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Ploughshares MonitorThe

WINTER 2017 | VOLUME 38 | ISSUE 4

Project Ploughshares is an operating division of The Canadian Council of Churches

Bill C-47 “We cannot ... support this bill in its current form”

The Petrov ruleAutonomous weapons and the case for human control

First Committee Ploughshares staff report from the United Nations

Disarming security How Ploughshares shaped military export policy

Nuclear disarmament

—the best of times and the worst of times

The Ploughshares MonitorVolume 38 | Issue 4

The Ploughshares Monitor is the quarterlyjournal of Project Ploughshares, an operating division of The Canadian Council of Churches. Ploughshares works with churches, nongovernmental organizations, and governments, in Canada and abroad, to advance policies and actions that prevent war and armed violence and build peace. Project Ploughshares is affiliated with the KCU Centre for Peace Advancement, Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo.

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ContentsWinter 2017 PROJECT PLOUGHSHARES STAFF

Debbie HughesTasneem JamalBranka Marijan Sonal Marwah

Matthew PupicMaria SkinnerWendy StockerBarbara WagnerJessica West

Cesar Jaramillo Executive Director

3

5

11

14

From the Director’s deskIn 2017 the campaign for nuclear disarmament has seen a serious threat and a reason to hope.by Cesar Jaramillo

Bill-C47Remarks to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committeeby Cesar Jaramillo

Reports from the UN First CommitteePloughshares staff attend events at the United Nations.by Cesar Jaramillo, Branka Marijan, and Jessica West

The Case for the Petrov ruleA 1983 incident serves as a cautionary tale for those developing autonomous weapons.by Branka Marijan

22 Open letterOn Canada’s absence from the multilateral process to ban nuclear weapons.

Disarming securityA look at Project Ploughshares and Canadian military export policy.by Paul Esau

“and they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation; neither shall they learn war any more.” Isaiah 2:4

The Ploughshares Monitor, the quarterly publication of Project Ploughshares, is available online at www.ploughshares.ca.

8

Funded by the Government of Canada

21 Open letterOn the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize

COVER: The Doomsday Clock, maintained by The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, which represents the threat of global nuclear war, was set at 2 ½ minutes to midnight—the second-closest to midnight since 1953.

cover story

The Ploughshares Monitor | Winter 2017 3

As 2017 draws to a close, two ostensibly contradictory yet coexisting realities define the

global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Each brims with intensity, the likes of which have not been observed in decades.

A serious threatOn the one hand, the threat of nucle-ar-weapons use, by miscalculation or design, has reached a level not seen since the Cold War. This year, the Doomsday Clock maintained by The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, which represents the threat of global nu-clear war, was set at 2 ½ minutes to midnight—the second-closest to mid-night since 1953. According to Re-tired Adm. James Stavridis, one-time allied commander of NATO, “we are closer to a significant exchange of ordnance than we have been since the end of the Cold War on the Korean peninsula” (Dreazen 2017).

Heightened security tensions be-tween North Korea and the United States make an otherwise unfathom-able nuclear catastrophe increasingly conceivable. But these two states are far from the only sources of tension that raise the prospect of nuclear-weapons use. From the per-ilous India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, to an increasingly strained NATO-Russia relationship, the spectre of a nuclear confrontation

casts a dark shadow over all humanity.

But a glimmer of hopeAt the same time, this year has seen one of the most consequential advan-ces in nuclear disarmament in recent memory. On an otherwise disheart-ening global security environment, it casts a glimmer of hope.

On July 7, a majority in the inter-national community adopted, against all odds, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons at the United Nations. For diplomatic delegations from more than 120 countries, multi-lateral organizations such as the Inter-national Committee of the Red Cross, and members of international civil society, it was a historic day. The hist-ory of the most devastating weapons of mass destruction ever conceived will now be divided into what came

before, and what came after, this landmark treaty.

In the UN conference room that day were many from the International Campaign for the Abolition of Nu-clear Weapons (ICAN), the inter-national coalition that convinced so many UN member states to negotiate this unlikely treaty. With relentless determination, campaigners the world over laboured to reach this goal. They have come to embody the transform-ative potential of organized civil so-ciety in multilateral nuclear disarma-ment processes.

Three months after the adoption of the treaty, ICAN Director Bea-trice Fihn received a call from the Norwegian Committee informing her that ICAN was to be awarded the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize. At Project Ploughshares we continue to rejoice

From the Director’s desk:

By Cesar Jaramillo

Nuclear disarmament: The best of times and the worst of times

Hiroshima survivor Setsuko Thurlow, Ray Acheson, and Cesar Jaramillo hold a news conference in Toronto in October about the Nobel Peace Prize.

The Ploughshares Monitor | Winter 20174

in the timely and richly deserved recognition of the tireless work of the many committed civil society rep-resentatives from all continents and every age group. Steadfast determin-ation overcame the persistent efforts of nuclear-weapons states and their allies to undermine treaty negotia-tions. We are proud of our own mod-est contributions to this grand effort.

Canada in the minority Heightened nuclear risks and strengthened norms against nuclear-weapons possession epitomize an on-going political struggle of the highest order.

An increasingly vocal majority of the international community demands the prompt and complete elimination of nuclear arsenals. A few states claim to require the purported security benefits of nuclear weapons and vig-orously resist the rationale for, and implications of, the nuclear ban treaty.

And while there are certainly nuances among individual national positions, there is no question that Canada is in the latter camp.

The process that led to the nego-tiations of the nuclear ban treaty was a clear example of effective, rules-based multilateral work. Decisions at the UN General Assembly are taken by majority vote—not by consen-sus— and Resolution L.41, which called for the nuclear ban treaty nego-tiations, was transparently adopted by a wide majority of UN members.

In other words, it was precisely the type of resolution that a responsible multilateral actor ought to honour. However, Canada instead aligned it-self with nuclear-weapons states and worked to undermine any and all ef-forts related to the nuclear ban treaty. It even boycotted the negotiations.

A consistent civil society message Canadian civil society was not silent.

In September, the Canadian Net-work to Abolish Nuclear Weapons issued the following statement:

Canada must now decide if NATO nuclear policies will be given a high-er priority than the country’s long-standing “unequivocal undertaking” to negotiations for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

We call on the Government of Canada to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and to state that Canada will, through dialogue and changes to its own policies and practices, persist in its efforts to bring NATO into conformity with the Treaty, with a view to Canada ratifying the Treaty as soon as possible.

In October, the Canadian Council of Churches sent a letter to Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland, which said in part:

We firmly believe that it is in the best interest of every nation to move decisively toward the shared goal of nuclear abolition and to consider the recently adopted nucle-ar ban treaty a necessary step toward that goal. We find it disconcerting that Canada’s position on nuclear disarmament aligns with that of states with nuclear weapons. We urge you to reconsider your current policy so that Canada can become an early signatory to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

In November, Canadians for a Nu-clear Weapons Convention, a group of more than 1,000 recipients of the Order of Canada, sent a letter to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, which read in part:

We recognize this Treaty as a mile-

stone on the long quest for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and thus take strong exception to your characterization of the Treaty as “useless.” We deeply regret your Government’s failure to recognize the validity and importance of the Treaty, agreed to by a majority of the world’s states, which creates a legally binding instrument to pro-hibit the possession and use of nuclear weapons – paralleling the treaties prohibiting chemical and biological weapons. The tenacity with which nuclear weapon states seek to retain and even “modernize” weapons whose use would be in direct violation of international hu-manitarian law, makes a mockery of the solemn commitments they made and legal obligations they assumed under the Nuclear Non-Prolifer-ation Treaty (NPT). Canada must take extreme care not to aid them in their abdication of responsibility.

