destabilization of

Pakistan and Pakistan’s relationships with

its Asian and Middle East neighbours. �

Notes

1. See Robert LaPorte (1969), Succession in Pakistan: Continuity and change in a garrison state, Asian Survey, 9:11, pp. 842-861; Wayne

Wilcox (1969), Political change in Pakistan: Functions, constraints and goals, Pacific Affairs, 41:3, pp. 341-354; Sumit Ganguly (2000), Pakistan’s

never-ending story: Why the October coup was no surprise, Foreign Affairs, 79:2, pp. 2-7.

2. See Shirin Tahir-Kheli (1977), Iran and Pakistan: Cooperation in an area of conflict, Asian Survey, 17:5, pp. 474-490.

3. See Janne Bjerre Christensen (2011), Strained alliances: Iran’s troubled relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan, Danish Institute for Interna-

tional Studies Report, 2011:03.

4. See Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid (2008), From great game to grand bargain: Ending chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Foreign Af-

fairs, 87:6, pp. 30-45.

5. See Christopher J. Pehrson (2006), String of pearls: Meeting the challenge of China’s rising power across the Asian littoral, Strategic Studies

Institute.

6. See C. Christine Fair (2007), India and Iran: New Delhi’s Balancing Act, The Washington Quarterly, Summer, pp. 145-159; Monika Chansoria

(2010), India-Iran Defence Cooperation, Indian Defence Review, 25:1.


It may be churlish to begrudge

Prime Minister Harper some

self-congratulatory hyperbole

for the Canadian military’s con-

tribution to the civil war in

Libya. On August 21, the rebel forces,

supported by NATO airstrikes since

March, swept the capital of Tripoli.

Moammar Gadhafi and his regime were

no longer in control of most of the coun-

try, effectively replaced by the National

Transitional Council (NTC). While repre-

senting only part of the Libyan popula-

tion, the NTC has nonetheless been

recognized by a significant number of

countries—including Canada—as the le-

gitimate government of Libya, and the

NTC representative has taken his place at

the United Nations.

Who beyond his family and hard core

supporters will mourn Gadhafi’s fall? Not

most Libyans, we can assume. During 42

years in power, the eccentric and terror-

producing Gadhafi took dictatorial control

over their lives, denying personal freedoms

and committing gross and systematic vio-

lations of fundamental human rights.

On September 1 in Trapani, Italy,

Harper (Prime Minister 2011) congratu-

lated Canadian Forces on their contribu-

Familiar opening scenes

Libya is rid of Gadhafi, but will Canadian Forcessoon be bogged down in another Afghanistan?

By John Siebert

ABOVE: A Libyan rebelfighter sits on the stepsof a bullet-ridden build-ing in Ajdabiya. Kate Thomas/IRIN

LIBYA AND THE CANADIAN FORCES

21The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 2011

tion to the Libyan campaign:

Just as Canadians thank you for your

work here, I know that countless

thousands of Libyans have reason to

be grateful, too. Few will ever know

you by name. Some may not even yet

be born. But if Libya can seize the op-

portunity that now lies before it, the

real results of your actions these past

five months will be seen. . . freedom

of speech, freedom of assembly—the

freedom of simply being left alone.

The Prime Minister went on to charac-

terise the contribution as Canada “punch-

ing above its weight.” The Royal Canadian

Air Force flew more than 750 sorties, or

about 10 per cent of the total. Two ships

from the Royal Canadian Navy helped to

enforce a maritime blockade. According

to the Prime Minister (2011), “Soldier for

soldier, sailor for sailor, airman for air-

man, the Canadian Armed Forces are the

best in the world.”

He was not alone in singing their

praises. Former Canadian Ambassador to

the United Nations Paul Heinbecker

(2011) enthusiastically wrote on August

23: “Success, vindication, satisfaction, op-

timism; there are many legitimate ways to

characterize the so far happy events in

Libya.” Being an old hand, Heinbecker

knows his way around a qualifier, in this

case the caveat “so far.”

Caution is warranted. The difficulty

with the current upbeat take on Libya is

that we have seen the opening scenes of

this movie before—in Afghanistan and

Iraq—and the rest of the show has not

been very pleasant.

Granted, no two wars are the same.

Libya is not Afghanistan, nor is it Iraq.

But the similarities are worth noting. Each

is driven by ethnic and tribal divisions, ex-

ploited for decades by dictatorial govern-

ments, and blessed with valuable natural

resources such as oil deposits that could

finance new futures.

We should remember the 2001 tri-

umphal entry of the Northern Alliance

into Kabul as the routed Taliban regime in

Afghanistan headed for Tora Bora. While

that victory came easily, with the assis-

tance of U.S. Special Forces riding on

horseback and calling in U.S. air strikes,

winning the peace in Afghanistan still

proves illusive 10 years later. On May 1,

2003, President George W. Bush made his

“mission accomplished in Iraq” speech

onboard the USS Abraham Lincoln. U.S.

troops are still in Iraq eight years later.

The UN Security Council approved

military action by an international coali-

tion led by NATO to halt abuses and the

spread of terrorism in Libya. U.S. leader-

ship in concert with NATO has been key.

