Hydropolitics in the developing world

A comparative case study between the Nile and the

Mekong river

Babette Schenkels, 10521364, Babetteschenkels@live.nl

The Politics of Development - Bachelor thesis

Supervisor: Dr. Sebastian Krapohl.

Second reader: Dr. Rosa Sanchez Salgado

Bachelor Political Science, University of Amsterdam, 29-01-2018

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction 4

2. Literature review 6

3. Theoretical framework 7

4. Methodology 10

4.1 Research design 10

4.2 Case selection 10

4.3 Data & indicators 11

5. Analysis of the Nile 12

5.1 Background of the Nile 13

5.2 Historical development of the water allocation 13

5.3 Application of Hydro-Hegemony to the Nile 15

6. Analysis of the Mekong 20

6.1 Background of the Mekong 21

6.2 Historical development of the water allocation 21

6.3 Application of Hydro-Hegemony to the Mekong 24

7. Comparative analysis 28

8. Conclusion 31

9. References 34

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“Fierce competition for fresh water may well become a source of conflict and wars in the future.”

Kofi Annan, March 2001

“But the water problems of our world need not be only a cause of tension; they can also be a catalyst

for cooperation…If we work together, a secure and sustainable water future can be ours.”

Kofi Annan, February 2002

Abstract

As water scarcity is rising, the relationships between riparian states in transboundary rivers will become

more contentious. This research compares the hydropolitical relations in the dynamic contexts of the

Nile and the Mekong. It aims to explore the different possibilities of downstream states to assert

leverage in international river basins. Downstream countries are geographically in a disadvantaged

position. The pollution and water management policy of the upstream countries poses a threat for the

water supply of the downstream countries. This thesis will apply the Hydro-Hegemon theory to the

dialectic relationship between the riparian states of the Nile and the Mekong. The central question is:

how can downstream countries influence transboundary water allocation in the developing world? The

main finding is that material power can help downstream countries to reach the hegemon status and

thus control the water resources in the basin. Egypt is military and economical superior to the other

countries and is therefore able to influence the water allocation. The downstream countries of the

Mekong river are materially inferior to the upstream countries. Their strategy is to stress the

importance of international norms.

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1. Introduction

Water insecurity is considered as a key development issue in the 21st century. Worldwide water

scarcity is increasing rapidly, as climate change, economic development and population growth are

putting pressure on water resources (Rieu-Clarke et al., 2015). In recent decades, more attention in

scholarly and popular discourse has been raised to the role that water scarcity can play in conflicts.

Scientists refer to water as “the new oil” and predict that the new resource wars will increasingly be

fought over “the Blue Gold” (Barlow, 2001; Hansen, 2017). Many countries in the developing world are

currently facing water scarcity, and due to population growth and economic development, the scarcity

is expected to increase (Homer-Dixon, 1994). Consequently, tensions between or within states can

arise, especially when states have to share their access to water in transboundary waters. Almost half

of the Earth is covered by 286 transboundary river basins and 151 states have territory in these basins

(UNEP, 2016). River basins are important for a state’s social and economic development, as rivers are

used for multiple purposes, such as hydroelectric power generation, agriculture and fishing.

The economic development of the Global South has led to an increasing interest in the

construction of hydropower dams. These hydroelectric dams can cause significant harm to the flow

downstream, as they affect the water quantity and quality, the fertile sediment and the underwater

fauna of downstream areas (International Rivers, 2017). Upstream countries have a tendency to

manipulate the water resources to support their national needs, which can have severe consequences

for the neighbors downstream (Nugent, 2013). In the water allocation of transboundary rivers, power

asymmetries play an important role in the unfair distribution of water resources. Therefore, in this

research the focus will be on the politics of transboundary river basins, in order to identify the

underlying causes of the water crisis. The geographical position on the river makes downstream

countries dependent on upstream actions for their water resources. For that reason, this thesis aims

to examine the different possibilities that exist for downstream countries to make up for their

disadvantaged geographical position. The central question in this thesis is: How can downstream

countries influence transboundary water allocation in the developing world?

In this research, a comparison will be made between the power asymmetries in the Mekong

and the Nile basin. Both rivers are shared by many riparian countries, whose conflicting interests have

created tensions and hindered cooperation efforts in the past century. The Hydro-Hegemony theory

of Zeitoun & Warner (2006), later updated by Cascão & Zeitoun (2010), will be used to gain more

insight in the power relations between riparian countries of the Nile and the Mekong. As the Hydro-

Hegemony theory has emerged relatively recent, the framework still lacks empirical foundation.

Therefore, this thesis attempts to add to the literature on river basin conflicts and further develop the

framework of Cascão & Zeitoun (2010). Furthermore, this research can be relevant for international

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organizations which cope with water conflicts and cooperation, as it offers insights in the power

relations between transboundary river states. In an era of increasing water stress, it’s vital to

understand how riparian states share and distribute their waters, in order to promote peaceful

cooperation and sustainable development in the developing world (UNESCO, 2016).

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2. Literature review: debating water conflicts

In scholarly and popular discourse, climate change is increasingly being framed as a security threat, as

it’s believed to be a threat multiplier for conflicts (Huntjens & Nachbar, 2015). In the literature, two

main discourses can be distinguished on what causes environmental conflicts: the Neo-Malthusian and

the political ecologist discourse. The two discourses differ in their framing of the problem and

supposed solution. The main scholar in the Neo-Malthusian school of thought is Homer-Dixon (1994).

Homer-Dixon argues that the rapid population growth is currently overstretching the capacity of the

earth’s water resources. The increasing demand of water causes overconsumption of resources,

resource degradation, and finally scarcities. According to Homer-Dixon, these scarcities will inevitably

result in violent competition over water (Homer-Dixon, 1994; Homer-Dixon, 2010).

The political ecologist discourse claims that water crisis is the product of political and economic

inequalities between states or within states. According to political ecologists, power relations

determine how costs and benefits of environmental change are distributed among humans. Therefore,

the uneven allocation of water resources in the world can be explained by power asymmetries

between states (Robbins, 2012; Rodríguez-Labajos & Martínez-Alier, 2015).

In this thesis will be reasoned from a political ecologist point of view, as it will be argued that

power asymmetries between riparian states play an important role in how water resources are

allocated in the river basin. To support this statement, the Hydro-Hegemony theory will be used as

theoretical framework, which will be discussed further in this thesis (Cascão & Zeitoun, 2010).