The way forward is clear. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nucle-ar Weapons has been adopted. The Nobel Peace Prize has affirmed the validity of this groundbreaking effort and propelled it forward. Heightened risks of catastrophic nuclear confron-tation underscore the urgent need for decisive, timely progress to nuclear abolition.

The message from civil society to the Canadian government has been remarkably consistent: the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons constitutes a watershed moment for nuclear disarmament. But our gov-ernment does not seem to be listen-ing. □

FROM THE DIRECTOR’S DESK

ReferenceDreazen, Yochi. 2017. Former NATO military

chief: there’s a 10% chance of nuclear war

with North Korea. Vox, September 28.


On September 26, 1983, Stanislav Petrov, a 44-year-old lieuten-ant-colonel in the Soviet Air Defence Forces,

made a critical decision (Chan 2017).

Petrov was on duty at Serpukhov-15, a control centre outside Moscow that mon-itored the Soviet Union’s Oko early-warn-ing satellite system, which identified ballistic missile launches, mainly by the United States. The Soviet Union/Russia

The case for the Petrov rule

By Branka Marijan

A 1983 incident—in which one man made a decision that most likely averted a nuclear war—serves as a cautionary tale to those developing autonomous weapons


used these satellites until 2015. Petrov had worked with them from their inception in the 1970s.

That night in 1983, the alarms went off and the system indicated that five intercontinental ballistic missiles had been launched from a base in the United States. Relations between the Soviets and Amer-icans had been tense for weeks. Soviet leader Yuri V. Andropov feared an Amer-ican attack.

Petrov had to decide whether to act on the information provided by the com-puter systems or to regard the alarm as a system malfunction. His decision was pivotal. His report would go to his su-periors, who would inform the general staff of the Soviet military, who would then consult with Andropov on launching a retaliatory attack.

In response to a “gut instinct,” Petrov reported a system malfunction (Bennetts 2017). He was right. The United States had not launched any missiles that night. Had Petrov reported a ballistic missile launch, the result could have been nuclear war.

Petrov died earlier this year at the age of 77. He only became known to the general public in 1998 when the former commander of Soviet defence, General Yury Votintsev, published his memoirs (Bennetts 2017).

The Petrov rule Petrov’s story is an insightful tale from the Cold War that clearly indicates the potential dangers of a world with nuclear weapons and one in which we relinquish decision-making to machines. To crys-

tallize the critical lesson here, we can formulate the Petrov rule: Only a human being can make the decision to use a weapons system to launch an attack. This rule is driven by the simple recognition that technology is fallible and that crucial human characteristics, such as Petrov’s “gut instinct,” cannot be replicated by machines.

Elsa B. Kania (2017), an adjunct fellow with the Technology and National Secur-

ity Program at the Centre for New Amer-ican Security, writes, “Petrov’s decision should serve as a potent reminder of the risks of reliance on complex systems in which errors and malfunctions are not only probable, but probably inevitable.” Kania is aware that militaries could be tempted to trust algorithms that can pro-cess massive amounts of information in the blink of an eye over human beings. Indeed, automation bias—the over-reli-ance on automated systems that results in errors—is a particular concern as hu-mans interact with ever improving tech-nologies.

Human control and autonomous weapons systems Petrov was mentioned only once at a side event to the 2017 meeting of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems at the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), held November 13-17 at the UN in Geneva, Switzerland. However, the notion that there is something essen-tially human, such as Petrov’s gut instinct, that machines cannot replicate was a focal point for debate.

AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS

This rule is driven by the simple recognition that technology is fallible and that crucial human characteristics, such as Petrov’s “gut instinct,” cannot be replicated by machines.


The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, to which Project Ploughshares belongs, has called for a preemptive ban on the development of autonomous weapons systems that do not have meaningful hu-man control—systems that could select, target, and kill people on their own. So far, 22 countries support an outright ban, with Brazil, Iraq, and Uganda signing on during the GGE meetings (Campaign to Stop Killer Robots 2017).

Most of the countries that spoke at the CCW, including Canada, supported some form of human control over weapons systems. But the nature of human control can become unclear when examining how critical decisions such as selecting, tar-geting, and killing are made. Are humans ultimately in charge of the decision or are they merely pushing buttons in response to prompts by the system?

When is human control “meaningful” human control? What does “meaningful” mean? This adjective was the subject of much debate. In a recent paper, Article 36, a Campaign member and British civil society organization, stated, “Other terms, such as sufficient-, adequate-, ne-cessary-human control, could be chosen instead of the term ‘meaningful’. The choice of wording has certain subtle implications—for example, the term ‘meaningful’ arguably draws in broader concerns regarding the right to dignity, whereas a term like ‘sufficient’ implies a minimal requirement.” What is clear is that it is important to ensure that any international agreement retains a robust

view of the central role a human must play in decision-making.

The human backupIn 1983, the Oko system was still new; it was only placed on combat duty in 1982. Stanislav Petrov knew that it contained flaws and acted accordingly when it sounded a false alarm.

How has our view of technology changed in more than 30 years? Is the same skepticism alive? Kania (2017) asks us to consider how current generations, whose daily lives are filled with inter-actions with new technologies, might re-spond to a similar situation. Certainly, mil-itary officers using systems with artificial intelligence will have to be trained in their possible fallibility or dysfunction.

In 2010, Petrov declared, “We are wiser than computers. We created them” (Bennetts 2017). Some may point out that machine learning will change that conclu-sion. Already computers are performing tasks that are beyond human capability. However, the Petrov story should remind us that machines are still machines. Some-times, no matter what the technology dic-tates, it is necessary for humans to trust their guts. And their compassion. Their restraint. Their sense of fellow feeling with other humans. So far, no one has been able to create machines with these qualities. □

Branka Marijan represented Project Ploughshares at the CCW events.

AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS

References

Article 36. 2017. Autonomous weapon systems: Evaluating the capacity for ‘meaningful human control’ in weapon review processes. Discussion

paper, November.

Bennetts, Marc. 2017. Soviet officer who averted cold war nuclear disaster dies aged 77. The Guardian, September 18.

Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. 2017. Support builds for new international law on killer robots. November 17.

Chan, Sewell. 2017. Stanislav Petrov, Soviet officer who helped avert nuclear war, is dead at 77. The New York Times, September 18.

Kania, Elsa B. 2017. The critical human element in the machine age of warfare. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 15.

Branka Marijan is a Program Officer with Project Ploughshares.

