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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS 4th INFANTRY DIVISION

APO San Francisco 96262

· ~DEC1969 SUBJ~CTa Operational Report - Lesaon Learned 4th Infantry Division

Period ~ding )l October 19690 RCS .CSFOR - 65 (R2)(U) .

S~ DISTRIBUTION

1o (C) OP~HATIONSa SIGNIFICAN'r ACTIVIU~S

a.o General o

(1) !Airing the period cov~red by this report, the 4th Infantr)' Division continued its participation in Operation DAN ~UY6N- HIN~.

(2) Or~anizational Structure. Task Organization, Operation HINt.S, 1 August - )1 October 1969, is set forth at Inclosure 1.

{J) Commanders and major staf'f as of the end of the reporting period are 11steJ at Inclosure 2o '

(4) Locationsu cool"fiinates for villages, LZ's and FSB's are listed at Inc lo sure 6. ·

(5) Mission. The Division's general mission during this reporting period was to conduct operations in support of GVN pacification . . programs1 provide reaction forces to counter enemy attacks against . . .. kay 1nstalla1ona and populated centersa conduct operations to screen the CARaOJIA~l Border and tc interdict enemy infiltration · routes; secure lin~s of conu'.'luncation in the Division area of opera.: .. tions; maintain coordination and liaison with GVN forces and agencieSJ . conduct offensive op~rations to destroy NVA and maln force enemy units· · and be prepared to deploy one brigade with three battalions to conduct operations anywh~r~ 1n VI~TNAMo

(6) Concept of Operation, The Division accomplished ita multi­ple missions by deploying units to areas of operation where several. ta.sks co11ld be pet"f'ormed simultaneously. Ta~ks which exceeded bri-

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gade control capabilities or which required aaseta not available t.o ; · -~~-- - ..... _, _ __ b_rigades were assigned ll1aa1ons under Divia1~n control.

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A~"DilH .;c!-MH CONFIDENTIAL '4 0 E r.1q~ SUBJ~Cra Opera.t.lcnc:l ~ •\c;)<.lr t •• Lessons Lea.rned 4th Infantry ~v1s31.J'l

Fer1od. .~miing Jl October 1969 0 RCS CSFOR- 6,S (H2) (U)

la) Pa<'. iflc~t~ons The 1st Br1gade was responsible for that po1 .. -tl.on of Bfoi-i DI1rn P?ovinc'l t.hat lie:; in the Dl.Vl.slon areao One bat­t alion was assigned responsibility for AN ·rlJC Di.strict 11 while BINH lllK Jistrlct received a small~r effort because of 1ts sizeo The 2d B11.­gade0 with no flxeJ. .A.0 1• conducted civlc action project~ 1n each of its areas of operationo The Jd Brigade was assigned responsibility in each of the threa d1str1cte o

(b) Screen the ~estern approaches into the Dhision Area. of Oper­at.ioni The D1ns1on cavalry squadron under D1v1s1on control aecom­pl1shed this ~iss1ono I~ was assigned an area of operation along the CMU30:1IAN Border from the southet"n PUI TRAP Valley in the north to the IA DRANG Valle~ in the soutb Lu include the CHU PA Mountainso

(c) Interdiction of Infiltration Routesa The inf'1ltrat1on route t.hat s+.arts in the CHU PA Mountain area and runs ea.at in ~ TRUNG District •:.ross1nz Highway 14 mid~ay between PLEilCU and. KONTUH Cities were assigned to the battalion stationed 1n I& TRUNG District. The cavalry squadron was assigned the western origin of the 1nfiltration route that orisinates in the IA DRANG V~lley and runs eaat 11 cros-s1ng Highway 14S~ ~i -jO kilometers south of PLEIKU Citfo The re­mainder of this route ·~as assigned to the battalions Vith the mis­sion of pacification 1n the THAN AN and PHU NHON Districts where th• route passes throu6h their areas of operat1ono

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(d) Highway Sec.ur1ty1 H16hway 1911': was secured by the tank bat­talion p reinforced 0 under Division controlo The remaining routea were secured by the battalion with pacification responsibility in the district through wh1ch the route passeso

(e) Reaction Foreet»s The D1v1sioa, • .,.,.,.s prepared to counter enuy attacks against key installations and pop.U,,.tion centers within its area of operation~ The concept was to rcli41'Ve GVN forces in securit7 m1as1ons to perm1t them to effect direct reinf'orcement. It this waa not possibl•~ thG Division wao prepared to employ torces first to cut ott tneay with~raval routesr second 0 to attack the eneay forces di­rectly a and third~ to reinforce the defendera. Primary responsibility re~ted with the brigade or separate battalion/squadron within who .. area o! operation the attack took place. ·

· (!) Liaison with GVN • The Dh·ision maintained cuntinuous liai­son with Headquarterso II Corpsu The brigades aa1nta1ned continuoua 11&1.aon with the provl.nr.es 1n wh1rh they are l~at9d. Battaliono aas191ed a par.1f1cat1on ndss1on ca1nta1ned cont1n~o~a 11aiaon vitb

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the district to which they were ass1gnedo

(g} Deter and Defeat Major Ground Attacks against PL~KU and BINH DINH Provlncea The D1v1.s1on ~as deployed to cover all av·ttnues · of approach either by maneuver units or surveillance b1 a variety of nLea.ns.. The appr"ach or major enemy ani ts would be blocked by screen­ing forces employing multiple means of fire supporto

(h) Sw1ng Br164des The D1v1s1on conc~pt of operation calls .for one brigade of th?ee battalions with no fixed area of operationo Thia bri­gade was to be ava.:..lable f~r employment anywhere w1th1n or outside of the Division area or operations u Due to directed missions in the AH LAO Valley and. increased .. ~ •• ~my •ct1v1ty in PL~IAU 0 this concept bas not been fully implemented so faro

bo Intell1genC4o

(l) General a Enc.ny activity throughout the :pivis1.on area of oper­ation dur1ng August r~ma1.ned l1ghto All _three NVA Regiments which had pa:-ticlpat.ed in i:h~ Sl~mmer Off•nsi ve wHRdrew into CAMBODIAN sanctuariea during July and wer~ 1nact1ve during Augusto In KONTUM Province 0 the )04th Local Force Batta.lion attempted to fill the void created when th• 28th and 66th NVA Regiments withdrew to CAMBODIA 0 and conductod fre­quent standoff attacks 1n the TANH CANH 0 DiiN BIKH a.reao

In PLZIKU Prcv·1nee 11 loc..-.1 fc."t'ce uni ts 1 ntensified theil haras­sing activity and stepped up village attacks o prt'paganda lec~ures ,

and civ1l1an proselyt1n0 while the 24+.h Regiment continued to ~or1t a.nd resupply 1n Base Al:'~a 7020

Als~whereD the 95B R~s~m~nt, o~erating ai·ong the PLEIKU - BINH DINH bordero was the only N_.~.( :re~i1'lent ~o remain active in the .Divi­sion area of operationo The K•2 3atta.l1onc> 9.5B Regiment contfnu,d• \he1r 1nterd1ct1on of H1ghwat 19 and harassed convo7a and fixed in­ata1lat1ona along the highway between LZ ACTivN and the MANG YANG Pa.8i o

· Increases in enemy act1 vi ty in ~ANG DUC and DABLAC Provinces re­q u1red. th• de~loyment of a task force of one rifle company, an air C';a.v&lry trn~p and a ground cavalry troop to BAN ~ THUOT oh' l··Sep·tea­berp Tnis ;task torce secure~ the ASP a.nd. airfield at BAN Hi THUOT East and co .111:.l:t&"" surveillance operatlona along the CAMBODIAN Border 1n southern LI CoTpa 1n support. of the 2Jd ARV:l ~v1a1on~

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~ONFiDENTIAL

SUU--l~'C'I, Opt"ra.ucna.l H"por~ Lcs$or.~ Learn~ci 4th '!'J'ant ry D1 v1a1on Peuoci ~ndllJ.~ Jl Q.· t.<'l:e:. 1969 11 NC3 CSF0H-rfr. (R2) ( U)

l">\.1rl.r~g S~p·". ~mbe!" 11 er.emy llCt.iVlty dtC'rf'&Hd throl)ghout th.r ~ -! ·~\on a.t~a. o! orera•.ior.. ., Lo<a.l for.ce un\t.s c.ont.inued to be r~sp~·':~~. 'J •,

most. ot~ the enemy activity as they increased their . vill~e h&I~st:..ft1t1I! 1".

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Ar. t1 v!. t.y wa.~ s_t.l:ongeut i.n BINH ilINH Provine(' Mhore ehments of th<"' ~ r.<t Brlgade cone] u~eJ. operation.a against the 1~th NVA Regim<:nt. and t?leme1n ~- ­of tht!' 9.)B He6imtin•. and comrnt;n~~d. an operation a.(5-.lnst. t.h'' GrA LAI Pr'l ~ v1ncia.l Commlttee to ~hfl nort.hw~t>t of Al K&:., In ad.d1tlon, the 2d Br1 .... gtlde deplQyed to BINH DINH Provil".c-e and commenced a combined operat.lon with R01'A fones in Bani' Area 226 t.ar0eted against. th~ 18+.h NVA Regblento

Inc rt..?a,,eod onemy rec.onna.1st1anc.e and activ1tles in early October in .. d.i.cateJ that. t.he en~my for<:e:.3 wei·~ prepari.ng to launch the1r Autumn 0£ ..... f unsl ve ~ n PW,;IKJ ar.d KON flli't Provinces ., In PL.c;IK'U Province ·' friendly forces b~gan t.o uke ine: .r~asinG contac.t w1.th llVA elements moving ea.st and not"th~a:.1t. out .. of the CHU PA .. It. \Jas ~ll.e\'ed that the 24t.h NVA Heglm~nt a.r.J )t3 ~th Ba.ttal1cn had infiltrated back lnto the CHU PA ar.d were pre-par.ing for a h1~hpo)nt .. A LHP sr.re'!n d~ployed west of ·p~I !!HONJ co1!.Umed thls m~v~;ii~ n t. a.r.d +.h" 2d. Ba t.t.A] ion . 8th Mechanized In'2 fantry ~ab deployed and be".'a.1666 '..ingaged ln a sustalned serles of contact• that l'ere st.l ll. i "'\ prc~grll!ss at the c.lose of the reportintJ period" To the south u AHVN forces c.aptured an 1nd1v1dual from the 6Jbt Colllposite Battalion west. o! PL~mm ~edt th5 ROC~T BOXo Contacts 1ntensi.f1ed d.a.ily and culminu.ted on 2~ October ,. when anemy forces launch~d a h1gh­pci nt in their Aut~Jr.n Offer.siv~u ~lthough Camp Enar1. r LZ OASIS (l and. US 1nstal.latior..s 1n PLi:IKU zec.ei.ved rocket attacks;, BF/PF elements a.nd rural v1llages and hamlets were the prim., enemy t.arget&o Villages to the southeast. of Camp Enar~. 11 sueh as Pi.t;I 00 LIM and. P~I PHAM KL.AH !> received mortar attacks during th1s perlod.o

In KO~'!UH Province 11 eneaiy activity ir.r.rea.sed daily throu~hout. the month of October unttl it al~o reached a M.ghpoint of 25 October" Al­lied. lnsta.llations received mort.at' and r.·ocj(et attacks,, nllagea and the D1str1et Headqua~t~rs at O~d v/\A TO rer.e1ved frequent standoff attaclrs ar.d ll~ht ground pro~s ., Slnce thai~ t.irne !1 IJ'l.VN forces have re­pe&ted.ly ma.de contact with ensDll un1~s operat1~..g in lONTUM Provinceo

In QUANG DUC Provine ~· reUa.blo int.el ligence at111 indica.tecl heavr eneJtY deplcyment j11 the :I Corps ··· III Corps border &Hao By late Octobe.r J tho ein•mj· tiad shlf't.ed thftH torcH to the northveat and posed. a threat to EU PR>u'Jv and. OOC LAP,. Dur!r.g th• l&at week of October" DUC WP !' BU PB.ANG and. f'lrebasos ln the BU PRANG area received heavy r.cojil••• rifle and mortar tire b.:t no major ground attackao

A poanble dw>g• 1n enemy ta.ctica was noted 1n October with the capture of COSVI Besolut1on 19 ~ Thia docwaent plua other docwa1nt•

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CONflDENI jAL

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i&\''.l\f a·otJ.·..,it"1 hllfir ·•t- ·~-f. ·d tb~v'ih~t U&o mont.b &D4 rtM·b---:1 a ~ jl :.4~ JX'1rrt Oti 25 ~t!Jbor vb~ tht• •nG\J,. lalmcht4 tbeb · wrnn•. otteralf•o ARVI 1~t.elh ti..c.~ t'\(t.ie:h~ hH\')' 111)11·tair attaob ~nd Al<Vll CJ"OUDd and OQn'\.r:r el.Hwnt.I >'.14. • · · \ r.nr;)ttH.,':\11 ccmt.J.c-t1 vi\b MC1!'1 t.ciN-elo ActivitJ Wa.ti ~d~rttc !o~ tr..• ~.d!~ o! t.h$ MnDtho

{b) PLf.UUs ;f'oll~.,.lr·.~ tha bn::!.r.at.t~ '~ tu •DH\1 11 1 ~UDlelr O!G. i· t~,;. .. ~ ft ··~, in Jut:r v bit·tb NV,. aN.~ Y0 ~'a to'?'Clj unlt& vitl:.~'li'W 11.lt.r.i tu1r baae iu'""a' t.e :.'*!'l t 1'1'.r!. ::"rt'.~\l_l:P~ .• Ta !lulri~,ri Uw &enth oC tve;uot~ an~ a~t.-v:Uy t~~ Pl.gnu Pr·~~ic".rc" vaAi l.hHtod t,t;. b6).!C~. u~:.z," attaeu t.7 10011 .iu~:dlla r ... ..,~u ·~ail'l ol\ Yi.) l~e~ t'.!!.1 hlJ:l.4'ta .lnc•"d lJi rural &re&ao MJl\Ily t~'r'(:~' appM\rl'id tc ~ conux.1:- "·~tb l.t.ll1t.~ d1n1:ption c.r the GQ I'ac:~lcaUnn e!'fc·.rt·o Tb~ofJ t.egaerd.og •<it.iv.\ties .lncreaoed in ~ ~i t Y UDtil tb .~ higbp~l»t \t'b! l"e&C.h'!d ~ f~pte.mter(\ iJAmf'D~ ~t t.be oJ1d, ~':.Z~c&Ut~ Eattalin~1 .. opcrAtJlig out ot tiai &e~U.em CHU PA» a~g'!d !ntrc.Q.~«!'m.t .it.&\ld t~1ff' 4.tiacu on triendl.7 inalallatiou talleuc i»s ill tbti PlJU¥U c · C.aQp '~~r1 &."Na dvrl»• """wt, aQd S.pt,.r~t.uo Al• tb<0\11!b t.t.~lr~ vu ' n't~q c~ttaH iD atta~b OD rtlla1ea and trieDCUi" i:!JJtallaUtN tcllC1iii1'g th• llid.;,S.pt~llber h!ihpobiD 1n~rMf1,l)i n.a 4mm&l.H&nt"t •.(l\iv:U~J b: ab111112t. ot th• 4th httel.ie~P 24th P.cic. llllllt. 1A the PJ3I Kb.(>liQ ana alM1 thft 6'311t Co.po.it. kttaliOD 111 tM PLEIKll •~• !) itd!.c.-a~~ 1.hat. ~ to~M V•N cmca agdA pnaparl.JJi tor a nev otf ~•iv•a

~ta~~ 1ud LBP •ightj~, ti> tN ¥Ht. and northvci-t, ot PLBIJU dur!ng tM tint week i;.t ~Y.t~r 9 cc,r~i?Md ellNIJ sonunt out ot the CHU P!o It va~ Al,s{' tei•w~ '°'"d th• 6th fettellcn Gd the nminder o! ;M UtD. N'tiA ~iD'mt. "ould ~.hc:r-U7 110\fe bacJt into tM CHU FA trci11 ~11· C~OD!.Jli !M.Jtcrt,~r o Xn(~MHd ~(.l.'tltaota v1 t'1 e:wtllJ torc:0a -.'CU!JJ.l rw Mft')BG 11- mWJJc.tobier :lJ=idt.cat.td t.b.at tbit 24th ll.giaent bad o~cted r et:CUpp'i.y tmd i1t.l'iVr6 ope:-11~! 'J;ie Dd vu ~pared to 1Dit-1at. att.aob f)D Ti.ll-'&c• ud fdtnd.lJ' !Jw~\icu 1Jl tbt PLE! ~ area d4 ~~~ c~~ 1.ct.\:dictlon or JJicbvQ 14 t.1-~ND Pl.EIIU and ~ ncuut4 c( th-. ~ ratt.cli~Q 8th I~ru~ (~bantsed) be­gan to ·~~t.<4: p.1.ta.V:-o:i alld c~pa.£lY size. )\'n force• OD a ddl.7 b&11e. Dooumanta capturo:! dud.»£ th°"'=- tootA.r tit )I !denti!itd •1-nta ot both tb• .4th ao.d (rtJt r•tt~. ! ~{!.;_1; 9 U<h. B+i.-Uift'1t. lQ.awben 1A PLEUU, ta.. 631at Cuspi:·*1h htt.J.i(!;i: l'~·~et.ebl.hldd tJieU otten•iY.- Ut.l aubJected ~ OASlS k i~ir !11.,~ ~e~.!'t Qd .,.-i.r attack 1D more tbu tiw ar.cthlto 1.11~ $~lit\ C~.c:..U- &~.tal.J.Clt ~~.,ued their ~cipaUoa 1A \be ~n~~ ofte11ai~ ~ :r~:.¢~.t-!~ illl•d lutallat.iona 1D PLUIU and ti.t'nlly Cur; '"a&n d•"' ' "'~ tll-- ~ ~ ·- +. "~.,k or October.

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~UBJACT ' Op~rationa) lfop._;ir1" · Lessons Leatned 4th ln.1'..u·.· : .'- D1v1s1on Pe11oa. !!:z,d.:.r.t) ..,\l. Or.' tober 1969 (1 HC., C~FOR .. 6) (.tt.;:..) '~ · ~

(-:.) B!Ni1 .i.UJ•Ha In August ~. h.; 1st. Brlga.dr. ~ontim•.:d t•lttl"'.' 0~1ora-tl.\'."n 4.:-a.rg~• .. c-d ,~~'11r..b• . t.h~ Hhh NVA Haglment. in th.el:r t-x~.et:· oiv~ has'l oHea t.o t.r.t' nor• .. ht--..1. sr. "f AN K~J!~ .,· rll.~m~n l. (i of the ldth HVA Feglment l~aJ beer. Pvaiattg t.o th<' nvrth ~ : nr; e mld -.Jui.y 1.n cv: 9ffort to a.void de1:·1s1 v e cont.ad. w) t.h t.nn lst. Btlga.dt?. for!" el3a One battallor.. from the 1st D"'~gad.ti "as llfied to .rn a r ~d nr: rth of the re~1ment"e loce.­t1Gn 1n an att~im~·" tQ J.rlv(• the er.en~ ~ -.Q• k lnto in.endly eleint»nts swE'epiug from t.he sN1th., Fo!lc·wl ng r.1x·!.ad.lt; con•J ~i.et !n the northern a.rt'a ll thA lo'.h ~~'I.A Hi;.g~ Clf\C\1. !led r.or~. hrnst a.cross the SONG CON River 1nto B1SP. Are~ 226 ., leavll\:~ bt:h!nd rda.r s•:c uU .t .. y e1ement.s to slov down f rlendly f<Hc t:ts .\n pt.r.rsu1 t o SporadlC' c-onta~ t wlt.h the small s1ze ur-1t.s or~c t.· i·red. t.hrougt..ov.t. tP~ month of AU{TlJ ~t.a l'he numerous bun~e= (X)mplt-x~~ !."Wldv ·· onta.ct.s .. : .t.h ent.•my fot·~e-s ., heavy growid-to · a1r fire ClrCl·unt.ered.,, tl:e unr:.o\;·erl ng of a hosplt.a.l t:-omp1ex 0 and tho d1sc:.ov~1y C·l i.rea.por.s and rke '.: ad:.r;-s at +:.e.:>t.eJ. to the rlegiment' a exr. e ~ 51,re UGt! of 't.he a.r~~ as a base a.re.iu ~hen the 1st Brigade ter­:ni r. ai .. .:d '+_hei:'!:' operat.lon aL)<...inst thf' 13th NVA RP.giment :i t.hey had ac­cou1! ~.ed fot over JOC NVA/Vr. k)) !ec and 50 000 pou~ds of rice captured. ~s~wbere j n Sou.t.!:em BWH DIHH .. t. he K~2 Battall~n,, 95B Reg1ment in.-:-Teased +.t .. &1r i:iterd.:.ct.!on of filgi1~ t1Y 19 beh11Jo1~ the MANG YANG Pa&o ar.d LZ ACTION dur!:'lS Augusto In lat.o August. " a. brge number of .t\?D readlngs . eor.sc.= act!.vat. ~c·n.S 11 and v1ftUll. reconna1asa.nce s1ght :.r.g!· 1ncC.t:ateJ. that eiem~nts ot· th~ 1' -2 Ba•talion lo'3ated r.o:th of 1. r.~ ii: ghli'it,Y l 9 werEi movlng south on t.h€j: wq to VC Valley for. ::esupi:·lY At this tl.mt?- t· th~ h'~ Br!~ac:l• eommanr.:ed a multi-'Mt··· ~ a.1 ; .:,n cp".- ~ a•.1on in VC VaJ.:tly t.a~ge1.oo. aga.inat. tbe l( .. 2 Batt.a1Jon 0

9 ~>B R~gl m·~r..r. o

!~ m:d· 5e~t~m ~ ~r ls~ Br:gade !orce5 t~rmtna~ed ~heir succestd'ul opeirat.1cn t ~::-g~te.d .16alns1. 1.he 9 .5B Rt?gH1e!'+. .. lbt' Regiment "'as 1orced to brt.-.llr. C.t• liion 1n· .. ~· :.~uad .5:. ~o el ernf:lr. ts l 11 an att.empt ~.o evad~ the sw~e~lng forc~. s 1 b..:.t !le•. bt?!ore Lte.y lost 94 K!A, .5 tons of rice, and rn!.si:~U ar.eous ~tta~l ar;.1s and munl 1.1ons" In add1tl.on 11 ;:ioru than 'i24 o850 pl.ast~l'G 1i1e r:e t'eir\C'·"ed from the oodles of tW<" dead NVA of ... :1,·us., ?: 10: t.o t i':',, r.enH~ at.10 :. of 1 .. he VC Valley cpera.tion l' lat 3~lgade ini~:a.•.ed a.n op~rc.· 1or\ aga.lnst t he GIA LAI Prov1ne11.l Com­~1".tc~ ltl the! r base ar'3a. t.~ \.he nc· rthwe~1. of AN .KHio Only aporadi.c ~ o:.tac. ~ wa.s' t? n -:o L.n ~. flred. Wlth sqLrtd s!7.t' Sft;Ur1ty elem•nts from the Provtni::.~ Ur ~t .i Foll~w . .u1g this opt'ra ti.on .. D1vls1on attent1on was cUre~t~d once aga.ln tr'· the lSth NVA 3t-:tlm1tnt. whlch had relocated 1nto it~ old base are~ !n ~~~ Af~a 226 h!i~: the operat1on had coaaenced, tt.~ 2d Br:..ga.de ~l~mEtnts 1'e1e ) o!r.od by ROY.A forces io conduct a. com­b! r.ed opt.r a t.1on agfJ.l ra:>t th~ 15th NVA Rf'g~ ~~r,t. iLDd what were believed. to \.._ 6.!U~nt! cf Lh.- BWH DI:•.' ??-ovlni:to.l Uni-.. Although only spc:·wc eort.a.i:.t eo~ld. ~ 1r.aJe (1 o"er 28 ~ons of material trer" capt\aed 11nd. ov•r 120 en~~ k! lled by co:.'t1ned forces !)

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' I AVDDIHC-·MH . CONFIDENTIAL ~o E c 1969 SUBJECT& Operati.011al R~poT"t c-. t.~snor..a Learn~d 4th Infantry lb.,r~.s1on

Pe.;- lC'd ~rd1. r'.g )j Oc t.'-'OOl.' 1969 11 RCS CSFQR ... 6.5 {B2) (U) .

En•Mny ac t1."' 11.y t~ma!.rtf.'d light until lat.e Ck\to ber. when eri.amy forces· 1n~:ea.se t.helr h1.ghw~y lnlerdict.ion to the east. and west o! AN lCHE() Forty NVA were killed t~ t he not'theast of AN KffE during the last week of October foll ow1.ng an. at.tempted c-onvoy attac.ko

(d) DARLAC and QUANG DLTC s Enemy act1.vH.y 1.n DARLAC Province r~-ma.i ned constant w1.th previous monthso As 1.n the past 0 BAN ME THUOT CHy C' ont.inued t.o prodd.~ the most. lucr.at,jve ta.Igetn In August., BAN ~m THHOT ~as sub.iected to two stal"ldoff atta.r.k.s from element.s of t.he K J94th Composite Ba.tt.aJlono l!ll.sewherec, enemy ant1v1.ty was limited to sporad..l.c ground pro~s j.n an area south of the cit.yo

Dux1ng September 0 en~my elements concentrated on harassing outT.>Osta and v:llages t o the nort.h and northeast of BAN ME '£HUOT Cityo while at .: .. tacks on BAN ME THUOT itself ceasedo It was later lu.rned from pri­soners thc.:-.t thf' If. .... J94th had moved into Base Area 740 to conduct train-

, lngo HoMev~r ~ one prisoner captured from the battalion statei that t.he K- J94th had l~ft. beM.nd an element to harass the cityo Activity lncreased in October 0 as enemy elements stepped up their harassment to the north and northeast of BAN ME THUOTo In ad.~tion to th1s 0

local fC1rce elements intensified i.nterdlction of Highway 21 east of the cityo In m1d~October0 documents were captured nort.h of the city

· 1deot1fy1ng el em.er.ts of -t.he JOlst Local Force Battaliono Al though ~he )Olst Local Fore~ Battal.1un was believed to have left its old area of operations in HU>PY VALLEY south of Highway 21 0 this was the first 1~dic:ation that t,he JOlst was r~sponsi.ble for the increased activity in the BUON 1l> areoo

}· In the I! Corps .., III Corps Border area during Octcbert1 B Troop of t.he ?th Squad.reno 17th Cavalry obtained their first 1nd1 ~at:i.on o! moYemer• ~n the BU PRANG area.o Cont.a~t was 11.mibd to ~ound-to­al.r 1ndderrt.s a.J'l.d sporadJ.c c•bserva.t.1.on of one to two individual.so In l.a.t.e Cktober il -rt..aU.ablEi 1nteU1genC'e 1nd.1eated eMil.Y mt-veraent north­f::ast tc~a.T'd DU PRANG» Followtn.g th1s 0 the Spe~j al Forces Camp at BU PRAN~" f1H ·,'s\tppt>rt bases in thA area 0 and DUO LAP Special Forces Ca.mp began tc r~co1ve heavy re~oilless rifle and mortar attacks, Enemy aet.1.v:1.t.y ~do& l1nal t-.d t o att.a-:-ks by fire w1th· no ground at .... tacks occurring"

-. (2) ··Est.1mated enenil composit1on 0 cil sposU1oD 0 and strength ~·S etf

Jl October 19690

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AVi>DH··GC~MH CONFIDENTIAL . ~DE c 196R 5UBJiCTa Op~r~tfoi~ :C. Report L• Leasona Lea..:-n.ed 4th fo.fantry ·l'i1"181.on

Ptiinod Ending )l Odober 19690 RCS CSFOR-6.5 (R2) (1.1;

UN!1t a:rr1·on't Headqu1art.er-tJ 250th Tra.nsp<:ir ta:i ion G co'.lp

~TII1i!I@_STBEN9~ . l vOOQl+J

PRODAB~ LOCATION unToc;i;ar 1n-· ·a:J.1!'~)Dli

40th Ar1~i.lle-r.-y Regiment H~ad11uart.e.r. s JOth. Ba1:.tal1on/40'th. A·rty llegl mer.i.L )2d Bat.tal.1.on/40th Art.y Reg1ment . 3Jd B;s.Uall.on/40t.~ Art.Ulery R~g1.meu:t 4lst B~tt.~.1l.M!4 01.h Ar. y R<"gl.ma~t 42d Batt.aiion/40th Art.y Regl.meo.,. 46t.h Battahon./40~h Axt.y H4?gj m~mt 74th Ba'ttalio.n/40th Arty Begiment. K--16 Tank Ba.t. ~.a~.:.on/40th Arty Ul Art.j.J l~ry Bathl3ou (J7rnm AA) 40t.h Ul Ai:·t.!lle?ry Batta.Hon (l.O.S Hc.•w) 40; .. h 18th NVA Regiment 24t.h NVA. Regimen-: 28t.h NV A B.eg:'i ri:~~.t 66-t b. NV A R~giment 9 5B NVA Reg1 m~n.t

?50 . ·100 .. · ·~oo

2JO • , 240

210 a.o 2:10 210 240 2 .~o 2,50

DA.F.v .. n 'J'l.·1 .... Bcrder area Unkr,;o~n

Unknovn Unknown Unknown Unkno~n

Vt·~ J+S 8609 Unknown Unkn(;WD. Tr'i ... ·Border Area Vi.c BA 701 Vlo BA 226 CHU PA. Unknc~ liin Unkncwn Vi~ BA 202

.,. .

H-&1 5 Local Fo.rr..e Baih~.ion K·"'20 . Sapper BattaDc-n

1 0200 900

10400 . 102.50

625 l..50 1.50 JOO 250 150 J20 200 200 J.50 22.5 )60

Southeast of PLiilCU • nc ZB 09JS

. K-25A Engineer Battalion K .... 2,?B ingjneer Batt,a.:\.1on K- 28' Sa.ppeir/F.cn Bat ta.llon K-3'7 Sapper BAt-ta.:u.~n X· .. 4.$ Loc:al Fo.tce B-lt .. tallon 91.tth Group JOlst Loc·~1· Fo:t~0 e Ba.tt.~.1.~n · J04th Lo-::·al Force Bat talion Ka-J94th Composite Battalion

· 40lst SappE'r Ba1. talfon 406th Sappe1: Battali.on

. 408th Sarper Battalion 6)lst Composite BattalioD Infrastruct.ut€i

. t;uer1l.la F·or~H TOO'AL ~EUY FOBCE;I

275 ·1~00

250 400

40400 -~~ZS. 200.51.0

(;) Significant li:Aei;.v Tact1.cs and Tec.r..n1quei11

Unknown Unknown Uuknown Unkno1'm Southeast of PLiIICU Vlc AS 9851 Y1·G BA 2)? Vic ZB 1026 Vic B'A ?40 Vic BA 2)8

. Vic AS 7921 Vic BA 229 CHU.PA

(a) A Div1s.ton Long F.a~g9 Bttc.onnaisoa~~-e ... P~~~l (LRRfh__~g_-~he, month of Sept.ember[' encowit.e:red a VC squad--'utlli.zing a scout_dog with . the point mnn.. Whtn the dog obe~rw~d tto .LRP team, h~ c.oumenced to bark &nd pointed 1n ths direction of the LHP team thua alerting the VC eleme~t to the presence of th.Et LR.l>s.. n-.1s "as the first encounter 1n ·

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AVDUH--GC-MH AOEC1969' SUBJ.ECl'a Operationa.l Hepc .rf - Lt's~on~ 1 ,,1a.~nec ~ .. ~.h lr.~ant.r.y Jiv1s1or>.