Hydropolitics has recently received more attention in political science. Most research has

focused on basins in the Middle-East and North-Africa. Also, it has been strongly associated with the

concept of water conflicts (Cascão & Zeitoun, 2010). Several authors have warned for emerging “water

wars” in the near future (Homer-Dixon, 1994; Gleick, 1993). Contrary, others have demonstrated that

water can lead to cooperation and peace (Allan, 2001; Wolf. et al., 2003).They argue that there is little

empirical evidence supporting the correlation between wars and water scarcity. Allan (2001) claims

that the import of “virtual water”, “the amount of water needed to produce goods and services”, is

one reason countries will not go into war over water (Hussein & Grandi, 2017: 799; Allan, 2001).

Hussein & Grandi (2017) and Zeitoun & Warner (2006) emphasize the importance to move beyond the

question if water scarcity leads to either conflict or cooperation, as both outcomes can coexist in river

basins. In this research, this static perception of cooperation and conflict will be dismissed, as it is

assumed that both exist in different gradations and develop and change over time.

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3. Theoretical framework

In the context of transboundary waters, Zeitoun & Warner (2006) developed a theoretical framework

to gain more insights in the power relations between riparian countries. This is called the Hydro-

Hegemony theory, and the revised version by Cascão & Zeitoun (2010) will be used in this research to

analyze the Nile and Mekong basins.

Hydro-Hegemony theory

In the Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics, “hegemony” is defined as the situation that emerges when

“one social class exerts power over others beyond that accounted for by coercion or law” (McLean &

McMillan, 2003: 239). “Power”, by Dahl defined as “A’s ability to get B to do something that B would

not do otherwise”, forms a central concept in this definition (Dahl, 1957: 202). Zeitoun & Warner relate

the concepts of power and hegemony to water politics, and describe the hegemon in this context as

the most powerful state of the riparian countries. Therefore, the hegemon plays a crucial role in the

allocation of water in the river basin. “Hydro-Hegemony” can thus be defined as “hegemony at the

river basin level that occurs where control over transboundary flows is consolidated by the more

powerful actor” (Cascão & Zeitoun, 2010, 28).

To study this power dynamics in the basin, Zeitoun & Warner (2006) have developed a

framework to analyze the different ways (coercive, normative, ideological or utilitarian) in which the

hydro-hegemon can exert its power in the basin. Cascão and Zeitoun have built upon this theory by

describing four different areas in which riparian states can hold power (2010: 32): the geographical

power, material power, bargaining power and ideational power. In this thesis, these pillars of power

will be applied to the Nile and the Mekong to analyze the hydro-political relations. Hereby, the focus

will be on how downstream countries are located within these different fields of power. Ideational

power is in this research considered as element of bargaining power.

Geographical power

The riparian position on a river can be an important influence of overt power (Cascão & Zeitoun, 2010:

31). As rivers tend to flow downstream, the geographical position can provide an advantage to the

upstream state, which has the ability to control the quality and flow of water that reaches the

downstream states. The geographical position determines the “exploitation potential” for the riparian

countries (Rieu-clarke et al., 2017: 302). The upstream basin is characterized by height differences and

steep land, which creates greater potential for hydropower projects (Adams, 2009).

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Material power

According to Cascão & Zeitoun, material power includes economic power, military capacity,

technological expertise and international support (Cascão & Zeitoun, 2010: 32). Asymmetries in

material power can influence the water allocation in the river, especially when combined with

bargaining power. States that possess material power can deploy different tactics on other riparian

countries. The first tactic is compliance by means of coercion, which include for instance (threats) of

military intervention, diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions and undercover actions aimed at

weakening the “political, military or hydraulic apparatus” of other states (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006:

446). Although military power has rarely been used in water conflicts, it can be an effective coercive

strategy, as proven by the outcome of the violence between Syria and Israel between the 1950s and

1960s1 (idem, 2006: 446).

The second tactic is compliance through (financial) incentives. Examples include bribery and

the provision of services in exchange for support (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006). In this tactic there is

compliance with the policy, because the counterparty is “better off” when he or she agrees to the

(financial) transaction (Kouwenhoven, 2013: 12). Economic trade-offs can result in mutually beneficial

water projects and thus form an incentive for cooperation in river basins (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006).

Moreover, the mobilization of financial resources and international support for your ideas and

interests, can improve your power position in the basin (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006).

Bargaining power

Bargaining power is defined as “the capability of actors to control the rules of the game and set

agendas” (Cascão and Zeitoun, 2010: 31). This refers to the ability of riparian states to determine the

terms of negotiations and agreements concerning the water allocation (Rein, 2014: 21). Bargaining

power is often used by riparian countries which have a lower level of geographical and/or material

power as a counter strategy against the water hegemon (idem: 22). Several bargaining tactics include:

finding official recognition through international treaties and international water law, promoting

cooperative institutions, negotiating bilateral agreements, active stalling and ideational tactics. “Active

stalling” means the refusal to negotiate or cooperate in order to maintain the status quo and is often

used as bargaining tool in river basins. This includes the refusal to share data on water use and

development plans. The example of Israel, who refuses to share data on water use by Israeli settlers

1 This refers to “water war” between Syria and Israel in the Jordan river in the 1950s and 1960s. The military attacks by

Israel effectively blocked the construction of water development projects and increased Israel’s control of the basin (Trottier, 1999; Warner & Zeitoun, 2006).

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in the Palestinian West bank, illustrates this lack of transparency (Tagar et al., 2004; Cascão and Zeitoun

2010; Rein; 2014: 21).

The ability to appeal to legal principles can increase the legitimacy of riparian states and thus

enforce their bargaining strength in the negotiation process . International law reflects and reproduces

global discourses on water issues. These international norms can restrain a state’s policy choices and

behavior, and even reshape state conceptions of national interests. As such, international water law

can influence hydropolitical relations in river basins, as states can appeal to law principles to claim the

“rightness” or “wrongness” of a riparian’s actions. (Daoudy, 2008; Shannon, 2017; Rieu-Clarke, 2017:

300). The 1997 UN Convention has established several legal principles that can increase the legitimacy

of downstream states in the negotiation process, such as: “the principle of equitable and reasonable

utilization”, “the obligation not to cause harm” and “prior notification”. These principles contain

judgements that could constrain upstream states’ behavior.

However, their impact remains limited as countries have disputes about the meaning of these

principles and moreover, only few countries have ratified the 1997 Convention. The lack of a central

authority to legally enforce the customary water principles, limits the effectiveness of international

water law to create equal water-sharing policies (Daoudy, 2008: 100).

Lastly, ideational tactics can improve the bargaining position of a riparian state. This ideational

power entails the capacity of a riparian to impose and legitimize a particular set of ideas and narratives.