[email protected]


On February 14, 2015, Ed Fast, the former Canadian Minister of International Trade, helped an-

nounce the largest advanced manufacturing contract in Canadian history. A brilliant economic achievement on paper, the 14-year, multi-billion-dollar deal promised to directly benefit 500 Canadian companies, and continue an important trade alliance with a strategic ally. The only catch was that the deal was to manufacture a military weapons system, Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs), and the ‘strategic partner’ was the repressive theocracy of Saudi Arabia.

Canadians have long been ambivalent (perhaps ignorant) about their country’s participation in the global arms trade, al-though the tangible benefits have generally been considered to outweigh the potential costs. It is easy to welcome the jobs and capital provided by military exports, and such deals have proved critical to Canada’s Defence Industrial Base (DIB) by sustain-ing and subsidizing military production.

On the other hand, the presence of Canadian military goods in conflict zones around the world has cast a dubious shad-ow over the DIB and its governmental supporters. Since WWII, Canadian exports have found their way directly or indirectly to both Iranian and Iraqi forces during the Iran-Iraq War, the American forces in Vietnam, the apartheid-era government in South Africa, the British forces in the Falk-lands/Maldives conflict, Israeli forces in Lebanon during the war, the governments of El Salvador and Honduras during the

insurrections, and Saudi Arabia during dec-ades of regional instability (Regehr 1987, p. 3).

In 2016, largely thanks to the LAV deal, Canada became the second-largest export-er of military goods to the Middle East (Chase 2016a).

The Canadian policy of pursuing eco-nomic advantage through military export has always conflicted with its political and ideological commitment to universal hu-man rights and global development (GAC 2017a), but rarely has the discordance been so embarrassing and so obvious.

Global Affairs Canada (GAC) recog-nizes an official responsibility for the ends to which Canadian weapons and muni-tions are put by the eventual buyers (GAC 2017b). The 2015 deal with Saudi Arabia, a nation with a long history of human-rights abuses, would seem to be in violation of the GAC policy to closely control military exports to countries “whose governments have a persistent record of serious viola-tions of the human rights of their citizens” (FATDC 2017, p. 54).

Still, the GAC policy also includes a loophole allowing military exports to hu-man rights violators like Saudi Arabia if “it can be demonstrated that there is no rea-sonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population” (FATDC 2017, p. 54.)

It is precisely this loophole which GAC’s “SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR ACTION” (dated March 21, 2016 and released to the public on April 12,

Disarming Security

By Paul Esau

Project Ploughshares, arms sales to Saudi Arabia, and the shaping of Canadian military export policy


CANADIAN MILITARY EXPORTS

2016) used to justify the exchange, assert-ing:

Based on the information provided, [GAC does] not believe that the proposed exports would be used to violate human rights in Saudi Arabia. Canada has sold thousands of LAVs to Saudi Arabia since the 1990s, and, to the best of the Depart-ment’s knowledge, there have been no incidents where they have been used in the perpetration of human rights viola-tions. (GAC 2016, p. 4)

Only a month after this memo was made public, video evidence of LAVs be-ing used by Saudi Arabia to repress dissi-dents between 2012 and 2015 was brought to light by The Globe and Mail reporter Steven Chase (2016b), but this finding has had, as of now, no discernable impact upon GAC’s previous decision. Sadly, this is in keeping with a historical tradition in Canadian guidelines for arms exports,

which have proven time and time again to be neither as restricted nor as inflexible as advertised (Bangarth & Weier 2016; Siek-ierski 2016).

Some argue that the Canadian gov-ernment is forging ahead with the deal because of Saudi Arabia’s importance as a security partner in an otherwise unstable region, or perhaps because it is being squeezed by pressures from a national mil-itary-industrial complex that requires for-eign orders in order to remain in business (Epps 2015). After all, this single contract is projected to keep 3,000 Canadians em-ployed for the next 14 years, primarily in London, Ontario where General Dynam-ics’ LAV manufacturing plant is located.

The Saudi LAV deal is not the first time that Canada has pursued major exports to a country with a repressive regime. In fact, it is only the latest in a long history of gov-ernmental encouragement of the domestic manufacture and international sale of mil-itary commodities.


CANADIAN MILITARY EXPORTS

ReferencesBangarth, Stephanie & Jon Weier. 2016. Merchants of death: Canada’s history of questionable exports. ActiveHistory.ca, April 18.

Chase, Steven. 2016a. Canada now the second bigge4st arms exporter to Middle East. The Globe and Mail, June 14.

_____. 2016b. Saudis use armoured vehicles to suppress internal dissent, videos show. The Globe and Mail, May 11.

Epps, Kenneth. 2015. Arms export win is human rights loss. The Ploughshares Monitor, Spring.

Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada. 2017. Export Controls Handbook, August.

Global Affairs Canada. 2017a. Priorities.

_____, 2017b. Report on Exports of Military Goods from Canada – 2016.

_____. 2016. Memorandum for Action to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Regehr, Ernie. 1994. Project Ploughshares. Coalitions for Justice. Ed. Christopher Lind & Joe Mihevc. Ottawa: Novalis.

_____, 1987. Arms Canada: The Deadly Business of Military Exports. Toronto: James Lorimer.

Siekierski, BJ. Selling armoured vehicles to Saudi Arabia: A Canadian tradition. iPolitics, February 11.

For example, in 1986, Canadian Exter-nal Affairs Minister Joe Clark travelled to Saudi Arabia to begin negotiating a deal that would eventually result in the same Ontario plant (under General Motors control at the time) exporting $1.9-billion worth of LAVs to the kingdom. This precursor to the current deal was being negotiated while Clark was simultaneously working on a review of Canadian export guidelines that resulted in the current GAC controls against the exporting of military goods to countries with a persistent record of human rights violations. His ability to pursue a deal with Saudi Arabia on the one hand while endorsing guidelines meant to prevent such deals on the other is an eerie harbinger of the current Trudeau govern-ment, which is again endorsing a deal with the Saudis while also promising to sign the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). It is hard to remain hopeful about the strength of that latter promise when measured against its historical precedent.

Yet not all Canadian institutions have been as friendly to the current Saudi deal as the federal government. One of the most vocal critics is the Waterloo-based NGO Project Ploughshares, which has played a role in criticizing and shaping Canadian military policy since the organiz-ation’s formation in 1976. Ploughshares is not only critical of Canada’s current agree-ment to supply even more LAVs to Saudi Arabia, but also of the larger discontinu-

ities between Canadian military produc-tion, export, and policy.

In fact, the history of the Canadian arms industry since 1976 is riddled with moments when the organization helped to bring public pressure to bear upon the more dubious aspects of Canadian military production and export. Ploughshares was regularly quoted in newspapers, consulted by government committees and policy reviews, and enjoyed significant public sup-port into the 1990s in research initiatives, advocacy campaigns, and organized affiliate groups across the country (Regehr 1994).

Project Ploughshares used its platforms and leverage to promote export restrictions, budget reductions, and policy alternatives that sought to bring Canadian policy in line with novel interpretations of security, de-fence, and the global environment.