Pe!"h.'d J.i;r.tJJug J.~. Octobur 1969u rlCS C3FOR··6S (B2) (P'

tt.e D1v1s1on area of operations or eneimy forces uhl1.z1ng do~'' as a.n early wax -.ing 8/Stemo

(b) A alg.'li~ir. ant tactic rer.·ent.ly noted by the '"th Inf ant.ry Di ·dr.·.i . f o ;:.:;. (!S 1 s the enemy" u use cf shot t fuzed. Rro· . 7 round~ to obtain an &l.r b~r~tu On ~evoi.~~. occ,.t.sions r.ece11tly 0 RPG·--? rounds fired at fdendly forces ha.ve detonated pr1.or to t:trjk.l.ng a solid object" All RPG ·? 101.:.nds a.re armed wl.th a sel f ·-- desi .. ruct mecha.nis1n to explode a.f'ter traveling approXl.mat.ely' 800 me1.erso Indications are that enemy forces a.re ta.k.1.ng advantage of th1s limitatlun in an effort to inflict max-imum casuaJ.tieso

(c) A recent operation conducted 1nc ·Base Area 226 in DINH JINH Province uncovered a muni.tions cache belonging to the 18th HVA Regi-­ment containing 56 rounds of mixed lOr?-mm a.nd 122~- ilUll rocketsa Until this dl.scoveey v the regiment. was not· credJ..t.ed with having a rocket ca.pabl.l1tyn Alsov ducument.s and a POw captured from t.he 9513 Regi .,.. ment indicated that the regiment has a cache of 122···nun rocketso Al­though both regiments have rocket caches 0 it ls not believed that they have qualified artillery personnel assignedo. It is possible that enemy units have stockplled rcckets 1n thei.r bue areas with the intent.ion or moving in trained artUlery personnel when a lucrative target presents 1-tself u

(d) A returnee from the K~4 Battalion~ 24th NVA Regiment revealed that he observed a new type of 122--·mm rocket which is termed a DKB or A·l2 rocketu The returnee also stated that. the DKB used a shell 80 cen­timeters long". with a warhead 25 centimeters longo He also 1.ndieated that the tubes could be assembled togethe~ for mass firing or could be fired singly"

(e) A :returnee from the 24th Regiment. revealt1td the following security and signaling m~thods emplcyed by the 24th Regiment during missions 1 A pier,~ of painted 1 uminous wood is t1.ed to the back of the head for recognition during hours of d.arkness1 units may iden­t~fy themselves by & prearranged number or taps on a .rifle butt or a ?&rticular vocal clicking sounds Wlits may identity themselves b) a whl.te cloth or bacd on the ~= or som~ prdde&1e:Plated place of the body such aa just below the lef't elbov.n

(t) Beeen~ PO~ testimony indicated that eneJIUI unita have cap.­tured dutfiebag equ1pMnt ~d have sent the d~v1ces to North Va-vr­NAM tor analyaiau The POW also stated that the NVA have sensor teus operating in Sou\h VIll.-vi'NAM with the ad.ssion of finding and

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AV.DDH---GCnMH CONFIDENTIAL 4DEC 1969 SUllJJroTs Op~r.at lonal Heport = Lt;ssons Learned 4th Ir.fa.ntry .Jl .v~. !31.\Jn.

Per1od l!.'ndl.ng Jl October 19690 RCS CSFOR-:6·~ (R2) (U)

destroying or b"oby trcA.ppl.ng Ollr dev1ceso Recently 0 sensor f1elda in the DUC CO area were found Marked indicating general locations o! tha .string and waru1ngs to avoid the area.o

(4) Hecap1tulat1on of l!!nemy Battle Loases1

(a) ParsonnEtla KIA (BC) 969 NVA CIA 4 VC/VMC CIA 8 1'ota.l 93Y

(b) Weapona ~ S/A 173 a/s ...!1 ·rotal 190

(c) Ammunitions S/A rounds 1000269 c/s rounds 1040J Grenades 4)9 M1nea l))

(d) Miscel lane-ous Captur~ ed Itemsa Explosives 206 lbs

Documents ,534 inches Rice 3811945 lbs Salt 20082 lbs

(e) Enemy Fac1llt1es Destroyed St ructures lo)l.6

Fortifications So904

(S) Enemy Capab111ties 0 Vulnerabilities 0 and Probable Courses of Act1ona

(a) Capabilities

~ The 40th Artillery Regimentu with its artillery battalions, is capable of conducting standoff attacks ut111zi11& recoilless r1-fles o 82-.mm a.nd 120 "mm mortars 0 107 ..... mmo 122-mm 0 and 140-u rockets, 8.).~nuu gun~ and 10.5-mm howitzers throughout KONTUM 0 PLEIKU, and DARLAC Provinceso

~ The K--·16 T&nk Batta.Hon (Pl'-76) has the capability ot con­duct1ng armor a.tta.cks 1n KONTUM and PL~IKU along the CAMBODIAN Border,

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AVDDti.G~MH CONFIDENTIAL .4DEC1968 SUBJ~Ta Operational Report - Lessons Loarned 4th Infantry ~iv1a1on

Period ll!nd.ing )l Ootober 1969~ RCS CSFOR~6S (B2) (U)

J. Tho l8t~. NVA Hog1mu~1t hae the capability o! con<!.ucting rault1.-battal1on size attacks against allied 1nstallat1one0 isolated camp•o .:a.nd p..>pul.a.ted a.teas 1n central BINH DINH Province. Tney can also 1nto1-d1.ct H1ghwa.y 19 and the plpoline from BINH KlU; to Al'J Klia:o

~ Tl~ e 24th NVA Reg1ment, 1s capable of conducting battalion size at tacks •6a.1H.:.t a.l.Ut:~ ln~tallatl ons and villages and hamlet& located in the P~I MHONG arta and interdict Highway 14 from PLEIXU north to KONTUM Oityo

.2 The 9513 Regiment is cap&ble of conducting up to battalion size attacks against fire support basesu isolated camps 0 and popu-

. lated a.reas in the ~IKU - BIHH DI•m border areao They oan also 1 ntordict Hi.ghway 19 by ambush and m1n1ng 0 attack pump atations and bridges 0 and destroy sections. of the pipeline troa AN 1CHi to PLEilCUo

~ The 631 Composite Battalion is capable of conducting up to battalion s~ze ground attacks supported by mortar and rocket f1re 1n the PLEIKU .... Camp Ena.ri 0 LZ Oasis areao

1 The K-25A and K~25B Battalions are capable of building trail networkso fort1!1cations 0 and artillery positionao 'lbey can also con­duct up to company s1ze attacks on allied inetallationa and rurc~ areaa.

8 71e KJ20 a.nd K~28 Sapper Battalions can conduct limited atta.cks on .lilied 1nstallaUone and isolated villages and h&mletso

i The 408th Sapper Battalion ca.n conduct company s1ze sapper attacks supported by 11Prtar and possibly rock~t fire against allied 1nstallat1ons and populated areas in central rnd eastern Pi.Kil1Jo

!Q. The )04th Local Force Battalion ca.n .. conduct company eime attacks 1n the TAN C&'iH ... DI~ BINH area and interdict Highway 14 from lCONTUM City north to DAlC f'Oo

ll.. The 94th Group is capable of conducting ground ~~t;a.r attacks 1n up to battalion strength 1n uortheastern IONTUMo

(b) J ineay Vulnerabilities

•· ~emy unita are vulnerable to airstrikea and art1lle17 fin when in bivouac or maasing for an attack.

An•IQ' we~pone 0 m\;J11~1on&11 and f'ood cache• are v\&lnerable to

CONFIDENTIAL . ·· 12 . .

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AVDDH- CC- MH CONFIDENTIAL 4 0 E r.19~ SUBJEC'l'a Operat1on-.l Report ..... Lf\ssons Learned 4th Infantry .•. h··,.~sion

Perlod 6nd1ng Jl October 1969 0 BCS CSFOR·6.5 (R2) (U)

a.111.ed sea.n,h ar.d t.:h1a.r opera.tionsu

.l. ~n~my llnl~S of commun1r.at1.on are &uff1.clently extended· to mak.8 them vulnerable io 1ni.ord1ct1.c•n by allied opC!Y:at l.onsu

~ En~my units are vuln~rable to psychological oparat1ons due to low morala~ heavy personnel losseso and shortages of food and medical. suppl.ieso

.5.. Enemy movement is vulnerable to dt>tection by airborne per-sonnel dot.;:ct1on and sensor dov1cesu

§. l!;nemy forces haH limited log1stical support and cannot conduct extended offensive operations unless they are near existing base areaso

(o) Probable Courses of A~tion

!. Througbout the Divlsion area of opeu.tiona·0 enemy forces a.re expected to conti.aue t.heir present off ens1 ve !or a short period of time and will pLobably conduct one more offensive before the end of t.he year o

G. In £\ONTUM Pt·ov1nc:e 0 olements of the 40th Artillery Regi-ment are expect.ad to conduct mortar and rocket attacks against BEN H.i!.-"':t\, JAK TO,, ·rANH Ciu~H\) DI.l!!N ilI'NH 11 PO~I KLl1"!NG 0 and KONTUM Cityo These atta.cits c:an be accompanied by up to battalion size ground at­ta.cks •

. 1 The )04th Local Force Battalion· is expected to continue ha­rass1n~ ~ctivity in the TANH CARH - DIEN BINH area and interdict High­way 14 from KONTUM City north to .DA1C 1'0.

i Other loc~al forc.e units 'A·:\.ll probably conduct platoon to cotnpa.ny strength harassing attacks 1n th$-DAK S6ANG, DAlC PWC 0 FLATiAU GI,. and MANG BU!\ areaso ..

5 In PLi:IKU Provin~e p the 24th Regiment ia expected to conduct up to co~pany s1.~e attaeka on RF/P•t installations and villages and hamlets 1n the v1c1n1ty of P.Lt;I HHONG and interdict Highwq 14 be­tween PI.iIKU and KONTUM C1tyo

§. The 6Jlst Comp~s1te Ba.tt~ion 1a expected to conduct attacks by f 1re on the ~KU - Camp ls!nar1 - LZ Oasis area •

• Z. 'fne 408th Snpper Bat talion is ~··oected to increase har.ua1ng

attacks 1n cel'tr&l and eastern PL£UKU Pre. v nee. The batt&lir'n can alao

be expected to conduct aaCDRtlO!NtiAf Wlita 1n ~Province,

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AVDDH GC .,MH Wl~iJDfNTlAL ADE c !911 . Oper ational « .... »r r- t,~~~c •;;:, Le-i. rn.ed 4th Infantry D~ "i : ... ; on Period ~dH1g ·1 ;. O···tober ~969 t ' RCS CSFOB-65 (R2) (1.1)

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SUBJt;Cf ~

~ . Lo(';a°i fr:·ce l4nlts arA expected t.o harass l1nes of comnn...nio&t.l.on and conduct ten·o.clsm and assaGs1nat1on act1v1t1es 0 and small scale attacks on hJ.mlets and vtl1ages in an att.ampt to disrupt the GVN pat1f1catl .n efforto

9 i 't e 9 ·--o B~g~ rr.ent. !s expected to conduct limlted squad to co111paDy ~L!. 1. a:~ ~ .~1. · 1< :.-: ct~cll r i : ~t. brldGe ser"u-rl.ty elements 0 strong pol.nta 0

~ L·:r.p s t .. 11.1ons ,, ~.nd convC'·ys a li ong Hl.ghwa.y 191n eastern PL~IKU and \'h.1 st ~ r:1 i·,INH r1JlHC In ~ddl tlon 11 t.hfty w'lll also conduct m1nl.ng of Highway l.9 ::wd lP terdic. t t.!'1) pl.pel~neo

19.. In BINH DtNH Prov1nc.e 0 elements of the 18th NVA Regiment aTe P-xpect.ed t.o attemp't disruptlon of the GVN pac:lflt:a.t1c.n effort 1n VINH THANH Valley and conduct ljmit~d interdiction of Highway 19 east of AN ~o

}J.. In ~."BLAC Prov1nce r enemy forces are expected to conduct attacks by fl.re and Ught ground probes against BAN ~ THUOT 0 LAC THI~N 1• BUON HO ) a.nd su:rr0und.1.ng areaso

12 In QUANG DUC Prcw·i.nce 0 installations 1.n the BU PRANG - DUO LAP "i!-~e-. could p<'Ssibly ncelve multlbattalion size attacks supported by mo'Ctar and rocket f ireo

(6) Mll~.tary Intelli.gence Activities

(a) Generals Dl ~ring the past qua.rter 0 the 4th Mi:i.tary Intel­:igenc"e ~T.a~.hm~nt (;·1ID) p"to'·ide.i Couutertnteilligence (CI) (I Jmo.u J

IntertJT~tatic·n (II) ti an4 !r,'terrc-gation Prisoners of War (IPll) sup~ p~rt t~ the Divisiono S~veral innovations were made during the re­po.rt1 ng pedcd to enhance The ii.naJ. product provided the Divisiono In a.ddltion 0 special emphasis was pla~ed on the internal security ot Camp Ena.r1 and the d~n1al of c.lassl.fied or sensitiva information to ~ow level r 01· pvtential low level enemy a5entso

\b) Collr.t.er1nt•i.l1gMct11~ The a.«:.t1v1ties oi the CI ~tc;tion during the reporting period cont1n11~d to include pr•planned operations a­g.unst small loi:.a.l force unj'ts and ind1.v1duals with the ma.jority o! the CI eif ort 'be1.ng devot~d. i-o increasing the number of agent sources ilfl th1n the Tactical Area. of H.,sponsib1l11~y., A combined operation was c.ond.uct"d dur1.ng • .. he- quarter to screen all indigenous employees working a.t Camp b-'na.ri " Tho M~y successf\U. operation l'esulted in the 1d'ln­tl:"1ca.t1or. ar.d. r~e :itraliza.• .. j on of Jl VC a.nd VCSo The emphasis i:lfi.ced on inte!nal secur1ty and s~curlty of classified material cont1nued0

~1th repeated unannounced CI lnspections plua inspections of unit burn areas UG~d ~o destroy claaaif1ed materialo

( c) In+ .. erroga t.lon c1! Prisoners of Ja?' s Prisoner interrogation

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mDH- GC- MH i CQNf10£NTIAl 40EC1969 SUBJECT• Opor,;4l ~ ·f .. H~~ port - Leaaone Learned 4th lruant~y ~1via'on

reriod ~, 1 - ~ l.ng Jl October 1969 11 RCS CSroR- 65 (B.2) (U)

methods were enhan~: ed durl.ng the- last quarter w1tb. th" utllbat.lon 1)f ~ tape rei:order d~ung interrogation seasionso The ut111zat1on of a tal>4!' record.er allowed the 1.nterpreters to obtain a comprehensive interrogation from particularly lntell1sent or knowledge~ble detaineoso IP~ also prov·1ded direct support. to the 2 ·<3th Infantry (Mech) during their op­eration 1n the eastorn. CHU PAo A HOI CHANH from the 24th HVA Regiment and a representatl.ve from IPW accompanied t.he z .. ,8th Infantry (Mech) during a sweep ope.ration and provided the bat.talion w1.th an intimate knowled«5e of ~nemy techniques and probable enemy locca.tionso

(d) Iiitagery Interpreto..t1on ~ect1on ~ 1>ur1ng the past quarter 0

the II ~ect.1on coordinated wi.t.h the OB .5ect11>n on ~everal. occas1onso A concerted effort~ by Il 11 OB ., an·i IPW during the period resulted 1n a comprehensive study of the PW .TrlAP Val.leyo MOHAWK and BIRDDOG ai.8-s1ons have beun flown rec.ently to ket;;jp the study currento The II Section also provldcld overlays of har~ ta.rgets 0 tra1ls 0 and cultivated areas for operat1ons ln the CHU PA and Base Area 2260 In add1tion 0 II coordinated w1 th Dufflebag for the emplacement of ground sensors in the PLEI TRAP Va.lleyo

(7) Communications Security (COMS.b;C)a During the past quarter0 us• of unauthorized codes continued to be the most common security viol~tiono Addi tionally ~ there was an increase of trans~1ssions of classif~ed 1.nfolination 1 n the clearo ·rti1.s was partially caused by the large influx of new personnel into the Division but was remedied by f1ra d1sc1plinary ac.t1on by commanders and by continued COMS~ 1natruc-t~on by the J74th RRC~ During the period l August throu6h )l October ·1969 11 the J74th RHC reporte.i a total of )) COI'1S~ ~1olat1ona 1n the D1vls1on"

Co Operations and Tra.l.ning Activ1tieso

(1) Operat1onso

(a) The 4th Infa.ntr,y D~vision was disposed as shown on Map 1, Inclcsure 40 ~t the beginning of thl.s reporting period.

(b) Ellemy aet1-tity in the DivU1on area of operatiqna remained at a low level during the months of A%"USt and September. Intelli­gence indicated the cont.1nuei presence of element~ of the 24th UVA Reg1ment 1n the CHU PA Mountains area and to the northwest of ~ MRCNG; 9.5.3 F~g1 r.,E'.nt. un1. t.s south of Hlghwa3 19E; and a major por­tion of the 18th NVA lleg1ment ~nits northeast of AN lG'~o En8JD1 for­ces in the B~l HJi.T ... DAK TO ... TAN CANn area during June withdrew 1n Jaly and did not app~ar aB~1n unt11 Cktobero · However 0 there were nuaerous small contacts in the POLBI ~lG area. during S.pt.ea'ber

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AV DDH-- ~GC...,MH ~Ol\1FIDENT1Al ADEC1969 SUBJ~·ra Opera.tlor;uil Rc:. pc- r. 'L ... ~rnson~\ LtJar.ned 4th Inrant.xy Dlvi tsl on

~rlod ird.\ 1'(1 :,.J O·tocer 1969 () HCS CSFORu.65 (R2) (U)

t..hat ind.:lc:att'J. 'i'G/ w.'.\~ forc.a5 :emfJ.in~d l.n the a.r.a.. 'lil.gh"'f11 19.ul anQ. tbe, .id.Jaoent. p1 pell ne contl 7'\'lld ta ~ targets for VC/NVA 0 in the BI~H J)INH cUHe D\4111".g Sepiem~t\, . ~.he Di "11.aion c·on1.1.nl4ed o ~er at.ions Mi th GVN :'o .r r; ~s 0 wt·.~nev~r ~· s:31.bJ.r. . AcUvity against local VC/VOI cont1.nued .z· c"opc !"'·auon/cC'o::dlnahon w1th pr?v1no1.a.l and local governmen·t of-

n-. ~~ l. ~t :l.> c:; tta:. :. on J 121.h. Ir..fan~ry was sent unde:r the operational con­t..·01 t..'i. il ... : l /3~ '~~:-b1 ·: 1 • .. :i.~ " : ,.~ ; i.dei for <.\p~!ations 1n th~ A.N LA.0 Valley on GO Sept.Emt:~r »ecauu of the 1Mi·aased enemy actl.wity 1.n QUANG Dt:C and .D,;IU,A~ 1 1 rov!.rv· •: n TaSk fvr-:.~ Fl.GHTBR "-'i..S 1. C•rrPed at tho end of Sr:ptem'biir at BAi~ ~ '!'HUlll' .in- :.iUpp')tL ot the 2)d AHVN D!.v!eiono The D3~1sion committed A ~mpar..y~ 2·J5th Infantry and A and D Troops of t hf4 7-~l ?th Ca"f'alry to th1s 'ra.ak Force" The Jd AB.VN Ca.v~ry resumed • .. r.~ r~apons1M.Hty f<'r lb ghYay l.4!1 !:r.om th.a 2 -8th Irifantry (Mech) o

'!b~ l ~10th Cavnlry completed a ph.as£d. stand.d.ovn at Cup Bad.r,11ft i.n pr~ paratl v:" to assumt' a st:::~Aen.\.ng mlssl.on ln the west. along the CAMDOJJ.J.N B ~:z:dc-:= o 'lb.e •.hxee da: ' of· r:aon-·aggr.essi veness during the VC/NVA standdo"n &1.gn1f1r.a.ntl.y lowered the nl.illlber of combat opera­tions conduc.ted 1n September., l'he enemy continued to nbulld and resupply his tore es until Ooto ber o

ineaay activity 1n~reas~d throughout the Div111on area of oper­atlol'\s dw:1ng October. Heat:-y enemy reoonnaJ&san\,·.e activity was noted beth 1n KONTUM and PLi.1:10J PTov1n¢es during the first week of Ootobero Increased act1r1.t.y 1.n the PLEI M.RONG area. ~nd:teat.ed the eleaents ot

.. the 24tb NVA Reg1.aeni w,.r·'!' preparing to launch a new h1ghpo1nt.o Eneay ac.t1v1 ty cul.m1n&i,ed on 25 O~t.ober 0 when the enemy launched the f1.rat phase of their current otrens1.,,e and conducted. nwaerotla attacks by !1H ~l'ld Hght ground. p~~a" The 6)let Compoa1t'l Battalion be­came act1v~ tnd oondu~tt'Ci artacks by !~r.e ln the P~IIU .. Caap ina.ri · Oa&lf· a.:·~ao tll!agH to th~ "ast, t:"f Cap ~naz1 were .iao subjei~ted + "." r~-rass1ng att.ackso The 2d B:ig1 . .d.e wu joined. in late ~"o°tf.r by PO!A :or-:es f<'!' ~.oa'b1n'•·d ope~a• i.ona against elements of the lSth NVA Reg1mt'4t. in<UlY aoth'1ty was Hght 1n the are& until lat• On.tober vhen en~1'V !orces increased. tnt~%'dlct1on of Klibway 19 to the 9Ut and west of AN Kf'..t;11

• . ( e ) lat Br1pd.e1 0J-~rat.1on lllAYNi JA\'il.IM continued dun.ng AU·• gust, wUh tlem•nta of totr infa.ot ey ba+.tal1ou and. a cavalry aquad­::-on r:.orAucting operaUc·ar,J ~ong H1Ghlfay 19i: ud 1ta adjacent pipeline, pac1£1cat1c;n opei-at1.ona. ~.n c(,op--rat1or. &Dd coordination w1th Li TRUNC and. AN 1\IC w.atrl.cta , u,d M&?'":h and t1utxoy operat1ona 1.n NV.A. do•·· 1nated. •.reu nort.h ·ot All Kl-:B .;nd Jnto DAI PHOU Y&lle7 (VC V&l.le7). 'nlf!I 2-8th Infantry (K...:..h) "U replaced on Highvq 191 by th• 1-lOth

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AV JD~· Gr.··J-U{ CONFIDENTIAl :40EC1969 . SUBJ~CT~ OpMatl ona..t. !ittpc~r•, - L~e;sopc., L~a.rne l ijth Infant,x, .. f).:·. " 1 · 8~ on

P"r;.1.od End.lv~ .)J O~t.ob~:r 1969 t R.CS GSFOR--6; (R2} (l'J

Cavalry (~) fro in t~fti .~ct Bt.lgad~, and. rr\~·U.rnt:td to ZC.. B.tlgad.e c.or:t rol o

Company Al) ;3--·J 2th. !r1f11n;' .. r -y ·' s\:,rpori.6d. ·::a.Y a· 00 a.rt,r"llery platoori. 1, pl.o·­·flded t.hE\ Y1ta.1 tmpp;·rt. f n:- the C.VN paofl-:-'at.1on operat.~C'.''l r.outb of H.1ghwriy l ~~ 1n Lb' 'J'Hll.NG J.h.c.t.J'l .~t b~' (.~orJ.\~" 1..i r.' lf. ~·· r · ·~·onlr.g 11 u.rnl>uuh LU•d searc· h and d.6ar· opo:rahor..so On 15 August. H wa:.; de.hrir.l.n~d that local GVN effo!'t.s had. d~velc-ped tc· t.h'=' P'-~ l.nt c.,f b':\1ng able to both pa.ci!y th~ ar~a and. at. thE' same t~ mf<· SAn .. r~ t.bem~~) lfASo As a result 0 U~ S\,;.pport \las 1'""1 '·aseti. and r~tl\.l"ned " '' lhf' · T" parent. un~ t.a .. Of par­t1. ~~·l.ar s3gn.l.fjc.ani:-e was th~ l st B:r .; ~,de's pcr.1--t:a1.jvrA cf NVA safe areas Mrth. of .4.N KP..i~ aga.l.nst. E'. lr. :non~s c ~· t.r~ 13th. NVA. Regim~nt dur .. ing Opera.UN}. G'AFi•'E'r BLUE ·:.'>- 25 .A.t.g) ar..;:.. ..>ot:.th cf H~gr .. Ma.y :l9i. near the DAK PAYOU Valley· ag.~ l.r !lt t.h~ 9 ~-.B .t?egl.mF>n.t. o Opr· ra.t!~:o. GAFFEY BLUE · lnvoJ.v~d "the J.-·thh Inf an·f.":'J a::d ~.l.em~z:.t a t-f tJ~$ .! ... .e.t,b. !r.af antry and l-69th A--moro Tt:·.a rnmb;;-r of r.cnfao:; t ,i:i. l' find.J.ngs (\ results,, a.Dd defense of the area_, plus thP.o p-·c-x..~m:.1.y of u·,fl a=ea. tr. Base Al'ea 226 0 made 1 t evident that the bounda.r1.~s of Base A."'t:.f.!in. 226 we.re subjec.t to change u ·The mcw~ID.ent. of s:.g[llf ic ar:·!- .!R. 11 s :f :om th.~. 18th Reg1m9nt 0 a base area to Base J>..l'f:.~ . 226 add.ed. c:redP.n°:.e. tc th:.s thesi.so Results of ti1e w~nty day cr£>r~·n.~r .,,~r6~ l OO NVA KIA (a total of JOO KIA fo?: the ent!~e ~pe~a;-1.on" of t~': months) u ~i PO~·Q & l 4v800 lbs of rice captured .a.nd J.';2 st.TucttLTe.S and f'crt.1:!1r.at1cns deattroy&do Three US verE' K.T.A an.d. tM ytee.l"\. WU) N1.ri.~ hel1.ccpte:'.s Mer.~ ~.aged or des­troyed dur1ng t.h~ c·perat:1o!l' as a. result of heavy grouD.d~to-air fireo South of Highway 19E11 !.n the •.tl .c~ .n: .. t.y of the SONG BA Rl.vf.'r and DAK PAYOU Va.lleiy 11 tb.~ } ·12t.h Inf~.n.try and : .. - fQtt.~ ... ArJYIO!:' 1nltia.ted opera. .... t1.ons against lC'ca: VC at>d tt-e ~:.tbdra"l!'.g • . ':"u.er.ts o-f tt.e 9.5B B.egi­ment.o Thi.a opera'~1on vas to· sen·" to neu.trU.::.ue Base ArAa 2020 There was a c.oordinat~d l ncrease 3 r. VC ~ .n~ ... ;i.at.ed a.c+,ivj ty during the r ., ;r•. of ll/~.2 A~.~s'*~ whic.h in.c.lud~d a t;apk'&r a.tta~k on Ca.mp Radc]~.~f~ seven vehicles and ho 'buUd.l.ngs "ere destroyed p ~nd on-s. vahl •: 1 ~ and seve-.r.. bu n~r..gs dait~fdo Th'1rf\ wer.CJi no friendly ca& .. ua.lt1eso A~•.st 12t.r. .,ras most prod'lcUve. with I'f'gal"d to en4'my battle l c·sseso I::, ftl ght.· sepa.r:st~ 1r..'=:id.e~t.s ~her"?' were j,S NVA XIA and 2 US WIA, Operat.~ons . ln SU{)p·.,. rt c-! GVN pa('.1fieat1on effort.a 1n. L8 TRUNG a.Jld AN TUC had the f'ull cooperation of a.H ageni:iea Md cont1nued·1nto S€pt.,~r.\~r.,

Oper~tion WAYN~ JAVELIN continued 1nt~ Sep~~ab6ro Tb• )-1.2ih Ir.!antry(I w1U\ scppcrUng l05ma 3r.d l55H ax1:lllery 11 punu•d ele­~!n\s of K2/95B. Reg1.ment. a.far th91 !' a.'tort.h~e a,,1.eap·t tQ i.nterdl.c.t H1.ghway 19,, Atr. the enRmy bT.ck,_, up ~. n":'.o sull un!tt> and ·withdrew aollth of Bue .A:ea 202 0 the ) --12th !nfantr, and an air ca.val.r,y troop from th!- 7-l?tb Cavalry ~ rea.-!t!ng to intelligence reporta 11 car­hed on running conta~: t.a more than )0 ~.ometera south of Highv&y 19 ' into PHU BON Pro~1Mee Thla r~p'd ~netra.1.1on deep into and thru

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SUlUFCT8 O~..:.rnt:\ .. e ..... 'l!. F.~pH'i ... t~aso:~ ~ k,c;.:·..i~ 4\n Iu.tant~ Dtv'l.eion .'?o.d~i !;i.dL~ .3 ; 0Qtobu 1969 .. RCS C~F'JB_,Q5 (B.2) (U)