The main tactic is knowledge construction by creating narratives and storylines that benefit their

national interests. In this way, the riparian state can influence and attempt to control the perceptions

on the water allocation process in the basin and thus enforce its legitimacy. Another ideational tactic

that is often used in river basins is issue linkage. Daoudy defines this as a situation that occurs when

“an upstream-downstream issue is linked to another issue and cooperation is generated by mutual

concession or, on the contrary, negotiations encounter obstacles” (2009: 367). An example of this

tactic is the securitization of water issues, by linking water to problems related to environmental and

food security (idem: 2009).

To conclude, following the framework of Cascão and Zeitoun (2010), it can be assumed that

despite the lack of geographical power, downstream states can exert material and/or bargaining

power to influence the water allocation in river basins. Different tactics, such as compliance through

coercion and financial incentives, the appeal to international legal principles and issue-linkage, can

strengthen a downstream state’s ability to compensate its disadvantaged geographical position. This

leads to the following two hypotheses: “A downstream state needs material power resources to

compensate for the disadvantaged strategic position” (1) and “International norms play a significant

role in water resources allocation in the river basin” (2).

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4. Methodology

4.1. Research design

For this research, there is chosen for a comparative case study design, as this design allows to do in-

depth and detailed research. This makes it suitable for this thesis, which aims to research the causal

mechanisms and complexities that come into play in the water allocation of transboundary rivers. The

comparative case study of this design analyze the similarities and differences of two or more cases

(Goodrick, 2014). This research explores the different possibilities of downstream states to influence

the water allocation in a basin by analyzing power asymmetries in two transboundary river basins. To

find answers to this question, the Hydro-Hegemony theoretical framework (Cascão and Zeitoun, 2010)

will be empirically tested in both basins. As the Hydro-Hegemony theory has emerged relatively recent,

the framework still lacks empirical foundation. Therefore, this thesis attempts to add something to the

literature on river basin conflicts and further develop the framework of Cascão & Zeitoun (2010).

4.2. Case selection

In this research, a comparison will be made between the power asymmetries in the Nile and the

Mekong. The first case study is the Nile river basin. The river counts most riparian states of all

transnational rivers, as it runs through eleven countries which belong to the poorest in the world

(Aslake, 2016). The Nile is a vital source of life for many inhabitants in the region, who depend on it for

their livelihoods. Growing tensions and changing dynamics in the basin in recent years are increasing

the urgency to research this case.

The second case study is the Mekong River. The Mekong River is crucial for the human

development of the South-East Asian inhabitants, as more than 80 million depend on the course for

food, water and income (Van den Boogert, 2013). The countries of South-East Asia belong to the

world’s most water-stressed countries, which makes researching this case more relevant. Although

many research has focused on China’s economic foreign policy, not a lot of attention has been paid to

China’s hegemonic behavior on the Mekong River.

Both rivers are located in the developing world and shared by many riparian countries, whose

conflicting interests have created tensions and hindered cooperation efforts in the past century.

Whereas in the Nile case Egypt as downstream country has been the hydro hegemon of the region for

decades, the downstream countries in the Mekong case are the least powerful countries of the basin.

Thus, the cases are similar on the variable of geographical power, but different on the variables

material and bargaining power, which makes it interesting to see how much effect this variable has

and how downstream countries in both cases are trying to make up for their disadvantaged position.

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4.3. Data & indicators

To support the statements made in this thesis, a variety of sources are used. For the theoretical part,

mainly academic articles and books will be used. For the empirical part, statistical data from different

databanks will be included (Aquastat, International Institute of Strategic Studies, Mekong River

Commission and the World Bank). Furthermore, case studies on the Nile and the Mekong River, reports

of meetings, media articles, law and policy papers will be analyzed. The use of many different sources

increases the validity of this research.

To measure the power of downstream states, the variables Geographical power, Material

power and Bargaining power will be analyzed. The geographical power can be easily determined by

looking at the geographical location of a state on the river (Rein, 2014). In the analysis of material

power there will be looked at economic capacity, technical control, international support and military

power. Indicators such as GDP per capita, the share of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP,

and the development of hydraulic infrastructure will be used to measure this (Cascão, 2009: 246;

Parkes, 2013: 452). Indicators of bargaining power include international law, cooperative agreements,

active stalling, and ideational tactics.

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5. Analysis of the Nile

Figure 1: The Nile river basin (Philips, 2006)

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5.1 Background of the Nile

In this analysis of the Nile case, first an overview will be given of how the water allocation of the Nile

has historically developed since the colonial era until now. Then, power asymmetries in the river basin

will be analyzed by using the Hydro-Hegemony framework by Cascão & Zeitoun (2010). The sub-

question central in this analysis is: How can downstream countries influence transboundary water

allocation in the Nile Basin?

The Nile is one of the world’s longest rivers in the world, covering almost 7000 kilometers in

one of the poorest regions of the world, providing fresh water to approximately 300 million people

(Aslake, 2016: 7). The river counts most riparian states of all transnational rivers, as it runs through

eleven countries: Burundi, Egypt, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Kenia, Sudan, South-Sudan,

Tanzania, Uganda, Eritrea and Ethiopia. The river is separated in the White Nile, The Blue Nile and the

Nile. 85 % of the Nile is located in the North Eastern countries Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan (El Zain, 2007).

Therefore, the thesis is mainly focused on this part of the basin. The

population growth is expected to reach 800 million by 2050 (Wiebe, 2001). This will have an enormous

impact on the availability of water in the basin, as the demands from agriculture, hydropower, industry

and domestic use will rise. In addition to population growth, climate change, pollution and hydraulic

exploitation, pressure the resources of the basin. These challenges, “combined with historical

grievances related to intra-regional politics” are threatening the regional stability (Hussein & Grandi,

2017; Kouwenhoven, 2013).

5.2 Historical development of the water allocation

Colonial era (1882-1965)

The origins of the Nile conflict can be found in colonial treaties between the riparian countries. During

the colonial era, the British had an enormous influence in the Nile delta. To secure their interests in

colonies Sudan and Egypt, it was important to control the water in the Nile. The Nile water was needed

for fertile land and crop production. Successive agreements in 1902, 1929 and 1959 effectively granted

Egypt and Sudan rights and control over the Nile water (Kouwenhoven, 2013; Di Nunzio, 2013). The

legitimacy of the Treaties in 1929 and 1959 has been contested by other riparian states. However, due

to civil wars and weak governance during this period, the upstream states were unable to perform

counter-hegemonic actions (idem: 2013).

Towards cooperation (1965-)

After 1965, upstream countries increasingly started to dispute the consolidated control of Egypt. This

resulted in several regional cooperation initiatives in the river basin, including examples as Hydromet

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(1967), the Undugu (1983) and the TeccoNile (1992). However, the achievements remained limited;

first, because not all riparian countries were included and, second, because the focus was mainly on

technical, instead of legal and political issues (Cascão, 2009: 246).

