hpg commissioned report supporting resilience in difficult places · 2019. 11. 11. · situations...

HPGHumanitarianPolicy Group

Supporting resilience in difficult places A critical look at applying the ‘resilience’ concept in countries where crises are the norm

Simon Levine and Irina Mosel

March 2014

HPG Commissioned Report

About the authors

Simon Levine and Irina Mosel are researchers with the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI).

Acknowledgements

Many thanks to Kathleen White for valuable early help in our research and thinking, and to Rachel Slater and Margie Buchanan-Smith for helping to stimulate our thinking on the problem of resilience in difficult places as this paper was being prepared. Many people working in development and humanitarian action gave very generously of their time, knowledge and ideas in interviews. Thanks too to Barbara Kobler, Sebastian Wigele and Hanna Maier for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Particular thanks to BMZ for funding the study, and to GIZ for its constructive engagement. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of ODI, BMZ or GIZ.

Humanitarian Policy GroupOverseas Development Institute203 Blackfriars RoadLondon SE1 8NJUnited Kingdom

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ISBN: 978 1 909464 66 7

© Overseas Development Institute, 2014

Readers are encouraged to quote or reproduce materials from this publication but, as copyright holders, ODI requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication. This and other HPG Reports are available from www.odi.org.uk/hpg.

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Introduction 1

Whatdoes‘resilience’mean? 3

Whathas‘resilience’meantinpractice? 5

3.1Resilienceframeworks 5

3.2Resilienceandtheaidbureaucracy 5

3.3Resilienceprogramming 7

3.4Learningandresilience‘metrics’ 9

Whatneedstobedone? 11

4.1Refocusinginternationalaidtoprioritisehelpingtopreventpeople 11

fallingintocrisis

4.2Linkingemergencyanddevelopmentpolicyandinterventions 11

4.3Incorporatingafuture-lookingperspectiveintopoliciesandprogrammes 12

4.4Improvingtheimpactofpoliciesandprogrammingonthelives 13

ofvulnerablepeople

4.5Findingnewparadigmsforlonger-termsupportinprotracted 14

andrecurrentcrises

Ensuringresiliencestaysmeaningful:avoidingthepitfalls 17

5.1Genericresilienceinterventionsfordifficultcontexts 17

5.2Ignoringlessonsfromthepast 17

5.3Genericresilienceindicators 18

5.4Rethinkingrisk 19

5.5Unrealisticexpectations 19

Makingprogress 21

References 25

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Contents

�� Supportingresilienceindifficultplaces

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1Introduction

Policymakersandaidactorshavebeengrapplingfordecadeswiththequestionofhowtobettersupportvulnerablepeopleaffectedbyprotractedorrecurrentcrises,andhowtodeliverlong-termsupporttoreducechronicpovertyorvulnerabilityinplaceswhereemergencyreliefisfrequentlyrequired–andwherewhatareoftenconsideredtheprerequisitesfor‘normal’developmentareabsent.Thispaperreferstothesesituationsas‘difficultplaces’,bothbecausethepeoplelivingtherefrequentlyfacedifficultiesinachievingevenaminimallevelofresilience,andbecausetheyarethemostdifficultenvironmentsforthoseconcernedwithsupportingpeople’sresilience.Therecentshiftofattentiontowards‘buildingresilience’hasprovidedanewbannerfordiscussionsabouthowtoengageinprotractedcrises,orincountrieswithrecurrentcrisesandathighriskofcrisis,inwaysthatgobeyondsupportformeetingimmediateneeds.

ThispaperhasbeencommissionedbytheGermanFederalMinistryforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(BMZ)tolookatthechallengesofsupportingresilienceinsituationswhereitisnecessarytothinklonger-term,butwherethestabilityandstronggovernancewhichareconsiderednecessaryfortraditionalmodelsof‘development’areabsent.TheGermangovernmenthasdevelopedastrategyforengagementin‘situationsoffragilityandprotractedcrises,duringperiodsofrecoveryandincountriesthatareparticularlyexposedtonaturalhazards’(BMZ,2013b:5).Itusesthelabel‘transitionaldevelopmentassistance’(TDA)forthisassistance,whichcanworkinparallelwithhumanitarianassistance,followitor,asitsnameimplies,beusedduringahoped-fortransitiontomoretraditionalmodalitiesoflonger-termdevelopment.ThemainaimofTDAinthesesituationsisexplicitly‘tohelpstrengthentheresilienceofindividuals,localcommunities,civilsocietyactorsandstateinstitutions’(ibid.).

Thepaperlooksathowresilienceisbeingtakenforwardintheinternationalaidsector,andthenathowbestadonorcansupportresilience-building.Paradoxically,althoughresilienceseemstobean

objectiveparticularlyappropriate(indeed,necessary)tothesituationsforwhichTDAisintended(conflict,fragility,protractedorrecurrentcrises),muchofwhathasbeenwrittenaboutresilienceassumesmuchmoreidealconditionsasitsprerequisite,andsocannotusefullyinformthoselookingforapracticalwayforwardinsuchsituations.Onestudy(Bahaduretal.,2010)findsthatthemostcommonlyidentifiedrequisitesforpeopleorcommunitiesbeingresilientwere:ahighlevelofdiversityineconomicopportunities;communitieshavingavoiceinrelevantpolicyprocesses;effectivedecentralisedandflexiblegovernanceandinstitutions;andahighdegreeofsocialandeconomicequity.Theseidealsaresofarfromtherealitiesofdifficultplacesthatitishardtoarguethattheyareusefulevenasaguideinsettingadirectionfordesiredchange.Thiswouldleadtotheconclusionthatresilienceisprobablynotarelevantobjectiveinmanydifficultplaces.Frankenbergeretal.(2012:9)israreinmakingthisexplicit:

There will be certain situations – such as those where formal government remains fragile or absent and/or those experiencing ongoing violent conflict – where resilience building may be impossible unless and until basic minimum conditions are present.

Thisconclusionsitsuneasilywithwhatcouldbecalledthe‘political’caseforresilience.TheGermangovernment’sdevelopmentpolicyinthecontextofconflict,fragilityandviolence(BMZ,2013a:7)arguesthatconflict,fragilityandviolenceare‘centralchallengesofdevelopment policy’[emphasisadded],asitisinotherrecentpolicydocumentsfromtheEuropeanCommission(EC)(EC,2012a)andtheUKDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID)(Ashdown,2011;DFID,2011a).Itispreciselythiskindofdevelopmentinthesekindsofcircumstancesthatisbeingcalledforinthecallforattentiontoresilience(seee.g.BMZ,2013b;Ashdown,2011andmanyothers).Canitreallybeunfeasibletosupportpeople’sabilitytocopeintheveryplaceswhereresilienceismostneeded?

� Supportingresilienceindifficultplaces

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Oneside-effectoftheincreasingattentiononresiliencehasbeenaplethoraofframeworksdescribingorexplainingit–andsomedegreeofconfusionaboutwhatbuildingresilienceactuallymeans,letalonehowbesttoachieveit.Despitetheoftenfraughtdiscussionsoveritsdefinition,‘resilience’hasasimplemeaning:theabilitytoabsorborresistastressorshock,andtorecoverfromit.Thewordhasbeenappliedinmanydisciplines(psychology,ecology,physics,sport,economics),tomanyentities(healthservices,livelihoods,eco-systems,footballteams,bankingsystems)andinrelationtomanystressesandshocks.Innormalparlancethewordpresentsfewproblems,butironicallyaperceivedneedtofindamore‘academic’or‘scientific’definitionthatcouldgivecertaintyandclarityhasmoreoftenbeenasourceofconfusionandmisinterpretation.

Althoughmostdefinitionsofresiliencerefertotheabilityofsystemstofunctioninthefaceofdisturbancesorhazards,thispaperusesresiliencetotalkaboutpeople.Mostdefinitionsfocusontheamountofdamageorlosssufferedbythe‘system’afterashock,andthespeedatwhichsomenotionofnormality(usuallytakenasthestatusquoante)isregained.Whateverformofwordsisused,theconceptofresiliencehastoincludeconsiderationofthefollowingelements:

• Exposure:theseverityoftheproblemsthatpeopleface,andthelikelihood(risk)thattheywillbehitbythem.

• Vulnerability: howbadlytheywillsufferiftheyareaffectedbytheproblem.

• Coping and adapting:1thedifferentthingsthatpeopledowhenhitbyproblemstomitigatedifficultyorsuffering–theirabilitytomaintainanacceptablelevelofwell-beinginthefaceofproblems.

• Recovery:people’sability,overtime,toreturntotheirpreviouslevelofwelfare,followingaproblem.

Thispaper,too,arguesthatresilienceshouldnotmerelybeusedinrelationtohowmuchislostasaresultofashockorstress,butmustalsoberelatedtothedegreeofsufferingthatpeoplehavetoendureasaresult.Peopleareresilienttothedegreethattheyavoidfallingintounacceptablelivingconditions.Theideathataminimumthresholdofwell-beingiscentraltoresilience–i.e.thatarichpersonisoftenresilienteventhoughtheymaylosealotmorethananun-resilientpoorpersoninthefaceofthesamethreat–hassomehowbeenexcludedfrommostcommonlyuseddefinitionsofresilience,lostperhapsintheattempttofindamore‘scientific’definition.

Themeaningofresilienceiseasilyunderstandableinindicatingageneraldirectionofwhatneedstobedone.Likemostusefulwords,itisnotascientificconceptdefinedbyaneatmathematicalequation.Attemptstoturnitintoonewillinevitablyleadtomisunderstandingandconfusion–buttheyareunnecessary.Weneedtobearinmindthevariousconceptsrelatedtoresilience(risk,coping,thresholds,vulnerability,etc.)andthendecideineachsituationwhichonesarecritical.

2 Whatdoes‘resilience’mean?

1 Copingreferstowhatpeopledointheshortterminabnormalcircumstances.Ifsuchbehaviourbecomespermanentthenpeoplewillhaveadapted–andwillpresumablyfindanewsetthingsthattheycandointhefaceofadversity.Thiswillbetheirnewcopingbehaviour.

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Althoughthewaysinwhichtheresilienceagendawillchangeaidpracticearestilldeveloping,anditisfartooearlytojudgewhatlong-lastingimpactitwillhave,fourareaswherechangesarebeingtalkedaboutandplannedareemerging.Theseareasofattentionare:theframeworksfordiscussingthetaskofresilience-building;reformoftheaidbureaucracytosupportresilience;programingspecificallyforresilience;andestablishingametricsofresiliencebywhichitcanbemeasuredandimpactcanbeassessed.

