identifying a developmental pattern of the moral …
TRANSCRIPT
IDENTIFYING A DEVELOPMENTAL PATTERN OF THE MORAL REASONING
PROCESSES PRIOR TO KOHLBERG'S STAGE ONE
by
REBECCA JUNE GLOVER, B.A., M.S. in H.E.
A DISSERTATION
IN
HOME ECONOMICS
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Approved
August, 1988
^01
Copyright by Rebecca June Glover
1988
AC KNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express my thanks and appreciation to
the chairman of my dissertation, Dr. Connie Steele, for
her input regarding the analysis of the developmental
trends contained in the subject interviews as well as her
numerous editorial comments. Dr. Steele has been
supportive of me and has provided assistance throughout my
graduate program, and I am very grateful for her patience
and friendship. I would also like to thank the members of
my committee for their input to my dissertation: Dr. Nancy
J. Bell's comments regarding procedural issues. Dr. John
R. Nevius's helpful input regarding issues of morality in
my scoring procedures. Dr. Jean Pearson Scott's
statistical assistance and friendship, and Dr. Monte
Bobele's useful suggestions regarding the interview
process.
Further, I would like to express my appreciation to
my friends and colleagues both in and outside my graduate
program for their many words of support, advice, and
comfort during both the good times and, more especially,
in the bad.
And finally, my thanks and appreciation to the late
Dr. Lawrence Kohlberg for the giving of his life's work
and time to help young fledglings such as myself.
11
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii
ABSTRACT vi
LIST OF TABLES viii
LIST OF FIGURES ix
CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION 1
Statement of the Problem 1
Review of the Literature 6
Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Reasoning 10
Levels of Moral Reasoning 12
Stage 1: Heteronomous morality 15 Stage 2: Individualistic,
instrumental morality 16 Stage 3: Interpersonally
normative morality 17 Stage 4: Social system morality 18 Stage 5: Human rights and social
welfare morality 19 Stage 6: Morality of universal-
izable, reversible, and prescriptive general ethical principles 23
Kohlberg' s Methodology 26
Criticism of Kohlberg 31
Rationale for the Present Study 38
11. METHODOLOGY 4 5
Subjects 45
Measures 47
111
Skill Domain of Care/Life 51
Familial relationships task domain 51 Sickness/Death task domain 53 Substages 4, 5, and 6 55
Skill Domain of Justice/Law 56
Laws/Rules task domain 56 Fairness task domain 58 Substages 4, 5, and 6 60
Substage 7 62
Procedures 61
Interview 62
Scoring 63
Method of Analysis 64
III. RESULTS 67
Group Homogeneity 67
Interrater Reliability of Scoring 68
Scale 68
Heinz Dilemma 69
Guttman Analyses 70
Reproducibility and Scalability 71
Pearson Product Correlations 74
Familial relationships scale 74 Sickness/Death scale 74 Laws/Rules scale 74 Fairness scale 74 Care/Life with familial relationships
scale 75 Care/Life with sickness/death scale 75 Justice/Law with laws/rules scale 76 Justice/Law with fairness scale 76
Chi-Square Analyses 77
IV
IV. DISCUSSION 78
Scale Analyses 78
Post-hoc Analyses 82
Predicted Guttman Scale 82
Comparisons of Chronological and Mental
Age Groups 84
Developmental Trends 90
Correlation of Scale to Stage Score Based on Kohlberg's Heinz Dilemma 100
Conclusions 102
Recommendations for Future Research 103
Familial Relationships Task Domain 105
Sickness/Death Task Domain 106
Laws/Rules Task Domain 107
Fairness Task Domain 107
Care/Life Skill Domain 108
Justice/Law Skill Domain 109
Implications 110
REFERENCES 112
APPENDICES
A. KOHLBERG'S HEINZ DILEMMA 116
B . SCORING MANUAL 119
C. TABLES 131
D. LETTER OF EXPLANATION AND CONSENT FORM 144
E. DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRES 149
ABSTRACT
While moral reasoning may require an integration of
several concepts, no method of examining the development
of this apparent "complete" morality prior to the
individual's ability to make a Stage 1 moral decision as
assessed by Kohlberg (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) has been
developed. This study initiates description of the
individual's moral reasoning prior to an ability to make a
Stage 1 Kohlbergian judgment and serves as initial
identification of a developmental pattern of the
integration of skills necessary for understanding issues
contained within a Kohlbergian moral dilemma.
Young children appear unable to resolve all the
concepts/issues contained in Kohlberg's Heinz dilemma. An
accurate estimation of early moral reasoning ability might
be obtained through delineation of concepts as dilemma
resolution occurs. This study's examination of the
development of moral reasoning processes attempted to
serialize the issues contained within Kohlberg's dilemma
through the utilization of Kurt Fischer's (1980) model for
skill-building.
This study hypothesized that the issues of life and
those of law--the underlying issues of the Heinz dilemma—
are scalable as substages within the task domains of
Familial Relationships, Sickness/Death, Laws/Rules, and
Fairness. Guttman scale analysis was utilized to
vi
determine the scalability of the items hypothesized by the
investigator to be in each task domain as well as those of
higher order skill domains of Care/Life and Justice/Law.
Interviews were conducted with 80 subjects--20 subjects in
each of these age groups: (1) four years, (2) seven to
eight years, (3) nine to ten years, and (4) eleven to
twelve years.
Guttman scale analyses revealed coefficients
sufficient to validate the task domain scales of
Laws/Rules and Fairness. While coefficients of the other
scales did not reach high,validity levels, these
statistics approached values necessary for validation.
Comparisons of consistent progression of correct
responses across chronological age and mental age, as well
as qualitative analyses of the interview transcripts,
indicated developmental trends in the issues. The
investigator concluded that scaling these issues in order
to analyze their progressive development toward Kohlberg's
Stage 1 can be accomplished. A revised scale is proposed
for future examination of varied populations.
Vll
LIST OF TABLES
1. Differences Between Age Groups as Determined by Demographic Variables 132
2. Guttman Scale Analysis: Familial Relationships Task Domain Substages 1, 2, and 3 133
3. Guttman Scale Analysis: Sickness/Death Task Domain Substages 1, 2, and 3 134
4. Guttman Scale Analysis: Laws/Rules Task Domain Substages 1, 2, and 3 135
5. Guttman Scale Analysis: Fairness Task Domain Substages 1, 2, and 3 136
6. Guttman Scale Analysis: Care/Life Skill Domain with Familial Relationships Substages 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 137
7. Guttman Scale Analysis: Care/Life Skill Domain with Sickness/Death Substages 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 138
8. Guttman Scale Analysis: Justice/Law Skill Domain with Laws/Rules Substages 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6....139
9. Guttman Scale Analysis: Justice/Law Skill Domain with Fairness Substages 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 140
10. Progression of Correct Responses to Items by Chronological Age 141
11. Progression of Correct Responses to Items by Mental Age 142
12. Predicted Guttman Scale: Care/Life Skill Domain with Justice/Law Skill Domain 143
Vlll
LIST OF FIGURES
1. Serializing the Issues Contained Within Kohlberg's Heinz Dilemma 50
2. Scale Proposed for Future Study 104
IX
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
The development of the individual may be viewed as a
process of evolution and change--a portion of which
involves the individual's ability to make moral
judgments. Moral judgments of varying magnitude are
determined by the individual on a daily basis as one
elects the manner with which circumstances or individuals
encountered will be dealt. Whether or not these judgments
are of a large or small magnitude, all are ways in which
one enacts the moral decision-making processes.
The study of "moral development" refers to the growth
of the individual's ability to distinguish right from
wrong, to develop a system of ethical values, and to learn
to act morally (i.e., moral development is the study of
the individual's ability to reason morally and to make
moral judgments). A theory of moral development,
therefore, explains how individuals develop in their
ability to make these moral judgments (Rich & DeVitis,
1985).
Inherent in the study of moral development is the
concept of morality, a system of conduct based on moral
principles (Rich & DeVitis, 1985). These moral principles
have been defined by Kohlberg as not only rules for
action, but reasons for action as well (Leibert, 1984) .
Morality is broadly concerned with how people deal with
one another and with prescriptions and proscriptions
regarding interpersonal relationships and transactions.
Further, Leibert has defined the "buzzword" of morality as
"should" in that it may convey obligation, duty,
propriety, or expediency.
Rest (1983) defines morality as a societal enterprise
involving the establishment of cooperative social
structures that individuals must support to accomplish
shared goals. He cites indicators of an individual's
morality to include behavior that helps another; behavior
in conformity with societal norms; the internalization of
social norms; the arousal of empathy, guilt, or both;
reasoning about justice; and putting another's interests
ahead of one's own.
Rest (1984) further maintains that a complete theory
of morality must address what he defines as the four
components of morality: interpreting the situation (i.e.,
imagining the possible courses of action in a situation
and tracing out the consequences of action in terms of how
they affect the welfare of all the parties involved),
determining what course of action would best fulfill a
moral ideal, deciding what one actually intends to do by
selecting among competing values, and finally, executing
and implementing a plan of action. Rest maintains that
"no current theory has useful things to say about all
components of [morality, although]...most approaches have
something useful to say about some of the components."
Piaget (1932) assumes morality to be a matter of
justice and defines morality as respect for rules and as
the fair application of rules to those persons
constructing them as well as those persons to whom the
rules apply. Following Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg (Colby &
Kohlberg, 1987) has developed a theory of the development
of moral reasoning that has been held by many as the
standard theory of moral development. Kohlberg (Colby &
Kohlberg, 1987) cites the recognition that morality and
moral judgments refer to a mode of prescriptive valuing of
the obligatory or right as a critical point in the study
of moral development, and that moral judgments have
certain properties that make them moral judgments.
Therefore, while moral development refers to the growth of
the individual's ability to make moral judgments, morality
refers to the rules or guidelines surrounding these
judgments as manifested in the individual's behavior
(Kohlberg, 1984) .
In light of the evidence concerning the many elements
of morality, critics have argued Kohlberg's (Colby &
Kohlberg, 1987) theory to be one of justice and not
morality as he does not represent the full domain of moral
development (Sullivan, 1977). Foremost among these
critics is Carol Gilligan (1982) who argues for the
broadening of the moral domain to include an ethic of
care. Other indicators of morality might include Perry's
(1970) theory of ethical reasoning. Fowler's (1981) theory
of faith development, and Loevinger's (1976) theory of ego
development in that each contributes to the individual's
"system of conduct."
Kohlberg (1984) contends his stages of moral
development are more correctly stages of justice reasoning
and acknowledges that justice does not define the full
domain of moral development. He does, however, view
justice as the basic moral principle. The basic
developmental concept underlying the stage sequence
presented by Kohlberg is the level of sociomoral
perspective--the characteristic point-of-view from which
the individual formulates moral judgments. As the
individual becomes increasingly less egocentric, he/she
simultaneously becomes better able to exercise a "moral
point-of-view," the perspective of any rational individual
recognizing the nature of morality or the fact that
persons are ends in themselves and must be treated
accordingly (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).
Critics of Kohlberg maintain the complexity of his
hypothetical dilemmas have rendered them inappropriate for
examining the moral judgment of the young child due to
their difficult content and structure (Rest, 1983). Damon
(1984) maintains that while there is some evidence of the
child's use of fairness or distributive justice, children
do not always express such principles in their moral
discourse. He defines an "other morality of the child"
expressed often in peer settings and based on principles
of equality, cooperation, and reciprocity.
Working with the dilemmas contained in the current
Moral Judgment Interview (Colby et al., in press),
Kohlberg identifies two predetermined issues within each
that provide the basic conflict to be resolved (e.g., the
Heinz dilemma contains the issues of life versus law).
The study carried out attempted to formulate a preliminary
method of examining the early development of an
individual's moral reasoning process by addressing the
issues contained within Kohlberg's dilemmas in order to
examine more clearly the moral reasoning of the child
prior to his/her formation of a Kohlberg Stage 1 moral
judgment. This study has hypothesized that the process of
moral reasoning develops in a fashion similar to the
processes of skill building and the systematic
integration of concepts presented by Fischer (1980).
Therefore, the researcher has conceptualized that the
ability to recognize and resolve the two major issues of
justice and care develop from a compilation of cognitive
coordinates that are integrated into a hierarchy leading
from simple to more complex sets. At each coordinate, a
minor, less complex dilemma has been presented to the
individual for resolution. As the coordinates build upon
and are integrated with each other, they may be seen to
develop into the issues Kohlberg presents in his Heinz
dilemma, allowing for the development of the underlying
reasoning that allows the individual ultimately to make a
moral decision to be examined.
Further, the method of viewing moral reasoning
presented here could also provide a means for viewing the
development of the moral orientation argued for by
Gilligan (1982)--i.e., that of care. As the issues that
precede Kohlberg's Stage 1 of moral reasoning have been
presented, a differentiation did become somewhat apparent
making evident the path of development suggested both by
Kohlberg's (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) traditional ethic of
justice as well as by Gilligan's (1982) more contemporary
ethic of care.
Review of the Literature
Historically, the study of moral development has
followed two major traditions: the behavioristic
orientation (Hartshorne & May, 1928; Hartshorne, May, &
Mailer, 1929; Hartshorne, May, & Shuttleworth, 1930) and
the moral-reasoning orientation (Piaget, 1932).
Hartshorne's and May's early emphasis on situational
specificity and their conclusion of no unified character
trait of honesty led to an apparent lack of interest among
behaviorists in that moral traits did not appear to exist
as organized inner entities in individuals. Later,
stimulated by the Freudian notions of identification and
internalization of the superego, researchers again
involved themselves in the study of moral development
primarily based on verbal reports about behavior. The
theoretical framework became a translation of Freud's
psychoanalytic concepts into a behavioral, learning
orientation, while the focus of study rested on resistance
to temptation and guilt, on overt responses and anxiety as
drive (Burton, 1984).
The dominant theoretical orientation in the study of
morality and moral development today, however, is the
study of moral judgment and reasoning. Although the
behavioral component in morality is recognized, more
emphasis is devoted to cognitive components and
progression through developmental stages (Burton, 1984).
Building from his observations regarding the development
of cognition as a continual process of assimilation and
accommodation, Piaget (1932) discusses morality in terms
of an understanding of rules and as an aspect of
cooperation and reciprocity. He identifies one notion,
perhaps the most rational of all moral notions, which
seems to be the direct result of cooperation--the notion
of justice. Piaget further maintains that the sense of
justice, though naturally capable of being reinforced by
the precepts and the practical example of the adult, is
8
largely independent of these influences, and requires
nothing more for its development than the mutual respect
and solidarity that holds among children themselves.
Piaget's (1932) study of the rules of a game led to
the conclusion that there exist two moralities—a morality
of constraint or of heteronomy, and a morality of
cooperation or of autonomy. Heteronomy is expressed by
numerous affective reactions and characterizes the moral
judgment of the child prior to the age of seven or eight
years. In this morality the power of orders or rules is
initially dependent upon the physical presence of the
person who gives them. During times of this person's
absence, the rule loses its force and violation of the
rule results merely in a momentary uneasiness.
With advances in cognitive operations (e.g.,
egocentricism) and social cooperation, the child arrives
at new moral relationships based on mutual respect that
lead to a certain autonomy. Here, two primary factors
must be noted. First, in games with rules, children
beyond the age of seven years tend to regard rules as the
result of agreement among contemporaries and accept the
notion that rules may be changed by means of democratic
consensus. Second, an essential product of this mutual
respect and reciprocity is the sense of justice; as early
as seven or eight years, justice prevails over obedience
and becomes a central norm (Piaget, 1932) .
Piaget (1932) further identifies three great periods
in the development of the sense of justice in the child.
The first period, lasting up to the age of seven or eight
years, is characterized by the non-differentiation of the
notions of just and unjust from those of duty and
disobedience--i.e. , whatever conforms to the dictates of
the adult authority is just. Here, the child sets the
necessity for punishment above equality of any sort; where
obedience and equality are brought into conflict, the
child repeatedly favors obedience as authority takes
precedence over justice. Throughout this period, the
conception of justice can only develop on certain points--
those where cooperation begins to make itself felt
independently of constraint. On all other points, what is
just is confused with what is imposed by law, and law is
completely heteronomous and imposed by the adult.
Piaget's (1932) conceptualization of the second
period does not appear until approximately seven or eight
years of age. This period may be defined by the
progressive development of autonomy and the priority of
equality over authority. Punishments are now based on
reciprocity, and the belief in immanent justice is
perceptibly decreasing. Further, moral action is sought
for its own sake independently of reward or punishment.
Equality reigns supreme; in conflicts between punishment
10
and equality, equality now outweighs all other
considerations including authority.
Finally, at approximately 11 or 12 years of age, a
new attitude emerges that characterizes the feeling of
equality, and that is a development of equalitarianism in
the direction of relativity. Instead of looking for
equality in identity, the child no longer thinks of the
equal rights of individuals except in relation to the
particular situation of each. Identical laws and
punishments are no longer applied to all persons as
extenuating circumstances of individuals are now
considered (Piaget, 1932).
Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Reasoning
Building on Piaget's (1932) work regarding the
emphasis on the cognitive components of morality, Lawrence
Kohlberg has developed a theory of moral development which
has evolved as the theoretical framework for perceiving
the development of moral reasoning. Critical to Kohlberg
is the recognition of a moral judgment as referring to a
"mode of prescriptive valuing of the obligatory or right."
While other modes may reflect descriptive judgments of
social behavior and institutions (e.g., level of social
cognition or role-taking), moral judgments are made only
when social cognition is extended into prescriptive
judgments as to what is right or good. For example, the
question "What is a husband-wife relationship?" examines a
11
level of social cognition; however, when the question
becomes "Should you break a husband-wife relationship by
divorce?" the answer is more likely to include not only a
social-cognitive judgment, but a judgment of prescriptive
valuing as well. Therefore, while a higher moral stage
requires a higher level of logical and social cognitive
ability, advanced logical thinking and social cognition
may be expressed without constituting advanced moral
thinking (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).
Within the Kohlbergian framework, moral judgments may
be defined as judgments of value, not fact; as social
judgments, judgments involving people; and as prescriptive
or normative judgments, judgments of ought, or rights and
responsibilities rather than value judgments of liking and
preference. They direct, command, or oblige the
individual to take action, deriving from some rule or
principle of action which the individual takes as binding
upon his own actions. Moreover, the notion of a rule or
principle requires moral judgments to be universalizable
prescriptions. Universalizability is seen as a logical or
metaethical statement about the meaning of words, as the
necessary requirement of moral words (Colby & Kohlberg,
1987) .
Drawing from Socrates and Rawls, Kohlberg maintains
the primacy of justice in moral development in that
justice is seen as the first virtue of a society.
12
However, even though Kohlberg's theory may be
characterized as one of justice reasoning, it is not
accurate to argue that the theory may handle only
judgments that are explicitly justice oriented. Kohlberg
characterizes four moral orientations reflected in
responses to his hypothetical dilemmas: (1) general and
normative order or impartial following of rules and
normative roles; (2) utilitarian maximizing of the welfare
of each person; (3) perfectionistic seeking of harmony or
integrity of the self and the social group; and (4)
fairness, balancing perspectives, maintaining equity, and
social contract. While justice underlies all of the
orientations, it is most directly emphasized in the
fairness orientation (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).
The central focus of the Kohlbergian stages of moral
development is on deontic judgments; closely related are
judgments of "rights." The most structurally distinctive
feature of Kohlberg's moral stages lies in the fairness
orientation, where balancing operations of reciprocity,
prescriptive role taking, equality, and equity are most
explicit and are most parallel to Piaget's cognitive
operations (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).