The call for cooperation became greater as a result of increased political and economic stability

in the upstream states. Until 1999, no multilateral agreement existed that involved all the Nile riparian

states. In 1999, for the first time all 10 riparian states cooperated in an agreement called the Nile Basin

Initiative. The NBI is seen as a platform to negotiate a multilateral treaty between all riparian states.

This treaty is called the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) and aims to replace the existing and

controversial historical water allocation in the Nile. The NBI is seen as a temporary mechanism until

the CFA is realized (idem: 2009; Hansen, 2014). The mission of the NBI is “to achieve sustainable socio-

economic development through the equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin

water resources” (Nile Basin Initiative, 2017). Negotiations on the CFA are creating new tensions in the

river basin, as Sudan and Egypt refuse to accept the terms of the agreement (Kouwenhoven, 2013). In

figure 2, a timeline of initiatives and agreements in the Nile basin is presented since 1929.

New developments (2008- now)

Since 2008, new developments have contributed to changing power relations in the river basin.

Ethiopia made tactical use of the Arab revolution that raged through Egypt in 2011, by starting the

construction of a large unilateral project: the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). While Egypt’s

attention is appointed to internal affairs, Ethiopia managed to gain international support and secure

the construction of the mega dam. The GERD is intended for winning electricity, but can potentially

store the water flow for two years (Cascão, 2009; idem: 2013). In this way, Ethiopia could exercise

control of the water flow and determine the amount of water that flows into Egypt. In view of this risk,

the Egyptian government has opposed upstream projects along the Nile River Basin, leading to

intensified relationships in the basin (One World, 2015; idem: 2013).

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Figure 2: Timeline of initiatives and agreements in the Nile basin since 1929 (Cascão, 2009)

5.3 Application Hydro-Hegemony to the Nile basin

In this section of the thesis, the Hydro-Hegemony framework (Cascão & Zeitoun, 2010) will be applied

to analyze the power asymmetries in Nile river basin. The focus will be on the question how Egypt as

downstream country has traditionally been able to exert material, bargaining & ideational power to

maintain its hegemonic position.

Geographical power

The geographical position of a state is an important factor in understanding the allocation of water

resources in a river basin. In general, upstream states have an advantage in terms of the ability to

manipulate and control the water flows. However, in the case of the Nile, Egypt has been able to

compensate for its disadvantaged downstream position by its supremacy in the other fields of power

(Parkes, 2013; Zeitoun, 2012).

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Material power

Economic capacity

Egypt’s GDP per capita is much higher than those of other riparian states, which makes Egypt the

strongest economic power of the basin (Table 1; World Bank, 2016). Moreover, contrary to other states

in the basin, whose economies depend mainly on agricultural activity, Egypt benefits from a highly

diversified economy (Carles, 2006). Egypt’s economic hegemony enabled Egypt to embark on

ambitious infrastructure projects in the basin, grant economic privileges to downstream neighbor

Sudan (i.e. 1959 Treaty) in exchange for political support. Meanwhile, the political and economic

unstable upstream states were not able to counteract Egypt’s unilateral behavior on the river (Parkes,

2013; Yacob, 2011).

Military power

Furthermore, Egypt’s possesses relatively strong military power, military expenditure covering 1,7% of

its GDP (World Bank, 2016; Table 1). International financial support is a major contributor to this

position. For instance, the USA has transferred $1.3 billion annually to strengthen Egypt’s military

capability (Carles, 2006: 28). Historically, Egypt has threatened other riparian states with military

action to maintain its controlling position and to prevent the construction of upstream dams on the

Nile (Zeitoun, 2012).

In 1978, the proposal of Ethiopia to build an irrigation project at Lake Tana was answered by

Sadat with military threats. In 2001, former Egyptian president Mubarak stated that if the downstream

flow is diverted the “response will be beyond anything they can imagine” (Klare, 2001). More recently,

in response to the upstream claim for an equitable water allocation, Egypt declared that it would “be

willing and able to intervene militarily in order to maintain the status quo” (Nugi, 2010; Yacob, 2011).

Furthermore, former Egyptian president Morsi has threatened Ethiopia with the use of force against

the building of the GERD (Clements, 2017). These examples illustrate the continued hegemonic

position of Egypt by enforcing compliance through coercion (Kouwenhoven, 2013). However, except

of an unsuccessful military attempt against Sudan in 1958, Egypt’s military threats have not resulted

in an actual outbreak of war (Yacob, 2011: 18).

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International support

Egypt’s dominant power position in the MENA-region has resulted in favorable trade and diplomatic

relations with Western governments. Egypt’s international support can be explained by its geostrategic

position in the Suez Canal shipping route, its oil and gas resources and its former role as peacemaker

in the region (role in Israel-Palestine conflict) (Allan, 2011; Parkes, 2013: 452). Significantly, Egypt’s

strong international position is reflected in its presence in international water bodies, as its officials

occupy several influential positions (idem, 2013: 452; Carles 2006: 26). In this way, it has often been

able to obstruct financial support for infrastructure projects by upstream countries.

Recently, Egypt has sought to get international institutions as the United Nations and the

World Bank to intervene in and to halt the construction on the GERD (Foreign Policy, 2016). Egypt has

also lobbied with Western and African governments to block the construction. However, the GERD

project has almost entirely been financed by China, who has become a key external player in the region

(One World, 2015). This has impeded Egypt to influence events as they have done in the past, especially

during the colonial era (Kalpakian, 2015).

Moreover, international institutions and donor organizations increasingly realize their role in

promoting transboundary water cooperation in the developing world. Therefore, the Nile Basin

Initiative of the upstream states has received financial support from the United Nations and the World

Bank, undermining Egypt’s dominant position in the basin (Kehl, 2010).

Technical control

The internal support that Egypt received during the colonial period has provided the state of full

technical control in the basin. ‘Technical control’ refers to Egypt’s capacity to capture the Nile’s water

resources “by use of its hydraulic infrastructure and water resource management expertise” (Parkes,

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2013: 452). Egypt’s technical knowledge and capacity has resulted in the construction of several large

scale dam projects, such as the Aswan High Dam in the late 1960s (Cascão, 2009). Since the mid-1990’s

however, upstream states have increasingly stressed the need for the Nile’s water resources to meet

the growing demand for electricity and food production. To utilize the Nile’s resources for hydropower

and irrigation purposes, upstream countries have embarked on infrastructural development projects

on the river. This has concerned Egypt, which fears a reduction of downstream river flows (Cascão,

2009: 251).