3.1Resilienceframeworks

Muchattentionhasbeendevotedbyaidorganisationstodevelopingframeworksforthinkingortalkingaboutresilience.Bypresumingthatthechallengeswhichneedaddressingundertheheadingofresilienceneedanewconceptualframework,thereisanimplicitsuggestionthatresilienceisanewanalyticalchallenge,presentinganewsetofissuestobeanalysed.Onthewholetheseframeworkshavenothelpedtointroduceclarity,andtheyhavesometimesconflatedcharacteristicswhicharenotonlydifferentbutmayevenbemutuallyexclusive;theyalsoriskmaskingsomeofthekeyquestionsforanalysisbecausetheyhavetriedtopindownahighlyamorphousconceptthatcanbeappliedinsomanywaystosomanykindsofentitiesinsomanysituationsinsomanyfields–withoutnecessarilymaintaininganyunchanging‘quintessential’coreofmeaning.Asaresult,frameworkshaveriskedmakingithardertohaveasensiblediscussionaboutpeople’sresilience(seeBox1).

Insomecases,frameworkshaveevenbeenmisleading:theyhaveriskedconfusionabouttherelationshipbetweenemergencyreliefandlonger-termdevelopment

supportthattheresilienceagendaissupposedtoimprove;2theyhaveimpliedunreasonablepossibilitiesasgoals(e.g.theideathatresilientpeoplebecomebetteroffthemoreshockstheysuffer(DFID,2011b));theycanundermineanalysisofinequalitywithinsocietyasadeterminantofvulnerabilitybyseeingresilientindividualsasthebuildingblocksandnecessaryconditionforhavingresilientcommunities(e.g.TANGO,2012)–infact,communitieseverywherecanderiveresiliencebytheirabilitytomaintainsomeoftheirmembersinextremevulnerability;or,asdiscussedabove,theycreateadescriptionofresiliencethatistooremovedfromrealitytoprovideaguidewhenworkinginrealsituations.

Thispaperdoesnot,therefore,discussframeworksfurther,savetomakethepointthatresilienceinanyparticulardomainisbestanalysedthroughframeworksthatexplaintheworkingsofthosedomains,e.g.livelihoodresilienceisanalysedusinglivelihoodsframeworks,nutritionalresiliencethroughnutritionalframeworksandtheresilienceofbankingsystemsthroughbankingandfinancemodels.

Overtimeempiricalstudieswillhopefullyprovidenewinsightsaboutwhathelpsmakesomepeoplemoreresilientindifferentcircumstances.Suchstudiesaretakingplace,justasempiricalstudiesonvulnerabilityhavebeenundertakenformanyyears.Progressinunderstandingisincremental,though,andsuddenconceptualbreakthroughsortheoreticalrevolutionshavenottakenplace.

3.2Resilienceandtheaidbureaucracy

Resiliencehashadthemosteffect,andthemostpositiveimpact,ininfluencingthinkingaboutthebureaucracyofinternationalaid.Manyaidactorsseeresilienceasofferinganotheropportunitytoaddressthedisconnectionbetweendevelopmentand

3 Whathas‘resilience’meant inpractice?

2 Mostresilienceframeworksmakenoreferencetohumanitarianaid(e.g.Oxfam,FAO,PracticalAction,TulaneUniversity,TANGO),althoughitisgenerallystatedthathumanitarianactionhasaroletoplayinbuildingresilience.


emergencyaid.ThehighlyinfluentialHumanitarianEmergencyResponseReview(Ashdown,2011)turnedthehumanitarianchallengearoundandmadedevelopmentprogress(nationalandinternational

policies,aid,etc.)responsibleforensuringthatpeopleareabletocopewhenproblemsoccur.Forthistohappen,developmentthinkingmustbeinformedbyanunderstandingofhowpeoplefallintocrisis–whoisvulnerable,when,whereand,themostneglectedquestion,why.Developmentpractitionerswouldthushavetocollaboratewithcolleaguesresponsibleforemergencyresponseintwoways:theirunderstandingofwhatneedstobedonewouldhavetobeshapedbyananalysisofthecrisis;anddevelopmenteffortswouldhavetobetargetedatthesamepeoplewhoaremostofteninneedofemergencysupport.

Oncedevelopmentstrategiesareshapedbythinkingaboutcrises(orvulnerabilityandresiliencetocrises),itthenbecomesnecessaryforthisunderstandingtoworktheotherway:emergencyactorsneedtounderstandhowrelieffitsintoandisguidedbyalonger-termstrategy.(Suchademandforjointanalysisisalsomadebyothers,e.g.Frankenbergeretal.(2012).)Thiscannotofcoursehappenaslongasdevelopmentstrategiesaremissinginactionincrises-proneareas.Theargumentthatdevelopmentpolicyshouldbedeterminedbycrises,whichbecameamajorcatalystfortheresilienceagenda,overlapswiththecaseforrethinkingLinkingRelief,RecoveryandDevelopment(LRRD)–anLRRDagendathatisnotjustaboutemergencyrelieftryingtofindexitstrategiestolinktolong-termstructures,butisagenuinely‘two-wayLRRD’.(SeeSection4belowandMoselandLevine(2014)forafullerdiscussionofone-andtwo-wayLRRD.)

Smallstepscanrepresentamajorparadigmshift.TheECalsoseessuchlinksasacentralissueinimprovingaid.Itsresiliencepolicy(EC,2012a)andthefollow-upActionPlan(EC,2013)bothstresstheneedforacommonanalyticalapproachtoemergencyanddevelopmentsupportthatmakesresilienceacommonreferencepointforbothhumanitariananddevelopmentactors,andcallforjointplanningprocessestodevelopbothkindsofsupport.Suchjointplanninghastakenplaceinsomecountries.SeniorofficialsattheUSAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID)ranexercisesincountryofficeswherestaffmappedtheirdevelopmentandemergencyspending.Thevisualdemonstrationofthealmosttotallackofgeographicaloverlapbetweenthetwospokeforitself,andwillhopefullyleadtochangenotjustinthegeographicaldistributionofaid,butalsoinhowaidprofessionalsthinkabouttheirwork.

3 Manyauthorshavedescribedorexplainedresilienceusinggraphsshowingsomeideaofwell-beingontheyaxisandtimeonthexaxis.Examplesrangefromthemostpictorialorsketched(e.g.DFID(2011b)),throughtheillustrative(e.g.MitchellandHarris(2012))tothemathematical(e.g.BarretandConstas(2013)andRenschleretal.(2010)).

4 SeeforexampleRenschleretal.(2010).

Althoughtheconceptofresilienceasawholeisreceivingagreatdealoftheoreticalattention,someoftheareaswheretheoreticalattentionismostneededarebeingskatedoverandevenmaskedbydefinitionsortheoriesthathidethequestionsfromscrutiny.Someoftheissueswhichneedanalysinginanygivensituationbutwhicharebeingobscuredbyframeworksinclude:

• Therelationshipbetweenriskandresilience(whenisrisktobeavoided,andwhataretheopportunitycostsofavoidingit?).

• Howfarispeople’sabilitytowithstandashockrelatedtotheirabilitytorecoverfromit?Isitrighttoequate(asmostresilience‘graphs’3andsomedefinitionsdo4)aquickerrecoverywithasmallerlossinthefaceofshocks?

• Ifnot,whenisitbettertoinvestinoneratherthantheother?Howdowebestjudgewhenitisbettertoinvestintheabilitytoresistshocks,ratherthaninanewstrategythatwouldavoidthoserisks?

• Whatistherelationshipbetweenhumanitarianactionandresilience-building?Although‘integratedresilienceprograms’arecalledfor(e.g.Frankenbergeretal.,2012),istheaftermathofadisastertherighttimetomakestructuralchanges?

• Resilienceisaqualityascribedtocommunities,systemsandhouseholds.Whatistherelationshipbetweenthese?Domoreresilientcommunitieshavefewervulnerablepeople?Whichshouldbetheobjectiveofinternationalaid?

Box1:Whatismissingintheresiliencetheories?

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Otherdonorsarealsothinkingaboutthesameproblemsandtryingdifferentapproaches.BMZ’suseofaspecialfundingstreamwithinTDA,whichseekstobridgethegapbetweendevelopmentcooperationandhumanitarianaid,hasbeendiscussed.Withafocusonresilienceasaguidingprinciple,itisspecificallythoughtofasamedium-termengagement(uptofouryears)insituationsofchronicorrepeatedemergency,withflexibleandadaptableimplementationmodalities.DFIDistestingdifferentapproaches,includingtheuseoflong-term(currentlyfour-year)humanitarianprogramminginprotractedcrises(supportedinYemen,theDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC),Ethiopia,Sudanand,shortly,Somalia)andanewfundingstreamwhichintegratesconcernsaboutchronicvulnerabilitytocriseswiththeadditionalvulnerabilitiesexpectedtobecreatedbyclimatechange.

Anothercommonthemerunningthroughresiliencediscussionsistheneedforgreaterflexibilityinprogrammingandaidmanagement.Thefirsttargethasbeenflexibilityinthescaleofinterventions,with‘flexing’becomingthenewtermforanincreaseinthescaleofaprojectinthefaceofanimminentcrisis.Moreattentionwillalsobenecessary(especiallyindifficultcountries)onflexibilityinthesenseofbeingallowedtoadaptinterventionsascircumstanceschange.Thisrequirementisapplicabletoaidgenerally,particularlyincountriesin‘transition’orotherwiseatriskofcrisis.Itistooearlytoexpectconcretechangesinthebureaucraticsystemsofaidwhichcansatisfythecompetingneedsforflexibilityandaccountability,butthefactthatthisissocentralonsomanyagendasisamajoropportunity.

Resiliencehasbeenspokenofinformallyasbeing‘acombinationofDRRandsustainabledevelopment’.DRRhadbecomeartificially–andproblematically–restrictedtonaturaldisastersandpurelytechnicalinperspective;resilienceoffersanopportunitytorevisittheconcernsofDRR,butwithalensthatincludesthepolitical,socialandeconomicaspectsofsustainablelivelihoodsthinking.Therearethose5whogofurtherandexplicitlyunderstandresiliencetoincludetheabilityoftheinternationalcommunitytorespondearlierandmoreeffectivelytocrises(ofwhateverkind),makingemergencypreparedness(andnotmerelyDRR)aningredientinresilience-building.