The advocacy practised by Canadian disarmament NGO Project Ploughshares regarding military policy and the arms trade in the 1990s was an attempt to shift Canadian priorities from national secur-ity to common security/human security, and that shift required a drastic change in Canadian military production and export policy.

Ploughshares has advocated for policies of transparency and regulation as the most effective means of constraining the global proliferation of arms, and pursued these specific policy initiatives in both the na-tional and international forum. □

This edited article is excerpted from Paul’s 2017 thesis for his Master of Arts degree in History from the University of Lethbridge in Lethbridge, Alberta. The thesis is entitled Disarming Security: Project Ploughshares, the Just War, and the New World Order and includes chapters on “Ploughshares and the Just War,” “Canada’s Defence Industrial Base,” and “Project Ploughshares in the Early 1990s.”


We cannot and do not support Bill C-47 in its current form

Good afternoon. My name is Cesar Jaramillo and I am the executive director of

Project Ploughshares. Thank you very much for the kind invitation to address this Committee.

For decades, efforts to better regulate illicit or irresponsible arms exports and to strengthen military export controls have been a key focus of the activities of Project Ploughshares. We were strong advo-cates of the landmark international Arms Trade Treaty long before its adoption, and have since under-scored the importance of full com-pliance as the ultimate measure of the treaty’s effectiveness.

We were greatly encouraged by Canada’s decision to join the ATT after a highly conspicuous absence, and have engaged in a constructive spirit with colleagues at Global Af-fairs Canada on this important file. However, while our desire to see Canada become a fully compliant state party to the Treaty has not changed, our expert assessment is that the proposed legislation—i.e., Bill C-47—would not enable Canada to meet the requirements and expect-ations of the Arms Trade Treaty.

We have profound concerns about substantial shortcomings of the Bill that make it impossible for us to rec-ommend it before this Committee. For absolute clarity: we cannot and do not support Bill C-47 in its cur-rent form. This is a position shared by a host of Canadian groups from the disarmament, human rights, and development fields—some of which have testified before the Committee on this very issue.

Before I address some of our major concerns about the Bill, I would like to underscore the singular importance of this opportunity to review Canada’s military export con-trols regime. It is indeed a rare oc-currence that may not happen again in years or decades.

As such, we encourage all stake-holders, including members of this Committee, to seek strong, effective legislation for Canadian arms exports that is truly in line with modern ex-pectations of rigour, accountability, and transparency in the global arms trade, including, of course, full com-pliance with the ATT.

A key concern about the proposed legislation is that it does not address the exemptions that have long been

afforded to Canadian military ex-ports to the United States.

Under current practice, left un-changed by Bill C-47, Canadian mil-itary exports to the United States are exempted from licensing and report-ing requirements applicable to every other destination. These exemptions are utterly incompatible with the letter and spirit of the Arms Trade Treaty.

Even though we have long con-sidered such an arrangement to be problematic and contrary to expect-ations of transparency around Can-ada’s arms exports, this loophole has become especially egregious as Can-ada readies to accede to the Arms Trade Treaty.

We are aware that the position of Global Affairs Canada is that the exemptions granted to U.S.-bound exports are consistent with the Arms Trade Treaty. For several reasons, we must express our disagreement with this view.

The Arms Trade Treaty, in its first article, calls for the “highest possible common international standards.” To be sure, there are two interrelat-ed and equally important elements in this requirement: highest possible

By Cesar Jaramillo, Executive Director, Project Ploughshares

Remarks to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development— November 2, 2017


international standards, and common international standards. Yet the ar-rangement with the United States neither constitutes the highest pos-sible standard nor is it common to the standards applied to others.

Likewise, Article 2 of the ATT is explicit about its applicability to all military exports covered under the treaty, and Article 5 calls for the

Treaty to be implemented in a con-sistent, objective, and nondiscrimina-tory manner.

We find it hard to see how “all” could be interpreted to mean any-thing other than the totality of Canadian exports, including those destined for the United States. Fur-ther, the unique treatment afforded to the United States is out of line

with the expectations of consistency, objectivity, and nondiscrimination specified in Article 5.

Such exemptions would be in-compatible with ATT obligations, regardless of the recipient. In the case of the United States, they are especially suspect.

The United States is the largest exporter of weapons and military

An Act to amend the Export and Import Permits Act and the Criminal Code (amendments permitting the accession to the Arms Trade Treaty and other amendments)

Sponsor: Chrystia Freeland, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Status: In committee (House), as of Oct. 3, 2017

Summary1

This enactment amends the Export and Import Permits Act to

(a) define the term “broker” and to establish a framework to control brokering that takes place in Canada and that is undertaken by Canadians outside Canada;

(b) authorize the making of regulations that set out mandatory considerations that the Minister is required to take into account before issuing an export permit or a brokering permit;

(c) set May 31 as the date by which the Minister must table in both Houses of Parliament a report of the operations under the Act in the preceding year and a report on military exports in the preceding year;

(d) increase the maximum fine for a summary conviction offence to $250,000;

(e) replace the requirement that only countries with which Canada has an intergovernmental arrangement may be added to the Automatic Firearms Country Control List by a requirement that a country may be added to the list only on the recommendation of the Minister made after consultation with the Minister of National Defence; and

(f) add a new purpose for which an article may be added to an Export Control List.The enactment amends the Criminal Code to include, for interception of private communications purposes, the offence of brokering in the definition of “offence” in section 183.

Note

1. This summary is provided by the Library of Parliament.

BILL C-47

BILL C-47


equipment in the world, and Can-adian components can be incorpor-ated into systems in the United States and then exported to third parties without requiring further authoriza-tion from Canada.

The United States is also, by far, the largest recipient of Canadian mil-itary goods. Project Ploughshares es-timates that Canada exports military goods worth as much as $2-billion to the United States annually—typically more than half of total military ex-ports. So, with Bill C-47 in its current form, the majority of Canadian mil-itary exports will neither be reported nor subject to export permit require-ments, even after Canada joins the Arms Trade Treaty.

Critically, the United States is not an ATT state party, and is not expected to become one in the fore-seeable future. Canada, on the other hand, will be a state party and the expectation is that all its arms export regulations will be entirely consistent with the provisions of the treaty, in-cluding those related to licensing and reporting obligations.

Further, a widely shared goal of states parties is the universal adop-tion of the ATT. And it is hard to see how Canada can contribute to that objective when it offers laxer condi-tions to a non-state party than it does to those states that have agreed to be bound by the treaty’s obligations.

Another area of great concern relates to the way in which Bill C-47 addresses Articles 6 and 7 of the treaty, which refer, respectively, to Prohibitions and Risk Assessments.

In this regard, Global Affairs Canada has indicated that “Canada’s current export permit considerations are consistent with all these elements as outlined in the ATT, but are es-tablished as a matter of policy, not law.” GAC has also stated that “the critical element was the need to cre-

ate a legally binding obligation for the minister to take the ATT assess-ment considerations into account in deciding whether to issue an export permit.”

