Table of Contents VULNERABLE GROUPS and REMEDIESREMEDIES UNDER THE NATIONAL LAW1A. The Writ of Habeas Corpus1CASE: VILLAVICENCIO vs. LUKBAN3CASE: MONCUPA vs. ENRILE et. al5CASE: In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Del Rosario, et al.7CASE: CHAVEZ vs. CA8CASE: GUMABON et al. vs. Director of Bureau of Prisons10CASE: In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Abadilla, et al. vs. Ramos, et al.12CASE: PACQUING vs. CA15CASE: In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of ILUSORIO, et al. vs. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, et al.18B. Writ of Kalikasan20C. Temporary Protection Orders/Permanent Protection Orders25D. Investigation by the Commission on Human Rights30E. The Writ of Amparo33CASE: SECRETARY vs. MANALO40CASE: ROXAS vs. ARROYO et. al44CASE: BURGOS vs. ARROYO et. al47CASE: CADAPAN vs. ESPERON et. al50

REMEDIES UNDER THE NATIONAL LAW A. The Writ of Habeas CorpusIt is defined as a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his caption and detention, to do, submit to and receive whatever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf. Hence, an essential requisite for the availability of the writ is actual deprivation of personal liberty. (J. Bernas, The 1987 Philippine Constitution: A Comprehensive Reviewer, 2011)The 1987 Philippine Constitution under Article III Section 15 states that: The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.While under Article VII Section 18 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states that: The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

CASE: VILLAVICENCIO vs. LUKBANZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.GR 14639, 25 March 1919Facts:The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers, At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25. The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila. Just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the application will be considered as including them. Some of the women married, others assumed more or less clandestine relations with men, others went to work in different capacities, others assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to return to Manila (7 of which became witnesses in the present case).

Issue: Whether a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to acquire the persons of the prostitutes shipped to Davao.

Held: A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived this right. Further, if the public official is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, these same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The said officials, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded. Both on reason and authority, that no one of the defenses offered by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.

The remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus. A civil action was never intended effectively and promptly to meet a situation in which there is restraint of liberty. That the act may be a crime and that the person may be proceeded against is also no bar to the institution of habeas corpus proceedings. Habeas corpus is the proper remedy.

HABEAS CORPUS; NATURE. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.

Where it is impossible for a party to sign an application for the writ of habeas corpus, it is proper for the writ to be submitted by some person in his behalf. RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential objects and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.

COMPLIANCE WITH WRIT. For respondents to fulfill the order of the court granting the writ of habeas corpus, three courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity these persons could not safely be brought before the Court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 87.)

CASE: MONCUPA vs. ENRILE et. al

EFREN C. MONCUPA, petitioner, vs.JUAN PONCE ENRILE, FABIAN C. VER, GALILEO KINTANAR, FERNANDO GOROSPE, AND JOSE CASTRO, respondents.G.R. No. L-63345 January 30, 1986 Facts: Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, was arrested on 22 April 1982 at about 10:50 p.m. at the corner of D. Tuazon Street and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. Moncupa was brought to MIG-15 Camp Bago Bantay, Quezon City where he was detained. On 23 April 1982, on the allegation that he was a National Democratic Front (NDF) staff member, a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was issued against him and 8 other persons. After two separate investigations, conducted first, by Lieutenant Colonel Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Chief of Task Force Makabansa Investigation Group and second, by Investigating Fiscal Amado Costales of Quezon City, it was ascertained that Moncupa was not a member of any subversive organization. Both investigators recommended the prosecution of Moncupa only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents under Presidential Decree 33. Consequently, two separate information were filed against Moncupa, one, for illegal possession of firearms before the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other for violation of PD 33 before the City Court of Quezon City. Against the other accused, however, the cases filed were for violation of PD 885 as amended. Moncupa was excluded from the charge under the Revised Anti-Subversion Law. Moncupa's arraignment and further proceedings have not been pursued, and yet, Moncupa's motions for bail were denied by the lower court. Moncupa filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Juan Ponce Enrile, Fabian C. Ver, Galileo Kintanar, Fernando Gorospe, and Jose Castro contend that the petition has become moot and academic must necessarily be denied, as Moncupa may have been released from his detention cell (i.e. temporary release).

Issue: Whether the petition for the writ of habeas corpus has become moot and academic in view of Moncupa's temporary release.

Held: Attached to Moncupa's temporary release are restrictions imposed on him, i.e. (1) His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that petitioner gets the approval of respondents for any travel outside Metro Manila. (2) His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of respondents is also required in case petitioner wants to change his place of residence. (3) His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he should not "participate in any interview conducted by any local or foreign mass media representatives nor give any press release or information that is inimical to the interest of national security." (4) He is required to report regularly to respondents or their representatives. The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the temporary release constitute restraints on the liberty of Moncupa. Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of Moncupa. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus. In the light of the ruling in Villavicencio vs. Lukban, which held that "a prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient," the present petition for habeas corpus has not become moot and academic. A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.