Bargaining power

International law

Already since the colonial era, Egypt has been able to influence the negotiations and determine what

is and is not on the agenda (Cascão, 2009). This bargaining power is mainly derived from Egypt’s claim

to the “principle of historic rights” in international water law, that allows states to claim water that

was allocated to them in the past (Gupta, 2016). Egypt has always appealed to colonial treaties to

secure its consolidated control in the river basin to in the basin. In 1902, the first agreement was

negotiated between the British rulers and Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II. Due to this treaty, Ethiopia

lost its advantages of possessing the strategic position on the river (Kouwenhoven, 2013). In 1929,

another treaty is concluded between Egypt and Britain, granting Egypt the right to inspect and prohibit

any upstream construction projects on the Nile. This agreement was motivated by Egypt’s strategic

importance to the United Kingdom, as Egypt’s position on the Suez Canal determined British access to

India (Di Nunzio, 2013). After the independence of Sudan, Egypt and Sudan sign the 1959 Treaty, in

which they allocate the water bilaterally. Without consulting other states, the two riparian countries

closed deals about building large scale dams, such as the Aswan dam. The agreements helped to

institutionalize the historical claim to the Nile resources by Egypt (Cascão, 2009).

Cooperative agreements & active stalling

Historically, the internal capacity of upstream states to influence the negotiations, discourses and

agendas has been weaker than the bargaining power of the downstream countries. Consequently, for

a long time they have not been able to establish the water policies and to promote their interests in

the agenda making process (Cascão & Zeitoun, 2010). Only after the 1990s, the upstream states

developed a collective strategy to contest the downstream hegemony of Egypt. In 1999, the Nile basin

Initiative was established to negotiate a Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) between all parties.

The CFA aims to replace the existing and controversial historical treaties and to provide an institutional

framework to create sustainable cooperation in the Nile basin. Cascão and Zeitoun (2010) argue that

the bargaining strength of upstream cooperative institutions counterbalances their weaknesses in

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other power areas (Cascão & Zeitoun, 2010; Yacob, 2011). However, after decades of negotiations, the

CFA is still not ratified by downstream countries such as Egypt and Sudan, who have often refused to

participate in negotiations. Daoudy (2008) calls this strategy “active stalling”, used by hydro hegemonic

countries to oppose challenges to its hegemonic position and to maintain the status quo

(Daoudy, 2008; Hussein & Grandi, 2017). Since 2015, Egypt and Sudan seem to have realized the

ineffectiveness of this strategy as they have rejoined negotiations on the CFA. Despite Egypt’s threats,

Ethiopia has continued the construction of the GERD. To avoid other losses to the downstream flow, a

more effective strategy might be to participate in the negotiations and ensure its rights from within

this cooperative framework (Al Sayegh, 2016).

Ideational tactics

Related to the bargaining power is the ideational power, the ability to construct and sanction a

particular set of ideas in the basin (Parkes, 2013). Egypt has been successful in highlighting its absolute

dependency on the Nile’s water resources. To legitimize its hegemonic position in basin, Egypt has

claimed its historic rights to the Nile water (i.e. colonial treaties) and framed water as a “national

security issue” (Cascão, 2009: 248). In 2011, President Hosni Mubarak stated that "Egypt’s national

security is closely linked to water security in the Horn of Africa region and the Great Lakes region" (SIS,

2007). By constructing this narrative, Egypt has promoted a particular set of ideas and discarded any

sets of alternative ideas, for example the rights and development of upstream states (Cascão, 2009:

248). As a result, Egypt has been able to legitimize the status quo among regional as well as

international actors (Cascão, 2006: 29; Parkes, 2013).

20

6. Analysis The Mekong River

Figure 3: The Mekong (CGIAR, 2012)

21

6.1 Background of the Mekong

In this analysis of the Mekong, first an overview will be given of important historical events concerning

the water allocation. Then, power asymmetries in the river basin will be analyzed by use of the Hydro-

Hegemony framework. According to the Mekong River Commission (2011), the Mekong river ranks as

the 12th longest river in the world. The river flows over 4900 km through 6 countries: China, Myanmar,

Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. The total area of the Mekong covers 795 000 km2 and can be

separated in the Upper Basin and the Lower Mekong Basin (Aquastat, 2011). The river flows from the

Tibetan Plateau to the Mekong Delta, and forms an important transportation route between the

riparian countries (MRC, 2005) (Van den Boogert, 2013). China is, together with Myanmar and to lesser

extent Laos, located in the upper stream of the Mekong. This part of the river is characterized by great

height differences and steep lands, making the area suitable for hydropower generation. The rapid

economic growth of China in recent decades, has made the country increasingly hungry for electricity.

Therefore, China has been developing large scale hydropower projects in the Mekong river (idem:

2013).

The Mekong river is crucial for the human development of the South-East Asian inhabitants,

as more than 80 million depend on it for food, water and income (idem: 2013). Although the countries

have economically developed rapidly in recent years, approximately one-third of the population still

lives on less than US$2 per day (Aquastat, 2011). Especially in downstream countries Laos & Cambodia,

a large percentage of the population lives in rural areas and is dependent of the Mekong for fishery,

industry and agriculture. Climate change, population growth and economic development however, are

putting pressure on the quality and availability of water resources (idem: 2011). These issues are

endangering the ecological stability of the region and thereby putting the livelihoods of the population

at risk (Rein, 2014).

6.2 Historical development of the water allocation

Mekong Committee (1957-1995)

Between 1945 and 1975, South East-Asia was threatened by a series of wars between communist

Indochinese forces against mainly French, Cambodian, South Vietnamese, American, and Chinese

forces, the so-called Indochinese wars (Fifield, 1977). These tensions and complex relations between

the basin countries increased the urgency to create clear agreements on the Mekong (Van den

Boogert, 2013). In addition, the economic potential of the Mekong river increasingly attracted the

attention of foreign governments and investors. This led to the establishment of the Mekong

Committee in 1957, which consisted of the four downstream countries and was supported by the UN

(Rein, 2014). The aim and functions of the Mekong Committee were described as following: “to

22

promote, coordinate, supervise, and control the planning and investigation of water resources

development projects in the lower Mekong Basin” (Browder & Ortolano, 2000: 505; MRC 1957: art 4).

However, due to the Vietnam War and Cambodia’s civil war, hardly any development projects of the

MC came to fruition. Also, the committee was mainly focused on technical cooperation (JEC, 2005)

Mekong River Commission (1995-now)

In 1995, when relationships in the region were stabilized, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam

signed an agreement that changed the Mekong committee into the Mekong River Commission (MRC).