Here again, similarities can be seen with

the Afghanistan war.

In Libya, terrorism was by the regime

against its own people. The invocation of

the “responsibility to protect” by UN Se-

curity Council resolutions 1970 and 1973

in March 2011 to stop Gadhafi’s forces

from wiping out civilians in Benghazi

quickly and openly morphed into regime

change. Except for the damage done

through the inappropriate use of the R2P

doctrine in Libya to cover for regime

change, the parallels with Afghanistan and

Iraq pretty much hold.

Let’s not forget the flood of arms in

Libya that will enable violent responses to

We should remember the 2001 triumphal

entry of the Northern Alliance into Kabul

as the routed Taliban regime

in Afghanistan headed for Tora Bora.

LIBYA AND THE CANADIAN FORCES


grievances by all factions for decades to

come. Before March 2011, the Gadhafi

regime was armed to the teeth. During the

fighting of the past five months, NATO

members and others supplied NTC rebels

with small arms and light weapons to even

the fight. Now Government arsenals are

reportedly being looted (Lucas 2011).

How long before a franchise of “IEDs R

Us” opens in Libya, as it did in

Afghanistan and Iraq?

The inherent catastrophe fuelled by the

prevalence of guns and bombs in Libya is

worsened by another casualty in this civil

war: the UN arms embargo on Libya. Re-

ports indicate that the Chinese offered and

perhaps supplied arms to the Gadhafi

regime in defiance of the embargo (Smith

2011). However, NATO members and oth-

ers supplying the Libyan rebels with arms

must also come under scrutiny. There is, ad-

mittedly, some dispute about whether the

UN arms embargo applied only to Gadhafi’s

regime or to all sides in this civil war. Clarifi-

cation is being sought on whether Canada

also violated the UN arms embargo.1

The primary response of NATO par-

ticipants in the Libya campaign to the ap-

parent victory of the NTC forces is, much

like Prime Minister Harper’s speech, char-

acterized by a sense of vindication. They

assisted in vanquishing an evil regime, and

now bless the new leadership they chose.

Current talk at international donor confer-

ences focuses on establishing democracy,

state building, and post-conflict recon-

struction and development assistance for

infrastructure and the establishment of a

vibrant private sector.

These plans and good wishes must

translate into actual policies, programs,

and institutions that have a positive effect

in Libya over the coming years. None of

these same promises and plans have been

successfully implemented so far in

Afghanistan and Iraq. Having taken the

military plunge, however, there is no turn-

ing back from the reconstruction chal-

lenge in Libya. To rebuild is the third pillar

of the R2P doctrine. For the sake of the

people of Libya, Canada and its NATO

allies must succeed, but the portents are

not encouraging.

Initial tallies reported by the interim

health minister of the NTC of deaths in

Libya since fighting began in February

are 30,000, with 50,000 wounded and

possibly 4,000 still missing (Sacramento Bee

2011). The actual numbers have not yet

been independently verified. Revenge is

in the air. Gadhafi remains at large.

Fighting continues within Libya. It is not

yet clear if Libya’s regional neighbours

will all fall in line to support the NTC, or

if, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, some will

provide sanctuary and support for a pro-

longed insurgency against the new gov-

ernment.

Winning the war does not mean that

the peace will be won. We must hope that

Canada and its NATO allies have learned

this lesson from Afghanistan and Iraq. �

Note

1. At the end of August, Project Ploughshares

sent a letter to Canadian Foreign Minister John

Baird, asking for clarification on Canada’s official

interpretation of the UN arms embargo. To view

the letter, please go to: www.ploughshares.ca.

References

Heinbecker, Paul. 2011. Plenty of credit to go

around in Gadhafi’s fall. The Ottawa Citizen, Au-

gust 23.

Lucas, Ryan. 2011. Weapons proliferation a

‘key concern’ in Libya. The Globe and Mail, Sep-

tember 14.

Prime Minister (Canada). 2011. Statement of

the Prime Minister of Canada while in Trapani,

Italy. September 1.

Sacramento Bee, The. 2011. Libyan estimate:

At least 30,000 died in the war. September 8.

Smith, Graeme. 2011. China offered weapons

to Gadhafi. The Globe and Mail, September 3.

John Siebert

is Executive

Director

of Project

Ploughshares.

[email protected]

Farewell Reception

for Nancy Regehr

CIGI Building

Waterloo, Ontario

June 24, 2011

PUBLICATIONS MAIL AGREEMENT NO. 40065122

RETURN UNDELIVERABLE CANADIAN ADDRESSES

TO PROJECT PLOUGHSHARES

INSTITUTE OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES

CONRAD GREBEL UNIVERSITY COLLEGE

WATERLOO, ONTARIO, CANADA N2L 3G6

Space Security 2011

“The Space Security Index continues to represent

the most thoughtful, informed and nonpartisan

summary of annual space activies and policy

developments relevant to the safe accesss to and use

of space. In its broad view of space secruity,

covering issues ranging from space weapons

to orbital debris and space traffic management,

the Index has contributed to defining the field.”

Jonathan McDowellAstrophysicist, Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics

To order or download: www.ploughshares.ca or www.spacesecurity.org

available now

the ploughshares monitor

Documents