CASE: In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Del Rosario, et al.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF TEODOSIO LANSANG RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, and BAYANI ALCALA, petitioners, vs.BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine Constabulary, respondent.G.R. No. L-33965 December 11, 1971 Facts:In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two (2) hand grenades were thrown, one after the other, at the platform where said candidates and other persons were. As a consequence, eight (8) persons were killed and many more injured, including practically all of the aforementioned candidates, some of whom sustained extensive, as well as serious, injuries which could have been fatal had it not been for the timely medical assistance given to them.On August 23, soon after noontime, the President of the Philippines (Marcos) announced the issuance of Proclamation No. 889, dated August 21, 1971 suspending, the writ of habeas corpus, for the persons presently detained, as well as others who may be hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith. Petitions for writs of habeas corpus were filed by persons, who, having been arrested without a warrant therefor and then detained, upon the authority of said proclamation. Petitioners questioned the validity of the said Proclamation.

Issue:

Whether the Proclamation 899, which suspends the privilege of writ of habeas corpus is unconstitutional on the ground that President Marcos arbitrarily issued the said proclamation order.

Ruling:

The President did not act arbitrarily in issuing Proclamation No. 889, as amended, and that, accordingly, the same is not unconstitutional.Two conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ, to wit: (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege. The Presidential Proclamation under consideration declares that there has been and there is actually a state of rebellion andthat"public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken in order to maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people and preserve the authority of the State." The President declared in Proclamation No. 889, as amended, that both conditions are present.Furthermore, In case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, the President has, under the Constitution, three (3) courses of action open to him, namely: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. He had, already, called out the armed forces, which measure, however, proved inadequate to attain the desired result. Of the two (2) other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.

CASE: CHAVEZ vs. CA

ROGER CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE WARDEN OF THE CITY JAIL OF MANILA, respondents.G.R. No. L-29169 August 19, 1968

Facts:Chavez (petitioner) with his co-conspirator was charged of qualified theft of a motor vehicle. Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. During the trial, the prosecution presented the petitioner as their witness however the counsel of the latter objected as he argued that as a matter of right, it will incriminate the petitioner. The prosecution insisted to present the petitioner as their ordinary witness and not a state witness, and proceeded with the direct examination. The Presiding judge of the Court of first instance Quezon City sustained the action of the Fiscal. The judge manifested that there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness-stand including the accused. The judge assured that if there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for defense counsel to interpose his objection and the court will sustain him if and when the court feels that the answer of this witness to the question would incriminate him. The trial court freed all the accused except Roger Chavez who was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime ofqualified theft. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). CA, however, dismiss the appeal. The petitioner filed a petition invoking that he is entitled, on habeas corpus, to be freed from imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial which resulted in his convictionhe was denied his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against himself.Issue:Whether or not petitioner is entitled on habeas corpus and to be freed from imprisonment on the ground that that in the trial which resulted in his conviction, he was denied his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against himself.Ruling:The Supreme Court directed the respondent Warden of the City Jail of Manila or the Director of Prisons or any other officer or person in custody of petitioner Roger Chavez by reason of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, to discharge said Roger Chavez from custody.The course which petitioner takes is correct.Habeas corpusis a high prerogative writ.It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's constitutional rights are disregarded.Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdictionand therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus.This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant.Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ.The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final.38For, as explained inJohnson vs. Zerbst, the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must beliberally given effectso as to protect well a person whose liberty is at stake."A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers.

CASE: GUMABON et al. vs. Director of Bureau of PrisonsMARIO GUMABON, BLAS BAGOLBAGOL, GAUDENCIO AGAPITO, EPIFANIO PADUA and PATERNO PALMARES, petitioners, vs.THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondent. [GR L-30026, 30 January 1971]

Facts: Mario Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on 5 May 1953 to suffer reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping. Gaudencio Agapito, Paterno Palmares and Epifanio Padua, likewise pleaded guilty to the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder and other offenses, and were similarly made to suffer the same penalty in decisions rendered, as to the first two, on 8 March 1954 and, as to the third, on 15 December 1955. Lastly, Blas Bagolbagol, stood trial also for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder and other offenses and on 12 January 1954 penalized with reclusion perpetua. Each has been since then imprisoned by virtue of the above convictions. Each of them has served more than 13 years. Subsequently, in People v. Hernandez (reaffirmed by People vs. Lava), the supreme Court ruled that the information against the accused in that case for rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery was not warranted under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no such complex offense. The fear that the Pomeroy vs. Director of Prisons ruling stands as an obstacle to their release on a habeas corpus proceeding prompted Gumabon, et. al. to ask that it be appraised anew and, if necessary, discarded.

Issue: Whether habeas corpus the appropriate remedy where the accused had served the full term for which they could have been legally committed, and in light of the Hernandez ruling.

Held: The writ of habeas corpus' latitudinarian scope to assure that illegality of restraint and detention be avoided is one of the truisms of the law. It is not known as the writ of liberty for nothing. The writ imposes on judges the grave responsibility of ascertaining whether there is any legal justification for a deprivation of physical freedom. Unless there be such a showing, the confinement must thereby cease. If there be a valid sentence it cannot, even for a moment, be extended beyond the period provided for by law. Any deviation from the legal norms call for the termination of the imprisonment. The liberality with which the judiciary is to construe habeas corpus petitions even if presented in pleadings on their face devoid of merit was demonstrated in Ganaway v. Quilen. Likewise in Conde v. Rivera, one that broadens the field of the operation of the writ, that a disregard of the constitutional right to speedy trial ousts the court of jurisdiction and entitles the accused if "restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom." The writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. The scope and flexibility of the writ its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected. Where, however, the detention complained of finds its origin in what has been judicially ordained, the range of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is considerably narrowed. For if "the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order," the writ does not lie. Once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention. Thus, the continued incarceration after the 12-year period when such is the maximum length of imprisonment in accordance with our controlling doctrine, when others similarly convicted have been freed, is fraught with implications at war with equal protection. Where a sentence imposes a punishment in excess of the power of the court to impose, such sentence is void as to the excess, and some of the courts hold that the sentence is void in toto; but the weight of authority sustains the proposition that such a sentence is void only as to the excess imposed in case the parts are separable, the rule being that the petitioner is not entitled to his discharge on a writ of habeas corpus unless he has served out so much of the sentence as was valid. The only means of giving retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the accused is the writ of habeas corpus. Insofar as the remedy of habeas corpus is concerned, the emphatic affirmation that it is the only means of benefiting the accused by the retroactive character of a favorable decision holds true. Gumabon, et. al. clearly have thus successfully sustained the burden of justifying their release.

