i. introduction from security governance to geopolitical...

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Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies Vol. 11, No. 4, 2017Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies Vol. 11, No. 4, 2017

46

From Security Governance to Geopolitical

Rivalry: Iran-GCC Confrontation in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean

Haifa Ahmed Al MAASHI

(Dubai Public Policy Research Centre, UAE)

Abstract: This article aims to address the aspects of conflict between Iran and the GCC starting from the geographical location, focusing on the factors that influence the acquisition of power by different state actors in this maritime sphere. The purpose of the article is to uncover the significant factors that directly and indirectly affect the distribution of influence between Iran and the GCC countries in this strategic marine area through following different sub-goals that deal with the main elements regarding security, political and economic conditions within every country in that region, as well as among the various regional and international powers. The analysis reveals that the interests of the GCC in this strategic maritime outweighs the interests of Iran. In the meantime, Saudi Arabia and UAE consider this area a high security threat region, while Iran sees it as one of the multiple security axes that are associated with its interests. The security risks that threaten the Arab Gulf states because of the new political and economic relationship with Yemen due to the war, in addition to the declared and latent maneuvers of world powers from outside the region either to besiege the Gulf axis or to initiate alliances with the Gulf states, signify without doubt the strong future influence of this geographical spot for the GCC and the possibilities of conflict escalation between Iran and GCC. Key Words: Iran-GCC Confrontation; Geopolitics; the Red Sea; the Indian Ocean

Within the geographic strategic area that surrounds the strait of Bab Al-Mandab, there are two strategic naval fringes. The first one starts from the port of Midi on the Yemeni western coast line down to the port of Do’bab, adjacent to the Strait of Bab al-Mandab, and it extends to the opposite African coast, from the port of Massawa on the Eritrean coast down to the port of Djibouti. The second fringe starts from the Gulf of Aden along the Yemeni southern coast up to the port of Daba in Hadramout, and along the northern coast of Somalia starting from the port of Berbera in Somaliland up to the port of Bosasso in the Puntland. The conflict of interests between Iran and the Arab Gulf states within this strategic zone highlights a complex and wide network of alliances on the regional and international levels. It also embraces different political, security and economic implications that strongly highlight the confrontation between the Shiite camp led by Iran and its proxies, and the Sunni camp led by Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies.

Dr. Haifa Ahmed Al MAASHI, Dubai Public Policy Research Centre, UAE.

From Security Governance to Geopolitical Rivalry: Iran-GCC Confrontation in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean

47

I. Introduction

Proper attention to geography, as Robert Kaplan believes in his famous book, The Revenge of Geography, What the Map Tells Us about the Coming Conflicts and the Battle of Destiny, leads to pragmatism rather than idealism and optimism. “Geography is a background to the history of humanity itself ... It may reveal the government perspectives on the long term better than its secret councils. The location of the state on the map is the first thing that introduces this state, even more than its philosophy of governance.” Infollowing this line of thinking, this article is trying to expose the current, potential and growing geographical influences of the two strategic fringes within the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea in the Indian Ocean in an area starting from the port of Massawa in Eritrea and extends along the western coast of Yemen overlooking the Red Sea and includes the eastern coast of the Horn of Africa, reaching the vital strait of Bab al-Mandab toward the Gulf of Aden, which combines the southern coast of Yemen and the northern coast of Somalia.

This geographical area has become a major concern for the regional and international powers due to many reasons, the most important being the security issue. The outbreak of the war in Yemen in 2015 led to the escalation of military confrontations on land, sea and air, which significantly influenced maritime navigation and international trade movement in that area. However, the war in Yemen was not the main driver or the first spark of tension in this strategic zone as this tense situation was caused by other factors such as piracy, arms smuggling, and the influx of refugees from the Horn of Africa to Yemen’s western and southern coasts. Also, other factors of great influence are terrorist mobilization and the terrorist’s exploitation of piracy and refugees in executing their operations.

The geographical map of this region embraces strategic ports and around 216 islands, mostly in the Red Sea as its number reach up to 156 islands and the rest exist in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. (16 islands are inhabited and 199 are uninhabited areas). In addition, there’s also a vital strait of Bab al-Mandab, which is a major trade route linking East Asia and Europe with the world, which is the main transit route for ships from the Western Fleet in Saudi Arabia, based in the port of Jeddah on the Red Sea. The eastern border of the Strait is located on the western coast of Yemen, and Djibouti lies in its western border.

Francis Simba points to the realist view of the sea power theory developed by Alfred Thayer Mahan in the early 20th century. He believes that Mahan’s understanding of the anarchic nature of international politics, the importance of geography in the balance of world power, the role of naval power in national security policy and the ability of history to shed light on contemporary politics remains relevant to the world of the 21st century.

According to Mahan, the economic, military and political power of Great Britain was a direct result of its maritime power. Captain Mahan also cited some of the key factors associated with maritime power, including geography, government, national personality and population. The communication and concentration of the fleet was also important for the naval force. In addition, Mahan emphasized how marine strategies in the past can be used at present.

Willian Marmon, “The Revenge of Geography, What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the

Battle Against Fate,” by Robert D. Kaplan, The European Institute, 2013. Francis P. Sempa, “The Geopolitical Vision of Alfred Thayer Mahan,” The Diplomat, December 30,

2014. Kaitlin Oglesby, “The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: Summary”, http://study.com/academy/less

on/the-influence-of-sea-power-upon-history-summary.html.

47

From Security Governance to Geopolitical Rivalry: Iran-GCC Confrontation in the Red Sea and the Indian OceanAsian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies Vol. 11, No. 4, 2017

46

From Security Governance to Geopolitical

Rivalry: Iran-GCC Confrontation in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean

Haifa Ahmed Al MAASHI

(Dubai Public Policy Research Centre, UAE)

Abstract: This article aims to address the aspects of conflict between Iran and the GCC starting from the geographical location, focusing on the factors that influence the acquisition of power by different state actors in this maritime sphere. The purpose of the article is to uncover the significant factors that directly and indirectly affect the distribution of influence between Iran and the GCC countries in this strategic marine area through following different sub-goals that deal with the main elements regarding security, political and economic conditions within every country in that region, as well as among the various regional and international powers. The analysis reveals that the interests of the GCC in this strategic maritime outweighs the interests of Iran. In the meantime, Saudi Arabia and UAE consider this area a high security threat region, while Iran sees it as one of the multiple security axes that are associated with its interests. The security risks that threaten the Arab Gulf states because of the new political and economic relationship with Yemen due to the war, in addition to the declared and latent maneuvers of world powers from outside the region either to besiege the Gulf axis or to initiate alliances with the Gulf states, signify without doubt the strong future influence of this geographical spot for the GCC and the possibilities of conflict escalation between Iran and GCC. Key Words: Iran-GCC Confrontation; Geopolitics; the Red Sea; the Indian Ocean

Within the geographic strategic area that surrounds the strait of Bab Al-Mandab, there are two strategic naval fringes. The first one starts from the port of Midi on the Yemeni western coast line down to the port of Do’bab, adjacent to the Strait of Bab al-Mandab, and it extends to the opposite African coast, from the port of Massawa on the Eritrean coast down to the port of Djibouti. The second fringe starts from the Gulf of Aden along the Yemeni southern coast up to the port of Daba in Hadramout, and along the northern coast of Somalia starting from the port of Berbera in Somaliland up to the port of Bosasso in the Puntland. The conflict of interests between Iran and the Arab Gulf states within this strategic zone highlights a complex and wide network of alliances on the regional and international levels. It also embraces different political, security and economic implications that strongly highlight the confrontation between the Shiite camp led by Iran and its proxies, and the Sunni camp led by Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies.

Dr. Haifa Ahmed Al MAASHI, Dubai Public Policy Research Centre, UAE.


47

I. Introduction

Proper attention to geography, as Robert Kaplan believes in his famous book, The Revenge of Geography, What the Map Tells Us about the Coming Conflicts and the Battle of Destiny, leads to pragmatism rather than idealism and optimism. “Geography is a background to the history of humanity itself ... It may reveal the government perspectives on the long term better than its secret councils. The location of the state on the map is the first thing that introduces this state, even more than its philosophy of governance.” Infollowing this line of thinking, this article is trying to expose the current, potential and growing geographical influences of the two strategic fringes within the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea in the Indian Ocean in an area starting from the port of Massawa in Eritrea and extends along the western coast of Yemen overlooking the Red Sea and includes the eastern coast of the Horn of Africa, reaching the vital strait of Bab al-Mandab toward the Gulf of Aden, which combines the southern coast of Yemen and the northern coast of Somalia.

This geographical area has become a major concern for the regional and international powers due to many reasons, the most important being the security issue. The outbreak of the war in Yemen in 2015 led to the escalation of military confrontations on land, sea and air, which significantly influenced maritime navigation and international trade movement in that area. However, the war in Yemen was not the main driver or the first spark of tension in this strategic zone as this tense situation was caused by other factors such as piracy, arms smuggling, and the influx of refugees from the Horn of Africa to Yemen’s western and southern coasts. Also, other factors of great influence are terrorist mobilization and the terrorist’s exploitation of piracy and refugees in executing their operations.

The geographical map of this region embraces strategic ports and around 216 islands, mostly in the Red Sea as its number reach up to 156 islands and the rest exist in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. (16 islands are inhabited and 199 are uninhabited areas). In addition, there’s also a vital strait of Bab al-Mandab, which is a major trade route linking East Asia and Europe with the world, which is the main transit route for ships from the Western Fleet in Saudi Arabia, based in the port of Jeddah on the Red Sea. The eastern border of the Strait is located on the western coast of Yemen, and Djibouti lies in its western border.

Francis Simba points to the realist view of the sea power theory developed by Alfred Thayer Mahan in the early 20th century. He believes that Mahan’s understanding of the anarchic nature of international politics, the importance of geography in the balance of world power, the role of naval power in national security policy and the ability of history to shed light on contemporary politics remains relevant to the world of the 21st century.

According to Mahan, the economic, military and political power of Great Britain was a direct result of its maritime power. Captain Mahan also cited some of the key factors associated with maritime power, including geography, government, national personality and population. The communication and concentration of the fleet was also important for the naval force. In addition, Mahan emphasized how marine strategies in the past can be used at present.

Willian Marmon, “The Revenge of Geography, What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the

Battle Against Fate,” by Robert D. Kaplan, The European Institute, 2013. Francis P. Sempa, “The Geopolitical Vision of Alfred Thayer Mahan,” The Diplomat, December 30,

2014. Kaitlin Oglesby, “The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: Summary”, http://study.com/academy/less

on/the-influence-of-sea-power-upon-history-summary.html.

48


48

The classical theory of Mahan may well apply to what is going on in the strategic square between the western coast of Yemen and the eastern coast of the Horn of Africa, bringing together different civilizations, governments and nations. Also the theory may apply to the role of different players within the two strategic fringes like UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iran, United States, regional or international powers, or the various African states in the horn of Africa. Some of the conditions that Mahan identifies may relate to the naval power of these different players in terms of significance of the naval coasts within this area and its strategic value, the significance of maritime trade to the development of sea power, the extent of maritime coasts and the characteristics of the main ports.

How does the social, military, political and historical background of different state or non-state players work together to preserve the security and stability of this strategic area? Moreover, are the relations between them based on complete disharmony or full agreement or a mixture of this and that?

In addition to the factors mentioned by Mahan, there may be other factors that manage the geopolitical situation in this area, which are the bilateral and collective alliances, both within each state or between the different states, and the emergence of external and superpower forces within the scope of these alliances in the strategic fringes.

This article aims to uncover the most important factors that constitute the naval power of Iran and the GCC and that directly and indirectly affect the distribution of influence between Iran and the GCC countries in the target strategic area. The article attempts to utilize the Mahan’s theory partly by starting from the geographical location through focusing on the factors that influence the acquisition of power by different states in the maritime sphere. Even though it is a classical theory, the influence of these factors continues to stand out to this day, thus contributing to the interpretation of the naval power of the countries, especially in the strategic scope we are looking at.

The objectives of this article is: First, identifying the most important areas of conflict between Iran and the Gulf States. Second, highlighting the commercial and military naval forces of the two parties and making a comparison between them to expose the utilization of their naval power in the conflicts within this area. Third, exposing the policies of both Iran and the GCC in dealing with the countries overlooking the coasts of that region. Fourth, clarifying the main issues that constitute the cornerstone factors in the confrontation between Iran and the GCC. Fifth, focusing on the role of bilateral and collective alliances between Iran and the GCC on one side and the different regional and international powers on the other side and its implications on the management of conflict and the distribution of naval influence in the target area.