Ba.H Aroa 2·0~ p:~Yif'W t.') ctJ·mplatoly dlfJ~rganbe the enellq' 9 den;r h~ ln u.s~ <'!f i1. ea!ft ba\"~!1 '1.n'i DPi:&t-& bh off'aosivo capab!li ty tor "" u:­t~ncfod P'~r1•"1o ln r.onj".l!l~lfo~:\ vltb t.v.) ~g1onal Forco Comp(UllH troa P1 :tJ '!' ' l1 !•'\' ~-~ ~ trl~t ) thts OPf.u"n.tioo 11100 oouoterod th6 en••q~· " threat. . ,._, : ~ 1 : . . · r; - . ··: ~ · ~· •. : "r+ ~1 o!' CHEO REOu Du.r.1.ng one ot th• nua-

iJ4•lUG cont~..:. i,ij oi ~.,. 'J •. ,, :/tb. Ca:nJ l'.)"1> tb.o t.et"o-rifb platoon va.s :ln­.:13rt(jd o." l, Sop~etl.bo:- of':J)~· ~·111.,hlp.1 o~p·uidai Ol &.~ utimatd 20 ... 25 ~'V Ao F-::."n..: .1~ I.\ r~ :i·.4: ~ ,,r t.);a~ t.'1E4f1P vo:·o t.v.J 9·""U p.utolt v 6Vld tbt D~e1 o! t.-{\ NVA ~r!i~u .r~ v \ th pM~ . ~r".1. -:· ~ll,d':l1nt~ 7)4 1>~.Jt) ~lant~rllo At t~li'- month ~ :i onrl .. th•.i .]. . :. : ·: ·. , fof'.,u, h :y .\'•" ~. 1 ; .... ; .. \d t •) Ll,11- ~! l'.HE "r~..i t.o 4531..et iu p~·~lil~"'-~· lnr:. and b!gbw"'y .s~l: ~ .... :"" ·;1~fo the l ... ; O"Lll C.,t ... alry., Opor-ati® 1.IAINR BOULDER ~aa ln.tti.rlt.ied 10 S.pt&ber,; by th~ i -Sth Inr1nt,,.,- ta:~~t~d aeaJn.t GtA LAI vc forne1 LOr~b of ~ KW£~ Tll.i.a ~pG.?'aUon wa!' prac'!'ded by dlver.1io."l~l'1 air oaTU!y m1.111ona., I.it" .!'t·r~..kst 9 and LRP in'ertionse ~h• tin~in&t "f a •vi khboard,, till4 bleph~c.(;~ ~~ d·,CUNa.nt.a 1nrH~•t4d the VC p.~ ... 11tia&l hoadquarter1 1D t.he art'& had diep~aced 1.n ~h~l o A .ugd!ic·ant action duriq th• openUon va' tho ~ight1ng o: u enerq cioapa.Qy 11H toroe OA 11 Sei>~mber by A T:oop~ 7-nt.n Oav&.1.170 GUD.thiJ)I and air IVD~f.t1 VtN. aployld tollovod b;r the in1ert1on ct tbt aub-r.ltl• platoOD u4 D Ce11JMD10 1..Sth lnt&n't:Jo 1'vutJ-t1n bodies v1re found alona vith Vl&poll• and ruokla~k•o

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Opttr~ c,i~u WA!N!t: JAVELIN tend'la toed o:i 18 Oct,obe:-. the ·rel.a t.1 nl.J nall D~t'r anc! lotJ iDteMlty ot eneq oontacta atteat.ed to the auoo~:~ of' thio cperati'ln dur1D( th8 prt''leding montho Ul en•111 ao­t1Yit:r appeared prhl:l' - .!.Jy d.iroeted i.~w&rd in'!:ident.I ot gro;md .. to4J.r !in and min:r ir:tf,.c.i~ct.\.cns ~r th~ h1ghvay and pipelineo Opuat.iOD Willi BOULDER 1.e:min~t ~~..: :1 Octr,c .. ro 1n-:- m»t aigllifica:it actiou ~courred o~ S Oot;,t-.,.. at 0 100 hour~ 1t. FS LA..Wo Thi CP ot ~· 1..Stb Int~'..\.itQ' r.a..:-o1v~d & ~O•)\dinat.ed f.tt.a~k tr02 the eo1lth aad e&5t by an eat.bated rl)!.nto~eod pl.a'°t>Ono Al.Un:.>gh tbrM J.Ddirtdual• bruch~d th~ vire9 qui .:.•. @14ployme.;lt Of & ~~ud r•.~etiCJl torco droY• tbflll vtf o .:ld tt.e c=biM tic,u or art.:~ lery P S?ClJKI and ground tire toreed th• NVJ. to '1:6U :ozit.aot at u200o Opl'r&tlo:'l WAINE BOULDER nttt.d 9.3 en_, . lll, 1 HOI CRAHHp 8.,00) le~ ot r1~1~p !\ .U~79 .,, 650 lba ot Alt and 2;i7SO lb! ot oor:io OP'rati.on WAYNE BREA~ o-...nceci on 18 0ct.ob9r vith 1~, St!l lntantrr in a ncurl\J' and P-1"itieat1oa. a1.Hion in the S-OHG BA Rinr V&lle70 Results to d•" induded 7 HY! lUA, 1 Ll~o 2 Autou.t,io v•apon1 0 a.!¥1 S Alli. ar&t with no US l('HGJ& On 14 Oetobe:p ~.!l., 1-10th Cay-.J.ry n'ltl4'.!ed th9 a111t1on ot aMurity tor Bigh­vq 19.S ~ the 1-69th A.~:-o Both "unita vv. plae9d d.ireotl.J uade:r 1>1Yia1on C!\"Jtrolo Tn~ ar,no:: ~attalicm va!t ini.tiall.J ~intcroed vith oz:• intant::--.1 eomp11 v ~ p:ovid• aeeudt.y tor the ioM l,low cperat1on. a%ki CD8 in:~t·t)' c ..ipen.y 85 a Nactit-n tort.e and ta.Dk aecuri tJ ele-­~Dt. Ti:.• highv~ vu r~ ot u .jc·r aeti~ until 18 Oct.oberp vheA

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.::· AV~DH ·GC·""H CONFIDliiTIAl 40Ec1969

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SUBJ~CT!l Operat.1or.aJ. :Repo:rt. ... . Les.->ons Learl"t'd 4th In.:t ··iI:' : Dl v1s1on Pt.r~od 1:':11 .' :.ur~ ) l. Oct.o'ber 19691, RCS C3FOil -·6) (H.l:J 1. L')

l. nc!.den~.s bt,gm Os:'CUtrl.ng with 1ncr~a.slng fTequenc.yo On ZU (k. t,o~r

thei plpe-:an~ was lnterdlcted wHh s1M.J . .t arms f1re,> B Company ,. l 691.h Armo1· v whl.~.e es~,~· r·t ~ ng a r onvoy rec e~.vod emal l arD>.S and B 40 fl re L' az~d a convoy from thll 8th Transport-at.~on Company rer.e.1 ved small arms and B-~40 f 1a from an est1ma-t .. ~d n.ftPen 'IC o A reat.t1.cn io:-ce engaged the eM.my &nd k~ Heed t.Etnv On 24 Or.1.(';ter, a large. c.ul vert was blown on th~ h1gh.way l' ·n 11 y mot.ers of pl pell n·~ were destrC\y~d ar'"d a ;!l ten truck dMaged l-y rJ. m~ Mo On 27· O·: t ober " Bridge #JJ was blo.in and on 28 Octt'°OOJ ,, a lafg(.41 crat.er was blo\tn 1n th.e rc.ai ~-ast of AN KHEo On 23 Ot:to~r l. an ao.J~~.;on~ l.nfa.~tr1 compar.y was placed under the oper­atl\lnal cont.~ .. 01 vf the l - 69th ArtJ1.oro Tha ad.dit:\.on of the infantry ':'.Ompa.""~ wil.l n\.;W gl ve: the armored fo !:ce mt're fl ex1.b111 ty in ;rov1d­!ng Toad so~~r:tyQ

(a) 2d Ht1.gaJ.ea Opera.t . .ton PL1WM1 T1.G~R cont1nued durlng Augusto w:t th scre£'nl ng 0 TC· ad Sfl.i:~ur1. ty l' and bc~~h l'3 an.d c oinbl.ned search and clf'ar/pa.Clflcat1on opera~ions" _\. 11.c-.1 so?". tt3am va.s established w1t.h KO!f.t.,U:-1 PIOCC and J'TOt",., fhe 2· 8t.h !r,f ant.ry (Mec.h) re•. urned !:rom lat. Drig.ide con':t'01 and as~umE:'d "wr..c u<:cur ty m)n:;.lon for Highway 14 .;: KONTUM pacif1cat1on supp<.~rt in the vicinity of PL~I OP/PL;t.I Oo and at the end ()f Au8l~M.J al so assur.lt'd S'2·cu.rl.t.y Tespons1oilit.y for High­way 19~ from l'L~IKU t.o .Brl.tigt' #JO. The l·J22d Infantry moved from its screom.ng m1s~1on nC\rth and WE·f.1. o! POL~! ~G and. 1n1tiated search and ~. ~ . ea.I opera+!ons on ;.rhat is refe!"red. to as tr.e PUIIW lk•c. ~et Box (ZA l45J)o Thl s move released an ARVN Ranger Bat.talion fTo?l a secur! ty rol€· tC' ;,:. J4M ·: t.s de~l <'YmEcnt to BAN ~ THUO'I for seart: h and destroy op~rat.l ot &,, !Ceieping a u.n! t in the area n."rth ... west o!' ~IKU $lgr.lf1cantly redu.ces t~e threat. of 122mm rcckets be1ng .. flred against thls ma~c.! pop~ atlon t::enter a.rd its aosocu.t.ed m.ilitary i'ac!.l ! .~J~eslJ · The l~·l2t.h Infant.ry ccnt1n,;.~d opentions agaJ.nst atay ber-1nd e1 E-ments of t.h'!' K- 4 Battall.on 1, 24th NVA R9glmer..t i.:l the ~I MHONG a!"ea w1 t.h C:tDG fo:r· ... t1ts f,..<'m r.hat cu,po A ba.tt.al1on size ~om-b! ned operat: on wa.s :;or1duc.1.ed. with C!DG forces 1n the moun~aJ.ns weet oi ~~I MBONG, In't ftlllge~.r.- e 1ndlcai.ed the presence o! a f'.'..ompa.ny size NVA fct-ce A.t.d a. resupply ~ot:.t.e in t,he areao No contact -.a& made $ the ~n~my successfully avoided detect1on. On 2) August 0 ~RP 2C enBag-.d sn ?JVA squad. Gun6h1ps ci.lld art1l lery were employed in suppr.-r1:. resultlng ln 9 NVA k~.lled an.d no friendly casu&lt1ea.

O~i!i:-a.~.!M;. PL'Tll.AH TICER l'aa brcugt~ to "'- su~cesaful close on 22 Sep•,,ezabeT ~ rl1max1ng a.."\ operat! on wt'-..!c t .. bgan on 22 AprU as the NV..\ "Suuer. Off'ens::·.·· ~· "&8 :n~.t1ated W4..t.h the 24t.h W!A Reg1ttent mov1ng e"st out of t~e CHU PA MC'cnta~ns towaTd Hi~h"ay 14 1n ~onju.nct1on v1th th• 25th a.rd 66tr~ NVA B~glmeDts c IN' .. .. r.~r1 . t,C'Warcl DAI ro. Th• f1v. aon~h operat1on 0 deslg&l~ to k~e~ ~iBhw1y 14 op!n to m111ta.ry and c1 v11 ar. tr~ fie. 11 d.e$troy ti'i~ &1 uents of the 24th NVA Reg1aent

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AV .llUH ·GC.· ·MB CONFIDENTIAL AOEC1969 SUBJ~T~ O~era~,lol'). ,;.' ! RE'port - LPsscr.s ~arned 4th Ir.~ a"' ... ~ . D1v.l.s1on

P~ r~ c, ,~. ~~~nc:. 1 .ri.1~ J.l Ck~tClbt\r l.969u RCS CSFOR.-1>5 (H~) 1,1. J

op~Yra1. lf>F ~n thr- al"'P:a. 0 protec.'t ~,b.e populatlon and assl.s1. ln i ... ll~'.L'U11 Provtn!"a p;s.c..·~fl('a.tlon effo.rts sc>u.thwaet of KONTUM I&sul 1 .. ed 1.n .'6z NVA. KlAL) l;~ POW/ P.OJ CHANJi l, l '),.1 n)unds of mortar and roc:k:et mWl1 .. #

UN".S and l J,.9i8 rour.C1s d . sm.;iH arms capturedo Use of Home Pl ow and do2,e!·~. ,lgain~t the~ r:.umewu& bi;.nker- complexes :t.ound l.n the Jungle res1:.l.t~d 1n thf.1 dest,...t .C". t.l.cm. of 4' 0979 fortl.flcaaonso denyl.ng the en~~·r S;lJe access to Highway 14 ar.id pro·~.1 .d.lng the loc.a.l. 1nhab1tants 11.'.a.n,.v acres or :: p · ~u r.ir::a. for cul~· 1··~ at1or..o It'rl~n.dJ.y lossf::t& were 81 k.1l°H'd ar"d 2:..5 tit'c:undedo S ~ r-r..e the 24th !"VA R'='g.1ment b~d on1y two ba1.ta.11C1ns, lt.. was cN~si.dered combat lneffti0tive as a resu1t of con ... t.rnu~d cor\'ta~·: t~ w ~ .... h t he 2d B!"1 gade :\.n May a.r.<i. wi.thdrE:-wJ '~to '-+.s sanc-­t.uar1e~0 leav1r.g ·r.~h3.nd only a token fo.r~; eo .i)ial.nµ; s~ptemnuro tr!6 2d Dr .l gad~ r~l C(';a t.ed t.o Carr.p Hri.dcllf'f w1 th 3 i'AC CP at LZ HAlW TJM~S.., The 1··12t.h 1.nfan1.r-,y 0 wh!c.h had been astride the hadit.1onal NVA routes t,c, Hlghw.ay 14!, was plac.~d under th~ operat.iona.l control of the 1.73d Atrbc1rr.e BrJ.gade and mov~d to LZ &NGLISH for subseq,u.ent ope't'at.ions l.n the AN LAO 'Va11.eyo On 2.l September 0 the brigade began an assault on Base Area 226 wt.ti" the c:.ombat assault of A and C Com~ par..1es·0 l ··22d Infantryo The operation,. PUTNAM TIGER 0 involved the 3 .. 8+.h ~nfarrt.ry!> 1L·22d Infan1.ry and B ·eompany 0 l ·-69th Armor {~}o The onerat:on was desl.gned. to d1scrgan.l ze and scatter the 18th NVA Reg1meintal €~.~mants l.n t4he Base Area 0 thu.s 0 rel1.e·ving any threat to tl".at .PC-rt!.on of Highway 19 betwBen AN ~ and QUI NHON and the rich ric:e c:oasta.l are~. sout.h of PHU MYo · Two major combined operations were rondu.cted 1n~olvl.ng 2d Brl.gade u.nits with two CSF companies from P~~I MRO.NG 1n t.he CHU PA Mou.ntains and Wl.th th~ 2d Battal1on 0 42d A.RVN Re.gimer.a.t. a.round Ba.se At:ea 2290 '.l'hese wer~ highly su~~cessfu.l and con~11nued th'3 ev~r 1 ncreas:..n.g cooperat1.on/ coord.inat.J.on between the 4th Inf'ant.r.y ill.vis~ on and II Corpso

Dur1n.g 0<, tci ber 0 Opna tl on Pl TTN AM COUG~ continued the assaltl t on Base Area 226 a.ltd t.f:lrml .r~ated on 28 Or..tobero The c:cord.lnated opera­tlor1s of US/ GVN fo:-·ces effec.h vel y d~sorgar,.l zed the el.ement,,s ·of the 18th NVA Feg1.ment. and force·d them to sca't.ter. i.nto other areaso Com­bined ope!atlons with the CRID f"Com 2 October untn 19 October were extremely succE'ss:ful ln. that caches of equipment were uncoveredo These 1ncluded 90 Mau.ser c.arbl.nes and SKS r.H.l.es 0 20 AT nunt.~s 0 80 AP mlnesu six 7.5i!1m RH. rcunds 1• 57 0 460 small arms rounds 0 2 MAS-36 riflesp one 9mm m:...~hinesun, 6. 4.K·-47 .rl.fle-s 0 OM p ... 38 p:\.stC'l 0 t.wo 82m.il mor._. ta..rs v 400 82rr.fll ·1to'f'tar rounds a.nd ~02 Blrnm mortar rounds 0 5 light machine~so l ·apa ..... 2 rocket 1 aunr;hero 23 RPG-2 :rounds 0 twent.y-...sl.x 120mm mor1.a.r rounds,, l CHICOM mach1r:tegun 0 ?60 12, (nun rounds ana 5, 590 lbs of nee., US losses were 4 KIA and 14 wIAp while the enemy suffE:1teJ 91 l<IA and. one prl soMro The dJ scovery and location of the caches 1ndicatta that th~ eneU\.V ur.1ts had b~en planning significant

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CONFIDENTIAL 14DEC 1969 . AVDDH--·GC-MH SUBJ~Ta Opera·tional Heport - L~esons Learned 4th Infantq .;l v!.sicn.

Period ~nd1ng 31 October 1969v RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

offensi~e c~erations in the areas of Highway 19 t~ the south and the heavily populateJ. coastal region of BINH DT!~11 Provinceu The equip­ment discoveries have 'very likely preP.:.-,pted and restricted enemy in­cursions into populatdd areas and have had a favorable effect on the population and the J&Cificatlon programo

(e) ):1 il:-j~ca.des The brigade terminated Operation G~Nl!: GALLOP resulting i.n d l-'VA KIA 0 14 detained and 1 ()420 lbs of rice and ) 11 282 rounds ~f small arms ammunition captured or destroyedo The 1-lOth C~valry moved to the 1st Brigadeo The l-14th Infantry terminated Operation G~NE ORANGE III on 5 August resulting ln 8J INA KIA, 6 POW's 0 S3 detained and 21 weapons~ 7JJ lbs of rice and 1,56 struc­tures and fortifications captured or destroyed" The l-J5th Infantry terminated Operation G~lE AX on 5 August resulting in 12 NVA KIA 0 .

11 POW's and 11 detained; 5 weapons ~ five 122-mm rocket boosters, sixteen 60·-- mm r.iortar rounds and J08 structures and fortifications were captured or destroyed , With ~e termination of these operations 0

Operation GmlBN~ AC~ was initiated involving all elements of the . Jd Brigadeo .l!:mphasis was placed 01* combined operationsD Two major . combined operations of battalion size were conducted involving the l-42d ARV!~ Battal.ion 11 HF/PF and CIDG, On 14 August 11 as a combined C;.JFfand Company B11 l .. 14th Infantry !'orce terminated a PLh:IKU Sec-tor controlled operation and were ;;ioving out of the area of opera­tions 0 an ammunitton cache was found consisting of .... llJ 32-mm and JO 6Q ... mm mortar rounds and 14l1000. rounds of small arr.150, Pacification in PrIU NHON and THANH AN D1str1.cts were supported on a: ·continuous basis by elements of the l· .. 14th and l-J5th Infantry.,

'!' Operation G~NE ACE ccntinued during September with the ·enlarge~

ment of the brigade area of operations to inclu'1~ Lile a1·\~a 2rexious-ly occupied by the 2d Brigadea This change came about during the latter part of September when two major adjustments of the Division area of operation took placeo First 0 the 24th STZ resumed Highw~ 14N security from the. 2d Brigade with the Jd ARVN Cavalry 0 .and sec­ond~ the 2d Brigade penetrated Base Area 226 and subsequently moved its entire headquarters ihtv the BIHH KHE a.reao The 2-8th Infantry (Mech) came under the op~rational control of the Jd Brigade upon departure of the 2d Brigade and was enployed along Highway 19 0 securit7 force for MARY LOU while it was being clos~d out 0 and as a aaneuver force west of PLEIKUo There were numerous platoon and company size combined operations leading to a continued increase in 'RF/PF and CSF combat effectivenesso The l-l4th :: lfantry and the l··J5th Infantry continued 'Bl/PF training programs in PHU NHON and AN THUC Districts, Tbe M-16 transition training was one of the most iaportant portions

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AVDJH -· X JM~! CONFIDENTIAL ttOE C 1969 .. SltD.~~Te Opsr;~t.~L,r: ·.11 t~ef,\J!'t. . . 1.~ss0ns l;t-arned 4th In!am.r" ).' j ·. ·s:·n

Ptrlou ">lcU.ng ) ... 0".'t-Obf,r 1969v RCS GSFOR-6.5 (R2) (U)

of "th~ s prvg"'arto Ar.. att.:irk by fne vas conducted a3a1nst the CP~ f

l ·--J)th Ir.iar.t.ry at FB GYPSY on 16 Sep1.e-mber.o Thl.rt .. y rounds of m~X"d 75mm r!collless r!f a~ ard 82mm mortar rounds were rece1vedo Thr~e · · US we re wounded ln thi) shf li lnJ;u .Phree secondary ex~losions were • cbserved as a re~ul t of i: ount.,er. mortar !.1r~u Ori 29 Sept.ember ti west. of the CHU PA I) B Compa.r..y 1. 2- J 5tc Iri anny minus al"d a PL~l DJER.~HG CSF r ompany made c.. ont . ~c t \J .! tr. ar. ectl mat.~d NV.A -~ompa.ny o ·rh'3 Recon ..... na1ssant:'e Pla"f..O(' ft al'.'d C Co1npany 'l"E\lnforc~d t,r,F. six hour cont.ac..to R'?.5Ul ts were 2 US Kl A a"id 8 1{1Jq 25 HVA we.re Kl.Ao To assl st. in the securny of BLT PRANG and BAH Ml!.! THUOT at~~ n A CompanY r· 2· -· J5th Infantry wa~ p.~ .aced unde: t~h.f. c-pe:ra-t.l.ona::.. ('_ ontrcl of Dlv~ sion Task Force FTGHT~H along w1th :e an.d D 1'roops r, 7 ·-·:..?\.h Cavalry u

Ope!at.~.or1' GRE~N~ ACE 1.e.rmlnatP.d on 16 0::;\c•ber and rel lnqul shed a larg~ part of the weste~r ssctor of thelr area ~f operation to the 1-.:0-th Cavalry wc1ch. p un.d.er D.l.v1sfon. cont~ol 0 l.nlt!ated a scr~nrng opera1 l~n ll KRA.fu:R ~HI'X'.U: 0 des:gned to pree:.1.uds inf:H trat.ion c:L. ;_nl.ts frorr. CA}IBOD1A lntc; 1.he D~ ~~ : s~ on S(»cured areas a The ' search and. cl ear/ pacif! . .-::atton operations of +/·"~,:\ Jd 'Br-:1. gad~ we~·P.i redeslgnat~d C..~NE BEAR, In the PLE! MFOHG arerl ~n 19 October at, 0835 11 C Company a 2 ... 3th. Inf an~ry (Me~h) rec;el vtl sm~ l B.!"ms a.r.d B·--40 f1rP.. fr.om a well dug in eriemy forc-.~o The or..~ hour and t.wen.ty m1.nute contact resulted in 2 US K!A 0 3 WlA ar.d 2 enemy K1.A 0 l AK·~·47 and l B .. 4Q C;apturedo At 1207 A Company ~· while attempting 't.o rel.n!orce. C Compa~y t1 recelved small arms a.nd mortar fire from an unkn.owr' s1.ze enemy forceo Contact, was · majnt.ained untn 1)12 arld resu.J.t.ed n 4 US K!AI) 16 M'IA ar.1.d 14 NVA KIAo Strong enf.my a.r, t!.on {.ontlnue'i: in the PLEI MBONG areA- resul t1ng • in the 2·--8t,h Infantry (Me·c-h) b~ing ")1.ac.ed ur..der. t·he <'P~~at.1.onal' c.cn ... t.rol of ihe Dlv'isl.on on 20 0 ;~.t.~b~.r an.d i.n1Hatl.n.g Op(:!:ratl.on HODGES BLACKo Spoiadic con.tac~ r.ont1.nued j n tr .. ~ . s area.,. Or.·. 21 Or,:tober at 1705r· B Oompa.ny 0 2 ... 8th Infan·r.ry (Mech)i, whHe at,1,,Amp+.ing to recovel\_ an armored personri.el c.arr1eru re~~e1.veid smal). az·mso automatic weapon and B ~40 f1.!'6 from an ur:iknown s!.z~ enemy fo.rceo Gi..\..'l.Sl'::1ps 0 ta.ct.ical aircraft and artillery supported the. 1nfiurr .. ry as trey closed with the enemyo \lrl.er. th_, ene.,...~ broke r..ontac.t a.t4 174;,, 24 NVA bodl.es were coun.t.ed and f .rl.end.ly l.os~es wera. l KIA ar..d. l #IAa Or. 2) October 11 A Company found 40 la"r·~e! foh ,.f'1.c:at1.ons 1.n a ~mall a.tea all connec.ted with (·07ilmnr..H·at.i.ons w.l.rFto TM.s ls be.Hev~d to have been a 1' '~ g1 rnenta.1. or bat ta!! on CP <'om pl ex. ~· o nt.rol.l1r.g the en.gaged f orc.E'So In ne bunker lJ NVA bod.~es were c:cun":.edu Cc·ntac t con.1.l.nueci unt.11. the er~ ·:-I Octo ... ber anc!. resul t.ed in 4 l'S KIA o l? ~HA,, ar·d 70 enemy KIAo Th.-7e.ogage ... mer.t of t.his unit l.r. th.E\ PL£I MRONG are.a has seriously d~.sr\-i>ted plans for int.erd'ict1.on of Hlgt-i.way '-._., and coordinated a.ttacka on ?LiIKU 0 •

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.· CONFlDENTlAL ADEC1969 AVuDH.uGc-MH

SUBJ~CT~ Ope~:itionaJ Rflpor~ - l.e ~sor · .· · :_: Yr ~· ~ , ....

Perl od End! ng ) l Oc. 1 . ~ ,bar ' n(.o ~1 ; _' ~ rsFOt~ ·t'antry Dl vision ,, (R2) < !.1)

KONTUM and US nstal a+..1ons l n t..r~ t, . ··.; ~' · fr ~ ror\.!nued us~ of Rome· Plowe 1n destro~n.ng the n·u.me. rou~ l:'.ur.ke-"" ar.d fon~. f .1-:-a1 ~ on compl.ex&s l.n '"l'1~ · area wHl d.eny ~. he er.P.m,y fTP.fl .aC'('ess t. r.. H1· eh'-'a,Y 14 and provi.de l v. , .. ~. inha'tfi tant.s add.l ttonal c.ul '· l'' atl en are.aso fhE! 1 ack of con~.:-..1.r t perrr.! t.­ted a greater effort ·t.o be. dH~~~ed. "tC'Wa. .. d pa•·J f li: at1on pro3ra.ms 11

cl.vie action and tra!.n.i ug (.f ARVN C"•lem~·n.,., s l.n th~ 0·PE.i£NE B~AR al·aa of .operat.!.onso· Th.1 s trRj nlng has errharl ~.ed -+.r.e i;;·omba r Aff ec t .1:1eness of the VIETNAM~SE ur. :.ts 1 mrol ved u and. th~ t ther programs have engendered addi.t1onal. conf1den(': e from t.he pf.'o pl € l .n t he gov err.Jllental programso On 20 CK.tober 0 the Jd B:rlgade ar.d. the. 42c ARVN Regiment 1.n1t1at.ed Opera.t1on GUI.NT THAHG }5/GREENE BULL~T ln •he CHU PA area with the l ·- J.5th an.d } ·l.2t-h In.f ~.n.~:ry L\ ar.d thf.t 2d a.fld. Jd Bat. t a!.ions ti 42d Regimont~·o Thi.s operati.onl) des1gned to lnt~ !'ude i..nto a knC'wn enemy sanctuary 0 was

, preceded by a one week al"t~:ll )er.Y pr~pa:r~:T.ioo of· m·we than 9 0000 rounds, 141 t.actical alr sorties 11 and .~4 'E ·- ·52 s•:--1"t.1eso ':t'h&re ...,as little enemy actl vi t.y unt.l.l 29 Ci: H·b'3r a1. 104·5 whE-1n u· ~ 2d .Plat.oon ryf B Compa.ny 0

} ·12th Infantry was -:ngaged by ar. ~st,J.mat.ed two· pl atoor..s of NVA/VC 1n bunkar.~·o They weir+.' r e1 nfor.ced b:t ;) C.orn.pax.i.y o Supp.nt was provi.ded by arti.llery 0 gunshlps a.n.d tactlca~. a.i.ro · • Con1~ar:;}· b:·oke at 16000... Re­sults were 2 US KIA 0 12 WI.A and 8 NVA Kl Ao On JO an.d Jl Octo bar 0

contact cont.i.nued 1n 1;h." C.HU PA so~ e.ly 1n. thE=i }·12th Ir.fantry area.o On the morning of .'30 October n t,he CP· l.ocat ~, on rec.e1,,·ed small arms and 82mm mortar f i:reo ~lgh-....een US were w:::.und.ed cy t.he mortarso On Jl O~tober 0 A Comp~y rec •?.:i ved 511'.al .l am.s and. B· 40 fl.re and 0 Company made cont.a.ct wit.h an est.: ma te.d ~1:1eimy pla~:oon :· ,ei elemento l'he in­creased er.a.eomy a.c t~ .on lnd.~ .. ('atod 1 hat a majc-r b• .s~ arA-a h;id been pene-. t.r.ated and ,...ont.inu.ed d.l.s-:-uptlon of t hl s a.rea. m . .. '-' tireempt en.emy of fen­si ve operations 1rA No~·ember t"' t.he. east. by t,he : 6)1.st NVA Composit~e Battali~n. ·

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(2) The following OPLAN:~ " ·;·_;·..-. ~Y; b : •. ;.:red dur.tn.g the rep<?rting period8

(a) OPLAN 69 .... 69 0 dated 5 .August~ 1969 0 classf1ed SECfil.-ir 11 • will,fot. be discussed i.n 't~hls :.-~pol't . o

(b) OPLAH 2~69 (SP.R~INS ii HITE) ti : 'dated 12 44'August 1969 o· cl&aaified S~Cb"""T and wi~l not be d!.scussed 1n t.~! s Y~~ctrt o ··

( c) OPLAN 2 ~,..69 (STEEL CABLl!; CHAilli!~) 11 dated 19. Au~st 1969 0

class1.f1ed SECB~'T. a.rd v.Hl n.01. be dl.s.· ussed 1.n thi~a r&~rt, · ·

~d) · OPLAN 2.6 ... 69 (ST~ CilLE ALPB'A) 0 dated JO August 1969 9 clas-~1f1ed S~ffi3.1T and will not be. ·di.s~ussed 1.n thls re~rt.-

(e) OPLAN 18J~69~ da+.er 1 t ~') :~ f. 1: ber 1969 0 cl ua1f1ed. SJs1C&'T0 ~111 ·not bt diiacuased l.n th1s ""'" ~· ... t ,

CONFIPENTIAl

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A':L~Ja CC M~ 40EC 1968 SUD"l~C l' ~ '.lpe·:ar.i ona.: R~port. . Les:.lon!j Learned 4th Inf::~r: . 1.~ .-.. · t'-~· ., !.,.; .. : • •

P.:.\ ri~d ~nd:.nt_; Jl Oc• .. cber 1.969 L) FCS CSlt"'QR. 65 (lfL) \l.'1

(f) OPLAN ;~7 09v J a1.ed. ? :Jt!pi ember l969 tJ classlfled CO;~FIDE.~ : : ~,~·o 7J n.6 plar! 01:+.J 1ne;:, ai: t.icns r~qul.red of t.he Division Support. Com1ria.11.:' :.n t.~·.~ e ~rt of damage ;~sult.ing from Memy attack and/or darnage caused Dy r.a + ur a..' J~. 3ast.t.> ::· -=~ ~ . c Ca rr.p ~rar ~ ...

