humanitarian intervention: somalia, 1992-93 prof. theo farrell king’s war studies

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Humanitarian Intervention: Somalia, 1992-93 Prof. Theo Farrell King’s War Studies

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Humanitarian Intervention: Somalia, 1992-93

Prof. Theo FarrellKing’s War Studies

Humanitarian Interventions?

India in East Pakistan (1971)

Tanzania in Uganda (1978)

Vietnam in Cambodia (1978)

Post CW interventions

Northern Iraq (1991) Somalia (1992-93) Bosnia (1992-94) Rwanda (1994) Haiti (1994-95) Kosovo (1999) East Timor (1999)

Impact of end of CW

Created new opportunities and imperatives

New view of 3rd world conflict

Growing public pressure for HI

Unlocked the UNSC

UN peacekeeping budget

1988: $230 m

1990s: $800-1,600 m

Post CW interventions

Northern Iraq (1991) Somalia (1992-93) Bosnia (1992-94) Rwanda (1994) Haiti (1994-95) Kosovo (1999) East Timor (1999)

Somalia: the essentials

Two missions(i) UNITAF: Dec 92 – May 93(ii) UNOSOM: up to Feb. 1995

Three UNSC resolutions794: UNITAF mandate814: UNOSOM II mandate837: Declaration of war

Somalia on the map

Background: Somalia

Cold War legacy: economic ruin and country awash with weapons

1991: USC overthrow Siad Barre

1992: Somali state collapses

1992: Death of Somalia

USC splits in warring factions(a) President Ali Mahdi(b) Gen. M. Farah Aideed

Growing humanitarian crisis: war and famine

UN agencies flee Somalia

Deployment of UNOSOM (Aug)

Somalia: war and famine

1992: Death of Somalia

USC splits in warring factions(a) President Ali Mahdi(b) Gen. M. Farah Aideed

Growing humanitarian crisis: war and famine

UN agencies flee Somalia

Deployment of UNOSOM (Aug)

1991: brave new world

The Gulf War (w/Soviet help) Kurdistan Collapse of Soviet Union

New BOP and emerging normative order

Agenda for Peace (Jan. 1992)

Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well.

Pressure builds in DC

Ismat Kittani report to UNSC (25 Nov): 70-80 of food aid not reaching the hungry

CARE USA leads alliance of INGOs calling for intervention

Debate within deputies group: “our helicopters don’t work in deserts.”

NGOs divided

For: CARE USA and Oxfam-USA

Against: MSF and Save the Children

Unsure: Concern Worldwide and Oxfam-UK

Pressure builds in DC

Ismat Kittani report to UNSC (25 Nov): 70-80 of food aid not reaching the hungry

CARE USA leads alliance of INGOs calling for intervention

Debate within deputies group: “our helicopters don’t work in deserts.”

What’s this then…?

Operation Restore Hope

VCJCS says “yes”

3 Dec: UNSCR 794

9 Dec: Marines hit the beaches

Why?(a) public opinion(b) Clinton and Bosnia

Weinberger-Powell Doctrine

Clear (doable) goals

Success likely

Decisive and overwhelming force

Clear (quick) exit strategy

UNITAF

37,000 strong, over 20 nations

28,000 = US forces (10 Mt Div and 1 MEF)

Also large and capable contingents from France (2800), Canada (2200), Italy (1300) and Belgium.

UNITAF: rapid deployment

Robert Oakley clears the path

9-16 Dec: secured Mogadishu, Kismayo, Baidoa, and Baledogle

16-28 Dec: completed full deployment, one month ahead of schedule

Somalia: major urban centres

UNSCR 794

Based on Chap VII

UNITAF was to use “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.”

Secure environment

Disarmament?

Guarding NGOs?

Creating secure zones and corridors

Disarmament?: not likely

Bush (5 Dec): UNITAF to “open supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a UN peacekeeping force.”

Boutros-Ghali letter to Bush (8 Dec).

CJCS Powell: “Disarmament is not possible in a country where everybody has a weapon.”

Lt. Gen. Johnson: “totally naïve.”

Creating security?

UNITAF engaged in haphazard disarmament (French/Belgium v US)

Guarding NGOs:* disarming NGO guards!* practice changes in Mogadishu after March* Australian (Baidoa) & Belgian (Kismayo)

Patrolling: US “human tanks” v French in

skirts

Disarmament agreements

7 point agreement btw Aideed and Ali Mahdi (11 Dec 1992)

Addis Ababa agreement by 15 factions (8 Jan 1993)

Addis Ababa Conference on National Reconciliation (27 March 1993)

UNOSOM II

28,000 troops from 30 nations

Major contingents from Pakistan, Belgium, France and Italy

US force stays on: logistics (3,000) and QRF (1,150)

Chaotic handover: Pakistanis and Italians ill-equipped, Indians late, “exhausted and demoralised” HQ

UNSCR 814

Prevent resumption of violence

Take action against peace spoilers

Control heavy weapons and seize small arms

Secure aid and protect UN/NGOs

all under Chap VII

Adm Jonathan Howe

Road to war

Early shows of force in Jan

SNA sneak heavy weapons back into Mogadishu

May: Belgians repulse SNA from Kismayo

Possible op against Radio Mogadishu

5 June: SNA ambush Pakistan unit, killing 24 and injuring 57

UNSCR 837

UNSOM II to “take all necessary measures against those responsible for the armed attacks.”

Including those responsible for inciting the attacks

The UN-SNA war

June: UNOSOM offensive

July: UN under siege

August: hunt for Aideed(led by Task Force Ranger)

UN’s obsession

Mission over

UNOSOM II collapses

3 Oct: 18 killed, 78 injured

7 Oct: Clinton ceases offensive ops, and US to pull out by March 1994

Europeans follow suit

India, Malaysia, and Pakistan left holding the fort until Feb. 1995

Myth of mission creep

Boutros-Ghali & Albright pushing the HI agenda

UNOSOM II mandate: overly-ambitious from the start

BBG backed Howe’s gunboat diplomacy

Public opinion

CNN effect:- policy: certainty v uncertainty- political: unity v disunity

Body-bag syndrome:- cause and time- political v public tolerance

Force protection v protecting civilians

US “human tanks” in Mogadishu

Haiti (Sept 1993):* 10 Mt Div in Port-au-Prince v US Marines in Cap Haitien* MNF CO Maj. Gen. Meade v CJSC Gen. Shelton

The shadow of Somalia

Gen. Sir Michael Rose (UNPROFOR): “the Mogadishu Line”

PDD-25: don’t call us

Agenda for Peace 1995: consent, impartiality and non-use of force

Rwanda: April-July 1994

Bosnia 1992-1995

Haiti 1994-1995

Inducing consent

“Escalating to success”

Request for armour and AC-130s turned down

Danish tanks in Bosnia

Getting heavy in Kosovo