II. Areas of Conflict in the Strategic Fringes and the Confrontations

between Iran and the Gulf States

1. The target naval area in the Red Sea The Ports in the Western Coast of Yemen Considering the scope of the war in Yemen, which began in 2015, the importance of

the western coast in Yemen is more prominent than ever before. The coast starts from the port of Midi in the far north, reaching to Bab al-Mandab in the far south, thus combining the strategic ports that are located between them, such as: Al lehiah, AlSalief, Al Hodeida, AlKhokha, and AlMakha. This coast extends along a line of about 450 km.

Those ports formed an important naval outlet since the beginning of the Yemeni war between the legitimate government led by Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, under the leadership of the coalition (that is led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE) and the Houthis- Saleh forces


49

and their supporters. Through these ports, the Houthis confirm their control over the provinces near these ports, such as: Hajah, Amran, Jawf, and Hodeida. These ports are hot spots for smuggling arms and military equipment, which the Houthis received from neighboring ports on the eastern coast of the Horn of Africa, and they are also deemed to be strategic outlets for managing and implementing the war plans in the face of the coalition through threatening the security of maritime navigation and blocking the progress of the coalition towards the Yemeni capital Sana’a. In addition to that, Houthis utilize these ports as a platform to launch ballistic missiles either inside the Yemeni lands toward the legitimate army or toward the Saudi borders in the north. The route of attack depends on the installation of various radars to direct drones and booby-trapped boats.

The coalition has accused Iran of using the sea ports in the western coast of Yemen to escalate the conflict and for using devious means to smuggle arms and fuel from ports on the southern coast of Yemen. The confrontations were greatly intensified in Bab al-Mandab Strait between the coalition forces and the Houthis-Salah camp. At present, Bab al-Mandab includes Saudi and Emirati forces as well as forces from the southern resistance and a broad air cover and naval fleet (Saudi and the Emirates). The liberation of the long coast adjacent to Bab al-Mandab from Houthis-Salah forces took nearly a year. The last locations to be liberated was Do’bab in the northern borders of Bab al-Mandab Strait and 30 km from the strait where its control allows coalition forces to move freely within the strait, put an end to the Houthi’s missiles attacks and striping the Houthis from the ability to launch ballistic missiles from that area by ruining their radar platforms on the western coast of Yemen.

The confrontations in the port of Makha took less time, as the coalition managed to control it within three weeks. However, they spent a lot of time cleansing the area around the port and removing the landmines that the Houthis had placed in the port range.

The port of Hodeida remains a real threat for the coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The uncertainty surrounding the military scene around the province of Hodeida and the port arise after international warnings led by Russia and some international bodies warned the coalition about invading the port under the pretext that the seizure of the port of Hodeidah militarily will prevent humanitarian assistance to enter areas, populated largely by the Yemeni and controlled by the Houthis and Saleh’s forces. The port of Djibouti

The vital location of the Djibouti port highlights its role in this maritime region and its unique policy within the game of political balance through establishing different relations with international and regional powers and hosting a number of military bases. This apply as well on Djibouti’s relations with Iran and with the Gulf states.

The port of Djibouti became an important location after the 9/11 attacks, the outbreak of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, and the Ethiopian-Eritrean war of 1998-2000, which stripped Ethiopia of its ports in Eritrea.

The Gulf States’ relationship with the port of Djibouti has emerged strongly through the UAE and DP World’s acquisition of the largest container terminal in Africa for 50 years after the Djibouti parliament approved the deal in 2005. The dispute escalated shortly after the collapse of the negotiations Between Dubai Ports World and the Government of Djibouti on the rights of operation of the port where it reached legal confrontations in the arbitration proceedings in London 2014. The Court of London acquitted DP World in 2016 of all the allegations made by the Government of Djibouti. DP World station (Duraleh) is strategically positioned at the crossroads of the main cargo lines connecting Asia, Africa and Europe. The port is located on the East-West Trade Road and is a safe transit hub for

“Djibouti Is Overcrowded with Foreign Military Bases,” Al Jazeera, April 11, 2016.

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48

The classical theory of Mahan may well apply to what is going on in the strategic square between the western coast of Yemen and the eastern coast of the Horn of Africa, bringing together different civilizations, governments and nations. Also the theory may apply to the role of different players within the two strategic fringes like UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iran, United States, regional or international powers, or the various African states in the horn of Africa. Some of the conditions that Mahan identifies may relate to the naval power of these different players in terms of significance of the naval coasts within this area and its strategic value, the significance of maritime trade to the development of sea power, the extent of maritime coasts and the characteristics of the main ports.

How does the social, military, political and historical background of different state or non-state players work together to preserve the security and stability of this strategic area? Moreover, are the relations between them based on complete disharmony or full agreement or a mixture of this and that?

In addition to the factors mentioned by Mahan, there may be other factors that manage the geopolitical situation in this area, which are the bilateral and collective alliances, both within each state or between the different states, and the emergence of external and superpower forces within the scope of these alliances in the strategic fringes.

This article aims to uncover the most important factors that constitute the naval power of Iran and the GCC and that directly and indirectly affect the distribution of influence between Iran and the GCC countries in the target strategic area. The article attempts to utilize the Mahan’s theory partly by starting from the geographical location through focusing on the factors that influence the acquisition of power by different states in the maritime sphere. Even though it is a classical theory, the influence of these factors continues to stand out to this day, thus contributing to the interpretation of the naval power of the countries, especially in the strategic scope we are looking at.

The objectives of this article is: First, identifying the most important areas of conflict between Iran and the Gulf States. Second, highlighting the commercial and military naval forces of the two parties and making a comparison between them to expose the utilization of their naval power in the conflicts within this area. Third, exposing the policies of both Iran and the GCC in dealing with the countries overlooking the coasts of that region. Fourth, clarifying the main issues that constitute the cornerstone factors in the confrontation between Iran and the GCC. Fifth, focusing on the role of bilateral and collective alliances between Iran and the GCC on one side and the different regional and international powers on the other side and its implications on the management of conflict and the distribution of naval influence in the target area.

II. Areas of Conflict in the Strategic Fringes and the Confrontations

between Iran and the Gulf States

1. The target naval area in the Red Sea The Ports in the Western Coast of Yemen Considering the scope of the war in Yemen, which began in 2015, the importance of

the western coast in Yemen is more prominent than ever before. The coast starts from the port of Midi in the far north, reaching to Bab al-Mandab in the far south, thus combining the strategic ports that are located between them, such as: Al lehiah, AlSalief, Al Hodeida, AlKhokha, and AlMakha. This coast extends along a line of about 450 km.

Those ports formed an important naval outlet since the beginning of the Yemeni war between the legitimate government led by Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, under the leadership of the coalition (that is led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE) and the Houthis- Saleh forces


49

and their supporters. Through these ports, the Houthis confirm their control over the provinces near these ports, such as: Hajah, Amran, Jawf, and Hodeida. These ports are hot spots for smuggling arms and military equipment, which the Houthis received from neighboring ports on the eastern coast of the Horn of Africa, and they are also deemed to be strategic outlets for managing and implementing the war plans in the face of the coalition through threatening the security of maritime navigation and blocking the progress of the coalition towards the Yemeni capital Sana’a. In addition to that, Houthis utilize these ports as a platform to launch ballistic missiles either inside the Yemeni lands toward the legitimate army or toward the Saudi borders in the north. The route of attack depends on the installation of various radars to direct drones and booby-trapped boats.

The coalition has accused Iran of using the sea ports in the western coast of Yemen to escalate the conflict and for using devious means to smuggle arms and fuel from ports on the southern coast of Yemen. The confrontations were greatly intensified in Bab al-Mandab Strait between the coalition forces and the Houthis-Salah camp. At present, Bab al-Mandab includes Saudi and Emirati forces as well as forces from the southern resistance and a broad air cover and naval fleet (Saudi and the Emirates). The liberation of the long coast adjacent to Bab al-Mandab from Houthis-Salah forces took nearly a year. The last locations to be liberated was Do’bab in the northern borders of Bab al-Mandab Strait and 30 km from the strait where its control allows coalition forces to move freely within the strait, put an end to the Houthi’s missiles attacks and striping the Houthis from the ability to launch ballistic missiles from that area by ruining their radar platforms on the western coast of Yemen.

The confrontations in the port of Makha took less time, as the coalition managed to control it within three weeks. However, they spent a lot of time cleansing the area around the port and removing the landmines that the Houthis had placed in the port range.

The port of Hodeida remains a real threat for the coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The uncertainty surrounding the military scene around the province of Hodeida and the port arise after international warnings led by Russia and some international bodies warned the coalition about invading the port under the pretext that the seizure of the port of Hodeidah militarily will prevent humanitarian assistance to enter areas, populated largely by the Yemeni and controlled by the Houthis and Saleh’s forces. The port of Djibouti

The vital location of the Djibouti port highlights its role in this maritime region and its unique policy within the game of political balance through establishing different relations with international and regional powers and hosting a number of military bases. This apply as well on Djibouti’s relations with Iran and with the Gulf states.

The port of Djibouti became an important location after the 9/11 attacks, the outbreak of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, and the Ethiopian-Eritrean war of 1998-2000, which stripped Ethiopia of its ports in Eritrea.

The Gulf States’ relationship with the port of Djibouti has emerged strongly through the UAE and DP World’s acquisition of the largest container terminal in Africa for 50 years after the Djibouti parliament approved the deal in 2005. The dispute escalated shortly after the collapse of the negotiations Between Dubai Ports World and the Government of Djibouti on the rights of operation of the port where it reached legal confrontations in the arbitration proceedings in London 2014. The Court of London acquitted DP World in 2016 of all the allegations made by the Government of Djibouti. DP World station (Duraleh) is strategically positioned at the crossroads of the main cargo lines connecting Asia, Africa and Europe. The port is located on the East-West Trade Road and is a safe transit hub for

“Djibouti Is Overcrowded with Foreign Military Bases,” Al Jazeera, April 11, 2016.

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transshipments and similar activities. It employs about 1,000 employees and about 99% of them are Djiboutians.

The UAE started economically in Djibouti through DP World, but it soon turned into the military scale after the escalation of tensions in the Yemen war in an attempt from UAE to secure the western front of Yemen. There was a clash between the two countries concerning the rights to use the airport runway which led to a cut in diplomatic relations.

Regarding Saudi relations with Djibouti, in March 2016, discussions took place between Riyadh and Djibouti to sign a comprehensive bilateral security agreement, including the long-term return of the Saudi military base to Djibouti which indicates the importance of Djibouti as the headquarters of the Saudi military base.

The Eritrean port “Assab” The military presence of both Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the port of Assab in

Eritrea has prompted many analysts to stress that such presence is not limited to strengthening the fighting front in Yemen. Stratfor points out that, beyond supporting the ongoing activities in Yemen, the establishment of bases outside the UAE borders reveals the ambitions of Abu Dhabi and its Gulf allies to strengthen their military presence in the region. The new facilities at the Airport’s runway indicate that the UAE military presence is not limited to providing logistical support, but are rather a part of the UAE’s strategy to operate effectively in the Arabian Peninsula and in East Africa, and to strengthen efforts within the GCC to form diplomatic alliances.

When Qatar’s role in Eritrea is in question, it has emerged through its role of a mediator in the dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti, but this role as observers think, may extend along the African coast in that region, especially considering the directions of other Gulf countries to establish military bases in this coast to secure their political and economic interests. However, such role was affected negatively after the harsh dispute between Qatar and its GCC neighbors especially when both Djibouti and Eritrea decided to shake hands with the Saudi-UAE alliance and expel the Qatari from their circle of interest. Qatar withdrew its 450 soldiers from the borders between the two countries and decided to end its role in those countries at least for the time being.

Assab is also serving as a base for a naval blockade of Yemen’s Red Sea ports such as Hodeida. Since the attack on AQAP in Hadramout in April 2016, Assab has also served as a transit point for UAE vessels for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction materials, including generators and fuel to Mukalla. As a result, Assab port became the first Emirati site for military power outside the country.

The difference between the ports of Djibouti and Assab Port of Djibouti is the only port that adopts the International security standards for

ships and ports on the horn of Africa. The port of Djibouti has assumed a high regional status after the 1998-2000

Eritrea-Ethiopia border conflict and the closure of Eritrea’s maritime ports to Ethiopia. • The port of Djibouti contains multiple military bases for different countries from

inside and outside the region as it hosts a number of military bases for up to 27 Western

“London Court of International Arbitration Rules in Favor of DP World,” Al Bayan, February 21, 2016. “The First Saudi Military Base Abroad in Djibouti: The Nucleus of Bab al-Mandab Protection?” Al

Khaleej, October 12, 2015. The UAE Joins An Exclusive Club,” December 8, 2016, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/uae-joins–e

xclusive-club?utm_term=independence&utm_medium=affiliate&utm_source=pepperjam&utm_campaign=43737.