(e;) O?LAN 23 69 (iiLAZ~) 11 d.<a.t.t.~d. 29 Sepi.embe:r l.969 1, classified co:.FID.@N1'IA1 I Tr.~ s pl ar. reql~l ~~ t!S t.h~ .J1 V.1 s1on tc· organL~e Q.Ild ,LJre­par~ to d~p: ... ·y a 400 man. +.emporary reac.tjon force composed of rear detac.hment 1>erscnne'J u

(h) 0.21.AN )O· 69 L, d.~.~.c.~d. 4 Qr.k,ber 196Q ,, c.t..ass1.f1ed GO.~lt'ID~rJTIALo The Di vis1 en would prepare to re1nf orc.e artillery pos1 tions/FSB {· s in the BUPRANG/iXIC LAP area on orde-::- o

(i) OPLAN 29 ... 69 ( ~nA~3.u;L d.a1_. ecl 26 Od.ober 1969 L· classified Cul·~FID~Nl'UL ., !he Di.vision :reinfcrr.es combined defensive forces in the ?L~IKU dehnse cc·:nplex.,.

(a.) The following clcso al.r support ml.ssions "'ere fl.o~n in sup-port of Operat1.on D1W QUY"~N HIN~Sll l August .... Jl ~tober l969a

TYPE :·I.3N REQ FI.O'.iN SOHTIE F4 F:..oo Al.E AC .. 47 Cll9 B··-5? .:\)? A4

FAC PP FAC ma C33 PP CSJ lMrt SPOOKY I100N.3Hiff~ SHAJO.V Cl JO TO£AL

2250 275 550 J7J 18 6 8 8 y;sa·

990 2(1 141 lOJ )8 6 8 8

144c:' .,,

1985 70Q 626 102 9J2 210 120 212 250 45 87 6 169 . 96 73 18 6 8 ~

298~ io~o· 90~ 320

(b) Bomb Jamage Ass~&~m~nt

l 8 6

24

8

8

5

.5

li!S'.f ~~ , ::; s~c. AA ROJ\D TYP~ HSN KB.A BK.RS Fiil~ ~X.PL

!4·0 106

i4 57

JJ J2 B 2

PSN S'rH.t BaDG cur

2 2

l.95 209

12 l

FAC PP F'AC Il1~·I CS3 PP CSS UL"t rorAL 146. :~~ 4o ~ r;

·~nr!~~~~~~ey· 'lnl lllit~ ··~i ~!1.Dt1.L~ · UH

4o4 -l)

24

15 518

112

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AVDDIL~ 40EC1969 SUB.Ji£T3 Operational Rfi}Xll'·t, ... w~· tH:·iU• Lurned. 4th lnt•t.11t~ DiYiaion

P~r:lo4 Ending J l Oc:tober 1969t> RCS CSFO!b65 {R2) (U) .

(s) B-52 Str!i.e§& !b5~ 0 1 11tr,J.d' kn<*P baee area.8 9 infiltr.i.tirm routea£> atroog .P¢1.llt.!.9 and ma.jog· NV! he•.ct,~no Bi01Jl Prim1r/ u.d Second&r7 atrikea were delive~•d in nupport ot OJ)'~&tion DAB QUYEN -IJtNESo 'l'h. following tigurH ahov tJl• nwabu or atrike1 c.D.rried out duriDB th• .r~por:t:L"i p.wriods

TIPE M.!SSIOB u:~s SORTIES

PBlMARY ::'} 107 SECONDARY U·, ~·6~ TO'rAL ~SJ 170

(4) T?"dniugs Ttle 4th lntant~ Tr·ainiq Detachment trained a total. ot 49222 US ~nlbud msn 0 :)86 US 1.>f'ticera and 1S6 VIE'l!U.MF.SI enlisted men duri~ tht- np~rt.1Dg .periOO.o

(a) The Nolll=Clomm!aaioneid Otfi~or Combat Leadership oourae gr£duatAd 98 9tudenUlo

(b) TM replacaunt, cnmmittee trained ) 9875 enlisted men and 586 ottiGerlo

(G) Th• ~Rt~ondo School graduated 135 student.so Ot thea•0 19 attended th• MACY Re~om.d.o Schoolo

(d) The Speoial Training Secti¢n trained 39 aniper•o

(~) Tvo spe~i~l ~lasse~ on pa.trolling v&rG ooodueted. tor base camp peracnnel rti.1ulting in 33 enlisted gndU&teilo

(t) Tlw Boeonnaiuancie Platoon9 id B&ttalion11 35th lntautQ' r•~•ivod the tvolv• day ~eeonnaissan~o ~ourato

(g) Tho RF/PF and Kit .Carson Sc.out programs contiDuodo RF/PF gr&dua.ted 112 students and 44 Kit Carsen Sooui. graduatedo

(h) Ruplacement training will b6 incroa.Hd trom 3 to 4 d.qa duriq th• n.zt qua.rtero Additional markamanoh.ip9 pa.trolliq11 HVA taotic1 and base cup detense oouraes will be ineludedo

(S) Chemioalo

(a) The Diviei'>D Chuical Section ~rt'o1'118d H a it.art 1ection t.nd u &D operat11Ji eect~oco The Chemical Section and 4.:!d Chemical Detaah-11e11t operated extueivelJ in the emplo1J119nt or Riot. Control -'i•'1tl .

Cr.:• ·~sA~"!I . J4 tf,,~~ All F! ~ Jtl. J.AL .. Iii ~il\~~f' '·tZ:!'. C:t • . ... • ~- w~· •" \i . Wll'

25

AVD~ 4DEC1969 SUP.JIC•s Operat1Cl.~l He~rl "" L3&1ooe l.aar.alfwd .4th Intantr, );?~don

Perie~ iod~ 31 Ootober 19690 RCS CSFOR-6S (i.2) {~/

(RCA)D aupt-nidOD anq conduct ot b.rbicide operationsv anC. th~ opet'C) ation and maiilten&il·O• ot Airborne P·.raonne.l Det.e<tor (APD) ~'l.\ 1=e:uto In addition9 training vaa conduoted in Cl:R i-.adiDeea and UH Gt tJt~ dard and tield expedietlt flue weaponsn l'b• chem.i<>.al ASP ope-rated b ~uppor·t or D.i ridon mbdono and alao supported Di visioaal uni t1 ait requir~do

(l.1) TRAILL1UST de!oliaticn mi1ruiions inca."eased over the previoue reportJ.ng per1ltld11 whll·• hel:kopter detol.l.at.fon m1ss1ona deoreaeed .o Th• inonu~ 1Jl TRAl.LDlTST mia~ionn 1~ 1tt:ribt~ud . to impra'f'ed vei.ther oonditiona ovor th~ ar•a or operaticn~o Th~ JJaljQr ity of TRAlLDUST miHiona werei now ill BIW Dl~li ~·vinoe 0 whe~ the monaoo». season TariH aomtwha t in ocourrencie •'i th that ot 'the remainder ot the arN. ot operatJ.onao The decre&H 1'l helicopter d~fol!at.lo'!l ailaione ii a ttributtd to the laek i0t h$rb1:!}idet ancl ~ili tical olearanceo Se. Inclc1ure 5 ft)r a swmnary ot detol:J.atiow ope!'ationso

( 1) G~r.al~ t1petki1'g 0 horbicidfle wire not e1Jttioientl.7 availl:> able thro~h ARVtiI euppl.7 ~hannela in quantities to 1upport extenaiT• helicopter employmento

(2) Beginning. 1 <1'11¥ ~9$9 political olearanee to_r the U4>lo7-ment ot herbicidM vaa ditticul~ to obtaino At that time!) the •P­proved arna in KOJITUM9 ~D 'and Blmi DINH ProvilhcH v•re dra1c­tical.17 nduced ill siHo The Divilioo Ch•ld.cal Seotioo hat pre.pared a atudy requ•uting 111)n extensive are•• tor em.pl.CJ1D&nt ot berb.icidM. Partial approval baa be.n obtainedp and complet• approval ia ~ced.

(~) Riot. Cont.rol Aient (ROA) munitiou were exteube~ emplo7ed in, 4,ireo't. suppcirt, ·ot combat OP9ration11 and aip.if'ioantlJ.iD.creaaed the ett.ct1nneu at. tir. eupptt;lf·to. BCA targ~ta v•re located b7 aped.al , intelligence a~t1viti•&J necesa&rJ ol~•ra.n~e• vere Prooe11ed bJ Divilion l~ Support Coorc!aatioc Element (FSCI) J and m1111ona V.re o=dueted. bJ' the Divilicn Cbdical S.otiono See lnelo1un 5 tor a 1W11D&J7 .ot RCA operatiouo

( 1) Th• aaount of perl11t.tnt OS eaplo;rt-d nearlJ tripled over · ·. · · th&' of · t.i"-ii ~iJ)g r•~rt perioAo Th• Cheaioal Section eapl.07~ · · 1P126 dl'UM agaiD1t targ•ta iD ' "~ PLBI TRAP Vallq 0 iD tb9 T101nit7 of ·CHU · PRO.~ Mountdn~ and VC Vallqo Pnma wre •pl07od bJ" air drop troa OB-47 btlioopter1 qd.Dat. illtiltr.tion route19 vq 1\atione" b\m­br•o ·~0 and aa..uq and al.111~ a.nu to 'dea, their UH to 1ibe en_,.o IAtelllcence •ourcea 1.DditatAd aajor en_, IMn'IMDt avq

fna looaticu 1A vhiGh ciJ f~DENf 1At~· . 2' :.· ... : . .

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. . CO~!fmE~U~_1Al · ~o·ec1969-AV DUH .• ·GC -·MH -t

SUB • .TECr ~ Op"!'!'cl t, <'na: J-'.q~ ··· ... 1. .. . 1, .. : :;scr~ •.. l:-' ~· -.r: , .. , ~- ._:. t.r I:.. l ' ar.t.ry i):· v~ _s1on

PHH'd ~r~d"ng }l Ot:.tcb_,r 1969 ; HCS ~SFOil · 6c. (R2) (n

(Z) Nonpt-n.i stent CS was P.rup~! eyed 1 n tbe form of XI-Al 5 ("''... .S:.Ht:., CS Canister c· .... ·. ~;terfi" ~;mployme~: .... l.' f CS enha.nr~ ed the effer. t.heness oi g:round op~r-ations . , art.1j1ery t. +act.lca i. aJ.rstrl kes 0 Wld. B-..52 :raid:-; " The Chemical 3ec tlt'n t~inployed 9'/4 Xlfl ') cl ust~rG du'."'1 rig t.hi:· p~::ciodo

( d) Airborne Personnel v~t~c~.ox (AP.D) C'lpH~t.1 on.s ctlntl uue to ba cent.rally controiled frcm t.he dl. · .11~1on Lase ra11·p .. To er.hanre flex· 1bU1ty .1 however., one APJ a!\J. ope.::a.tor have be~n dt.-at,a.Ued t.o He adquar~ tei·s 1• 1st. D·n~ade t.o s1:ppc·rt operat.loos 'n BIHH DIHn Province ., Another AP.D and optn:.·at.or ~1avt~ bt:-cn d.etalle(i t.c- t.he advl.SL'ry element of H~ad- ·

q Ud.rter~ 11 2·1~ th clp,~c. lal Tac' l.cal Zc;ri.e t.o ~uppc,.s: 1~ op~ rat ions t.h.roughout 1.he 24th 8T ~ . 1 The Dl v l sloP.. · 5 APD t~2.m (SCOHPTOi~) continues to operate as a :four &hip hunter killer team t; om posed of 2 A.H-l gunships and 2 QH ,.6 light observation h(~HcfJr/\. ers , h,lli) ml asJ ons du:: ing the reporting period r4ere 172 ln August 1: .i06 l.n Sept.eim btn· 1• and 179 in Octobero

(e) Tt:.e Dlvlsion became 1.-he ftrst unit 1.n RVN to reC'-eive the Xl'U.91 ~'1ultlsho1 ?ortabl6 l"lame .ieapci.. The sy st.em is a. four shot~ u

roc.kat propelled 11 shonlJer- .t l.1·ed weapono It ls capable of firi.ng four incendiary rocket.s at ~;he rat.(~ cf one pt'T' second and bej ng reloaded wit.h new roc~et i::l1p:;;J In Ck~.ober 1; a New ~q_ulpmeni. Training Team 0

assisted by the fiivl.sJ.on Ct.eml.<".al Sect.1.orA condu.ct.ed training tn the oper.ation and malntena.nce of the weapon 3yst.em., The weapon has been distrlbuted to field unl ts and ls presently under evaluationo

(6) Research a.."".d l"ve:i.opmentu Ihms of equipment eva.l.ua.t.ed during the report1ng peri~d w~re&

(a) Ma.."":ginal 'l'e.rrain A.ssa1.1lt Bri ,l~>.= . (::~::ztr.:r: 34.) s T'nls it.em was tested by the 2d Ba~talion 0 3t.h Infcw.t.ry fer a period of· oO days with the iollcwl.n~ comment.s~ The MTA3L was found to be effective for a variety of mechanized m1ss:.ons du.!1.ng the d.ry sea.son 0 nowever 0

duriag i:.he wot season the MTABL ~as fcund t.o be 11:n;it.ed in tttmployment due to t.he ad.ditlor..al. we1~;ht c! t.he •:ehldf) ,> and the bridge tended to shift ur.de-r 1.oajs \,)n we~. K":1.11Jnd .. The l'Tl .. untenanc.e on the vehicle was ef'fer.:t.ivdy ac.compHshed at ba.t.t.a.licm leveil 1, and the final report wa.a a recommendation to accept t.he MTA.BL;

(b) Mine Boller MlA~ ThlS ltf.fm was e\Pal.uatecl fer a. per1od of 60 d.a.ys by the 4f.h Eng1ne~r Battalion ~1 tr. the foll.lw1n0 commeDtsa The ground clearanre was no+.- at.~l;.~1.e to M~(\ti.at~ the t.erra.in 1n this area of o 4.'era-:;.ien,. The '+.~·.c s1cn dru:ns ar~ not flex1 ble enough to allow tra.vd over AVJ;B or :Bailey typ~ 1ridges:· the structu.re frame and auppori arms were f'!l : <j_ Y;..U. l mproper st.cuct.ural ;:ia.tet'ial that caused strur. tural f a.1lureu The bearln~s of· thH l nd.1 vidual road wheels showed

C~:~mnrnTIAL

,.

CONFIDENTIAL . . . AVDDH- GC-MH 40EC196S . SUBJECTa Opsut.1onal Heport = LfJssons Learned 4th Infantry J)~ .,, s> on

Period J!;ncllng Jl October 1969v HCS CSFOR-65 (R2' <1 )

excessive wear, even with r•peated lubricat1on 0 and the two c~v ~ s that had th~ m1ne roller on them showed exceso1vo track and spror.ket wearo The recommendation tias that the mine roller be engineered to overcome the noted def1cie.1cies and be attached to C~V instead of tank s o

(C') ANTJOC S1ght1ng Systl'm XM-76 (~SUR.i!:224)~ It was tested !or a 60- day period by the 4th Infantry D1vis1on Art.Ulery and the follow ... lng comm~nts are of fereda There were no s1gn1f1cant maintenance prob­lems dl..lring the te3t.1ng periodo The Ollly deficiency was that the ::light­ing system had a tenden~y to fog up during abrupt temperature changes and would on occasion b~ un~u1table for use fer one and one-half hourso when operational 0 the system provided exc.ell~nt. s1~hting from a1rcraf't due to the v1.bra.t1on compensating gyrot., ~eco~.mend tnat tnc system have the fogglng tendencies corrected and be accepted for general useu

(d) The follow1.ng items are presently tnder evaluation or are k>rOgT"a.Med fo: e"l·alua.t.1onli

l. ~Iul t1sho1. Fl.a.me weapon XM 191 (.,;NSU~J) o Appeare .sat1::s- · fact;ry~ Can use mozeo

2 factory,

l

4 -i

2 z ~

i

~

11. d,

(1)

ARPA Big S~r.een Night V1~wer (~~SUH.b: 2?6) ~ Cm use more.,

Appears ea tis··

M-16 G:enade Retaine: Spring (1Wr 6HSlI~) ., l~o equ1;:nento ·

M ... 551 Sh~ridan (NOT ENSU~)a No equ~p13ent,,o

~apa,11ord . XJl.:.)7 (NOT BHSUBi)o lo eq\lipMato

M-48~) Coaaaadera CUpola (BMSURi 2)9). Ho eqad.pa .. \. I

Y-199 Anond Cara (IHSUil 162)0 SaUatactoryo ~ UM •no

rJ.aoreac•\ I.Mp (asuu 2SO). . lo •~'lipauto

Yariable Bod.1 .Armor (NOT EHSWU.:). Ko equipaento

Footgear tor Inundated Areas (DSUB 24?.l)o Ho equipaent.,

XJi...3; A:aueat SubsJatea (INSUBI 22))o 1e· eq\dpnnt.o

LogiaUca

Loginlcal Operat1enm, IWI QUiii - HIDS. . . ...

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\CoN~ID.ENTIAL

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1 CONFIDENTIAL .. ·; Av.6iia ~cc~MH 4 o E r.19s~

SUBJECra Operational Heport ..... Lessons Learned - 4th Infantry Division Period J!.Jlcllng )1 October 196911 RCS CSFOB-- 65 (R2) (U)

(a.) ~1nphas1s contfoued on . ~'tilhation of land lines of commun-1r.:ations (LLOC) throughout the D1v1siou ~ s area of- operations for move­ment of all classes of supplyo with the les~ening of the •onsoon rains in late September and early Octcb~r v road cont1t1ons improved

·in 'the forwa.rd areas whic,h greatly enhanced resupµl ~ O.iJerat1onsu A chang~ ~n tactical posture and i;nprove.d flying cond ~Uons contributed to the increased utilization of air assets (Air t1nea of Communicatioq, ALOC)o

-(b) J.nements of the 45th General Support Group and logistical ~upport act1v1t1es (LSA) of the 59Jd General Support Group 0 QUI NHON Support Comm&ndll continued to pro~"ide logistical support to the 4th Infantry Division 1n Operatl.on lilllESo Additionally 0 support was re­ceived from l.ogist1.cal. support ac.t1v1t1es of CAM RANH BAY Support Command at BAN ~ THUOT~ when a Division task force was deployed to the BAN ~ 'rHUOT area 1n late AuBus to

( c) Forward S'1pport Ele;nent OASIS . con t.1nued to support uni ts oper­ating 1n western PL6IKU Province with Class I 0 bulk and packaged Class III o Class IIIA(I. ba.rrler and construe ti.on mater1.al and Graves Regis­tration during a major portion of the period~ 45t.h General Support Group provided bath and laundry service at this locationo In late October 0 the OASIS was reduced from a b~igade to a battalion fireba.se as the Jd Brigade Headquarters returned to Camp Enario The FSE was withdrawn concurrent with the Jd Brigade relocation a.nd bath and laun­dry fa.cil1.t1.es were :eturned to 45th Groupo A DF2 refuel point was established at LZ !~DITH to support the 1st Bn 0 10th Cavalry r which was conducting screer.ing operations along the CAMBODIAN Bordero

(d) FSE MARY LOU continued to support the Division°s 2d Brigade w1th Class I, bulk and packaged POL issues 0 C~ass III 0 barrier and eonstruct1on materials and Graves Reg1stration 0 for a major portion of the per.icdo QUI NHON Support Comoand operated an ammunition supply point (ASP) at MARY LOU and the 45th General Support Group continued· to· provide ba~h and laundry sarv1ceo In late September0 ~phase out or ?ireba.se MA!l'l LOU itas initiated. The lat Battalion 0 12th Inf'antry was deployd to LZ ENGLISH which became OPCON to the 17'd Alrbome Brigade D and the remainder of the 2d Brigade deployed to the A!i lOii ~tta· for operations in Base Area 226 0 northeast or A:i M6o Laundry . . a.nd bath £ac111 U'l& returned to 45th General Support Group control and.· · : 'the MARY LOU "5P continued to f'unction until late October. · ~·

{e) At :amp a.dcl1f'f (AN i\Hi), support w&s provided bf LSA 'ot QUI NR:>N Support Command and a forward support element (136) operated.. Of the 4th S • T Battalion. Continuous support waa provided to the lat Brigade during the period from these activ1t1ea and teaporary · · auppcrt to'. the 2d Brigade 4L1ring 1 ta operations 1n Bue Area 226. '

·-- - - -- -·-CONFIDENTIAL

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AvouH .. cc-MH . CONFIDENTIAL . 4 DE c 19ss :" SUBJECT& Opera.tionu.l. Heport --· Lessons Learned 4th Infantry u1v1s1.un

Period ~~mg )l October 1969p RCS CSFOH-65 (R2)-(U)

The LSA pT~VldA} supply Classes Io III a IIIA p Yo Graves Registration and laun~IY s~r;Yl~e v Class II & IV suppl1ea and bath aervicea were provided DY the P'SEo

(f) In late October0 the 2d Drigad.e with two infantry b&ttaliona began operations in the AN LAO Valley adjacent to the 17)d Airborne B..:·i gade ar~a of operat.1ons along the coast o LZ ENGLISH became the log1at1cal support base of the ~rigade again 0 with combination LSA/FSi type support,, The LSA augmentrJ. by 4th S & ~ Battalion personnel prov1ded Cl~ss I o III 0 IIIA and, V supplies with the FSi prov1cl1ng Clasa Il &~TV e~pport and bath serviceo Grav•s Registration .and

· laundry fJ&~:~c" .provided by th• FSio

(g) A D1P2 ref~el po1.nt, was opened at Fire ba.se BLACKHAwlC on QL 19 in mld··Oct.ober., Thia point provided fuel resupply to the lat Bat.­t&lion" 69th Armor in support of this unit' a highway security a1aa1on.

(h) Direct support maintenance and meclical companies have · habitually been employed in direct 8\ipport of brigade taak r~cea.

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Suppl.7 and Services~

D1v,1a1on Supply Otfice (JBupO),

ReqU1si tiona received a.

Requiaitiona paaaeda

Requis1t1ona fllleda

Total clue out rele&aeaa

Claaa Io -

u,986 2,578

6,oso

3,105

.~ ll&tiona · Iaaued ( thrH Hal.a per ration) 1

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LOCATION

Cup lnar1

Al lCHI

A RArIONS C RATIONS LRP RATIONS SUNDBY l!ACY

801 0668 8111701 7,008 1,490

42),)S9 80,osa 6,096 1,220

rsi HABY LOU 3690688 29,6os )2,2S6 1,)66

rs1 0&a1• ~~a8SJ.. 27.l'f2 12.672 J..8. TOTAL l,8)luS66 U8,S04 5l,0)2 5,02&

CONFIDENTIAL )0

• • AVDµH GC, -M9 CDNflDENTJAL ·40Ec1969 SUiiJ~CT11 Ope.rct.tlo!'aj R~pc ·rt - les~ons Learnt)d 4tt'l Infantry J1v1sl.on

Period ~ndtng 31 October 1969v RCS CSlt"'QR .. 6.5 (R2) (LI)

bo Headco~nt and numbe~ of A Rations. Brcaks 0 Jl October 1969~

· AN KHE

FS~ MAFY LOU .. FSE Oasl.s

TOTAL

;A_ gg1.0N ffi~A~.

80.111668

42}uJ59

;69 v6e8

?J€&~.

... 8)~ ,, _')A6

l CiaS~ Ill~

.e_. Bu.l k POL Iss\: es ln Ga:.:.on~ R

2 !I 22.4 ;1 500

F3~ ~lARY LOU

FSE OaEJis

TOTAL

.2 Pac.lc.ag~ POL Issues~

!.1QCATIO!

Camp ~a.!~

Ml Y.H~

FS:; ~1iJlY LOU

73E Oasis

TOTAL

• In Ga.\lc-ns

OE ~~' O*

4:. ~60

lt t.8ZC·

935

__§J.2

AVG.AS

.57 0200

60 0700

.Q~Q.·

l ( o5l7

lJ 11 i60

Jr..t.90

__ i,.J95.

J9 i: 272

NU,•W.c'R CF TO'fAL HA1.'TON fuµ_QQO~H' .~~~

390 vJ77 4.5

509 ,)lJ 2l

4Jj 0549 18

g7fL62.1 !.2.

2 0108 0102 99

Q~~~** QM** 00 ... 20•

8,,696 14v.505· J1179S

Sr.260 210420 loJSO

)0 275

..l s925 ._.. -310880 511450

•• In Pounds

CONFIDENTIAL )l

AVDDH-GC. MH CONFIDENTIAL ~DE c 1968 :. SUBJECT~ Operat.1ona.:. Report ... Lessons Learned 4th Infantr.y D1v1a1on

Per1od E:id.1ng Jl October 1969 11 RCS C~FOR~6S (R2) t,U)

~ Class IV Issueaa

&,OCATION ~~ QON~~BT~NA SANDBAGS ~v & J' 40 & ~c 2.:..L~ . Camp ~ a.r1 m 1~914

'\ .

))1 0400 141187.4 80991 \ ... AN nilt.' 504 4 0700 · 1053911800 908)5 2li,544

• ti

~';J~ HARY LOU 172 10670 790000 1!166S SoJZB

FSE Oa.sis Ul l115QZ ~Z2u40Q. 2p664. - ~

TO·?AL L ./' f ~ ~ 90786 2u222o600 29110)8 4lo63S

.i Bathss 420570

§. Graves R~g1stratton

!. Hi!man Rema!ns Processeds )Oo

Jl . Personal propez:ty shipments proceasede 108:0

Z. The US Air Force expended the following quantities of Class III and v in support of operations& . .

!. Q!!ss III

Fighters

Bombs

CBU

1 lpalm

Rockets

·: .Quantity

)o478o46)o5 gals

1 oS69o076e9 gals · '

~t:z: '~ach) Wei~ht 'sLtl . 11[1482 )o)59o0 .

1.:

892 12400'

10199· 41809

152 )0~4

· 2., Del1vered b1 fighters and AC~=-47 (Spooky).

Ordnanoe _Qty 'each) · ~1ght (s/t)

20-»m.m )45 0 .. 600 84o4

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1 During the reporting period .. ther.e were 186 convoy.a with a total of 40918 veh1cleso Company B0 4th Supply and Transport Ba.t­tallon ha\U~d supplies to FS~~' A from the corul'a.ny 0 s base at Camp Ena.rio Company l3 also a~3monted D1vl3l.onal uuits wi.th vehkles for unit movesD as required.a

~ ·

A1rcraft Supports

Total cargo tonnage moved by dedicated airs )?o4

Total passengers moved by dedicated airs 20 096

Total cargo toruiage moved by special mission aira 21702

5! Total passengers moved by special mission aira 537

!. Total cargo moved by opportune aj.rs 0

t Total passengers moved by 'opportune air& 0

(k) Medical Services The 4th Medical Batta.lion 0 with Companies B0

C and D supporting the lstp 2d and jd Bzigades respect1vely 0 and Com­pany A supporting .Camp Enar1 0 provided the following medical services during.the quarters ·

Jill!! PATIENTs 2EEN ADMHTED R~rURNED TO DUTY

HQ & A 911787 4,58 J46 B Co 6j)209 571 Z77

C Co 20426 277 100·

D Co L.fil. .JQi U§.

TOTAL 20 0 013 1 0611 859

(2) Ma.terlal Readinasso

· CONFIDENTIAL ))

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WiJF mnm.At ~ ·IC.~ ·~~9 AVDDR.-00.:--MM " 1, ~ • f.'J~ SUBJ~Ts OJ:"'U.H i~~~.1 ~•'r· :;t.·t· • ~nlf®( t.'8.un~ 4Ul .lnta.ntn- Ph'biOI\

PiiiJ~·-:' ~~i ~,d~t'g .31 O~tot-e?> ~969t\ RCS CSFOR-6!1' (Jil) (U)

(•) Durlni t .hei "~Tt,.~ .. ng period th'!! operatloul readh.«·n r·r.~.1.lif: ot t.b.e Divfoior, d~(:U .~., Tbi~ vae ~a.mad by a dM~reaet1 in enCJLiY a.'­U.viey and tl. rHu.ltu\t, l~~n?-1.\H in tht attention f0t~l!tid OD th1' B:'.~· ~"!1.n.ut:'ei ot ~u.tpm~nto Th~ W'Hk.ly. DetdliJr.1~ ~ptn·t, (DA Fon 2'~:i)£,) pro1'-4 ·i1;:(;'~c1tlwir• it..,,11 "' r,:1~a~ .. ~ ~t' ~D1.torir .. i vw.htit6UE.~• IDU\-gt'VA·nt at th• un.!.t l..t;t-•olo Th·~ o;p.:.ra.tio~a.l ~ .. din~t~ rat-" for oonrmt1..foa.U.OD eq·~p:Dltnt ill\:t -p.t"lOnc .~M mcd\UH b-e·~ .. tM aY.-il•blao 'J:hlf.9 Dirl~!«>n h.a~ not, J•t re~dved 111d.et.11·h1..r.t -'dulH to ~onddor th~ prc·J:l• al.lt,ri.atod.,

(b) One ot th~ kfi.Y fe.CWJ."'I U impn"~ri..\':\'; N1~.t.4ll'1'1~~- e'tr.•trO i~e.~~ 1's the Diybioo ha11 t.e1~~ thti tonu.tlic:l!\ ~f t. r··~ii~.i.TO.~~t Divbia~ CMMJ. Tep under th• 1upcmai1tl!1. ot t.r.1~ /l.CJ t~fS 0 01:-''.4a R1\«l\l,y \\k1 l l.M P quditiGd per­.sonl'l.-.1 ver~ CJh(o~~ !Jt"Cm. Dbi.dooal _uni ta to tom the t.uio Tb• team l'H ~oOO.u~t,.d ~;>pK'r.:r~'.;..~,.1,v JJJ i.D~p.eic.U.~M e1Me 1 ~ f't:lrma tim1 and onq l'~'f'en 'Ul).:t.t,.fl rer.: t:.br.d tJa.ti~fA~t,ary ratiX"lgo 011 th."lr in1tlu in!lpet<'~tiono 'lhG priq.r._r reHon of tht1 unHt.i!;Jf•t::t.t:i27 ratings 11 failiDg •<JorH 1D th• ~raa ot ma.int.ena.ne~ mmf:i<t-~to 'l'AE.FS r4'eord~o. pubU1;2atiort.a 0 e.nd PLL require more ompbasia a.t unit l~vel and the CMMI 'EellJD 1a bringi~ .. thb t,o tlM' at~tioxi of tbre r.JoJl'Jllanderiao Coupled with. the to:nr.ation ot the CMMI T.amp a. oompl.<rW, Diddon Hatedel R!-1.d.'l.DeH SOP waa vrit­t.n o The int.n tic~ ot th~ StJP va1 to prorldrt th• unit. oonm1&11dere vi th a o~in and comp.let! publ.icationD which,, with a minima ot 1uppl11-msntarJ p.ihlicatioca~ allov him to ef'feotiT~ maintain and mu~g• tho oqui~t within hia oommanclo It can be expect,ed that the CMMI Team and the &ew Ma.teriol Readil>.eee SOP vil1 oo~~·~~·l'but4 to a aignio ticant i.noreaa• 1D t,h~ operational rsadhleea of tb.$ Di'Yi•ion duri.Dg th• noxt quartero

(~) 'lbe failure ot f30m.bat 'f'.hicl• ODgi!llel W&I ?'6Ciucitd IOJDeVhai during thb nporting periodo The imp1'riiO.Dc• of operator leffl ad.D­tu.ance waa sU.Hed and impz-oTtUPent Gould contiDU4'o

(d) A etanddt?Arn vu oomplet.d t tu th• 1at Squadron,, 10th Cavalr7 during the r.porting poriodo Tho a~ddow vaa ao~ozpllahed one troop at a t:UM oTer a ti ve and onlfr-:>bal.f" wee1' period o The unit VH «q>er­iencil\g a TtJrf lov operatioDBl rate prior to it.a standdowo The oper·­ational rate vas inr.reaeed during th• ota?&ddo-wn9 and the etf•ot ot t,h• tstand.down bu re1ulted in the initiation ot a Diriaion polio7 that Neb DWebanized unit v1ll ban a platoon .iem.mt UDdergoiD& a etaDddown at Uf given timeo

(•) M&Ut.nance Sup1'-0rto

( 1) Jie.1.dquartera and Co:mpamJ A (.Ma.h Support.) 0 704tb Naintenance Batto.l.ior. :-:~ntinl!ed ita rot. ot pro'ridiq direot aupport ma.intenanc:e tor CL11p Eoad uni ta,, bse:~:up cl1r1crt. 1Upp~ tor th• ba ttaliou torvqd

CDtJFIDENTIAL . ~·

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.. . : AV DDH--· GC;_·MH CONflDENTIAL .40EC 1969 SUBJEC'l'1 Op ... :- -.u~n1a.! Rop<>r t ... Le6aons Iieaned, 4•h In!antry .01 ··~· ~ . a1or..