3.3ResilienceprogrammingAlthoughamaindriverforthinkingaboutresiliencewastheconvictionthatdevelopmentaidshouldtrytopreventpeoplefallingintocrisis(i.e.anobjectiveofaid strategies),‘resilience-building’isincreasinglybeingusedasaspecifictechnicalobjectiveofaidprojects.Somedonorshavecreatedfundsspecificallyintendedfor‘resilience-building’,evenifthissitsuneasilywiththeideathatsupportingresilienceentailsbreakingdownbarriersbetweenfunds,communitiesofpracticeandbureaucracies.Althoughformanytheresilienceagendaisexplicitlyaboutinter-disciplinarity,mostresilienceinitiativesandprogrammeshavefocusedonlivelihoods.‘Resilienceprogramming’isnotwidelyusedtorefertoeffortstoensurethatbasicservicesareresilienttocrises.DFIDhaslaunchedamajorfundforclimatechange‘resilience’,whichexplicitlyencouragesDRRapproachesaimedprimarilyatresilience.

Resiliencebudgetsarestillintheirinfancy,buttheyarelikelytospread.TheEuropeanUnion(EU)isincreasinglyadoptingthelanguageofresilienceinitsprogramming,butthisislargelyarephrasingoffoodsecurityobjectivesratherthana‘new’setofobjectives.6DFID’sConflict,HumanitarianandSecurityDepartment(CHASE)haslaunchedseparatetendersforfour-yearprogrammesinSomaliaforlivelihoodsprojectsandresilience-building,thoughitisnotclearthatthedistinctionwillinfactbemaintained.USAIDlaunchedarequestforproposalsfora‘Sahelresiliencelearning’programmeinJune2013withthegoalofpromoting‘theadoptionofprovenresilience-enhancingtechnologiesandinnovations’(USAID,2013).Thisdocumentendorsedmethodologiesformeasuringresilience,whichsuggeststhatthedirectionofresilienceprogrammingwillincreasinglybebasedonobjectivesandassessmentcriteriaderivedfromtheoreticalresilienceconstructs.

Theaidsectorasawholehasnotyetarrivedatanyconsensusonhowbesttobuildorstrengthenresilience,andindeedmostagencieswouldhesitatetoclaimthattheyhavetheanswer.Anumberoftendencies,togetherwiththeirimplicitassumptions,canhoweverbeidentified.Someorganisationscontinuewiththesameprogrammingthattheyhavebeenusingforyears,relabelledas‘resilienceactivities’.Thisprobablydeserveslesscriticismthanitreceives,

5 SeeforexampleHarris(2013),Manyena(2006),UNISDRandWMO(2012).

6 TheEUCommunicationonResilienceiscalledThe EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises.


ifitisbelievedthattheresilienceagendadoesnotintroduceanewobjectiveoranewanalyticalconcept,butusesanewlanguagetocallforarefocusingofaid(i.e.politically,nottechnically).Thedangercomeswhenactivitieswhichcouldconceivablysupportresilienceinparticularsituationsarethenbelievedtobeinherently‘resilienceenhancing’wherevertheyoccur.Sincethelistofactivitieswhichcouldimprovepeople’sassets,production,humancapitalandmarketaccessisalmostlimitless,almostanythingcanbecalledresilience-building.(Onedonordrewupalistof73distinctprojecttypes,rangingfromfunctionalliteracythroughiodisingsalttosupportingmicro-savingsgroupsin‘anattempttocategorizeandorganizelogicallyallofthedifferenttypesofactivitiesthatcanbeimaginedtobuildresiliencetochronicdroughtandconflictintheSahel’.)Interventionsarethenjustifiedbytheircategorisationasresilience-buildingratherthanbyreferencetoaparticularproblemorsituationalanalysis.

Aslightlydifferenttendencyhasbeentocallverybroadlyformajorresilienceinitiatives,butwithoutcommittingtoanyspecificapproach,forinstancetheEU’sSupportingtheHornofAfrica’sResilience(SHARE)initiativeandtheGlobalAllianceforResilience(AGIR).Thereasonforthisisabeliefthatthechallengeofresilienceisnotinherentlyanewonefordevelopmentaid,anddoesnotneedanyparticularlynewsolutions–justgreaterresolvetodowhatwealreadyknowhowtodo.Althoughwewouldarguethatitiscorrectthatthechallengeisnotatallnew,itdoesnotfollowthatwethereforeknowhowtomeetit.Theresiliencedebateisitselfrootedintheconvictionthataidhasforyearsbeenfailingtopreventpeoplefromfallingintocrisis,andnotmerelybecauseinadequateresourceshavebeendevotedtothetask.Thevaguenessindescribingwhatistobeaccomplishedandhowisthereforeworryinginthatitmayreinforce,oratleastpermit,analysisandprogrammingbyassumption–thekindoflist-makingdescribedaboveasabasisforinterventions.Thislegitimisesdesigningandfundinginterventionswhicharenotclearlybasedonin-depthanalysisofpeople’sspecificsituation.

Thebeliefthatweknowwhatworksisstrong,althoughdifferentpeopleororganisationsputtheirfaithindifferentapproaches.Somerelyontechnicalsolutionssuchasdrought-tolerantseedsandsmall-scaleirrigation(e.g.USAID).Otherslooktolessproveninterventionsbeingadvancedindependentlyofanyresilienceobjectives.Forexample,boththe

EU(EC,2013)andUSAID(USAIDandRockefellerFoundation,draft,July2013)havelaunchedactionplansonresiliencewhichhaveinsuranceasakeycomponent.Itisstriking,though,thatneitherdocumentexplainshowandwhereinsurancemightwork,orevenwhichkindsofinsuranceshouldbeusedandforwhom.

TheWorldBankand,withWorldBankloans,severalgovernmentsinAfricaareincreasinglylookingtopublicworksprogrammes(PWP)asavehicleforcreatingeconomicassetsandprovidingshort-termemploymentforlargenumbersofpeople.TheWorldFoodProgramme(WFP)isinvestingsimilarlyinPWP,thoughmoreoftenthroughemploymentpaidin-kindwithfood.Althoughthiswasnotoriginallyanagendaemanatingfromresilience,itisnowbeinglinkedtoit(WFP’sfoodforassetssupporttothesemi-aridpartsofUgandaisnowbeingdescribedas‘resilienceoriented’).Thisisparalleledbyincreasingattentiontosocialprotection,forinstancebyDFIDandincreasinglybytheEU,andthelanguageof‘graduation’fromsafetynetsorsocialprotectionisperhapsbeingseenasasynonymforachievingresilience.

Thelinkbetweensocialprotectionandresilienceisintuitive,butnotentirelysimple.Socialprotectionissometimesseenasacomponentofresilienceandsometimesasavehicle for buildingresilience.Thedistinctionisimportant.Theformerviewacceptsthatpeopletargetedbysocialprotectionmayneverbeabletoachieveindependentresilience.However,iftheycanrelyonsupportintimesoftroubletheycanenjoy‘dependentresilience’,butonlyifsocialprotectionisrights-basedandreliable(andgenuinelyfreespeoplefromdependencyorexploitation).Themorecommonthinkingbehind‘socialprotection-typeapproaches’seessupportasenablingtargetedrecipientstobuildpersonalorcommunityassetstothepointwheretheyachieve‘independentresilience’.Arecentunpublishedreviewfoundthattheseprogrammesoftenhadunrealisticexpectations,offeringrelativelysmalltransfersovertooshortatermtoachievetransformativechange.

Anothercommonapproachtoresilience-buildingistostressthewayinwhichinterventionsorpoliciesaredevelopedandimplemented,ratherthantheirtechnicalcontent.Manyagenciesbelievethatmulti-sectoralapproachesareessentialforsupportingresilience,onthegroundsthatthechallengeswhichpeoplefacetendtoaffecttheminlotsofways,andhencethereisaneedtoaddressthechallenges

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holistically.However,whateverthemeritsorotherwiseofmulti-disciplinaryorholisticapproaches,thereisnoclearreasonwhytheyhavebeenspecificallylinkedtoresilience.Itmaywellbethatimportantcontributionscanbemadeinhelpingpeoplebecomemoreresilientbyaddressingonesinglechallengethattheyfaceratherthantryingtorespondstoalloftheirchallengesatthesametime.Thisoughttobetreatedasanempiricalquestionratherthanadefiningcharacteristicofresilienceapproaches.

Thesameappliestocommunityparticipation,whichisoftentakentobeessentialforflexibilityandresilience-building(see,forexample,theapproachofwww.reachingresilience.org;IFAD(2013);andtheWorldBank’sCommunity-DrivenDevelopment(CDD)approaches).Participationhaslongbeenadvocatedwithinsustainabledevelopmentcircles,butthelinkswithresiliencearenotclear(evenifparticipationandflexibilityarebothvalidprinciplesforaidagencies).Participatoryapproachesmayinfactleadexternalactorstofocusundulyonthecommunitiesorhouseholdswhoseresilienceistobesupported–possiblyunderplayingtheimportanceofaddressingstructuralcausesofvulnerability,whichmayliefaraway.

Amoreencouragingtendencyisagrowingrecognitionthatthereisuncertaintyastohowbesttosupportresilience,andabeliefthatinnovation,differentkindsofprogrammingandlearningareneeded.Thismayslowlybereplacingthemorewidespreadassumptionbehindmajorinitiativesthatweknowhowtosolvetheresilienceproblem.Thereisaneedtounderstandfarmoreabouttheimpactofinterventions(disaggregated,quantified,contextuallyunderstoodandassessedyearsafteraninterventionceases),anditistobehopedthatattemptstolearnwillbebroad-basedandnotstraitjacketedbyresilienceframeworksornewtheoreticalresilienceindicators.

Ingeneral,so-called‘resilienceprogramming’isstilltoonewtoassesswhetherornotaclearbodyofworkwillemerge,andmostcurrentinitiativesarebasedonoldapproachestofoodsecurity,earlyresponseandDRR.However,thoughafreshtakeonoldproblemscanbeusefulinbringingnewenergytothechallenge,thereisadangerthatthismakesitlesslikelythatthinkingandprogrammingwillbegroundedinahistoricalperspectiveandlessonslearnedfrompreviousexperience.Themostimportantshiftinattentionasaresultofthefocusonresilienceisneitherinthecontentormodalityofprogrammingitself,

butratherinhowprogrammingisdesigned.Severalactors,includingtheECandsomedonors,havecalledformuchgreaterproblemandsituationalanalysistounderpininterventionsandpolicy.Inpart,thisisacallfordevelopmentandemergencyagencies,departments,ministriesandofficestoworktogetheronanalysis,butbyimplicationthisisextendedtoincludetheneedforanalysisfromseveralperspectives:political,economic,political-economy,conflict7(asappropriate).Itishardtoexaggeratetheimportanceofashiftinemphasisawayfrominterventionsbasedonneedsassessmenttowardsonesderivedfromin-depthproblemanalysis.Thisisprobablythesine qua nonofgenuineprogressinsupportingresilience.