“The Ports of the Horn of Africa: New Space for International Competition,” Sumaya Shiekh, November 21, 2016.


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countries. There’s a large presence of France, which acts as an “external guarantor of Djibouti’s security”. France also plays a pivotal role in the fight against maritime piracy in the European Union: Atlanta, Eunavfor, Nestor operations were based in Djibouti.

This comparison gives preference to the port of Djibouti with regard to many points, which may be reflected on the status of these ports whether economically or militarily and their relationship with either Iran or the GCC. But we must bear in mind that president Afewerki’s political strategy of choosing his friends and enemies may qualify him to play a more vital role in this region than the Djiboutian president.

Yemen’s islands in the Red Sea: Sites for smuggling and attacks The large numbers of islands on the northern and southern parts of the western coast

of Yemen in the Red Sea are an essential element in increasing the level of importance of this naval fringe where many islands possess strategic positions on the military scale.

The military use of Yemeni islands in the Red Sea is a long-standing affair since the British occupation of southern Yemen, where Kamran Island was one of the largest Yemeni islands in the Red Sea used by the British government to attack the Italians in Massawa and Asmara in Eritrea in the early 20th century. And then the Yemeni authorities in the north of Yemen during 1970s had allowed the Eritrean rebels to use the Hanish archipelago to store weapons and attack the Ethiopian regime. The islands also witnessed a conflict between Yemen and Eritrea in the 1990s, between 1995-1998, in which dozens of soldiers were killed from both sides following Eritrea’s attempt to occupy the Hanish Al-Kubra island.

The Houthis and Saleh alliance used the islands in the military confrontation while the islands were under the control of Yemeni soldiers’ pro-Houthis Salah camp, to store and smuggle weapons to the port of Hodeidah overlooking the Red Sea.

The GCC has its plans concerning these islands but these are not disclosed yet. In the meantime, the UAE has made great strides in building a military base on the island of Mayyon in the vicinity of the Yemeni Bab al-Mandab strait, to support its military operations in southern Yemen and to secure the strategically important Bab al Mandab sea passages.

Bab al-Mandab and the struggle of regional and international powers This strait includes the largest gathering of ships and fleets of different countries, so it

is difficult to assert that there is one side (either a bilateral alliance or international one) or even one state that controls the movement of maritime traffic in this strait.

Iran continues its military buildup near that strait practicing the military show up. In April 2017, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard sent group 45 of naval forces which included a destroyer and ship (Tanb) to the Gulf of Aden and Bab al-Mandeb under the pretext of protecting Iranian ships in this region. These vessels were anchored in Omani ports before taking off to the sea.

The United States was also trying to militarize the waterway under the pretext of confronting the “Somali pirates”. It wanted to create the conditions in which the rest of the world would accept the continued presence of its fleet operating in these strategic international waters, but it is clear that the British and French naval forces are there to support the American ally, and beside them there are also troops of Russia, China, India and Iran.

The issue of piracy may be an essential element in the presence of multiple naval forces of many countries in Bab al-Mandab, but it is not the main reason for their presence.

“The Alliance Controls the Yemeni Island of Hanish al-Kubra,” Erem News, December 2015. “The UAE Is Building a Military Base in Bab al-Mandab and Yemenis Accuse It of Occupying Their

Country,” Al Deiar, February 18, 2017. Andrew Koryobko, “The GCC Is Expanding to Eritrea, and It’s Not Good for Ethiopia,” Katehon 2016.

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transshipments and similar activities. It employs about 1,000 employees and about 99% of them are Djiboutians.

The UAE started economically in Djibouti through DP World, but it soon turned into the military scale after the escalation of tensions in the Yemen war in an attempt from UAE to secure the western front of Yemen. There was a clash between the two countries concerning the rights to use the airport runway which led to a cut in diplomatic relations.

Regarding Saudi relations with Djibouti, in March 2016, discussions took place between Riyadh and Djibouti to sign a comprehensive bilateral security agreement, including the long-term return of the Saudi military base to Djibouti which indicates the importance of Djibouti as the headquarters of the Saudi military base.

The Eritrean port “Assab” The military presence of both Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the port of Assab in

Eritrea has prompted many analysts to stress that such presence is not limited to strengthening the fighting front in Yemen. Stratfor points out that, beyond supporting the ongoing activities in Yemen, the establishment of bases outside the UAE borders reveals the ambitions of Abu Dhabi and its Gulf allies to strengthen their military presence in the region. The new facilities at the Airport’s runway indicate that the UAE military presence is not limited to providing logistical support, but are rather a part of the UAE’s strategy to operate effectively in the Arabian Peninsula and in East Africa, and to strengthen efforts within the GCC to form diplomatic alliances.

When Qatar’s role in Eritrea is in question, it has emerged through its role of a mediator in the dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti, but this role as observers think, may extend along the African coast in that region, especially considering the directions of other Gulf countries to establish military bases in this coast to secure their political and economic interests. However, such role was affected negatively after the harsh dispute between Qatar and its GCC neighbors especially when both Djibouti and Eritrea decided to shake hands with the Saudi-UAE alliance and expel the Qatari from their circle of interest. Qatar withdrew its 450 soldiers from the borders between the two countries and decided to end its role in those countries at least for the time being.

Assab is also serving as a base for a naval blockade of Yemen’s Red Sea ports such as Hodeida. Since the attack on AQAP in Hadramout in April 2016, Assab has also served as a transit point for UAE vessels for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction materials, including generators and fuel to Mukalla. As a result, Assab port became the first Emirati site for military power outside the country.

The difference between the ports of Djibouti and Assab Port of Djibouti is the only port that adopts the International security standards for

ships and ports on the horn of Africa. The port of Djibouti has assumed a high regional status after the 1998-2000

Eritrea-Ethiopia border conflict and the closure of Eritrea’s maritime ports to Ethiopia. • The port of Djibouti contains multiple military bases for different countries from

inside and outside the region as it hosts a number of military bases for up to 27 Western

“London Court of International Arbitration Rules in Favor of DP World,” Al Bayan, February 21, 2016. “The First Saudi Military Base Abroad in Djibouti: The Nucleus of Bab al-Mandab Protection?” Al

Khaleej, October 12, 2015. The UAE Joins An Exclusive Club,” December 8, 2016, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/uae-joins–e

xclusive-club?utm_term=independence&utm_medium=affiliate&utm_source=pepperjam&utm_campaign=43737.

“The Ports of the Horn of Africa: New Space for International Competition,” Sumaya Shiekh, November 21, 2016.


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countries. There’s a large presence of France, which acts as an “external guarantor of Djibouti’s security”. France also plays a pivotal role in the fight against maritime piracy in the European Union: Atlanta, Eunavfor, Nestor operations were based in Djibouti.

This comparison gives preference to the port of Djibouti with regard to many points, which may be reflected on the status of these ports whether economically or militarily and their relationship with either Iran or the GCC. But we must bear in mind that president Afewerki’s political strategy of choosing his friends and enemies may qualify him to play a more vital role in this region than the Djiboutian president.

Yemen’s islands in the Red Sea: Sites for smuggling and attacks The large numbers of islands on the northern and southern parts of the western coast

of Yemen in the Red Sea are an essential element in increasing the level of importance of this naval fringe where many islands possess strategic positions on the military scale.

The military use of Yemeni islands in the Red Sea is a long-standing affair since the British occupation of southern Yemen, where Kamran Island was one of the largest Yemeni islands in the Red Sea used by the British government to attack the Italians in Massawa and Asmara in Eritrea in the early 20th century. And then the Yemeni authorities in the north of Yemen during 1970s had allowed the Eritrean rebels to use the Hanish archipelago to store weapons and attack the Ethiopian regime. The islands also witnessed a conflict between Yemen and Eritrea in the 1990s, between 1995-1998, in which dozens of soldiers were killed from both sides following Eritrea’s attempt to occupy the Hanish Al-Kubra island.

The Houthis and Saleh alliance used the islands in the military confrontation while the islands were under the control of Yemeni soldiers’ pro-Houthis Salah camp, to store and smuggle weapons to the port of Hodeidah overlooking the Red Sea.

The GCC has its plans concerning these islands but these are not disclosed yet. In the meantime, the UAE has made great strides in building a military base on the island of Mayyon in the vicinity of the Yemeni Bab al-Mandab strait, to support its military operations in southern Yemen and to secure the strategically important Bab al Mandab sea passages.

Bab al-Mandab and the struggle of regional and international powers This strait includes the largest gathering of ships and fleets of different countries, so it

is difficult to assert that there is one side (either a bilateral alliance or international one) or even one state that controls the movement of maritime traffic in this strait.

Iran continues its military buildup near that strait practicing the military show up. In April 2017, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard sent group 45 of naval forces which included a destroyer and ship (Tanb) to the Gulf of Aden and Bab al-Mandeb under the pretext of protecting Iranian ships in this region. These vessels were anchored in Omani ports before taking off to the sea.

The United States was also trying to militarize the waterway under the pretext of confronting the “Somali pirates”. It wanted to create the conditions in which the rest of the world would accept the continued presence of its fleet operating in these strategic international waters, but it is clear that the British and French naval forces are there to support the American ally, and beside them there are also troops of Russia, China, India and Iran.

The issue of piracy may be an essential element in the presence of multiple naval forces of many countries in Bab al-Mandab, but it is not the main reason for their presence.

“The Alliance Controls the Yemeni Island of Hanish al-Kubra,” Erem News, December 2015. “The UAE Is Building a Military Base in Bab al-Mandab and Yemenis Accuse It of Occupying Their

Country,” Al Deiar, February 18, 2017. Andrew Koryobko, “The GCC Is Expanding to Eritrea, and It’s Not Good for Ethiopia,” Katehon 2016.

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As a result, the constant presence in Bab al-Mandab by these forces becomes a key element in displaying their military naval power in this area.

2. The target naval area within the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea The ports in the Southern coast of Yemen: There are number of vital Yemeni ports situated in this area within the Gulf of Aden

and the Arabian Sea headed by Aden port, ports of Mukalla and Daba in Hadramout, and the ports of Shabwa governorate which include Balhaf, Al-Bayda, Gena and Bir Ali.

The ports of Aden and Mukalla are primarily commercial and until now they lack a large container terminal to accommodate giant tankers or military ship, but ports such as Balhaf and Daba are mainly for loading and exporting oil, so their value may rise sometimes according to the level of oil production and the loading rate on the ports. The small harbors such as Al-Bayda and Bir Ali were exploited by the Houthis and Saleh before the outbreak of the war of 2015 and during the war to smuggle arms and fuel.

The presence of the UAE on the island of Socotra at the end of the southern entrance of the Arabian Sea prepares the UAE to take control of navigation in this region and it is connected with the economic interests of the UAE in the Arabian Gulf. This important navigation line can also be used to enhance the UAE’s role in combating maritime piracy.

The port of Bosasso in Puntland Bosasso is the third largest port and coastal city in Somalia after Mogadishu and

Kismayo, and was classified by the International Monetary Fund in 2008 within three of Somalia’s most developed cities in terms of trade and economy. The distance between the port of Bosasso and the port of Berbera in Somaliland is about 465 kilometers from the east, but cooperation between the two ports is unclear as a result of the political tension between them, so their external cooperation with other countries in the region is much greater than the internal cooperation among them.

International interest toward the port of Bosasso is not as large as the interest towards the coast of Somaliland, especially that the port of Berbera in Somaliland is closer to the Ethiopian border, making it a very important link between Ethiopia and the Gulf of Aden. UAE has recently extended its interest to Bosasso, with P & O Ports signing an agreement for the management and development of Bosasso Port for 30 years period. There is no doubt that the UAE’s investment in Bosasso is a complementary step to its investments in the neighboring port of Berbera, so the objective may include economic and political aspects to promote the UAE’s strategy on the Somali coast.

This region is also a rich fishing center, and some believe that fish revenues may provide an alternative to the looting and piracy of unemployed Somali youth across those ports.

However, the coast of Puntland is exposed to illegal fishing and that also applies to the coast of Somaliland. Most of the boats illegally fishing come from Iran, Yemen, China, and many Southeast Asian countries according to the maritime organization. This means that Puntland needs more maritime power to control its naval borders and protect its fish resources and that might push its government to cooperate more extensively with some countries such as UAE.