Petiod ~d.lr..g Jl October 1969 0 RCS CSFOR···65 (82) (u.:

e.upport comp-.nbs ~ &upply c·f C~. , .. ss !.X (repa.lr pa.rta) u - and _ntrogra.de of materlalo (04ih Ma.1ntenance forward support companies cont1nued to support. ~.he l st l) 2d a.nd Jd Brlga.deso CC!mpany E (Transportation Aircraft Mi.1nbnanc") D 10'7.ate.d at Ca.mp lm&X'1 0 continued 1 is aircraft : dl.r&\':t support maintena.nre m.1 asion .,

£ Emph4s1s 1s pliA.~ed on repat.r by for~a.rd · ma1ntenance com­panies w1th supplementaty contact teams provided by Headquarters and Company A0 704th Ma1nt.enanca Bat.tal 1on,

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.WDDH (' .. ~H GONADENTlAl ~DEC 1969 ~. JJD .. J~C r : O;_)t: .:.:.1·. ' \,. : ·I : . '

P0;·1od .!.·r, 1~ . : nl'; · ,~

r.p.:;auns· L1,,~arned 4t.h Tr. ." :l.rjlry P1v~s1. on

G· r obf.1:: 1969;, HCS CSFQR.-f.c: i)'2) ::

~o 1'01 .a_! ifo,~)pts l ,. ' '{JCj

~o To t aJ .Uu~ Owt Rel eases 14 r,9'/1

to Tota: Pn.:;:,sl ng A..: l :..ens 28v096

go To":"a :1 H~·p? ";'In·, sl'" m~.r~ . Peques ts 12 1696

h .. Tot.a.i. Ja. rehN;.~;~ P~ri.a.1 . s 1 .028

To~£' ... T,. a.ns,1·: t l C. ·f ! !.:. .Po&t.~d 9Jv6J9

J.·· rct :i.i L1r.t;.!j \1C /~BL l'"' 130

~~o T.o t a.l z~ro Da.'lanre % ? :1 )09

Ze;.r. Ba.} an':~. er.I 40% ~ ') ~

,... :- \•) D'"· m a.:, · ~ A: C(·I71C;1~at1on 77%

P,o raeillan d. S<Lt.l.s~actlon 46%

(J) Adml!i!.1 str.at!ono Ac:'.l.on was completed on 101 Reports of Su:vay w:..th 2J ~ . urren-+~.ly pending fi.nal a.ct1ono Thirty-five Quarter­ly Reports of. Optna.tional Loss we.re approved and 266 Combat Loss Re°po:!'t.s werf:' p!'oc.essec!.c,

e o Cl Vll Affairs

(a) TAOR ~ Th~ Gl ~r~.c Ai~. t.~ on t e~.Dl.s and villages in which they re-s~~- ~ hav"=' cont1nued to be atta.~ked. 1 .• probed. and ta.rge1.ed for k:i.dl1a._;p1ngs an'"" .assabslnat.1on att~mp .... ou S:..gm.n .. ~ant ac. t.l.vl.~. 1es indl:.ded the kid ... · napping C'f twenty ~t .. o cl.v: .. 11 ans from PL~I B~NG 0 1n~.:udin.g eightf'en PS.DF:: and a.t.t.f'mpt ~c:4 muniet ... t.he ~ 1Ha.ge rhi.ef of PLEI LE Ai.~H resulting in '-W~· PSD; .UA tr..'-;' (! .\. OTC of PL.i.i.!I HO BY and one of the US 'JIA du:-1.ng a.n ambush near th~.~ Vl :!.~ . ,1ge; f OU."' er.e.my KIA 11 on.e f'Uendly c.i.•J'1.13 a.n WIA durirag a.n at.tac.~ on Pl~1 PHAM G~~ B a•Hl a. sen f:'O of probes in the axea of I>LEI THUNG H~:NG ,1 PL.b:I KJNG BR&.H and l11~I BREL DOR resultlng in one frl E-ndly and one ene?ll.Y KI A.,

( b) The rn ... SI 8 expl!r·1 m~n~ a.l rice ~JT.'O jer.: t en.joyed excel~ e.nt "re._.. sul h during l .t:;;; i .n1 •.=.a:~ pt:a.se ,ht.h twer.ty percen+, (20%) subtracted from tho g:"oss ..,sl gr·+ of the r1 co har.vcsted t.o allC\\ol for m0isture con ... ~ent .. the ylelds ,.n.;"'~C-.i f':"om a lcw of 2 :,500 k1los/heet.are to a h1.gh of

12,000 kllc•s/tu•ctar• fh) GON"'f 1DER1l~f . course , when compared

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AVilDH-·GC.&•MH CONf lDENTtAl 40EC1969 SUBJ~Ta Operailona.l Heport - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry D~ ,,1 ~ion

Per1od Ending Jl October 1969 0 RCS CSFOR -65 (R2) (ll)

wl.th the national avera,se of 2 11 100 k11os/hectareo Present plans call f'or putting ln from t.hirty to forty hectares of IRS/8 during December to deternune the f eas1bil1ty o! a winter rice crop in ·this areao

2 'rh~ four PF platoons rec.ru1.ted fro n the ·rAOR area have com-pleted their train1ng 0 two of wh1chv the P~I ro and PLEI HO BY pla.tJons ,, are now ba·: k in thelr villageso 'rhe llLEI NHOA YU'r platoon is processing at ldi~ TRlmG District and should be bac~ 1 n i h village w1th1n one weeki there is a possibility of the r~I PHAM ~ platoon being hold at. D1st.dct Headquarters to help secure an artillery po­s1 tion and tnts headqu~rtors is attempting to have District return this platoon t~ its village· in lina with the ~T.omises made the vil­lage when the platoon was recruite4J

] · Through bc·th 1'..he !1i'i..hn1c M1nor1 ties Office and Agr1cul tural Serv1.ce Office 1n P~JKU some seven thousand (7 0000) add1t1ona.l fruit trees and 7~000 f1ngerlings for the village fish ponds have been ob­ti.lned and d1str1 butedo

~ The ARVN \JA NCO program has continued to grow and function smoothl y u Tho 1 otal t:rained a1, the II Cc::rp& Civic Action cou.tse now stands a.t thiity-·six (.36) u Two NCO 0 s have been lost· to the progr~; one tnTough the lack of motivation v an~ the other due to a roYtin• assignment to JCS 1n SAIGONo Of the r~ma.inder ~ twenty-eight a.re worlting 1.n cl.vie action postso The oth"r six are working s.s inter­preters back j.n the battalions of the 4th Iniantry Division from which they were dra11rno Wj th:1.n two months reassignments .will be ;,ade to p·ut these six into Civic Action Postso At the ·present the:-e are only twenty-eight posi.tions that can make effective use of AHV?l C ·. IlCO' a ·and to incorpora~e all the CA ttained NC0°s immediately into 'ime program after formal traini.ng would deprive units of ba.dl.y needed lnterpreterau Also 0 on the last day of October an ARYN lLT was at­tached to. the Office of the Assisi~ant Chief of Sta.ff 0 GS 0 to under­study the 4th Infantry D1 vision CA programo ·

~ The education program in the T~R showed the greatest gains during the reporting rer1odo Through the efforts of the Ethnic Minor­ities Ch1ef o PLEIKU 0 i:·.Uned and certified MONTAGNARD teachers were assigned to the school~ in the TAORo This resulted in the GVN begin­ning to pay teachers while improving the overall quality of instruction. It als~ greatly increases the probability of a vehicle educational program cont1nt.A1ng 1n this area once the 4th Infantry Division leaves. Also u through the efforts of Company Bo 8th PSYOPS Battal.1on 0 SoOOO JARAI language texts were reproducecl and distributed to the achools 1n the TAOR along Ml.th the teacher' s manual for the aue. (Students

CONf IDENTUU. )?

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~~~~~ ~~e·Tat.1ona1 Boport~q~E!P~NU~k rn:!R~~,1~~~n Peirj <.'d Ending )l. Ootober 1969 . · RCS CSFOR·-·65 (R2) (U)

population is now 4.pprox1ma.tely 2500).

6 MONTAGNARD med.1.c .training is being greatly 1ncrea.aed. ~IKU hospital bas agreed to conduct a t.wo month course which will result 1n the GVN ee~t1fic~t1on and eventual employment of those who successfully ~o:n~:et\l ihe courseo The requirement of VI,b,"'TNAMJ!:S~ literacy ha.s presen-

~ ·l tht) ~eatest. \11... .~: LL:lty to dat.e ln finding recru1ts1 howevero thirty re~rul.ts have been lo<:.ated and will be given OJT ln the village d1spen­sa.r1 t.11s from 1 Noveziiber to eady January when the formal course will be­gln a.t. the PL.b;IK.U hospi.ta.l o

z. R~cent. programs a.r .. d guidanco from boi.h ICC a.nd GJ stepped up ( the training and patrolling activities by the TAOR PF elements and PSDJ'. Tha current policy is to get thP.se elements outside the village defen-sive perimeters on patrols and a.mbusheso The principle training burden has fallen on the resident CA team and activity has greatly increased recen~ly in this areao The long ro~ge results should be extremely fru1t.:f'uL

8 In late October two windmills were obtained through CORDS, · IFFORCEV o These are presently being erected and should they prove

successful 0 an additional eighteen have been promisedo These wind­mills offer tremendous potential in regard to raising the level of sanitation and personal hygiene as well as an econom1cal 0 simple and effect1 ve means \lf 1r:rigationo "

(b) KONTUMa ~1th the movement o! the 2d Brigade, Civic Action by the ·4th Infantry Division ceased in this areao No major projects were in:the building stage and thereby left unfinished and the II Corps GS ·.a4visor was informed as to what. continuing programs had been sup­ported by the Division and the status of eacho Also 0 the GS" II Corps sent an officer with a US advisor to KONTUM to coordinate the transfer to 24th STZ of civic action formerly handled by the 4th Infantry. Divisiono

(r.) PLEIKU (Outside TAOR)a Civic Action outside the _TAOR in PLEIKU has been concentrated ln those hamlets along the principal LOC' a a Highway 14 South in PntJ NHO•i, Higkwa.y 19 West in THANH AN and Highway 19 ia.st in LE TRUNGo Support has been mainly in the :f'oria ot MiOOAPS a.nd some ll •11 ted school support. The )d Brigade handled PHU NJl)N and THANH AH "'1 ~.h lat Squadron 0 10th Cavalry servicing ~ TBUNGo The effec:t1venesa of the 1-lOth'a effort• waa evidenced by aou excellent intelligence on pending enemy attacka given to the CA team by people in the bamleta where they worked and the recent killing ot

· CONFJDEHTJAL , \

. . AVDJH "GC· ·MH 40EC1969 SlfJ.3J~CTa Opti!!rational He port · ~ L~ssons L~arr.ed 4th Inf"'1ltry J~ ·• ~ .. : '· .:

Pe.ri.od ~'nd1ng Jl October· Jq6'! 1' HCS CSFOR ~65 (rt'2) (l')

one and capture of fou1 VC ,~. udn- ty the PJL'F in another hamleto ·rr. .. l· ... lOth CA team is noW' engaged in r~ openl ng a school 1 n t.bi s area a.th.: recrui t!.ng a.nu tralniu~ I·lOiffi\G~iAHD med1•:.s .. A ne;.i dlspensa.r; ~ponsc1ad by t.he )d. Bngade haJ been .Jpened. ln PHll iiHl)!L Al t .• hou~h. ?aot. rpeclfical .... ly a clvic action prog.i.·am J tho .PF' and PJDF have received consld~rabl~ t.ra1n1ng and have been engaged ln combined up~rat.1ons wit.h Jd iir1gaJe units :> thus improving t.he effect. l.venP.~s of these t.err1tor1al security elements () anJ. advancing GCN' R pa.cificatlou pro6Ia.m in t.he area.,

(d) BINH DINH .~ Cn le AcUon has rema.ln"d ac1~1 ve in the Aii rue .. l3I~rn DINH area with prime er.i.tJ t: d.G~ ~i on l·iliDCAt.>5 anll r,.01:imodi,ty dlstr1~ ·

but.ionu Ad.di ":: l .onaHy l l a. hl t:;h.ly succes~.-fol PSYOPS face ··to f a.ce ca.m­pa.1gn was co,1dud.ed .uong Hi ~hw'1.y :! 9 usJ n3 'bot..h C1 vie Action and P.SYOPS assetsu ~l th the shi!Ling of 2d Bngade H,..adq_uart.ers lnto BINH DIHH 0

4th Infantry Div l si.on Ci vl.c Ac t1on wl.11 undoubtedly 1ncrcace i.n in­tensi t.y and area servlced ,J

(e) Other~ The prn~"rcun t.o ir.no~ · u.la.te the TA.OR population has proven hlghly su~ces:3fu.l. "-JJ.. i-,t over ? t1 900 cf a. population of 21 0000 already lnn"culated.u In a.d~l.Uc n t.c the d1rect ben~fit of countering any possibil1t.y of plagu.e epidernic.s v thls program stitrv-ed. as a vehlch to introduce .relatively sophtst!cat.Ad prever..t.t\fe mt:'d.icinfl on a mass sc. a.leo It also "xerc.ised GVN .ced1 1• al supp;.y channels since 1t. was the province hosplt.al s1·aff t.hat. s1,.i·ppU .. ed t.he :::;~rum and gave tht? Major.J.ty of the actual ln.nccula,..ic-ns ~ , ar..d by so dc1ngt· lt. brought the hospital staff into cor..":act "'it.h large rn:.mb~r of peopl.f.; of which t.hey 11.ere charged with prc,vid.ing ;n~c!.:.:: a1. tr.-ea+.men~., It. also dt:monstra~.ud GVN° a concern for t.he people by the pr~ssnce of tre province heal th workers out in rela.t.1 ve!y remote hamletQ and v.i.llagesu

(£) Statist1.c.al Summar;• of Civl.c Action

(l) Construction projects du.ring t.he reporting periodo Jo1nt project~ are marked with a J next \.o t.he numbero

PBOJ~rs ~Uil.i!. !EPAI~

Dwellings 8J .. 27· ?4

Roads (kilo~eters) lo5 llo SJ·-47 o S

Churches 0 4

Hoap~tala 0 f )

cnrJFtDftUIAl J9

... 1

~

' 1 -- - -·

~ONFIOENlJAl .,

AV DDH· ·GC .... MX ·40EC 1969 SUBJ~CT1 Operatlcna~ Hepor , , - 1.osoc•ns Le.a.med 4th Infantry il1 · 1.~ s1N >.

Penod End1ng Jl vc· t vber 1969 11 RCS CSFOR-65 (H2) (L'~

Dlsperti:r d.rl es 6 4J ... l4

-Market Places lJ 0

. ' School s ~J a.8

,. 5J-20

L.n.r : n~ s 83J ... 54 . 4 ... T-21

Bri dges 4Z 8 5J .. 20

Bun.kers .• 07"1..11 62J-43

Fence (k1l~meters} l ., ';J ... oJ 4J- 9

Spillways 6J lJ-ll

Archways ~ 0 ~.

~ilCAP HU'\-8 2J ... 12 4J·--4

Ca:ttle Pens 6J ... iQ 6J-18

r~ ?:lg Pens lQJ ... 9 l.5

Defensive Perimet.er (met ers) Jr 700J-lu850 41149SJ-J60S

· Flag Poles 7J ... 6 5J .. 1

Play GroWldS 6 • .i-8 SJ-4

Volley Ball Courts 2"r ... 6 17

Fish Poncia 7J .. 15 l?

Cat.es l.Z 8J-6

Sumps lJ l

Gardena 59J .. -J lJ

Cul.vans 14 2

Bu.llei1n BOa.rd ;J-7 SJ'

CDNFlDENTlAl "°

• .,.. . AV~JH"GC-MH CONFIDENTIAL '• ~ 0Ec1969 . SlJBJ~Ta O~eirat1.onal -Raport - Lessons Learned-4th Infantq Jiv:.sion

Period .bdld1ng )1 October 1969 0 RCS CSFOR.65 ('12) (U)

Wells 4J-9 ···

~ Hea.lth1

MEDCAP3

Youth Health

H~alth Items (scape etc)

l Ser\··1ces1

Cement

T1n Sheets

Lumber

Paint ·

Hope

Nalls

Barbed wire

Sand Bags

Edgineer Stakes

co~'lcerti.na lire I

Food

Clothing

(2) ARYN Dependent Housing.

9u010

1)0029 bags

10226 each

JJ

67'~468 boa.rd feet

201 gallons

620 feet

57) pounds

484 coils

51~25 ea.en

49200 each

820 coils

28 0 0 so po,Wlda

60040 pounds

(a) S1gnif1cant Activities, During the reporting pe~iod lit-tle progress has be .n made in the AHVN Self-Help Dependent Housing Pro­gram.. Tho major problem illl.:l boun· tho non-a.va1lab111ty ot AHVN aold1era t.o work on the conatruct1on, since they have been heavily coamittecl to tactical o-,erat1ona, During th-. period covered. by this re~ort, conotruc­t1on waa coapleted on twenty (;O) family unite and twent7 (20) new \lJlita

CONFIDENT JAL . 41

t. I

I '

Wtlrt' sr.art.t~(: .., AT, ttle AHVN Depencie111 .. Housl ng Council hol.1 a.t .l I (. ,, · p~· H~adqua.n .. ~r::. on ) 6 S~pte:nbcr l 969 v t.he la.ck of progress reported o:; all unu..; m4d~ lt cl ear that the program goals could not be a.ch1ta 'lfl. .. 1i in ,..._ roa.sonat.-lei tllllt.' o As a. result of the meet1ng ~ DCG J) I~iOrtC~V 0

· ~ ""' t 01.1t. a. l ct toe on 2.9 September l 969 1. that rC''lSed the goals both ln '/· , cu r _-cm-. p n:l~, .. .:\ ·d •:r.•c the fuiure u Tho revi~-,ed IFlOttC~V goal for Pha.:.;o T will con :.~ lc t. oi tne tota.l of fa.Jr.Hy units unuer construction .l.~.d c. o~nplt•ted .. '1'1.e 4th Infantr/ Di.vi slon revised goal for Phase I h 6d f .. 1.m1ly uni ts w: t.h 43 .fan1!.l" un1 t.fl already complet.ed and 20 famlly un1 ts under con~trtlct :'..On., ~,u, ure goals wi 11 be based on available matt)rlal t.ither than e:.3t1mat~tts of its fut.ure ava.1h.b111 ty o

( b) St.atl.stl"",So

(1) The foll~w1ng materials were provided during the period covered by this report n ·

42d Regimen~

Jd Ba.Ltal1<;n

4th B.,t.tallon

2d. Hanger Group 120 bags

Jd Armored. Ca va.l. l-y ?20 bags

Total (Au~ . Sepa Oct)

)40 bags

'tli~ S~'TS

326

J26

LUI1B~

700 (BF)

~=- (BF)

1,200 (BF)

(2) The fo'l.lgwing ls a tot.al of material.a that have been provided. to date•

411540 baia

( ~) Payehologl ~·l Opera.t1ono ...

CONfillE~ITIAl 42

~lBAa BF

18~260

' . .

.. . .. CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDH .. GC···MH ~40cC'i969 ~UBJ~CTa Op<:.ra11onu.l ileport. ., Leaeona. ~•~\.! 4th In!a.ntry Divieion

Pf.'rjod Bnd!ng )l October l969v RCS CSFQR .. 6_5 (R2) (U)

(a) Significant Act1vit~~R

±. Jurlng tho reportlr.g period the 4th Infantry D1v1s1on conducteJ. two lnt ens1ve fa1:u -to ·-.:'c..cc psyrholog1cul operati~)ns C'4i:l·­

pa1gns ln coordrna.~.i.on wt th GVN PJYOP assets , The first ope:.rat.ion was conducted a.l onJ iUchway 19E from Lil! 'fi?UNG District Headquarters to AU Kiili f.:'01:i 2.5 Augutit t.o 1 Sept.ember 1969(1 and the sec.and opcr -atl on ,,;as conducted on H1gh.·1ay 14 north f:or.i t>WIKU t.o KONTUM ft'om 9 -12 Se.pt.~mber 1969,, 'I'r"e object!."~ ~as to gain 'the suppo·rt a.nd confl.J.ence c•f the people<> The op-:rations pru\l'eJ. t.o t.Je 'very effec-­tl'l/e a.nd aE-s1~ ~.ed in tre reduct.ion of enemy mining incidents alo:ig both routes ., Addltlonall.Y :· the number of vHlagers who volunta.rHy reported the loc.a t.i..ons c)f t·:>namy minec 1ncrea::;ed during the perj odo Also 0 resistance by the people aga.1nst, VC demands was evidenced by the vl:lagers from KON CHARA> On 12 S~pt.ember 1969~ a group of MONTAG­NARD v1.llagers from KON CHARA were approached by f1ve VIET CQl;G iax collec.tors who dcna.r.ded 60 ,. OOO$VN 1n taxeso The villagers attacked the VC and k1lled t.he:.. t' leader,, with tho other four VC rallying to th~ GVN~ The ,_·1llagers were rewarded for their actions i.n a. special ceremo~..y when they received gifts from the PL~IKU Province Chief 0 and the l~t.h Infantry Dl v1s1ono

.?.. u\4:rins the reporting per1odc: the Dl.v"lsion PSYOP sec-t!on experienced d1!!'1c.ult1es !.n obta1.n1ng suf'fici er.i.t ai.r support fo-:: leaflet.s and ta.pe m1 !3sioris 11 dt~e to the relocation of ·the Air Force ?3 YO? support um t. frora PL~IKU "to TUY HOA., However 11 these ir.:.tlal d1filc:.ult.1es wore ovarcor.ie as the new ~lror.edures for re -·· quost.1ng l eaflu1~ raj nn1ons wen~ formal 1 ~ed Wl th the ru-~r~1.ttta.nco of l.ht· l.'.1vl~\h 1 r1 Al.r I.l"lrnou OH1··•.'r .Lr.U. Alr ~"orcu pernonnol at l'UY. HOA, Ir, add.1 t:on. tha PSV')P sect.ic11 now =eceives air support from a VNAF un1t :n ?L~!KU~ and ' r1s increased the number of leaflet missions flown by organic helicopter a1r asset.Su or particular significance is the · leaflet drops that a.rE. mad~ 1n conjunt:.tion with cheraieal missions o·~ el the aroa.11 The ~er:11ion has developed ~ ~pectal leaflet to ac-company the cht-m1ca.l dropso

J The Division PSYOP section ~Aft seleeted. fO\ir ll1 Ca.rson 5( outs tc be tra1ned ~- n the conduct cf psychol ogie~ oper•­t1.ons, Twc o! t.l:c SF- !n.i: .vid.~a.ls rece1 ve experl.enco 1n propagan'1a warfare whl1e v.orklng w1th the V~r CONG~

i The ~:v1s~~r. P3YOP sect1on continued membership in the PL~IKU PSYOP C~·ord.:.nat:.ng Commit.t.eo 0 which ':oord.inates all ?SYOP act1vit1es 1n the Pro· . • nee ., It is at these meetings tna.t Prov1nc1al anJ. ih v1sj.on rdpresenta.ti ves exchange ideas for i.~pro­v1ng Pj10? prc,.~raDla ~ a.nd expl41n particular problem areas that have ~en e~eountored, '!'he Chief o! the VI~rNAM.656 Information Service,

CONflDENTIAL 4J

l

CONFl.DENTJAL " . 40EC1969

JU3.? t.X:·r ~ Operat icJna: L(t:l"" c, .... Les Jons Learned 4th InfM.t ry lln·~.31.r.: r. Peo od ~r..drng )"1 ~tober 1969D RCS CSFOR"-6.S {R2) (U)

Ch..u rrna.11 of the Ccmml t, t.eo ,, has now a&sumed the respon.s1 b111 ty of ar~ ranc1ng for ;.nd d1ssem1nat~ng all PSYOP printed material. to the dist­ricts and the Dl.v1sion., This function lilas formerly a.ccompl1~hed by th• Assistant. Provlnce Adv1.sor for PSYOPSo The change over has not re­duced tht' amount of publ 1cat1ons a.va.llable for distribution and the D1na1on continues tr) pro\·ide tha local populace wit~ magazines, " l' ·: s :JJ.?er~ posters and 1aov1e fi.lmso

S1.a'f.isilca.l Dat.a

L~af.1 ets

Speaker hrs u (air)

Speaker hrso (~ound)

Aud10 Vl.sual h:rso

Ai ter.dani~ e

C&.D Perf o~mance hrsn

Attendance

Armed Propaganda Team ~ days

VI~"TNAi·~E Ir..forrna tlon Service V1.si.ts

f ·o Personnel

Aug-Oct 69

lJ7oJ90 0 000

·241

616

196

380664

22

Jo JOO

15

20

(1) Strength~ Authorized and assigned strengths at the begin-ning of and close of the period were as followsa

(a) Beginning of Per-lod (1 August 1969) o

OFF ~o EM ~. Authorized - organic units l vl {-. ] '1? 16(1485 l7r795 '~. '"' Authorized · at.t..ached units _ _iQ. -11 26J l~0.2Q.

TOTAL 1,, 166 2J4 170448 18084.5

Assigned .. ,, or~an1c units l r210 189 17()148 181191-7

Assl.gned - attached units __£. ..:JQ 222 11011

TOTAL l 262 219 181107? 19,5.58

~coNflDEHTIAL "'*

I ' I

I •

I ! ' I

I I :

I

' l • I

... . ,• AVf)DH-GC-MH CONFIDENTIAL '40EC 1968 SUBJ~Ta Operat1onal Report - Leeaona Learned 4th Infantry Uiv1aion

Perlod ~d1ng Jl October 19690 BCS CSFOH-65 (R2) (U)

(b) lmd oi Period (:}l October 1969)0

Authorized - organic units 10119

Authorized - attached unite

TOTAL

-2. J o __ o

10119 195 160485 i1;799

Assigned - organic un1~s 10201

~ssigned - attached units 0 0

·roTAL

(2) Repl.ac:~ment.sa The Dlvision received a total of 576 officer ar..d 50149 enlisted replacem~ntso During the same per1od 0 6)4 officers and 60764 enlisted men ~otated out of the Divis1ono

(J) Casualtiesa

lat Bde

2d Bde

Jd Bde

DIVARTY

DIS COM

l-lOth Cav

l:-69th Armor

4th Eng . ' ·4th Avn

124th.Sig

Hoo~ 4th Inf .Div

4th MP Co

HOSTIL:b; Woun~ed nead ~sing

272

140

72

21

20

5·

6

0

29

2J

8

.J

l

4

?.

1

0

l

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1 0 0

CONFIDENTIAL 4S

NON-HOSTILE Wounded Dead Missing -- '·

JO

69

46

19

14

2J

22

14

s 7

2

2

6

6

0

l

l

3 . 0

0

4

l

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

... - -;- .

....

. l ,.

I

I

I

',~

I i

I t 1 I

~: l I

I _J. j

r

I CONFIDENTIAL-AVI'Jfi..-.GC-·HH ~DEC 1969 SJBJ~CT& Operational Rt'port .... Leesons Learned 4th Infantry Divla1<.1t

Perlod i!nd.1ng Jl October 19690 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Scout Dogs 0 0 0 1 0 0

K-75 Inf 10 0 0 1 0 0

· :- L ~lI ~. ~Q. Q. ~ Q. Q.

'NTAL 615 77 0 2.53 23 2

(4) Morale and Per3onnel Serv1cess Awa:cde and Decorations during the peI1od were presented as followas

PFCORATIONS A#ARD~Q AUG §EP QQI.

D1st1ngu1shed Sen·ice Cross 1 0 0

Sil ve.z:· Star 5.5 .53 J6

Legion of Merit 8 1 1

Distinguished Flylng Cross · 5 1 9

Sold.iers Medal 14 1 11

Bronze Star (Valor) 246 128 63

Bronze Star (Service) 2'J9 243 193

Air M~dal (Valor) 8 5 6

Army Commenda.tion (Valor) lJO .59 37

Army Commendation (Service) 1o1J8 ,795 4JJ

Purple Heart 14J 95 110

Air Medal (Service) _.fill ~ J.Q2.

TOTAL Lo .04 !,"}27 1oJ08

l'~.

Combat Infantry :Badge 10192 1o1J6 10102

Combat Medical Badge 82 J6 Jl r: ; CONFIDENTIAL

46

I I

~ .

·' ,,

..

.: . . AY.DDH-CC-MH CONFl.DENTIAL '4 0 E c 1969 SUBJECT: Operat.1ona.l rleport. - Lesson~ Learr.f""d 4th Infantry Dl. vision

Perlod .&11d1ng Jl October 1969 v R.CS CSFQR .... 6.5 (R2) (U)

Aircraft Crewman Badge d 18 ll

Miscellaneous Badges _2Q.

loJ02 TOTAL lo2J5

(5) Promoi1onss A total of .5 0974 enlisced p~rsonnel were pro .... moted during the reporting periodo

(6) Reenlistments There were a total of 270 reenlistments during the reporting pe.tiodo The breakdown was as follows 3 First Term RA Reenlistment a 185; AUS ~nl1.atments1 85.

