icheme presentation slpsig 2012 learning fr past incidents

Upload: sl1828

Post on 14-Apr-2018

218 views

Category:

Documents


1 download

TRANSCRIPT

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    1/33

    ERMDelivering sustainable solutions in a more competitive world

    Safety & Loss Prevention

    Special Interest Group Launch

    Learning from Past Accidents

    Presented by

    Dr. Christina PhangEnvironmental Resources Management

    The worlds leading sustainability consultancy

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    2/33

    ERMSlide 2

    Presentation Outline

    Some lessons from past accidents

    Three Causes of major accidents

    Four Practical Initiatives

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    3/33

    ERMSlide 3

    Past Major Disaster

    Piper Alpha (1986)

    Esso Longford (1998)

    Texas City (2005)

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    4/33

    ERMSlide 4

    Piper Alpha - Lessons

    Engineering Integrity Platform not designed to withstand

    prolonged fire

    Operator Performance

    Insufficient training to ensureeffective operation of the PTWsystem

    Contractors lack offshoreexperience

    Working Environment

    Inadequate flow of labour

    Inadequate working programme

    Pressure to maintain production atwhatever cost

    Communication & Information

    Lack of feed forward and feedbackcommunication

    Inadequate display and access ofinformation

    Inadequate emergency controlcentre

    Emergency procedures manualinadequate

    Procedures & Practices

    Maintenance procedures wereinadequate

    Emergency Procedures were

    inadequate

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    5/33

    ERMSlide 5

    Piper Alpha - Lessons Management Control

    Inadequate performancemeasurements

    Failure to manage change as rigprocesses were extended

    Inadequate co-ordination anddefinition of responsibilities

    Unclear assignment of safetyresponsibilities

    Poor emergency planning

    Site & Plant Facil ities

    Operating outside the designenvelope

    Lack of isolation of gas pipelinesfrom other rigs

    Organization & Management

    Inadequate methods for setting

    work priorities Lack of commitment to safe working

    environment

    Inadequate PTW system and firesafety

    Poor organization betweenoperations and maintenance

    Inadequate shift changeoverprocedures

    Inspectors and auditors failed toidentify hazards

    System Climate

    Company subjected to productionpressures

    Risks from other rigs not realized

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    6/33

    ERMSlide 6

    Esso Longford, 1998

    Brittle fracture of vessel

    2 fatalities 8 injuries

    25 tonnes released causing an explosion followed byJet fi re which burned for 2 days

    Loss of gas supply to Victoria for 2 weeks withsubstantial disruption to the local economy

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    7/33

    ERMSlide 7

    Learning from Esso Longford

    No Process Hazard Analysis completed (egHAZOP)

    No assessment of Major Accident Hazards

    Ineffective management procedures

    Staff competency

    Reliance on lost time injury data in major hazard industries is

    itself a major hazard - Hopkins

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    8/33

    ERMSlide 8

    BP Texas City, 2005

    Vapour Cloud Explosion

    15 People killed 180 Injuries

    Isomeriser Tower overfilled

    Blowdown vessel and associatedstack overfilled

    Liquid hydrocarbon released andformed flammable vapour cloud

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    9/33

    ERMSlide 9

    Key findings

    Cost cutting and production pressure impaired safetyperformance

    No responsibility for assessing & verifying MAH prevention

    Reliance on low personal injury rate as safety indicator

    Mechanical integrity programme - equipment was run-to-failureLack of reporting and learning culture

    Safety campaigns were aimed at personal safety

    Deep seated problems identified but management action was

    too little too late

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    10/33

    ERMSlide 10

    Baker Panel Recommendations

    Effective leadership from senior management

    Implement an integrated and comprehensiveProcess Safety Management (PSM) system

    Ensure employees and contractors haveappropriate process safety knowledge

    Develop positive process safety culture

    Implement leading and lagging indicators

    Implement an effective audit process

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    11/33

    ERMSlide 11

    What Can We Learn from Past Incidents?

    Challenges in having design, technical andoperations integrity

    What safety barriers/ controls/ mitigationmeasures were missing or failed?

    Information sharing new hazards,understanding of risk levels, etc.

    Identification ofPerformance Indicators

    that might have given an indication that an

    major accident/ incident was imminent

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    12/33

    ERMSlide 12

    Three Causes of Accidents(There are only three!!)

    Poor design and Poor Equipment

    Poor procedures or people not following procedures

    Incompetent and ill-disciplined people

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    13/33

    ERMSlide 13

    Problem 1:

    If everything is important then nothing isimportant.

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    14/33

    ERMSlide 14

    Typical decline in process safety

    Time

    SafetyPe

    rformance

    Learning

    Phase

    Ageing p lant

    Loss of memory

    Creeping Change

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    15/33

    ERMSlide 15

    Where do I start?

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    16/33

    ERMSlide 16

    Solution 1:

    Understand what is Critical

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    17/33

    ERMSlide 17

    Bow Tie Analysis

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    18/33

    ERMSlide 18

    Define Performance

    System definition and role

    Function

    Reliability and availability

    Survivability

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    19/33

    ERMSlide 19

    What can Bow Ties do for me?

    Overview: understand the major accident events:causes, consequences, hazards and safetybarriers

    Focus: what is CRITICAL

    Understand Communicate Act

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    20/33

    ERMSlide 20

    Problem 2:

    Poor or Non-existent Procedures

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    21/33

    ERMSlide 21

    Solution 2:

    Statement of Operational Boundaries(SOOB)

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    22/33

    ERMSlide 22

    Follow Critical Rules - SOOB

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    23/33

    ERMSlide 23

    Scope of a SOOB

    Barrier-defeating factors

    Concurrent operations (aka SIMOPs)Non-routine operations

    Abnormal process conditions

    Equipment that is not fit -for-purpose

    Systems unavailable due to maintenance or damagePoor environmental conditions

    Key personnel unavailable

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    24/33

    ERMSlide 24

    Problem 3:

    People cause accidents most of the time

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    25/33

    ERMSlide 25

    Incompetent ill-disciplined people

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    26/33

    ERMSlide 26

    Solution 3:

    Employ competent and disciplined people

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    27/33

    ERMSlide 27

    All Outcomes Arise from Behaviors

    Behaviour = Thought + Action Management whether they know it or not

    creates an env ironment that y ields a

    body of operator behaviours

    The front line behaviours which arise willyield good and bad HSE (and operational)

    outcomes

    Acceptable / Unacceptable impacts

    Compliance / Non-compliance

    Controlled Risks / Accidents

    There is no improvement in performance

    without a change in behaviour

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    28/33

    ERMSlide 28

    Improve Safety Culture

    Make sure: the way we do

    things around here,

    is the safe way

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    29/33

    ERMSlide 29

    Problem 4:

    Inability to respond to a major accident

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    30/33

    ERMSlide 30

    Solution 4:

    Be prepared for the worst case scenarios

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    31/33

    ERMSlide 31

    Understanding Accident Scenarios

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    32/33

    ERMSlide 32

    Be Detailed & Verify

    Plan

    Equipment

    Consumables

    Command and control

    InterfacesTraining, drills, combined exercises

  • 7/30/2019 IChemE Presentation SLPSIG 2012 Learning Fr Past Incidents

    33/33

    ERMSlide 33

    Four Initiatives tied to Accidents Prevention

    Use the BTD to show how they fit

    What is critical applies to all green boxes

    Manual of permitted operations poor procedures and peoplenot following procedures - Prevention

    Hire competent disciplined people covers both sides of BTD

    Prepare for worst case scenario RHS of BTD