Port of Berbera in Somaliland The port of Berbera is still developing but it has potentials for regional and

international military exploitation. Anwor Ahmed Myo, “Somalian Cities,” Somali Times, May 17, 2016. “P & O Ports Signs Agreement to Develop and Manage Bosasso Port in Somalia,” Emirates Today,

April 6, 2017. Harun Maruf, “Somali Forces Shoot and Kill Iranian Sailor in Indian Ocean,” VOA, October 8, 2017.


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The GCC operations in this region increase through the UAE which aims to strengthen its position in the port of Berbera on the commercial and military levels. On the commercial level, the UAE’s objective is to exploit the port for 30 years through Dubai Ports World while on the military level, the UAE aims to establish a military base that may intertwine positively with its deployed military bases in Yemen and Eritrea.

The new interests that surrounds the port of Berbera may put the UAE in conflict with neighboring countries such as Djibouti and Ethiopia, especially as Ethiopia is strongly seeking to secure its position on the Somali coast through the port of Berbera. Iran may exploit these clashes of interests to create a front against UAE interests in Berbera.

However, the strategic location of the port of Berbera may prompt international forces to cooperate with Somaliland and that can be observed through the latest maneuvers of US government to approach Somaliland, which may support the UAE position.

III. Confrontations between Iran and the GCC in the Red Sea: The Western Coast of Yemen and the Eastern Coast of Africa

Both costs embrace a number of countries and share the main outlet toward the Indian Ocean. This is evidenced by the presence of different commercial vessels and war ships from the GCC, Iran, US, Russia, EU, and China.

The maritime sovereignty in this naval area is divided between two coasts that are under the control of state and non-state actors: AL Houthis, legitimate government of Yemen and the coalition are in the western coast of Yemen. In the African coast are Djibouti, Eritrea, and various foreign countries with different military bases.

The confrontations that took place between Yemen and Eritrea on the Hanish islands located in the Red Sea in the 1990s, pointed clearly the split of interests within the international community toward this area and this example proved the difficulty of determining who is in control of this dynamic navigational line.

Hanish conflict exposed the relation between Eritrea and Israel, which had emerged during the Eritrean-Yemeni conflict through vast military support that continued to evolve until this day and through Israel use of the Dahlak island which is close to Yemen’s strategic Bab-al-Mandab Strait in the Red Sea. This may have its repercussions on the Eritrea’s relationship with the GCC in general.

For Iran, its relationship with Eritrea seems clearer in the economic sphere than the security or political spheres. The Iranian support for the Eritrean economy had started after the end of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war, where the Eritrean government granted Iran exclusive control over the Eritrean Oil Refinery in December 2008 in exchange for Iranian upgrades to the facility.

Through its policies in the African coast, Iran depends on initiating economical and financial plans to invest in Eritrea and to provide its support to improve the infrastructures. However, at the same time Iran exploit these initial plans to interfere in the security levels.

As a part of its own ideology, Iran prefers to mingle in the Eritrean society, either by providing economic support or applying the policy of Shiism that was a big success for Iran in Sudan and in many African countries. This policy gradually granted Iran the power to interact within the social structure in these countries and influence the decision makers.

The alliances strategy that is adopted by different regional and international players in this area plays a significant role within the scope of each state to protect their interests. For

“Tel Aviv Spies on the Region from Its Bas in the Eritrea Island,” Al Waght News & Analysis, June 6,

2016. Arial-Farrar-Wellman, “Eritrea-Iran Foreign Relations,” Critical Studies, January 17, 2009.

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As a result, the constant presence in Bab al-Mandab by these forces becomes a key element in displaying their military naval power in this area.

2. The target naval area within the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea The ports in the Southern coast of Yemen: There are number of vital Yemeni ports situated in this area within the Gulf of Aden

and the Arabian Sea headed by Aden port, ports of Mukalla and Daba in Hadramout, and the ports of Shabwa governorate which include Balhaf, Al-Bayda, Gena and Bir Ali.

The ports of Aden and Mukalla are primarily commercial and until now they lack a large container terminal to accommodate giant tankers or military ship, but ports such as Balhaf and Daba are mainly for loading and exporting oil, so their value may rise sometimes according to the level of oil production and the loading rate on the ports. The small harbors such as Al-Bayda and Bir Ali were exploited by the Houthis and Saleh before the outbreak of the war of 2015 and during the war to smuggle arms and fuel.

The presence of the UAE on the island of Socotra at the end of the southern entrance of the Arabian Sea prepares the UAE to take control of navigation in this region and it is connected with the economic interests of the UAE in the Arabian Gulf. This important navigation line can also be used to enhance the UAE’s role in combating maritime piracy.

The port of Bosasso in Puntland Bosasso is the third largest port and coastal city in Somalia after Mogadishu and

Kismayo, and was classified by the International Monetary Fund in 2008 within three of Somalia’s most developed cities in terms of trade and economy. The distance between the port of Bosasso and the port of Berbera in Somaliland is about 465 kilometers from the east, but cooperation between the two ports is unclear as a result of the political tension between them, so their external cooperation with other countries in the region is much greater than the internal cooperation among them.

International interest toward the port of Bosasso is not as large as the interest towards the coast of Somaliland, especially that the port of Berbera in Somaliland is closer to the Ethiopian border, making it a very important link between Ethiopia and the Gulf of Aden. UAE has recently extended its interest to Bosasso, with P & O Ports signing an agreement for the management and development of Bosasso Port for 30 years period. There is no doubt that the UAE’s investment in Bosasso is a complementary step to its investments in the neighboring port of Berbera, so the objective may include economic and political aspects to promote the UAE’s strategy on the Somali coast.

This region is also a rich fishing center, and some believe that fish revenues may provide an alternative to the looting and piracy of unemployed Somali youth across those ports.

However, the coast of Puntland is exposed to illegal fishing and that also applies to the coast of Somaliland. Most of the boats illegally fishing come from Iran, Yemen, China, and many Southeast Asian countries according to the maritime organization. This means that Puntland needs more maritime power to control its naval borders and protect its fish resources and that might push its government to cooperate more extensively with some countries such as UAE.

Port of Berbera in Somaliland The port of Berbera is still developing but it has potentials for regional and

international military exploitation. Anwor Ahmed Myo, “Somalian Cities,” Somali Times, May 17, 2016. “P & O Ports Signs Agreement to Develop and Manage Bosasso Port in Somalia,” Emirates Today,

April 6, 2017. Harun Maruf, “Somali Forces Shoot and Kill Iranian Sailor in Indian Ocean,” VOA, October 8, 2017.


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The GCC operations in this region increase through the UAE which aims to strengthen its position in the port of Berbera on the commercial and military levels. On the commercial level, the UAE’s objective is to exploit the port for 30 years through Dubai Ports World while on the military level, the UAE aims to establish a military base that may intertwine positively with its deployed military bases in Yemen and Eritrea.

The new interests that surrounds the port of Berbera may put the UAE in conflict with neighboring countries such as Djibouti and Ethiopia, especially as Ethiopia is strongly seeking to secure its position on the Somali coast through the port of Berbera. Iran may exploit these clashes of interests to create a front against UAE interests in Berbera.

However, the strategic location of the port of Berbera may prompt international forces to cooperate with Somaliland and that can be observed through the latest maneuvers of US government to approach Somaliland, which may support the UAE position.

III. Confrontations between Iran and the GCC in the Red Sea: The Western Coast of Yemen and the Eastern Coast of Africa

Both costs embrace a number of countries and share the main outlet toward the Indian Ocean. This is evidenced by the presence of different commercial vessels and war ships from the GCC, Iran, US, Russia, EU, and China.

The maritime sovereignty in this naval area is divided between two coasts that are under the control of state and non-state actors: AL Houthis, legitimate government of Yemen and the coalition are in the western coast of Yemen. In the African coast are Djibouti, Eritrea, and various foreign countries with different military bases.

The confrontations that took place between Yemen and Eritrea on the Hanish islands located in the Red Sea in the 1990s, pointed clearly the split of interests within the international community toward this area and this example proved the difficulty of determining who is in control of this dynamic navigational line.

Hanish conflict exposed the relation between Eritrea and Israel, which had emerged during the Eritrean-Yemeni conflict through vast military support that continued to evolve until this day and through Israel use of the Dahlak island which is close to Yemen’s strategic Bab-al-Mandab Strait in the Red Sea. This may have its repercussions on the Eritrea’s relationship with the GCC in general.

For Iran, its relationship with Eritrea seems clearer in the economic sphere than the security or political spheres. The Iranian support for the Eritrean economy had started after the end of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war, where the Eritrean government granted Iran exclusive control over the Eritrean Oil Refinery in December 2008 in exchange for Iranian upgrades to the facility.

Through its policies in the African coast, Iran depends on initiating economical and financial plans to invest in Eritrea and to provide its support to improve the infrastructures. However, at the same time Iran exploit these initial plans to interfere in the security levels.

As a part of its own ideology, Iran prefers to mingle in the Eritrean society, either by providing economic support or applying the policy of Shiism that was a big success for Iran in Sudan and in many African countries. This policy gradually granted Iran the power to interact within the social structure in these countries and influence the decision makers.

The alliances strategy that is adopted by different regional and international players in this area plays a significant role within the scope of each state to protect their interests. For

“Tel Aviv Spies on the Region from Its Bas in the Eritrea Island,” Al Waght News & Analysis, June 6,

2016. Arial-Farrar-Wellman, “Eritrea-Iran Foreign Relations,” Critical Studies, January 17, 2009.

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example, Israel’s attempts to get closer to Ethiopia South Sudan and Kenya, Eritrea while at the same time trying to play the game of political balance in its favor by strengthening ties with both Israel and Tehran.

The war in Yemen gave the Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE a wide access to tighten their control over the Yemeni coast in the Red Sea and expanded their influence on the African coast, with the general direction to invest there economically and militarily.

Saudi Arabia and UAE: The acquisition of power politically and economically within the navigation line

Firstly, both leaderships have wide military power on their bases in the Yemeni coast, especially in the southern side of Bab al-Mandab to provide security to the southern governorates in Yemen in collaboration with the southern resistance. These security measures escalate toward the north in the ports of Makha, Khokha, Hodaidah.

Secondly, the military bases, airports and sea terminals owned by Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the eastern coast of the Horn of Africa, starting from the port of Massawa to Puntland, are considered a partial military forces but they all perform in a unified manner.

Thirdly, this military and economic power and influence of both Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the African coast is prone to rise or fall in the scope of its space and the degree of its impact over the long term. This depends on economic, political and diplomatic relations with African governments and the internal conditions within these countries politically and socially, and the limits of their acceptance of GCC interference.

Fourthly, Saudi Arabia and the UAE do not possess acceptable levels of local security cover within the African countries that host GCC bases, which may be an obstacle in the future for both Saudi Arabia and the UAE that prevent them from maintaining their interests within the various African bases.

UAE Role Yemen’s war is the main driving force for the UAE’s military interests in that region.

UAE military priorities in Yemen can be classified into four sections: Counter-terrorism operations against al-Qaeda in southern and eastern Yemen.

Stabilizing the areas that have been liberated from the Houthis and Saleh’s forces. Training local forces fighting with the coalition front which include forces from

southern provinces such as the Hadrami elite, the Shabwani elite, and forces fighting inside the northern governorates of both Marib and Makha.

Securing the role of the UAE as an economic hub in the region through establishing a strong economic network that will contribute in providing economic and human resources for the UAE and grant it a wide and strong logistical support.

The role of Oman and the intertwining interests between the Gulf states and Iran The Omani role sometimes seems ambiguous within the scope of its intervention in

the Yemen war. In spite of that, Oman confirmed that its position is neutral and basically based on providing various means of mediation to resolve the conflict between the two warring parties in Yemen which include the legitimate government on the one hand and the Houthis and Saleh on the other.

However, according to international observers, Oman is often overlooking secret operation of smuggling oil and arms from the south-eastern coast of Yemen. Local sources confirmed that large quantities of smuggled oil coming from Oman pass through Shabwa governorate, and that at least 30 to 40 fuel tanks are smuggled daily from the Shabwa

“Why the UAE Seeks to Strengthen Its Influence in the Horn of Africa,” Al Khaleej, April 29, 2017; Emad Anan, “A Military Base in Somalia: How the UAE Strengthens Its Influence in the Horn of Africa,” NonBost, February 13, 2017.


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coasts over the ports of al-Bayda, Qena and Bir Ali and the main beneficiary are the Houthis and Salah forces.

It is also mentioned that the smuggling operations are carried out through Nashtton port on the Yemeni-Omani border, located within the Yemeni province of Al-Mahra, where the port is the only seaport in the province, which receives the Iranian fuel and weapons that goes to the Houthis.