CASE: In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Abadilla, et al. vs. Ramos, et al.IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROLANDO N. ABADILLA, SUSAN S. ABADILLA, in her own behalf and in behalf of the minors JUNE ELIZABETH, ROLANDO, JR., DAPHINE JENNIFER, MA. THERESA, ANNA ROSANNA, VINCENT MARCUS and BART JOSEPH, all surnamed ABADILLA, petitioners, vs.General FIDEL V. RAMOS, Chief of Staff, AFP; Major General RENATO DE VILLA, Commanding General, Philippine Constabulary & Vice-Chief of Staff, AFP; and Brigadier General ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, Commanding General, CAPCOM, PC, respondents. [GR L-79173, 1 December 1987] Facts: On 27 January 1987, a group of officers and enlisted men of the AFP seized control of the radio-television broadcasting facilities of the Republic Broadcasting System (GMA-Channel 7) located in Quezon City, ostensibly for the purpose of toppling the existing constitutional government. While the takeover might have been a prelude to similar operations throughout the national capital, it did not succeed. On 29 January 1987, the mutineers surrendered to the military authorities and the possession of the facility was restored to the owners and managers thereof. Soon thereafter, the military authorities conducted an investigation of the matter. On 18 April 1987, a group of enlisted men staged a mutiny inside the Fort Bonifacio military facility in Makati, Metropolitan Manila. The mutiny, dubbed as "The Black Saturday Revolt," did not succeed either. After the incident, the military authorities also conducted an investigation. The first investigation was concluded on 12 March 1987. The investigation disclosed that Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) of the AFP was one of the leaders of the unsuccessful takeover of the GMA radio-television facilities. The Board of Officers investigating the matter recommended that the case of Colonel Abadilla be endorsed for pre-trial investigation and that the appropriate charges be filed against him for violation of Article of War 67 (Mutiny or Sedition 1, Article of War 94) in relation to Article 139 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 1 of PD 1866, and such other offenses that may be warranted by the evidence. Accordingly, a charge sheet was prepared against the Colonel. The investigation conducted on "The Black Saturday Revolt" ended on 27 May 1987. It was found at said investigation that Colonel Abadilla was also involved in the mutiny. The Board of Officers conducting the investigation also recommended that the case be endorsed for pre-trial investigation and that the appropriate charges be filed against the Colonel. The Colonel was likewise charged, accordingly. Colonel Abadilla was at large when both investigations were conducted. On 4 May 1987 or some two weeks before the second investigation was concluded, Major General Renato De Villa, Commanding General of the PC and Vice Chief of Staff of the AFP issued an Order for the arrest and confinement of Colonel Abadilla. On 21 May 1987, AFP Chief of Staff General Fidel V. Ramos issued General Orders 342 dropping Colonel Abadilla from the rolls of regular officers of the AFP. On 7 July 1987, the Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City filed an Information for Slight Physical Injuries with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metropolitan Manila in Quezon City against Colonel Abadilla (Criminal Case 0237558). On 27 July 1987, a combined element of the Philippine Army and Philippine Constabulary arrested Colonel Abadilla. He was detained first in Camp Crame in Quezon City and later, up to the present, in Fort Bonifacio in Makati. On 30 July 1987, another Information, this time for violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition) was filed by the Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City against Colonel Abadilla. The case was assigned to Branch 104 of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City (Criminal Case Q-53382). On the same date, Mrs. Susan S. Abadilla, the spouse of Colonel Abadilla together with their minor children June Elizabeth, Rolando, Jr. Daphine Jennifer, Ma. Theresa, Anna Rosanna, Vincent Marcus and Bart Joseph, went to the Supreme Court and filed the Petition for habeas corpus, challenging the validity of the detention of Colonel Abadilla.

Issue: Whether Colonel Abadilla's confinement is illegal because under Article of War 70, a person subject to military law can be detained only if he is charged with a crime or a serious offense under the Articles of War.