This characterization leaves the impression that the only measure necessary for Canada to be in full compliance with Articles 6 and 7 is to establish a legal obligation for the minister to take certain factors into account when assessing export permit authorizations. In reality, however, the Arms Trade Treaty establishes a higher standard than merely “taking into account” certain considerations when deciding on ex-port permit applications.

The ATT establishes categorical prohibitions on certain arms exports depending on the outcome of an ob-jective risk assessment process, and includes unambiguous wording to this effect when referring to exports that a state “shall not authorize.” Canada’s export controls regime lacks any such obligation or word-ing—whether in policy or in law.

The obligation for the Minister to simply consider certain factors does not suffice to meet Treaty standards, even if established as a matter of law. In the absence of language that explicitly requires the denial of cer-tain export permits, the Minister will have virtually unchecked discretion to authorize any and all military exports, however questionable the recipient—or however damning the risk assessment—as long as he or she indicates that all factors were “taken into account.”

We are further concerned that, under the current approach taken by Global Affairs Canada, the details re-lated to these critical areas will be left to subsequent regulations, which are to be known only after the legislation is enacted.

Of course, we do not oppose in

principle the notion that certain as-pects of a Bill can be and, in other contexts, have been, left to be ad-dressed by subsequent regulations. What we find problematic is that aspects related to some of the most crucial dimensions of the ATT—Prohibitions and Risk Assessment—would be a matter of regulations and not law.

Another area that the Bill fails to address has to do with the lack of harmonization between the De-partment of National Defence and Global Affairs Canada vis-à-vis risk assessment processes for arms ex-ports. While both departments will need to comply with the obligations of the ATT once Canada becomes a state party, we are concerned that having two separate risk assessment procedures may lead to inconsistent standards and decisions concerning where Canadian military equipment may end up.

I had earlier pointed to the obli-gation contained in Article 5 of the ATT to implement Treaty provisions in a consistent manner, then in the context of the exemptions given to U.S.-bound exports. The requirement for consistency in the implementa-tion of the treaty is also applicable to the dual risk assessment processes at the Department of National De-fence and Global Affairs Canada.

To finish these remarks, let me reiterate that we remain very much supportive of Canada’s becoming a fully compliant state party to the Arms Trade Treaty. Unfortunately, however, Bill C-47 falls short of meeting the spirit, objectives, and specific provisions of the ATT and thus we cannot support it in its cur-rent form.

Thank you very much for your attention. I would very much wel-come comments or questions related to these remarks. □

BILL C-47


The First Committee is one of six main committees at the General Assembly

of the United Nations that deals with matters concerning world peace. This

particular committee, which meets every October, handles all matters of

disarmament and international security. All 193 member states of the UN can

attend. Each year, Ploughshares staff go to sessions and side meetings related

to Ploughshares’ program areas. This October, Executive Director Cesar

Jaramillo and Program Officers Branka Marijan and Jessica West were

present.

United Nations First Committee on Disarmament and International Security

Joao Araujo Pinto/UN


The Humanitarian Disarmament Forum, which began in 2012, has become an annual gathering, con-ducted on the margins of the UN General Assembly First Committee. The 2017 Forum, organized by Hu-man Rights Watch, PAX, and the Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic, was held at the UN Church Center from Octo-ber 13-15. In attendance were some 90 participants from 50 organiz-ations (including Project Plough-shares), who exchanged views and provided updates on various cam-paigns from arms control and nucle-ar weapons to autonomous weapons systems.

Stephen Goose, director of the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch, opened the Forum by acknowledging that “these are challenging times.” He reflected on ongoing conflicts in Syria and Yemen and the ever-present dangers of nuclear weapons. Technological developments, largely unregulated, have brought new concerns about the weaponization of artificial intel-ligence and the transformation of warfare.

However, Goose also noted sever-al important developments that have revitalized disarmament activities. Awarding the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) has been a galvanizing force for disarmament work by civil society organizations.

ICAN and the role of civil society in disarmament The Forum is set up to allow for the exchange of views, with much dis-cussion occurring in smaller groups. Among the themes discussed this year were the role of civil society, the need to put humanitarian concerns front-and-centre in international dis-cussions, and the role of champion countries, such as Canada.

ICAN’s efforts to rally support for a treaty that many doubted would happen were, of course, applauded. Many attending organizations, includ-ing Project Ploughshares, contribute to and champion ICAN’s work. ICAN’s widespread support demon-strates the ability of ordinary people to meaningfully contribute to global issues. Evan Cinq-Mars, from Center for Civilians in Conflict, described ICAN’s accomplishments as a “testa-ment to the power of civil society.”

According to Tim Wright, ICAN’s Asia-Pacific Director, ICAN learned from such previous campaigns as the International Campaign to Ban Land-mines (ICBL), which won the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize. Individuals who had worked on and still contribute to the ICBL noted that over the last two decades civil society has become a key player in disarmament. While it was once difficult to obtain access to UN conferences, civil society is now a regular participant.

ICAN members stressed the im-portance of the civil-society voice in the wider disarmament discussion. Wright, in particular, wanted engaged citizens to know that “the civil so-ciety voice is credible.” Individuals should not doubt their power in speaking out on disarmament issues, even the technical ones. Citizens must encourage states to meet high international regulatory standards and should not accept watered-down regulations that might appeal to more

countries.

People firstThe credibility of voices of ordinary people was central to Forum discus-sions. The mantra of humanitarian disarmament approaches is “People first!” Sometimes civilian impact is not directly addressed at international discussions and should be empha-sized more.

Civilians bear the brunt of vio-lent conflict. Already disadvantaged groups such as minorities, women, and children are particularly hard hit. In the first six months of 2017, 1,662 civilians, many women and children, were killed in Afghanistan (Bendix 2017). In Yemen, war, famine, and disease are killing as many as 130 children a day (Kasinof 2017). This information must be at the heart of UN discussions on disarmament and be clearly heard in countries that have the ability to ease the suffering and address the violence. Countries that can choose not to arm regimes, such as the government of Saudi Arabia, which cause the violence and suffering.

Champion countries and the miss-ing Canadian voiceThe Forum highlighted the role of champion countries in supporting humanitarian disarmament work by civil society. Countries such as Ire-land have led the way in calling for more civil society involvement and have been crucial partners for civil society organizations.

In his remarks to the UN General Assembly on September 23, Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Simon Coveney (2017) said, “The UN Charter does not begin ‘We the Member States’, but rather ‘We the Peoples’. Our policies and actions must reflect this, the inherent equality of humanity at the core of

Humanitarian disarmement: Putting people first

UN FIRST COMMITTEE


our multilateral system. In practice this means listening to and heeding the voices of women, the voices of young people, the voices of the mar-ginalized.”

The question of Canada’s ap-proach to disarmament came up several times in discussions. Coinci-dentally, the Forum was founded on the occasion of the twentieth anni-versary of the ICBL and 2017 marks the 20 years of the Ottawa Treaty, for which Canadian diplomats and civil society received much praise. Now, Canada seems to have taken a step back.