Brian Whitaker suggests that Oman was not as diligent in preventing “anti-ship missiles, explosives, money and individuals” from crossing into Yemen as there is a long history of commercial smuggling on the Yemeni-Omani border in the run-up to the war.

In the context of the tripartite relationship between Oman, the Houthis and Iran, Oman stands out as a link loop between the two sides. “The economic cooperation between Oman and Iran may support this view as Oman is in need for Iran to overcome its shrinking budget by increasing trade with Iran as well as Iranian support for a liquefied natural gas pipeline from Iran to boost energy industries, support economic development in Oman and, finally, secure Iran’s foreign deposits in Omani banks that reach billions of dollars”.

This economic cooperation between Oman and Iran has its negative effects on GCC maneuvers in this naval strategic area, whether with Saudi Arabia or other Gulf States, where the later view it as a harm to their interests, while Oman sees it as a part of its neutral role in the region. But the war in Yemen raised doubts with regard to the Omani position, especially since Oman did not join the Gulf military front, although it has declared its position as a political mediator in the Yemeni conflict, a position that did not lead to any successes until now.

Qatar’s role Qatar is very ambitious in adopting a track to protect its interest in this strategic

marine area. Not long ago, Qatar was working on a plan to join an alliance with one of the two axes. The first axis represents Saudi Arabia and UAE while the second axis represents Iran. But within the scope of the Qatari crisis with the Gulf states, the alliance with Iran began to emerge strongly, which may open a new chapter of relations between Qatar and the states of the Horn of Africa, especially in the distribution of power politically and economically and that will eventually depend heavily on cooperation with Iran.

The political role that Qatar is currently playing in the scope of its foreign policy is aiming to influence the regional and international systems to prove itself as an influential country in the region. This means that Qatar may be planning to establish new military bases in this maritime region. Qatar may lack the incubator in Yemen, but there is a high probability of gaining acceptance for its new role in the African coast.

Iran maneuvers alongside its proxies in the strategic Fringes The attack on the UAE ship Swift in Bab al-Mandab, led by the Houthis, a relief ship

belonging to an Emirates-based company carrying relief supplies to Yemen. The ship was sailing in the Bab al-Mandab Strait when it was attacked with a missile that destroyed the watchtower in the vessel in October 2016.

A Saudi warship was attacked on the western coast of Yemen in January 2017, causing an explosion that killed two crew members. The Houthis admitted to launching a ballistic missile towards the ship in the Red Sea from the island of Zoqer located between Yemen

Farook AlKamaly, “Historic Port Turns into A Fuel-smuggling Station to the Houthis,” Al Arabi Al Jadeed, January 8, 2016.

“Why Is the Province of ‘AlMahra’ Outside the Circle of Conflict in Yemen? And What Is the Relationship with Oman?” Aden Life, December 26, 2015.

Brian Whitaker, “Oman Blamed for Iranian Weapons in Yemen,” October 20, 2016, http://al-bab.com/b log/2016/10/oman-blamed-iranian-weapons-yemen. Ibid.

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example, Israel’s attempts to get closer to Ethiopia South Sudan and Kenya, Eritrea while at the same time trying to play the game of political balance in its favor by strengthening ties with both Israel and Tehran.

The war in Yemen gave the Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE a wide access to tighten their control over the Yemeni coast in the Red Sea and expanded their influence on the African coast, with the general direction to invest there economically and militarily.

Saudi Arabia and UAE: The acquisition of power politically and economically within the navigation line

Firstly, both leaderships have wide military power on their bases in the Yemeni coast, especially in the southern side of Bab al-Mandab to provide security to the southern governorates in Yemen in collaboration with the southern resistance. These security measures escalate toward the north in the ports of Makha, Khokha, Hodaidah.

Secondly, the military bases, airports and sea terminals owned by Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the eastern coast of the Horn of Africa, starting from the port of Massawa to Puntland, are considered a partial military forces but they all perform in a unified manner.

Thirdly, this military and economic power and influence of both Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the African coast is prone to rise or fall in the scope of its space and the degree of its impact over the long term. This depends on economic, political and diplomatic relations with African governments and the internal conditions within these countries politically and socially, and the limits of their acceptance of GCC interference.

Fourthly, Saudi Arabia and the UAE do not possess acceptable levels of local security cover within the African countries that host GCC bases, which may be an obstacle in the future for both Saudi Arabia and the UAE that prevent them from maintaining their interests within the various African bases.

UAE Role Yemen’s war is the main driving force for the UAE’s military interests in that region.

UAE military priorities in Yemen can be classified into four sections: Counter-terrorism operations against al-Qaeda in southern and eastern Yemen.

Stabilizing the areas that have been liberated from the Houthis and Saleh’s forces. Training local forces fighting with the coalition front which include forces from

southern provinces such as the Hadrami elite, the Shabwani elite, and forces fighting inside the northern governorates of both Marib and Makha.

Securing the role of the UAE as an economic hub in the region through establishing a strong economic network that will contribute in providing economic and human resources for the UAE and grant it a wide and strong logistical support.

The role of Oman and the intertwining interests between the Gulf states and Iran The Omani role sometimes seems ambiguous within the scope of its intervention in

the Yemen war. In spite of that, Oman confirmed that its position is neutral and basically based on providing various means of mediation to resolve the conflict between the two warring parties in Yemen which include the legitimate government on the one hand and the Houthis and Saleh on the other.

However, according to international observers, Oman is often overlooking secret operation of smuggling oil and arms from the south-eastern coast of Yemen. Local sources confirmed that large quantities of smuggled oil coming from Oman pass through Shabwa governorate, and that at least 30 to 40 fuel tanks are smuggled daily from the Shabwa

“Why the UAE Seeks to Strengthen Its Influence in the Horn of Africa,” Al Khaleej, April 29, 2017; Emad Anan, “A Military Base in Somalia: How the UAE Strengthens Its Influence in the Horn of Africa,” NonBost, February 13, 2017.


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coasts over the ports of al-Bayda, Qena and Bir Ali and the main beneficiary are the Houthis and Salah forces.

It is also mentioned that the smuggling operations are carried out through Nashtton port on the Yemeni-Omani border, located within the Yemeni province of Al-Mahra, where the port is the only seaport in the province, which receives the Iranian fuel and weapons that goes to the Houthis.

Brian Whitaker suggests that Oman was not as diligent in preventing “anti-ship missiles, explosives, money and individuals” from crossing into Yemen as there is a long history of commercial smuggling on the Yemeni-Omani border in the run-up to the war.

In the context of the tripartite relationship between Oman, the Houthis and Iran, Oman stands out as a link loop between the two sides. “The economic cooperation between Oman and Iran may support this view as Oman is in need for Iran to overcome its shrinking budget by increasing trade with Iran as well as Iranian support for a liquefied natural gas pipeline from Iran to boost energy industries, support economic development in Oman and, finally, secure Iran’s foreign deposits in Omani banks that reach billions of dollars”.

This economic cooperation between Oman and Iran has its negative effects on GCC maneuvers in this naval strategic area, whether with Saudi Arabia or other Gulf States, where the later view it as a harm to their interests, while Oman sees it as a part of its neutral role in the region. But the war in Yemen raised doubts with regard to the Omani position, especially since Oman did not join the Gulf military front, although it has declared its position as a political mediator in the Yemeni conflict, a position that did not lead to any successes until now.

Qatar’s role Qatar is very ambitious in adopting a track to protect its interest in this strategic

marine area. Not long ago, Qatar was working on a plan to join an alliance with one of the two axes. The first axis represents Saudi Arabia and UAE while the second axis represents Iran. But within the scope of the Qatari crisis with the Gulf states, the alliance with Iran began to emerge strongly, which may open a new chapter of relations between Qatar and the states of the Horn of Africa, especially in the distribution of power politically and economically and that will eventually depend heavily on cooperation with Iran.

The political role that Qatar is currently playing in the scope of its foreign policy is aiming to influence the regional and international systems to prove itself as an influential country in the region. This means that Qatar may be planning to establish new military bases in this maritime region. Qatar may lack the incubator in Yemen, but there is a high probability of gaining acceptance for its new role in the African coast.

Iran maneuvers alongside its proxies in the strategic Fringes The attack on the UAE ship Swift in Bab al-Mandab, led by the Houthis, a relief ship

belonging to an Emirates-based company carrying relief supplies to Yemen. The ship was sailing in the Bab al-Mandab Strait when it was attacked with a missile that destroyed the watchtower in the vessel in October 2016.

A Saudi warship was attacked on the western coast of Yemen in January 2017, causing an explosion that killed two crew members. The Houthis admitted to launching a ballistic missile towards the ship in the Red Sea from the island of Zoqer located between Yemen

Farook AlKamaly, “Historic Port Turns into A Fuel-smuggling Station to the Houthis,” Al Arabi Al Jadeed, January 8, 2016.

“Why Is the Province of ‘AlMahra’ Outside the Circle of Conflict in Yemen? And What Is the Relationship with Oman?” Aden Life, December 26, 2015.

Brian Whitaker, “Oman Blamed for Iranian Weapons in Yemen,” October 20, 2016, http://al-bab.com/b log/2016/10/oman-blamed-iranian-weapons-yemen.

Ibid.

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56

and Eritrea. An attempt to fire rockets at a frigate American Navy on October 9 and 12 in 2016.

There was several official US statements confirming that Iran was behind the missile strikes on US Navy ships from areas controlled by the Houthis .

The direct confrontation between Iran and other marine powers in this area has emerged more than once between the Iranian Guard forces and the US Navy through Iran various attempts to target the American ships in the Red Sea or in the Straits of Bab al-Mandab.

Iran is supplying the technology for the Houthis’ remote-controlled boats. Especially if we notice that the tactics employed by the Houthis on their bomb-boats are very similar to the Iranian tactics in terms of the technology used and the way of attacking.

Even if these attacks did not fulfill its goals, they still cause a threat with a strategic value for Iran. The Iranian political and security strategy is seeking to escalate its confrontation with Saudi Arabia by threatening its powerful allies. On the other hand, the Iranian authorities asserts to the Houthi in Yemen that Iran stands on the anti-coalition line in the Yemen war, leading to a tough confrontation against Saudi Arabia and against American influence in the region in general.

The challenges facing the United States in this region continue to grow rapidly and the Iranians and their proxies challenge the capabilities of the US Navy to operate freely in one of the world’s most important maritime bottlenecks. The United States’ response also poses a risk of escalating the Yemeni war internally and regionally.

The confrontation between Iran and the GCC in this vital zone may produce more than one camp as the GCC countries does not represent one front in terms of their positions with Iran but may be divided into a few camps. But the Saudi-UAE bilateral alliance is at the time the cornerstone alliance in the face of Iran. The two Gulf states are unifying their efforts to assert their influence and control over the ports and maritime sites in the two maritime fringes.

On the other hand, we must bear in mind Iran’s quest to establish different relations with the eastern coast of Africa. For example, Iran’s most distinguished relation may be with Djibouti after the December 2010 presidential visit and the subsequent joint military agreement. This move provides leverage for Iran and its presence at Bab al- Mandab.

IV. The Comparison between the Naval Forces of Iran and GCC in the Target Area of Iran’s Naval Force

Tehran has historically used its naval forces to send strategic signals and establish its

foreign policy ambitions. The Iranian regime sees its naval sources as one of the most visible counter-forces against the United States and allied forces off the Iranian coast and one of the best military services to manage conventional military operations.

The Islamic Republic of Iran navy (IRIN) and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Alex Lockie, “US General Thinks Iran Is Behind the Missile Attacks on US Navy Near Yemen,”

Business Insider, October19, 2016. According to a statement by the US director of national intelligence Dan Coats, “Houthi Rebels Carry

Out Series of Bomb-Boat Attacks,” Maritime Executive, August 17, 2017. Kattrine Zimmerman, Emily Estele, “Escalation in the Red Sea: Yemen’s Civil War, Iran, and Saudi

Arabia,” Critical Threat, October 14, 2016. Ibid. Joshua Himes, “Middle East Security Report: Iran Two Navies,” Institute for the Study of War, US,

2011. Ibid.


57

Navy (IRGCN) have been reorganized more than once, the last of which was in 2007. The reorganization reflected Iran’s growing regional ambitions as the two forces were separated from each other in naval missions. This may not be compatible with the theory of Mahan, which stresses on the need to concentrate the naval force in one center and not to divide it into different centers.