The new agreement was more detailed and provided the commission with more functions. Moreover,

the scope of the cooperation had widened. The economic agenda remained important, but the new

agreement was increasingly focused on the sustainable use of water resources (MRC, 1995: art 1;

Sunchindah, 2005). In addition, new regulations concerning transparency were implemented in the

agreement, such as clauses of notification and prior consultation (MRC, 1995: Art. 5). However, despite

these cooperative steps, the MRC’s power and effectiveness remains limited, as its decisions are not

binding and upstream countries China and Myanmar refuse to join and participate in the Committee

(Rein, 2014).

23

Table 4: Main historical events in the Mekong river basin (Aquastat, 2011).

24

6.3. Application of Hydro-Hegemony to the Mekong

The sub-question in this analysis will be: How can downstream countries influence transboundary

water allocation in the Mekong? To answer this question power asymmetries in the river basin will be

analyzed by using the Hydro-Hegemony framework by Cascão & Zeitoun (2010).

Geographical power

China, Myanmar and Laos have the most geographical power, as the countries are located in the

upstream part of the basin. Their geographical position in the basin allows these upstream countries

to control the flow and use the water resources for national purposes. The upstream basin is

characterized by height differences and steep land, creating great potential for hydropower projects.

Downstream countries Cambodia and Vietnam have the least geographical power, and both are very

dependent on upstream activities for their water resources (Rein, 2014). Therefore, the focus in this

analysis will mainly be on the possibilities of these two countries to counterbalance their lack of

geographical power.

Material power

Economic capacity

Cascão & Zeitoun (2010) have described material power as economic power, technical control, military

might and international support. Table 2 shows the economic power differences between the riparian

countries, measured by GDP per capita. China’s rapid economic development has made the country

by far the strongest economic power in the basin. Laos and Cambodia clearly possess the least

economic power in the basin (Table 2; World Bank, 2016). China’s economic dominance in the region

has given the country a number of instruments to impose its hegemony on the river basin. China has

implemented its foreign policy strategy to invest in infrastructure projects in return of natural

resources and profits. By offering loans under favorable conditions to develop hydropower and other

development projects in the basin, China is spreading its influence in the region. The economic value

of Chinese FDI in the region increased from 10 milliard dollars in 2000 to 83 milliard dollars in 2010

(Naohiro, 2012). The enormous number of Chinese aid and investments project in South East Asian

countries are making their economies increasingly dependent on Chinese financial support. Therefore,

governments of the downstream countries are cautious in expressing their critique on China’s

hydropolitical behavior (Van Houdt, 2013: 51-52; Osborne, 2009).

Military power

When measuring the defense budget of the riparian states, China appears to be the strongest military

power in the region (IIS, 2013). However, when analyzing the military expenditure as a percentage of

25

GDP, the ranking is quite different, as Vietnam’s relative percentage of military expenditure is regarded

the highest in the basin (Table 2). Vietnam’s historical hostile relationship with China seem to have

reinforced their interest in “developing its own self-sufficient military capacity to deter China from

using force” (Thayer, 2011: 348; Clements, 2017). In 2016, Vietnam installed rocket launches to the

South Chinese sea to react to China’s disputed claim to this area (The Guardian, 2016). Nevertheless,

despite Vietnam’s improvements to its military capabilities, it has not yet confronted China military

over its Mekong policy (Clements, 2017: 11).

Technical control

China has the most technical knowledge and water management expertise in the basin and was the

first riparian country to start the development of hydropower projects. Besides developing

themselves, China plays an important role in investing and developing infrastructure projects in other

countries in the basin. Upstream neighbor Myanmar has no specific interest in developing

infrastructure projects, as its share in the catchment area is merely 3% (Dinar et al., 2007). Laos

however, aims to become “the battery of Southeast Asia” and has constructed many hydropower

projects in recent decades (ICEM, 2010). The growing population and economic development of the

downstream countries in recent years has increased their need for energy and thus their interest in

hydropower projects (Rein, 2014).

International support

Downstream countries receive a lot of international support from international organizations and

foreign governments such as Japan, the United States, Germany, the Netherlands, the UNDP and the

European Union for the development of the Mekong River Commission (Rein, 2014). In 2005 for

example, the United Nations started the Mekong Water and Sanitation Initiative “to support the

people in better accessing clean water supply and sanitation services by 2015” (UN-Habitat, 2018). The

EU transferred 4.95 million euro to the MRC in 2013 to promote the sustainable development of the

river (Rein, 2014: 54). Furthermore, downstream countries receive international support mainly from

26

the Asian Development Bank, China and foreign companies to finance the construction of hydropower

projects (idem: 2014).

Bargaining power

International law

Vietnam is the only state that has ratified the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational

Uses and thereby is the only state that explicitly acknowledges the principles of “equitable and

reasonable utilization”, the “obligation not to cause significant harm”, and regulations concerning the

exchange of data and information, the protection and of water bodies and the creation of joint

management mechanisms (Water Unites, 2018; Rein, 2014: 64-65). Although the Convention could in

theory challenge the hydro-hegemonic power asymmetries in the basin, the non-binding character of

the Convention and the fact that relatively few parties (and mainly downstream countries) have

ratified it decreases its impact (Gupta, 2016). However, the Convention is regarded as an important

step in establishing international water law and a follow-up could become a relevant bargaining tool

for downstream countries (idem, 2016).

Cooperative institutions and active stalling

Cooperative initiatives such as the MRC offer opportunities for downstream countries to gain

bargaining power about the water allocation in the Mekong. The MRC aims to create “reasonable and

equitable use” of the Mekong river by promoting cooperation in the basin and support different

programs to ensure this (MRC, 2013a). The main concerns of the cooperative MRC are regarding the

development of hydropower projects, most of them constructed by Laos and China, who have long

been unwilling to provide any information on its unilateral activities in the basin. In the MRC agreement

of 1995, several regulations are implemented to improve transparency in the basin, i.e. clauses of

notification and prior consultation. When riparian states provide the MRC with information and data

on the proposed use of water, this can be controlled and discussed by the member states. For large

scale projects or projects implemented during dry season, notification and dialogue is required before

implementation (MRC 1995: Art. 5; Rein, 2014). Environmental impact studies are used as a bargaining

tool to influence the decision making process. Scientific data and information are necessary to conduct

these studies, as the data enables the MRC “to strengthen their river water-level monitoring and

improve the accuracy of flood forecasting as well as mitigate the negative effects of flooding” (MRC,

2013a).

Several cooperative steps in recent decades illustrate the increased bargaining power of the

MRC. Since 1996, Vietnam and China have become dialogue partners of the MRC. In 2005, China also

agreed to discuss technical issues in the MRC, i.e. flood management and alleviation. Another

27

important step was in 2013, when China after years of negotiations with the MRC, officially agreed to

share hydrological information more frequently with downstream states (MRC, 2013b; Rein, 2014; 38-

39). When in 2016 a severe drought hit the Vietnam delta, China released more than 12,65 cubic water

from the disputed Jing Hong hydropower reservoir into the Mekong delta in order to deal with the

droughts. These cooperative acts can be seen as a result of the “institutional leverage provided by the

MRC” (Clements, 2017: 61).