As Erin Hunt (2017), Program Coordinator at Mines Action Can-ada, wrote ahead of the 2017 UN General Assembly, “Canada has a long history of leading on disarma-ment issues but that reputation is on shaky ground.” Hunt pointed to Canada’s boycott of the negotiations of the treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons and the lack of attention to the anniversary of the Ottawa Treaty and its implementation. Jennifer Wiebe (2017), director of Mennonite Central Committee Ottawa, con-

curred: “Far from ‘being back’, Can-ada seems to be inching backwards on disarmament.”

At least one international cam-paigner said, “We really need Canada back as a champion; it is surprising to see their current approach.” If for no other reason, the Canadian gov-ernment should be motivated by the understanding that it will be compet-ing for the 2021 UN Security Council seat against countries such as Ireland and Norway.

An important reminderDisarmament is not currently a priority, even in leading international civil society organizations. The dis-armament machinery at the United Nations is slow and often dead-locked.

But ICAN’s Nobel Prize, symbol-ically shared with Forum participants in the form of chocolate Nobel coins, is an important reminder that, although the odds are often stacked against those of us pushing for more humanitarian approaches to disarmament, we can have an impact on the global stage. As one ICAN

campaigner noted, many will say that something cannot be done, particu-larly without the powerful states. But the reality is different. Much can be done if concerned citizens speak up and place civilians at the core of their advocacy.

Countries such as Canada could show real leadership in taking up this banner.

—Branka Marijan

ReferencesBendix, Aria. 2017. Civilian deaths in

Afghanistan reach a record high. The

Atlantic, July 17.

Coveney, Simon. 2017. Address to the

United Nations General Assembly, New

York, 23 September 2017.

Hunt, Erin. 2017. As UN General Assembly

kicks off, all eyes on Canada’s

disarmament stance. Open Canada,

September 13.

Kasinof, Laura. 2017. The deep roots of

Yemen’s Famine. Slate, November 20.

Wiebe, Jennifer. 2017. Out of step on

nuclear disarmament. MCC Ottawa

Office Notebook, October 25.

A cautious optimism marked the opening of debates on outer space at the United Nations First Committee on Disarmament and International Security this past October. However, serious divisions quickly became ap-parent.

No weapons in outer space, yetProposals were advanced to over-come the longstanding stagnation of efforts to enhance global security and prevent the weaponization of outer space. Russia and China pro-posed the establishment of a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to make recommendations on Preven-tion of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), which has been stalled on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) for almost three decades. And sponsors of what is now an annual resolution on Trans-parency and Confidence-Building

Measures (TCBMs) in outer space supported discussion of practical implementation measures at the UN Disarmament Commission.

There was also support for efforts to advance multilateral negotiations of a new arms control treaty. Kaz-akhstan, members of the Collect-ive Security Treaty Organization, Pakistan, Algeria, South Africa, Cuba, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Venezuela specifically supported the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects

Divisions on outer space security

UN FIRST COMMITTEE


UN FIRST COMMITTEE

(PPWT), tabled by Russia and China in 2008 and 2014. But the United States, the European Union, Aus-tralia, France, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, among others, had reservations about this specific text, particularly about the lack of a definition of space weapons, lack of verification, and silence on use of terrestrial anti-satellite weapons (ASATs).

States could not agree on how to confront the ongoing develop-ment of ASATs, the dual uses of anti-ballistic missile systems, and the potential deployment of ABMs in outer space. Should the focus be on weapons in space or the use of ter-restrial-based anti-satellite weapons? Should states seek to negotiate new, legally binding measures in the CD or adopt voluntary actions? Poten-tial for proliferation and parallels to nuclear weapons were raised by Kaz-akhstan and Pakistan, with the latter asserting that this time the burden of nonproliferation will not be borne by developing countries.

Voting on resolutionsSri Lanka and others again tabled resolution L.3, Prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), which calls on the CD to establish a work-ing group. Noting that it has been on the agenda of the CD for more than three decades, Pakistan called the time “ripe” to negotiate a treaty. While the United States and Israel

abstained from the vote, the reso-lution otherwise received universal support.

Support was widespread for ad-vancing efforts to implement the TCBMs recommended by the 2013 Group of Governmental Experts. China, Russia, and the United States once again tabled Resolution L.46, Transparency and confidence-building meas-ures in outer space, which was adopted by consensus. The United States, Canada, Japan, and Australia indi-cated that implementation measures would be added to the agenda of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 2018. This approach seems to be the most viable path for-ward, with Australia suggesting that the process could lead to recommen-dations to the CD.

Resolution L.53, No first place-ment of weapons in outer space, had 17 co-sponsors this year, although the EU and Switzerland questioned its effectiveness as a TCBM. The reso-lution was adopted with a vote of 122-4-48 (for, against, abstained). In explaining its vote against the resolution, the United States noted the failure to define a weapon and to address threats posed by terrestrial anti-satellite weapons. Voting yes, India noted that such a political com-mitment, while not a substitute for legal measures, did prevent weapons in outer space. European states abstained, expressing a preference for a focus on behaviour in space.

Abstainers Canada, Japan, and Aus-tralia jointly called for measures that produce practical rather than political effects.

Voting results for L.54, Further practical measures for prevention of an arms race in outer space, were 121-5-45. Resolutions in previous years called on the CD to consider the PPWT. L.54 called for a GGE to be estab-lished to make recommendations on a new legal instrument to prevent an arms race in outer space. In voting against, the United States and the United Kingdom noted that this process is intended to remain tied to the existing draft treaty, which offers no definition of a space weapon and subsequently no ability for veri-fication, and expressed no concern for ASATs. Russia claimed once again that reference to the use of force covered ASATs and it called on European states not to be con-strained by NATO.

While these voting results are not remarkably different from those of previous years, the focus on one topic has shifted from the future to the present. Many states explicitly referenced concerns about existing weapons programs and their poten-tial use in outer space. Now time continues to tick away as states en-gage in what often appears to be a politics of procrastination.

—Jessica West

States could not agree on how to confront the ongoing development of anti-satellite weapons, the dual uses of anti-ballistic missile systems, and the potential deployment of ABMs in outer space. Should the focus be on weapons in space or the use of terrestrial-based anti-satellite weapons?


UN FIRST COMMITTEE

Ploughshares program officer Jes-sica West was among the speakers who addressed outer space security at the UN First Committee meetings in October. She focused on trends in outer space governance and how they relate to the key tenets of the Outer Space Treaty.

Responding to new and old challengesAs West noted, various space actors are pursuing different paths and it is the role of the United Nations to bring these efforts together and maintain a coherent governance framework for outer space. World leaders must carefully consider safe-ty, security, and sustainability when exploring the governance of outer space. The current inability to ad-dress at the international level the hard questions related to national security and potential warfare in space could cause the entire regula-tory structure to crumble.

Access to outer space is flourish-ing, largely because of the success of the Outer Space Treaty in cre-ating and maintaining a secure en-vironment. But space is being used in ways not even imagined 50 years ago. These changes bring new—and revive some old—challenges.

The risk of warfare in outer space is growing. Partly this is because of various technology de-velopments, which are made more dangerous by rising geopolitical ten-sions, a growing willingness to ap-proach outer space as a domain of warfare, and ongoing international

failure to agree to new restraints on the use of force in outer space.