Levels of Moral Reasoning
The basic underlying concept in Kohlberg's stage
sequence is the level of sociomoral perspective—the
characteristic point-of-view from which the individual
13
formulates moral judgments. The nature of this
perspective is seen as being intrinsically moral rather
than a logical or social-cognitive structure applied to a
moral domain, and the levels of moral perspective provide
a general organization of moral judgment (Colby &
Kohlberg, 1987).
Kohlberg's moral stages are grouped into three
levels: the preconventional level, the conventional level,
and the postconventional level. The term "conventional"
is used in the sense that morality consists of socially
shared systems of moral rules, roles, and norms;
therefore, the individual at the preconventional level
does not yet fully understand and uphold socially shared
moral norms and expectations. The individual at the
postconventional level understands and generally accepts
society's rules; however, acceptance of these rules is
based on formulating and accepting the general moral
principles on which they are based. In the event these
principles conflict with society's rules, the
postconventional individual judges by principle rather
than convention (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).
The three levels are more easily understood as three
different relationships between the self and society's
moral rules and expectations. The preconventional level
perceives these rules and social expectations as being
external to the self while the conventional level
14
perspective identifies self with the rules and
expectations of others--i.e., these rules become
internalized. Finally, the postconventional level
perspective differentiates the self from the rules and
expectations of others and defines moral values in terms
of self-selected principles (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).
Each moral level contains two stages, the second
stage being a more advanced and organized form of the
general perspective of the level. The sociomoral
perspective of each level is as follows: Preconventional
Level—Concrete Individualistic Perspective, Conventional
Level--Member-of-society Perspective, and
Postconventional Level--Prior-to-society Perspective
(Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).
The individual at the preconventional concrete
perspective thinks about his/her own interests in a given
situation and those of others he/she may care about.
Rules and laws are viewed as something enforced by
authority and are to be followed in order to avoid
punishment to the self. Conversely, the conventional
member-of-society perspective is concerned more with
social approval; the individual here is loyal to persons,
groups, and authority and is concerned with the welfare of
others and society. The viewpoint becomes one of
participants in relation to a group; the needs and
15
viewpoint of the single individual being subordinate
(Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).
Finally, the postconventional perspective returns to
the standpoint of the individual rather than the point-of-
view of "us members of society." However, this point-of-
view can be universal and is that of the rational moral
individual. This "prior-to-society" perspective questions
and redefines the conventional perspective in terms of an
individual moral point-of-view in order that social
obligations are defined in ways that can be justified by
the moral individual. The individual's commitment to
basic moral principles (e.g., equal rights of individuals)
is viewed as more important than simply taking society's
perspective or accepting society's laws and values. This
perspective is that of the individual who has made the
moral commitments on which he/she feels a good/just
society should be based and is defined in terms of why
something is right or wrong. While legal-social
obligations are recognized, recognition of moral
obligations may take priority when the moral and legal
viewpoints conflict (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).
Stage 1: Heteronomous morality. The perspective at
Stage 1 is that of naive moral realism. An action is seen
in terms of its concrete moral significance; its goodness
or badness is seen as real, inherent, and unchanging.
Moral judgments are self-evident, requiring little or no
16
justification beyond assigning labels or citing rules, and
bad actions consistently lead to punishment with an
absence of deservingness or intentionality. Here, moral
rules and labels are applied in a literal, absolute
manner, and justice is characterized by strict equality
rather than equity. Physical or categorical
characteristics of individuals determine their authority,
power, or moral worth, and there is a failure to
differentiate multiple perspectives on the dilemmas--i.e.,
self and other share a single perception of the situation.
What makes something right or wrong is defined by
authority rather than by cooperation among equals (Colby &
Kohlberg, 1987) .
Stage 1 responses to the question, "Should Heinz
steal the drug?" from the dilemma presented in Appendix A,
would be as follows:
Heinz should steal the drug because his wife might be a very important person.
Heinz should not steal the drug because it's a crime. (Colby et al., in press)
Stage 2: Individualistic, instrumental morality.
Stage 2 is characterized by a concrete individualistic
perspective; there is now the awareness that each person
has his/her own interests to pursue and that these
interests may conflict. Further, a moral relativity
develops out of the understanding that different persons
can have different, yet equally valid justifications for
17
their claims to justice. The morally right is relative to
the particular situation and the actor's perspective on
the situation. The perspective at Stage 2 becomes
pragmatic--maximize satisfaction of one's needs and
desires and simultaneously minimize negative consequences
to the self. However, limiting the Stage 2 perspective is
the failure to provide a means for deciding among
conflicting claims and ordering or setting priorities on
conflicting needs and interests (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).
Responses to the question "Should Heinz steal the
drug?" from the Stage 2 perspective include:
Heinz should steal the drug because his wife will die without it.
Heinz should not steal the drug because the druggist made the drug and can do what he wants with it. (Colby et al., in press)
Stage 3: Interpersonally normative morality. In
Stage 3, the separate perspectives of individuals are
coordinated into a third-person perspective, that of
mutually trusting relationships among people incorporated
in a set of shared moral norms according to which people
are expected to live. Further, these moral norms and
expectations are generalized to all persons and
situations. Stage 3 norms provide an integration of
perspectives which recognize a general social agreement on
what constitutes a good role occupant. Here, there exists
an emphasis on being a good, altruistic, or prosocial
individual as well as on good or bad motives which
18
indicate general personal morality. As a result of this
socially shared perspective, the individual at Stage 3 is
particularly concerned with maintaining interpersonal
trust and social approval. This reciprocity is most
clearly represented in the Golden Rule perspective of "Do
unto others as you would have them do unto you" (Colby &
Kohlberg, 1987).
The Stage 3 individual might respond to the question,
"Should Heinz steal the drug?" as follows:
Heinz should steal the drug because we are all human beings and we should be willing to help others.
Heinz should not steal the drug because the owner worked hard for what he has and you shouldn't take advantage. (Colby et al., in press)
Stage 4: Social system morality. At Stage 4, the
individual takes the perspective of a generalized member
of society; this perspective is based on a conception of
the social system as a consistent set of codes and
procedures that apply equally to all individuals. Here,
pursuit of individual interests is acceptable only when it
corresponds with the maintenance of the sociomoral system
as a whole. The informally shared norms of Stage 3 are
systematized at Stage 4 in order to maintain impartiality
and consistency. Further, the social structure now
includes formal institutions and social roles which
function to mediate conflicting claims and to promote the
common good. The perspective taken is generally that of a
19
societal, legal, or religious system which operates within
institutionalized laws and practices. Conversely, the
Stage 4 perspective may represent a higher moral or
religious law embodied in the individual's conscience even
though it conflicts with institutionalized laws. In this
event, the internal conscience or moral law is seen as
being equal to some system of divine or natural law (Colby
& Kohlberg, 1987) .
The Stage 4 individual might answer the question,
"Should Heinz steal the drug?" as follows:
People should do everything they can to save another's life because people must have some sense of responsibility for others for the sake of society or humanity.
One should obey the law because respect for the law will be destroyed if citizens feel they can break the law any time they disagree with it. (Colby et al., in press)
Stage 5: Human rights and social welfare morality.
The Stage 5 prior-to-society perspective is that of a
rational moral individual aware of universalizable values
and rights that should be built into a moral society.
Laws and social systems are considered just in terms of
the degree to which they preserve and protect fundamental
human rights and values. Here, the social system is
viewed ideally as a voluntary contract between individuals
designed to preserve the rights and promote the welfare of
all individuals; this is a "society creating" rather than
a "society maintaining" perspective. Within the Stage 5
20
perspective, the primary focus may be either on rights or
on social welfare; individuals may not be deprived of
these rights even through freely chosen contracts. Each
person is seen as having an obligation to make moral
choices that uphold these rights even in cases where they
conflict with society's laws or codes. Here, there is a
concern for protection of the rights of the minority that
cannot be derived from the social system perspective of
Stage 4 as social institutions, rules, or laws are
evaluated by reference to their long-term consequences for
the welfare of each person or group in the society (Colby
& Kohlberg, 1987) .
In answer to "Should Heinz steal the drug?" the Stage
5 individual might respond as follows:
Heinz should steal the drug because the right to life supercedes or transcends the right to property.
It is important to obey the law only to the extent to which the law in a given situation is fulfilling its legitimate function or purpose of protecting fundamental individual or human rights. (Colby et al., in press)
Kohlberg's stages as presented above have been
documented both cross-culturally (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987;
Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983; Snarey, 1985)
and across gender (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Walker, 1984;
Walker, 1986) . Longitudinal data has also provided
evidence displaying the developmental pattern of these
21
stages (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983; Walker,
1982) .
Snarey (1985) presents a review of 45 studies of
moral development conducted in 27 countries. He concludes
that the data presented in these studies provide evidence
that Kohlberg's interview is "reasonably culture fair" and
that it further supports his assumption of invariant
sequence, as stage skipping and regression were rare.
Colby and Kohlberg (1987) cite three longitudinal studies
in three cultures (the United States, Turkey, and an
Israeli kibbutz), all of which provide evidence of
Kohlberg's five stages of moral development. In the 20-
year longitudinal sample of 84 males ranging in age from
10 to 16 years at the initial time of testing (also
reviewed in Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983),
Kohlberg provides data indicating attainment by subjects
at all five stages. For the Turkey study, written with
Mordecai Nisan, data were collected from male subjects in
three locations--a rural village, a seaport, and the
national capitol. Ranging in age from 10 to 28 years,
some of the 50 subjects during the study's 14-year
duration were interviewed only twice, while others were
interviewed three and four times. Data from these
subjects provided further evidence of Kohlberg's stages
with no skipping of stages across time. The Israeli
kibbutz data presented by Colby and Kohlberg (1987),
22
written with John Snarey and Joseph Reimer, further
validate the cross-cultural nature of Kohlberg's stages.
The sample included 92 adolescents (69 males and 23
females, ranging in age from 12 to 26 years) who were
interviewed over a two-to-nine year period. Evidence of
reasoning at all five stages was found with insignificant
evidence of stage skipping or regression.
While Colby and Kohlberg (1987) provide documentation
of the Kohlberg's stages across gender. Walker (1984;
1986) presents a review of 108 sample populations covering
childhood through adulthood in which sex differences on
Kohlberg's stages were examined. Of these 108 samples,
only eight clearly exhibit significant differences in
which the male subjects reached higher stages of moral
reasoning than the female subjects. In addition. Walker
concluded that several of these eight samples included
methodological flaws. He suggests, therefore, that males
and females are more alike than different in their
development of moral reasoning (Walker, 1986).
Evidence displaying the developmental pattern or
sequentiality of Kohlberg's stages also exists (Colby,
Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983; Walker, 1982), In
their review of Kohlberg's 20-year longitudinal study,
Colby et al. (19 83) provide ample evidence of the upward
progression of subjects through Kohlberg's stage sequence
with little evidence of regression or stage skipping.
23
Walker (1982) presents research involving 101 children, 59
girls and 42 boys, ranging in age from 10 to 13 years.
After determining the child's level of cognitive,
perspective-taking, and moral development, the child was
exposed to a brief role-playing situation in one of the
following treatment conditions: one stage below reasoning,
one stage above reasoning, two stages above reasoning,
neutral reasoning, and no treatment. Results of this
study support Kohlberg's notion of invariant sequence as
development was always to the next higher stage. Further,
no regression or stage skipping was found.
Stage 6: Morality of universalizable, reversible,, and
prescriptive general ethical principles. The exact nature
and definition of Stage 6 is uncertain as no longitudinal
subjects of Kohlberg clearly indicate a focus of reasoning
distinct from Stage 5. Stage 6 is included here for
theoretical completeness even though it is not included in
the current scoring manual and has not been validated as a
culturally universal sequential "natural" structure.
Kohlberg maintains Stage 6 may perhaps be viewed as part
of a broader level or "soft stage" of "ethical and
religious philosophy" supporting moral action (Colby &
Kohlberg, 1987).
The sociomoral perspective of Stage 6 is that of "the
moral point of view," a point-of-view that ideally all
human beings should take toward one another as free and
24
equal autonomous persons. In order to do this, equal
consideration must be given to the claims of each person
affected by the moral decision being made. This
prescriptive role-taking is governed by procedures
designed to insure fairness, impartiality, or
reversibility. Procedures of this sort are formalized in
various ways--one being the selection of justice
principles under what Kohlberg terms a "veil of ignorance"
in which the chooser does not know which person in a
situation or society he/she is to be. The individual must
choose a principle or policy with which he/she could best
live in the position of any person, including the position
of the person(s) who would be most disadvantaged. A
second formalization is that of "moral musical chairs," a
second order application of the Golden Rule. Not only is
Heinz, the actor in Kohlberg's dilemma, to take the point-
of-view of the dying person, of the druggist, and of
himself, but in doing so each person (druggist, dying
person) is expected to take the point-of-view of the
other. A third formalization is expressed through an
emphasis on actual dialogue, an ideal communication
situation, and a fourth formalization is considering
preference under the condition of having an equal
probability of being any of those involved in a situation
of a society (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).
25
Stage 5 general principles are distinct from either
rules or rights in that they are positive prescriptions
rather than negative proscriptions and they apply to all
situations. Further, respect for human dignity may
sometimes involve breaking the rules or violating rights
recognized by society. General principles at Stage 6 may
be one or several; single principles include the principle
of justice or respect for human personality or dignity and
the principle of utility or benevolence. Multiple
principles of justice include the principle of maximizing
the quality of life for everyone, maximum liberty
compatible with the like liberty of others, and equity or
fairness in distribution of goods and respect. These
principles may be expressed either in terms of the
language of human rights (and reciprocal duties) or in the
language of care and responsibility for human "brothers
and sisters" (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).
At Stage 6 the operations of equality, equity, etc.,
become self-conscious principles; the operations of
prescriptive role-taking (i.e., balancing perspectives)
and universalizability, therefore, become operative
principles as well as being validity checks on the reasons
given for upholding moral laws or norms. Stage 6 is based
not so much on a new social perspective as it is on a
deliberate use of the justice operations as principles to
insure that perspective when reasoning about moral
26
dilemmas. These characteristics of Stage 6 reasoning
require that Stage 6 raise dialogue to a principle or
procedure of "moral musical chairs." Thus, while Stage 5
is grounded on the notion of contract or agreement. Stage
6 is oriented to the process by which agreements or
contracts are reached as well as to insuring the fairness
of the procedures which underlie such agreement. For
example, underlying the social contract and agreement of
Stage 5 is the notion of the importance of maintaining
human trust and community. At Stage 6, the notion of
trust and community becomes the precondition for dialogue,
human rights, etc. (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).
Kohlberg's Methodology
Kohlberg's current assessment instrument, the
Standard Issue Moral Judgment Interview (MJI) (Colby &
Kohlberg, 1987; Colby et al., in press) represents a
culmination of 25 years' work that has followed the moral
development of a single group of males. Beginning in
1958, there has been a continual evolution in the proposed
definitions of moral judgment stages as well as the
assessment methodology. By a method referred to as
"bootstrapping," Kohlberg and his colleagues have
generated an evolving research program in which
longitudinal data feed back into the theory and
methodology to improve the account of development.
Kohlberg maintains, however, the theoretical and
27
methodological evolution did not consist of generating new
scoring rules which would force internal consistency, but
rather the evolution entailed a sweeping revision of the
entire stage sequence, a radical redefinition of the basic
structures in moral development (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).
The MJI consists of three parallel forms (Form A,
Form B, and Form C), each containing three hypothetical
dilemmas; Dilemma III, Form A (hereinafter referred to as
the "Heinz dilemma") appears below:
In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $400 for the radium and charged $4,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money and tried every legal means, but he could only get together about $2,000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So having tried every legal means, Heinz gets desperate and considers breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. (Colby et al., in press)
Each dilemma is followed by a series of nine to 12
standardized probe questions (see Appendix A) designed to
elicit justifications, elaborations, and clarifications of
the subject's moral judgments. The questions for each
dilemma focus on two predetermined moral issues
representing the central value conflict in the dilemma
(e.g., the "Heinz dilemma" shown above represents a
28
conflict between the value of preserving life and the
value of upholding the law). Life and law are the two
standard issues for this dilemma, and the probe questions
are designed to elicit information on the subject's
conceptions of these two issues (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).
Standard Issue Scoring involves first classifying the
responses of the individual to each dilemma into the two
broad categories of moral issues. These responses are
then matched with a moral norm--i.e., the moral value or
object of concern that is brought to bear by the subject
in justifying his/her chosen action in support of the
dilemma. While the issues reflect what the subject thinks
should be done, the norms clarify why he/she thinks this
should be done. Responses are further classified into
elements that serve to capture a single, complete moral
judgment. This element provides a reason, principle, or
concern for which the norm serves as object. In essence,
selection of an issue in a dilemma represents a choice of
action that is in need of justification. The norm
represents a partial justification, and the element
represents a final justification. Therefore, a full moral
judgment is a concern about a norm in terms of an element
in the service of an issue (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). For
example, in reference to the "Heinz dilemma," the
response, "stealing the drug because the wife has shared
her life with Heinz, and the least he can do is to save
29
her," would be scored under the life issue, the
affiliation norm, and the reciprocity element (Colby et
al., in press).
In terms of scoring responses to the MJI, within each
issue a stage score is entered for each match between a
criterion judgment in the manual and a moral judgment
given in the interview; these criterion judgment matches
are identified in the manual as reflecting certain norms
and elements. Typically, between one and five matches are
assigned for each issue. While in practice these matches
tend to cluster at a single stage, or at two adjacent
stages, there is no restriction in the scoring rules
regarding this number. The rules allow scores to be
assigned at the first five stages, provided matches are
found at those stages. In calculating an overall stage
score for the completed form, a summary score is assigned
for each of the six issues. These six scores are then
combined to yield a global interview score and a
continuous weighted average for the interview (Colby &
Kohlberg, 1987) .
Kohlberg's MJI has proved to be "well within the
limits of acceptable reliability" (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987,
p. 67). Test-retest reliability figures indicate
correlations between time 1 and time 2 testing for Forms A
and B to be .96 and .97 respectively. Further, percent
agreement figures for interrater reliability on Form A
30
range from 88% to 100% for agreement within one-third of a
stage and from 75% to 88% for complete agreement. Form B
interrater reliability figures indicate 100% agreement
within one-third of a stage and from 78% to 88% for
complete agreement. Alternate form reliability was
determined by percent agreement between Forms A and B;
100% agreement within one-third of a stage and 75%
complete agreement.
In terms of the validity of the MJI, Colby and
Kohlberg (1987) argue the appropriate validity concept for
the measure is construct validity and cite the two most
critical criteria to be invariance of stage sequence and
internal consistency. They interpret construct validity
to mean the "fit of the data obtained by means of the test
to primary components of its theoretical definition," and
argue the positive results of the longitudinal analyses
support not only the theoretical assumptions, but also the
validity of the measure. They further contend validity
and reliability of a test to be closely related as both
refer to the generalizability of performance on a test to
performance in other situations:
In the case of structural stage, construct validity demands high generalizability or test-retest and alternate-form reliability. If a stage is a structural whole, the individual should be consistent over various stimuli and occasions of testing. Our reliability data fit this demand rather well. (p. 70)
31
Both the reliability and the validity of the MJI have
been established using complete forms (e.g., all three
dilemmas contained in Form A, B, etc.). For this reason,
stage scores are normally calculated from subject
responses to all the dilemmas contained within one form.
While it is possible to stage score the dilemmas contained
within each form separately, it is not advisable (R. J.
Glover, personal communication with A. Higgins, February
8, 1988).
