icheme presentation slpsig 2012 learning fr past incidents
TRANSCRIPT
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ERMDelivering sustainable solutions in a more competitive world
Safety & Loss Prevention
Special Interest Group Launch
Learning from Past Accidents
Presented by
Dr. Christina PhangEnvironmental Resources Management
The worlds leading sustainability consultancy
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ERMSlide 2
Presentation Outline
Some lessons from past accidents
Three Causes of major accidents
Four Practical Initiatives
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ERMSlide 3
Past Major Disaster
Piper Alpha (1986)
Esso Longford (1998)
Texas City (2005)
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ERMSlide 4
Piper Alpha - Lessons
Engineering Integrity Platform not designed to withstand
prolonged fire
Operator Performance
Insufficient training to ensureeffective operation of the PTWsystem
Contractors lack offshoreexperience
Working Environment
Inadequate flow of labour
Inadequate working programme
Pressure to maintain production atwhatever cost
Communication & Information
Lack of feed forward and feedbackcommunication
Inadequate display and access ofinformation
Inadequate emergency controlcentre
Emergency procedures manualinadequate
Procedures & Practices
Maintenance procedures wereinadequate
Emergency Procedures were
inadequate
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ERMSlide 5
Piper Alpha - Lessons Management Control
Inadequate performancemeasurements
Failure to manage change as rigprocesses were extended
Inadequate co-ordination anddefinition of responsibilities
Unclear assignment of safetyresponsibilities
Poor emergency planning
Site & Plant Facil ities
Operating outside the designenvelope
Lack of isolation of gas pipelinesfrom other rigs
Organization & Management
Inadequate methods for setting
work priorities Lack of commitment to safe working
environment
Inadequate PTW system and firesafety
Poor organization betweenoperations and maintenance
Inadequate shift changeoverprocedures
Inspectors and auditors failed toidentify hazards
System Climate
Company subjected to productionpressures
Risks from other rigs not realized
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ERMSlide 6
Esso Longford, 1998
Brittle fracture of vessel
2 fatalities 8 injuries
25 tonnes released causing an explosion followed byJet fi re which burned for 2 days
Loss of gas supply to Victoria for 2 weeks withsubstantial disruption to the local economy
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ERMSlide 7
Learning from Esso Longford
No Process Hazard Analysis completed (egHAZOP)
No assessment of Major Accident Hazards
Ineffective management procedures
Staff competency
Reliance on lost time injury data in major hazard industries is
itself a major hazard - Hopkins
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ERMSlide 8
BP Texas City, 2005
Vapour Cloud Explosion
15 People killed 180 Injuries
Isomeriser Tower overfilled
Blowdown vessel and associatedstack overfilled
Liquid hydrocarbon released andformed flammable vapour cloud
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ERMSlide 9
Key findings
Cost cutting and production pressure impaired safetyperformance
No responsibility for assessing & verifying MAH prevention
Reliance on low personal injury rate as safety indicator
Mechanical integrity programme - equipment was run-to-failureLack of reporting and learning culture
Safety campaigns were aimed at personal safety
Deep seated problems identified but management action was
too little too late
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ERMSlide 10
Baker Panel Recommendations
Effective leadership from senior management
Implement an integrated and comprehensiveProcess Safety Management (PSM) system
Ensure employees and contractors haveappropriate process safety knowledge
Develop positive process safety culture
Implement leading and lagging indicators
Implement an effective audit process
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ERMSlide 11
What Can We Learn from Past Incidents?
Challenges in having design, technical andoperations integrity
What safety barriers/ controls/ mitigationmeasures were missing or failed?
Information sharing new hazards,understanding of risk levels, etc.
Identification ofPerformance Indicators
that might have given an indication that an
major accident/ incident was imminent
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ERMSlide 12
Three Causes of Accidents(There are only three!!)
Poor design and Poor Equipment
Poor procedures or people not following procedures
Incompetent and ill-disciplined people
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ERMSlide 13
Problem 1:
If everything is important then nothing isimportant.
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ERMSlide 14
Typical decline in process safety
Time
SafetyPe
rformance
Learning
Phase
Ageing p lant
Loss of memory
Creeping Change
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ERMSlide 15
Where do I start?
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ERMSlide 16
Solution 1:
Understand what is Critical
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ERMSlide 17
Bow Tie Analysis
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ERMSlide 18
Define Performance
System definition and role
Function
Reliability and availability
Survivability
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ERMSlide 19
What can Bow Ties do for me?
Overview: understand the major accident events:causes, consequences, hazards and safetybarriers
Focus: what is CRITICAL
Understand Communicate Act
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ERMSlide 20
Problem 2:
Poor or Non-existent Procedures
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ERMSlide 21
Solution 2:
Statement of Operational Boundaries(SOOB)
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ERMSlide 22
Follow Critical Rules - SOOB
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ERMSlide 23
Scope of a SOOB
Barrier-defeating factors
Concurrent operations (aka SIMOPs)Non-routine operations
Abnormal process conditions
Equipment that is not fit -for-purpose
Systems unavailable due to maintenance or damagePoor environmental conditions
Key personnel unavailable
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ERMSlide 24
Problem 3:
People cause accidents most of the time
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ERMSlide 25
Incompetent ill-disciplined people
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ERMSlide 26
Solution 3:
Employ competent and disciplined people
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ERMSlide 27
All Outcomes Arise from Behaviors
Behaviour = Thought + Action Management whether they know it or not
creates an env ironment that y ields a
body of operator behaviours
The front line behaviours which arise willyield good and bad HSE (and operational)
outcomes
Acceptable / Unacceptable impacts
Compliance / Non-compliance
Controlled Risks / Accidents
There is no improvement in performance
without a change in behaviour
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ERMSlide 28
Improve Safety Culture
Make sure: the way we do
things around here,
is the safe way
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ERMSlide 29
Problem 4:
Inability to respond to a major accident
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ERMSlide 30
Solution 4:
Be prepared for the worst case scenarios
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ERMSlide 31
Understanding Accident Scenarios
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ERMSlide 32
Be Detailed & Verify
Plan
Equipment
Consumables
Command and control
InterfacesTraining, drills, combined exercises
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ERMSlide 33
Four Initiatives tied to Accidents Prevention
Use the BTD to show how they fit
What is critical applies to all green boxes
Manual of permitted operations poor procedures and peoplenot following procedures - Prevention
Hire competent disciplined people covers both sides of BTD
Prepare for worst case scenario RHS of BTD