However, despite the improved cooperation, the MRC’s power and effectiveness remains

limited. This can first be explained by the lack of regulatory power, as the decisions made in the

Commission are legally non-binding and coercive sanctions when member states don’t act according

to the decisions (Schulze and Schmeier 2012: 238; Rein, 2014: 85-86). Moreover, the institution lacks

an individual veto power over upstream projects, illustrated by Laos’ “pursuit of dam development on

the river’s main stem despite strong protests from Cambodia and Vietnam”(Clements, 2017: 62).

Finally, the refusal of China and Myanmar to become member of the MRC forms another important

impediment to the institution’s power. Lowi (1993) argues that this unwillingness to cooperate reflects

typical upstream hydro-hegemonic behavior to prefer to act according to their unilateral interests

instead without considering the needs other riparian states. This is, however, in contrast to the

downstream states, who rather promote a collaborative institution consisting of all riparian countries

(Lowi, 1993: 10; Rein, 2014: 85-86).

Ideational tactics

Downstream countries Vietnam and Cambodia have used several ideational tactics to counter

unilateral behavior in the basin. The first ideational tool is the accusation of upstream behavior by

constructing an “injustice narrative” to create a more equal and transparent water allocation. The

accusations are for example appointed to misleading information, the lack of transparency, the

inequity of negotiations or the negative impact of the upstream dams (Rein, 2014).

The second ideational tool used by downstream countries is issue linkage (Daoudy, 2009). By

linking the issue of water with environmental and food security, both Vietnam and Cambodia have

highlighted their weak and vulnerable positions as downstream states. For instance, some common

way the securitization technique is used are: “emphasizing the number of people who are dependent

on the river and whose livelihood is threatened by dams; talking about the danger to fishery, food

security, biodiversity and animal species”(Rein, 2014: 73). This technique is also used by a growing

number of local, regional and international NGOs that are trying to counter the hegemonic behavior

in the region by creating awareness of the environmental impact of the dam projects (Haefner, 2015).

28

7. Comparative analysis

In this part of the thesis a comparison will be made between the different and similar possibilities of

downstream countries to counterbalance their lack of geographical power. The comparison will be

structured on the basis of the two hypotheses as formulated earlier in this thesis.

H1: A downstream state needs material power resources to compensate for the disadvantaged

strategic position

According to Cascão & Zeitoun material power includes economic power, military capacity,

technological expertise and international support (Cascão & Zeitoun, 2010: In the case of the Nile,

Egypt has, despite being a downstream country, been the hydro hegemon for decades. Egypt received

international support from Britain and later other donor countries and organizations to gain material

power in the basin. The colonial treaties and the bilateral agreements of 1929 and 1959 with Sudan

have institutionalized the water allocation according to Egypt’s benefits (Cascão, 2009: 248). In

addition, Egypt’s strong economic and military power relative to the other riparian states improved its

material power position in the basin. Egypt’s economic hegemony has enabled Egypt to embark on

unilateral projects in the basin and grant economic privileges to win political support from downstream

neighbor Sudan. Several military threats made by Egypt towards downstream countries illustrate its

tactics of enforcing compliance through coercion. Significantly, when Egypt’s ability to exert its

material power decreased after the Arab Spring in 2011, other countries took advantage of the

situation by constructing unilateral development projects on the river (Kouwenhoven, 2013).

In contrast to the Nile case, the downstream countries In the Mekong clearly lack material

power to counterbalance China’s upstream behavior. China’s economic dominance in the region has

given the country a number of instruments to impose its hegemony on the river basin. China has spread

its influence in the region, by offering loans under favorable conditions to develop hydropower

projects in the basin. Therefore, most downstream countries seem to avoid criticizing China’s unilateral

hydro politics, afraid of the consequences for their trade relations with the hegemon. Only Vietnam

has appeared more critical towards its neighbor country and has strengthened its military capabilities

in recent years (Clements, 2017; Van Houdt, 2015).

Although China dominates in most aspects of material power, international support from

foreign governments and international institutions for infrastructural projects and cooperative

institutions offers downstream opportunities to influence the hydro political realities. International

institutions and aid organizations increasingly seem to realize their role in promoting transboundary

water cooperation in the developing world (Kehl, 2010). This is also visible in the Nile basin, where

29

upstream countries have received financial support from the United Nations and the World Bank to

sustain the Nile basin initiative.

H2: International norms play a significant role in water resources allocation in the river basin.

International norms can increase the bargaining power of downstream states in river basins. The

bargaining power is defined as “ the capability of actors to control the rules of the game and set

agendas” (Cascão and Zeitoun 2010: 31). In the case of the Nile, downstream state Egypt and Sudan

have benefited from the “principle of historic rights” in international water law, that allows Egypt to

appeal to the colonial treaties to secure its consolidated control in the river basin (Gupta, 2016). In the

case of the Mekong, the downstream countries don’t have the historical advantage of beneficial

colonial water treaties. The UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 1997 however,

could offer a legal framework that can be used by downstream states to promote equitable use in the

basin. Downstream Vietnam has ratified the law and appealed to the “equitable use” principles in the

Convention (Rein, 2014: 64-65). The non-binding character of the Convention and the fact that few

countries have ratified it decreases its influence (Gupta, 2016).

In both basins, the non-hegemonic states have developed a collective strategy to contest the

river’s hegemons. The bargaining strength of the cooperative institutions compensates their

weaknesses in material power. In the Nile basin, the NBI is a cooperative initiative led by upstream

states, while in the Mekong, the MRC consists out of the mid- and downstream riparian states. Both

the MRC and NBI promote cooperation in the region and. The NBI is mainly focused on the creation of

a new “equitable” water agreement, the CFA, to change the historical allocation. The main concerns

of the MRC are regarding the development of hydropower projects, most of them constructed by Laos

and China. Several regulations in the MRC have been implemented in order to improve transparency.

Information and scientific data enables the MRC to conduct environmental impact studies and forecast

negative effects of dams. The increased participation of China and Egypt reflects some successful

efforts of the cooperative agreements. However, due to the lack of regulatory power and active stalling

by hegemons both the impact of the NBI and MRC have so far remained limited (idem: 2016; Rein,

2014).