3.4Learningandresilience‘metrics’

Twoparallelprocessesmayhaveasignificantimpactonhowresilienceisunderstood,programmedandfinanced.Thereisabroadmovementwithintheaidsectortotiefundsincreasinglyto‘results’aspartofvalueformoney.Thisdepends,ofcourse,onagreedwaysofdefiningandmeasuringresults.Therehasbeengrowingattentionondevelopingmethodologiesformeasuringresilience,andselectingparameterswhichcanserveasindicatorsorcomponentsofresilience.TheFoodandAgricultureOrganisation(FAO)hasledworkonquantifyingresilience;DFIDandUSAIDhavebothchampionedthevalueformoneyjustificationforresilience,andDFIDhassupportedworkaimedatquantifyingthis.VariousNGOsarealsoadvancingmethodsforquantifyingresilienceortheimpactoftheirresilience-buildingwork(e.g.MercyCorps,Oxfam).Althoughitistooearlytosaywhatimpactquantificationwillhaveinsettingtheagendaonresilience-building,itislikelytobesignificant.Whetherornottheinfluenceispositivewilldependverymuchonwhatapproachesbecomesindustrystandards.

Afulldiscussionoftheconceptualandmethodologicalproblemswiththecreationofaresiliencemetricisbeyondthescopeofthispaper,andiscoveredinLevine(2014).Theneedformuchbetterunderstandingandassessmentoftheimpactof

7 BasedontheBMZstrategyDevelopment for Peace and Security(BMZ,2013a),alldevelopmentinterventionsinfragilestatesrequireacontextanalysisthatdealswithconflict,violenceandfragility.

�0 Supportingresilienceindifficultplaces

interventionsandpoliciesisnotinquestion.However,thiscannotbeachievedbyconstructingsomeabstractentitycalled‘resilience’,creatingalistofitsvariousprerequisitesorcharacteristicsandthencountinghowmucheachofthesechangesovertime.Thisattempttocreateauniversal,genericwayofquantifyingresilienceremovessomuchofwhatisimportantaboutwhatneedstobeassessed–whattheparticularconstraints(andopportunities)areforspecificpeopleinanysituation,andhowfarthisischanging.(SeealsoUSAID/DFID(2012)ontheneedforcontext-specificmonitoring.)Twoexamplesillustratewhythisiscountertocommonsense.

First,theassumptionthatanyprogressoncharacteristicsofresilienceistobecountedequallyassumesthattherearenothresholdsbelowwhichprogressisnotuseful.Infact,buildinghalfadamdoesnotprovide50%ofresilienceagainstaflood:itprovidesnoprotectionatalluntilthedamiscompleteandhighenough.Progressonresiliencemustbeanalysed,notsimplymeasured,againstwhatisseentobeenoughforpeopletobeabletocope.

Second,genericmeasureswouldallowaresiliencescoretoincreasewhicheverofthegenericcomponentsofresiliencewerealtered,regardlessofwhetherornottheywererelevanttotheparticularthreatthatpeoplefaced.Forexample,theresiliencescoreofpeoplelivingnearariverwiththethreatoffloodingcouldbeimprovedequallybygivingthemlivestock,byprovidingthemwithahealthcentre,bygivingthemanextrayear’sschoolingorbyimprovingfloodcontrolmeasures.Itseemsobviousthatwhichonecontributestotheirresilienceshouldbederivedfromananalysisoftherisksthattheyfacedandtheirdifferentoptionsforfacingthem.Thisisnottoassumethattherecanonlybeonestrategyinthefaceofrisk(intheexampleabove,investingineducationtogetajobintownorinvestinginlandthatcanbeirrigatedforcommercialhorticulturemaybemoreusefulthanflooddefences).Diversityofsolutionsdoesnotcontradictthe

argumentthatindicatorsofprogressinresiliencecanonlybedeterminedforaspecificpopulationgroupinaparticularcontext,andthattheywilldependonthechoseninterventionanditsaccompanyingprogrammetheory(seeSection4.3).

Ithasbeenarguedthatanapproachtomonitoringandquantifyingimpactwhichlooksonlyatcomparingchangesinsituationinthesamecontextovertimeabandonstheattempttoquantifyresilienceinwayswhichallowcomparisonstobemadefromoneplacetoanother.Thereplymustbetoquestionwherethisdemandforcross-situationalquantitativecomparisoncomesfrom,or,moreprecisely,whythisdemandisbeingmadeof‘resilience-building’whenithasnotbeenmadeinmostothersectorsbefore.Verylittlegoodassessmentoftheimpactoflivelihoodinterventionsiscarriedoutandimpactmonitoringisstillinitsinfancyinthissector,eventhoughtheconceptsareclear,thetoolsarewellunderstoodandtheindicatorsare(relatively)straightforward.Evenifthedemandforcross-situationalmeasurementsofresiliencemadesense,itwouldbestrangetoplaceademandon‘resiliencebuilding’thathasneverbeenplacedonothersectors.Forthoseactuallyworkinginthefield,themostimportanttaskistorefinewaysofanalysingsituationsofrisksothatcontext-specificindicatorscanbeidentifiedandmonitored–indicatorswhichareactuallyusefultothosedesigningandimplementingpoliciesandinterventions.

Therelativelylimitedcontributionsofarof‘resiliencethinking’inhelpingtoimproveaiddoesnotmakethetasklessrelevantorlessimportant.Thefocus,though,shouldremainonwhattheconstraintsare–whethertheconstraintsfacingvulnerablepeople(orinstitutionsandsystems),ortheconstraintsfacingtheaidsystemsintendedtohelpthem.Itisnotbychancethatthegreatestprogresshasbeenmadeintryingtoreformtheaidsystem:theresilienceagendahelpsgatherpoliticalwilltoaddressinganareawheretheproblemsandneedswerealreadywellidentified.

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Thecoreconcernbehindthecallforresilience,ithasbeenargued,istheneedtotargetdevelopmentsupportatthosewhoaremostatriskoffallingintocrisis.Fivebroadandinter-relatedareaswhereprogressisneededcanbeidentified,allofwhicharegenerallyvalid,butwhichhaveparticularresonancefordifficultplaces.

4.1Refocusinginternationalaidtoprioritisehelpingtopreventpeoplefallingintocrisis

Thisistheprimarychallengeforsupportingresilience:mobilisingthefullweightofpoliticalandeconomicresourcesthatdevelopmentactorscanofferintheinterestsofpeoplemostvulnerabletocrisis.Theprimaryimportanceofthisprinciplefordifficultplacesispreciselytoargueformorelong-term‘development-style’aidforthesecontexts.Twoparticularchallengesaredetailedhere,onthecontentandthepoliticsofresilience.

Thetaskofsupportingtheresilienceofspecificvulnerablegroupsindifficultcircumstancessuchasconflictsisdiscussedbelow.Thereisalsothelarge-scaletaskofaddressingthechronicpovertyandexposuretoriskoflargepopulationsinareasoftheworldsuchastheSahelandtheHornofAfrica.Aprojectapproachcannotbesufficientforsuchamacro-scaleendeavour.Solutionsareneededthatcanworkatscale.Partialmeasuresmayormaynotbestepsonthepathtowardsresilience:someconceptionoftheoveralltaskisneededinordertoguideindividualcomponentsofthatendeavour.Thishassofarbeenabsentfromthelargerinternationalinitiatives(e.g.SHARE,AGIR),whichhavenotprovidedarealroadmapordestinationforresilience-buildingefforts.However,onlywhenthisisdonecanaidprogrammesbeassessednotbywhattheydoandhowmuchtheyspend(outputs),butbyreferencetotheirplacewithinabiggerpicture,makingclearhow,andhowmuch,theycontributetoanoverallstrategy.

Thechallengethenwillinvolvedevelopmentagenciesacquiringdifferentsetsofskillsandexpertise:

understandingprocessesofvulnerabilityatmicro-level,aswellashowmacro-economicconditionscreateenablingenvironmentsfromwhichsomecanbenefit;andunderstandinghowpoliciesandinterventionsplayoutinpractice,oftenincontrasttotheirstatedtrajectoriesortoeconomictheory.Inmostcountrieswherethereisextremevulnerability,someofthecauseslieingovernanceandalackofpoliticalwillorinterestinmarginalisedgroups–orevenanactivedesiretomaintaintheirmarginalisation.Manycountriesreceivingaidfavourinvestmentinhigh-potentialareas.Thecurrentdevelopmentconsensus,aroundagreementssuchasParisandBusan,isthatdevelopmentagendasshouldbesetbynationalgovernments.Therehashoweverbeenlittlediscussionofpossibletensionsbetweensupportingtheresilienceofthemostvulnerablecitizensandsupportingthenationalpoliciesoftheirgovernmentsthatmaybepartlyresponsibleforunderminingpeople’sresilienceinthefirstplace.

4.2Linkingemergencyanddevelopmentpolicyandinterventions

Thereisnoobviousconsensusastowhetherdevelopmentsupportandemergencyreliefshouldbethoughtofasoneormanagedseparately.Thereisequallynoconsensusovertheextenttowhichdifferenttoolsandstructuresshouldbeusedforthetwosituations.Oneofthemainjustificationsformaintainingsomedistinctionisthatemergencyorhumanitarianreliefissupposedtobegivensolelyonthebasisofneedandinapoliticallyneutralway:fewwouldarguethatdevelopmentsupportcanbesoapolitical,orthatcomparativeneedistheonlybasisfortargetingit.Whateveristhoughtaboutthedifferencesbetweenhumanitariananddevelopmentaction,though,thereislittleargumentthatmuchmorecollaboration,interactionandsynergyisneededbetweendevelopmentandemergencysupport,orthatincountriesfacingfrequentorcontinuousemergenciesajointanalysisbydevelopmentand

4 Whatneedstobedone?


humanitarianagenciesandspecialistsisnecessarytoensurethatdevelopmentaidandpolicyisbasedonanunderstandingofhowsomepeoplefallintocrisis,andthatcrisisresponsewillbeplannedwithabiggerandlonger-termpictureinmind.Indifficultplaces,thisessentiallymeansthatallassistance,howeveritisfundedandadministered,shouldbebroughtunderasingleanalyticalandstrategicumbrellacoveringbothlonger-termandshort-termperspectives.