Held: Article of War 2 enumerates who are subject to military law. In March, 1987, Colonel Abadilla was a military officer. Under this Article, he was subject to military law. Section 10 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, AFP, which discusses court-martial jurisdiction in general, states the general rule to be "The general rule is that court-martial jurisdiction over officers, cadets, soldiers, and others in the military service of the Philippines ceases on discharge or other separation from such service, and that jurisdiction as to an offense committed during a period of service thus terminated is not revived by a reentry into the military service."Attention is called to the exception mentioned in the last sentence of the Section, to wit "So also, where a dishonorably discharged general prisoner is tried for an offense committed while a soldier and prior to his dishonorable discharge, such discharge does not terminate his amenability to trial for the offense." This exception applies to the case of Colonel Abadilla inasmuch as he is at present confined in Fort Bonifacio upon the orders of his superior officers, and his having been dropped from the rolls of officers amounts to a dishonorable discharge. Section 1 (b) of PD 1860, as amended, even acknowledges instances where military jurisdiction fully attaches on an individual even after he shall have been separated from active service, which provides that "all persons subject to military law under Article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War who commit any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said Articles of War; Provided, that in either of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Article 38 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, or court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the accused military or Integrated National Police can no longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from the active service without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless otherwise provided by law." Colonel Abadilla has been charged by the military authorities for violation of Article of War 67 (Mutiny or Sedition) which is a serious offense, and the corresponding charge sheets have been prepared against him, which satisfies the requirement of Article of War 70, which provides that a person subject to military law can be detained only if he is charged with a crime or a serious offense under the Articles of War. Thus, as the detention of Colonel Abadilla under the circumstances is not illegal, the Petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed for lack of merit.

CASE: PACQUING vs. CANORBERTO FERIA Y PACQUING, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, MUNTINLUPA, METRO MANILA (IN PLACE OF THE JAIL WARDEN OF THE MANILA CITY JAIL), THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH II, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, and THE CITY PROSECUTOR, CITY OF MANILA, respondents.G.R. No. 122954 February 15, 2000

Lessons related to Habeas Corpus: The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is traced to antiquity was devised as a speedy and effectually remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of justice and to have the issue ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority. Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excessAs a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint rests on the petitioner who attacks the restraintWhen a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged its judgement, order, or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus.

Facts:

Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under detention since May 21, 1981, up to present by reason of his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, in Criminal Case 60677, by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, for the jeepney hold-up and killing of United States Peace Corps Volunteer Margaret Viviene Carmona. Some 12 years later, or on 9 June 1993, Feria sought to be transferred from the Manila City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City, but the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail informed the Presiding Judge of the RTC-Manila, Branch 2, that the transfer cannot be effected without the submission of the requirements, namely, the Commitment Order or Mittimus, Decision, and Information. It was then discovered that the entire records of the case, including the copy of the judgment, were missing. In response to the inquiries made by counsel of Feria, both the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2 attested to the fact that the records of Criminal Case 60677 could not be found in their respective offices. Upon further inquiries, the entire records appear to have been lost or destroyed in the fire which occurred at the second and third floor of the Manila City Hall on 3 November 1986. On 3 October 1994, Feria filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Supreme Court against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on the ground that his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right to due process. In its Resolution dated 10 October 1994, the Second Division of the Supreme Court resolved (a) to issue the Writ of Habeas Corpus; (b) to order the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to conduct an immediate raffle of the case among the incumbent judges thereof; and (c) to require [1] the Judge to whom this case is raffled to set the case for hearing on 13 October 1994, try and decide the same on the merits and thereafter furnish the Supreme Court with a copy of his decision thereon; [2] the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, et. al. to make a return of the Writ on or before the close of office hours on 12 October 1994 and appear personally and produce the person of Norberto Feria y Pacquing on said date and time of hearing to the Judge to whom the case is raffled, and [3] the Director General, Philippine National Police, through his duly authorized representative(s) to serve the Writ and Petition, and make a return thereof as provided by law and, specifically, his duly authorized representative(s) to appear personally and escort the person of Norberto Feria y Pacquing at said date and time of hearing. The case was then raffled to Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which on 15 November 1994, after hearing, issued an Order dismissing the case on the ground that the mere loss of the records of the case does not invalidate the judgment or commitment nor authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the proper remedy would be reconstitution of the records of the case which should be filed with the court which rendered the decision. Feria duly appealed said Order to the Court of Appeals, which on 28 April 1995, rendered the Decision affirming the decision of the trial court with the modification that "in the interest of orderly administration of justice" and "under the peculiar facts of the case" Feria may be transferred to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City without submission of the requirements. With the motion for reconsideration being denied for lack of merit, Feria filed the petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case subsequent to conviction of the accused would render the judgment of conviction void, or would it warrant the release of the convict by virtue of a writ of habeas corpus

Held: The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is traced to antiquity, was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defence of personal freedom. It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority. Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. 15 Petitioner's claim is anchored on the first ground considering, as he claims, that his continued detention, notwithstanding the lack of a copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is violative of his constitutional right to due process. Herein, based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of Feria which serves as the legal basis for his detention. Petitioner made judicial admissions, both verbal and written, that he was charged with and convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, and sentenced to suffer imprisonment "habang buhay". Further, the records also contain a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated January 1985 of then Judge Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting to the fact that Feria was convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide on 11 January 1985. Such Monthly Report constitutes an entry in official records under Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which is prima facie evidence of facts therein stated. As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint rests on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful public authority, the return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal. Since the public officials have sufficiently shown good ground for the detention, Feria's release from confinement is not warranted under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, there is also no showing that petitioner duly appealed his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, hence for all intents and purposes, such judgment has already become final and executory. When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment, order, or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus. Put another way, in order that a judgment may be subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus, it must be void for lack of jurisdiction.

CASE: In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of ILUSORIO, et al. vs. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, et al.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs.ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES, respondents.