Criticism of Kohlberg
Critics of Kohlberg's (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) theory
of moral judgment reasoning have cited numerous
methodological problems. One major criticism has focused
on the use of his hypothetical dilemmas in that they are
complex, unrealistic, and irrelevant to the respondent
(Hoffman, 1980) . As the dilemmas are hypothetical, the
respondent is often asked to deal with strange situations
mostly far removed from his/her life experiences
(Saltzstein, 1983) . Following on this, others purport
that the abstractness and complexity of the dilemmas
renders them inappropriate in examining the moral
reasoning of the young child. Rest (1983) argues that the
complex structure and content of the Kohlbergian dilemmas
leaves the child under the age of 10 or 12 years unable to
grasp their meaning let alone understand the questions
being asked. Damon (1984) maintains that the child
32
develops principles of equality and justice during the
childhood years and uses situations of fairness as an
index of how children use moral principles. He cites
evidence of the child at age six beginning to prescribe
equality of treatment as a means to fairness, later
reciprocity in the form of compensation for merit or
deserving develops, and by the age of 10 or 12 years, both
principles are elaborated and integrated with each other.
Damon (1984) further argues that children do not
always express such principles in their moral discourse:
If children are presented with conflicts of authority drawn from the adult world, as in the case of Kohlberg's dilemmas, they are likely to acquiesce to the press of adult constraint and keep their moral principles to themselves. This is why we find Stage 1 responses to the Heinz dilemma all through childhood, (p. 113)
He continues saying Stage 1 obedience has little to do
with the lively "other morality of the child"--i.e., the
morality based on principles of equality, cooperation,,
and reciprocity. Damon (1977) contends that the most
appropriate context for analyzing the reasoning of the
young child is in the child's immediate milieu.
Kohlberg defends his use of the hypothetical dilemmas
maintaining their implementation is necessary in order to
evaluate the individual's most advanced level of moral
reasoning. As individuals do not consistently reason at
their highest stage, he argues that the hypothetical (or
distant from the subject's reality) dilemmas minimize the
33
gap between competence and performance. By using these
hypothetical dilemmas and their follow-up probe questions,
it is more likely that the individual will reflect his/her
upper limit of thinking than would be the case if real-
life dilemmas were presented (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). In
response to questions of age problems, Kohlberg agrees
that the dilemmas are inappropriate for young children and
does not advocate their use until the age of 10 or 12
years (R. J. Glover, personal communication, July 5,
1986).
Other critics of Kohlberg (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987)
argue his theory to be one of justice and not morality, as
Kohlberg does not represent the full domain of what is
meant by moral development (Sullivan, 1977). Perhaps the
strongest proponent of the narrowness of focus in
Kohlberg's theory is Carol Gilligan (1982) who presents
data arguing for the broadening of the moral domain to
include an orientation of care. Gilligan contends that
morality includes two moral orientations, that of justice,
as conceptualized by Kohlberg and his colleagues, and that
of care. In support of this, Gilligan offers a view of
morality focused on a way of solving conflicts so that no
one will be hurt. She proposes the use of these
perspectives in organizing both thinking and feeling to
empower the self to make different types of moral
judgments (Kerber et al., 1986).
34
Gilligan initially maintained her orientation of care
to be more central to the female "voice" of moral
development appearing in late adolescence. However, more
recently, she has argued that this care perspective may
not be biologically determined or unique to women. She
states that she sees in women's thinking the lines of a
different conception, grounded in different images of
relationships and implying a different interpretive
framework. Further, she maintains that her work focuses
on the difference between the two moral orientations
rather than on the questions of whether or not men and
women differ in reaching Kohlberg's stages (Kerber et al.,
1986).
From a study involving two males and two females at
each of the following ages: 8, 11, 14-15, 19, 22, 27, 36,
45, and 60-plus years, Lyons (1983) presents evidence that
women beyond the age of 27 years show increased
consideration of justice in their conceptualization of
moral problems or conflict, although they continue to use
considerations of care more frequently than justice.
Additionally, across the life span, men's considerations
of justice maintain greater consistency than do women's
considerations of care. This study implies that males,
although introducing considerations of care, tend to
define and resolve moral problems within the justice
35
framework, while the focus of care in moral reasoning is
characteristically a female phenomenon.
While Kohlberg's stages are typically referred to as
stages of "moral development," Kohlberg (1984) himself
contends that they are more correctly stages of justice
reasoning. He further acknowledges the theory of justice
reasoning to be necessary yet not sufficient for defining
the full domain of moral development. Despite this
proclamation, he nevertheless argues for justice as the
basic moral principle (Kohlberg, 1981) stating that
although both welfare concerns and justice concerns are
present at the birth of morality, justice alone takes on
the character of a principle at the highest stages of
development; other principles fail to resolve moral
conflicts or resolve them in ways that seem intuitively
wrong. Further, justice is the only principle which "does
justice to" the viable core of the lower stages of
morality.
In terms of an orientation of care separate from that
of justice in moral development, Kohlberg responds that
experiences that lead to development in the justice
orientation are not distinctly different from those
experiences that lead to development in the care
orientation. Rather, the considerations of care and of
justice are interwoven in working out resolutions.
Moreover, he argues for a view of justice that is beyond
36
either strict contract, strict retribution, or strict
obedience to rules. This view of justice focuses on ideal
role-taking, a principle that may be labeled respect for
persons (i.e., the ethic of justice) or caring for persons
as ideal ends in themselves (i.e., the ethic of care)
(Kohlberg, 1984) .
Kohlberg (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) further states that
many or most moral concerns of care are concerns about
enhancing the welfare of other persons or not hurting them
and about preserving and embracing relationships with
others. He considers these concerns as falling within the
domain of justice as the orientation of social utilitarian
concern for the welfare of others or the perfectionistic
orientation of promoting harmonious social relations.
Nevertheless, in terms of his hypothetical dilemmas, he
concedes:
... our dilemmas are really not very good at getting at relationships in a certain sense... [in that] they always put relationships against a certain rule or a law or punishment, etc., and that's not the way to bring out the highest level of a kid's orientation. (R. J. Glover, personal communication, July 5, 1986)
Bill Puka (1987) argues that it is unlikely that
justice will ultimately encompass all key features of
care; moreover, some features of justice will actually
oppose those of care. He states that care, an expressive
ethic by nature, puts compassionate virtues and intentions
into judgments. In contrast, the ethic of justice prefers
37
that the individual judge fairly out of respect and
concern for another; it tolerates on principle merely just
behavior or treatment of others. While there are pro's
and con's to reliance on each orientation, Puka argues
that one cannot assume they simply balance out, making
care and justice "equally credible."
In addition to the ethic of care, there may exist
other orientations within the domain of moral development.
In their review of theories of moral development. Rich and
DeVitis (1986) include Perry's (1970) theory of ethical
reasoning and Fowler's (1981) theory of faith development.
Although these theories are not proposed as additional
orientations of the moral domain, they may be viewed as
indicators of morality in that they contribute to the
individual's "system of conduct"--i.e., his/her system of
ethical values.
Kohlberg (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) maintains that
understanding the nature of the moral domain necessitates
distinction between normative ethics and metaethics.
Normative ethical questions ask what is right, wrong,
good, morally obligatory, and why; they are judgments
which assert that a choice, action, or policy is morally
right or wrong and may take the form of a principle.
Metaethical thinking, on the other hand, addresses
logical, epistemological, or semantic questions. He
contends that his theory of moral reasoning examines
38
normative judgments and, therefore, can be considered to
represent operational thinking. The theories of Perry
(1970) and Fowler (1981) deal more with metaethics and may
be considered to represent second order or reflective
thinking.
Rationale for the Present Study
While general agreement exists among those studying
moral reasoning that the understanding of morality or
justice requires an integration and awareness of several
concepts, there appears to be no method of examining the
development of this apparent "complete" morality prior to
the individual's ability to make a Stage 1 moral decision
as assessed by Kohlberg. This study has addressed the
moral reasoning of the individual prior to his/her ability
to make a Stage 1 Kohlbergian judgment and serves as an
attempt to identify a developmental pattern of the
individual's understanding of the underlying skills
necessary in order to integrate these skills to provide an
understanding of the issues predetermined by Kohlberg to
be contained within a moral dilemma.
Kohlberg has argued that moral reasoning requires the
application of general principles (Stage 5). While not
expecting every individual to respond to the dilemma by
applying these principles, Kohlberg nonetheless presents
the complete dilemma to the individual for resolution. He
then begins a series of questions designed to examine the
39
moral reasoning of the individual (Colby et al., in
press).
As the majority of individuals, especially the young
child, appears unable to relate all the concepts/issues
contained in the Heinz dilemma during the process of
resolution, it seems unlikely that an accurate estimation
of moral reasoning ability could be obtained unless a
delineation of these concepts/issues were described. This
study's examination of the development of the individual's
moral reasoning process attempted to serialize the issues
contained within Kohlberg's dilemmas through the
utilization of Fischer's (1980) integration of concepts
and skill-building technique. The study has thus provided
an examination of the moral reasoning of the child prior
to Kohlberg's Stage 1 (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).
The method for examining the evocation of moral
reasoning in the developing child has followed that
suggested by Fischer's (1980) method for observing the
acquisition of cognitive skills. Fischer has proposed a
view of cognitive development in terms of skill
acquisition with subsequent integration of skills. A
skill is defined as a unit of behavior composed of one or
more sets; the concept of skill requires that unevenness
be pervasive in development because skills are defined in
terms of the environment as well as the individual. A
broad grouping of these behaviors or skills has been
40
referred to as a skill domain. As methods for grouping
behaviors are not reliable, the term "task domain" is
implemented in reference to a set of behaviors that
involves only minor variations in the same task. A skill
domain incorporates several task domains as it implies a
grouping of behaviors across tasks (Fischer, 1980) .
Skills develop through a series of levels wherein
development is seen as relatively continuous and gradual,
and the individual is rarely at the same level for all
skills. As the development of skills is induced by the
environment, only those skills induced most consistently
will be at the individual's highest level; therefore,
unevenness in development is the norm. As the individual
develops, this optimal level increases in order to allow
the individual to extend these skills to that higher level
(Fischer, 1980) .
Fischer conceptualizes skill development in terms of
the hierarchical organization of new types of skills that
become increasingly more difficult. The individual is
first able to control variations in only one set: one
action, one representation, or one abstraction that may be
geometrically represented by a single point:
o
The individual is next able to combine several actions or
sets to produce a new structure:
41
This structure is termed a mapping and defines a simple
relation between two or more actions or sets. The •
subsequent integration of several mappings produces a
system:
It is the relationship between two or more subsets of two
or more sets. Finally, the individual is able to combine
several systems:
in order to create a system of systems (Fischer & Pipp,
1984) .
Theoretically, a most simplified example of Fischer's
organization of skills may be proposed as follows:
Initially, the child has the capability or skill to look
at a ball; the child also has the skill of closing his/her
hand around the ball if the ball is placed into the
child's hand (i.e., one action). However, the child is
not capable of seeing the ball and reaching to pick up the
ball. Next level, the child is able to combine at least
two skills into one mapping; i.e., s/he is now able to
both see the ball and reach to pick it up. When the
child reaches the point of integrating these skills, s/he
now has the ability to combine a minimum of two mappings
42
into one system. One mapping may be the ability to see
the ball and reach to pick it up, while a second mapping
may be the child's ability to release the ball and
visually follow its path as it falls.
Upon reaching the final point diagram above, the
child is now able to combine two systems in order to
obtain a representational set in regard to an object.
Here, the child comprehends his/her system of seeing the
ball, reaching to pick it up, releasing the ball, and
visually following its path to the floor where it then
bounces. Consequently, s/he is now able to construct the
representational set that the ball has the characteristic
to bounce.
The proposed serialization of issues contained in
Kohlberg's dilemmas would allow the developing individual
to address each concept/issue as it is woven into the
compilation of cognitive coordinates that build into the
more complex dilemma in a manner similar to skill building
as demonstrated above. In response to this
conceptualization of a means by which to examine the
individual's moral reasoning, Kohlberg has argued that the
dilemma itself must be kept intact and suggests instead a
reworking of the questions designed to accompany each
dilemma (R. J. Glover, personal communication, July 5,
1986).
43
The difficulty that the individual (typically under
the age of 10 or 12 years) has in understanding the
issues contained within the dilemma lies in his/her
inability to coordinate the various concepts. A reworking
of the questions accompanying the dilemma would find the
respondent similarly incapable of comprehending the
issues. Therefore, a differentiation of the issues, a
reduction of the question's complexity, and a more
gradual, serial introduction of the issues requiring an
increasing number of skills to be coordinated might enable
the individual better to comprehend the overall conflict
involved in the dilemmas, thus providing a more accurate
examination of early moral reasoning as well as an
improved awareness of the development of the underlying
reasoning that allows the individual ultimately to make a
moral judgment in the Kohlbergian sense. Further, by
serializing the issues contained within the dilemma into
skill domains of justice/law and care/life, development
along each of these orientations across the lifespan may
be examined.
The study further serves to validate the scalability
of the development of the understanding of the underlying
moral issues determined by Kohlberg. By accepting the
concept of justice inherent in moral reasoning, as is
proposed by Kohlberg, as well as the inclusion of
Gilligan's (1982) care orientation, one can apply the
44
tenets of skill building to the concepts of moral
reasoning to produce two skill domains—justice versus
care. Alternatively, these two domains may be viewed as
most similar to the predetermined issues in Kohlberg's
Heinz dilemma—life [domain] versus law [domain]. This
serialization of the Heinz dilemma requires a series of
stories/queries that build hierarchically from simple to
more complex sets that ultimately culminate in the
coordination and integration of the two skill domains that
are integrated in Kohlberg's original dilemma.
This study hypothesized that the issues of life and
those of law--the underlying issues contained within the
Heinz dilemma [i.e.. Dilemma III, Form A of the Moral
Judgment Interview (Colby et al., in press)] are scalable
as substages within the task domains of familial
relationships, sickness/death, laws/rules, and fairness
and the higher-order skill domains of care/life and
justice/law.
CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY
Subjects
A total of 10 males and 10 females were selected
from each of the following age groups: (1) four years of
age, (2) seven to eight years of age, (3) nine to 10
years of age, and (4) 11 to 12 years of age. The four-
year-olds were selected in order to establish a base-line
of performance of all subjects and were representative of
the preoperational child as defined by Piaget (Piaget &
Inhelder, 1969) . The seven- to eight-year-old subjects
were selected as representative of early concrete
operational performance, and the nine- to 10-year-olds
were representative of late concrete operational
performance. The 11- to 12-year-old subjects were
representative of those capable of early formal operations
as defined by Piaget. Selection for participation and
assignment to age group was determined by the subject's
chronological age at the time of assessment; therefore, a
four-year-old subjects ranged in age from 4-0 to 4-11 at
the time the child was interviewed.
In order to provide a homogeneous sample, all
subjects were selected from the Lubbock County, Texas,
area and demographic information was obtained through the
questionnaires located in Appendix E. The subjects were
from middle to upper-middle class families and were
45
46
predominantly Caucasian with one Black child and four
Hispanic children. Fifteen of the four-year-old subjects
were selected from a total of three local day-care
organizations that were willing to assist the investigator
in seeking parental permission to interview the child.
Five of the subjects in this group were located through
personal contacts of the investigator; however, all five
children also attended local day care.
Subjects from the three older age groups were
initially sought through the after-school program offered
by the YWCA organization of Lubbock. Four schools in the
southwest area of the city of Lubbock were selected, and
letters of explanation and parental consent forms (see
Appendix D) were sent home with each child in order to
obtain permission to interview that child. In this
manner, all but 10 of the subjects in the seven- to
eight-year-old and the nine- to 10-year-old groups were
located for inclusion in the study. The remaining 10
subjects were obtained through personal contacts of the
investigator.
As older children tend to leave school campuses
shortly after school, it was more difficult to obtain
subjects for the 11- to 12-year-old age group through the
assistance of the YWCA organization. A total of three of
the subjects for this group were obtained from the YWCA;
the remaining 17 subjects were located through several
47
personal contacts of the investigator as well as
references from subjects regarding possible participants.
Consideration of each subject's mental (MA) age was
given through the administration of the Slosson
Intelligence Test (SIT) by the investigator. This
assessment of MA served as an indicator of the
approximate level of cognitive functioning of the
individual. To obtain background data on the subjects,
each child and his/her parent(s) completed separate
demographic questionnaires developed by the investigator
(see Appendix E).
Measures
A measure was compiled by the investigator to elicit
the moral reasoning of the individual with a developmental
age of four to 12 years. The instrument would be
considered as having been validated if Guttman scale
analysis resulted in a coefficient of reproducibility at
0.90 or above, a minimum marginal reproducibility of less
than 0.90, and a coefficient of scalability at 0.60 or
above.
The assessment instrument to be validated consisted
of a set of queries designed to establish a developmental
sequence of the individual's moral reasoning prior to
Kohlberg's (Colby & Kohlberg, 198 7) Stage 1 that would
ultimately allow him/her to make a moral judgment in the
Kohlbergian sense. In other words, confirmation of a
48
sequence of moral development was sought that might aid in
the examination of the reasoning and rationale that
underlies (or occurs prior to) the Kohlbergian Stage 1
level of the individual.
The assessment instrument constitutes an analysis of
the development of the sequences of the two skill domains
(issues) contained in Kohlberg's Heinz dilemma (Colby et
al., in press) as shown in Appendix A and determined by
Kohlberg (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) to be inherent in an
individual's moral reasoning—one domain of care/life and
the other of justice/law. The queries contained within
the assessment instrument and the order in which they
appear along the scale were developed by the investigator
and begin at a fundamental understanding of a concept and
proceed upward through the sequence of substages until
culminating with Kohlberg's original Heinz dilemma at
Substage 7.
In order to establish a developmental pattern of the
moral reasoning processes that allow an individual to
comprehend the overall conflict contained within a
dilemma, the particular items on the scale leading to the
Heinz dilemma that were developed in this investigation
are considered to be appropriate for that dilemma only—as
other Kohlbergian dilemmas would require an analysis of
somewhat different issues. The two skill domains (i.e.,
issues) contained within the Heinz dilemma were
49
identified as those determined by Kohlberg (Colby et al.,
in press) of life and law, herein referred to as care/life
and justice/law.
In keeping with Fischer's (1980) delineation of skill
domains with task domains cited in Chapter I, after
examination of the skill domains by the investigator as
they are presented in the Heinz dilemma, two task domains
were believed to be contained in each. Within the skill
domain of care/life, the task domains of familial
relationships and sickness/death were identified, and
within the justice/law skill domain, tasks domains of
laws/rules and fairness were hypothesized. The specific
queries/items that constitute the first three substages
contained on the scale in Figure 1 were developed in
consideration of the developmental progression of the
separate task domains as determined by previous
researchers as will be shown. Also in keeping with
Fischer's notion of unevenness in development (Fischer &
Bullock, 1984) , queries for differing task domains across
a substage may not appear to be at the same level of
cognitive functioning, i.e., a Substage 1 query within the
laws/rules task domain may be more difficult than a
Substage 1 query within the familial relationships task
domain. Responses at the upper substages should not
exhibit a separation into task domains, as responses to
the queries at these substages should reflect a
50
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coordination and integration of the separate task domains
of familial relationships and sickness/death and of
laws/rules and fairness, provided the individual has
developed this moral reasoning skill.