The‘LRRDproblem’hasbeenidentifiedanddiagnosed,andourdiscussionoftheproblemandhowtoaddressitiscontainedinacompanionpaper.8ProgressonmakingLRRDarealityhasbeenlimited.MoselandLevine(2014)lookattheneedforwhatcouldbecalled‘two-wayLRRD’,wherereliefanddevelopmentaremutuallylinkedorintegrated,ratherthanthinkingonlyoflinkinginoneway,emergencyreliefhandingovertodevelopment.Reliefanddevelopment,andanyotheraidcategoriessuchasTDAorrecovery,mayexistatthesametimeinthesameplace,usingdifferentmodalitiestoaddressdifferentproblemsortakeadvantageofdifferentopportunities–buttheyshouldbeconceivedholisticallyaspartofacompletestrategy.

Thedifficultiestoachievingthisareprincipallybureaucratic.Developmentspendingrarelyhasasitsprimaryobjectivethecreationofconditionsthatpreventcrises(seeabove).Thisisbothamoralproblemabouttheuseofaidresources,andalsoapracticalonebecause,intheabsenceoflonger-terminitiatives,itisimpossibletofindsensibleexitstrategiesforshort-termreliefefforts.Agenciesinvolvedinemergencyreliefthusfindthemselvesforcedtouseofteninappropriatetoolsandshort-termfundingtorespondtochronicneedsbecausetheycannotfindanacceptablewayofwalkingaway.Chronicproblemshavetobediagnosedinemergencyterms(i.e.focusingonsymptomsandneeds)–butreliefcannotbringchronicneedsbelowacceptablethresholds.SuchasituationwasclearlyseeninHaiti,wherethreeyearsaftertheearthquakechronicpovertyandgrosslyinadequatehousingconditionscontinuedtobepresentedasaproblemof‘displaced’peopleinordertojustifyanemergencyresponse(UNOCHA,2013).

4.3Incorporatingafuture-lookingperspectiveintopoliciesandprogrammes

Resilience,asalatentcapacitywaitingtoberealised,seemsintrinsicallytoincludeinitselfthefuture,andpeople’sfutureresponsestochangingcircumstancesandevents.Changecomesfromfactorssuchasglobalisation,urbanisationanddemographicandtechnologicalchanges,allofwhichwillalmostcertainlyaffectmostpeople’slivesinthecomingdecades,aswellasclimatechange–andagrowingrecognitionoftheimportanceofclimatechangeamongdevelopmentactorshasbeenakeydriverinpromotingtheimportanceofforward-lookingperspectivesinpoliciesandprogrammes.Thewaysinwhichtheseforceswillshapepeople’sliveswilldependultimatelyonpolitics,institutionsandtheplayingoutofrelationshipsofpower(seeListerandPain(2004)forexamplesfromAfghanistanofchangesinmarketconditionsdrivenbypowerandpoliticsratherthanbyeconomicortechnicalchange).Rapidprogressinimprovingtheabilityofaidtobeforward-lookingispossibleontwolevels:intheanalysisbehindtheformulationofdevelopmentstrategies;andintheirimplementation,byensuringthatdevelopmentpolicyandinterventionssupportpeople’sownabilitytodealwithunknownfutures(or,tousethecurrentjargon,their‘adaptivecapacity’).

Adaptivecapacitymeanspeople’sabilitytomakeandrealisewell-informeddecisionsinthefuture.Adaptivecapacityisimportantinalldevelopmentsituations,butitisespeciallycriticalindifficultplaces,whicharetypicallyrapidlychangingsituations,wheretheabilitytocopewithchangeiskey–andwherepeoplemaynotbeabletorelyonothers(e.g.theirstate,elites)withoutexploitation.Supportingadaptivecapacityisslowerandmoredifficultthantransplantingnewtechnologiesorprovidingassets,anditneedsverydifferentskillsfromtheonestechniciansgenerallypossess.Itwillthushavesignificantimplicationsforstaffingandresources.Forexample,farmoretime(i.e.farmoreresources)isneededtoundertakemeaningfulparticipatoryprocesses,whichhavetobeconductedbystaffwithskillsinsocialanalysisandfacilitation,ratherthanstaffwhoseinstinct(andtraining)is

8 Thepaper(MoselandLevine,2014)wasalsocommissionedbyBMZ.

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toimmediatelyoffertechnical,expertadvice.Atahigherlevel,supportingadaptivecapacityandmakingthesocialandinstitutionalrealitythekeyfocusofattentionmeansdevolvinggreaterdecision-makingauthoritytostaffwhoareexpertsinthecontext,whereasthispower(andthecorrespondingremuneration)isinmostcasesconcentratedinthehandsofstaffwithageneralistexpertise,andexperiencefrommanycontextsisvaluedabovedetailedexperienceofone.(SeeLudietal.(2012)forafullerdiscussionoftheimplicationsoftakingadaptivecapacityseriouslyfordevelopmentprogramming,fundingandstaffing.)

4.4Improvingtheimpactofpoliciesandprogrammingonthelivesofvulnerablepeople

Animprovementinthequalityofaiddependsinpartonanimprovementinthequalityofprogrammes.Itisfrequentlypossibletoseesimplyfromananalysisofaprojectdesignthatthestatedobjectivesdonotmatchproposedactivities.Thisismostoftenbecausethenecessarylinkbetweenthetwo,andtheanalysisoftheproblemandoftheproposedintervention,ismissingorsuperficial.Untilprogrammingisobligedtobe

Twoexamplesmayoffersomecluesastowhat‘good’resilienceprogramminglookslikeindifficultplaces.

Inpost-earthquakeHaiti,oneNGO,Architectesd’Urgence,wasworkingoncommunityneighbourhoodplanninginsuburbswhichhadnoofficialexistence.AswithmuchofPort-au-Prince,noplanningpermissionhadbeengrantedforanydevelopmentandtheformallegalstatusofthelandwasprobablyimpossibletountangle.Localresidentsexplainedhowtheirunofficial(or,inthelocalauthority’sterms,illegal)statuswasamaincauseofvulnerability,underminingtheirsecurityoftenureandconstrainingaccesstoservices.TheNGO’sresponsewassimple:aspartoftheneighbourhoodplan,housingnumberswereallocated.Residentshadsmallmetalplatesmadewiththeirnumber,whichquicklybecameasemi-officialaddress.Althoughthelegalstatusoftheirneighbourhoodhadnotchanged,residentsfeltatransformationintheirabilitytonegotiatewithlocalauthoritiesanddefendtheirrightsovertheirproperty.Thehousenumberallocationwasasmallpartofaprojectandbroughtnochangeinpeople’sassetorskillsoranydirecteconomicbenefit.Itdidnotsolvealltheirproblems–butitradicallyreducedwhattheyfeltwasoneoftheirmainsourcesofvulnerability.

IntheNubaMountainsofSudan,recurrentconflicthasbeenaconstantinpeople’slives.Theylivewiththeconstantthreatofhavingtoflee–quickly,forextendedperiodsandwithfewifanyexternalsourcesofsupport.Whenpeoplehavetoflee

highupinthemountainsfindingfoodishard,andlivestock(goats)hadtobeleftbehindbecausetheycouldnotwithstandthecoldconditionsathigheraltitudes.Asimpleinterventionintroducedadifferentbreedofgoatspecificallychosenforitsabilitytosurvivethecold,allowingpeopletotakewiththemsomemeansofsurvivalwhentheyfled.Acultureofmutualassistancemeantthatthenewgoatbreedscouldbeeasilymultipliedandshared.

Dothetwoprojectshaveanythingincommon?Neitherwasdesignedasaresilience-buildinginitiative.Neitherattemptedtosolvealloftheproblemspeoplefaced.Neitherwasmeanttobereplicable.InNuba,theactualassettransferwassmall,anditcertainlydidnotmakepeopleanyricher;inHaiti,peoplereceivednothingatall.Inboth,theinterventionswerebasedonaverygoodunderstandingoflocalsocialdynamicsandtheirimportance.Neitherinterventionbotheredwiththeusual‘shoppinglists’thatpeoplepresenttoNGOs:instead,people’srealsituationwaswellunderstood.Perhapsasaresult,neitheroftheprojectsfittedclearlyintoadiscrete‘sector’(werethegoatsinNubaalivelihoodoraprotectionproject?).

Perhapsthesecretofgoodresilienceprogrammingisdoingsomethingsmart,basedongoodanalysisofpeople’sproblemsandopportunitiesandgoodunderstandingofthelocalsocialandpoliticalsystem,anddesignedtogivethehelptoletpeopledothethingsthattheywouldliketodoforthemselves.

Box2:‘Whatdoesagoodresilienceprogrammelooklike?’


underpinnedbyananalysisofasatisfactorylevel,muchaideffortwillcontinuetohaveminimalimpactonthelivesofthosewhomostneedit.Suchanalysismustbeassophisticatedinlookingattheproposedsolutionasattheproblemstobeaddressed.Muchprogrammingisbasedonanaïvebeliefabouthowaprojectwillplayoutinstitutionally,failingtotakeintoconsiderationthewayinwhichresourcesandpowerarecontested–andthatthepeoplewhoseresilienceneedsbuildingarepreciselythosewiththeleastabilitytocontest.Thisrequirementistrueinallsituations,butismostcrucial–andhardesttodowell–indifficultplaces.

4.5Findingnewparadigmsforlonger-termsupportinprotractedandrecurrentcrises

Genericprogrammingisnotappropriateforacategoryofcountries(i.e.thedifficultones)withnothingincommonexceptpreciselythefactthattheyshareunpredictabilityandlong-termcrises.Indeed,BMZ’sTDAfundforsuchcountrieshasbeenpredicatedontheneedforflexibilitybecausestandardmodelsfordeliveringaidareunlikelytobeappropriate.Thatsaid,certainbroadprinciplescanbeofferedonhowtoworkinthesecountries.

Achoiceisoftenpresentedbetweenworkingthroughthestateorignoringthestateandengaginginsteadindirectservicedelivery.Thedichotomyisfalseintwodirections:manypossiblerelationsarepossiblewithstatesandgovernments;andtherearemanyotheractorsbesidesthestateandtheaidagencywhichcanbeinvolvedinaidinterventions.Engagingwiththestateisalwaysimportant,butthestateisnevertheonlyviableornecessaryinterlocutor,especiallywhereitispartytoaconflict.Insuchcases,adialoguemuststillbeheld,andrelationssought,withdifferentpartsofcentralandlocalgovernment(whicharerarelymonolithic)evenwhenthisisnotconsideredthebestwayofdeliveringassistanceeffectivelyormostfairly.Insuchsituations,manyotherinstitutionsandentitiesmaybeimportantpartners,alliesortargets.