G.R. No. 139789 July 19, 2001

Lessons re Habeas Corpus:A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention or by which is withheld from one entitled thereto it is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedom, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all the manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs. That is a matter beyond judicial authority.

Facts:

Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. On 11 July 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of 30 years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. Out of their marriage, the spouses had 6 children, namely: Ramon Ilusorio (present age, age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age 50); Sylvia (age 49); Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39). On 30 December 30, 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about 5 months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor in New York, USA. As a consequence, Potencianos health deteriorated. On 25 February 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. On 31 May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati. On 11 March 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that Erlinda I. Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio-Yap refused Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorios demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City. After due hearing, on 5 April 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered decision, ordering Bildner and Yap to allow visitation rights to Potenciano Ilusorios wife, Erlinda Ilusorio and all her children, notwithstanding any list limiting visitors thereof, and ordering the writ of habeas corpus previously issued be recalled and the petition for habeas corpus be denied due course. Hence, the two petitions, which were consolidated and are jointly decided.

Issue: Whether a wife may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal Bliss

Held: A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral. Herein, there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions. Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. The crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Still, with his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right. The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right.

B. Writ of KalikasanOverview Then Chief Justice Reynato Puno said that while the writ of habeas corpus originated in England as a legal recourse for those wrongly detained, and the writ of amparo came from Latin America to address its own brush with human rights violations, the writ of kalikasan is proudly Philippine-made to deal with cases in the realm of ecology.

HistoryIn 2009, the Supreme Court held a forum on environmental protection in Baguio City where difficulties in the prosecution of ecology-related crimes and the huge backlog pending in the courts were identified as among the issues affecting the implementation of environmental laws.The high court then came out with the writ of kalikasan the following year when it issued the rules of procedure for environmental cases as a special civil action to deal with environmental damage of such magnitude that it threatens life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. Provision for the Writ of Kalikasan was written in 2010 by theSupreme Court of the Philippinesunder Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases as a Special Civil Action. The Supreme Court underChief JusticeReynato Punotook the initiative and issued Rules of Procedure for Environmental Case because Section 16, Article II of the Philippines' 1986 Constitution was not a self-executing provision.A non-self-executing provision refers to one that cannot be invoked before the courts as it is. There must first be an enabling legislation or some other legal means by which the same can be effectuated and be a basis of a legal cause of action. (Tanada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997)Writ of Kalikasan; defined "Kalikasan" is a Filipino word for "nature".AWrit of Kalikasan is alegal remedyunderPhilippinelaw that provides protection of one's Constitutional right to a healthy environment, as outlined in Section 16, Article II of the Philippine Constitution, which says the "state shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. The Writ of Kalikasan means a legal remedy available to any natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, people's organization, non-governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. (Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC Rule 7, Sec. 1)Who and Where shall be filed?The writ of kalikasan may be sought by anyone a) whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or b) whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is threatened with violation, by an unlawful act of omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity and such violation or threat involves environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants of two or more cities, or provinces. (Rule 7, Section 1)The petition for the writ of kalikasan shall be filed with the Supreme Court or with any of the stations of the Court of Appeals. (Rule 7, Section 3) Note, however, that the filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative actions. (Rule 7, Section 17) Within 3 days from filing the petition deemed sufficient in form and substance, the Court shall issue the writ and require the respondent to file a return. (Rule 7, Section 5) In response, the respondent is required to file a return containing his defenses and supporting evidence within a non-extendible 10-day period after the service to him of the writ. He must raise all defenses in the return, otherwise they are deemed waived. A general denial of the petitioners allegations shall be deemed an admission by the respondent. (Rule 7, Section 8) If the petition fails to file a return, the hearing shall proceed ex parte (i.e., the hearing will proceed with only 1 side being heard). (Rule 7, Section 10)The penalty of indirect contempt may be meted out to a) a respondent who refuses to file the return, b) a respondent who unduly delays the filing of a return, c) a respondent who falsifies a return, or d) anyone who disobeys or resists a lawful process of court order. (Rule 7, Section 13)

Highlights of rules1. Highlights of the Rules include provisions on: (1) citizen suits, (2) consent decree, (3) environmental protection order, (4) writ of kalikasan, (5) writ of continuing mandamus, (6) strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP) and (7) the precautionary principle.2. The provision on citizen suits liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing environmental laws. Citizen suits have proven critical in forcing government and its agencies to act on its duty to protect and preserve the environment. The terminology of the text reflects the doctrine first enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993). To further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules enable litigants enforcing environmental rights to file their cases as citizen suits. As a procedural device, citizen suits permit deferred of payment of filing fees until after the judgment

3. The use of a consent decree is an innovative way to resolve environmental cases. It allows for a compromise agreement between two parties in environmental litigation over issues that would normally be litigated in court, and other matters that may not necessarily be of issue in court.

4. An environmental protection order refers to an order issued by the court directing or enjoining any person or government agency to perform or desist from performing an act in order to protect, preserve or rehabilitate the environment. It integrates both prohibitive and mandatory reliefs in order to appropriately address the factual circumstances surrounding the case. This remedial measure can also be prayed for in the writs of kalikasan and continuing mandamus.