West argued that more needs to be done to reinforce the key values of the Outer Space Treaty and the security of outer space. A lot is go-ing on in outer space governance at the national level, with the private sector, civil society, and academic institutions increasingly influential. But these efforts could lead to the fragmentation of international space governance. The role of the United Nations should be to see that every-one moves in the same direction at a manageable pace.

But the UN is itself fragmented, only seeing success in certain ele-ments of space security.

What’s happening at the UN?West took a cautiously optimistic view of progress being made at the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), which has been developing voluntary guide-lines that bring together best prac-tices on working safely and sustain-ably in outer space. Still, activities in outer space have the potential to outpace the developments of guide-lines. For example, measures to pre-vent the creation of debris in outer space increasingly appear inadequate in the face of new proposals for large constellations of satellites.

A number of programs at the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) contribute to univer-salizing the benefits of outer space. And maintaining the Registry of Space Objects is a key contribution to transparency, which could pro-vide a model for additional initia-tives.

On the negative side, the UN has not been successful in addressing geopolitical tensions related to the potential for an arms race or war-fare in outer space. West noted that

the Conference on Disarmament has been deadlocked for so many years that “I’ve lost count.” Efforts to develop a treaty banning weapons and the use of force in outer space have been divisive. And attempts to develop a voluntary code of conduct outside the UN machinery have dissolved, at least for the time being.

A way forward?West highlighted two new initiatives intended to advance this stagnating process.

The first involves discussions at the UN Disarmament Commission on a joint working paper by the United States, Russia, and China to promote practical efforts to im-plement the recommendations in the 2014 report by the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on transparency and confidence-build-ing measures. West urged greater focus on transparency of military programs.

The second proposal, by China and Russia, involves the creation of a Group of Governmental Experts on preventing an arms race in outer space. While a resolution on PAROS is adopted by consensus every year at the UN, efforts to implement it have stumbled. This proposal, West believes, could move the agenda for-ward, particularly if the GGE has the leeway to examine a wide range of options and challenges.

Ideally, these two initiatives would ultimately reinforce each another. However, early indications suggest that mistrust, geopolitical tensions, and unyielding political preferences will continue to hold sway.

Holding the pieces togetherTo accomplish anything, West stat-ed, it was necessary to build trust and relationships among global

Outer space: New and old challenges


players in outer space. Governance efforts at the UN require more coordination—as is generally rec-ognized. UN bodies must remain

engaged with national governance efforts, and build on initiatives to involve the private sector and civil society.

The UN, West believes, has an important role to play in the security of outer space. It must not let itself be left behind. □

Project Ploughshares and its partners on the Space Security Index (SSI) project joined with the Government of Canada in hosting a First Com-mittee side event on October 17 to launch the 2017 edition of the annual report. The panel discussion was chaired by Canada’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Rosemary Mc-Carney, whose opening remarks em-phasized the importance of diligent research and analysis to inform good policy outcomes. Noting the critical nature of tracking developments on an ongoing basis, she stressed the unique contribution of the SSI.

Panelists included Jessica West, the managing editor of the SSI at Project Ploughshares, Laura Grego of the Union of Concerned Scientists, and Victoria Samson of the Secure World Foundation. They focused on a num-

ber of stressors that require urgent attention if the secure and sustainable use of space for peaceful purposes is to be maintained.

West highlighted the environ-mental challenges and resource scar-city associated with projections of mammoth growth in the number of satellites in outer space, regulatory and ethical questions raised by the prospect of greater private sector and human activity in outer space, and uncertainties tied to the shifting role of outer space as a potential domain of warfare. The outer space regula-tory regime could be fragmented if global rules do not keep pace with rapidly changing capabilities and na-tional regulations.

Samson noted the challenge posed by the rapidly increasing number of new actors in space, which inspired the publication of the Handbook for New Space Actors. She drew attention to prospects for large commercial sat-ellite constellations, evolving counter-space programs, and potential crisis escalation in space, which call for new norms of behaviour and improved space situational awareness.

Grego reminded her audience of the logic and self-interest that es-tablished arms control measures in outer space during the Cold War, and of their enduring rationale. Noting renewed interest in space weapons programs and describing a number of ways in which satellites can be harmed, including through the use of anti-missile defence systems and du-al-use capabilities of rendezvous and proximity operations, Grego noted that such programs are still subject to the laws of physics and could pro-duce masses of debris, among other problems. While space may be the military high ground, she argued that it not only can, but must be shared.

The panel and the following dis-cussion clearly indicated that all coun-tries need to accept their responsib-ility in maintaining the security and sustainability of outer space. How-ever, some are reluctant to pursue additional arms control measures, and new norms of behaviour take time to develop. But as the panelists pointed out, events both on the ground and in outer space are moving quickly. Time is running out. □

Under stress: Space security in 2017

Ploughshares’ Program Officer Jessica West speaks on a panel during a First Committee side event at the United Nations in New York in October.

UN FIRST COMMITTEE


UN FIRST COMMITTEE

Outer Space SecurityStatement to the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee

Chair, today is an auspicious day to address this Committee on the security of outer space. On this very date, Oc-tober 10th, the Outer Space Treaty—the bedrock of international space law—entered into force exactly 50 years ago. Outer space now provides vast social, scientific, and economic benefits to humanity. But the sustainability of this critical domain also faces critical challenges.

The diverse nature of space activity requires attention on numerous fronts, and at the highest levels. As we are ad-dressing the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, we wish to draw attention specific-ally to the urgent need to engage in policy discussions and legal instruments related to space arms control.

No clear norms are in place today to prevent an arms race in outer space. At the same time, ground-based anti-sat-ellite weapons (ASATs) have been tested; communications satellites are deliberately and routinely jammed; missile defence systems have been used as ASATs; and precursor technologies that would allow space-to-space offensive capabilities continue to be developed.

The United Nations General Assembly has voted for several years on a resolution on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), which notably states that:

• The “prevention of an arms race in outer space would avert a grave danger for international peace and secur-ity”; and that,

• The legal regime applicable to outer space does not in and of itself guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Despite wide international backing, the annual PAROS resolution has not once been supported by the most ad-vanced spacefaring nation in history. The Conference on Disarmament, which has the primary responsibility for PAROS, has been unable to conduct any substantive negotiations for more than two decades. And any attempts to discuss arms controls at the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) are dismissed as falling outside its jurisdiction.

In the end, efforts to address the prevention of an arms race in outer space head-on do not seem to be a top policy priority for the international community.

During our statement before this Committee last year, we put forward various recommendations concerning the space domain. They all still hold true, but let us highlight again two of the utmost importance:

1. States should pledge not to use any space- or ground-based capabilities to deliberately damage or destroy space assets.

2. States should indicate support for the negotiation of a treaty preventing an arms race in outer space and for interim transparency and confidence-building measures toward that end.

Chair, multilateral arms control efforts have typically occurred only after certain categories of weapons have already been used in conflict. With PAROS, however, the international community has the unique possibility to act proactively before outer space becomes weaponized—and the social and economic benefits derived from it are put in jeopardy.