(?)

(8)

.~

Postals

(a) Money Order saless $2u664ol74o0lo

(b) Parcel Post and Postal Feesa $.57 o44.5ol0o

(c) Incoming Ma.11 a . Air Mail 10776 sacks Flrst Class 349 sacks Off 422 sacks !lirer.:t. 91195.J sacks nraal<down l.Ji,'/69 fiUH':k6

l)~lP l i ,. J 'I!> t.l~•"1 l\n

(d) 011~' going Mail~ ilr Mail & First Class 1,662 sacks Sacks 40207 OSP 2,2)2

(e) Number of mal.l da.yss 92

Special Servlces Acti.vitiesa

(a) The Division was visited by the following ll USO snowsa

"Tug of Punch George Gobel South Market Street Band M'as Am.erka Chanin Hale Boy Acuff Bob Weymouth George Jes.3el Free Lancers Gary Vinson Melba Joyce

CONFIDEN11Al 47

r l ;, __

l .

i I

I

AV UDH .t:c ... Mll 40EC1969 : ~lJBJtl!Ta Operat 1Lur~ . .tl. H\.!~1'1. Le~son~ Le-a1•1ed 4th lnt' J.lltry fnv1s1on

Period ed1ng Jl October 1969 11 H~ CSFOB .. 65 (F-2) (r)

(b) The Dhis1on was visited by four t",uring aold1er sr.0111ao

(c) B&i! quotas received were 4 11 255 cut --·of'-countryv and 795 in-country"

(d) A total o! eevent.y-·flve 16 .. mm films circulated w1th1.n the Dlv1s1ono

(e) A to·"-·•·l of ij. 0 500 personnf!l checked out lr,200 books froa the 3pec1al Serv~ces L1bra.ryo

( 9) Chaplains Ac ti v 1 tit.ts~ Tne follodng serv1.ces were conducted , dur1.ng the period w1 th the following at tendai:i: e 1

DEN Ol1INATION ~UH_!3~R OF SERVIC~ A'r'r61WANCh!

Roman Catholic 9)8 220688

Protesta.n.t 10897 250082

Jewish lJ lJO

Memorial Services .51 2()504

(10) Maintenance of D1sciplln~ 0 Law and Orders

(a) Gdneral Courts· ifartlal a 10

(b) Special Courts ... Martul ! 108

(c) Summary Courts MW. 1 al 5 5

(ll) Ho.Uth~

(a) In recent month.s L. skin cilsease has caused man ··day losseso Preven~41on pro~·ra.ms are being 1nl ll a.toed and this problem ls be1n6 monitored closelyo Pr1or1ty 1s b~lnJ oiv~n to water and clothing resupplyo Clean uniforms a.re b~1ng issued about every four days and clean soc.ks every one to t.wo days"' Medics have been

1 instructed to inspect the skl.n of each of their men to reduce this disease wherever possible,, Prompt t.rea.t..:&ent wlll prevent more ser-· 1ous 1llnesso

(b) In the last several aonths 0 a nwaber of animal bites have occurred w1th1n the D4v1~~onn In the aontb or Jept~mber 0 s1x~y m•n were treated for anluaJ b1 tes ~ Anirl&ls must be registered and tethered p and ., cup;_'gr to fl ! <'TC" th1s ha.a b9en 1.n1t1ated by the

CDMFIDOOIAI. 48

. , ·:

; • , • I

.· . ..

Military Police., Cont1nu.1ng ~mphasis 1s being placed on rodent contz-0J. . Personnel are be1ng encoura~ed to use bed nets as a protective mea.su1e against rodents u

go Engineer

{l) Gene::·alo During this qt;.art.er 1 i.he major1.ty of the eng1neer effort waa ln. d1ro~t support of combat operatlons" All oparat.1ons of rl.fle l"Ompany sH•.e or lar~or .l.ncl uded. onGln~f.'lr Gupportu Thre1J line.-\ compa.n1ea t'tllllal.ned w direct support. of the t.hree brtgades .. One company was l n ouppc·ri of tho Tar;k Foret• Cominandor at Camp Radd1f f c while the bridge company supported the D1v1s1on with tactical brid­g1ng 0 combat eog1neer VfJh1cleRv and assistance \lith base camp projectao

(2) Operatl. '=1-ns ,,

(a) Company A continued in direct support of the Jd Brigade and all attached units at LZ OJi.SIS .) HaJor tasks were road mai.ntenaJ1ce

0

drainage " upgrading a Landing Zone {LZ) ~ nrebase construction 0 mine­sweeps and direct combat supporto During August and Septemberp a to­tal of 2 0 44? kllvmeters of roads \tas mlneswept o The company con .... structed two LZ ~ o and upg:-aded four .,

(b) Company B reraained ln direct support of the 1st, Brigdde operating out of Camp Rad.cli.i fu Xajor effort was expend.ed ln dlrect support missions to lnia.ntry battal.1ons im1:;,lv1ng development. of fire suppori:. ba.ses and Li ~ s 11 bunker destru<.~ tl.on and road ma1nt.enanceo In add1t.l.on p w1t.h one land r lea.ring team f :"."o::i HHC l' 10 kilometers of roa.d were cleared from iilghway ).9 north on ri1gh.,,ay 50.3 u

(c) Cornpa..~y C r~ma1ned ln svp;ort cf tho 2d Driga.de throughout the r·~;>ort1ng pe-:-loda The cc:·mpo.ny operated o~t of FS.B :·IA.RY LOU 0 until 21 September 1969" The company then moved to LZ HARJTIHJ!So On 28 October 1969 0 the cor,1 pany moved to LZ ~NGLISn la t.he vicinity of BONG SON~ Considerable e~fort was expended cy the company in upgrad­ing LZ ' s and ~alnta1n1ng roads to battalions and LZ 0 s c The 2d platoon wcirked 1n the v1cir.1 '..y of LZ PilH~Y with one ,iaC land cledr1n8 team to finish a bunker destru~tlon mlss1~1 n At the roncluslon of the m1sa1on, over 7 n000 bunkers had beon destroyedv The majority of operations by the platoons w1th 1n!antry batta.11cos consisted of bunker deatruct1on

0 conat~u~ting LZ "a and upgrad.lns F3B ~ s o

(d} Company DJ during the period l Augt&st through 20 October 1969 .. wa.a involved both 111 • d.lrect and ger.~ral au.pport roleo lbe

CONflDEN TJAL 49

,

, !

I · I

. \

rn~!~~nr:~rrw ni AVDD!i=®~.MH i8_1j~ ·d ~~~r~ £j ~i1 4 o E c 1sss SUBJF.CT~ 0})6r•tio.'rhal Rep..'~'."~ -.... ~~soz.1- le~nad 4th lnf.rnt~ Dividon

P•dN\ i.lld~g :n 06tc1.!er 1969p .Rr.S CSFO!b.65 {P2) (U)

2d platooo vaa l.n DS ot ·1 =22.d Inrt.llU,- and later )-12th Int'antr'J ·m.\til 23 Sept.mbeiro Tb~ othe1• platoonn ver. 1D OS ot Cqp Radolitf o

T;ypical ta&b at Camp B.-.dt:Utt includ.,d oonutruotion of a mine boomD repail'~ ruade and S4 ya~dao On 24 Septemt,erv the 2d p1.a.to<1rr. vu. assigned the taak ot r•bullding •nd repair°ing br1di• aecur1t7 atruoturu on Highwq 19.

{ t) r.oir.,pany ! gne geDeral efli1'leer support to the Di Yid on vi th tactical brJ.dg~i) minesweepy base camp ~onetruotionp convc;1 Hcurit70 re1au11p?:J' hauling and traMportat.1.ono Compa.lzy' E01 br Jdging support consi&tt..'<i ot a JSl · ~~ dry iepan lo~atad wost ot KONTlJM on tbe route to POl.E.I KlLONG and vario~ AVLB miuiona within the Divition AOo The CEV vith the mine roller att.a.cha·ut."'1 ttH ffnipl oy"d in minesweC"-pa along_ routH tram Li OASIS to FSB 0 •• in the Jd Brigade UH or operat.i~no One platoon vaa r•spontiibl• t~r ti!t~en constr'Jcticn projects in supJ>"'rt ot Camp Jnari ii: addition the dh•ss~bly tJt on• brigade J'SB at MARY LOU in t!le vid.1-ity of IOllTUMo Bridge trnolul trom the compa111 vere used t.o haul supplies and p&r1onnel in support ot engineer and tact1~al unitao ln addit1on£1 ten dump truc:kl ass.tgned tco Comp&n)' Ever• uaed to haul rock and Hnd tree Pl.EIKU 1.nd l.ONTOM r•epeotbel.70 to tire auppor\ baae1 in the Div1aion •~ 9t operatiozwo

ho Anr¥ !Yiat.ion Operationa

. ( 1) Operational totah ot the 4\h. AriaUon Battalion were u tollowea

!.~ ~_£ ~ W!~ Hour• now 30241 30029 20926 9D196

SortJ.ea 11D044 9D"3 8D)41 28p82.8

'lrooP9 Litt.d 1Sp986 1209;5 10p852 390793

Tona ot Car10 ~3 "5 142 6SO

Airoratt. IUaied 4 9 4 17

Ureratt. Deatrored 0 2 0 2

(2) the aYerac• num~r of aircintt per dq uaed 1D 111pp0rt ot tbe 4t.b Intu~·7 Dbi.11oa VH &

28 l.lllu,1Jl0 12 ~1C/1Jb· t ~9 .3 0&:.6l0 4 0470 1 ClbS4

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.. · .. AVDDH-GC-MH CONFIDENTIAL ~ 0 E c 1969 SUBJ~Ta Operationd.l Heport - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division

Period &l~ing Jl October 1969 0 RCS CSiiOR-65 (ii2) (U)

1. Inspector General

(1) Fourth D1v1aion Annual General Inspections of two divisional units were conducted~ Courtesy inspections in preparation for the USARV AGI ~ere conducted in f~fteen (15) units. and fourteen (14) reinspections were nadeo The 4th Infantry Division received its Annual General Inspection by H~'s, USARVo

(2) No complaints were received by this office during the re­porting periodo Three hundred and twenty-seven requests for assist­ance were received during th1a periodo

j, Signal

(1) Generals Operational activities continued to focus upon providing multichannel communications in support of the Division and its elementso

(2) Operations a

(a) On 22 September 1969 0 elements of Company B were de­ployed in support of a 2d Brigade TAC CP at LZ HARDTIH&!So Operations ended on 2J October 1969.

(b) On 18 October 1969 0 the headquarters of Company B de­ployed to Camp Radcliff at AN K~o

(c) On 26 October 1969 0 elements of Company B were deployed to LZ ~GLI3H in support of the 2d Brigade move to that area. Elements of HHC and Company A were deployed on 27 October 1969, to assist in wiring in the 2d Brigade Headquarterso

(d) On 23 Octob~r 1969 0 the Jd Brigade moved from LZ Oa.sis to Camp Enarl. One VHF system wa.s discontinued. Elements of Company B were moved to Camp EnarL

(e) On JO October ~.969, multichannel communications to LZ MARY LOU were term1natedo Elements or Company B supporting this operation returned to Ju~ Kru:;n

k. Information Activities

(1) Juring the period 1 Ausust - Jl October 1969, a total or 18 ne~s correspondents visited the Division AO, covering a variety or sub­jocts ranging from pure hometown and human interest Daterial to the Division's active coa'bat and Jacification operations. Included in the

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AVDDH-GC-MH CONFIDENTIAL ~DEC 1969; SUBJ~CTa Operational Heport - Lessons Laarned 4th Infantry Di.vision

Period ~nding .Jl October 1969 0 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

news media personnel were representatives from Overseas Jeukl,Y, Timtt Life Publicat1ons 0 AP 0 UPI 0 Telenews International, New York Times, Newsweek.o and N~ (Scr1pps- rioward) o M111 tary correspondents from Stars & StriEes.0 MACY o USARV, InVo and a DOD Pictorial Team also visited the areai There was one free~lance writer in the area dl.LI'ing the period,

(2) During the quarter 0 the Rad1.o/TV Section broadcast 2 0 ?00 minutes on AFVN-(AM-FM)-PLEIKU as news broadcasts, An additional l,)50 m1nutes of news were aired over the AM facilities of AFVNo QUI NHON, An additional 1 0920 m1nutea were utilized for a ~sc jockey show and chaplain's messaJes over AFVN PL~IKU. Talev1sion was used quite extensively during the period with 2~4JO minutes of broadcast time used for · Division news and special events. A total of Jd) hard news radio releases were received 0 prepared 0 and cleared by the section dur1ng the period,

(J) Thi.a Div1s1.on continues to be a leader in the number or home­town news release subml.ssionso Uuring the period August througn Oc­tober, 6,859 DA forms lu.526 were logged and forwarded, Thu 1e some­what of a drop from prev1ous quarters and re!lects a decrease in in-

. com1ng personnel and the general lull in ground action. Action haa been taken to increase a1gn1ficantly tne nllll'btr of nlea111 111baitt1Cl,

(4) The photo r1l1a11 prosr&11 which 'bl,an 1n July cont1nu11 to progress 1n a sat11£actory mannero ~ing the reporting quazt.er 0 711 pictures were forwardc~ for release as op;osed to 491 the previous. quarter. ·

(5) A total of 553 hometown interview releases and audio tapes were procesz.ed by the Home 'l'own News Center for use by local rad1o sta­tions 1n CONUSo .Special. emphas1& 1s being given th1s program !or the Thanksgiving/Christmas nol1day periodo

(6) Improvements continue to be noted 1n the distr1but1on of com­mand 1n!orma.tion publications, t.i newspapers are now broken down for d1str1but1.on at the battalion le"'el rather than the brigade level. This modification has apprec1ably reduced the time required to ge~ tne papers to the man in the fleldo

(&) There were four fact sheets prepared and iiatr1buted during the period 1 August through )l October 1969.

(1) Changes Reg&.rd1.ng Courta-Kartial.

(2) Ca.re and Prevention or Field Diaeaaea

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... . .. AVDDH GC-Nrl CDNFmmTIAl 40EC1969 SUBJ~CT1 Oper.it1vn:il itoport. Lessons L1Jarned 4th Infantry D: "1 :s10n

PorlcJ LW!J.lu6 Jl Oi:t.ober l9o9 t' i\CS CSFOR-·65 (R2) (U,;

(J) VI.b'i~Af\ tt'n t ~rtalrnn~nt Cvn1' .est..

(4) VUNG TAU JN. CounLry ~&H

(b) T~ere w~re ~) l~~~~~ of tnb J1vision °s ~ee~ly newsp~per The St.!'.~dfs~LL~oY.~~ v pu.bl 1 stc:i <fo:rlr.g t.ne quarte! (' 1n~lud.1ng a spec1al 1~sue commemora · \; . ..._~ tl' e Dl 'i lSlon '1 ~ thtrd comba1,, ann1 versary and award of the HVN Ga.Han try ;:' -.·oss \Ill.th Palm. A s~n es of articles was run on the H&R s1 tes a~al 1.able 11 Jncnnsed empn.is1s w.:i.~ g1ven to comma.n.<i information top1 cs durj n~ +,he pt..'n Ocl.t. A spur. 1a.l or1 en ta ti.on issue was al so prcparedo

( ~) ·rhe flr~t. l e.sL.& o1 t.C~.e new Ll1..., isl.on year boo~. ~sprl t .J was prepared and r;a,s• r1 but.ed Ju rin 1: t.be qv.art.er o Tne ~ec rJad issue was also prepared w1ti1 dls•.ribut.lon sr.teduh~J fL"r J 5 ;Jt, .... ·yrember l969u This pub­lication .. in ma..:,az1 ~u.11 for;:.at.. _. coup) e.~ fe(.\t.ure material concerning .Di vi­sion act1v1t1es with command lnfozmatlon r.w.t~.dalsn

(7) Durin.·:r: t.htJ per1.od .. the H :ot.o Sect.ion produced ? 1,0J8 prints and proce~:>('d 67 rel... s of coloreJ. f H m, ~r.iphasis continues on photo journal1sm ,, however 1, zupport. .r~qu1red. for the Ho;ne Town News .Program has ha.mpered th2s s1..Hae111hat. o The l~er.e; pt of adlHlonal equipment should al.lev~aTe this problem Jn toe nea~ futureo

(3) The P.-111<. Informa·UoP Sec~.io:i released a total of 2 v.501 hard news stories and ~ ,394 pl:.ot.cs dt•ri n~ tbe ql!art.er .) rh1s l.s a relativel1 ne~ progra~ . begun ln Julf , which nas sl~nif1cantly aided in informing tho pu bll c. of t.he ac t.icns of the 4th Di v1s1on .:i Jt,eedback ls most inf or .. f.lal but a.lj lnj.\ c:at..icns a re an inc: reas~ ng "warent'ss of the Dl.v1sion' a operations thr0u~h CJ~US m~dlav

( 9) Inci"eased c overGt.ge h~s bt:en noti..•d on 4th Dl. vision events in the three r.:ajcr conmand ~ubH\:aticn~• rn VI~~,~~~1~ Stars & Stripe~n

USARV E~~f>!.~~! and MACV Qbs~E.Z.!.o Tne fol lowlng coverage was received during the period. ..

~~E~!:.!'.~f. 'i.- st.or1es 28 photos

Q~~!:"~~£ J6 stori t'~ 28 photos

Star~ &~~~. Jl r,tories lJ photo a

(10) Durlng ~he per1c.d ... A1. £,;us•. · Jl 0-:tober l'I 2 1.206 new members were enrclle1i : .n tt.e 4tr. ~."lei.or. ~$5o i:-:1 a·.jcr. .1 bnnglr..g the total me:nbersh1p to l! . 51; J Seventeen per cer~t C'f t.rose precently ass1gn~d to the 4th Dl.vu1on an i:ember~ or the .As~.<'C ~·.:en , Scholarsn1p Fund contribution•

CONFIDENTIAL 53

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' AVDDlbQC~ 40EC1969 SUBJ~'l8 OporaUo.oa: P41~}°';··~ • .,_ l..c-!s»n' J~a.ned 4t.h h.!11.ntey Dlvl•ioa

A>er1«\ .. li:nd~ 31 OctQb3r 1 9~'):> RCS CSi"t)B-65 (B2) (V)

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during th-. pel ·loo tote.led i239 7200 76D rabJ.na th• total ~llectiona to data t·~ $2'71f)JlZ5o18.,

(&) On .31 Alliuat., PFC Paul Greatboun 0.~&IAt t.h8 100000th ..._ bar ot the Camp ka.r1 CU.pter ot the 4th Dirllion Aasooiatio:lo PFC Gr.a.thous~ wa1 pre~Nitod vi t.n h\• 1P.arubea."tA1p card b7 ~e CommndiJll GenorG.l ot th• .4tb .ln!UlLr:y Dbi.:d.OGo

{b) h Sep~...mb~r 0 thi& euat~tan of' the 4th Diviaioa Aa­s~btion Tlatted the Dh.\.d-Jn Lia.'b·(\Q NC0° ii at, the 6?th Enouatlon li'J1p1tal.9 and 26th CAsU4ltJr S~ging Flight t, inau.:re that a workable diatributi,.,n s7ste.~ was in oparation tor gitta t=' the dok ~ vwndecl Gt the Dirlaion ~baeod b¥ tbe 4th Didn.1~ Aaaod&tiono

(o) furi~tg th~ Z)O.tJa ot Octobor9 •. tota.l or $275v000 ot PiriJl11xi Scholuship f\md1 va.1 ·trannterred to the Riggi Hational Bank ot WaahiDgtoo9 DoCo 9 fr.o:a the agn~t between the 3cbolar8hip 1WMi BQUd ot Truat.ett1 and the Bi6ga HatJ.onal Bank 1D iDOruent1 ot $25D00Jo

2o (C) LESSONS LEARNFlli OOMMAHDEROS OBSEBVATIOHS9 EVALUilIOHSp AID BIX:OHlmlDATIOHSo

&o Peraozmal

( 1 ) B&a St.uuib7 Liat.t

(a) ~1$1J'A& Du.ri.Qg tbia per1M unit.a were receivinl ·numeroua reportl ot B&R llno umit 11 o

(b) lp.11tA~S FnquenUyD peraon.uel bad requested an B&ll tor a 1peoitio da.t..i) but upon rooeipt ot the all~•tion had deolined \b9 B&ll at the laai mimlt.o Thia n1ult.d in a Be 111DO 1hov" oharaed t.o the UD.i to

(~) __ c; ~at a 11t-tulcl'b!1 B&R roster be ·lid.A.-tained. Th11 rost-Jr should oonisialt or t.h! ~XlH ot pera'>unel nut 1D 1tan- vho d'>dr• Rt.a to the 1pecifl.~ looationo Wha MR ~ abaiw traftl orcMr• an 3ubm!tted to a bMdquarter1 0 a roater ot 1tudqy penocmel vill •cr,o:I*11 the ordorao Units then wr1f7 the Ml.at.rd 1adiv.1dual9:1 int•tions to aeoort the Bill not. llH tban 36 houri prlor to ~htitduled d4rutur·t and not aore tban IJJ houno In ti» enDt. an iDdiYidual. !l:.i.:.eduled t'> d•pt.rt on B&R oumot accept the Blclg perm!ss.1.ve tranl order• ca be pnparecl tor \he tint. 1nd1ridual on the studb7 lbt. and bud oarr19d t.hroueh obauel1 to Speoial

Serrioea. . CONFIDENTIAL . .54

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Pe1·!.··l ~;.,u!1t5 ';.i uc t.o'ue& 19690 i1CJ c~ .. ,,,t ·65 (R2) (u)

(u) 9~~.!_~~~~U) KJ.J.t! ~r.l1steJ. personnel oerv!ng ln the

ca.pai~· lty of CICW cln.e.t a1·e 07AlF door gun.ners 11

(o) ~vjl~2--£.~_.s Ideal:Y :· only sc; .. ool traln\ld cu~w ch18fs 6?N aht)uld bd o.l.lo~t:J. to crt\fll a.'J. dl.rcraft.u

C·.) ~~~~r,.daH_m:~. ' Duo to the uh.>rtage of qual1!1ed 6?N crew c:hl.efav rec:rult1ng ahd ~ele.c Uo1~ oi' pe.r-.:.o,,ncl f\lr 6?N slots should be clo~ely inon1toredo A t1·a1niuu proc;ram in Lbe sorvlce platoon whare highly 111oi.1vat.Hi 1·.;1·dQ11nel recetvo 60 to 90 days trainin6 ai; mechanlc' a helpers ~fvre t.hoy are a.U~w:?d tc· ere~ ah~cr~ t.. ca.a result 1n a tre-mend~u~~ incr~a;.;o 1.n averagA aJ rcra.ft ~waila.bi.lity ra.to.

(1) Tape Re·~· o!'de?:s and Inte.r:.rcg"tlon

(&) Q.~~~!"!~!!~· ' The interrogation of particularly intel­lig~nt 'i!td lmowl11dgeat1e d.eta1neea has sometimes produced a. great amount of .;o:nplex mat~r1al. ln a very ~hort tlme. Interpreter& have oo~n u.nable to ~e~p pa.c.e w1th the deta.1nee and consequently 11 valuable 1nformat1on has been lost,

(b) ~~al.u~~· The technique of ut11121ng a tape recorder allnws a verbatim transh.tion of the detainee' s comr.1ents and. has re .... sul tel! in a. more comp.r·ehE,nsive int.erpretation bein.; obtained f'rom the 1nterroeat!.on of knowle~c.abl e dota.1.nceso In a.dditionL' interpreters are a!f orded more time subsequent to the actual 1nterrogat1on to trans-

late the deta.1nee 0 a commentso

(r.) !~~~!~' The IP~ Sec.tion should be authorized two tape rec.orders tl' 1.nsure tba.t all inhrrogations a.re ex1,>lo1.ted for their fall intelligence \"'alue.

(2) M&lli1ple incmy Mines

(a.) QRg1!!tJ.1oru St. · ;~ral onemy mines have been detected in one locat.ion and t.he enemy of'ten utilizes culvert.a ·to cuounage h1a

mine&o

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AVDDH- CC-MH CONRDENUAL ..

Sl,!3,T~T~ Ope.u-.Li,\.·l1-~1tJ. R~~c.ct. ,., Leae.ons Lea.rr~•d 4th In!an·(.ry P~ ··· ! ~ion :P~. r.:..~J. K".l.li1nJ Jl Odober 1969 0 RCS CSFOR- 6; (P2) {_u,

(b) .:~~l!:i~l:H?ll.~ U.nr..&c.esaa.ry additional daal~~ and c.asuil· tl.es .tcsult when 1nd.hidi.:als and vehicles ·move through an area ~fore a. thorough sea.re h upon the ini t1al location or one mineu Ml.nCJ d\;-L~ 1J ·· · tors fa.11 to pick up mines 1n culvertao

(c) £.£'··2~1f!!. t.1!! .. clf!:1£.l'.l .. d Upun discovery or di.m.otation of a m1ae a thorough visual and mochan1cal soarch should be ma.de 200 meters in all d:i.ro~tions around the location ot the first mine. Cauful visual search around all culverts should be included as part of mine sweep operations.

()) Ariemy Cac:he Sites

(a.) O'bstlrvat.1on s Enemy Lilli ts continually use the aa.me area.a for w~ stat1onsand resupply/cache s1teso

(b) !Syal uatl.o!l_a The eneizy is forced to frequent- the eame areas due to his laok of nil.v1gational equip11ent 0 1.oeo compassea 0 mapa, Therefore~ the enemy mu3t use natural terrain to locate his cache• and way sta.tionso

{ c) ,!!ecomme.'ld.a. tl.ons a Uni ts should periodically check areas of known cache i.Jld strong po1.nts from past experience, Natural ter­rain featureG such as cavea 0 thick undar·oruah and draws should be searched in deta.Uo

(4) Area Searcheo

(a.) Q)?!;ervat19JlA When a ma.jor contact is made with the ene111 0 inva.riably 0 the enemy w1ll have a cache close by,

(b) ~al.uatioqs Supplies are very precious to the enemy and therefore a fairly strong security force is employed to guard the aupplieao The units will g1ght to evacuate or defend the auppl~ea,

( c) W!a!...ndat!oqa ~hen a. unit 1 s eiigapci, a detalled search o! the contact area should bo rriade tor caches once the enemy bre&ke contact or 11 overpoweTed~

c, Operation&o

(1) Marking of Sieaay Base CMps

CONFIDENTIAL 56

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AVDDH-GC-MH SUDJ~Ta Operational Ro~ort - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Divj~Jon

# Period Ending )l Octobor i969 0 RCS CSFOR-65 (HZ) (U)

(a) Obsorvationa A battalion discovered a large base caJU~ complex or bunkers and caves.

(b) t,"'val.uaY:£u.a The. to.ct1c&l situation precluded a thor­ough search of the complex and the battalion moved to another location. When the tactical oituat1on permitted" the battalion ret1lrned. to the general area of the enemy base camp but was unable to find the exact location due to the dense jungleo

. (c) R&commend~t1ona ~hen an ememy base camp or fort1ticat1on ls found and a thorough search cannot be made 0 the area should be marked to insure friendly location of the site when a thDrough soarch can be made. Markin5 material preferably should be visible from the air and relatively perman"•nt 1n nature 0 such as International Orange Paint.

(2) Sapper Attacks

(a) Observa1!<::1• During this period enemy operations stres~ed sapper attacks and the sap~er attacks are expected to continue.

(b) ~valuations Sapper attacks are preceded b~ detailed re­connaisaance to include identifying anti-intrusion devices and deter­mining the extent of protective wir~. This may take place ) to 7 day~ prior to the attack and is followed by attack rehearsals. The night before a sapper attack 0 the enemy will neutralize obstacles by t1e1ng · down trip f'lares 0 minef3i 0 etco 0 and will approach within a few hundred meters of the pos1tiono After dark they will slowly work their We¥ through the wire using the least likely avenues of approach along low groundo Sapper attacks usually take place between 2400 a.nd 0200 hours. They may be preceded by mortar f 1re to get US troope to move inside bunkerso The sapper attack wlll be quick with one or two squads head-1111 for predeterminei targets such as ammo storage, artillery positions, or CP's, Half or the sappers will be armeu with 7 to 14 CHICOM grenadoa and up to 20 kilograms of TNT. The other sappers will have AX-47'••

(c) Becommendationa That all personnel familiarise thea­aelvea with current sapper tact~cs and techniques.

(3) ROKA Search Techniques

(•) Observadona ROKA forces have bean extreael.1 aucceaatul 1n searching out ene111 lorces and inate:del.

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CONFIDENTIAL

AVDJa ... Gc- :rn ~DEC1969 ~rrBJEC·ra Opt)ration;.l Heport .. Lessons Learnad 4t)'i Infant;J' :Ji '.:°1~.\on

Perioa ~nding )1 October ·l969 0 RCS CSFOB-6S (R2J (U)

..