Figure 1 represents the investigator's
conceptualization of these queries and their referent
substage based in part upon the work of Piaget (1932) and
upon Fischer's (1980) postulations regarding the
integration of sets of skills. Appendix B provides a
Scoring Manual for these queries. An explanation of each
and scoring (e.g., "Pass" or "Fail") concerns are
outlined below. While in some instances requirements for
scoring were based on findings of studies cited below, in
others these requirements were determined by the
investigator based on pilot interviews conducted with
children and the investigator's most accurate hypothesis
as well as knowledge of developmental theory.
Skill Domain of Care/Life
Familial relationships task domain. In regard to the
familial relationships task domain, the individual's
comprehension of the kinship system may be viewed in terms
of classification and the ability to understand social
relationships (Fischer & Watson, 1981). Piaget (Piaget &
Inhelder, 1969) has defined the problem of classification
to be the young child's inability to deal simultaneously
with more than one categorization of identification. This
52
inability to classify thus serves to limit his/her
comprehension of numerous roles held by one individual
(e.g., father and husband).
Further, in determining a developmental progression
of the comprehension of the kinship system. Chambers and
Tavuchis (1976) conclude that the knowledge of kin terms
is often "incomplete and fragmentary." Data analyses
indicate children at both the first and third grade levels
are able consistently to identify correctly the terms of
"mother" and "father"; however, when identifying the terms
of "brother/sister" and "husband/wife," the third-grade
child will respond correctly while the first grade child
is more likely to make an error in identification.
With the queries, a set of four wooden figures--
representing a father, a mother, a son, a daughter, and an
infant—are presented to each subject. Following on the
findings of Chambers and Tavuchis (1976), at Substage 1
the subject is asked to identify the figure representing a
father, a mother, and a baby. A "Pass" score is given for
correct identification of all figures. At Substage 2, the
subject is asked to identify the figure representing a
father, a mother, a brother, and a sister. Again, a
"Pass" score is given for correct identification of all
figures. The Substage 3 story/query asks the subject to
identify the husband, the wife, and the children.
53
Provided the subject correctly identifies all the figures,
a score of "Pass" is given for that substage.
Sickness/Death task domain. Information for the
development of this task domain relied on the individual's
comprehension of both sickness and death. Bluebond-
Langner (1978) provides evidence that children at an early
age are able to identify the role of being sick or ill
with receiving some form of medication to aid the child in
recuperating or to help him/her "feel better." These same
children also provided evidence of the awareness that
often medication is not effective or "doesn't work
anymore."
Further, Koocher (1973) interviewed children ranging
in age from 6 to 15 years and found that responses to the
question, "What makes things die?" frequently included
physical deterioration and illness across the levels of
preoperational, concrete operational, and formal
operational cognitive functioning. While evidence of this
type of response appeared in all three categories,
concrete and formal operational children provided
significantly more of these responses than did the
preoperational children. Alternatively, all instances of
magical, egocentric responses (e.g., "You die when God
reads your name in his book.") were attributed to
preoperational children.
54
Koocher (1973) also posed the question, "What will
happen when you die?" Here, references to being buried or
to going to heaven or hell accounted for 73% of the
responses of the children. The children were also asked,
"How do you make dead things come back to life?" With the
exception of eight preoperational children, no child in
the study indicated that the revival of dead things was
possible.
Nagy (1948) has identified three stages of
development in the child's understanding of death. In the
first stage, children between the ages of three and five
deny death as a regular and final process and view it
instead as a further existence in changed circumstances.
In the second stage, typically between the ages of five
and nine, death is personified by the child and is seen as
distant from the self. Finally, at the third stage
beginning around nine years of age, death becomes viewed
as a process that takes place in the dissolution of
bodily life. By this point the child is also aware of the
inevitability and the finality of death.
Based on the evidence outlined above, the following
procedures were followed in order to evoke the child's
reasoning about sickness/death. Beginning at Substage 1,
the subject was asked to recall a time when he/she was ill
and what might have been given to the subject to make
him/her "feel better." A "Pass" score was given to the
55
individual who responded that he/she was given medicine
typically to make him/her "feel better." At Substage 2,
the subject was questioned concerning the various
possibilities of not receiving the medicine. Here, a
"Pass" score was given for a response containing the
notion that one might become more ill, eventually leading
to death. At this substage, if the concept of death was
mentioned, a "Pass" score was recorded--it was not
required that the concept be fully understood. In order
to receive a score of "Pass" at Substage 3, it was
required that the subject exhibit an awareness that
without proper medication an ill person could ultimately
die and that the subject display a full comprehension of
the finality of death.
Substages 4, 5, and 6. The intent of the queries at
the higher substages (i.e., Substages 4, 5, and 6) was to
investigate the individual's ability to integrate the
concepts of the Familial Relationships and Sickness/Death
task domains and the issues contained in the queries at
the three lower substages as they related ultimately to
Kohlberg's Heinz dilemma. It was hypothesized by the
investigator that the responses of the individuals at
these substages would provide evidence of a developmental
progression regarding the need of a husband to help a sick
wife, the reasons for his providing aid, and the extent or
56
degree to which a husband should go in order to obtain
this aid.
Substage 4 presents the subject with the query,
"Should a husband help a sick wife receive medication to
prevent her from dying?" This substage, therefore,
necessitates successful progression through the prior
substages and requires an integration of the two task
domains. A response from the subject in the affirmative
constituted a "Pass" at Substage 4. Substage 5
incorporates the subject's rationale for providing the
husband with a reason for helping the ailing wife. A
"Pass" here required the subject to recognize the
affection and commitment a husband and wife share.
Substage 6 presents the notion of the extent to which a
husband goes (or should go) in order to aid the ill wife.
Accompanying questions here (see Appendix B) probed
various possibilities such as exhausting all of one's
financial resources and/or assuming a large financial
debt.
Skill Domain of Justice/Law
Laws/Rules task domain. The rationale for the
queries regarding the individual's knowledge and
understanding of rules was based on Piaget's (1932) study
of the child's understanding of the rules of a game as
well as his conceptualization of the child's cognitive
processes. As discussed earlier, Piaget notes an initial
57
period of heteronomy in the child prior to the age of
seven or eight in his/her understanding of rules in that
s/he views rules and their power in conjunction with the
authority from whom the rule originated. Further, the
child's egocentric characteristics enable him/her to
arrive at any form of social cooperation, resulting in the
opinion that rules must consistently be followed and
punishment must be routinely enforced when they are not,
despite the intent of the actor.
At about nine or 10 years of age, the child moves
into a period of autonomy defined by Piaget (1932) as
being based on mutual respect and cooperation. Rules
become viewed more in terms of general agreement among
contemporaries that may be changed by means of democratic
consensus. Further, identical laws and punishments are no
longer applied to all individuals as the intent of the
actor is now taken into consideration.
As in the task domain of familial relationships, the
child's ability to classify also plays a role in
progression of the queries in the laws/rules task domain.
The child's ability to generalize an understanding of
rules as opposed to merely providing specific examples
aids in his/her comprehension of the reasons for obeying
rules as well as the consequences when rules are not
obeyed.
58
Substage 1 presented the subject with the task of
defining a "rule." A "Pass" score was given for
responses that indicated that rules govern behavior—i.e.,
rules may be defined in terms of what the subject may or
may not be allowed to do. Substage 2 incorporated the
notion of adherence to these rules, and a "Pass" score
here was given for any response that reflectd the
subject's awareness that rules are obeyed in order to keep
behavior within the realm of acceptability. (Note: A
response saying that rules are to be obeyed simply because
a specific individual has said they are to be obeyed did
not constitute a "Pass" at this substage.) Substage 3
investigated the subject's awareness of consequences
induced as a result of not following a particular rule or
set of rules. A "Pass" score here indicated the subject's
recognition that some form of punishment is applied to
those who do not obey rules.
Fairness task domain. The queries contained within
this task domain were established in a similar fashion as
those of the laws/rules task domain in terms of the
child's ability to generalize the concept of fairness as
opposed to providing specific examples. Additionally,
Baldwin (1955) discusses fairness in terms of the child's
initial need to be considered "good"; i.e., the child has
an egocentric concern for how s/he is evaluated by others
59
but not with the objective fact of fairness in terms of
reciprocity.
At a higher level, fairness is viewed in terms of
equalitarianism--the demand that all individuals should be
treated exactly alike. Further, the child begins to
appreciate the point of view of other individuals, while
being very concrete with his/her evaluations (Baldwin,
1955).
Later, fairness becomes more differentiated as
benefits are adjusted to fit the needs and desires of the
individual and later the welfare of the group. With
maturity, fairness gradually shifts from a more concrete
demand for equality to a flexible judgment that takes into
account the needs and abilities of the various people in a
situation as well as the objective demands of the
situation itself, thus representing the objectification of
ethical principles and moving away from the egocentricity
of the younger child (Baldwin, 1955).
Substage 1 within this task domain questioned the
comprehension of fairness. A "Pass" score at this level
required evidence that the subject possesses an
understanding of fairness in terms of individuals being
dealt with equivalently. At Substage 2 the subject's
awareness of reasons for being fair were probed. At this
substage, a "Pass" score reflected a rationale for
behaving fairly. While the notion of the Golden Rule
60
orientation would be considered a "Pass," being fair
because a specific individual has instructed the subject
to be fair would not be considered a "Pass." Substage 3
investigated the subject's understanding of consequences
that occurred as a result of not treating individuals
fairly. A "Pass" here required evidence of the awareness
of harm to others as a result of unfairness.
Substages 4, 5, and 6. The queries found at
Substages 4, 5, and 6 represented the investigator's
hypothesized integration of the concepts found in the task
domains of laws/rules and fairness. The aim of the higher
substages was to determine the individual's reasoning
processes regarding the conflict perceived when laws/rules
are viewed as unfair, the results of maintaining
laws/rules that are unfair as well as the consequences of
disobeying laws/rules that are perceived as unfair.
Substage 4 required successful progression through
the prior substages and an integration of the two
preceding task domains. At this substage, the subject was
asked to consider the presence or absence of fairness in
all laws/rules. A "Pass" at Substage 4 required the
subject's acknowledgment that all laws/rules that govern
behavior are actually not fair and that the respondent's
recognition that these laws/rules should indeed be applied
fairly to everyone. Substage 5 presented the subject with
the possibilities of consequences resulting from the
61 »
application of laws/rules that are unfair. A "Pass" score
here was given for the recognition that unfair laws/rules
result in one individual or a body of individuals being
treated discriminatorily or in a manner in which not all
individuals would appreciate being dealt. Substage 6
required the subject to consider the possibility of not
adhering to a law/rule that was considered unfair. A
"Pass" score at this substage was constituted by a
response that incorporated the concepts of obeying
laws/rules to the extent that the benefit of the majority
is met. Here, it was necessary that the subject show
evidence that as much as possible must be done in all
situations in order to achieve fairness for everyone.
Substage 7
At this substage, the subject was introduced to
Kohlberg's original Heinz dilemma and its follow-up
questions as they appear in Appendix A. Resolution of
this dilemma required the integration of the two skill
domains of care/life and justice/law and necessitated the
subject's comprehension of both sets of issues. The
subject's responses to the follow-up questions was scored
according to the rules of standard scoring contained in
Kohlberg's present scoring manual (Colby et al., in
press)•
62
Procedures
Each child was interviewed by the investigator in a
quiet area of his/her school or home. Before beginning
the interview regarding the scale described above, both
the child was asked to complete a demographic
questionnaire (see Appendix E) in order to obtain
background information; parents of the children had
completed a similar questionnaire at the time consent for
the child's participation in the study was granted.
Following that, the Slosson Intelligence Test (SIT) was
administered by the investigator.
Interview
Each subject was interviewed by the investigator.
Beginning with the four queries at Substage 1 (see Figure
1), each subject was asked to listen to the accompanying
query and then to respond to the questions with his/her
best answer. All responses were recorded on audiotape
and later transcribed. The various queries were
presented to the subject as they appear horizontally
across the substages in Figure 1—i.e., the subject was
first asked to address each query at Substage 1, then each
query at Substage 2, etc., until all queries across all
the substages were addressed. Each subject was allowed to
continue along the sequences of queries until he/she had
completed the entire scale. All queries and their order
of presentation remained as nearly the same as possible
63
for each subject. Follow-up probe questions were asked by
the investigator when further clarification of the
subject's statement was needed. Due to the nature of the
queries and their varying degree of difficulty, follow-up
probe questions were not necessary for all items on the
scale. Subjects in the age groups of nine-to-10 years and
ll-to-12 years were also asked to complete the Heinz
dilemma (Dilemma III, Form A, MJI) and each of its
accompanying probe questions as shown in Appendix A.
Scoring
Responses of the subjects to the queries located on
the scale in Figure 1 were scored as "Pass" or "Fail" as
described in the discussion of the measures above. The
investigator served as one rater of the responses with an
independent rater providing a second score in order to
establish interrater reliability. The second rater was
trained by using three interviews with children not
included in the study. The second rater was provided
with a scoring manual and, after being allowed to read
through it and ask questions for clarification, was asked
to score the three interviews that had already been
scored separately by the investigator. These two sets of
scores were then compared and examined for matched
responses (i.e., both scoring the same response as "Pass"
or "Fail").
64
The second rater was then given the transcripts of
the first five interviews completed from each of the four
age groups for a total of twenty interviews. After
scoring these interviews, an item-by-item comparison was
conducted in order to determine the exact number of match
scores between the two raters.
The stage score of the subjects' responses to the
Heinz dilemma was also scored by the investigator in
accordance with the standard scoring procedures described
by Colby et al. (in press). Further, after being scored
by the investigator, two subjects' transcripts from the
Heinz dilemma were mailed to the Center for Moral
Education at Harvard University and scored by a member of
the staff in order to establish the level of reliability
for scoring subjects' responses to the Heinz dilemma
between the investigator and former colleagues of
Kohlberg.
Method of Analysis
Fischer and his colleagues (Fischer & Bullock, 1984)
have stated that developmental sequences demonstrate
developmental change and continuity and that the scaling
of a developmental sequence is of chief concern. In order
to test a developmental sequence, an independent measure
of each hypothesized step in the sequence is required.
Performance on these independent assessments should form a
sequence testable by a Guttman (1944) scaling analysis
65
wherein each subject passes all the steps prior to the
highest step passed and fails all steps subsequent to the
lowest step failed.
For the purposes of this study, each subject received
a score of "Pass" (+1) or "Fail" (+0) for each query
given. Following completion of the interviews, Guttman
scales analysis produced the coefficient of
reproducibility, the minimum marginal reproducibility, the
percent improvement, and the coefficient of scalability of
the scale utilized in this study. The coefficient of
reproducibility is a measure of the extent to which a
subject's scale score is a predictor of the response
pattern; coefficients higher than 0.9 indicate a valid
scale. The minimum marginal reproducibility constitutes
the minimum coefficient of reproducibility that could have
occurred for the scale, and values of less than 0.90 are
desired. The percent improvement represents the
difference between the coefficient of reproducibility and
the minimum marginal reproducibility and indicates the
extent to which the former is due to response patterns
rather than the inherent cumulative interrelation of the
variables used. Finally, the coefficient of scalability
provides evidence of the scale's unidimensionality and
cumulativity and is required to be above 0.6 in order to
substantiate the scale's validity (Nie, Hull, Jenkins,
Steinbrenner, & Bent, 1975).
66
In addition, inter-item correlations and part-whole
correlations were examined. Correlation of each item with
all other items yielded the inter-item correlation matrix,
while the part-whole correlations consisted of each item
being correlated with the sum of all items in the scale
(Nie, Hull, Jenkins, Steinbrenner, & Bent, 1975).
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
The purpose of this study was to validate the
scalability of the development of the individual's
understanding of the underlying moral issues determined by
Kohlberg. The 80 subjects participating in the study
were categorized into four homogeneous groups determined
by chronological age at the time of assessment.
Group Homogeneity
In order to determine the homogeneity of the four
groups, both a one-way analysis of variance and a Chi-
square analysis were computed for each of the following
demographic variables: socioeconomic status (SES),
race/ethnicity (RACE), religious affiliation of the child
(RELAFF), father's occupation (DADOCCU), mother's
occupation (MOMOCCU), family constellation (INTACTFAM),
father's level of education (DADED), and mother's level of
education (MOMED); see Appendix E for the coding of these
variables. As shown in Table 1 (see Appendix C), no
significant differences were found between the groups
based on the ANOVA as well as the Chi-square analysis {TQ_ >
.05) for any of the variables cited above, thus
establishing the likeness of the four groups of subjects.
67
68
Interrater Reliability of Scoring
Scale
Responses of the subjects to the queries located on
the scale in Figure 1 were scored as "Pass" or "Fail" as
described in the discussion of the measures in the
previous chapter. Comparison of raters' scores to the
three interviews used for training purposes indicated that
the two raters had matched (both scoring the same
response as "Pass" or "Fail") on 50 of the 54 responses
(18 items X 3 subjects)—i.e., 92.59% of the raters'
scorings were identical.
After both raters had scored the 20 interviews
selected to be utilized in order to establish interrater
reliability, an item-by-item comparison was conducted to
determine the exact number of match scores between the
two raters. A total of 335 of the 360 items were
determined to be matched, leaving 25 items, or only 6.94%,
not matched.
Examination of the items not matched indicated that
the majority of nonmatches occurred in the two middle age
groups: one nonmatch in the four-year-old group, 11
nonmatches in the seven- to eight-year-old group, seven
nonmatches in the nine- to 10-year-old group, and two
nonmatches in the 11- to 12-year-old group. Further, of
the 25 responses not matched between the two raters, four
responses were failed by the second rater and passed by
69
the investigator, while 21 responses were passed by the
second rater and failed by the investigator, providing
evidence that the investigator proved a more stringent
rater than did the second rater. For this reason,
nonmatched responses were assigned the score determined by
the investigator in order to allow for consistency of
scores for the total group of 80 subjects.
Heinz Dilemma i - » ^ ^ > — ^ - a ^ ^ n — V i ^ B i ^ ^ — •
The stage score of the subjects' responses to the
Heinz dilemma were also scored by the investigator in
accordance with the standard scoring procedures described
by Colby et al. (in press). After being scored by the
investigator, two subjects' transcripts from the Heinz
dilemma were mailed to the Center for Moral Education at
Harvard University and scored by a member of the staff in
order to establish reliability of scores on the Heinz
dilemma between the investigator and former colleagues of
Kohlberg. Results of these comparisons revealed that
while the determined stage score of one subject assigned
by the Center staff member matched exactly with that
assigned by the investigator, the second stage score
differed from Stage 2/3 as assigned by the Center staff
member and Stage 1/2 as assigned by the investigator.
70
Guttman Analyses
Although the 18-item scale presented in Figure 1 is
viewed as a single, continuous progression with
development occurring across the skill and task domains,
for purposes of analysis it was necessary to fragment the
scale as theoretical conceptualization of the scale
requires an integration of the separate task and skill
domains and not a sequential accumulation or summation of
the issues' scorings. In order to test the scalability of
the items, the four task domains were first analyzed
separately. Familial Relationships Substage 1 (FR 1),
Familial Relationships Substage 2 (FR 2), and Familial
Relationships Substage 3 (FR 3) constituted the Familial
Relationships Scale; Sickness/Death Substage 1 (SD 1),
Sickness/Death Substage 2 (SD 2), and Sickness/Death
Substage 3 (SD 3) constituted the Sickness/Death Scale;
Laws/Rules Substage 1 (LR 1) , Law/Rules Substage 2 (LR 2) ,
and Laws/Rules Substage 3 comprised the Laws/Rules Scale;
and Fairness Substage 1 (F 1), Fairness Substage 2 (F 2),
and Fairness Substage 3 (F 3) comprised the Fairness
Scale.