This reorganization reflects the focus of Iranian leaders on a strategic triangle stretching from Bab al-Mandab, across the Arabian Sea to the Straits of Hormuz, and across the Indian Ocean to the Strait of Malacca. The region includes strategic maritime trade routes that Iran considers necessary to ensure the future of its economic sector. IRIN currently consists of some 200 ships and 18,000 personnel. At the same time, the IRGCN has been constituted as a coastal defense force largely focused on asymmetric and mobile combat capabilities in the Gulf in addition to fast attack boats, torpedoes, and anti-ship cruise missiles.

Saudi naval force The Saudi Navy is ranked third in the Middle East after Turkey and Israel. In the

Yemen war, it played a major role in liberating the southern coast of Yemen, overlooking the Arabian Sea, where it was able to cut supplies from the Houthis and besiege the Midi port opposite to the Saudi border in the northern Yemen. The thunderbolt naval forces were able to liberate Jabal al-Doud from the Houthis.

The Saudi Arabian naval forces are divided into two parts: the Eastern Fleet in the Arabian Gulf, and the Sea of Oman and the Western Fleet in the Red Sea. In return for the superior air cover of the Saudi forces, Iran is compensating via surface-to-sea missile defenses, speedboats and old Kilo submarines, though this makes it difficult for Iran to move in seas far from its coasts such as Bab al-Mandab.

UAE naval force UAE naval force was founded in the early 1970s and since it was established until

now it stands on defense bases. It contains missile boats, patrol boats, and BMP-3 armored carriers. The naval force continues its naval training system relying mainly on Western technologies and expertise such as Canada, Germany, and France. However naval observers think the UAE maritime forces lack manpower resources.

UAE is trying to compensate for the lack of personnel in its naval forces by strengthening the marine air cover through maritime attack and maritime surveillance helicopters. Also, it is seeking to “upgrade its blue water capabilities through the acquisition of assault and landing craft as well as amphibious armored personnel carriers for its marine battalion”.

Within the scope of the naval forces, the Gulf countries, especially the bilateral alliance, which includes Saudi Arabia and the UAE, needs to strengthen and build a joint naval force to protect maritime regional security.

V. The Struggle between the Major Powers in the Strategic Fringes

United States and the exploitation of the African ports and Bab Al Mandab The United States has turned a French foreign camp in Djibouti, the Lemonier camp,

Ibid. Masood AlZahid, “Saudi and Iranian Navy Compared to ‘Light Shield Gulf 1’,” Al-Arabiya, October 6,

2016. Ibid. For more details refer to: “Emirati Navy,” https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/uae-navy.

htm.

57


56

and Eritrea. An attempt to fire rockets at a frigate American Navy on October 9 and 12 in 2016.

There was several official US statements confirming that Iran was behind the missile strikes on US Navy ships from areas controlled by the Houthis .

The direct confrontation between Iran and other marine powers in this area has emerged more than once between the Iranian Guard forces and the US Navy through Iran various attempts to target the American ships in the Red Sea or in the Straits of Bab al-Mandab.

Iran is supplying the technology for the Houthis’ remote-controlled boats. Especially if we notice that the tactics employed by the Houthis on their bomb-boats are very similar to the Iranian tactics in terms of the technology used and the way of attacking.

Even if these attacks did not fulfill its goals, they still cause a threat with a strategic value for Iran. The Iranian political and security strategy is seeking to escalate its confrontation with Saudi Arabia by threatening its powerful allies. On the other hand, the Iranian authorities asserts to the Houthi in Yemen that Iran stands on the anti-coalition line in the Yemen war, leading to a tough confrontation against Saudi Arabia and against American influence in the region in general.

The challenges facing the United States in this region continue to grow rapidly and the Iranians and their proxies challenge the capabilities of the US Navy to operate freely in one of the world’s most important maritime bottlenecks. The United States’ response also poses a risk of escalating the Yemeni war internally and regionally.

The confrontation between Iran and the GCC in this vital zone may produce more than one camp as the GCC countries does not represent one front in terms of their positions with Iran but may be divided into a few camps. But the Saudi-UAE bilateral alliance is at the time the cornerstone alliance in the face of Iran. The two Gulf states are unifying their efforts to assert their influence and control over the ports and maritime sites in the two maritime fringes.

On the other hand, we must bear in mind Iran’s quest to establish different relations with the eastern coast of Africa. For example, Iran’s most distinguished relation may be with Djibouti after the December 2010 presidential visit and the subsequent joint military agreement. This move provides leverage for Iran and its presence at Bab al- Mandab.

IV. The Comparison between the Naval Forces of Iran and GCC in the Target Area of Iran’s Naval Force

Tehran has historically used its naval forces to send strategic signals and establish its

foreign policy ambitions. The Iranian regime sees its naval sources as one of the most visible counter-forces against the United States and allied forces off the Iranian coast and one of the best military services to manage conventional military operations.

The Islamic Republic of Iran navy (IRIN) and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Alex Lockie, “US General Thinks Iran Is Behind the Missile Attacks on US Navy Near Yemen,”

Business Insider, October19, 2016. According to a statement by the US director of national intelligence Dan Coats, “Houthi Rebels Carry

Out Series of Bomb-Boat Attacks,” Maritime Executive, August 17, 2017. Kattrine Zimmerman, Emily Estele, “Escalation in the Red Sea: Yemen’s Civil War, Iran, and Saudi

Arabia,” Critical Threat, October 14, 2016. Ibid. Joshua Himes, “Middle East Security Report: Iran Two Navies,” Institute for the Study of War, US,

2011. Ibid.


57

Navy (IRGCN) have been reorganized more than once, the last of which was in 2007. The reorganization reflected Iran’s growing regional ambitions as the two forces were separated from each other in naval missions. This may not be compatible with the theory of Mahan, which stresses on the need to concentrate the naval force in one center and not to divide it into different centers.

This reorganization reflects the focus of Iranian leaders on a strategic triangle stretching from Bab al-Mandab, across the Arabian Sea to the Straits of Hormuz, and across the Indian Ocean to the Strait of Malacca. The region includes strategic maritime trade routes that Iran considers necessary to ensure the future of its economic sector. IRIN currently consists of some 200 ships and 18,000 personnel. At the same time, the IRGCN has been constituted as a coastal defense force largely focused on asymmetric and mobile combat capabilities in the Gulf in addition to fast attack boats, torpedoes, and anti-ship cruise missiles.

Saudi naval force The Saudi Navy is ranked third in the Middle East after Turkey and Israel. In the

Yemen war, it played a major role in liberating the southern coast of Yemen, overlooking the Arabian Sea, where it was able to cut supplies from the Houthis and besiege the Midi port opposite to the Saudi border in the northern Yemen. The thunderbolt naval forces were able to liberate Jabal al-Doud from the Houthis.

The Saudi Arabian naval forces are divided into two parts: the Eastern Fleet in the Arabian Gulf, and the Sea of Oman and the Western Fleet in the Red Sea. In return for the superior air cover of the Saudi forces, Iran is compensating via surface-to-sea missile defenses, speedboats and old Kilo submarines, though this makes it difficult for Iran to move in seas far from its coasts such as Bab al-Mandab.

UAE naval force UAE naval force was founded in the early 1970s and since it was established until

now it stands on defense bases. It contains missile boats, patrol boats, and BMP-3 armored carriers. The naval force continues its naval training system relying mainly on Western technologies and expertise such as Canada, Germany, and France. However naval observers think the UAE maritime forces lack manpower resources.

UAE is trying to compensate for the lack of personnel in its naval forces by strengthening the marine air cover through maritime attack and maritime surveillance helicopters. Also, it is seeking to “upgrade its blue water capabilities through the acquisition of assault and landing craft as well as amphibious armored personnel carriers for its marine battalion”.

Within the scope of the naval forces, the Gulf countries, especially the bilateral alliance, which includes Saudi Arabia and the UAE, needs to strengthen and build a joint naval force to protect maritime regional security.

V. The Struggle between the Major Powers in the Strategic Fringes

United States and the exploitation of the African ports and Bab Al Mandab The United States has turned a French foreign camp in Djibouti, the Lemonier camp,

Ibid. Masood AlZahid, “Saudi and Iranian Navy Compared to ‘Light Shield Gulf 1’,” Al-Arabiya, October 6,

2016. Ibid. For more details refer to: “Emirati Navy,” https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/uae-navy.

htm.

58


58

into the most unmanned drones base outside the war zone in Afghanistan from where Patador drones take off around the clock on missions in Somalia and Yemen, and pilots are directing at the Naval Force Center 8 thousand miles away in Nevada. The Lemonier Camp is run by the Joint Special Operations Command of the Pentagon, and it operates in cooperation with other bases within the Arabian Peninsula, especially in drone strikes.

This reflects clearly the latent American role in the Yemeni war, which is highlighted by drone attacks on al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in various Yemeni provinces or through extensive logistical support for coalition forces, as well as providing background maritime protection in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea through more than one destroyer and a US aircraft carrier.

Russian ambitions in the ports of Yemen The Russian ambitions in the ports of Yemen have not yet emerged clearly after the

gradual retreat from Southern Yemen since the civil war of 1986. This Russian retreat was clearer after the unification of Yemen 1990 and the collapse of the socialist power around the world. In the context of the war in Yemen, the Russian role is not visible but at the same time is not absent.

The current Russian role in Sanaa and the Russians’ relations with the Houthis and Saleh is evident and has its repercussions on the Russian position about the negotiations surrounding the Yemeni crisis in the UN and the Security Council. The partnership triangle between Iran, Russia, and the Houthi-Saleh camp confirms that Russia’s ambitions within Yemen have not ended, but may start from a new point. There are numerous analyzes that attempt to highlight the Russian role as a competitor to the American one and the same time intertwined with Russian roles within regional crises in both Iraq and Syria.

The naval locations that constitute interest for the Russians in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Arabian Sea depend to a large degree on the Russian naval military presence in this region and the limits of its privileges, capabilities, alliances, and areas of influence.

VI. The Main Issues that Constitute the Cornerstone Factors in the

Confrontation between Iran and the GCC

1. Terrorist organizations The spread of terrorism in Somalia through Al-Shabab organization is a challenge and

a major threat in this region as this kind of terrorism is crossing beyond the borders of Somalia and reaching the neighboring countries in eastern Africa such as Kenya or Tanzania. Abdi Sayed points “the rise of Al-Shabab outside Somalia from minor incidents in 2010 to 20 incidents per year and the most in Kenya”.

This may include some negative indications pointing that such extension could affect strategic areas in the East African coast overlooking the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea through various sea ports and could contribute to establishing links between Al-Shabab and terrorist groups such as AQAP in the parallel coastline within Yemen.

The role of maritime ports in the escalation of terrorism includes: export terrorism to neighboring coasts through launching terrorist operations, smuggling arms, fuel and money to terrorists, directing illegal movements for terrorists to escape or form new terrorist hotspots, providing “Safe Heaven”.

“Death from Afar,” The Economist, November 3, 2012; Helene Cooper, “Pentagon Warns Ships as

Pirates again Prowl Waters of Somalia,” New York Times, April 24, 2017. Abdisaid Musse Ali-koor, “Islamist Extremism in East Africa,” Africa Security Brief, No.32, August

2016, pp.1-2.


59

In the context of the movements of Al-Shabab organization in the regions of Somalia, there is a vague picture of these movements between Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland. Al-Shabab organization has been subjected to a strong fight by the Somali government and AMISOM forces which led to the uncovering of its terrorist activities and this would escalate the organization’s attempt to hide or rearrange its terrorist military agenda in another part of Somalia.

The strained and unstable relationship between Somaliland and Puntland, may constitute an appropriate entrance for terrorist organizations such as al-Shabaab to exploit this relationship negatively between three main regions: Mogadishu, Somaliland and Puntland to exercise its activities more freely. And these practices may extend outward across the coast of Puntland and Somaliland to threaten the western shores of the Red Sea and specifically the ports of Yemen, whether through arms smuggling or through transferring Yemen into a safe haven especially if the siege on the terrorists inside Somalia intensified.

Regarding Djibouti, the state maintained a relatively secure situation through its geostrategic alliances and by virtue of its geographical position which formed a shield in the face of terrorist violence. Over the past decade there has not been a terrorist attack except the one on May 2014. But the presence of a large numbers of military bases may prompt terrorists to launch terrorist operations.

The terrorist operations in Eritrea can be initiated through entities that do not have connections with terrorist organizations such as AQAP or Al-Shabab. The democratic organization of the Afar Red Sea ( the organization was launched in 1999) to demand the independence of the province Danekalaa inhabited by a majority of the Afar Red Sea and the organization is also a member of the Democratic Eritrea Alliance which is a political organization trying to overthrow the political President (Afewerki) is an example of an organizations that may, in the future, try to influence the security of the Eritrean coast and, in particular, foreign bases located in the ports of Eritrea.