(b) ~valuat1cna Good 1qtoll1gonce is the basis for the ror­mulat1on0 execut1ono and excellent ~ ·e.:>ults ·or aon search opera.t1oa1s. Intelligence 1nclud~c prior knowl~Jge of the ~aemy, his '11.gposit1on and strengthu a terratn a.nalysis 0 and long xange/contlnuous weath~r fore­castso A typical ROKA area of opsrations during a ~earch normally oon­sists :)r' a 200~ m~tar rail.us circle cordoning the bul~ or the enemy forcu Wlthin the AOo A maximum amount of t.roops use thorouc;t. search techniquesu slowly tightening tae cordon bf .moving .50 to 100 m~tera a dayo As the cordon t1&~t&n~ 0 ROKA troops, forc~d to leave the cor­don due to the shr1n~1ng circleu form a 3eQ)nd cordon concentratinf on suspect areas 0 rid&es" rossible exf11tra;t1on :outes (blue 11t1~s),

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J.nd 11.kely avenu~·G c,f approach of an e'Qe;ny count~=a t tack. A third cordon is often provided by a r~serve forceo The techniques o! patience and aet1-culous sea.rch of avery mat~r of the objective area saves lives and in­surea complete clea.ranco. The ROKA aold1er often moves &long on h1a haunches in a half duc:t waddle with ·Lhe M16 a.t the ready under hio right ca.rm ..;hile he searchus above, . below, right and left with h!.s lef't handD always observing. Thia is slow and it triea the patitlnce of the individual and the comm!Ulders of each level·who •ust refrain froa press1no speed. Its casualty saving quality and thoroughness are th• pay off. ROY.A troops carry light coJAba.t loada during search opera-tions. Small arms 0 LAw's, and 60-u mortars are followed b)I heavier weaponry1 flamethrowers, l06-11m recoileas ritles, 81 .. u mort.ara, SS gallon drums of napa.lm (with connecting pipe tp pump the napalm into caves and tunnel coaplexes and ignited with fla.aethrowe•• or !irv), and quad 11.SO caliber ma.chineguna. On• cla¥'s apa.n rations necessitate ~1 resupplf o Followin~ a a:>KA aearch, operation a •atay behind• taak force conducts mop up operat1ona, Sweeps a.re conducted to pick up enemy stra&J].ers, Enemy cache areas are re-aoarched, marked, and to1·t1ficat1ona are deatroyedc Critiques &r• conducted clown to the squad l•vll tollow1ng ROKA search m1111ona 1tre111ng new and old 11aaon1 learned. The 1ucceaa of ROXA search operations urs1ng the above tech­n1q ue1 11 accented by continued succe1s!ul operationa again1t the eDelQ'e

(c) Rocomr.aende.t1ona All comru.ndera, when t1u1bl1, should eJ1ulat1 the aucceaaf ul IX&llpl• ot tho ROXA tore•••

(4) Cloa1 Art1llel')' Support

· (a) baervat1ona Ground forcH have a tendency to rel.1 on

air-ground !ire Hpec1&llf COllf iDmtlAL° Hpport W\1 1n

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AVDriH-Gc-MH . COHflDENTIAl ~OEC1969 SUBJbllT1 Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division

Period Ending )1 October 1969 , RCS CSFOR-65 (B2) (U)

contact rather than cloae art1llery sup~orte

(b) ~~~· Ea.ch enemy contac~ presents a challenge ilo the leader on the ground lev·el to evalua.te a.nd apply proper combat reaol.lrcesu Informal queries indicate that the general consensus of opinion leading to the call for guneh1ps is related to clearance timee, saf'ety restr1cUons and whe.t appears to be a "carte bla.nche" author1t7 tor anyone in the area to cheekf'1re the az·t1ller7.

( o) .Re~~~rnen<~~l2!:.s That wae of' artillery as the most respon­sive means of £1.re support bo euphasl.zed. and that small unit leaders re­ceive cont1nuous training ca.ll1ng for and adjusting artillery. That this training empha.a1ze the use of continuing adjustment as the unit aovea ao that fires can very qui.ckly be adjusted to the contact area. 7Lia el1a1natea some of the safety restr1ct1onso That schemes of :.:.uieuver and gun·~target lines be considered in advance and that "check­t1re" authority be limited· to senior ground commanders in the area and air routes and corridors be formally established and adhered to.

(S) Enemy Detection

(a) Observation 1 The ·cmerq seems to retain the ability to engage triendl.y oompa.ny a.nd batt.a11.on r.~ .. sea.

(b) Evaluat.1on1 On numerous occasions d'1%'1ng the reporting periodo friendly bases were attacked at ranges fro• JS to So aetera and on one occaa1on a i'SB vaa penetratedo

(c) Qone1Y!l,2D,• That 61lall unit load•ra be constantly re­ainded that act1Ye 0 aggressive use ot a coabination of SBP'a, LP'•• and local patrolling are the be&t defense against baM cup probea and attacka. .

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(6) · ~ the ineay

. (a} Qbaervat1on .. 1 On too uD, occu1ou, cont.act vit.h t.he ep-.., tollova a £orma.t 0£1

~1} Cont.act Htabl1ahed. -. 2 Artillery and~"r gunahipa called. ) Area.a avept w1t.h negative reaulta.

(b) Evaluationa While the decision or th• 'beat. •q to enga&a · t.he en.., awai be left t.o tho ·couander on the groun41 vhtn contact. la

the nault of a _.ting ellg&luent and t.he en.., la not 4q 1n ac­pualn tin and aauuver to close "1th and. W.l or oapt.un t.be • ..,

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AVDDH-GC-llH c~~m~mnm. 40Ectsss SUBJJm'a Oper&tional Report - Le111one Learned 4th Intant~ Div1eion

Period inding )1 Ootoar 1969, acs csrca-65 (B2) (u)

by tire and aaneLlver voW.d procWce 110n ,aean1Agtul. rea\llta and bat.tle­tield intelligence,

(o) Recoamendation.a That sll&ll. unit leaden be conatantl1 reainded that ag~ss1ve ofteneive tactic• uaing orgaoio tinpover usually ,rcdLlca the boat results and ->.r• likely to red.Lice r&ther than increase fJ '.\endly oaa\l&l tiea.

(?) Hipahoot

(a) .Q!lnnr~J:.t!!ll.• M~l'\Y Uanoa inLell it{onoo report,o 1m11oated.

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a luor&t1Vel enea, t1Lrgut w1Lh1n "' 1*ttea.J.1on'd AO b&.&t. oLAt. ot csupIJOrtins Artillery range. To capitalise on these opportwiitiea, a short duration rSB consisting ot froa tvo to thne tubes of attillery secured. by a ntle platoon can ~ established to support auch an operation,

(b) Evaluation a When targets o!' opportwli ty present tbea­ael v .. outaide a unit's supporting artillery tan, effective operationa oan be directed agairutt tho by displacing two or three tubea ot artll• le17 to a aaall PSB to a&ippc,rt the operation, 1'h1s 1SI can be MCuncl 'b7 a ritl• platoon aupplementecl by artllle17 peftonnel, .. It lbould 'be reoogn1Md that this rsB 1a tor a abort period ot tia• 01117,

(o) Btc9!1!!Ddat1op1 Conervlera give oon~ration to ... pl.oJiDg abort d&lrat.ion rsB'a againat tarpta ot opportun1t7 oubid8 ~eir supporting &rtlllery tans.

(8) Land Kav1gat1on

(a) Observationa · Platoon and aquad. leaden teJMl to n1J on the ooap&IQ' ooaaancler tor land navipt.ion,

(b) •&luationa Leader• who an not conatutl1. avan o..( tbeir poa1t1ona on the ground. are loainl valuable experience 1D ter-

. ra1n anal.J•i• and 110n 1mport.utl1 an not pnpancl to tab control ot their eleMDt aboW.cl aoMtbing happen to the .i...m lead8r,

(o) Concluaiona Co99andu"a aboulcl conUn~ tad.s au'bor­cU.Datu about looationa vblle the Wllt MY•• .... 1uun t.ba' all lMdHa an a11an ot the~ ground location.

(9) Can71nc •••1nlt1on

(a) ObMn•Uopa Sol.41en ~ueDU, Oarrt uoblu pa ••-mlUOD hllobo YWa et1le o..r ~ lboul.Un aa4 ,.a.

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SUBJ~CT1 Oparatfor.al. rtf\J>4 r:t. ... Lt'u ~~uns 1,it;u:n~d 4th fofa.ntry D1v1s1.on Period !!.'.adrng J l. Ck:tob~r 1969 i, HCS C~FOR·~65 (R2) (ll)

(b) ~·~a.). ~~t.~ or1 ~ Dur1n6 stream cross1n~s this ll!et.b ;i) at c...rr.v in,; ~irnur,a ; .on "rua t•.1M a dttf in1 te sa.f tjty ha.zard. bttci.U3a th6 atl\··

mLmlt1on will keep t.he pack attached to the body of the ma.n even lf he­succeeds in drcppl.ng his pac.ko

( c) If~~. ~!~:! '.~ !~':_latbl£. • Unit le<.:a.ddrs st,oul d insure. th-.t M-60 a.mnu.:·.nition is carrl~d 1n such a .,,ay that 1t cannot irupede t.he solc;\ier -.hen he drops hl.s p~k.i

(a) 9~:?.A~~:;~~i:' ii VC and NVA wUl frequently tra.11 moving US f orceso

(b) 1~ •-''fl l ~lat.1'.'~H Wh~;a tt.1~ one•1n.Y 1::i follow1ng US forces hf' u1.a1alJy w1ll ul•t.Y )00 1,, '..th) llh •i,,10 l1~1h\t1ll 1.h·~ i·~ar uo,)UrlLy.,

( c ) rl~1: or1'Ilh!ild,._t 1.on 1 Be-i c'~e dJl el ornent ri~v,~s to a new lo­cation th~y shouid ~h~;~·· pr e:pl.anned an ambush squado This squad should be dropped off at JJkc1.Y ambush s!.t~s while the coirpa.ny continues to moveo This pra.ctlc.e a.lso ghes a. bulk of the element kno"'ledge of their location ln case t~eJ have to be reiniorcedo

(11) Aer1a.l. Ot~er1rat1.on for A.rmor

(a) 9t.sm~H9.~' Often while moving through dense jungle terr•~n ~ tan~s hav~ difficulty s~1er,t1ng a route which will minimize otstac1 e~ ..

(b) Lt>--··i.} ua~Hina Aerli.i.. obsenation has a.ssisted greatly in -...-- ..... -..... ---:- .. d1re,u:-.g the lec.d e~eillent t.o uoid obstacl6S i.lld impc.ssible terra.ln. Th15 cZA.n ovt:rcoms the na.vic;atic!~al problems exp~ricncud when ctservatien fa r~st.ricttid on the o;rour.d 4:.c· a distance of 10 to 20 metera.

(c.) !i!!;2.~.!pda.U,2,!l• Aerial support should be u.d.e available to az-mor un1t~ conduci1ng opera~iol\s in jungle and other restricted torr-.1n.

(a.) c ·L, ;->fH'~a·· .. 1cr?t Whu1 tarJts WC.OH stuck or d&a~ed by une• 3:e.-.~. dUt.-7.riCNi

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frOD\ ... ~io1·m~ llnes of -;ouur.icetion, & ~ajor reCOVttry prol>­lelll lti d.CJw· elc~cA."

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\be thiGv bnrd ~arth 1-._vttro Junior leadera otten do Mt. ~lH \J~, mgnitl'd• of tihtlir probl OJI Mi att~pt to recowr the -web.lob utt .~.,, c011n11tional ~~hni1uas whi('Jb assume that bardstand 1a nearbJ. ID !KJdlt', CH .. the~ NOOl'e3'Y ettorta are a vaat. ot time and eDISriQ' &rld ._ .. ua: ,., •.: .. t~.- "biale trr.ft vithout outside a11i1t-..Me.

((J) ~9u~)~.K1~~ In addUioo to !llte1111tiM training ot Yelu.C'J.ti e-:-.'l'n~nd-.ns t<' rM~:lzo and avo1d auch are&Bp apbub ™' be p.beud on ~-irly ~1lldat tor ~Jdst,awQe" 'tbA. juuhr bader abo\114 aak• bia bHt attempt a~ nc:o-..,r1J.le t.1• ~".ole but 8hould that tdl ho ~oul~ 1~1}d.i.at,~~ 1.~t'quftJ-t. the &a3ittUJt':,, rar a aer.ior no:>n17 apeoiallat, and proYJde a lbt ot mt,,rltle that. bet toel1 necHSUJ' tor 8UOc•a:s~ ncofttJ'') TbU•l 1t,em ahould be uaemhlet2 vhil• the ape:: :&lln u &.vouta, Upou uriYol e.t the a.:;ena, the apeo1allat, 11&bJ ~· anal.,-cU and c.ll• tor t.htJ vaitJ.qg mat.rial ud aubaltc b.11 nq"'9Cat tor •.aurit.7 fo~e~., engine , UMI otber nqainum.'t:..,. to ccmplat.e t.De entire Olt!Wl'&\i.i\Ao ?Ab aot!oD 1"'4late~ toauaa oO""PDd attontio:i OD tbtt problea Gd j;re&\q red-.a tba at.&O\IDt or vut.ed t.1l'Ao aDd ettart. t.bat rNUlta when uaia\Uaoe h plea•nl.r· \0 the operatJ.an.

(13) Tanka in t.b1 hd!Nat. Pin Bale

(a) .Qbunat.1smi ~ .. ot ~ lank ill bdireot. t1N role.

(b) ~~~ '?hon ar~ u:q probl- eaMSoutered ill .-phauizille ~~ ~ 1n an 1ndir.at. t1ro rol•. roe .. probl.w iMlw'• aOt»V.rl.tq ot tire, ateu1'" war °" tM 90...- pn tubo ud rodUDiDc the mbile upeot ot armoro The p!\1bloa ot accur"~ ~tire a·t.am troa the t~t. t.'ult the projeotil.• tired baa a tix4;d ~· and t.be weapon itoelt bu a relat.1"1¥ t'lai. trajK~!7• C'*pena~ .l~ tor nap 11 ~ ~ b7 adJWltifti the ol•mt.2.an of t.h• guDo Sino• tb9 veapoD baa • nat. traj90tl>r;y - lnt.l'Mdht. llUl l~~ a · :,.s betveen CUil and tu--get. C&DnOt be OftJ~alM U 1t. O&D vhe6l b~..; .. ; arUlJ.e17 vA9n t.be elew.ti.a and cUrc• aooounu tor n.J;;o. t~ ·~ proble11 of ez.. ~n wu- ia hport.ant; tho tube life ot tM 90-a pD la nlat- . i~ lav OCllPL~ to U.:U1 ... .-ct tire voap..'iMI. j;>p?Gd;latel.J 1.JJIJ l'OD49 -or HI v1ll war out• 90-~ .,au vMnu tho tube Ute ot -..t art.1Uer7 pleau i8 51000 to 6.,~ ~. !be tJ6ird probla la a YiolaDt. nd­~ ot c~t. powv. %uta wra dqAO! to ~r, ~· U.. SA d 1Ddirect. f4-n role. tbt t.Ak. la& 1A a.ra ~ pos1t.lola. lo~ vlthsMD.ilJllg ~•r-, tb9 tut bu Ud1no\ tire n1e pz'D9'ldiaa a wl~ IU1Jpleatllt to otbv !JMUNO\ ~ .. ,_. tor a. tne .,...... vitb • 1aq9 YOlme ot t1n.

(•) IMQll:l1Q2~~~ It tub mat. be mpicPt ia u.

. CONFIDENTIAL 6Z

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SUBJ~·· Oper&tional i.eport ... ~asona Learned 4th Intut~ Di vi.don · Per1od ind.1.ri )l October 19690 RCS CSP'OB-6S (12) (U)

indirect f1r• role 11 YO;r. ahould b4 used to &djuct the fin. Dlle t.o the b&l.11at1c chaza.ate:r1st1cs of tho gun and ammun1Uon, it. auat be real.bod.

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(14) Baaction to rite

(a) ~•rvJ.t~~.• lm'l.ng the 1ni tial volle1 ot 1ncoa1ng tire., 110at everyone took coYe~ 1n builkera and f1.gbt1ng poa1t1onao

(b) l'!~!t!!~s I\~ri.ng any type of attackr aaaa1.ve volua•• of !ire auat be r19turned immed1&t•l1 w1th 111hatfllver weapona a.re avall­a.bleo In order to control. 11 d!r~ct 0 or shi!t these f'irea, ludera and ke7 peraonnel auat be out e~aluating the s1tuat1~D tirat h&Ddo At the inception of th• attack on GYPSr, about 5(1f, ot the fighting atre~ were outside their bunk'1r5o Aft.er. ln1t1al 1.ncomins 1nd1v1duals ven f1t1ng,. c;ouwu.c.a.t1ng v and aa&Utir..g 1n ,,vaeuation of the wounded. Although sol~era outside bunker6 1ncreaaed. the probability of ca.a­ualt1ea0 the activity was absolutely n9Ceasary tor gun crova to de­lb'er accurate f:Jrea and !or medJcal personnel to render a14 to the WOWldedo

(c) Becownd&t1on1 The number of penonnel out.aide mn.. kera should be kept. to a. a1n1awa., cona1atent with what. auat be ac .. coapl1abdo Lead.era mu.st l>. out dl.recting eff ozta and enJ.uating the ai t.uat1on.

(15) Direct Anillery 11r.e

. ~ .. : . (a) 2bae_rvat1on• A battery· emplo19d d.ire~t tin: ap1net . • ... , ::· ~ 1U&Ssle ilubea dur1.ng an attack on a fire support base .. . •.. ..

(b) ~!!!!l.'M!>J:.1 0 The Battery CO &p<'tted the tlub of the tbil'd rol!?ld. find b.)' the enea.vo The lint' of a1ght fro• the pn to t.ar­gat wu obstructed i.D aoM a:•u 'gy latnnea, equ.1paent racka, and eqineer at.alceao Obaerven wen ~steel near the IUD pit.a and directed. _tin V1th1n three ainutea attar r•e•1v1ng th• tirat 111coa1ng roWMl.

(c) !!i2_wpd.at12n• St:rwcturea w1th1n the 105-u bo..User dinct. tin aect.on should. be conatru.ctecl below pn pit wall lnel. or llOYed '\o &llov unbaapend dJrect t1rea. Latrine• aD4 ab-,wera aboulcl be fabricated to be toppled euilf. When clet1n&ble, __, target.a preHOt t.tMi•HlYH dllrinc an at.t.acko controlled. auppnulve t1rea alat 'be 1ued.1.at•l1 eraployed. Suppre&aive tin• mat- oont.1.D­uoual.7 'be dell vend. on obaervN ene-v ta+g•+·•·

CONFIDENTIAL 6)

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i·~~· ti ~~~P.~t"~I'.\"' n ~ . AVDDR.- r~. ,_M{ 1U. .~~~ ~~ w~Wwu~ I iu ·~L ~40Er,196~ SUBJECTx Operat1.t:-!'ln1 lt~p..:-1 ;~· t .. LeesoM Learnt'td 4tb Inrantey Di video

Peri.:4 lndi.ng .31 Oc1;0ber ·1 969» BCS CSFOR-65 (B2) (U}

('16) Flghti~g Pos.it.iol\a ~or Sup!JOrt PerEonnel

(a) .Q~~t)t?IU~-si~ Fighti'-'S podtions built. on tirebaaes are intended to acc;umcdat.e only infantry elementeo During the attaok on a tireba.sev support pel"~Qr.nol repcr-ted t" their lltJopiag bunkers or were used to evao\,l&te the voundedu

( ~,~ X~~-~:~, a.t. :. :·~ : I t iauppbrDentary t1gntiog politiona are aonatructed ,., thay oan te used to strengthen overall defenseo

. ( '!l ) .~~Q!lm~~~l.t.11m8 S!appl•menta.ry tight!Dg positions fi-\.,.,

use by support per oc·Mel should. be constructed to blcck enezv adnnce1 it the perim.e"49r 11 brca.t:,.hedo

do OqCUliz:atiml - HoM.

t~o TrainiJ>g

(1) Cri tiques

(a) Oiti1e~~& Mbile Gonducting combat openti~p a uneuver compaDJ baa little time tor torma.l or 1Nd=tormal ~o

. (b) clifflJwttfoxu Leaders and all comma.ndera oan caretw..17 observe their personne1 while on operationov and daily concluot a tho~ :·'""ugh9 d.-tailed C'ritlque .of ell ot~~emd act.1~ 9 . both good and bado

·. (~) ~~W8 That Gomznsrider' and le.adera make maximum use or the te.@!Wque of odtiquiq to counter the ,lac!: of Gr£an1Hd tra'n'ng vhil.e on operaUCDlo . I

(2) Quick Wl

(a) Ql!1e:rntiGa& A hasty 1pra.y ot autc-maUc veapona tire 1a otten used to 1D:!.tiall7 engage eneJl\Y aoldieno

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(b) lnlMt.Uo~ A baety 11118 1"0tuid aprq" 11 ~ not, · etteati n vben UiliiJta the flDA?i1J' o I t. :!i."pond5 on~ magazine aDd le&T .. little or DO ammunition tcr eu.ata.und t.itt-o Haguixlo changH O&UM lull.1 penittlri tt. en9111 to gain tirf\ euperiorif,Jo

(o) CAPcl~& tbverorep o~er1 1how.cl 8apl.OJ the

C~f~flDfNTIAL 64

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.,:· AVUriH- GC-MH CDHFJDENTIAL ~0Er.1q~~ SUilJIOO'ra Opeiati.:-nal Rt:po1·t, ~ Lessons Learneu 4th Infantry Di.vi31on

Purlvd ~ding Jl October 1969 11 RCS CSFOR-6.5 (R2) (U)

•quick kill" tdchnlquo~ and emphasize that evun a few rounds ha3t1ly aimed ~re more effect.h'e than lo that are spr~eclo

()) Sfil> '1'rain1 n[;

(a.) Q:2stirvatiol}. ~ Due t.o constant turnover of personnel 11

unit commanders aXE; forced to rely on relatively untrained a.nd inexperienced soldiers to lead SRP 0 sp

(b) £!,"'\l'a:J.u~!~ion .5 Inexperienced leaders operating indepen­dently put a much 6rea.ter buxden on unit leaders and reauire de­tailed instructions before being sent out on a missiono

(c) £2.!!cl!:!§.~~ Unit leaders should 1nsuro that SRP's are issued detailed but simple orderso Patrol leaders should be quizzed thoroughly on routes of rua:rch GO that unit commanders can be sure that patrols get to the risht pos1tl cnu Classes should be conducted at every available opportunity on pertinent subjects 0 so that lead­ers are trained as rapidly as possibleo ·

(4) Tank Mod1flcation for ARVN Driver Training

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(a) Ob§~~~s Certain modifications are necessary before the average ARVN soldier can crew the M48AJ tanko

(b) ~Ya!~~l.ons The biggest problem is the weight factor, . including both m~terial and meno At the ~resent~ the ARYN personnel are unable to stop the tank within the normal stopping. d.istanceo It takes approximately 1000 1 bsl. of pressure by gauge to stop when travel­inga t spet3ds above 10 miles an houro The VIi!.'THAHt.:3~ can get a.bout 200 lbs" Audi tionally 0 ·~he AHVN soldiers are unable to lock the brakes even when the tank is at a complete halt witho11t usin~ both feeto The type seat and backrest in the H48AJ is not suitable to smaller V~"'TN~i soldier 0 s use. The seat does not adjust forward enough to provide back support nor go high enough to provide forward and side vision over both f enderso

(c) ~2m~end~s A modification kit should be developed which will provide at least a 6- extension of the brake pedalo The seat should be mocUfied to provide a locked non-leaning backrest and a lO• increase in height for ~roper visibility.

f o Logistics ·

(l) Monsoon Supply Preparation

CONflDEi~TIAL 65

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AVJJH-·GC ... Mtt 4DEC196& :3UBJ~cr~ ~"· pu.rat.loti..:.i..! . ,1 vl-'or . Les~ons Learned 4th Infantry Div!..3i on

1-'er~Cld ~rd1f'l~ )l OctoooL .. 1969 11 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (u)

('°") Q2~~F.:!.~~~-2.~1.~ Land s~pply routes were found to be un-reliabl~ a.nd unne6ot1abie during periods of heavy raino

(b) ~a.1 ~~~ioq.~ During tho middle or July 0 fire support bases iccat~~ along land supply routes required overland resupply by convoy due to weat.heru After 1.nit.1.al attempts with organizational

.· \_;: 1 .c: . ~ : .::"a11d . sped.al purpose vehicles 0 ~. o eo 0 M,548 full tracked c.:u:~..; ... . .1. :.: t .. ~ .... ..,) u.. i ... l wt1 .. ~ uJ.ed G08H vehicles 11 were employed with only limited succ:ess,. Increased use of land mines to interdict roads was encount~r~d as the ~se or roads was in~reasedo

(c) Recommendat. 3i:1 ~ a Prior to the onset. of monsoon rains, a thorough engineer recon.naissance of all intonded overland supply rouhs should 'be made. These routes should be upgraded where neces­sary during dry work periodso During monsoons 0 maximum use of good weather must be ma.de and. stocks of Class Iu III 0 IV and V built up on fire support bases to minimize the re~uirements for overland supply. when overland supply is required 0 it must consist of quantities of necessary items ~onsistent with the difficulty or resupplyo Excess i.lse of road.3 durir!g bad weather will make roads 1mpassablee ilhen using special ?L.\t·pns~ vehicles not organic to the unit 0 the recov­ery capability of these veh1cles 0 in case of mechanical failure or mishap 0 is vital .to the planning or the resupply convoy o

(2) Resupply of Forward Units

(a) Observatioa_a During a three day period of July 0 some units became low on stocks of food and suppliee because of inclement weather on days of intended resupplyo

(b) ~aJJ!!llin.• Often during the monsoon season when units allowed food supplies to be used according to predetermined consump­tion rates 0 planning to be resupplie4 on schedule 0 period.a of ration­ing were experieneedo The weight or meals carried is the critical factor in dater~lning tho number of meals an element can carry. Stores or food on fire support bases were used to resupplJ elements when they could only receive resupply by walking to the resupply point,

(~) Recom!!'lendat.10111 Durlng the monsoon period the basic load of meals carriad sholll.d be increased to twelve, of which six should be Long Range Ration Packets~ This will increase the available meala without 1~creasing we18hto ih~n possible 0 units should rotate through fire bases regularly to keep nu+,rit1on up while Long Range Ration Packets a.re belna used more extensivelyo Resupply of units must be a part of operational pla.nn1ng and accomplished enough in adv&nce of the

necessary time to provide ~~~i~~~~~pplf. d1ff1cult1ee,

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CONFIDENTIAL-~

AVDDH=-GC ._.)fH A 0 E c 19 69 SUBJ~CTs Opera• .. :!.uhi.i h-.;pon - Lttsson& Lei.4.rned 4th I.o!antry P~ \"'~ion

Perh'd iti.dln3 )} October 1969 v HCZ CSF\lR .. 65 (B2) ( .·

(3) Fteld Show{'l' lJr..it.s

(a) QE~~~U<.1u Durlng +.t:e quarter ,, tnere wen a lc.xge number of r~que~ts fer use of S&T Ra~.talion 11 s fie] d shower ..,ointb a1... fcrililard firebo.nes o :·k·st unl t.s d€·G1rei tr1...c k r.1ct.:.r:. 1.cl units ,, which arc in short supply,,

(t.) ~~·~~ uat.1~,r.. ~ The S&T Ba.ttal1on ls authorized nirte field. shower un1 " .. s by present. HTO~ .! Of t.he!:ie niM 0 only threo are operateJ. as truc·k moun t ed units-u (Tr-..td. rr.1.'1.mt.ed. units have a Wl'~tor t .. an~ 0 the water pump :· and the hot. water hea+ e.r- mounted on a. 21" ton irucko Tnis pormits the sho'i«er ~eri.t. and s1·.ray units t,o be ~ot up at a ba.t~alion firebasi3 v norm3.Uy on a hHltop 1; a.:id alluWii tl·:. ~ true~. to travel bac.k and f,rth l'.o ti'1e nearest ~t?.ea.m for Wu.tor)" Tt,e H~!ilaining s1x uni ts ara not ir~ck mouni.edu 1'l")c.y are J.es1gnl!d to be s~t. up bes1.de strea.ma · or lakes and to p~mp wa~.t,r out (;f the st.ream or lake., However 0 few Dl.vislon flreba~es a.re esta.bl.l.shed bJ wr.i.t.~r sources since the firebases a.re establl::;hed on h1gh ~r\ .. md ,, A truc-k mount.ed wa1.~r tank 1.s imper ... ati~·e for opera.1.ion of .3r.ow~r Li.ntt~ in an unconventional warfare s1t­ua.t1.ono Unde-r the pre!:)ert, MTO~ th.t S&T Bat. ta.lion does not have suf'·-· flci~nt zt t~n ~rucks ur water tanks to operate nine truck mounted units.

(i;.) ~~£Qf!\~~!'da~!Q!~.~ That aJ.l sr .. oiller units assigned to s&·r Bai.talH~t'.5 rn Vfa'rH~M be of the truck mounted desizno

(4) Insect Con.tr.cl

(a) ~:ro~_!:1at-.a.2~.~ Tht; opt.1 m.,;.m tl me of the day to employ insecticide a3aj.n~t mosqr.11~os ls between dusk a.nd dawno However v the use of aircraft limits aeri~ 3praying to dayl1sht hourso The use or .ui aircraf't for inse~:t.ici.de sprayin~ is a drain on already 11.iti.tcd al'r-:.raf i. ~;:s~tso Spra..,vin6 on a rc~J arl.y schedll.led bases is difficult be~.a.use if the one J,GB.AV~.NCO sprayer in the Divi.sion ca.n not be used on a. scheduled day due to weather o::: tacti.ca.l airc.ra.f't requirements 0

1 t may be several d~s bef'ore tho spr~ve .. · is available to the user again,

(b) .~"'::~~U.8 To o'·erc.ome the problems encountered 1n a.1rc:art,, s~ray1ngi) a pre-gram of g:ounu sp"t'a.ying using the Ml.06 RCA Dlsper;"~r \ 111 t.y N~ t~) was es1.a.blishedo The Hity Mit.e is placed in a ~ ton t.rt;.ck (c·r other vehi(h) wnir.h dr! ves arou.nd the FSB a.t dusi<o For 1'1.r~or FSB 11 ~ sl.lch as lZ OASIS " a. rack to hold the M!.ty Mite and a 55 eall.Ctn dr\.m cf ;.n.:;,c~i.:: d.de was fabricated for a ; ton trailer, · Tn1s perm11.& sprayi11g toe 1Jnt 1 r.c FSB wi t.hout replon1sh1n£) insecticide. Alt.hMJ{-~h j t. l tl t"" ::~,~on :.,, (' b;;1:4rvt.- t.ht\ eJ' f~ci.s or t.h13 l'roceJure on

th@ mAlarlA ut@, th&in luu~ hu'*n 1\ nn1·.ir.d11hl~ · d\lcrellru~ in the number of

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kONFID.ENTIAl : ~OEC1969 AVDDH-CQ.KR SUBJiCT1 OpercJ.ticir~1 Hepor1. .. Le&sons .Learned. 4th Want~ Div,.aion

P~riod End1r.u J1 October 19690 RCS CSFQR ... 65 (R2) (U.)

flies at FS£ 11 s where thl.s procedure is being used,

(o) Conolus1o~a That ground spraying with the Kity Mit~ be used in lieu of aerial spraying wh~never posaibleo

(1) Po~er Sourcfts

(a) Qbser'!!t!~t A requirement exists to have FM voice coa­aun1cat1ons from the Battalion Command Bunker during alertso For max­imum effectiveness VRC- 12 series radios are used instead of the AN/PRC-25, However 0 a 24 volt battery was being used as the sole source of power for these radios and there were no provisions for recharging the ba.t~ tery during the course of an alertu Consequentlyo even if the alert lasted only for a few hours; the battery would. lose some of its power and communications difficW.t-.ies were encoun~oredo

(b) Evaluati.onR Within the Battalion Communications Section a 1oS DC generator was on hand but was being kept in· Adainistrativ~ Storageo Keeping this generator readily available near the Command Bunker and in a state of readiness for operations enabl.ea a quick change to generator If ~wer in the event battery power fadeso

(c) ~!Dl~i~a Units should not rely solely on bat­tery sources for emergency colllJ'llun1cat1ons unless a system is ava11-a'hb whi.c:h allows the battery to be recharged during operationo Lacking this a DC generator should be available and ready to provide power for communications during alerts or a.ttackso

(2) Antenna Orientation

(a) Observations When faced with a high loa1 obstacle in a VHF radio relay aystem 11 it ia sometime& possible to iJlprove ayataa quality by a slight misorientation of antennas to the aide of tile ob­stacle •

(b) ivalua.tiona whll~ it ia generally desirable to have VHP antennas .at opposite ends of a. syEt·~)m oriented. directly at one another, the mutual misorientation of gntennaa to an aJJaing point allghtly (leu than 10 degrees) off the noraal orientation, and &Nq troa the obstacle provides a better tranaaiaalon path,

(c) Recoue,nd.at12!• That the aiaorient.&tlon technique be tried on all var eyateas sutfe,rlng frua high lou o'bataclea.