Vulnerabilityanalysisshouldrevealwhereconstraintstopeople’sindependenceandabilitytocopecomefrom–andwhereopportunitiesforexpandingtheiragencylie.Thismayrelatetothemarket,other

membersofthecommunity,sourcesofinformation,institutionsofjustice(formalorinformal)orfinancialservices.Aidagenciesdonotneedtotakeresponsibilityfortacklingconstraintsdirectly:societyisalwaysaconstantfluxofprocessesandstrugglesbetweeninstitutionsandbetweenpeople,anditisnecessarytoidentifywhichofthesecanbestbesupportedandhow,inordertoachievetheobjectivesoftheintervention.

Problemsinmostofthecountriesunderdiscussionwillnotbesolvedeveninthenextdecadeormore,soamuchmorelong-termviewisnecessary.Thismayincludebothalong-termstrategy(of20years

Therearenoeasygeneralisationsaboutthecollectionofcountriesvariouslycalled‘fragile’,‘conflict-affected’orin‘protractedandrecurrentcrises’.However,whereconflictatsomelevelhasbeenpersistent,itisoftentobeexpectedthat,eveninpost-conflictrecovery,someorallofthefollowingconditionsmaybefound.

• Thestateisweakand/orofcontestedlegitimacy.

• Governanceispoor–corruptionisrife,politicsservetheinterestsofthoseinpower.

• Institutionsareweak.• Manypeopleareverypoor.• Theeconomyoffersfewopportunitiesfor

mostpeople(buthighrewardsforafew).• Theeconomyislargelyinformal–perhaps

evenwithastrongillegaleconomy.• Lawandorderisinsufficientorisoften

arbitrary.• Peoplefeelinsecure,andsohaveshort-term

horizons.• Itisdangeroustobethere.• Peopleareoftendisplaced,localsocial

normsandorderhavebeendisrupted.Theseare,ofcourse,theconditionswherewecanleastexpectprojectstofollowpredictedtrajectories,resourcestobedistributedandusedinaccordwiththewishesoftheproject–andwhereitishardesttoknowwhatisgoingonortobeabletodoanythingaboutit.

Box3:Whatdoweknowaboutdifficultplaces?

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ormore9)forlong-termchangeandalonger-termcommitmenttosupportforimmediateorshort-termproblems.Itiscurrentlydifficultfordonorstoplanbeyondafour-yearhorizon.

Theneedforflexibilityindifficultplaceshasbeenstressedfrequently(seeaboveandMoselandLevine(2014)).Operationalagenciesargueformorebureaucraticflexibilityfromdonorssothatprogrammescanadapttounpredictableneeds.However,thechallengeisnotonlybureaucratic.Decision-makersneedtoknowhowcontextsarechangingandwhatadaptationsinpolicyorinterventionsareneededasaresult.Thechallengeistohavetherightmanagementskills,investmentinawarenessandeffectiverelationshipsbetweenthedifferentactorsinaproject(donor,operationalagency,government,localinstitutions,localpopulation).Adonorshouldideallynotmerelyallowflexibilitybutdemandit–activitieswhichhavebecomeinappropriateshouldobviouslynotcontinuetobefunded.

Flexibilityiscurrentlyconstrainedbytheverylogicofprogramingandevaluation.Thecommoncurrentpracticeisforsuccessandimpacttobejudgedbyreferencetotheproject’s objectives.Ifthebeneficiarypopulationhasotherpreferencesandusesthelearningorinputsofferedbyaninterventioninordertomeettheirownpriorities,thisresultsinanineffectiveprojectaccordingtothemostcommondefinitions10of‘effectiveness’.Thisisparticularlyinappropriatefordifficultplaces,wherepeople’sprioritiesandopportunitiesareevenmorediverseandchangingthannormal.

Theneedforbetteranalysishasalreadybeenstressed.Apartfromanytechnicalandeconomicappraisals,asanabsoluteminimumalldevelopmentinterventionsshouldbebasedonadocumentedanalysisthatexplains:

• whypeoplesufferastheydo;• whattheirworldmaylooklikeinseveralyears’

time;• whattheyaretryingtodotoovercomethe

constraintstheyface;

• howtheirscopeformakingchoicescanbeincreased;

• whatispreventingthis;• whatinfluencesorsourcesofpowercanbe

harnessedtosupporttheagency;• whatdifferentinterventionsandpolicychanges

havebeentriedinthepast;• whatimpactthesehavehadondifferentpeople

andwhy;• whatpossiblemeasurescouldbetaken;and• howthesearelikelytoplayoutinpractice.

Itisraretofindanydocumentationofsuchananalysis.

Indifficultplaces,conflictandpolitical-economyanalysiswillbeespeciallyimportant,withaneedforassophisticatedananalysisoftheproposedsolution(e.g.politicalrealities,institutionalcapacityandthepowerbalancearelikelytoaffectimpact,includinghowaidmaybedivertedorco-opted)asfortheproblem.Thegeneralstandardofanalysiscannotbeimprovedbytrainingalone.Itisnecessaryalsotocreateademandforanalyticalcapacity,whichwillhappenonlywhengood-qualityanalysisisessential.Atthemoment,Mowjee(2013)’sobservationonemergencyrelief,that‘currentlytherearenoincentivesinthehumanitariansystemtoprovidethemostappropriateresponse’,isequallytruefordevelopmentinterventions.

Theprocessleadingtosuchanalysisalsorequiresfurtherscrutiny.Toooftenthechoiceofinterventionisbasedonsuperficialparticipation(seeLevineetal.(2011),particularlypp.32–33),with‘community’meetingsleadingtothecollectionofashoppinglistofrequests.Adifferentkindofengagementisneeded,onewhichinvolvesbuildingunderstandingandtrustoverlongertimespans,andinvolvesdifferentskillstofindoutwhatpeoplehavetosay.Thisrequiresgreaterinvestmentindevelopingtheskillsetneededtogainthisunderstanding,andawillingnesstofinancethetimeneededtoimplementtheprocess.

Thereisstilladominantaidparadigmthatconflictscreatepovertybyerodingresources,andthatthiscanbecounteredbyprovidingorreplacingassets,whichwillmakepeoplemoreresilient.Theimplicationsofpouringresourcesintothesekindsofsituationsareeasilyimagined;certainly,ifdoneatall,itneedsdoingwithgreatcare.Morecanoftenbeachievedby

9 TheWorldDevelopmentReport2011(WorldBank,2011)estimatesthatchangeinpost-conflictcountriestakesatleast30years.

10SeeforexampletheDACCriteriaforEvaluatingDevelopmentAssistance(OECD,1991):‘Effectiveness:ameasureoftheextenttowhichanaidactivityattainsitsobjectives[emphasisadded].Thisremainstheindustrystandard(e.g.ALNAP,2013).


thinkingofthepoliciesandinstitutionswhichshapewhathappenstopeople’sassetsovertime,wheretheygetthemfrom,howtheyareusedortradedandhowandwhytheybecomedepleted.Thecontrastcanbeseenintwoapproachesthathavebeenusedtotacklewidows’vulnerabilitytoland-grabbinginpost-conflictUganda.Oneorganisationpurchasedalargeareaoflandtoresettlelandlesswidows.Anotherchosetoworkwithlocalandnationalinstitutionsoflandjustice,bothformalandinformal,totrytoincreasetheirabilitytoadministerjustice.Regardlessofthedangersofcreatingacommunitymadeupentirelyofwidows,orthedangersofencouraginglandgrabbingbecausesomeoneelsewouldsimplytakecareof‘theproblem’,oneisbasedonmeetingtheneedsofafewdirectlychosenvulnerableindividuals,whiletheothercouldbedescribedasbuildingtheresilienceofallwidowsbyhelpingtocreateasituationwheretheyaresecureontheir

ownland.Needsassessment,asopposedtoproblemanalysis,oftenleadstoresourceprovision,ratherthanresilience-building.

Theexpectationsofmostexternalactorsneedtoberadicallyscaleddown.Donor-fundedprojectsareunlikelytoendconflictorpovertyormakepeopleresilienttoallthechallengestheywillface.Thisdoesnotmakethemirrelevant.Realismmeanshavinglessambitiousobjectives,beingmoremodestabouttheabilityofexternalactorstoeffectchangeontheirownandbeingmuchmoreopenaboutthedegreeofriskthatmustberun.Currently,externalactorsareusuallyfarmorerisk-aversethanthepeoplewhomtheytrytohelp.Agreaterwillingnesstoexperimentwithmodalitiesandinterventionsthatmayormaynotworkwouldbepossibleifcombinedwithbetterinvestmentinlessonlearning(toknowwhatisnotworking)andgreaterflexibility(tochangeit).

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Theprevioussectiondescribedsomeoftheimportantprogresswhichtheresilienceagendacanhelpbringabout.Althoughperfectsolutionstoproblemsshouldneverbeexpected,therearenoinsurmountablechallengestoachievingatleastadegreeofimprovementonallthefrontsdescribed.Severalpastinitiativeshavetriedtosolveexactlythesameproblemsasthosebeingdiscussedyetagainintheresilienceagenda(e.g.UN,2000).Inordertoavoidgoingroundincirclesagain,itisworthlearningfrompreviousattemptsatchangeandkeepinganeyeonsomeofthepitfallswhichwillneedtobeavoided.

5.1Genericresilienceinterventionsfordifficultcontexts

Eventhoughitiswidelyacceptedthatinterventionscannotsimplybeappliedasblueprints,itseemssensibletoestablishsomebroadlessonsabouttheinterventiontypesthathaveshownthebestresultsinsuchsituations.Unfortunately,thereisatendencyforbroadlessonstoquicklybecomestandardprogramming.Thisisindeedalreadyhappeninginresilience-building.Therearetworeasonstobecautiousaboutgenericprogramming.

Thefirstisthatconvincingevidenceforthechangesbroughttopeople’slivesfromspecificprogramminghassimplynotyetbeenpresented.Thisishardlysurprising,giventhatoutcomemonitoringhasonlyrecentlystartedtobegivenseriousattention,andtherehasbeenverylittleassessmentofthecontinuedimpactofinterventionsintheyearsaftertheircompletion.Thesecondreasonforcautionfollowsfromthelogicingroupingtogethercountrieswhereemergenciesarefrequentorrepeated,andwhereunderlyingproblemsneedtobetackledatthesametimeasinternationalsupportisneededtohelpmeet

immediateneeds.Thereisaplausiblejustificationforcreatingaseparateadministrativecategoryofaidfordifficultplaces,toestablishaidmodalitieswithgreaterflexibilitytofundneedsinalonger-termway,andgreaterroomformanoeuvreinrelationshipswiththestate.