Also, Eritrea has been linked directly or indirectly with Al-Shabab organization. This may be the reason behind UN Security Council action to impose an arms embargo on Eritrea in 2009. The embargo was renewed this year.

Country Incidents Fatalities Time Perpetrator group

(terrorist attacks by various groups)

Djibouti 2 5 2004-2014 Al-Shabaab

Somalia 1.532 2.996 2004-2014 Al-Shabaab

Eritrea 50 40 2004-2015 Red Sea afar democratic organization(RSADO)

The table is configured depending on information from (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. Figure 7. Source https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

As for the possible relationship between Al-Shabab organization in Somalia and AQAP, there is no clear analysis for the relationship between Al-Qaeda two franchises; AQAP and Al-Shabab in this region or its implications on threating international peace and security, or the repercussions of such relationship in directing the roles of GCC and Iran in

Eelco Kessels. Tracey Durner, Matthew Schwartz, “Violent Extremism and Instability in the Greater

Horn of Africa,” April 2016, p.10.

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58

into the most unmanned drones base outside the war zone in Afghanistan from where Patador drones take off around the clock on missions in Somalia and Yemen, and pilots are directing at the Naval Force Center 8 thousand miles away in Nevada. The Lemonier Camp is run by the Joint Special Operations Command of the Pentagon, and it operates in cooperation with other bases within the Arabian Peninsula, especially in drone strikes.

This reflects clearly the latent American role in the Yemeni war, which is highlighted by drone attacks on al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in various Yemeni provinces or through extensive logistical support for coalition forces, as well as providing background maritime protection in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea through more than one destroyer and a US aircraft carrier.

Russian ambitions in the ports of Yemen The Russian ambitions in the ports of Yemen have not yet emerged clearly after the

gradual retreat from Southern Yemen since the civil war of 1986. This Russian retreat was clearer after the unification of Yemen 1990 and the collapse of the socialist power around the world. In the context of the war in Yemen, the Russian role is not visible but at the same time is not absent.

The current Russian role in Sanaa and the Russians’ relations with the Houthis and Saleh is evident and has its repercussions on the Russian position about the negotiations surrounding the Yemeni crisis in the UN and the Security Council. The partnership triangle between Iran, Russia, and the Houthi-Saleh camp confirms that Russia’s ambitions within Yemen have not ended, but may start from a new point. There are numerous analyzes that attempt to highlight the Russian role as a competitor to the American one and the same time intertwined with Russian roles within regional crises in both Iraq and Syria.

The naval locations that constitute interest for the Russians in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Arabian Sea depend to a large degree on the Russian naval military presence in this region and the limits of its privileges, capabilities, alliances, and areas of influence.

VI. The Main Issues that Constitute the Cornerstone Factors in the

Confrontation between Iran and the GCC

1. Terrorist organizations The spread of terrorism in Somalia through Al-Shabab organization is a challenge and

a major threat in this region as this kind of terrorism is crossing beyond the borders of Somalia and reaching the neighboring countries in eastern Africa such as Kenya or Tanzania. Abdi Sayed points “the rise of Al-Shabab outside Somalia from minor incidents in 2010 to 20 incidents per year and the most in Kenya”.

This may include some negative indications pointing that such extension could affect strategic areas in the East African coast overlooking the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea through various sea ports and could contribute to establishing links between Al-Shabab and terrorist groups such as AQAP in the parallel coastline within Yemen.

The role of maritime ports in the escalation of terrorism includes: export terrorism to neighboring coasts through launching terrorist operations, smuggling arms, fuel and money to terrorists, directing illegal movements for terrorists to escape or form new terrorist hotspots, providing “Safe Heaven”.

“Death from Afar,” The Economist, November 3, 2012; Helene Cooper, “Pentagon Warns Ships as

Pirates again Prowl Waters of Somalia,” New York Times, April 24, 2017. Abdisaid Musse Ali-koor, “Islamist Extremism in East Africa,” Africa Security Brief, No.32, August

2016, pp.1-2.


59

In the context of the movements of Al-Shabab organization in the regions of Somalia, there is a vague picture of these movements between Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland. Al-Shabab organization has been subjected to a strong fight by the Somali government and AMISOM forces which led to the uncovering of its terrorist activities and this would escalate the organization’s attempt to hide or rearrange its terrorist military agenda in another part of Somalia.

The strained and unstable relationship between Somaliland and Puntland, may constitute an appropriate entrance for terrorist organizations such as al-Shabaab to exploit this relationship negatively between three main regions: Mogadishu, Somaliland and Puntland to exercise its activities more freely. And these practices may extend outward across the coast of Puntland and Somaliland to threaten the western shores of the Red Sea and specifically the ports of Yemen, whether through arms smuggling or through transferring Yemen into a safe haven especially if the siege on the terrorists inside Somalia intensified.

Regarding Djibouti, the state maintained a relatively secure situation through its geostrategic alliances and by virtue of its geographical position which formed a shield in the face of terrorist violence. Over the past decade there has not been a terrorist attack except the one on May 2014. But the presence of a large numbers of military bases may prompt terrorists to launch terrorist operations.

The terrorist operations in Eritrea can be initiated through entities that do not have connections with terrorist organizations such as AQAP or Al-Shabab. The democratic organization of the Afar Red Sea ( the organization was launched in 1999) to demand the independence of the province Danekalaa inhabited by a majority of the Afar Red Sea and the organization is also a member of the Democratic Eritrea Alliance which is a political organization trying to overthrow the political President (Afewerki) is an example of an organizations that may, in the future, try to influence the security of the Eritrean coast and, in particular, foreign bases located in the ports of Eritrea.

Also, Eritrea has been linked directly or indirectly with Al-Shabab organization. This may be the reason behind UN Security Council action to impose an arms embargo on Eritrea in 2009. The embargo was renewed this year.

Country Incidents Fatalities Time Perpetrator group

(terrorist attacks by various groups)

Djibouti 2 5 2004-2014 Al-Shabaab

Somalia 1.532 2.996 2004-2014 Al-Shabaab

Eritrea 50 40 2004-2015 Red Sea afar democratic organization(RSADO)

The table is configured depending on information from (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. Figure 7. Source https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

As for the possible relationship between Al-Shabab organization in Somalia and AQAP, there is no clear analysis for the relationship between Al-Qaeda two franchises; AQAP and Al-Shabab in this region or its implications on threating international peace and security, or the repercussions of such relationship in directing the roles of GCC and Iran in

Eelco Kessels. Tracey Durner, Matthew Schwartz, “Violent Extremism and Instability in the Greater

Horn of Africa,” April 2016, p.10.

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60

the region. However, the previous cooperation among the two franchises in the smuggling of fuel and weapons and the escape of several Al-Shabab fighters to the coast of Yemen may indicate the possibility for future coordination in broader areas, particularly in attacking vital sites or threatening the interests of different States in the region.

2. Threats of piracy in the strategic area Piracy near Bab al-Mandab is a vital security issue that emerged in the beginning of

the second millennium. After the collapse of the internal political and economic system in Somalia, some Somalis found an easy way to solve their financial problems by threatening the sea and exploiting ships loaded with fuel and goods to obtain huge sums of money through the detention of ships and hostages. Their operations in 2011 reached to 32 vessels and more than 700 hostages. However, foreign powers, led by the European Union in their various anti-piracy missions in the Horn of Africa, which officially began in 2008 to deter piracy in a maritime zone of up to 500 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia and neighboring countries, have put an end to the risk of piracy in that region to a large extent. UAE had a significant role in confronting piracy through supporting Somali government, in providing logistical support at sea, training Somali forces and contributing to improving the infrastructure of seaports to counter the threat of pirates.

However, the danger began to rise again. In March 2017 a UAE oil tanker was hijacked by pirates aiming for ransom, in front of the coast of Somalia and turned towards Allala port in Puntland Somalia, and in April 2017 an Indian merchant ship hijacked by pirates along the Somali coast, while the Chinese frigate managed to prevent Somali pirates from hijacking an oil tanker owned by the UAE in the Gulf of Aden. The number of incidents of the return of piracy rose since it disappeared in the region in 2012.

In its annual report 2016 on piracy, the International Maritime Bureau indicated that the ability and intent of piracy to attack commercial cargo remains on the Somali coast.

As for the relationship between Puntland Pirates and Al-Shabab within the target maritime area, there may be no clear relationship between Al-Shabab and the Somalis pirates because of the tribal differences as the pirates of Somalia belong to an urban form of the Majuritan Somali, specifically from the sub-clan of Issa Musa, which reside in Puntland and Somaliland, while Al-Shabab consists of Somalis from different clans from Mogadishu and southern Somalia, who don’t belong to the Majuritan clans. Also, the numbers of foreigners in Al-Shabab is high as the organization does not mind embracing foreigners and this does not apply to the Somali pirates as “They do not accept foreign figures among their group where racism stands out clearly.”

Although the recent executions conducted by Al-Shabab to Kenyan fighters may send different messages. This may indicate that Al-Shabab is aiming to change its orientation toward focusing on local fighters.

In addition, the Somali pirates’ agenda is to achieve mainly the financial goals. This however does not apply to Al-Shabab whose ideology and political objectives occupy the first items on their terrorist agenda.

The first direct contact between the two sides began at the end of the last decade,

Alkhaleej AlJadeed. April 29, 2017. “IMB Report: Sea Kidnappings Rise in 2016 Despite Plummeting Global Piracy,” Commercial Crime

Service, January 10, 2017. Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia. A Ticking time bomb “a report to the committee on foreign relations-

US senate (one hundred eleventh Congress) sec, session. January 21, 2010, p.18.


61

specifically in 2009, when pirates began to operate from the southern ports controlled by Al-Shabab, as the pirates simply pay fees to Al-Shabab to use ports. It is also noteworthy that the Al-Shabab organization itself has become a greater activist in the territory of the Puntland, where experts and officials believe it’s because they were being hunted and pushed from the south. But there are always possibilities for cooperation, especially with regard to the smuggling of money and weapons.

3. Illegal migration through different ports in the strategic zoneIllegal migration from the coasts of East Africa via the coasts of Somalia, Eritrea,

Djibouti and from Ethiopia to the coast of Yemen represents one of the continuing security risks in this region and it has many negative implications on the security, economic, social and military levels.

The first convoys of immigration for African refugees (mostly Somalians and some Ethiopians and Eritreans that were living in Somalia) to the coast of Yemen started in the early nineties after the outbreak of the Somali civil war. At that time, it was not considered illegal, but it was rather a mass escape that is approved internationally for humaniteration reasons to avoid the fires of war that was raging within Somalia.

The number of displaced Somalis in Yemen has exceeded one million and the Yemeni war that broke out in 2015 did not limit their immigration. It is noteworthy that the most important marine ports receiving the displaced people are in the coast of Shabwa, which is a hotbed of illegal immigration and are the most appropriate for the smugglers as they are not exposed to security restrictions.

The coast of Shabwa occupies about 200 km of the southern Yemen coast. The most important ports that receive African refugees are Kida, Al-Bayda, Al-Majdha and Al-’Alib in Bir Ali. It is one of the most seafaring ports. Where they move on a long road to Ataq, the capital of Shabwa and then Bihan on the borders with the province of Marib and then enter to Marib and from there to the Yemeni Saudi borders, where they receive smugglers to help them to reach Saudi Arabia.

The second line of illegal immigration flows from Marib to the ports of the Red Sea in Hodeidah to Sudan and then to Egypt, and from there to the Mediterranean Sea reaching Europe, which is a more difficult line to choose for refugees themselves and for smugglers.

There are numerous analysis indicating that most of these refugees, especially during the recent war in Yemen, are turning into mercenaries. The Houthis-Saleh camp are exploiting and recruiting them in training camps to prepare them as fighters. This analysis may confirm that the larger categories of African refugees are young people who are seeking new life away from their countries.

VII. Conclusion

The continuation of the war in Yemen without any signs to end, particularly in the

Ibid. “Somalia: Roadside Bomb Kills 8 in Puntland,” African News, April 23, 2017; “Five Suspected of

Shabab Militants Executed in Somalia for Killing Officials,” African News, April 9, 2017. Haifa Al Maashi, “Death Convoy from Somalia to Yemen,” Dubai Public Policy Research Centre,

September 6, 2017. “Special Report: African Refugees in Yemen, Fugitives or Fighters,” Al Mandab News, October 15,

2016.

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60

the region. However, the previous cooperation among the two franchises in the smuggling of fuel and weapons and the escape of several Al-Shabab fighters to the coast of Yemen may indicate the possibility for future coordination in broader areas, particularly in attacking vital sites or threatening the interests of different States in the region.