In order to incorporate the upper substages into the
scale analyses, it was necessary to build four scales,
each merging a task domain into the upper substages
constituting its respective skill domain. The four scales
built in this manner and their items are as follows:
71
Care/Life Skill Domain with Familial Relationships
Substages 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 (FR 1, FR 2, FR 3, CL 4, CL
5, and CL 6); Care/Life Skill Domain with Sickness/Death
Substages 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 (SD 1, SD 2, SD 3, CL 4, CL
5, and CL 6); Justice/Law Skill Domain with Laws/Rules
Substages 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 (LR 1, LR 2, LR 3, JL 4, JL
5, and JL 6); and Justice/Law Skill Domain with Fairness
Substages 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 (F 1, F 2, F 3, JL 4, JL 5,
and JL 6).
Results of these eight Guttman analyses appear in
Tables 2 through 9 in Appendix C. For each analysis, a
summary of the total responses scored as "Pass" and "Fail"
for each item are presented as well as the coefficient of
reproducibility, minimum marginal reproducibility, percent
improvement, and the coefficient of scalability for each
scale. In addition, the inter-item correlations and
scale-item correlations are presented with a chi-square
statistic, degrees of freedom, and scale reliability for
each scale analyzed.
Reproducibility and Scalability
Scalability is a function of the extent to which
observed response patterns can be accurately reproduced on
the basis of assigned quantitative scale scores. The
coefficient of reproducibility is a measure of goodness of
fit between these observed patterns and the predicted
ideal response patterns. The coefficient is simply a
72
measure of the relative degree with which the obtained
multivariate distribution corresponds to the expected
multivariate distribution of a perfect scale. A minimum
acceptable value of 0.90 has been set for this coefficient
as a scale is considered to be interpretable if it
reflects 10% or less error (Mclver & Carmines, 1981) .
Items with extreme marginal distributions tend to
inflate the value of the coefficient of reproducibility;
therefore, this value is compared to the minimum marginal
reproducibility which reflects the reproducibility of a
series of items based only upon the item marginal
distributions. A general guideline for this variable is
that its value be less than 0.90 (Mclver & Carmines,
1981) .
The difference between the coefficient of
reproducibility and the minimum marginal reproducibility
is represented by the percent improvement and serves as a
function of the improvement in prediction provided by the
scale over the marginal frequencies of the individual
items. This difference ranges from 0.00 (provided the
scale provides no improvement) to 0.50 (Mclver & Carmines,
1981) .
The coefficient of scalability is a measure of a
scale's ability to predict item responses in comparison to
predictions based on marginal frequencies and serves as a
measure of improvement in fit. If scale predictions are
73
perfect and there are no scale errors, the coefficient of
scalability would equal 1.00; however, if the scale
provides no improvement in prediction, the coefficient
would equal 0.00. As a rule of thumb, a coefficient of
0.60 has been utilized to indicate scalability (Mclver &
Carmines, 1981) .
Review of Tables 2 through 9 (Appendix C) reveal
coefficients of reproducibility of 0.90 or higher for the
four task domain scales: Familial Relationships Scale
(1.0000), Sickness/Death Scale (0.9167), Laws/Rules Scale
(0.9750), and Fairness Scale (0.9250). Of the scales
incorporating the upper substages, only the Care/Life with
Familial Relationships Scale (0.9458) revealed a
coefficient of reproducibility greater than 0.90. The
remaining scales all produced coefficients that approached
but were somewhat less than 0.90: Care/Life with
Sickness/Death Scale (0.8875) , Justice/Law with Laws/Rules
Scale (0.8917), and Justice/Law with Fairness Scale
(0.8583). All scales revealed minimum marginal
reproducibilities below 0.90 with the exception of the
Familial Relationships Scale whose value was 0.9708.
In terms of the coefficient of scalability, analyses
revealed one series of scale predictions which may be
considered perfect—Familial Relationships Scale (1.0000).
Other scales with a coefficient great than the necessary
value of 0.60 were the Laws/Rules Scale (0.9155), the
74
Fairness Scale (0.7231), and the Justice/Law with
Laws/Rules Scale (0.6312). Other scales revealed
coefficients of scalability as follows: Sickness/Death
Scale (0.4872), Care/Life with Familial Relationships
Scale (0.5593), Care/Life with Sickness/Death Scale
(0.4066), and Justice/Law with Fairness Scale (0.4963).
Pearson Product Correlations
Familial relationships scale. Pearson correlational
analyses for the three items on the Familial Relationships
Scale (FR 1, FR 2, and FR 3) revealed that these were
constants. The only correlation able to be computed in
the scale-item analysis was FR 3 (1.0000; £_ < .001).
Sickness/Death scale. Items on the Sickness/Death
Scale (SD 1, SD 2, and SD 3) revealed correlations between
items SD 1 and SD 3 (0.2884; £_ < .01) and between items SD
2 and SD 3 (0.3787; £ < .001) . All items correlated
with the complete scale with coefficients of 0.5221; £_ <
.001, 0.7777; 2. < .001, and 0.8203; £ < .001,
respectively.
Laws/Rules scale. All items on the Laws/Rules Scale
correlated (£ < .001) with each other as well as with the
scale as a whole as shown in Table 4 in Appendix C.
Fairness scale. Items F 1 and F 2 on the Fairness
Scale correlated (0.3858; £ < .001), and Items F 2 and F 3
produced a coefficient of 0.4045 (£. < .001). In terms of
scale-item analysis, all items correlated to the scale (£
75
< .001) with coefficients as follows: SD 1 (0.7627), SD 2
(0.8260), and SD 3 (0.6005).
Care/Life with familial relationships scale. As with
the Familial Relationships Scale, correlation coefficients
revealed constants for all items in relation to FR 1 and
FR 2. Examination of the remaining inter-item analyses
revealed correlations for item CL 4 with CL 5 (0.3618; £_ <
.001) and for item CL 5 with CL 6 (0.4426; £_ < .001).
Correlations were also found for item FR 3 with CL 5
(0.3403; g_ < .01) and for item CL 4 with CL 6 (0.3280; £ <
.01) .
In regard to scale-item correlations, again no
correlation could be computed for FR 1 and FR 2 with the
scale; however, all other items correlated (g. < .001) with
the complete scale.
Care/Life with sickness/death scale. In addition to
those correlations reviewed above in regard to the
Sickness/Death Scale, correlations for this scale were
found between items SD 2 and CL 5 (0.3401; 2. < -01)i items
SD 2 and CL 6 (0.3352; 2. < -01) r items SD 3 and CL 6
(0.3311; 2. < .01), and items CL 4 and CL 6 (0.3280; 2. <
.01). Other correlations (2. < .001) were found between
items SD 3 and CL 4 (0.4792), items SD 3 and CL 5
(0.5017), items CL 4 and CL 5 (0.3618), and items CL 5 and
CL 6 (0.4426). One negative correlation was detected
between items SD 1 and CL 4 (-0.0592; 2. > .05).
76
Scale-item analysis revealed correlations (2. < .001)
for all scale items with the complete scale with
coefficients ranging from 0.3630 to 0.7628.
Justice/Law with laws/rules scale. In addition to
those correlations noted in the Laws/Rules Scale above,
inter-item correlations here also revealed correlations (2.
< .01) for items LR 2 with JL 4 (0.3344) and for items LR
3 with JL 5 (0.2854). Further, correlation coefficients
for items LR 1 with JL 4, LR 3 with JL 4, LR 1 with JL 5,
LR 2 with JL 5, JL 4 with JL 5, and JL 5 with JL 6 were
all found to be significant (2. < .001).
Additionally, all scale items were found to correlate
(2. < .001) with the scale as a whole.
Justice/Law with fairness scale. Correlation
coefficients for this scale revealed correlations (2. <
.001), in addition to those previously cited in the
Fairness Scale, for the items F 1 with JL 4, F 1 with JL
5, JL 4 with JL 5, and JL 5 with JL 6. Further, although
not significant (2. > .05) , negative correlations were
found between item F 3 and all levels of JL (JL 4, JL 5,
and JL 6).
With the exception of item F 3, all scale items
correlated at the 0.001 level with the scale as a whole.
Item F 3 correlated with the scale at the 0.05 level.
77
Chi-Square Analyses
As it is possible to satisfy the general guidelines
of the Guttman scale analysis by chance, yet not provide
definitive evidence that the scale items are consistent
with the cumulative model, significance tests are utilized
to support further the scalability of the instrument. A
Chi-square goodness-of-fit statistic provides a test of
the hypothesis that a single Guttman scale underlies the
data with deviations from the cumulative pattern that are
random (Mclver & Carmines, 1981).
Results of the Chi-square analyses for each of the
scales reveal significant values for the Fairness Scale
(X2 = ii.216; df=3; 2. < -05), for the Care/Life with
Sickness/Death Scale (X2 = 84.978; df=56; 2. < .01), and for
the Justice/Law with Fairness Scale (X2=80.553; df=56; 2. <
.05). Scale reliability coefficients ranged in value from
0.7244 to 0.9854.
CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION
Scale Analyses
Three necessary criteria must be fulfilled in order
for a series of ordered items to be considered a valid
scale: (1) a coefficient of reproducibility greater than
or equal to 0.90, (2) a minimum marginal reproducibility
of less than 0.90, and (3) a coefficient of scalability
greater than or equal to 0.60 (Mclver & Carmines, 1981).
Based on these guidelines, the task domain scales of
Laws/Rules and Fairness as presented herein may be
considered to be valid scales. However, while the order
of the items contained on the Fairness Task Domain scale
appears to have been correctly hypothesized (i.e., F 1, F
2, and F 3), the progression of the items on the
Laws/Rules Task Domain appears to be LR 3, LR 1, and LR 2.
This information indicates the individual appears able to
determine the consequences of disobeying a rule or a law
before s/he is able to correctly define the concept of
"rule" itself.
The inter-item and item-scale correlations for these
two scales revealed strong correlations (2_ < .001) between
all the items contained on each scale separately with the
exception of F 1 ("What does it mean to be fair?") and F 3
("What happens if we are not fair?"). A possible
explanation for this lack of correlation might be found in
78
79
the scoring procedures for these two items. A score of
"Pass" was given to a definition of fairness (F 1)
described simply as "to share" or "to be nice," while in
order to "Pass" the F 3 item, the individual was required
to produced a response indicating awareness of the
feelings of another and the importance of treating all
individuals equivalently. While many of the children in
the study were able to produce a "Pass" response to item F
1 (32) , fewer children (8) were able to do so at item F 3
as they frequently provided egocentric responses such as
"People won't like you that much" or "You won't have any
friends," which were scored as "Fail."
In regard to the Familial Relationships Task Domain,
while the coefficients of reproducibility and scalability
proved to be indicative of a valid scale, the minimum
marginal reproducibility was above the maximum requirement
of 0.90; correlation coefficients also revealed constants
for this scale. The similarity of the items contained on
this scale may be such that they are interpreted by
Pearson corrrelational analysis as constants and,
therefore, did not compute correlations. The possibility
exists that the three items on this scale do not reflect a
progression as hypothesized or that the children in the
study's sample had all reached the ceiling (i.e., all
accurately responded to the questions) on these items.
80
While the statistical results produced on the various
remaining scales do not reach optimal limits for proving
their validity, many of the required coefficients approach
values considered to be appropriate. Both the
Sickness/Death Task Domain scale and the Care/Life Skill
Domain with Familial Relationships scale lack
coefficients of scalability greater than 0.60; however,
each produce coefficients (0.4872 and 0.5593) that
approach this value. Similarly, the scales of Care/Life
Skill Domain with Sickness/Death, the Justice/Law Skill
Domain with Laws/Rules, and the Justice/Law Skill Domain
with Fairness all produce coefficients of reproducibility
of 0.8583 and above, approaching the required value of
0.90. Perhaps the least valid scale is the Care/Life
Skill Domain with Sickness/Death scale in that this scale
produced a coefficient of reproducibility of 0.8875 and a
coefficient of scalability of 0.4066, both below the
required values of 0.90 and 0.60 respectively.
Explanation of these low coefficients might well rest
in the phrasing of the items contained on the scales
themselves. During the process of data collection, it was
noted by the investigator that items CL 4 ("Should a
husband help his sick wife get medicine to keep her from
dying?") and JL 4 ("Are all laws and rules fair?") were
passed with little difficulty and seemingly little
comprehension by the subjects as both items formed Yes/No
81
responses, and, due to scoring procedures established by
the investigator (see page 51) prior to the onset of data
collection, no further clarification from the subject was
required. Both items tend to fall much lower on their
respective scales than was hypothesized, due certainly in
part to the ease at which a child could respond
affirmatively or negatively. Transformation of these
items to ones requiring more thought and/or clarification
and justification from the subject might yield
coefficients that more accurately provide validation of
the scales.
Likewise, items phrased "what happens..." also proved
to be somewhat troublesome in that they did not appear to
be phrased in such a way as to provide the subject with a
direct indication of the direction for the response. For
example, item SD 3 asks: "What happens when a person
dies?" Responses to this phrasing ranged from a
discussion of "what happens" after a death (e.g.,
"Somebody may cry they loved them so much" and "You have
to go to a funeral and you have to do a bunch of stuff
that a lot of people don't want to do") to "what happens"
to a person who dies (e.g., "They go to heaven" and "They
get buried at a cemetery usually"), which was the
direction of comprehension examined. More directly
phrased items might also provide coefficients that might
further validate the scales.
82
Post-hoc Analyses
The purpose of this study was to determine the
validity of the scale by means of Guttman scale analyses.
Not all scales were determined to be valid; therefore,
several post-hoc analyses were conducted in order to
provide a better interpretation of the results as well as
means for creating a new scale.
Predicted Guttman Scale
Although the theoretical conceptualization of the
scale did not require analysis of the total 18 items of
the scale as a single analysis, the items were examined in
this way in order to provide a comparison of the ordering
of the items across the two skill domains (see Table 12,
Appendix C). Although coefficients of scalability and
reproducibility were not available with which to validate
the scale, the items were ordered by ranking the number of
correct responses--similar to the Guttman Scale analysis
procedure.
Examination of the ordering produced revealed that
with the exception of item LR 3 ("What is a rule?"), all
items contained in the Justice/Law Skill Domain produced
fewer correct responses than any of the items contained in
the Care/Life Skill Domain. Therefore, with the exception
of this single item, the issues examined by the
Justice/Law Skill Domain appear to be comprehended by
83
these individuals at a later time than those issues
examined by the Care/Life Skill Domain.
Based on this preliminary data, it might be
premature to conclude that the issues of justice/law were
more difficult for the individual to comprehend than those
of care/life. However, it was noted by the investigator
during the course of data collection and transcription
analysis that more probe questions were required in the
justice/law domain than in the care/life domain, providing
a further indication that the former domain may indeed be
more complex than the latter. The possibility exists that
the concepts of familial relationships and sickness/death
are more familiar to the individual, creating an earlier
developmental understanding of these issues.
Another implication from this finding is that the
phraseology of the items of the scale contained in the
care/life domain was not as difficult as those in the
justice/law domain. While children were frequently able
to respond accurately that a husband should help his sick
wife because he loved her, not all responses indicated
that every individual was able to qualify the love or
commitment between a husband a wife. Similarly, many
children appeared able to discuss death in terms of "you
get buried and you go to heaven;" however, not every child
was able to discuss death in terms of the permanent ending
of life. Perhaps a greater delineation of these issues in
84
terms of item construction and scoring procedures would
allow a more developmental examination of this domain.
Comparisons of Chjrpnological and Mental Age Groups '
Theoretically, it would be predicted that in order
for the items to be developmental in nature, the number of
correct responses produced by the children should increase
as their ages increase. Therefore, the items were
examined in regard to the chronological age groupings in
order to determine which of the 18 items produced more
correct responses in progression with chronological age
consistently across the four groups; i.e., four years,
seven-to-eight years, nine-to-10 years, and ll-to-12
years (see Table 10, Appendix C).
Results of the analysis indicated that 16 of the 18
items contained on the scale consistently produced a
greater number of correct responses as age increased. The
two items not maintaining this developmental pattern were
SD 2 ("What might happen to a sick person who doesn't get
any medicine?") and item CL 4 ("Are all laws and rules
fair?"). In regard to item SD 2, eight correct responses
were produced at age four, 19 at age seven-to-eight, and
then dropping to 18 at both nine-to-10 and ll-to-12
years. While these results indicate that the younger
children responded slightly more frequently that death was
possible in instances where a sick person did not receive
85
medication, this frequency is not great enough to cause
concern in the progression of the items. Examination of
the interview transcripts further revealed that the older
children were more likely to conceptualize a variety of
consequences to this item and also discussed these
consequences in terms of the severity of the illness;
however, the younger children frequently responded quickly
and with no regard for differences in degree of sickness.
It is likely, therefore, that the older groups of children
possessed the ability to produce the correct response, but
their review of various alternatives complicated their
ability to select a response while the younger children
(many still in Piaget's concrete operational period as
determined by mental age) could only comprehend a
medicine-death alternative.
Item CL 4 also did not produce a consistently
progressive correct response rate, building from one
correct response at age four, three at age seven-to-eight,
and then dropping to two at both nine-to-10 and ll-to-12
years. Again, while the drop does break the consistency
of the item, the degree of change is by one response only.
Here, the Yes/No nature of the question may have produced
difficulty, as scoring procedures did not provide a
reliable manner in which to score the responses.
This consistency of items was also analyzed in regard
to mental age of the subjects as assessed by the
86
utilization of subjects' scores on the Slosson
Intelligence Test (SIT). It was the intent of this
analysis to provide a second examination of the
developmental pattern of the items in relationship to
cognitive functioning of the subjects. For purposes of
this analysis, only those subjects who were assessed as
having mental ages of four years (n=8), seven-to-eight
years (n=8) , nine-to-10 years (n=19) , and ll-to-12 years
(n=18) were utilized. As the number of subjects
appearing in each mental age group is not equivalent, the
number of correct responses and errors were converted to
percentages in order to allow for comparison across
groups.
Results of comparison by mental age appear in Table
11 (Appendix C) and indicate consistent progression of
correct responses in fewer items than was noted in the
analysis by chronological age. Here, in addition to items
SD 2 and JL 4, other items wherein an increase in error
frequency in later age groups was detected included SD 3,
Fl , F 2 , F 3 , CL5, and CL 6. While comparison by
percentage does not allow for an exact measure of
difference, detected decreases in correct number of
responses are not large and appear primarily when the
latter mental group is reached. With the exception of the
break in consistency for item JL 4 and CL 6 (where breaks
appear in the seven-to-eight and the nine-to-10 groups
87
respectively) , all other breaks in consistency appear in
the 11- to 12-year-old group.
Examination of responses of the subjects categorized
into these mental age groups and receiving errors was
conducted in order to determine any underlying pattern of
explanation of why these consistencies were not
maintained. For the seven- to eight-year-old mental age
group, one individual had a chronological age of 4-10
years while all other individuals possessed chronological
ages between 7-0 and 8-11 years. Examination of the
responses in error for item JL 4 for these subjects
indicated these individuals maintained a concrete
understanding that all laws and rules are fair without
question. The probability exists that individuals of this
age have not yet begun to consider alternative actions and
rely on instruction from others (e.g., parents, siblings,
teachers, etc.) in whom they have total faith.
For the nine- to 10-year-old mental age group, a
total of 10 individuals with a mental age of 9-0 to 10-11
years possessed chronological ages of 7-0 to 8-11 years.