On this golden anniversary of the outer space treaty, we urge all states to act decisively to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Drafted by Cesar Jaramillo, Project Ploughshares. Delivered by Alice Slater, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.


OPEN LETTER

Beatrice FihnExecutive DirectorInternational Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons150 Route de Ferney1211 Genève 2SWITZERLAND

6 October 2017

Re: 2017 Nobel Peace Prize

Dear Beatrice and colleagues:

On behalf of the member denominations of The Canadian Council of Churches and its bodies, including operating division Project Ploughshares, we congratulate the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) for being awarded the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize. The award rightly recognizes ICAN’s formidable work to shed light on the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and its ground-breaking efforts to achieve a treaty-based prohibition of such weapons.

Project Ploughshares and its Executive Director, Cesar Jaramillo, are members of ICAN institutionally through the Abolition 2000 coalition, the Canadian Pugwash Group, the Sehlac network and the International Peace Bureau. We share your goals and honour you, your team, and your members for your work and leadership.

We are confident that today’s richly-derserved honour will serve to further stigmatize nuclear weapons and to foster the necessary environment for their complete elimination. Please know that we will continue to work diligently to advance nuclear disarmament, and look forward to further collaboration with all ICAN partners and supporters.

Canadian church leaders have spoken in a united voice on nuclear disarmament for decades now and we intend to join you in drawing attention to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and to work toward a unanimous and binding international treaty prohibiting such weapons.

We believe that to rely on nuclear weapons, to threaten nuclear attack as a foundation for security, is to acquiesce to spiritual and moral bankruptcy. We say without reservation that when measures employed to defend nation states and human institutions undermine God’s gift of abundant life, threatening humanity and the planet itself, such measures must be unequivocally rejected. (Church Leaders’ Letter on Nuclear Disarmament in 2013)

Congratulations on being the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize for 2017 award.

The Rev. Canon Dr. Alyson Barnett-CowanPresident, The Canadian Council of Churches

Cc: Member Denominations of The Canadian Council of ChurchesCesar Jaramillo, Executive Director, Project PloughsharesPeter Noteboom, Acting General Secretary, The Canadian Council of Churches

The Canadian Council of Churches is the broadest and most inclusive ecumenical body in the world, now representing 25 denominations of Anglican; Evangelical; Free Church; Eastern Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox; Protestant; and Catholic traditions. Together we represent more than 85% of the Christians in Canada. The Canadian Council of Churches was founded in 1944.

40yearsPLOUGHSHARESPROJECT


OPEN LETTER

The Honourable Chrystia FreelandMinister of Foreign Affairs125 Sussex DriveOttawa, Ontario K1A 0G2

6 October 2017

Re: Canada’s absence from multilateral process to ban nuclear weapons

Dear Minister Freeland:

On behalf of the 25 member denominations of the Canadian Council of Churches, we express our best wishes and appreciation for the important work carried out by Global Affairs Canada on many fronts under your leadership. Please be assured of our support for any and all efforts that contribute to a more peaceful, just and secure global order, and which are in the best interests of Canadians and the international community.

The Canadian Council of Churches has, for decades, written to successive prime ministers to express our convictions that safety and security do not come through the threat or through the use of nuclear weapons. On June 25, 2010, we wrote to Prime Minister Stephen Harper:

We believe that to rely on nuclear weapons, to threaten nuclear attack as a foundation for security, is to acquiesce to spiritual and moral bankruptcy. We say without reservation that when measures employed to defend nation states and human institutions undermine God’s gift of abundant life, threatening humanity and the planet itself, such measures must be unequivocally rejected. We cannot conceive how the use of nuclear weapons could be justified and consistent with the will of God, and we must therefore conclude that nuclear weapons must also be rejected as means of threat or deterrence.

We therefore write to convey our deep concern about the unacceptable threat to humanity posed by nuclear weapons, and about Canada’s role in the pursuit of a world free of these instruments of mass destruction. While this goal has been unambiguously affirmed by successive Canadian governments, including the present one under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, we see Canada embracing a minority position that seems to block, rather than promote, the abolition of nuclear weapons.

In particular, we wish to express our disappointment in Canada’s absence from the recent multilateral negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations on a “legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination.” Despite the lack of support by states with nuclear weapons—as well as their nuclear-reliant allies, such as Canada and most NATO members—negotiations resulted in a treaty establishing an explicit prohibition of nuclear weapons, which was adopted by a clear majority at the United Nations on July 7.

The ban treaty’s limitations are well known. Some stem from the reluctance of states such as Canada to participate in the process. Whatever the position of outliers, the ban not only fills a void under international law, but serves to further stigmatize these already illegitimate weapons. The oft-heard arguments that such efforts are premature or that international security conditions are not ripe are no longer credible. Nuclear disarmament efforts must be started, implemented and finalized under international security conditions that will be less than perfect.

The global momentum toward the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is largely driven by widespread frustration at the blatant disregard by nuclear-weapons states of the obligation to disarm, more than 45 years after the entry into force of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In recent years, the push for nuclear abolition has been energized by renewed attention to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of a nuclear weapons exchange.


OPEN LETTER

Numerous global security flashpoints have made conceivable the frightening prospect of a nuclear-weapons conflict. Unless nuclear weapons are completely eliminated, there is a real risk that most of what humanity holds dear will be destroyed. Beyond the legal case for elimination, we consider it a moral imperative to make concrete progress toward this long elusive objective.

In correspondence with Foreign Minister John Baird in April 2014, we expressed our “conviction that greater progress toward eliminating nuclear weapons is necessary, urgent and possible.” Members of the Council still hold fast to this belief.

Two weeks ago, on September 20, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons opened for signatures at the United Nations in New York and, on the first day, 50 states became signatories—a number that has since grown. Canada was not one of them, but the door remains open. There is no doubt that Canada’s embrace of this instrument would be welcomed by foreign governments and civil society, and would constitute a clear testament to our government’s stated commitment to nuclear abolition.

We firmly believe that it is in the best interest of every nation to move decisively toward the shared goal of nuclear abolition and to consider the recently adopted nuclear ban treaty a necessary step toward that goal. We find it disconcerting that Canada’s position on nuclear disarmament aligns with that of states with nuclear weapons. We urge you to reconsider your current policy so that Canada can become an early signatory to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

Thank you for your attention and actions on this important issue.

Rev. Paul Gehrs Chair, Commission on Justice and Peace

Cc:

Hon. Erin O’Toole, MP, Foreign Affairs Critic, Conservative Party of Canada

Hélène Laverdière, MP, Critic for Foreign Affairs, New Democratic Party of Canada

Luc Thériault , MP, Foreign Affairs Critic, Bloc Québécois Critic

Elizabeth May, MP, Leader, Green Party of Canada

The Canadian Council of Churches is the broadest and most inclusive ecumenical body in the world, now representing 25 denominations of Anglican; Evangelical; Free Church; Eastern Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox; Protestant; and Catholic traditions. Together we represent more than 85% of the Christians in Canada. The Canadian Council of Churches was founded in 1944.

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