2. Threats of piracy in the strategic area Piracy near Bab al-Mandab is a vital security issue that emerged in the beginning of

the second millennium. After the collapse of the internal political and economic system in Somalia, some Somalis found an easy way to solve their financial problems by threatening the sea and exploiting ships loaded with fuel and goods to obtain huge sums of money through the detention of ships and hostages. Their operations in 2011 reached to 32 vessels and more than 700 hostages. However, foreign powers, led by the European Union in their various anti-piracy missions in the Horn of Africa, which officially began in 2008 to deter piracy in a maritime zone of up to 500 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia and neighboring countries, have put an end to the risk of piracy in that region to a large extent. UAE had a significant role in confronting piracy through supporting Somali government, in providing logistical support at sea, training Somali forces and contributing to improving the infrastructure of seaports to counter the threat of pirates.

However, the danger began to rise again. In March 2017 a UAE oil tanker was hijacked by pirates aiming for ransom, in front of the coast of Somalia and turned towards Allala port in Puntland Somalia, and in April 2017 an Indian merchant ship hijacked by pirates along the Somali coast, while the Chinese frigate managed to prevent Somali pirates from hijacking an oil tanker owned by the UAE in the Gulf of Aden. The number of incidents of the return of piracy rose since it disappeared in the region in 2012.

In its annual report 2016 on piracy, the International Maritime Bureau indicated that the ability and intent of piracy to attack commercial cargo remains on the Somali coast.

As for the relationship between Puntland Pirates and Al-Shabab within the target maritime area, there may be no clear relationship between Al-Shabab and the Somalis pirates because of the tribal differences as the pirates of Somalia belong to an urban form of the Majuritan Somali, specifically from the sub-clan of Issa Musa, which reside in Puntland and Somaliland, while Al-Shabab consists of Somalis from different clans from Mogadishu and southern Somalia, who don’t belong to the Majuritan clans. Also, the numbers of foreigners in Al-Shabab is high as the organization does not mind embracing foreigners and this does not apply to the Somali pirates as “They do not accept foreign figures among their group where racism stands out clearly.”

Although the recent executions conducted by Al-Shabab to Kenyan fighters may send different messages. This may indicate that Al-Shabab is aiming to change its orientation toward focusing on local fighters.

In addition, the Somali pirates’ agenda is to achieve mainly the financial goals. This however does not apply to Al-Shabab whose ideology and political objectives occupy the first items on their terrorist agenda.

The first direct contact between the two sides began at the end of the last decade,

Alkhaleej AlJadeed. April 29, 2017. “IMB Report: Sea Kidnappings Rise in 2016 Despite Plummeting Global Piracy,” Commercial Crime

Service, January 10, 2017. Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia. A Ticking time bomb “a report to the committee on foreign relations-

US senate (one hundred eleventh Congress) sec, session. January 21, 2010, p.18.


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specifically in 2009, when pirates began to operate from the southern ports controlled by Al-Shabab, as the pirates simply pay fees to Al-Shabab to use ports. It is also noteworthy that the Al-Shabab organization itself has become a greater activist in the territory of the Puntland, where experts and officials believe it’s because they were being hunted and pushed from the south. But there are always possibilities for cooperation, especially with regard to the smuggling of money and weapons.

3. Illegal migration through different ports in the strategic zoneIllegal migration from the coasts of East Africa via the coasts of Somalia, Eritrea,

Djibouti and from Ethiopia to the coast of Yemen represents one of the continuing security risks in this region and it has many negative implications on the security, economic, social and military levels.

The first convoys of immigration for African refugees (mostly Somalians and some Ethiopians and Eritreans that were living in Somalia) to the coast of Yemen started in the early nineties after the outbreak of the Somali civil war. At that time, it was not considered illegal, but it was rather a mass escape that is approved internationally for humaniteration reasons to avoid the fires of war that was raging within Somalia.

The number of displaced Somalis in Yemen has exceeded one million and the Yemeni war that broke out in 2015 did not limit their immigration. It is noteworthy that the most important marine ports receiving the displaced people are in the coast of Shabwa, which is a hotbed of illegal immigration and are the most appropriate for the smugglers as they are not exposed to security restrictions.

The coast of Shabwa occupies about 200 km of the southern Yemen coast. The most important ports that receive African refugees are Kida, Al-Bayda, Al-Majdha and Al-’Alib in Bir Ali. It is one of the most seafaring ports. Where they move on a long road to Ataq, the capital of Shabwa and then Bihan on the borders with the province of Marib and then enter to Marib and from there to the Yemeni Saudi borders, where they receive smugglers to help them to reach Saudi Arabia.

The second line of illegal immigration flows from Marib to the ports of the Red Sea in Hodeidah to Sudan and then to Egypt, and from there to the Mediterranean Sea reaching Europe, which is a more difficult line to choose for refugees themselves and for smugglers.

There are numerous analysis indicating that most of these refugees, especially during the recent war in Yemen, are turning into mercenaries. The Houthis-Saleh camp are exploiting and recruiting them in training camps to prepare them as fighters. This analysis may confirm that the larger categories of African refugees are young people who are seeking new life away from their countries.

VII. Conclusion

The continuation of the war in Yemen without any signs to end, particularly in the

Ibid. “Somalia: Roadside Bomb Kills 8 in Puntland,” African News, April 23, 2017; “Five Suspected of

Shabab Militants Executed in Somalia for Killing Officials,” African News, April 9, 2017. Haifa Al Maashi, “Death Convoy from Somalia to Yemen,” Dubai Public Policy Research Centre,

September 6, 2017. “Special Report: African Refugees in Yemen, Fugitives or Fighters,” Al Mandab News, October 15,

2016.

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short term, indicates that the confrontation between Iran and the Arab Gulf states may intensify in the next phase where each party will seek maritime influence in the two maritime fringes.

The western coast of Yemen in the Red Sea is currently a major security zone which means that Iranian intervention to support the Houthis remains either by smuggling weapons, military supplies, equipment or providing logistical support.

The Strait of Bab al-Mandab is currently a major area of conflict between the Gulf States and their allies on one side and Iran and its allies on the other. Any security threats may lead to naval confrontations that would involve naval forces from the United States, Russia and China.

Iran’s naval force appears to be a huge force. However, this force depends mostly on an old fleet. The Saudi Navy relies on advanced and modern naval techniques, especially submarines and airborne coverage in the maritime range, which puts Saudi Arabia in a higher position than Iran in the maritime confrontation in this strategic range. However, the naval force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, which relies on rapid and sophisticated naval tactics through high speed boats, may pose a threat to maritime navigation in this region.

The UAE’s maritime presence in this strategic area is highlighted by naval bases on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden extending to the Arabian Sea. Through its strategy of building military naval bases, the UAE has been able to enhance its maritime influence in the region. This prepares UAE to play a regional security role alongside Iran and Saudi Arabia and will aid in strengthening its network of alliances in the region.

Security threats in the Horn of Africa whether in Eritrea, Djibouti or Somalia pose major challenges to the Gulf States and their security, political and economic interests. Most of these African countries play dual policies with Iran and the Gulf states.

The confrontations between Iran and the Arab Gulf states in the target strategic zone that stretches along two fringes in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea faced significant curves after the break out of the war in 2015 until the present time, but the confrontation among the two sides within the scope of maritime and coastal security goes back to much earlier time. It has emerged around different issues whether security, military or economic interests. Iran continued to adopt a hardline policy in dealing with the confrontations at sea with the Arab Gulf states, even in the scope of military exercises and naval maneuvers patrol in the nearby seas.

However, the strategic area that links the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden embraces currently the most heated maritime friction due to the ongoing military conflict in Yemen between the coalition led by Saudi Arabia, UAE and the legitimate government of Yemen, and the Houthis – Saleh camp, where the latter is backed by Iran politically and militarily.

Consequently, the military role of the GCC grew in a large and influential way that reflects the naval power of the GCC in the region. Also, different maneuvers of different states in that area shed the light on the balance of naval power with regard to Iran, GCC, Yemen, African countries, and foreign states from outside the region.

The direct and indirect interference of many regional and international actors into the confrontations between Iran and the GCC in this zone, highlights the complexity of relations among the different states and the difficulty in defining the short and long-term impact. In addition, the internal factors that interact within every states in this strategic


63

region contribute to a large extent either in the intensification or reduction of confrontation. Therefore, the stability of the situation inside Yemen would contribute in pushing the

confrontations to a different level, especially since the war in Yemen highlights the role of Iran through its proxy, Houthis. This is considered to a large extent an indirect military confrontation between the coalitions led by Saudi Arabia and Iran, although the level of this confrontation is low compared to Iran’s direct military intervention in other countries in the region, such as Syria, and Iraq.

Therefore, the interests of the GCC in this strategic maritime routes outweigh the interests of Iran. In the meantime, Saudi Arabia and UAE considered this area a high security threat region, while Iran sees it as one of the multiple security axes that are associated with its interests. The security risks that threaten the Arab Gulf states because of political and economic relationship with Yemen in addition to the geographic proximity make it a necessity for GCC to reinforce its marine power and initiate new alliances with the African states in the Horn of Africa, as well as with the various foreign powers from outside this region.

63


62

short term, indicates that the confrontation between Iran and the Arab Gulf states may intensify in the next phase where each party will seek maritime influence in the two maritime fringes.

The western coast of Yemen in the Red Sea is currently a major security zone which means that Iranian intervention to support the Houthis remains either by smuggling weapons, military supplies, equipment or providing logistical support.

The Strait of Bab al-Mandab is currently a major area of conflict between the Gulf States and their allies on one side and Iran and its allies on the other. Any security threats may lead to naval confrontations that would involve naval forces from the United States, Russia and China.

Iran’s naval force appears to be a huge force. However, this force depends mostly on an old fleet. The Saudi Navy relies on advanced and modern naval techniques, especially submarines and airborne coverage in the maritime range, which puts Saudi Arabia in a higher position than Iran in the maritime confrontation in this strategic range. However, the naval force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, which relies on rapid and sophisticated naval tactics through high speed boats, may pose a threat to maritime navigation in this region.

The UAE’s maritime presence in this strategic area is highlighted by naval bases on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden extending to the Arabian Sea. Through its strategy of building military naval bases, the UAE has been able to enhance its maritime influence in the region. This prepares UAE to play a regional security role alongside Iran and Saudi Arabia and will aid in strengthening its network of alliances in the region.

Security threats in the Horn of Africa whether in Eritrea, Djibouti or Somalia pose major challenges to the Gulf States and their security, political and economic interests. Most of these African countries play dual policies with Iran and the Gulf states.

The confrontations between Iran and the Arab Gulf states in the target strategic zone that stretches along two fringes in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea faced significant curves after the break out of the war in 2015 until the present time, but the confrontation among the two sides within the scope of maritime and coastal security goes back to much earlier time. It has emerged around different issues whether security, military or economic interests. Iran continued to adopt a hardline policy in dealing with the confrontations at sea with the Arab Gulf states, even in the scope of military exercises and naval maneuvers patrol in the nearby seas.

However, the strategic area that links the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden embraces currently the most heated maritime friction due to the ongoing military conflict in Yemen between the coalition led by Saudi Arabia, UAE and the legitimate government of Yemen, and the Houthis – Saleh camp, where the latter is backed by Iran politically and militarily.

Consequently, the military role of the GCC grew in a large and influential way that reflects the naval power of the GCC in the region. Also, different maneuvers of different states in that area shed the light on the balance of naval power with regard to Iran, GCC, Yemen, African countries, and foreign states from outside the region.

The direct and indirect interference of many regional and international actors into the confrontations between Iran and the GCC in this zone, highlights the complexity of relations among the different states and the difficulty in defining the short and long-term impact. In addition, the internal factors that interact within every states in this strategic


63

region contribute to a large extent either in the intensification or reduction of confrontation. Therefore, the stability of the situation inside Yemen would contribute in pushing the

confrontations to a different level, especially since the war in Yemen highlights the role of Iran through its proxy, Houthis. This is considered to a large extent an indirect military confrontation between the coalitions led by Saudi Arabia and Iran, although the level of this confrontation is low compared to Iran’s direct military intervention in other countries in the region, such as Syria, and Iraq.

Therefore, the interests of the GCC in this strategic maritime routes outweigh the interests of Iran. In the meantime, Saudi Arabia and UAE considered this area a high security threat region, while Iran sees it as one of the multiple security axes that are associated with its interests. The security risks that threaten the Arab Gulf states because of political and economic relationship with Yemen in addition to the geographic proximity make it a necessity for GCC to reinforce its marine power and initiate new alliances with the African states in the Horn of Africa, as well as with the various foreign powers from outside this region.

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