This group represented the point of break in consistency
for item CL 6 (from 75.0% to 73.3%). This degree of
decline is so slight as to be almost nonexistent as
examination of the error responses for both the seven-to-
eight year group and the nine-to-10 year group indicate a
general agreement that laws should be maintained
88
regardless of their lack of fairness in order to avoid
punishment and/or jail.
As indicated previously, all other breaks in
consistency appeared in the ll-to-12 group which
contained three individuals with chronological ages of 7-0
to 8-11 and 10 additional individuals with chronological
ages of 9-0 to 10-11. Responses to items SD 2 and SD 3
for these individuals indicated a lack of the
comprehension of the relationship of sickness to death and
an unclear understanding of the concept of finality in
death itself. Individuals here failed to mention death in
response to item SD 2 and were likely to discuss death in
response to item SD 3 in terms of angels and living in
heaven and going "down and hurt[ing] people." Responses
of this group in error to item CL 5 failed to note the
husband's love for his wife and, therefore, his desire to
help her. Subjects here frequently responded that the
husband should help his wife because he needed help
raising the children or in order for someone to be there
to "take care of the kids."
A break in consistency of correct responses was also
noted at the ll-to-12 group for all of the items in the
Fairness Task Domain (F 1, F 2, and F 3). Examination of
these incorrect responses indicated many subjects in this
mental age group continued to rely on specific examples of
fairness as a way of defining the term (F 1). Reasons for
89
being fair included lack of explanation ("I don't know")
as well as reflecting an egocentric concern: "If you're
not fair then somebody might start a fight with you or
something and you'd get in trouble" or "We should be fair
so that other people won't get mad at you and will like
you..."). In response to item F 3 in regard to
consequences of not being fair, individuals here reflected
a concern for not having friends, getting into trouble,
and no one liking them--all self-interest concerns.
Comparison of the consistency patterns by
chronological age and by mental age produce the argument
that chronological age, where 16 of the 18 items were
determined to produce a consistent progression, provides a
better indicator of development on these issues than does
mental age, where only 10 of the 18 items appeared to
produce a consistent progression. Examination of the
responses of the groupings by mental age reflects a lack
of personal experience in spite of the level of cognitive
functioning that most probably interacts with the
subjects' comprehension of these issues. While these
individuals appeared to possess the cognitive structures
required in order to analyze these issues, they were
perhaps lacking the social experiences necessary in order
to comprehend fully alternative or explanatory meanings
due to their younger chronological years.
90
Developmental Trends
The transcripts from the 80 interviews were analyzed
with the intent of noting possible developmental trends
for each of the items. While some items failed to yield
clear trends in responses, others allowed the investigator
to determine developmental patterns of the task domains.
The items regarding familial relationships were not
examined as all of the items were passed by all subjects
with the exception of seven errors on FR 3 ("Which one is
a husband, wife, child?"), all contributed by the four-
year-old group.
In regard to the Sickness/Death Task Domain, analysis
of these trends supported the research of Bluebond-Langner
(1978), Koocher (1973), and Nagy (1948) in terms of the
individual's understandings of both sickness and death.
All individuals tended to relate sickness with visits to
doctors and/or receiving some form of medication. At
approximately seven years of age, responses to SD 1
("What happens when a person is sick?") also began to
include more specific "happenings" in regard to sickness—
e.g., coughing, germs fighting germs, etc. Not until
later ages (approximately 9-0 to 9-6) did subjects begin
to mention people providing care to a sick person or the
possibility of going to a hospital.
Item SD 2 ("What might happen to a sick person who
doesn't get any medicine?") provided an additional
91
developmental patterning as early responses indicated the
individual would simply get "more sick," with the concepts
of death not consistently appearing until approximately
seven years of age ("You'll die"). At approximately age
10 years, subjects began to consider the severity of the
sickness in their responses indicating that "it depends on
how sick they are. If they're real sick ... there's
probably the chance they're going to die ... but if it's
just the flu ... as long as you rest and work, you'll
probably be fine" (10-4).
Item SD 3 provided a most interesting developmental
trend for this task domain. Early responses to "What
happens when a person dies?" ranged from a simple "I don't
know" to indications that the person "falls asleep" (4-3)
or "that's how life ends, but when it's time for you to
wake up, you'd go back to your house, but you'd find a
different house" (4-6) . While some of the younger
subjects appeared to be familiar with the term, they
displayed a lack of awareness of the finality of death
until approximately seven years of age. At this point
also began a more frequent reference to life after death
including God and angels in heaven as well as mention of
the cessation of bodily functioning ("...they can't see
and breathe and hear" [7-0]; "all the skin disappears and
... [in] a couple of days ... everything is gone" [8-6]).
Curiously, not until approximately age 8-8 years was hell
92
mentioned in connection with heaven: "Their soul either
goes to heaven or down there" (8-8) and "They'll go to
heaven unless they cheat against God and cussed too much
and all that" (9-11). Further, only two subjects when
questioned regarding the permanency of death mentioned
reincarnation and both were older subjects (ages 11-11
and 12-11).
The Laws/Rules Task Domain and the Fairness Task
Domain yielded developmental trends most worthy of note.
Rules were initially defined (LR 1 - "What is a rule?") by
the children in this study in terms of examples of rules
specific to each child; these rules were phrased in
various forms of "don'ts" (e.g., "don't push people on the
slide" [4-2] or "don't hit" [4-10]). As rules began to
be defined in more general terms, they were first phrased
in terms of being "nice" or "to be friends;" soon;
however, these general definitions also were defined in
negative terms (e.g., "A rule means don't do something.
Something mean" [4-4]).
At approximately seven years of age, rules were first
defined as "something you have to follow." Throughout the
seventh and eighth years, rules tended to be defined in
general terms of something to be obeyed for protection,
similar to a law: "Something that someone made so you
won't get hurt or you won't have to stay after school or
anything. Something that someone made so you won't get
93
hurt" (7-3), and "It's like something that you have to
follow or you might get punished—like the law" (8-5) .
Not until approximately nine years of age were rules
defined as general guidelines, with many children
referring to rules as "boundaries," "limits," or
"directions." Additionally, at approximately 11-6,
laws/rules were further distinguished in societal terms:
"It's something that you have to follow to keep everything
in order" (11-8) , and "Rules are something someone makes
up to make something better or more organized" (12-0).
Reasons for obeying rules (LR 2 - "Why do we obey
rules?") began with the child's desire to be viewed as
being "good" or "nice" or deserving "treats." At about
age seven, a shift was noted as the child's intent became
more egocentric: "so you won't get in trouble" (7-5) and
"so you won't get punished" (8-6). At roughly 8-8,
responses began to be more generalized as children began
to cite reasons for obeying rules as "so nothing could go
wrong" (8-8) or so that "people won't get hurt" (8-8). At
approximately 9-6 a new note of absoluteness was detected
as a majority of responses indicated rules should be
obeyed "'cause we're supposed to" (10-6). Many children
of this age responded with concrete simplicity: "It just
says that you have to obey the rules" (9-4) . Others of
the same age responded in terms of obeying rules because
"we think they're right" (9-3) or in order to keep people
94
in general "safe and happy." A more societal reason for
obedience was noted by the 12-year-olds: "so we won't
cause chaos" (12-2) and "Because if we didn't, we wouldn't
push ourselves and strive to do things and the whole place
would be goofed up and in total chaos and in disorder"
(12-11).
Finally, consequences of not obeying rules (LR 3 -
"What happens if we break a rule?") were unanimously seen
as receiving some form of punishment. For the younger
children, this punishment was viewed as very specific—
i.e., spankings, getting grounded, being put in time out,
etc. By approximately 7-4, punishment for disobeying
rules became more general as children more frequently
stated that they would be "punished" for breaking a rule
or sent to jail to "pay the consequences" (10-5). One
child in the study stated that if a rule was not obeyed,
"you have to learn by it and not do it again--someone
would teach you how to do better at that" (12-3).
Information obtained from these trends supported the work
of Piaget (1932) cited previously in Chapter 2.
Baldwin's (1955) work regarding fairness was also
supported in that responses of these individuals to the
items regarding fairness in the Fairness Task Domain
indicated children relied on specific examples in order to
define this concept (F 1 - "What does it mean to be
fair?") much longer than in regard to that of laws/rules.
95
With one or two exceptions, general definitions of
fairness ("being equal to other people") did not
consistently appear until approximately 9-5. Prior to
that age, the children in this study repeatedly cited
specific examples of fairness in order to provide a
definition of the term: "Like if you have 12 pieces and
one person has five pieces and the other person has seven,
that wouldn't be fair. You'd have to have one person has
six and the other person has six" (8-8).
Sometime during the eleventh year, subjects in this
study began to consistently define fairness in terms of
"... being equal to other people" (11-5) and "to give ...
equal opportunities to all" (11-6). By the twelfth year,
subjects were able to define fairness as "look[ing] at
both sides and understand[ing] the other person's point
of view" (11-11) and "to be what you think is right and
just for others as well as yourself" (12-11).
Reasons for being fair (F 2 - "Why should we be
fair?") followed a similar pattern as did reasons for
obeying laws/rules as the children initially stated a
desire to "be good" (4-3) and to avoid trouble or fights.
Rewards to self were also cited as reasons for being
fair—e.g., "So you can make friends" (8-8), and "So that
other people will like you" (9-9). Unlike the issue of
laws/rules which detected some concern for others at
approximately age 8-8, in terms of fairness reasons such
96
as "so no one's left out and get their feelings hurt" did
not appear until roughly 11-4. Responses of 12-year-olds
reflected a more societal concern: "So that the world is a
better place to live in" (12-2).
Consequences of not being fair (F 3 - "What happens
if we are not fair?") were initially expressed in terms of
cost to self--e.g., punishment, loss of a friend, having
others "mad at you" (7-8); however, beginning in roughly
the eighth year, these concerns were mixed with statements
regarding the possibility of "hurting someone's feelings"
(9-4) . While children as early as 10-4 described not
being fair as "it doesn't seem like it should be--it's not
telling the truth" (10-4), it was not until the twelfth
year that indications of resulting discriminatory
treatment were noted: "If we're not fair, some people
would get off free and some people would get in
trouble..." (12-2).
The Care/Life Skill Domain (CL 4, CL 5, and CL 6) did
not yield a developmental trend, as subjects of all ages
responded to the various items in a similar fashion.
Responses to the items here indicated a consensus that the
husband should help his sick wife and primarily out of
love or commitment: He should "comfort her and give her
medication." [Why?] "Well, he's been with her a long time,
maybe he likes her a lot" (12-5). The lack of evidence
supporting a developmental trend may be credited in part
97
to the Yes/No nature of item CL 4 ("Why should a husband
help his sick wife?") and the scoring procedures which
allowed this item to be passed relatively easily.
Further, the items on this portion of the scale assessed
did not allow for clarification of the love relationship
between the husband and wife and how that relationship
might differ from other relationships; e.g., siblings.
The implementation of these issues and a more stringent
scoring procedure might better evaluate the developmental
processes for this skill domain.
Responses to items contained within the Justice/Law
Skill Domain provided greater evidence of developmental
shifting. Although responses to item JL 4 ("Are all laws
and rules fair?") remained constant across the age groups,
it is maintained that the Yes/No nature of the item as
well as it's scoring procedure, much like that of item CL
4, did not call for a great enough evaluation of the
subject's reasoning processes to yield a developmental
trend.
The remaining two items on this skill domain did,
however, produce responses capable of examination. Item
JL 5 ("What happens if we have a rule/law that's not
fair?") saw the subjects' responses shift from the
conclusion that laws and rules must be followed regardless
of their fair application ("You have to go ahead and mind
it even if it's not fair" [7-3]) to an awareness that
98
unfair laws should be changed or protested. However, at
this point, the individuals were unclear as to why or how
these unfair laws/rules should be protested: ("You could
talk to the Governor about it and change that law" [Why
would you want him to change it?] "Because it's not fair"
[7-9]). While subjects at this point were able to note
the need for change, they appeared unable to explain what
about the unfair law was not fair and why it should be
changed until approximately age 12. At this point the
subjects were able to recognize the possibility of
"do[ing] the other people in" (12-11) with unfair laws and
the need to change these laws through popular vote or
appeal to higher authority; here, laws were changed for
specific reasons and not simply because they were unfair.
Item JL 6 ("What happens if we disobey a law/rule
that's not fair? Should we follow that law/rule anyway?")
also produced evidence of a developmental trend as
subjects across the age groups responded that
disobedience to unfair laws produced the same punishment
as fair laws, and they should be followed in order to
avoid punishment or jail. While this attitude toward
obedience at all costs continued, at approximately eight
years of age subjects' responses indicated some confusion
in either reasons for continuing to obey unfair laws ("I
don't know about that one" [8-5]) or if they should be
obeyed at all:
99
I: What happens if we disobey a rule or a law that's not fair?
S: I don't actually know.
I: What do you think might happen?
S: Might get in trouble.
I: Even though it's not fair?
S: Even though it's not fair, because it's a law and once there's a law it can't be taken away unless the person who made the law up says.
I: So we should follow that law or that rule anyway?
S: Yes, because it's the law.
I: So we should follow it until they change it?
S: Well that messes the whole thing up.
I: How does it mess it up?
S: Because ... well, that doesn't really mess the whole thing up. That got us a lot off the subject. (8-2)
Responses at this point also revealed a somewhat naive
sense of how laws could be changed with many subjects
suggesting "I think you should just get in your car and go
up to the President and say, 'Hey, I don't think that's
fair'" (9-3). Mixed with this confusion was the attitude
of many subjects who appeared to revert back to the
position that laws, fair or unfair, had to be followed
"because that's just the way it is" (10-1) with no mention
of attempt at change.
Finally, during the eleventh year many subjects
voiced the desire to change unfair laws and not obey them
100
in that they might not "believe in their nature" (12-2).
Further, processes for changing these laws focused more on
gathering public support, as suggestions were mad to "make
the public mad" (11-4) or:
S: The people who made up that rule and thought it was fair even though it's not, they'd try to put us in jail and people'd break out because they wouldn't think they were supposed to be and sometimes people, everybody has a right to call their lawyer and people, instead of calling a lawyer, they'll call a friend and tell that friend to call a friend, and then people start coming by and arousing things and making a big ruckus and then they'll have to let them go to get rid of all these people because they're causing a ruckus.
I: Should you follow that law anyway? Even if it's not fair?
S: No. It would be kind of complicated if we don't think it's fair because our Constitution said that we have the right to say whatever we think and we have the right to, like liberty and the pursuit of happiness, which means that we have the right to say whatever we want to and not get punished for it. If they say well, you can't say that to me because I don't think that it's fair or I think this is fair so we have to go by this rule because the Constitution also says that one person can't make up a rule, it has to be voted on and passed. (11-6)
Correlation of Scale to Stage Score Based on Kohlberg's Heinz Dilemma
As the 18 items contained in the scale were derived
initially from Kohlberg's Heinz dilemma presented in
Appendix A, it was anticipated that the correlation
between the scale as a whole and the subjects' stage score
would be quite high. As not all scales were determined by
Guttman scale analysis to be valid, only the task domain
101
scales of Laws/Rules and Fairness were correlated with
subjects' stage score in an effort to examine the
relationship of these two portions of the complete scale
to the Heinz dilemma.
Correlation coefficients between the Laws/Rules Task
Domain scale and subjects' stage score proved to be
significant ( = 0.4001; £ = .011) while that between the
Fairness Task Domain scale and subjects' stage score did
not (r_ = 0.2689; £ = 0.093). The scale as a whole
strongly correlated with subjects' stage score (r =
0.4906; 2.= .001); however, the complete scale was not
found to be valid by Guttman scale analysis.
While correlations would have been preferable, it
has been the argument of this study, as well as the intent
of the scaling of the issues, to present morality in terms
of an integration of the task domains of Familial
Relationships, Sickness/Death, Laws/Rules, and Fairness
and ultimately the skill domains of Care/Life and
Justice/Law as presented here. The purpose of scaling
herein examined was in providing a means by which to
evidence a developmental progression in comprehension and
integration of the issues collectively until the point is
reached at which an individual is capable of providing a
coherent rationale for Kohlberg's Heinz dilemma. With
this in mind, while strong individual correlations of the
separate task domains are desirable, they do not allow for
102
the integration of issues across task domains which might
provide a better means of analysis. Further, despite the
lack of strong evidence of scalability found through
Guttman scale analysis, the 18 items contained on the
scale collectively correlate with the subjects' stage
score as assessed through use of the Heinz dilemma.
Perhaps this collective correlation provides a more
appropriate means of examining the integration process and
its relationship to the Heinz dilemma.
Conclusions
While Guttman analyses of the scale presented in this
study do not provide conclusive evidence of the scale's
complete scalability and reproducibility, ample evidence
has been presented that allows the investigator to
conclude that developmental patterns of the moral
reasoning process prior to Kohlberg's Stage 1 may be
differentiated. Prior to this study, the moral
development of individual's deemed unable to "solve" a
Kohlbergian dilemma has been viewed in terms of
fragmentations such as the investigation of the
individual's comprehension of rules by Piaget (1932),
Damon's (1984) findings regarding situations of fairness,
and Gilligan's (1982) notions regarding the ethic of care.
However, with the advent of adolescence and adulthood,
morality is assessed more by the utilization of dilemmas
such as Kohlberg's Heinz dilemma with his theoretical
103
framework being accepted as the standard view of moral
development.
While the components of morality examined by
researchers such as Piaget (1932), Damon (1984), and
Gilligan (1984) are integral for the comprehension and
ultimate rationalization of a Kohlbergian dilemma which
determines the individual's stage of moral development,
their developmental progression prior to the attainment of
this comprehension has heretofore not been integrated into
Kohlberg's theory. This has resulted, therefore, in the
categorization of all responses to a Kohlbergian dilemma
not seen as adequate for stage scoring higher than Stage 1
to be collectively scored as Stage 1. This study
presents, then, a theoretical conceptualization of the
development of these early processes of moral reasoning.
Recommendations for Future Research
Results from this piloting of the scale and the
developmental trends detected in examination of subject
interviews provides a means for making revisions to the
items on the scale presented in order to encourage future
research in this area.
Based on the results of this study, a new scale is
presented for investigation (see Figure 2). The same task
domain and skill domain divisions have been utilized in
the new scale described below. Unless otherwise
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105
indicated, the scoring procedures remain the same as in
the original scale.
Familial Relationships Task Domain
It was determined that the issues as presented in the
original scale appeared too similar across age groupings
and did not allow for a detectable progression. Based in
part on these findings and in reference to the findings of
Chambers and Tavuchis (1976) regarding comprehension of
familial relationships, the examiner would present queries
for the task domain of Familial Relationships as follows:
Substage 1: Which one is a father, mother, child, husband, wife, brother, sister, parent, son, and daughter?
Substage 2: What is a father, mother, child?
Substage 3: What is a husband, wife, brother,
sister?
Substage 4: What is parent, son, daughter?
The phrasing of these items from the "Which one is ..."
format to the present "What is ..." format serves to
provide a better means of examining the individual's
comprehension of the relationships involved as opposed to
simple identification of the roles. As identification of
the roles must precede an understanding of the
relationship, however, the item for Substage 1 remains in
the "Which one is ..." format. As in the original scale,
the subject will be asked to correctly identify the
106
desired figure. A "Pass" at each substage would require
correct identification of all figures.
Sickness/Death Task Domain
Problems in the original scale with regard to this
task domain appeared to be related to the phrasing (e.g.,
"what happens...") of some of the items as well as a lack
of differentiation between death leading to burial and the
cessation of life. Items in the newly proposed scale
would attempt to clarify these points as follows:
Substage 1: What does a sick person do to feel better?