However,thisfallswellshortofsuggestingthatthereisanycommoncontent toprogramminginsuchcountries,beyondsomehigher-levelprinciplessuchasflexibility.Therearegoodreasonsforthinkingthatthereisprobablylesshomogeneityindifficultplacesthanamonganyothergroupofcountries,preciselybecausethesearethecountrieswherenormal‘rules’ofgovernance,societyandmarketsaremostlikelytohavebrokendown(seeBox3).Allaidshouldbetailoredtothespecificneedsandthecultural,politicalandeconomiccontextofacountryorregion,butthediversityandcomplexityofdifficultplacesmakeitevenmoredifficulttosharelessons–or,rather,toknowhowtodrawandapplylessons.

5.2Ignoringlessonsfromthepast

Previousattemptstotacklesomeofthesameproblemsbeingreaddressedunderthelabelofresiliencehavenotbeensufficientlysuccessful,anditisessentialthatthelessonsofexperiencearetakenonboard.Relabelingthechallengeas‘resilience’isleadingsometoseethisasabrandnewideawithoutprecedent.That,atleast,istheonlyconclusionpossiblefromthemarkedlackofattentiontoananalysisofthelessonsofrecenthistory.Forexample,amajorattempttolearnlessonsfromthe2000UNstrategyfor‘theeliminationoffoodinsecurityintheHornofAfrica’(UN,2000),whichclearlyhasnotyetmetitsobjectives,shouldsurelybethefirststepbeforelaunchinganInter-AgencyPlanofActionfortheHornofAfrica(IASC,2011),oraplanforSupporting

5 Ensuringresiliencestays meaningful:avoidingthe pitfalls


HornofAfricaResilience(EC,2012b).Ananalysisisstillneededcoveringbothtechnicallessonsandthepoliticalexperiencesofpreviousinitiatives,bothnationallyandwithininternationalinstitutions.Rebrandingfoodsecurityasresiliencehashadverypositiveeffectsincreatinganewandmuchwiderpoliticalandaidcoalition.However,pastexperienceremainsasourceofrelevantlearning,evenwhenthelanguagethatitusedwasdifferent.

5.3Genericresilienceindicators

Aidbureaucraciesjustifiablydemandaccountability,notonlyforactivitiesimplementedbutalsoforimpactsachieved.Theseaccountabilitydemandswillbeevenstrongerindifficultplaces,preciselybecausethedemandsofflexibilitymeanthatsupportcannotsimplyconsistinrollingoutapre-agreedsetofactivities.

Thereisastrongimperativeintheaidsectortowardsaccountabilitybasedonassessingimpactandvalueformoneybyestablishingindicatorsofprogresstowardsresilience.Developingspecificindicatorsforanypolicyorinterventioninordertoassessandunderstanditsimpactsiscritical.However,thetendencytoseekgenericinterventionsisparalleledbyastrongdemandforgenericindicatorsofresilience.Asdiscussedabove(Section3.4),thedangerofprogrammingdesignedtomaximiseresiliencescoresratherthanhelppeopleindifficultsituationsmustbeguardedagainst.Goodimpactmonitoringisneededthatstartsfromaclearanalysisofvulnerabilityandresilienceandagoodunderstandingofhowchangecanbebroughtabout(whatsomecallthe‘programmetheory’;seee.g.FunnelandRogers(2011)).Waysmustthenbefoundtocontinuallyassesswhetherornotthisprogrammetheoryisworkingbyassessingwhatishappeningineach‘link’ofthechainthatleadstothedesiredimpact.

Attemptstomonitorimpactoftencomeupagainsttworelatedproblems:lackofadequatebaselinesandmanyotherchangeshappeninginthearea(‘confoundingvariables’)thatmakeitdifficulttofindstatisticalconnectionsbetweenwhataprojecttriedtodoandfinaloutcomes.Theseproblemsarecompoundedfurtherinthecaseofinterventionsdesignedtosupportresiliencebecausethereisnoconsensusaboutwhatexactlyshouldbecountedasa‘resilienceoutcome’.Infact,evenifitwerepossibletomonitorinthisway,itwouldnotbeveryusefulasitmaytellushowmuchimpactwehad,butwewouldlearnnothingaboutwhyorthemechanismsbywhichitcameabout.

Theproblemscanbelargelyavoidedbygoingbacktotheanalysiswhichunderpinnedthedesignoftheprojectinthefirstplace.Thisshouldmakeclearwhattheconstraintstopeople’sresilienceare,howtheyoperatedandthemechanismsbywhichtheinterventionproposedtoaddressthem.Eachofthesestepsorlogicallinkscanbemonitored,usingqualitativeandoftenquantitativetechniques.

Forexample,theprovisionofirrigationpumpsmaybeseenasawaytopreventregularacutemalnutritioncausedbyseverefoodshortageswithrepeatedrainfailures.Thelogicalchainhasmany

links.Outcomesdependupon:thepumpsfunctioning(repairs,fuel,etc.);waterreachingthefields(irrigationdesign,maintenance);thedistributionofwaternotexcludingthosewhofacethehighestriskofmalnutrition(themaintargetgroup);thetargetgrouphavingtheability(i.e.time,skills,othernecessaryinputs)toreceiveyieldswhichoutweighanyopportunitycostsofpracticingirrigatedagriculture;adequatemarketaccessandconditionsallowingenoughincometomakeadifference;theuseofthatincometobenefitthoseatriskofmalnutrition(e.g.children);allofthismakingenoughdifferencetopreventmalnutrition;andmanymore,includingthebasicassumptionthatthecauseofmalnutritionhasbeenadequatelyidentifiedinthefirstplace.Thelinksinthechainarethusamixtureofphysical,agronomic,institutional,economic,socio-political,nutritionalandevengender-relatedfactors.Inordertounderstandhowaninterventioniscontributingtoresilience,eachoftheselinksandeachoftheseperspectivesshouldbeincorporated.Eachoftheselinkscanthenbeassessedandalsoquantifiedtounderstandhow muchchangeishappeningand why.Thiscanonlytakeplaceifthereisgooddocumentationofproblems,contextualanalysisandprogrammetheory.Currently,thisisalmostneveradequate.

Box4:Monitoringthelengthoftheimpactchain

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5.4RethinkingriskTheresilienceagendahasemphasisedtheimportanceofrisk(e.g.MitchellandHarris(2012))inalldevelopmentplanning.Resiliencemodelsarebroadlybasedontheideathatreducingrisk(orexposuretohazards)issynonymouswithincreasingresilience.Thismayleadtodevelopmentpolicyandaidwhichismoreriskaverse,inthesensethattheypromotelow-riskchangesinpeople’slives.However,seekingtoreduceriskmustbeseenintwootherdimensions.Thereisaneedtoassesshowfaritispossibletoescapepovertywithouttakingrisks.Interventionsintendedtomaintainpeoplewithintheircurrentlivelihoodstrategies(thoughwithahigherormorereliableincome)maydiscouragethemfromtakingthenecessarystepstoescapepovertyandachieveresilience,andyetmanyresilienceprogrammesaimtodopreciselythis.11Itisverydifficultwithouthindsighttoknowwhentransformationalchangeisaworthwhileriskandwhichkindoftrajectoryismaladaptive.Second,assessingpeople’sresiliencebylookingattheirexistingriskexposuremustbetemperedbytherecognition(discussedabove)thatrisk-freesecuritymaybethepricethatpeoplehavehadtopayforsurvival.ItispreciselytheenforcedavoidanceofriskthatcreatesaFaustianbargain(Wood,2003)wherebypeoplecanonlyguaranteetheirsecuritybyforegoingactions

whichwouldleadthemoutofpovertyortogreaterindependence.

5.5Unrealisticexpectations

Evenifthereismoreattentiontoresilienceinaidspending,betterprogrammingandevenanincreaseinoverallinternationalaid,vulnerabilityisnotgoingtodisappear.Thisisleftunrecognisedinsomeoftheresiliencerhetoric,e.g.thatoncewehavebuiltresiliencepeoplewillevenbeableto‘bounceback’andbecomeevenbetteroffafter(orbecauseof?)ashock(DFID,2012b).Unrealisticexpectationsmatterfortworeasons.Someofthepoliticalmomentumbehindresiliencecomesfromabeliefthatsupportforresiliencewillbringdownthefuturecostsofemergencyresponse.Thisexpectationissettingresilienceupforfailure;whenemergencycostsarenotseentobequicklyreduced,thereisadangerthatpoliticalsupportwillrapidlyerode.Second,overlyoptimisticexpectationshaveledtoinsufficientdiscussionoftheresourceimplicationsof‘achievingresilience’,andinsufficientanalysisofhowmuchcanactuallybeachieved.Itcannotbeassumedthatwhateverisdonewillbeofsomebenefit:therehastobeaclearobjectiveandroadmapatscale.Itisoftensaidthattheresiliencediscourseisbuiltonpositivity,incontrasttothenegativityofafocusonvulnerability.Thereisanunderstandabledesiretoremainoptimisticandtohavehighaims:thisdesireshouldnotcasthard-headedrealismasnegativityorcynicism.

11Forexample,peoplehavetoremainonunviablefarmsintheirvillagesinEthiopiainordertoreceivehelpfromthesafetynet,arguablydis-incentivisingtheirmovementtourbanareas–whichwouldconstitutearisk,butformanytheonlyaccessibleescapeintoresilience.

�0 Supportingresilienceindifficultplaces

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6 Makingprogress

Section4discussedfivebroadareaswherechangeisneededinhowaidisconceived,organisedanddeliveredinordertomakeamoremeaningfulcontributiontosupportingtheresilienceofpeopleinplacesaffectedbyprotractedandrecurrentcrisis,inconflictsandinrecovery.Aidagencieshaveamoralresponsibilitytodotheirbesttounderstandwhatthepeopleinthesesituationsmostneedandhowthatcanbestbearranged,andthentoorganisethemselvesandtheiraidinwayswhichcandeliverthis.Anumberofconclusionscanbedrawn.

Thinking about ‘resilience’.Theword‘resilience’isbeingusedtospeakaboutmanythings,andthereisatendencytoover-theorisewhatshouldbesimpleandtounder-theorisewhatiscomplex.Itisimportanttorememberthatthebannerofresiliencehascreatedimportantpoliticalmomentumbehindoldproblems(reshapingtheemergency–developmentseparation,findinganewaidparadigm,retargetingaidonthosemostpronetocrisis,etc.).Thismustbewelcomedandtheopportunitymustbeexploitedtothefullestextentpossible.Ifanewjargonisusefulforachievingthis,thenthereisnoprobleminusingitaslongasitdoesnotcreateconfusionorthebeliefthatabrandnewideahasbeencreated.Theanalyticaldemandsofaidplanninghavenotchanged:weneedtounderstandhowandwhydifferentpeoplearevulnerable,theconstraintsontheirindependentagency,opportunitiesforsupportingchange,thepowerrelationsthatmaintainvulnerabilityandthatcouldpotentiallyprovidesomewayoutofit,andhowthepoliticaleconomyislikelytoshapetheoutcomesofanyintendedintervention.Resilience,therefore,emphasises,butdoesnotchange,theneedforgoodunderstandingofproblemsandsituations.