Moreover, in both basins, downstream countries have used ideational tactics to increase their

bargaining power. Egypt has claimed its historic rights to the Nile water and framed water as a

“national security issue” (Cascão, 2009: 248). The downstream states in the Mekong have also used

the tactics of securitization by linking the issue of water to their environmental and food security. Also,

they have framed the hydro politics of the region as “unjust” and accused upstream states of the lack

of transparency, the negative impact of dams or the inequity of negotiations (Rein, 2014).

Finally, in the Mekong basin especially, a growing number of local, regional and international

30

NGOs are trying to counter the hegemonic behavior in the region by creating awareness of the

environmental impact of the dam projects and demanding governments to close down constructions.

31

8. Conclusion

The research question that was posed in this thesis was: How can downstream countries influence

transboundary water allocation? To answer this question, the Nile and the Mekong have been

compared by using the Hydro-Hegemony framework (Cascão & Zeitoun, 2010). The first hypothesis

that was formed is: “A downstream state needs material power resources to compensate for the

disadvantaged strategic position ”. Material power was shown to be a pertinent explanatory variable

for the water allocation in both basins. In the hydropolitics of the Nile in the 20th century, Egypt’s

dominant role in the basin can be explained by its large amount of material power in comparison to

other riparian states in the basin. Egypt’s geostrategic role, colonial relations, sustained economic

growth, technical expertise and advanced military sector are among factors that contributed to its

consolidated control in the basin (Parkes, 2006: 55). On the contrary, in the same period upstream

states lacked these material power resources, as they experienced civil wars, economic crises and

political instability. This imbalance of material power allowed Egypt to enforce compliance through

military and economic coercion and become a hegemon in the basin (Hussein & Grandi, 2015: 166).

In the Mekong, downstream countries have not been able to compete with its upstream

neighbors by means of material power. China’s economic, military and political dominance in the

region has given the country a number of instruments to impose its hegemony on the riparian states.

China’s strong economy and regional policy have made the downstream countries dependent on China

for aid and trade (Kehl, 2010). In this way, China has asserted political pressure on its downstream

neighbors, who are careful in criticizing China’s unilateral behavior, in fear of economic sanctions.

Moreover, China’s advanced water technologies have enabled the country to construct large scale

hydropower projects in the basin and gain technical control in the basin.

However, financial support from international organizations and foreign governments to

develop hydropower projects and sustain cooperative initiatives could increase the material power of

downstream states. International support can play an important role in offering “powerful economic

leverages to persuade reluctant states to cooperate” (Elhance, 2000: 216). This leads to the second

hypothesis: International norms play a significant role in water resources allocation in the river basin.

In this thesis, I have found that international norms can restrain and alter state behavior and improve

the bargaining power of downstream states (Shannon, 2017). These international norms are reflected

in international law, cooperative institutions, ideational tactics and non-state organizations. In the Nile

basin, downstream states Egypt and Sudan have benefited from the “principle of historic rights” in

international water law. This principle has allowed Egypt to appeal to the colonial treaties to legitimize

its control in the basin (Gupta, 2016). In the case of the Mekong, the UN Convention of 1997 offers a

legal framework that can be used by downstream states to promote equitable use in the basin.

32

Moreover, international cooperative institutions as the MRC and the NBI create mechanisms and

establish norms that could shape the behavior of states in the region. Several bargaining tools are used

by the MRC and NBI to influence the water allocation: conducting environmental impact studies,

promoting cooperation and transparency, the collection of data and the establishment of regulations

(Clements, 2017: 44).

Additionally, in both basins downstream countries have used issue linkage as an ideational tool

to increase their bargaining power. In an era of increasing water scarcity, the securitization of water

offers downstream states an influential narrative to promote an equitable water allocation among

international actors.

Although Egypt has historically been able to force upstream states to comply with water

policies that adversely affect them, the increased material and bargaining power of upstream states

have changed dynamics in the region. Over the years, Egypt gradually seems to have lost its hegemonic

power in the basin. Since the mid-1990’s, the economic growth of upstream countries has led to an

increasing interest in developing hydropower projects on the river. Ethiopia especially has turned into

a powerful country in the region, while Egypt’s domestic affairs in recent years have destabilized the

country. Its announcement of the GERD has concerned Egypt, which fears a reduction of downstream

river flows (Cascão, 2009: 251). Ethiopia legitimizes the GERD by arguing that it’s Egypt and Sudan’s

own fault by refusing cooperation. This would imply that Egypt’s active stalling of the NBI negotiations

has provoked the unilateral behavior of the upstream states. Kehl argues that “strong states may not

be able to win unless they participate in a cooperative negotiation process and a more equitable water-

sharing policy” (Kehl, 2010: 6-7). This suggests that, to prevent further unilateral projects by upstream

states, Egypt’s only option might be to cooperate in the NBI and influence the water allocation from

within this cooperative framework.

In the Mekong, the lack of regulatory power and active stalling by China and Myanmar

decrease the impact of the MRC. However, China has become more transparent towards the MRC

members and even released water to the downstream states (Clements, 2017). It is doubtful if China

would have acted this cooperative without the existence of an institution as the MRC (idem, 2017: 44).

Nevertheless, the non-binding character limits the bargaining power of international water law and

cooperative water bodies. International institutions and governments could play an important role in

improving this by imposing constraints on and providing upstream states of incentives to cooperate

(Kehl, 2010). The implementation of policies without some form of legal bindings proves to be

ineffective. A greater focus on legal institutional arrangements is needed in order to create equal

transboundary water management (Nugent, 2013). Therefore, for further research I would suggest to

gain more understanding about the role that the international community could play in transboundary

water politics. International financial institutions and foreign governments possess the resources to

33

compensate for the lack of influence of weak riparian states. Therefore, they should be more aware

about this dynamic because as water scarcity increases, transboundary water politics will become

more contentious (Kehl, 2010: 11-12).

Lastly, it is important to note the limitations of this research. To begin with, the hydro-

hegemony theoretical framework that I have used to analyze the transboundary river basins is highly

state-centric. This realist perspective limits the understanding of the influence of other relevant actors,

such as NGOs, multinational corporations and local communities (Rieu-clarke & Allan, 2017). The

inclusion of non-state actors could have improved the analysis. Due to the scope of this research, it

has only been possible to analyze the power asymmetries in the basins generally. It is presumable that

more possibilities exist for downstream states to influence the water allocation, that have not been

mentioned in this thesis. Furthermore, it must be stressed that it’s difficult to measure the causal effect

of each of the variables individually. Bargaining power and material power are strongly interrelated,

as the capacity of states to create and influence international norms often depends on material

resources.

Nevertheless, this thesis has made an attempt to contribute to a deeper understanding of

transboundary river politics. The link between water insecurity and power asymmetries remains

under-acknowledged, and more understanding about this relation is essential for policy-makers to

address this problem effectively (Parkes, 2013: 469).

34

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