Substage 2: If a sick person doesn't get any medicine, what are some things that might happen to that person?
Substage 3: What happens to a person when they
die?
Substage 4: What does it mean to be dead?
While some of these items contain the "what happens"
phrasing, these items appear to be more specifically
directed than did those in the original scale. Further,
in this revised scale, Substages 3 and 4 attempt to
differentiate between the responses similar to "You get
buried and go to heaven" ("Pass" for Substage 3) and those
which indicate death to be the end of life—required for a "Pass" at Substage 4.
107
Laws/Rules Task Domain
While the scale for this task domain in the original
scale was determined to be valid, adjustments have been
made here in order to present the items in the order
determined by the Guttman scale analysis as well as to
allow for a distinction between rules being defined in
regard to specific examples and in general terms.
Substage 1: What happens when we break a rule/law?
Substage 2: Can you tell me a law/rule?
Substage 3: Why do we obey laws/rules?
Substage 4: What is a law/rule?
A distinction is made between Substage 2 and 4 in that a
"Pass" at the earlier substage requires only that the
subject is able to provide an example of a law/rules while
at Substage 4, the subject is required to provide a
general definition of a laws/rules in order to "Pass."
Fairness Task Domain
The fairness portion of the original scale was also
found to be valid and changes here appear only in regard
to the subject's ability to rely on general terms in
providing a definition of fairness as compared to specific
examples, similar to the Laws/Rules Task Domain.
Substage 1: What does it mean to be fair?
Substage 2: Why should we be fair?
Substage 3: What can happen if we are not fair to people?
108
Substage 4: what does fairness mean?
Again, distinction is made between the specific and the
general at Substages 1 and 4. while an example of
fairness (halving an apple, etc.) would allow a "Pass" at
Substage 1, Substage 4 requires a general definition.
Care/Life Skill Domain
Data analysis in regard to this skill domain
reflected difficulty in interpreting information from
Yes/No type items (CL 4) as well as a lack of
differentiation between the husband-wife relationship in
terms of love and other types of love. Adjustments for
this skill domain reveal a new scale as follows:
Substage 5: What should a husband do if his wife is sick?
Substage 6: Why should the husband do these things?
Substage 7: Does a husband love his wife in the same manner a brother loves his sister? ["No" responses must be qualified.]
In order to maintain direct relationship to the issues
contained in the Heinz dilemma, responses receiving a
"Pass" at Substage 5 must include the husband getting
medicine for his wife, taking her to the doctor, etc. A
"Pass" at Substage 6 requires the subject to make
reference to the commitment between the husband and wife
or the love of the husband for the wife. The aim of
Substage 7 is an attempt to clarify the subject's use of
109
the term "love" and to detect an awareness by the subject
of the various degrees or types of love; therefore, all
"Yes" responses would be failed, while all "No" responses
would require further clarification in order to receive a
score of "Pass."
Justice/Law Skill Domain
As in the previous skill domain, difficulties
occurred in attempts to interpret information gathered
from Yes/No type items. The newly proposed scale is
devised to alleviate this problem as well as those
encountered with phrasing (e.g., "what happens").
Substage 5: Are all laws and rules fair? ["No" responses must be qualified with an example.]
Substage 6: What are the results of having laws/rules that are not fair?
Substage 7: What should we do if we have a
law/rule that is not fair?
While Substage 5 still presents a Yes/No issue, scoring
for this item is changed to "Fail" all "Yes" responses
while all "No" responses must be qualified as indicated.
Subjects providing examples that pertain to self-
interests only (e.g., "Don't hit") will be failed while
those reflecting a broader concern (e.g., "Single people
can't have children") will be passed.
110
Implications
It is anticipated that the utilization of this new
scale and similar data analyses as discussed in this study
will yield scale coefficients adequate to establish the
validity of the revised scale. Implementation of this
scaling technique in the study of moral reasoning skills
will allow the developmental pattern of morality to be
viewed more in terms of a developmental whole or
progression than in the fragmented perceptions of moral
reasoning currently implemented (e.g., Piaget [1932],
Damon [1984], Gilligan [1982]) prior to Kohlberg's theory
of moral reasoning.
The scaling procedure presented in this study
provides a means not only for examining the progression
and integration of these separate moral issues, but also
for differentiating these previously clustered stage
scores into a developmental progression of morality.
Thus, this study makes methodological contributions to the
field of moral reasoning in that a process such as the one
followed in this study might enable researchers and
educators to examine the individual's pattern of moral
reasoning by examining the individual's responses to the
more simplistic questions proposed—thus providing
indicators of the individual's state of moral development
prior to his/her ability to conceptualize a Kohlbergian
dilemma. Responses evoked would indicate the
Ill
individual's growth of comprehension in the separate task
domains of Familial Relationships, Sickness/Death,
Laws/Rules, and Fairness as well as the point at which
these task domains are then integrated into the skill
domains of Care/Life and Justice/Law. Such understandings
are critical for the educator's, researcher's, or parent's
effective interactions with individuals whose moral
developmental capacity has heretofore been collectively
categorized in Kohlberg's Stage 1.
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Hoffman, M, (1980) . Moral development in adolescence. In J. Adleson (Ed.), Handbook of adolescent psychology (pp. 295-343). New York: John Wiley & Sons.
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Kohlberg, L. (1981) . Essays on moral development: Vol. I: The philosophy of moral development. San Francisco: Harper & Row, Publishers.
Kohlberg, L. (1984). Essays on moral development: Vol. II. The psychology of moral development. San Francisco: Harper & Row, Publishers.
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Koocher, G. P. (1973). Childhood, death, and cognitive development. Developmental Psychology, 9_ (3) , 369-37 5.
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Lyons, N. P. (1983) . Two perspectives: On self, relationships, and morality. Harvard Educational Review, 53 (2), 125-145.
Mclver, J. P., & Carmines, E. G. (1981). Unidimensional scaling. Quantitative applications in the social sciences series. No. 24. London: Sage Publications.
Nagy, M. (1948). The child's theories concerning death. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 73, 3-27.
Nie, N. H., Hull, C. H., Jenkins, J. G., Steinbrenner, K., & Bent, D. H. (Eds.). (1975). SPSS: Statistical package for the social sciences (2nd edition). New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.
Perry, W. G. , Jr. (1970). Forips of intellectual and ethical development in the .college years: A scheme. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
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Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. (1969). The psychology of the child. New York: Basic Books, Inc.
Puka, B. (1987). Gilligan's web and the. care/Kojilberg debate (in five different voices). Unpublished manuscript.
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Rich, J. M., & DeVitis, J. L. (1985). Theories of moral development. Springfield, 111.: Charles C. Thomas.
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Snarey, J. R. (1985). Cross-cultural universality of social moral development: A critical review of Kohlbergian research. Psychological Bulletin, 97 (2), 202-232.
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Walker, L. J. (1982). The sequentiality of Kohlberg's stages of moral development. Child Development, 53, 1330-1336.
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APPENDIX A
KOHLBERG'S HEINZ DILEMMA
116
117
FORM A: Dilemma III:
In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $400 for the radium and charged $4,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money and tried every legal means, but he could only get together about $2,000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So having tried every legal means, Heinz gets desperate and considers breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.
QUESTIONS:
1. Should Heinz steal the drug? la. Why or why not?
t
[Questions 2 and 3 are designed to elicit the subject's moral substage and should be considered optional.]
* 2. Is it actually right or wrong for him to steal the drug?
* 2a. Why is it right or wrong?
* 3. Does Heinz have a duty or obligation to steal the drug?
* 3a. Why or why not?
[If subject originally favors stealing, ask:]
4. If Heinz doesn't love his wife, should he steal the drug for her?
OR
[If subject originally favors not stealing, ask:]
4. Does it make a difference whether or not he loves his wife?
4a. Why or why not?
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5. Suppose the person dying is not his wife but a stranger. Should Heinz steal the drug for the stranger?
5a. Why or why not?
[If subject favors stealing the drug for a stranger, ask:]
•
*
6. Suppose it's a pet animal he loves. Should Heinz steal to save the pet animal?
6a. Why or why not?
7. Is it important for people to do everything they can to save another's life?
7a. Why or why not?
* 8. It is against the law for Heinz to steal. Does that make it morally wrong?
* 8a. Why or why not?
9. In general, should people try to do everything they can to obey the law?
9a. Why or why not? 9b. How does this apply to what Heinz should do?
[The following question is designed to elicit the subject's orientation and should be considered optional.]
*10. In thinking back over the dilemma, what would you say is the most responsible thing for Heinz to do?
*10a. Why?
APPENDIX B
SCORING MANUAL
119
120
SCORING MANUAL FOR SCALE
On the accompanying score sheet, indicate a "Pass" or a tail tor each task domain within each substage by "pf?i"''^ either the "Pass" option (i.e.. Pass ( + 1)) or the Fail option (I.e., Fail (+0)).
Below, for each task domain query the question from the investigator appears in bold print followed by a brief explanation of "Pass" and "Fail" responses. Examples of each type of response also accompanies the queries.
For additional analyses, each time an egocentric responses IS given (whether it is considered "Pass" or "Fail") please mark it by placing an "E" to the right of the pass/fail options.
Substage 1:
FR: The subject is asked to identify the wooden figure(s) representing a father, a mother, and a baby.
Which one (i.e., which figure) is a father?
Correct response is A.
Which one is a mother?
Correct response is B.
Which one is a baby?
Correct response is E.
Acceptable answers to all three: "Pass" score (+1)
Unacceptable answers: "Fail" score (+0)
Incorrect identification of one or more figure(s).
SD: The subject is asked to recall a time when he/she was ill and is then asked: What happens when a person is sick? There may be one or two follow-up questions: What does one (do you) do to feel better? or Do you ever take anything?.
Required for a "Pass" here is some reference to some type of medication (either over-the-counter or
121
prescribed), reference to going to a doctor will also be considered a "Pass."
If only "home remedies" are referred to (e.g., 7-Up, staying in bed, etc.), the subject needs to be failed.
Acceptable answers: "Pass" score (+1)
You get a shot. You take pills. You take medicine. You go to the doctor.
Unacceptable answers: "Fail" score (+0)
My Mom gives me 7-Up to drink. You stay home from school. You throw up sometimes.
LR: The subject is asked: What is a rule?
A "Pass" response should provide some general, abstract definition of a rule. Responses by the individual which provide an example of a rule, should be scored as a "Fail."
Acceptable answers: "Pass" score (+1)
Something that you have to follow. Something you have to do.
Unacceptable answers: "Fail" score (+0)
I have to do my piano. No running in the house. Always do what Mommy and Daddy say.
F: The subject is asked: What does it mean to be fair?
A "Pass" response should be one in which it appears evident that the individual possesses a general understanding of fairness in terms of individuals being dealt with in an equal manner. Responses which are specific examples of fairness (e.g., in games, with candy, etc.) should be scored as "Fail."
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Acceptable answers: "Pass" score (+1)
To be nice. To share. To treat someone like you want them to treat you.
Unacceptable answers: "Fail" score (+0)
Don't snatch. Not to cheat on papers. Not to peek at someone else's test.
Substage 2:
FR: The subject is asked to identify the wooden figure(s) representing a father, a mother, a brother, and a sister.
Which one (i.e., which figure) is a father?
Correct response is A.
Which one is a mother?
Correct response is B.
Which one is a brother?
Correct response is D or E.
miich one is a sister?
Correct response is C or E.
Acceptable answers to all four: "Pass" score (+1)
Unacceptable answers: "Fail" score (+0)
Incorrect identification of one or more figure(s).
SD: The subject is asked: What might happen to an sick person who doesn't get any medicine?
Required for a "Pass" here is some reference to the possibility of the sick person dying. The child need not display a comprehension of death, only that death is possibly if a sick person never gets any medicine. There may be some follow-up questions to this; if they eventually get to death, they should be passed.
123
"Fail" responses should be those in which death is never mentioned as a possibility.
Acceptable answers: "Pass" score (+1)
You might die. You would get sicker and die.
Unacceptable answers: "Fail" score (+0)
You get worse. You get sicker. You keep on being sick. You go to the hospital and get an IV.
LR: The subject is asked: Why should (do) we obey rules?
A "Pass" score should be given here for any response that reflects the subject's awareness that rules are obeyed in order to keep behavior within the realm of acceptability. A response indicating rules are to be obeyed simply because a specific individual has said they are to be obeyed as well as responses which imply that rules are to be obeyed simply so that one does not "get in trouble" should be scored as a "Fail."
Acceptable answers: "Pass" score (+1)
To make the world better.
Because you could hurt someone and make them sad.
Unacceptable answers: "Fail" score (+0)
Because once I threw a glass bottle in the street and I got in trouble.
Because Mama said to. So you don't get disciplined.
F: The subject is asked: Why should we be fair?
"Pass" responses should be those in which the individual possesses somewhat of a Golden Rule orientation of treating all individuals alike (i.e., an orientation of altruism). A "Fail" response is one in which the individual reflects a more egocentric concern with receiving fair treatment from others.
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Acceptable answers: "Pass" score (+1)
Because it's nicer. So that everyone is treated alike.
Unacceptable answers: "Fail" score (+0)
So we can have more friends. Because Mama says to.
Substage 3:
FR: The subject is asked to identify the wooden figure(s) representing a husband, a wife, and a child.
Which one is a husband?
Correct response is A.
Which one is a wife?
Correct response is B.
Which one is a child?
Correct response is any of C, D, or E.
Acceptable answers to all three: "Pass" score (+1)
Unacceptable.answers: "Fail" score (+0)
Incorrect identification of one or more figure(s).
SD: The subject is asked: What happens when a person dies? Several follow-up questions might appear here, e.g.. What happens to the person who dies? What does the person do? How do you tell a person who is dead from a person who is not dead?
Required for a "Pass" is some indication that the individual comprehends the finality of death. At minimum the individual should exhibit some awareness that life is over, the person doesn't do anything (in terms of bodily functions), his/her body deteriorates, he/she does not "come back."
Responses such as "You get buried and go to Heaven" may be considered a "Pass" if some recognition is shown that the individual's physical life and existence is over. Responses which indicate the
125
child's thinks the individual simply "moves" to God's house where s/he can watch us from "up there" should be considered a "Fail" response.
Acceptable answers: "Pass" score (+1)
You aren't alive anymore. You stop breathing. You never come back.
Unacceptable answers: "Fail" score (+0)
You can't play and you can't go to school. You close your eyes.
LR: The subject is asked: What happens if we break a rule?
A "Pass" score will indicate the subject's recognition that some form of punishment is applied to those who do not obey rules.
Acceptable answers: "Pass" score (+1)
We get grounded. You get disciplined. You get a spanking.
Unacceptable answers: "Fail" score (+0)
Nothing. I don't know. We don't have to go take piano.
F: The subject is asked: What happens if we are unfair or are not fair?
A "Pass" response requires evidence of the awareness of the possible harm to others as a result of unfair treatment. A response indicating an egocentric concern with reaction to self as a consequence of unfair treatment to others should be scored as a "Fail."
Acceptable answers: "Pass" score (+1)
We might hurt somebody. We might make somebody feel bad.
126
Unacceptable answers: "Fail" score (+0)
People won't like us. You won't get friends.
Substage 4:
CL: The subject is asked: Should a husband help a sick wife get medicine to keep her from dying?
Responses which should be scored as "Pass" should be anything in the affirmative. Any responses which implies the husband should leave her alone and let her help herself should be considered as a "Fail."
Acceptable answers: "Pass" score (+1)
Yes. Sure. Of course.
Unacceptable answers: "Fail" score (+0)
No. She should help herself.
JL: The subject is asked: Are all laws/rules fair?
In order to receive a score of "Pass," the individual must make some recognition that not all laws/rules are fair to all people. References indicating they "should" be imply they might not be and should be scored as "Pass" as well. Responses indicating that all laws/rules are fair to all people at all times should be scored as "Fail."
Acceptable answers: "Pass" score (+1)
No. They should be. They are supposed to be. Some of them are and some of them aren't.
Unacceptable answers: "Fail" score (+0)
Yes, they give you equal rights. No, because in other countries you can marry your cousin, but in this country you can't marry your cousin. It wouldn't be fair to kill someone.
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Substage 5:
CL: The subject is asked: Why should the husband help hxs sick wife?
In order to receive a "Pass" score, the subject must comment m some way that displays recognition of the affection and commitment a husband and wife share. If the individual responds that he should help her so that she won't die, a follow-up question Why would be not want her to die? should appear. Responses not indicating affection/commitment should be scored as a "Fail."
Acceptable answers: "Pass" answers (+1)
Because in the wedding they said to have and to hold through sickness and health (vows).
Because he loves her. Because she loves him.
Unacceptable answers: "Fail" score (+0)
Because she might die. So that she can feel better. So that she can take care of the kids.
JL: The subject is asked: ffhat happens if we have a rule/law that's not fair?
A score of "Pass" should be given where there is the recognition that unfair laws/rules result in one individual or a body of individuals being treated discriminatorily or in a manner which not all individuals would appreciate being dealt.
Responses implying that people should "go on strike" or "go to Court" or "protest" should be accompanied by a follow-up question: Ifhy would they protest? Responses which continue on to explain people protesting, etc., for reasons of discrimination, etc., should be scored as "Pass." Responses stating individuals might protest due to personal value differences with the law/rule considered unfair should also receive a score of "Pass." Responses which indicate the individual is unsure of why protests should be made, should receive a score of "Fail." Responses such as the latter, should be further marked with an asterisk ,*** for future reference.
128
Acceptable answers: "Pass" score (+1)
People can't do the same things. People would not be treated equally. They might protest it. (Why?) Because they might not believe that that law was right.
Unacceptable answers: "Fail" score (+0)
You get mad. Everybody might go on strike. (Why?) Because they want to.
It comes on the news.
Substage 6:
CL: The subject is asked: Ifhat all should the husband do to help his sick wife?
In order to comply with the Heinz dilemma, a "Pass" response must make reference to the husband assisting the wife in receiving medical attention. Responses in which no indication is made referring to doctors, medicine, hospitals, etc., should be scored as a "Fail."
Accompanying questions may appear here probing various possibilities such as exhausting all of one's financial resources and/or assuming a large financial debt. For the purposes of scoring, these responses may be ignored at this point.
Acceptable answers: "Pass" answers (+1)
He should take her to the doctor. He should get her medicine for her.
Unacceptable answers: "Fail" score (+0)
He doesn't have to do anything for her. He should help her clean the house. He should stay home with her and wait on her.
JL: The subject is asked: What happens if we disobey a law/rule that's not fair? This question is followed by: Should we follow this rule anyway? and Why?
It is the response to the second question which should be considered for scoring purposes as punishment for disobedience was addressed at LR/
129
Substage 3. A "Pass" score here is constituted by a response that incorporates the concepts of obeying laws/rules to the extent that the benefit or desires of the majority is met. Here, it is necessary that the subject show evidence that as much as possible must be done in all situations in order to achieve fairness for everyone or to change an unfair law at risk to self. "Fail" responses should be those in which the individual indicates that the unfair law should be upheld in order to prevent punishment to self.
Responses indicating the individual or someone should "leave that place" or "go where they don't have that rule" should be scored as "Fail" if there is no indication that the individual should attempt to change the law/rule prior to leaving. Responses which indicate the individual should leave simply because they don't like the rule should also be scored as a "Fail." Responses which indicate the individual should leave at the risk of loss or cost to the self may be scored as a "Pass."
Acceptable answers: "Pass" score (+1)
We still get punished. We shouldn't follow the rules if we don't believe it even if we do get put in jail.
You'll still get punished. Not if its not fair; we should try to change it instead.