Understanding the impact of interventions on resilience.Theunpredictablecontextsunderdiscussioninthispapermakeitevenmoreimportanttounderstandinrealtimethewaysinwhichpeople’slivesarechangingandhowanyinterventioniscontributingtothatchange.Eachinterventionneedstobecapableofconstantmodification;widerlessonlearningcanonlybeachievedasmoreandmoreevidenceisbuiltup.Thejargonofresiliencecannotbe

allowedtodistractattentionfromanotheroldneed:formonitoringthatgoesbeyondcountingoutputsandwhichanalysesnotjustwhatchangeshavehappened,butalsohowtheyhavehappened.Resiliencere-emphasisestheneedtolookatdimensionsthathavebeengiventoolittleattention,suchaswhatchoicespeoplefeelabletomakeandwhatconstrainsthemfrommakingotherchoices,theimplicationsfortheirfutureofmakingthosechoicesandthenatureoftherisksthattheyrun.

Targeting aid on resilience.Oncemonitoringisprovidingenoughevidenceonhowaidisaffectingpeople’sabilitytocopewithhardship,thisrapidlyneedstobecomethemainpoliticaldimensionbywhichanoverallaidprogrammeisevaluated.Progressdemandsthatthisisnotdelayedbytryingtosetinstonethetechnicaldetailsofhowsuchevaluationtakesplace.Itisasecondarymattertoworryabouthow(forexample)tocombinethenumberofpeoplereached,theirrelativeneeds,whichkindsofprogresshavebeenmadeandtowhatdegreeandwhichkindsofriskremain.Suchquestionscanbedealtwithovertimeandshouldnotdistractattentionfromthepoliticalgoalofrefocusingaidonhelpingtoreducethelikelihoodthatthosewhoaremostvulnerabletocrisisfailtocopewhentheyencounterdifficultiesinlife.

Resilience in difficult places.In‘transitions’thereisaneedtothinkdifferently,butthereisnosetofrecipesthatcanbecalled‘resilience-building’,andnosetofruleswhichcansubstituteforhumanjudgementateachandeverystage.Basicprinciplesforworkinginunpredictableandpoliticallychargedsituationsshouldbeapplied,includingbuildinginmoreflexibility,longer-termengagement,morerisk-takingandmuchbetterlearning.Theseinclude:

• anopennesstoworkingwithawiderrangeoflocalinstitutions;

• amoresophisticatedbreakdownof‘government’andanabilitytochoosethepartsofgovernmentalorstateagencieswithwhomrelationshipscanbehelpful;

• opennesstoagreaterrangeofrelationships;• moreemphasisonsupporttoadaptivecapacity;


• focusingonimprovingpeople’slinkstoinstitutionsotherthanaidagencies;

• ensuringthatallcapacity-buildingstartsfromananalysisoftheconstraintstofunctionality(i.e.eschewinggeneric‘capacity-buildingactivities’);

• makingsurethatimprovingthelivesofvulnerablepeopleistheobjectiveofanycapacity-building,notimprovingthefunctioningoforganisationsorinstitutionsforitsownsake;and

• workingacrossthewholespectrum,fromimmediaterelieftolonger-termdevelopment,andformingrelationshipswiththosewhoalsoworkacrossthespectrum.

Building resilience with or against entrenched processes?Resilienceisseenbothasatransformationalagendaandonethatmakespeople’slivesmorerobustwithintheircurrentsystem.Likewise,aidagenciesneedtounderstandandwherepossibleworkwithinexistingpolicyandinstitutionalprocesses,andyetwherenecessaryandpossiblealsochallenge,providealternativesandbringtransformationtothesestructuresandprocesses.Thereisoftenatensionbetweenworkingtomaximiseacceptabilityandstrivingfortransformation,anditmayseemunhelpfultosuggestthattheonlyprincipletofollowistobeawareofthechoiceandtousejudgement.However,ensuringthatattentionisgiventothinkingaboutthistensionanddocumentingtherationaleforwhatevercourseofactionischosenwouldbeamajorstepforward.

A bureaucracy for resilience?Fewaidagenciesopposeflexibilityinprinciple,butthecurrentaidbureaucracydoesnotfacilitateit.Projectsaredesigned,managedandmonitored(intheoryatleast)accordingtologframes.Projecteffectivenessisoftendefinedasthedegreetowhichaprojectreacheditspredeterminedobjectives.Thiscreatesatensionwhenneeds,possibilitiesandoptimalwaysofinterveningareunpredictableandchanging.Logframes,asusedinpractice,reinforcetheideathatdeviationsfromaplanareassociatedwithprojectfailure,andriskisassumedtobehypotheticalonly,ratherthanbeingintegratedaspartoftheoverallinterventiondesign.Theneedforflexibilitydemandsthatoperatingagenciesareheldtoaccountforthedegreetowhichtheywerecapableofadaptingtheiroriginalplans–i.e.flexibilityshouldbeacontractualobligationandnotoptional.Onlythencaninterventionsalsotakeanattitudetoriskthatmatchesthatofthepeoplewithwhomtheywishtowork.Inorderforaccountabilitytobepossible,bothforimpactand

foruseoffunds,newcontractualarrangementswillhavetobedeveloped.Althoughthiswilltaketime,itneedstostarturgently.

Learning for resilience.Lessonlearningthatgoesbeyondtryingtofindreplicableblueprintsisnoteasyandneedsasizeablebodyofevidence.Increasedemphasiswillbeneededonestablishingcollaborativeeffortstofindouthowinterventionsaffectpeople’slivesandtheirresiliencetofuturedifficulties.Thiswillneedtogobeyondtheworkofanyoneagencyordonor.Currentlearningconsortiahavearoletoplay,butthisisnotthesameascreatinganopensourcebodyofevidencethroughacollaborativeeffortthatisnotonlysector-wide,butalsoincludesacademicsandexpertsfromoutsidetheaidsector.Althoughnoonedonorcancreatethisalone,thereisaresponsibilityoneveryagencytoplayaroleinhelpingthistohappen.AnyEuropeandonor,forexample,canmostusefullysupportthisthoughtheEU,i.e.takingtogetherboththeEUmemberstatesasindividualdonorsandtheofficesoftheEuropeanCommissionitself.Together,thesedonorsandtheirrespectivepartnersconstituteacriticalmassformakingprogress.TheEC’sActionPlananditsCommunicationonResiliencebothprovideapegonwhichtohangthiseffort,andsomeindividualEUmemberstateshaveexpressedinterestinsupportingthis.

Staffing for resilience.Resilience-building,inparticularinthecountriesunderdiscussionhere,demandsaveryhighlevelofsocialandpoliticalanalysisofthelocalsituation.Thecurrentstaffingofaidagenciesismoregearedtotechnicalabilities.High-levelmanagerialdecision-makers,oftenexpatriates,aremoreathomediscussingbroadconceptualideaslikeresiliencethanstaffontheground.Thechangessuggestedinthispaperwillcreateademandforgreaterinvestmentinrecruitingandretaininghigh-qualitystaffwhoareexperiencedinaspecificplaceorcountry.Staffwillneedafargreaterrangeanddepthofskillsinordertousenewmodalitiesforensuringthegenuineparticipationinanalysisofthepeoplewhoselivesinterventionsareintendedtobenefit,movingbeyondthesimplereportingbackof‘communitymeetings’withacollectionofprojectrequestsand‘shoppinglists’.Suchachangeinstaffingprofileschallengesthecurrentinequalitiesbetweengeographicalgeneralists(predominantlyexpatriate)andlocalspecialists(predominantlynationalstaff).Gainingarichunderstandingtakestimeandthattimeneedstobepaidfor,testingboththetimetablesandbudgetsofaid,whereexcessiveworkloadsandunrealistic

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timeframesdonotpermitthinkingtime.Thischallengecanonlybemetthroughexplicitpolicydecisions.

Theremayberoomforadonor,actingasathirdparty,tosupportanalysisbycreatinganalyticalcapacityasa‘publicgood’,tobeavailabletothoseworkinginsomeparticulardifficultplace.Thereareanumberofexpertswhoarehighlyexperiencedinparticularcountriesandwhoseunderstandingofcrisis,recoveryandrecurrentcrisisinthosecountriesoverdecadesshouldbeanecessaryinputintoanyanalysisanddecision-making.However,normalcareerprogressionmeansthat,astheseexperts(whethernationalsorexpatriate)becomemoreexperienced,theyarelesslikelytobeworkingindifficultplaces.Staffturnovermeansthatpreviousexperienceislosttothoseworkingintheareawhousuallywillnotevenknowaboutpeoplewhowentbeforethemandonwhomtheyoughttobeabletocall.Thereisthusnomechanismformakingpeoplewithalongstandingexpertiseinaparticularareaavailableforconsultationwhenneeded.Solutionstothiscanbefound.Withcurrentcommunicationstechnology,‘virtualanalyticalhubs’canbecreatedas

anopenaccessresource,freelyavailableforsupportinganybody’sdecision-making.Practicalstepscouldbeginimmediatelyonpilotingdifferentmodelsforsupportinganalysishubsinoneortwocountrieswithalonghistoryofintervention(e.g.Niger,Sudan,DRC).

An aid system for resilience.Itishopefullyclearfromtheprecedinganalysisthattherecommendationhereisnottocreateaseparateaidsystemforbuildingresilience.However,achievingprogressinallofthedirectionssuggestedabovewillrequiresomefundamentalchangesatsystemlevel,i.e.notonlyatthelevelofindividualaidagenciesbutalsoinrelationshipsbetweenaidactors.Inordertoachievethis,agenciesneedtothinkofthemselvesnotonlyasindividualactorstryingtooptimisethewaytheywork,butalsoassystemplayersactivelytryingtoshapethewayinwhichotheragenciesbehaveandrelatetoeachother.Someofwhatisrecommendedherecannotbeachievedbyanyagencyworkinginisolation.However,thatdoesnotabsolveagenciesfromplayingtheirpartinhelpingtobringaboutchangeatthismuchwiderscale.

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