5. Similar to the writs of habeas corpus, amparo and habeas data, the issuance of the writ of kalikasan is immediate in nature. It contains a very specific set of remedies which may be availed of individually or cumulatively, to wit it is available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, peoples organization, non-governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. The petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan can be filed with the Supreme Court or with any of the stations of the Court of Appeals. Likewise, the summary process leading to the issuance of the writ of kalikasan dispenses with extensive litigation; this facilitates the prompt disposition of matters before the court.

6. Another innovation is the rule on the writ of continuing mandamus which integrates the ruling in Concerned Residents of Manila Bay v. MMDA G.R. Nos. 171947-48, December 8, 2008) and the existing rule on the issuance of the writ of mandamus. Procedurally, its filing before the courts is similar to the filing of an ordinary writ of mandamus. However, the issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order is made available as an auxiliary remedy prior to the issuance of the writ itself.

7. As a special civil action, the writ of continuing Mandamus may be availed of to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law. It permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court's decision. For this purpose, the court may compel the submission of compliance reports from the respondent government agencies as well as avail of other means to monitor compliance with its decision.8. Its availability as a special civil action likewise complements its role as a final relief in environmental civil cases and in the writ of kalikasan, where continuing mandamus may likewise be issued should the facts merit such a relief.

9. Both petitions for the issuance of the writs of kalikasan and mandamus are exempt from the payment of docket fees.

10. Since formidable legal challenges may be mounted against those who seek to enforce environmental law, or to assert environmental rights, in light of this, the Rules make available a formidable defense in these by creating a rule on strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP). . These legal challenges may be pre-emptive in character and may be done in order to chill the latter.

11. Another significant aspect of the Rules that derives from the transboundary and temporal nature of ecological injury is the adoption of the precautionary principle. In this context, the precautionary principle finds direct application in the evaluation of evidence in cases before the courts. The precautionary principle bridges the gap in cases where scientific certainty in factual findings cannot be achieved. By applying the precautionary principle, the court may construe a set of facts as warranting either judicial action or inaction, with the goal of preserving and protecting the environment. This may be further evinced from the second paragraph where bias is created in favor of the constitutional right the people to a balanced and healthful ecology.

12. Some important provisions on criminal procedure can also be found under the Rules.The rule on bail makes available to the accused the privilege of bail from any court, within and outside the jurisdiction of the court which had issued the warrant of arrest. The immediate availability of bail is intended to obviate long periods of detention.

13. One important innovation under the rule on bail is the execution of an undertaking by the accused and counsel, empowering the judge to enter a plea of not guilty, in the event the accused fails to appear at the arraignment. This authorization permits the court to try the case in absentia, thereby addressing a fundamental concern surrounding the prosecution of criminal cases in general, where the accused jumps bail and the court unable to proceed with the disposition of the case in view of the absence of the accused and the failure to arraign the latter.

C. Temporary Protection Orders/Permanent Protection Orders

Republic Act 9262 "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004". It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the Provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the convention on the Elimination of all forms of discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party. (Sec. 2, RA9262)

It seeks to address the prevalence of violence against women and children (VAWC), abuses on women and their children by their intimate partners like:

1. Husband or ex-husband 2. Live-in partner or ex-live in partner 3. Boyfriend/girlfriend or ex-boyfriend/ex-girlfriend4. Dating partner or ex-dating partner

The Act classifies violence against women and children (VAWC) as a public crime.

What is Violence against Women and their Children?

It refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. (Par a, Section 3, RA 9262)

It includes acts such as:1. Physical Violence2. Sexual violence3. Psychological violence4. Economic abuse

What are the acts that can be classified as Violence against Women and Their Children?

1. Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;2. Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;3. Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;4. Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;5. Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. (Sec. 5 of RA 9262)

What can women and children do under the law?

The law allows women and their children to secure barangay protection order and/or temporary or permanent protection order from the courts.

They can also file an independent civil action for damages and criminal action for the violation of anti-VAWC Act.

Who gets protected under the Law?

The law recognizes the unequal relations of a man and a woman in an abusive relationship where it is usually the woman who is the disadvantaged. Thus, the law protects the woman and her children.

The victim, the child who is a minor (legitimate and illegitimate), and a person aged 18 years and beyond who doesnt have the ability to decide for herself/himself because of an emotional, physical and mental illness can make full use of the law.

Any child under the care of a woman is also protected under the law.

What are Protection Orders?

It is an order prescribed in the Anti-VAWC Act to prevent further abuse of or violence against a woman and her child. It also provides them relief from said abuse or violence. (Sec. 8 of RA. 9262)

What do Protection Orders provide?

The relief granted under a protection order serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim's daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain control over her life.

What are the types of Protection Orders?1. Barangay protection order (BPO)2. Temporary protection order (TPO) 3. Permanent protection order (PPO).

What are the reliefs provided by Protection Orders?

1. Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, any of the acts that constitute violence against women and children mentioned in Section 5 of RA 9262.2. Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;3. Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of the petitioner, regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the petitioner, or permanently where no property rights are violated, and if respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent has gathered his things and escort respondent from the residence;4. Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and designated family or household member at a distance specified by the court, and to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment, or any specified place frequented by the petitioner and any designated family or household member;5. Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile and other essential personal effects, regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany the petitioner to the residence of the parties to ensure that the petitioner is safely restored to the possession of the automobile and other essential personal effects, or to supervise the petitioner's or respondent's removal of personal belongings;6. Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to the petitioner;7. Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if entitled to legal support. Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an appropriate percentage of the income or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by the respondent's employer for the same to be automatically remitted directly to the woman.8. Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any firearm or deadly weapon and order him to surrender the same to the court for appropriate disposition by the court, including revocation of license and disqualification to apply for any license to use or possess a firearm;9. Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence inflicted, including, but not limited to, property damage, medical expenses, childcare expenses and loss of income;10. The issuance of a BPO or the pendency of an application for BPO shall not preclude a petitioner from applying for, or the court from granting a TPO or PPO. (Sec. 8 of RA 9262)

Who may file Petition for Protection Orders? 1. Parent or guardian2. Grandparents3. Children and grandchildren 4. Relatives (aunts, uncles, cousins, in-laws) 5. Local officials and DSWD social workers 6. Police 7. Lawyers 8. Counselors 9. Therapists 10. Health care providers (nurses, doctors, barangay health workers) 11. Any two people who came from the city or municipality where VAWC happened and who have personal knowledge of the crime (Sec. 9 of RA 9262)

Where to file an application for a Protection Order?

An application for a TPO or PPO may be filed in the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial court with territorial jurisdiction over the place of residence of the petitioner. Provided, however, that if a family court exists in the place of residence of the petitioner, the application shall be filed with that court. (Sec. 10 of RA 9262)

How to Apply for a Protection Order? The application for a protection order must be in writing, signed and verified under oath by the applicant. It may be filed as an independent action or as incidental relief in any civil or criminal case. If the applicants is not the victim, the application must be accompanied by an affidavit of the applicant attesting to a. The circumstances of the abuse suffered by the victimb. The circumstances of consent given by the victim for the filling of the application.

When disclosure of the address of the victim will pose danger to her life, it shall be so stated in the application. In such a case, the applicant shall attest that the victim is residing in the municipality or city over which court has territorial jurisdiction, and shall provide a mailing address for purpose of service processing. Barangay officials and court personnel shall assist applicants in the preparation of the application. Law enforcement agents shall also extend assistance in the application for protection orders in cases brought to their attention. (Sec. 11 of RA 9262)

How are Protection Orders enforced? All TPOs and PPOs issued under this Act shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. (Sec. 12 of RA 9262)

What are the penalties for offenders of the Law on Violence against Women and Children and violators of the Protection Orders? Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in the remittance of support to the woman and/or her child without justifiable cause shall render the respondent or his employer liable for indirect contempt of court. If the offender is a law enforcement agent, the court shall order the offender to surrender his firearm and shall direct the appropriate authority to investigate on the offender and take appropriate action on matter. Violation of Protection Orders shall be punishable with a fine ranging from Five Thousand Pesos (P5, 000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50, 000.00) and/or imprisonment of six (6) months. Violation of a BPO shall be punishable by imprisonment of thirty (30) days without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action that the offended party may file for any of the acts committed. Violation of any provision of a TPO or PPO issued under this Act shall constitute contempt of court punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action that the offended party may file for any of the acts committed. (Sec. 8, 12 and 21 of RA 9262)

What is a Barangay Protection Order (BPO), who may Issue (BPOs) and How? Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by thePunong Barangayordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of RA. 9262. APunong Barangaywho receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after determination of the basis of the application. If thePunong Barangayis unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any availableBarangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by aBarangay Kagawadthe order must be accompanied by an attestation by theBarangay Kagawadthat thePunong Barangaywas unavailable at the time for the issuance of the BPO. (Sec. 14 of RA 9262)

How many days will the BPO be effective? BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. (Sec. 14 of RA 9262)

What are Temporary Protection Orders? Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by the court on the date of filing of the application determination that such order should be issued. (Sec. 15 of RA 9262)

How many days will the TPO be effective? A TPO shall be effective for thirty (30) days.(Sec. 15 of RA 9262)

What may be granted or included in a TPO? A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in RA 9262. The court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. (Sec. 15 of RA 9262)

What is a Permanent Protection Order? Permanent Protection Order (PPO) refers to protection order issued by the court after notice and hearing. The court may grant any, some or all of the reliefs specified in Section 8 of RA 9262 in a PPO.(Sec. 16 of RA 9262)

How are Protection Orders applied to Criminal Cases? The foregoing provisions on protection orders shall be applicable and impliedly instituted with the criminal actions involving violence against women and their children.(Sec. 22 of RA 9262)

Where to seek help?

Women and children who are victims of violence may seek help from the following offices or agencies:1. Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) NCR Ugnayang Pag-asa Legarda, Manila Crisis Intervention Unit (CIU).2. Philippine National Police (PNP) Women and Childrens Concern Division (WCCD)3. National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Violence against Women and Childrens Desk (VAWCD)4. Public Attorneys Office, DOJ 5. Philippine General Hospital (PGH) Womens Desk 6. Womens Crisis Center Women and Children Crisis Care & Protection Unit East Avenue Medical Center (WCCCPU-EAMC) (Sec. 39, RA 9262)

D. Investigation by the Commission on Human Rights1987 Philippine Constitution, Article XIII Section 17 par. 1 There is hereby created an office called the Commission on Human rights. As to constitutional status, it is not the same level as compared to the other constitutional commissions in Article IX of the Constitution. The inherent weakness in the enforcement system of human rights in the Philippines can be attributed to the provisions in the Philippine Constitution. The Commission on Human Rights, established as a constitutional independent body to pursue the state policy on the promotion and protection of human rights, has been empowered to investigate only all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. (J. Coquia, Human Rights, 2012 )

Section 18 provides the powers and functions of the Commission which in essence is only investigative. (J. Bernas, The 1987 Philippine Constitution: A Comprehensive Reviewer, 2011) INVESTIGATE, on its owner on complaint by any party all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;

ADOPT its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the rules of Court.