(3) Obataolee to 1M Radio

CONFIDENTIAL 68

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(a) O~~-!ll~.a Many operations are carr1e<l on 1n tt1rr,1.!11 areas not ~onducive to good line of u16ht transm1es1ono

(b) Evaluat.1o~s The predominant means of corrununication for the battalion is the FM ra.dioo The expected and required transmission rU.st~nce varies from 10 to 20 kilometerso However 0 unless the terrain is relatively flat the communications within the line of sight limi-tation 0£ rad10S Will be diffiCUl t D ~·· '':'red.lctable f ·Or impOSSi bleo

(c) Conclt1sion11 When wor~- · .ag in mountainous terrain, good commynications require planned rolay stations and directional antennas. Elements also carry RT/GRC··292's and communication materials for field expadient omni and unidirectional antenna.Su Personnel should he aware of problems encountered due to obstacles to line of sii)ht 0 imp~oper placement of antennas 0 and over~hootlncio RTO's and commanders must be thoroughly trained anj supplied to fully utilize all available transmission aidso Equipment and personnel a.re available for relay m1sa1ons to achieve constant communications.

h, Material

(1) Steering Knuckle Failure

(a) Observations A high r~te of steering knuckle failure was noted when vehicles operated in deep mud or water.

(b) F.va1 U<l.+' on.& The cause al the failures wa.s determined to be ripped or mlsslng steerin~ knuckle boots.

(c) Recom:aendati.on1 ~hen operating 1n an area where there 1a deep mud and/or water , frequent inspections of the stooring knuckle boot be ma.de to insure it is not leaingo

(2) (a) Observations The M43A) OVM does not include the fuel tank lJUrge punp as a standard item of issue.

(b) ~'valuations This pump is a must when operating in wet weather to remove the water from the fuel tan~s. The adaption or the Mll)iJ. bilge puDlp to blhut hosas -.nd f1tt1utJG has saved many man hours roplacing fuel !llters and injector pumps.

(c) !.t£om::iendations The M48Aj OVH authorization be aod­ifiod t~ include the fuel tank purge pump a.a a standard. itea.

(j) Twik Comnander Override Mod1£1cat-1qn _ ,- ------1 CONFIDENTIAL

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11

AVJ>ml..oo-MH 40Et; ;~sa SUBJmTa Oper&tiona.1 Repcrt - Lessons Luamed 4th !nt&ntr;y Division I Period .it:nd1ne; )l October 19691 RCS CSFOR-6.5 (DZ) (U)

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(a) Observat1ona The Tank CoM&Dder override is mounted too · lov for & short Tank. Couander. . ,.

{b) l!:valuationa The M48A) tank 11 designed to fire and. tra-"~rsc but toned up.. · .

(c) Racommendatlona 'rhat the controls, suld operating rods be extended six inches up a.nd to the rear to provide complete control and vision at all times. Tn1a can be accompli~hed, if authorized, in &bout t.wo Qoura work ~1th organic tools and ingenuUy.

(4) SOP tor Engine Removal

.'(a.) Observationa Access to hose coupling 1a difficult vhen a1sconn~cting the engine froa the transaiasion on thu Mll)Al Arao~ Personnel Carrier· o.nd the M.548 Cargo Carrier.

(b) Evaluationa The left oxh&Uat 11anitold of the Mll)Al engine and the right manifold of the M.548 engine is the 1Jlped.1ment to

1

reaching the hose couplings, and is ditticuU to aaneuver aroWld 1n order to rele~se the coupling.

(c) Recouendetio~a 'lb&t the re110v&l. of·.tbe appropriat.e · exhaust u.nifold be aade ··~ part of the standard procedure of. diacon~. /' necting engines f ro11 the transaiasion.

(S) Changing Mul tifuel agines

(a) Observ&tiona The cha.nglq of eng1nea in aultitDel vheeled vehicles is cuabersoae • . . .

(b) Evaluationa The front croaa •aber of the vehicle ukea it difficult to easily reaove and reinstall •D61n•••

(c) Recouendationa That the ruov&l. of front. croaa -•r be aad.e a pa.rt of the standard proced11n of reaov&l ud uplaceaent. of enginH on ault.1tuel wheeled vehicles.

· ·(6) Filler Plug Beaov&l.

(a) Obaenatiopa ruler Plup on t.he tzon~ of MlOlA.\ 10.S. Hovitaera are beinc atri»pecl ot threads.

(b) iY&luationa T.J.a ia cauaecl by un1t.a no.\ b&Ylni t.be pn­per wrench to naove t.b• tiller plug, t.b&aa"oaualq t.be Plue t.hnada t.o 'be atrlpped,

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AVDDH---Gc"'"KH '4 tit L ivo ~ SUBJJs:CTa Operat1 .,na.1 R~~·.:·n ·- Lt'c,sozrn ! ~a.rnftd , .. ~. h I.!:h.ntry Di v151on

Perioo ~~ng Jl ~ktober 1969 0 HCS CSFOli-6) (ll2) ~t< i

(r.) Hec-2~~D.da.t1Q!l~ Fabrlcate filler plugs fro~ bl.and&ru. boltso M1nim-.l machln1ng 1a requ1red 0 with the rosultant plUc) h"vlug a. larger head whlch wlll. flt -. tox end wrencho

( 7) M· 60 Rec elver R1 vets

. (a) Q,E~~~:~t!.2~~ A h1e;;h percentage (.50 - 75%) of all M ~60 machinfl guns be1ng submltt.ed to support ma1.ntenance have loo6e rlveta on tr.e recei Vdr o 11 .. e rl vet-s work loose causlng t.he head space and b~­let r-.mp angle to cha.ng& caus1ns tho we.a.pan to jam and double feed..

(b) ~!.!lE.!llJl~' Rl,,ot.s c&1mot be tightened or replaced a.t th1 s level Wld the weapons are t.urned · 1n as unaen1c.eable and replace­ment we&por:s reqUls1t1onedo

(c.) !i~~nd.a_!:iona l'he 111&chine gun ~an be welded on each side where the rear half oi the rec.e1.vor ~ides into the front half. The rece1vttr should al.so be weldcic1 .. a.t the botto110 Welds should be electxic and no more than i to )/4 of an inch 1n lengtho

1. Other 1 None

n>R T~ COMMAN~h

6 lncls as

d~~-------~JLLAMAI Inc ls 2, 3, S and 6 wd- HQ,· -DA- - -

L!Cp GS . .loting Cbiet ot St&tt

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AV DDrl.,,. CC~ ·MH 40F r.1969

SUBJECra 0p(trat 1 'lrt~' Ht-~10.rt ·• Ll'suonrt LPl\.rr.ud 4th Int&ntry niv1s1on . 1..-:,.,oel ~nrllng JL October 1969 0 RCS CSJ'OR-65 (R2) ( · '

DISTRIBi.l1'lON ~ l •· GG v 4• .. h Inf Dtv l ... ACSFOR - D4 1 -4 OCMH ·~ DA

) -· rr.G., USAH~·

2 - CO~T ANAL ~TuDY GPo USARV 6 .... CG J IFFORCb:V l - Comdtr A.~m~d F~rces Staff Colle0e l - Comdt~ C&GS College l - Cc.•mdt ii Armor SC"h l ... Com\'it r Arty S.:.:h l ·- Co,ud.i. 0 A._.r. Sch l - Co1~dt1.1 ~,__"gr Sch l .:.. Cv;ud.t L' Inf' Sc·h 1 ·• Coindt (l Sl g Sch & C(an l - Co1'dt" LISA Chem Cen & Sch l - USHA L1bra:ry l ... CO, C!'C ,. CBR Agenc.y l - Cuo 52d Atty Gp l - COo 52d Cmbt Avn Bn 2 - CO, bt. Bde., 4th Int D1Y 2 - CO,, 2::1 BJe 11 4th Inf D1v 2 ~ CO~ Jct Bde 0 4th Inf Div l - C0 0 1 ?Jd Abn Bde 2 - CO, DIVARTY \ 2 - COo DISCOM 2 - co ~ lf.'t Sqdno 10th ~v 2 .. C011 lst Bn11 69t.h Ailllor 1 - co~ J3t Bn~ 8th Inf l - CO, 2d Bt\ 11 3th Inf l - CO, Jd Bn,. 8t.h Inf l - COo lst Bn" 12th Inf l - co~ let Bl'~ 14th Jn! l - CO~ lst Dn~ 22d Int 1 - C~:t 2d Bn 0 J.Slh In! l - C0 0 5th Bn, 16th Arty l - co" 6t.h Bn 1. 29th Arty l - CO, 4th Bn, 42d Arty " - CO . ZJ };;~" yt.h Art1 2 - C0 :- 4t.h ~~r l!n 2 • CJ, J24tn Si& Bn l · CO, 4th S!T Dn

· l ·• CO, )i Bn e l2t.'n Inf 1 - CJJ l~t Ju~ JSth Inf 1 - CO , 4 :. . · Ht'd iln

l - CO., 704th Ma111t Bn 2 - C0 0 4th Avn Bn l ... C0 11 7th Sqdn 11 l'lt.h C:•v 1 ... Chi et of Stid' Ip 4th Inf D1 v l - ACofS 0 Gl l - ACofS, G2 1 - ACo!SG G) l -· ACofS u G4 l - ACofS ,. G; 1 .. TAC.P (ALO), 4t.h Inf D1 v l. ... 00 0 4th Inf Div Repl Tng Det l - Provost Ma.rahal l - tG

10 - 00 0 29th Kil Hiat Det 1 - CheJlical otflcer l ... AG File

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AVFA-GC-HIST (4 Dec 69) 1st Ind (U) 1 5 ore 1!169 SUWECT1 Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division

Period l!Jlding 31 October 196?, l\C3 CSFOR - 65 (R2) (U)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

TO: Cowmanding General, United States Army Vietnam, A'ITN1 AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

l. (U) This headquar~ers has evaluated subject OR.LL and concurs, except ao indicated below.

2. (U) Reference para le(l)(a)§_: Dj;pCQiJlS, Headquarters, I FFORC~V is currently evaluating the pertonnance or tho pilot project windmills. It they prove effective, steps will be taken to determine whether or not w-'.ndll\i.lls can be provided through the Commodity Import Program. This would mean that the windmills would be available for individual Vietnamese to purchase, L:-t that none would be provided tree as US Civic Action Programs.

3. (U) Reference para lh(2): The average nur:"·:er or aircraft per day used in support or the division should be 30 UH-lH, 12 UH-lC/ AH-lG, 11 On-6A, 4 CH-47, and l Cn-54. These figures represent the average daily aviation support actually received and flown. They do not include support rendered by OPCON elements or the 7 /17th Cavalry Squadron which su~)fOrted continuously with two air cavalry troops and the Headquarters and Headquarters 'l'roop.

!:,. (v) r~oi'erence para 2C(4) (c): Ifonc,-,ncur. The restriction or the authority to 11 check i'ira 11 being liidted to senior ground canmanders ii contrary to sound safety procedures. Any person who observes a condition wrJ.ch could result in the injury o~ death or friendly personnel or non-combatants must have the authority to call tor a 11 check fire". All persoMel :nust be trained in calling tor and adjustment ot artillery fire, particularly in a.djuatir.g tire withir1 close proximity to triendl.7 or civilian elem~:nts.

;. (U) Reference para 2e(4)(c)s Nonconcur. The recommendation aa stated 'oes not present the ultimate solution to this problm. Thi• headquartors recom.-ilCnds that USJJW conduct a review o! US equipment planned !or tran~rer to A~Yr. tram the human eneineering stand point and determine the t'loditication& necessary due to US-VN anthropometric differences. ~~dificationa developed without a thorough &n&~aia !rCD the hum&n engineering st~ndpo!nt can result in a degradation ot the operator• 1 capabilities with a resultant reduction in equipment capabllit7.

CONFIDENTIAL !

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AVFA-GC-HIST (4 Deo 69) lst Ind (U} SUBJiar a Operational Report, - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Di vision

Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR - 6S (R2} (U}

6. (U) Retorence pare. 2h(2) (b) 1 Nonconcur. The MllJAl bilge pwnp ia not designed to pump ccmbustiblo liquids and its use tor this purpose constitutes a tire hazard. The unit hatl been advised to rflquest autil'-·· ·~~ntion for manually operated transfer pumps.

?. {U) R~rerence para 2h(3) (c): Nonconcur. This is an unauthorized modi.fication. Unit l1as bee·n advised to subnit an EIR.

8. (U} Reference para 2h(6)(c): Nonconcur. Inadequate explanation and information is provided. It is not clear whether the heads ot the plug are being damaged or the th!-eads stripped. No reason ia given for not having the proper wrench. 'l!hia headquarters ia in the process or checking the problem with aupport,ing maintenance and will advise the unit ot the results.

9. (U) Reference para 2h(7) (c) a Nt\nconour. Information conoeming thio pr0Llm1 11ll8 bo~n dbo,·lminatbd to the t'ield in maintenance publioation1, 'l'ltc. pMh.lt11n '·" onra'.i"l,ly "l,ul,u•t ~"'' lu~l·l'uol.lnuti huva \1aun dltt~hitniav~t.~.\ f••t' U•hlt•ll•l d 'A'" u~~ l1 l1u it1t•• U "' .,,. , '. •U' httWlJ vu"' ld1-. lllutU J'l l'jtt.i.UH h l.'UJ~ auLhui·l.~o\l ~u uu ve1•ru11no'1 nt gc1101•a.1. ou1•purt. lovel.

CF a 2 - ACSFOR, DA . l - en, 4th Int lliviaion

j~.:.££.~ FREIERICK E. HrlWIJ . 1 LT AGO ASST Al

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AVHGC-DST (4 Dec 69) 2d Ind SUBJEal'z Operational Report-Lessons Leamad 4th Intantey Diviaion l'•riod

Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

~UARTEBS, UNITrl> STATES ARMY, Vll.TNAM, APO San Fr1mciaco 96375 2 4 JAN 1970

TO: Ccmander in Chier, United States Arrq, Pacific, ATTN1 GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) hie headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Leaeona Learned .)r the q\1''\rterly pJriod ending .31 October 1969 tran Headquarter.,, 4th Infantry Dl vbion and oouu11E1nts ot indordng headquartera,

2. (C) Comments follow: . t.. (U) Reference item concerning 11 R&R Standb7 Lista", page 541 para•

graph 2a( 1); concur. The recommendation made b7 the 4th Int Div in para­graph 2(a)(c) appears to be a sound procedure: however, it would not be tea~ible tor all cormnanda due to dispersion ot subordinate units, Comnanda tdth unit5 widely dispersed would tind this proposal to be an adminiatra­ti ve burden.

b. (C) Reference item ccncerning "Tape Recorders and Interrogation•, page 55, paragraph 2b(1); concur. The IPW section ia alrea~ authorized aix tape recorders (AN/UNH-10) by MTOE 30-17G. The idea or utilizing tape recorders during interrogation has merit; however, tactical milita17 intelligence companies (MICs) should direct e!torts toward acquiring intomation tor in,.nediate tactical yalue 1 i.e., local VCI, OB and en•JV unit locations. Detailed interrogation ot highly knowledgeabltt PWa should be conducted at the CTZ interrogation centers or the CoJDbin•d Military Interrogation Center.

· c. (U) Re!erence item concerning "Close Artilleey Support", pap SS, paragraph 2c(4), and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 4. Concur with the recca­mendation, nonconcur with 1 at Indoraement. Ground Commandera must retain authorit1 to direct "che.:k fire". Anf attempt to allow "an.y peraon" to call tor "check lire" as described in 1at Indoraement, iaragraph 4, vill negt\te artiller/ responsiveness and put enelD)" deceptive radio atationa in A position ot stopping US supporting tiroa b7 near unchallenged calling tor •check tirea".

d. (U) Reterence item conceming "Hipahoot", pap 60, paragraph 2c(7); concur. The hipshoot aa described 1a a 1impl• adaptation of at,andard procedurea uaec b7 howitzer.; batteriea ot Armored Cawl.17 Squad­ron organic to Armored CavalrJ Reg 1.Jlenta.

•· (U) Ret'!rence item concerning "Konaoon SupP11 Preparation", pase 65, paragraph 2t( 1 ) ; conc\&r. Supply route.a anould be upgraded prior to monaoon ra1na &nd atocka ot Claaa 1, III, IV, and V should be b\lilt up on fin npport ba- WMIWWl' poaaibl•.

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AVHGC-DST (4 Dee 69) 2d Ind SUBJ:t;CT; Operational Report-Le.asons Learned 4th Infantry Di vision Pniod

Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR~S (R2) (U)

t. (U) Reference item concerning "Field Shower Uni.tau, page 67, paragraph 2t(.3); concur. However, the s&T Bn is authorized nine Bath Unit Portable: Gasoline engine driven, eight shower heads. The units authorized are portable only and nc1t truck mounted as indicated in the ORLL. The three truck mounted shower units must be locally tabricated as only the portable Ltt :.s 3vailt.~)l ~ a~ a standard item. The truck mounted shower unit idea has merit; therefore, ~ecommend submission or idea to us ~ Combat Devel­o:J!":"ent Co11uTil1nd IAW AR 71-1 or fabricate six additional truck mounted shower units to &.q,tisfy the requirement • .

g. (U) Retorence item concerning "Filler Plug Hoi-:.oval 11 , page 70, para.graph 2h(6),. and 1st Indorsement, paragx·aph 8; nonconcur. There is a standard tiller plug re~ainer wrench in the supply system (Part i/6103723, Rer page JO, fig 14, TM 9-3007 Oct 5.3). If' missing, the wrench shoulci be requisitioned by the unit. The organizational mechanic tool kit also contains a suitable wrench for removing the plug. Using an improper tool will strip the head of the plue but should not affect the condition ot the plug threads; however, it the threads become damaged, the recommendation at hand would be an acceptable field expedient.

h. (U) Reterence item concerning "M-60 Receiver Rivets", page 71, parag~~ph 2h(7), and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 9; concur. Keeping the M-60 machin6 eun receiver rivets tight has been a constant problem, recog­nized by change 2 to TM 9-1005-224-25, which provides instructions tor· using electric welds on the tront rivets only. It the rear rivets are likewise presenting problems, the using unit should submit an f4uipnent Improvement Recommendation (EIR) to USAWECOM. Thia headquarters can not a approve the welding aa recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C7 turns 4th Int DiT I F1'V

~~o/' L D. MURRAy CPT, AGC l•ssblont Adjutont Gnneral

CONFIDENTIAL

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GPOP·DT (4 Dec 69) 3d Ind (U) SUBJECT: Oper1tion1l Report of HQ, 4th Inf1ntry Division for Period

Ending 31 October 1969, acs csroa-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, P1cific, APO Sin Fr1nci1co 96558 12 FEB 1970

TOI A11i1t1nt Chief of Stiff for Force Development, Department of the Army, W11hington, D. c. 20310

Thia he1dqu1rter1 ·concur1 in aubject report 11 indoraed.

roa. THI COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

~41}/Jll'l-c. L. SHORn CPT, AGC .. AutAG

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ORGAH IZAl'IO!~AL s·rnuc ru1w;

(C) ·rask Org~b~tion aa of )1 July 1969 Mith supporting i'o.r1 r;:.>o

1st llde 11 4·t.h Inf Div ?d Bde 0 4th Inf Ji,,

1-8 Inf B/2-3 Inf

J-12 Inf 1-12 Inf

J-·3 Inf 1-22 Inf

2-8 Inf (-) B/7 ... 17 Cav 1-69 Armor (-) B/1-69 Armor 2-1 Cav (-) 4-42 Arty OS (-) A/7 ... 17 Cav A/'J-6 Arty DS 6 ... 29 Arty JS A/ 4-42 Arty GS A/2.,,.17 Arty DS C/ 6- 14 Arty GS B/2 ... 17 Arty DS A/1-92 Arty GS C/5-16 1\:rty GSR 6-29 Arty B/1-92 Arty GS B/4 ~ngr · B/5-16 Arty GSR Arty 4-42 Arty

D/704th Maint c/4 ~ngr B/4 Med C/704 Ha1nt Plat/B/124 Sig C/4 I-led

Plat/4 MP Co Plat/C/124 Sig TACP Pla t/4 MP Co .

TACP J9: Bdeg 4th Inf Div

Division Troops 1··14 Ir.f 1-35 Irif 4th &lgr (-)

2-35 Inf D/7-17 Cav 1- 10 Cav B/J-6 Arty GS D/2._.1 Cav B/ 6-14 Arty GS 2-9 Arty DS G/ 1-92 Arty GS C/J-6 Arty GS C/7-15 Arty GS c/;r-27 Arty GS 4 Avn D/5-16 Arty GS 124 Sig (-~ A/6-14 Arty cs . 4 l~P Co (-A/5··16 Arty GSR 2•9 Arty K/75 Inf (Ranger) D/4 ~gr 4 MI Det B/704 Ha.int 4 iiar Dog (Prov) D/~ Med 4J Chem Det Plat/B/124 Sig 29 Mil Hist Det

Plat/4 MP Co TACP

TACP

173d Abn Dde

C/7-17 Cav (OPCON)

2. (C) Task Organization change as noted in significant events S Aug ·691

-- --Inclosure 1

CONFIDENTIA°L 7'1

' DOWNGIADID " 3 ma amnm, -DICWSIRID &ml 12 YUIS.

DOD Dll S20G.10

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ri~.L~:; AS~& 2 ... J l. : ; ( · ; ~t:,~~IV ~:; 1 · ll1 Gav ( ·) au;c~v~. il/7-17 Cav ~6AS~a A/1-69 Arm

CONFUJEiirlAL 2d ~do 4th Inf Div

,\,:L~,w~' B/7/17 CR'' ~~IVA& 2-3 Inf {A'

Jd Bde 4th Inf Div

~~s~, 1-10 Cav (-) ~C~Iv~, A/1-~9 Arm

J ~ (C) Task OrJanization change as noted in significant events 6 Aug 69&

2d ilde 4th Inf iliv

4. · (C) ·rask Or()anization chan8e as noted in s1'3nificant events 12 Aug 691

1st Bde 4th Inf Div

rl~C~IV~1 B/7-17 Cav

2d .dde 4th Inf Div

~l!!AS~a B/7-17 Cav

5. (C) Task Organization change as noted in significant events 14 Aug 691

1st ride 4th Inf Div 2d Bde 4th Inf iliv

R~~~.u;, D/7-17 Cav ~~IVEt B/7-17 Cav

6. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 88-69 effective 18 Aug 691

2d Bde 4th Inf Div

~~AS~1 TACCP/A/B/1-22 Inf

3d Bde 4th Inf Div

IW.EAS~a A/2-JS t.nf

Division Troops

REC6IV~1 Ti;.CCP/A/B/1-22 Inf REC~IV~1 A/2-)5 Inf

7. (C) 1ask Organization as changed· by FnAGO 9)-69 effective )1 Aug 691

3d Bde 4th Inf Div

.. ~ .... •.

1. Constitute TF FIGdT6R Hqs. 2, Move TF FIGHT~ Hqs, one Inf Co and D/7-17 Cav to BMT OPCON T1 FIGHTiR, ;. Be prepared on order to move out one Int w/DS Arty to TF control.

7-17th Cav

1. Move one air Ca.Valry troop to BMT E OPCOH TF FIGariB.

8, (C) Ta.sk Jrgan1zat1on as changed by FRAOO 95-69 effective 2 Sep 691

1st Bde 4th Inf Div

Pl.at/1-69 Armor

2d Bde 4th In!' Div

79 CONFIDENTIAL J

~ UCAiv~. I ·----1

'PJ.at/1-69 Anor

I · .

,. " ~.' ..... ! -~ .. .. ~

·;.~ --- ----------------~· --·· ..

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·-:;:-__________ ___, · ' 4 1

. .. { CONFIDENTIAL 1

· • . : .. 9 • . ,(c) '·rask Organ1zat1oA .. a'S -cn~rt~ed.-by !t'HAGO 9b-b9 effective 5 Sep 691 ... . '

10.

11.

· 2d Bde 4th Inf J.li!. . Jl llde 4th Inf Div

lr f

(c) ·rask OrJanization as changed by Fn~GO 93-69 effective r; ·~< ,;.q,

2d Bde 4th Inf Div

&X:~V~a 1-22 Inf

Jd lid<3 4th In! Ji~

~Ll~s 1-22 Inf

(c) Taak Organization aa changed by FHAGO 102-69 effdctive 20 Sep 691

1st Bde 4th Inf ~iv

l~~AS~, ~lements/1-69 Arm

173d A1rborno Bde

i~V~a 1 Dn w/ ~ Arty

2d Bdo L~th Inf Jiv

!U:;~~IV~s elomonts/!-69 Ara ~.i,,u~s 1 Jn w/DS Art1 l~.i,,~.-l.:.& 2-d Inf

3d Bde 4th Inf Div

~£!:IV~s 2-J Inf

12. (c) !ask Organization as cna.nged by FRAGO 107-69 effective 12-16 Oct 691

1st Bde 4th Inf Div

a.:l,~Es 1-10 Cav ~~a 1-69 Armor (-)

Jg. Bde l~th In! Div

~~' element41-69 Armor

Division Troops

~IVEs 1-10 Cav ~Iv~, 1-69 Armor

1j, (C) Task 0r6anizat1on as chan~ed by ~~AGO 103-69 effective 13 Oct 691

14.

1st lide 4th Inf Div Jd Bde 4th Inf Div

~Ei J-12 Inf d~"C~IV~: )·12 Inf'

(c) Task Or~anlzation as changed by FRAGO 112-69 e!fectiv~ 2J Oct 691

1st BJ.e 4th Inf ~iv

f~~V~a 3 •. 3 Inf ~~Vb:a 1-14 Inf

173d Airborne Bd~

Rc:.'t.£A3.::" 1-12 Inf

2d Bde 4th Inf uiv

RI ~y. :•!A$~ I )-3 Int' ~IVia 1·12 Int

).l Bde 4th Inf D1 v

~~I 1-14 In£

15, (c) ·ra.sk Or3an1zat1on as changed by FRAGO 11)-69 ef'tective )1 Oct 691

Jd ilde 4th Int Div

~V•1 1-14 Inf' j CONFIDENTIAL I •

"O ; , 0 : ' ·

lat Dde 4th Inf' Div

I •.

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,:

~ ~·

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! CONFIDENnAL 16. (c) !'as~~ J~~ainhati~r. as _ of J1 October 1969 wit.:, 3Uppol.'tiag forces.

·- ~- .Z. ..... . . &...- -- -

1.st udc 9 4th Inf J11 _:q Uj13~llth jnf=-lll.-~

1-3 fo£ 1 ... 8 In! 6··"'29 (-) Arty DS .J./ 2-17 Arty DS il/2-17 Arty 00 C/ 5-16 Arty GSR 6-29 Arty A/6-29 Art1 D/5-16 Arty B/4 ~gr Ll/'/04 ~~c,int .. -~ · • 'n/121_,. Sig f':..~~t/~ i·il' ~o J/4· Mod l'AJP

2d ilde 5 4th Inf Div

1·22 Inf 4-42 Arty DJ C/4 ~nG'T C/704 Ma.int ..;./4 l{ed Plat/B/124 Sig Plat/4 M? Co l'ACP

Ti\SK FOn~ FIG!ll'~

B/2-35 Inf B/7-1? Cav J/7-17 Cav

. --· ---- - .. .

...... .,. ' ) .... , .... j,J!L

1-14 lnf 1- 35 Inf 2-35 Inf 2-9 Arty m A/_5-16 Arty ~SB 2-9 Arty D/5-16 Arty CS A/1 ··92 Arty CS A/.6-14 Arty G3 D/6-29 Arty GS C/7-15 Art,y GS C/6-14 Arty GS A/4 Med B/704 Haint ,\/4 Qigr J."'lat/B/124 Sig Pld.t/ 4 MP Co rA~i

ilivision Troops

2-o Inf 1-69 Armor 1-10 Cav 7-1? Cav (-) 4 ~ngr (-) A/_3-6 Arty GS C/J-6 i\rty GS B/6-14 Arty GS B/1-92 Arty GS A/4-42 Arty 704 Maint (-) 4 Med (-) 124 Sig (-) Flat/4 MP Co 'A/75 Inf (Ranier) 4 MI Det 4 •ar Dog (Prov) 4) Ch111 £Mt 29th HU Hist Det 4 AVD ·rACP

I CONFIDENTIAL fl I

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PHU BON .

DOWllGIADED AT 3 YEll llTEIVALS; ~ ··-: · g ~ · . DKWSIFllD Aftll 12 YWS.

t:. 0 N I= \IU~ N l \AL DOD DH00.10 ·.

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DOCUMENT coWQ~~!· . R & D . (Securllr cl•••lllrellon ol Urie, ~ ol eb•INCI •IMI lnde•lfta ,...,, .. ,be •nl•trd .,..,. l'-e oNt•ll raputl 111 rl•ulll•d)

I . 0"lGlNATING ACTIVlTV (COIJl.,.leeu ..... ) ~, . 1 , le,N£POIU •~CURIJ'f c.t.a'" ... ICAllOt

~- / . ·', ... ·- CONFIDENTIAL 20310

4 .. '·• ........ "°"" HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C.

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 4th Infantry Division

•• O&IC"u•nv& NOTCI (J'1pe ., ,.,,.,, ..... ,...,.,.," .,..,

Exoeriences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations. 1 A11ft ~Q tn ~1 nrt 69 • , . AUtMO"tlt (l'•nt ..... , ·'~· ....... t .......... , -

CG, 4th Infantry Division

I· "Cl'O"T D"T& Ja. TOTAL NO. 0,. l'AG&I

4 December 1969 85 ... CONT .. ACT 0" ... ANT NO • ... O"IOIN,.TOllll'I "&l'Of'1 NUMaUUI• .. .. C9"0J&CT NO. 694207

N/A .. ... :1:~.~POU NOlll (Alfr..., ,....,_ ... , ...,, ..... •1"94

II• IU""L&M&NTA"Y NOT&I ta. l"ONIO•UN• MtLITA"Y ACTIVtTY

N/A OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

ti. 4el1' .. ACT

83

DD .·= .. 1473 UNCLASSIFIED GC9ittr aa.atnceiiM

: \ !

I 1