PROVIDE appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under-privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;

EXERCISE visitorial powers over jails prisons or detention facilities;

ESTABLISH a continuing program of research, education and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;

RECOMMEND to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victim of violations of human rights, or their families;

MONITOR the Philippine Governments compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;

GRANT immunity from prosecution to any persons whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidences is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;

REQUEST the assistance of any department, bureau, office or agency in the performance of its functions;

APPOINT its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

PERFORM such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, 204 SCRA 483 (1991), declared that the Commission did not possess the power of adjudication, and emphasized that its functions were primarily investigatory. In Simon Jr. vs. Commission on Human Rights, 229 Scra 117, the Supreme Court said that the commission can only protect civil and political rights as distinct from less traditional social and economic rights.It can only issue preliminary injunctions or restraining orders. To exercise such powers, it has to seek authority from the regular courts (EPZA vs. Commission on Human Rights, 208 Scra 125 1992)

How Investigation by Commission on Human Rights conducted

Complaints filed to the CHR may come directly from victims, by way of motu proprio or from community level. Predominantly, most complaints originate from organizations or agencies. The commission recognizes this fact and so it maintains benevolent and yet stern relationships to these groups.

After the processing of documents, a special investigator and an attorney officer would handle the case. The investigator would study if the case needs an investigative inquiry or just verification of complaint details. Meanwhile, the attorney officer shall check whether a violation was really committed and if conciliation/mediation could be undertaken to resolve the case.

The success of all of these actions depend on the conduct of relations of CHR officers to the concerned groups and government agencies. Through the process of inquiry up to recommendation, the CHR will need the police agency. It might also request for the aid of other agencies that would better address the problem.

If the parties agree for an amicable settlement or one party promises to rectify and make amends, CHR will make sure that things agreed upon are followed. If some circumstances arise that merit judicial intervention, CHR will forward the case to the court.

To this point, CHR has to mobilize its units properly and at the same time cooperate with the appropriate government agencies to swiftly respond and hopefully resolve cases.

To this point, CHR has to mobilize its units properly and at the same time cooperate with the appropriate government agencies to swiftly respond and hopefully resolve cases.

E. The Writ of Amparo Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human rights states that Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

While the 1987 Philippine Constitution, ARTICLE 3 Section 1 provides, No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.What is the Writ of Amparo?It is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (J. Coquia, Human rights 2012)What rule governs petitions for and the issuance of a writ of amparo?It is governed by The Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC ), which was approved by the Supreme Court on 25 September 2007. This Rule also governs existing cases involving extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.What is the Supreme Courts basis in issuing the Rule?The Rule was drafted pursuant to the Supreme Court constitutional power to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights under Article VIII Section 5 (5) which provides, Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

When does the Rule take effect?The Rule takes effect on 24 October 2007, following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation.Who may file a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo?The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in the following order:(a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents of the aggrieved party;(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or(c) Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no known member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends the right of all other authorized parties to file similar petitions. Likewise, the filing of the petition by an authorized party on behalf of the aggrieved party suspends the right of all others, observing the order established herein.

Where can the petition be filed? The petition may be filed on any day and at any time with the Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred, or with the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court, or any justice of such courts. The writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.When issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, the writ shall be returnable before such court or judge.When issued by the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their justices, it may be returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional TrialCourt of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred.When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such Court or any justice thereof, or before the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred.How much is the docket or filing fees for the petition? There is NO docket and other lawful fees for the petition. The court, justice or judge shall docket the petition and act upon it immediately.What are the required contents of the petition? The petition shall be signed and verified and shall allege the following:(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and(f) The relief prayed for the petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.When is the writ of amparo issued? Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent necessity, the justice or the judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person to serve it. The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than seven (7) days from the date of its issuance.Is there any penalty in case of refusal to issue or serve the writ?Yes. A clerk of court who refuses to issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputized person who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the court, justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to other disciplinary actions.How is the writ of amparo served?The writ is served on the respondent by a judicial officer or by a person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply.After the writ is served, what should the respondent do?Within seventy-two (72) hours after service of the writ, the respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits which shall, among other things, contain the following:(a) The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any act or omission;(b) The steps or actions taken by the respondent to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission;(c) All relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party; and(d) If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall further state the actions that have been or will still be taken:(i) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;(ii) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;(iii) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance;(iv) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance;(v) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and(vi) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its resolution and the prosecution of the case. A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed. All defenses shall be raised in the return, otherwise, they shall be deemed waived.What happens if the respondent fails to file return?The court, justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte or even without the appearance of the respondent.What is the nature of the hearing on the petition? The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties. The hearing shall be from day to day until completed and given the same priority as petitions for habeas corpus.What are the interim reliefs available to the petitioner?Upon filing of the petition or at any time before final judgment, the court, justice or judge may grant any of the following reliefs:(a) Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an organization, association or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of the Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers involved. The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall issue. The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that may be imposed by the court, justice or judge.(b) Inspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in possession or control of a designated land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon. The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party. If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated. The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall expire five (5) days after