Unacceptable answers: "Fail" score (+0)
You's still go to jail. Yes. So we don't go to jail.
We still get punished and put in jail. I would go to where they didn't have that rule.
We get put in jail. I would rather obey them because I wouldn't know the laws very good.
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At the end of the score sheet, the ladder-like collection of blanks serves as a quick review of the data. Please put a "+" in each blank where a "Pass" was scored, and put a "-" in each blank where a "Fail" was scored. The following serves as a guide for these blanks:
Substage 6:
Substage 5:
Substage 4:
Substage 3:
Substage 2:
Substage 1:
CL JL
FR SD LR
APPENDIX C
TABLES
131
132
TABLE 1
Differences Between Age Groups as Determined by Demographic Variables
ONEWAY ANOVA CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS
SES
RACE
RELAFF
DADOCCU
MOMOCCU
INTACTFAM
DADED
MOMED
F(3,76)=0.4343
F(3,76)=0.6060
F(3,76)=0.1807
F(3,76)=0.6958
F(3,76)=0.3105
F(3,76)=0.6119
F(3,76)=0.2759
F(3,76)=0.3768
Raw X2 = 4.53077
Raw X2 = 8.77778
Raw X2 = 19.33569
Raw x2 = 4.30857
Raw X2 = 3.91052
Raw X2 = 1.87500
Raw X2 = 16.86066
Raw X2 = 18.97516
For all variables, level of significance £_ > .05
133
TABLE 2
Guttman Scale Analysis: Familial Relationships Task Domain Substages 1, 2, and 3
FR 1 Pass Fail
80 0
FR 2 Pass Fail
80 0
FR 3 Pass Fail
73 7
Coefficient of Reproducibility 1.0000 Minimum Marginal Reproducibility 0.9708 Percent Improvement 0.0292 Coefficient of Scalability 1.0000
Correlation Coefficients:
FR 1 FR 2 FR 3 Scale-Item
FR 1 1.0000
* *
FR 2 • •
1.0000
* •
FR 3 * •
* *
1.0000 1.0000b
Chi-Square = 0.186 Degrees of Freedom = 3 Scale Reliability = 0.9854
b £ < .001 **Analysis reveals constants
134
TABLE 3
Guttman Scale Analysis: Sickness/Death Task Domain Substages 1, 2, and 3
SD 1 SD 2 SD 3 Pass Fail Pass Fail Pass Fail
76 4 63 17 62 18
Coefficient of Reproducibility 0.9167 Minimum Marginal Reproducibility 0.837 5 Percent Improvement 0.0792 Coefficient of Scalability 0.4872
Correlation Coefficients:
SD 1 SD 2 SD 3 SD 1 1.0000 0.1612 0.2884a SD 2 1.0000 0.3787t> SD 3 1.0000 Scale-Item 0.522lt> 0.7777^ 0.8203^*
Chi-Square = 5.554 Degrees of Freedom = 3 Scale Reliability = 0.7244
a £ < .01 b 2. < .001
135
TABLE 4
Guttman Scale Analysis: Laws/Rules Task Domain Substages 1, 2, and 3
LR 3 LR 1 LR 2 Pass Fail Pass Fail Pass Fail
65 15 53 27 29 51
Coefficient of Reproducibility 0.9750 Minimum Marginal Reproducibility 0.7042 Percent Improvement 0.2708 Coefficient of Scalability 0.9155
Correlation Coefficients:
LR 1 LR 2 LR 3 LR 1 1.0000 0.4282t> 0.6053^ LR 2 1.0000 0.3622^ LR 3 1.0000 Scale-Item 0.8491 3 0.7653*^ 0.7895 ^
Chi-Square = 2.2 36 Degrees of Freedom = 3 Scale Reliability = 0.9415
a £ < .01 b £ < .001
136
TABLE 5
Guttman Scale Analysis: Fairness Task Domain Substages 1, 2, and 3
F 1 F 2 F 3 Pass Fail Pass Fail Pass Fail
32 48 25 55 8 72
Coefficient of Reproducibility 0.9250 Minimum Marginal Reproducibility 0.7292 Percent Improvement 0.1958 Coefficient of Scalability 0.7231
Correlation Coefficients:
F 1 F 2 F 3 F 1 1.0000 0.3858b 0.1531 F 2 1.0000 0.4045b F 3 1.0000 Scale-Item 0.7627b 0.8260b 0.6005b
Chi-Square = 11.216^ Degrees of Freedom = 3 Scale Reliability = 0.7782
a £ < .01 b £ < .001 c £ < .05
137
TABLE 6
Guttman Scale Analysis: Care/Life Skill Domain with Familial Relationships Substages 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6
FR 1 FR 2 CL 4 FR 3 CL 6 CL 5 P F P F P F P F P F P F
80 0 80 0 75 5 73 7 60 20 53 27
Coefficient of Reproducibility 0.9458 Minimum Marginal Reproducibility 0.8771 Percent Improvement 0.0688 Coefficient of Scalability 0.5593
Correlation Coefficients:
FR 1 FR 2 FR 3 CL 4 CL 5 CL FR FR FR CL CL CL Sea
1 2 3 4 5 6
le-Item
1.0000 * • ** * • * • • •
1.0000 ** ** •* **
1.0000 0.1028 0.3403a 0.2299 1.0000 0.3618^^ 0.3280^
1.0000 0.4426^ 1.0000
** ** 0.5559^ 0.5718t> 0.8305^ 0.7700t>
Chi-Square = 41.438 Degrees of Freedom = 56 Scale Reliability = 0.9125
a £ < .01 b £ < .001 **Analysis reveals constants.
138
TABLE 7
Guttman Scale Analysis: Care/Life Skill Domain with Sickness/Death Substages 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6
SD 1 CL 4 SD 2 SD 3 CL 6 CL 5 P F P F P F P F P F P F
76 4 75 5 63 17 62 18 60 20 53 27
Coefficient of Reproducibility 0.8875 Minimum Marginal Reproducibility 0.8104 Percent Improvement 0.0771 Coefficient of Scalability 0.4066
Correlation Coefficients:
SD 1 SD 2 SD 3 CL 4 CL 5 CL 6 0.2884^-0.0592 0.0788 0.2649 0.3787t> 0.2446 0.3401^ 0.3352^ 1.0000 0.4792^ 0.5017t> 0.3111^
1.0000 0.3618^ 0.3280^ 1.0000 0.4426^
1.0000 Scale-Item 0.3680^ 0.6570^ 0.7628b 0.5720^ 0.7591^ 0.7106^
SD SD SD CL CL CL
1 2 3 4 5 6
1.0000 0.1612 1.0000
Chi-Square = 84.978a Degrees of Freedom = 56 Scale Reliability = 0.8916
a £ < .01 t> £ < .001
139
TABLE 8
Guttman Scale Analysis: Justice/Law Skill Domain with Laws/Rules Substages 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6
LR 3 LR 1 J L 4 LR 2 J L 5 J L 6 P F P F P F P F P F P F
65 15 53 27 43 37 29 51 28 52 5 75
Coefficient of Reproducibility 0.8917 Minimum Marginal Reproducibility 0.7062 Percent Improvement 0.1854 Coefficient of Scalability 0.6312
Correlation Coefficients:
LR 1 LR 2 LR 3 JL 4 JL 5 JL 6 1.0000 0.4282b 0.6053^ 0.3983t> 0.4129^ 0.1843
1.0000 0.3622b 0.3344a 0.4280^ 0.2350 1.0000 0.3894b 0.2854a 0.1240
1.0000 0.5230b 0.2395 1.0000 0.3519b
1.0000 Scale-Item 0.7584^ 0.7009^ 0.6778^ 0.7316t> 0.7473^ 0.4353^
LR LR LR J L J L J L
1 2 3 4 5 6
Chi-Square = 62.026 Degrees of Freedom = 56 Scale Reliability = 0.8837
a £ < .01 b £ < .001
140
TABLE 9
Guttman Scale Analysis: Justice/Law Skill Domain with Fairness Substages 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6
J L 4 F l J L 5 F 2 F 3 J L 6 P F P F P F P F P F P F
43 37 32 48 28 52 25 55 8 72 5 75
Coefficient of Reproducibility 0.8583 Minimum Marginal Reproducibility 0.7188 Percent Improvement 0.1396 Coefficient of Scalability 0.4963
Correlation Coefficients:
F I F 2 F 3 J L 4 J L 5 J L 6 F 1 1 .0000 0 . 3 8 5 3 b 0 . 1 5 3 1 0 . 5 0 1 5 ^ 0 . 3 6 3 8 ^ 0 . 2 1 0 8 F 2 1 .0000 0 . 4 0 4 5 b 0 . 2 4 6 8 0 . 2 4 0 3 0 . 2 7 1 6 F 3 1 .0000 - 0 . 0 2 5 1 - 0 . 0 6 9 9 - 0 . 0 8 6 1 JL 4 1 .0000 0 . 5 2 3 0 b 0 . 2 3 9 5 JL 5 1 .0000 0 . 3 5 1 9 b JL 6 1.0000 S c a l e - I t e m 0 . 7 5 1 l b 0 . 6 8 0 3 b 0 . 3 1 3 2 ^ 0 . 7 3 1 9 b 0 . 6 8 9 5 b 0 . 4 6 2 8 b
Chi-Square = 80.553^ Degrees of Freedom = 56 Scale Reliability = 0.8309
a £ < .01 b £ < .001 c £ < .05
141
TABLE 10
Progression of Correct Responses to Items __^ _ by Chronological Age
Item
FR 1
FR 2
FR 3
SD 1
SD 2**
SD 3
LR 1
LR 2
LR 3
F 1
F 2
F 3**
CL 4
CL 5
CL 6
JL 4
JL 5
JL 6
4-yrs
20
20
13
17
8
4
1
1
5
2
3
7- 8 yrs 9-10 yrs 11-12 yrs ONEWAY ANOVA
15
4
9
4
1
0
20
20
20
19
19
18
14
7
20
7
20
15
15
6
2
0
20
20
20
20
18
20
19
9
20
7
20
16
18
14
10
20
20
20
20
18
20
19
12
20
16
10
20
18
18
19
15
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3,76
76
76
76
76
76
76
76
76
76
76
76
76
76
76
76
76
76
_ • • *
- * * *
=10.231b
= 2.171
=10.939b
=45.347b
=38.943b
= 5.3783
=57.000b
= 9.163b
= 1.966
= 0.357
= 6.333b
=12.587b
= 5.561a
=14.811b
=14.759b
= 1.966
**Item does not reveal consistent progression, a £ < .01 b p < .001 ***Analysis reveals constants.
142
TABLE 11
Item
Progression of Correct Responses to Items by Mental Age
4-yrs 7- 8 yrs 9-10 yrs 11-12 yrs ^=8 n= 8 n=19 n=18 ONEWAY ANOVA
FR 1
FR 2
FR 3
SD 1
SD 2**
SD 3**
LR 1
LR 2
LR 3
F 1**
F 2**
F 3**
CL 4
CL 5**
CL 6**
JL 4**
JL 5
JL 6
100 %
100 %
50.0%
87.5%
12.5%
12.5%
0 %
12.5%
25.0%
0 %
0 %
0 %
75.0%
0 %
25.0%
0 %
0 %
100 %
100 %
100 %
87.5%
87.5%
75.0%
62.5%
25.0%
100 %
12.5%
25.0%
0 %
100 %
50.0%
25.0% 75.0%
12.5%
0 %
0 %
100 %
100 %
100 %
94.7%
100 %
100 %
78.9%
36.8%
100 %
47.4%
36.8%
15.8%
100 %
89.5%
73.7%
52.6%
26.3%
5.3%
100 %
100 %
100 %
100 %
83.3%
94.4%
88.9%
50.0%
100 %
33.3%
22.2%
11.1%
100 %
83.3%
94.4%
72.2%
55.5%
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
F(3
65)
65)
65)
65)
65)
65)
65)
65)
65)
65)
65)
=19.155b
= 1.383
=16.340b
=33.709b
=18.474b
= 2.331
=57.464b
= 4.865a
= 1.608
65)= 0.838
65)= 6.385b
65)=15.37lb
65)= 8.024b
65)= 8.24lb
65)= 9.436b
5.5% F(3,65)= 0.779
**Item does not reveal consistent progression, a £ < .01 b p < .001 ***Analysis reveals constants.
143
TABLE 12
Predicted Guttman Scale: Care/Life Skill Domain with Justice/Law Skill Domain
Scale
FR
FR
SD
CL
FR
LR
SD
SD
1
2
1
4
3
3
2
3
Item Pass Fail
80 0
80 0
76 4
75 5
73 7
65 15
63 17
62 18
CL 6 60 20
CL 5 53 27
LR 1 53 27
JL 4 43 37
F 1 32 48
LR 2 29 51
JL 5 28 52
F 2 25 55
F 3 8 72
JL 6 5 7 5
APPENDIX D
LETTER OF EXPLANATION AND CONSENT FORM
144
145
LETTER OF EXPLANATION
Dear Parent:
I am seeking your assistance and that of your child in a project I am working on at Texas Tech University. I have received the permission of , Director of , to ask for your consent to talk with your child during his/her daily program.
I am attempting to find out more about the child's understanding of fairness, caring, sickness, and death. The discussion with your child will take approximately 30 to 45 minutes in order to determine:
1) an approximate mental age of your child.
2) responses to a questionnaire similar to the one attached that would provide information about your child (for example: sex, age, grade, etc.).
3) responses to a questionnaire I have developed that addresses the issues of rules, fairness, caring, etc.
4) responses to questions regarding a story involving a dying woman whose husband must chose between obeying the law or stealing medicine to save her life.
has approved my use of all of the questionnaires subject to your consent. My project has also been approved by the Human Subjects Committee at TTU as well as my faculty advisor. Dr. Connie Steele (806-742-2895). If you would like to discuss this further, please feel free to contact me at my home (806-797-2462) or at TTU (806-742-3000). If you prefer that I interview your child at a time other than during school, I can make those arrangements. Further, if you are interested, I would be happy to provide you with your child's results upon your request at the end of my project.
I am hoping that you will complete the enclosed Parent Demographic Questionnaire as well as the Consent Form attached. Please note that the only place where your child's name will appear is on the Consent Form. From that point on, each child will be assigned a subject number. Please return the completed forms to the instructor (s) of your child's program, and I will pick them up from there.
146
I appreciate your time in considering my project and thank you for your assistance. If you have any questions, please call me.
Sincerely,
Rebecca J. Glover
147
CONSENT FORM
I hereby give my consent for the participation of my child, , in the project entitled! Kohlberg Restructured: A New Means of Examining Moral Reasoning. I understand that the person responsible for this project is faculty member, Connie Steele, Associate Professor, Department of Human Development and Family Studies, College of Home Economics, telephone number (806) 742-3000, and graduate student, Rebecca J. Glover, candidate for a Ph.D. in Home Economics with emphasis in Human Development, telephone number (806) 797-2462. Rebecca J. Glover has explained that this study is part of a project that has the following objectives:
1) examination of the human being's development of moral reasoning skills across the lifespan;
2) comparison of the individual's moral reasoning skills with his/her cognitive reasoning skills.
She has (1) explained that no procedures will be followed that are experimental; (2) described the minimal risk; and (3) described the benefits to be expected. (No alternative procedures are anticipated.) The risks have been explained to me as follows:
The only risk involved is the loss of privacy/ anonymity with acquaintance with the project director, Rebecca J. Glover. Test results will be available only to the project director; however, no test taken by any individual will be marked as to that individual's identity.
Rebecca J. Glover has agreed to answer any inquiries I may have concerning the procedures and has informed me that I may contact the Texas Tech University Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects by writing to them in care of the Office of Research Services, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas, 79409, or by calling (806) 742-3884.
If this research project causes any physical injury to participants in this project, treatment is not necessarily available at Texas Tech University or the Student Health Center, nor is there necessarily any insurance carried by the University or its personnel applicable to cover any such injury. Financial compensation for any such injury must be provided through the participant's own insurance program. Further information about these matters may be obtained from the
148
Vice President for Research and Graduate Studies, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas, 79409.
I understand that my child may not derive any therapeutic treatment from participation in this study. I understand that my child may discontinue this study at any time I choose without penalty.
Signature of Parent of Participant Date
Signature of Project Director Date
Signature of Major Advisor Date
APPENDIX E
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRES
149
150
CHILD DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE
Please read each item below and indicate the response which best describes you by circling or checking each one. There are no right or wrong answers to any of the following. If you feel the need to explain some of your answers or to add information that is important, please do so by writing on the questionnaire. If you are not certain of any item or its responses, please ask for assistance. Thank you for your help in this project. Please be sure to answer every item.
1. Gender 1 2
Male Female
2. Age Birthdate
3. Racial/Ethnic Group:
years
1 Caucasian 2 Black 3 Hispanic/Mexican American 4 Other
ifeligious Affiliation: 1 Protestant 2 Catholic 3 Jewish 4 Other
5. Do your parents attend the same church as you? 1 yes 2 no
If not, what religious affiliation is your father? 1 Protestant 2 Catholic 3 Jewish 4 Other
What religious affiliation is your mother? 1 Protestant 2 Catholic 3 Jewish 4 Other
6. Education: Please circle the year below:
K 8 10 11 12
151
Who currently lives with you? (you may need to circle more than one option) 0 My parents: (check one or more of the following)
1 Mother ^ 2 Father 3 Step-Mother 4 Step-Father
5 Brothers: How many? 6 Sisters: How many? [[|]]^ 7 Step-Brothers: How many: 8 Step-Sisters: How many? 9 Grandparents: (check one or more of the following)
Maternal Grandmother Maternal Grandfather Paternal Grandmother _^^__ Paternal Grandfather
10 Other Relatives: please list them below
11 Others: specify who
8. Do both of your parents work? 1 yes 2 no
If both parents work, where do you stay during the day when both parents are not at home and you are not in school?
9. Have you or a member of your family ever been (or are now) ill for a long period of time? 1 yes 2 no
If yes, please indicate below the nature and treatment of this illness and the family member affected.
152
10. Has someone whom you have known died in the past few years? 1 yes 2 no
If yes, please indicate below your relationship with this person and the year and cause of death.
11. Do you "know" or have you been told of anyone known to your family who is now dead? 1 yes 2 no
If yes, please indicate below your relationship with this person and what you know about this person's death.
12. Are you a member of any school or church clubs? 1 yes 2 no
If yes, do you now (or have you in the past) hold a leadership position? 1 yes 2 no
Below please indicate the name and activities of your club(s).
13. Have you ever been grounded at home for doing something wrong? 1 yes 2 no
14. Have you ever been punished at school by being sent to the principal's office or by serving detention? 1 yes 2 no
15. Have you ever had anything stolen from you? 1 yes 2 no
16. Have you ever been the victim of a bully at school? 1 yes 2 no
153
PARENT DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE
Please read each item below and indicate the response which best describes your child or your family by circling or checking each one. There are no right or wrong answers to any of the following. If you feel the need to explain some of your answers or to add information that is important, please do so by writing on the questionnaire. If you are not certain of any item or its responses, please ask for assistance. Thank you for your help in this project. Please be sure to answer every item.
1.
2.
Child's Gender
Child's Age Birthdate
1 2
Male Female
years
3. Child's Racial/Ethnic 1 Caucasian Group: 2 Black
3 Hispanic/Mexican American 4 Other
4. Child's Religious 1 Protestant Affiliation: 2 Catholic
3 Jewish 4 Other
5. Does the child's parents attend the same church? 1 yes 2 no
If not, what religious affiliation is the father? 1 Protestant 2 Catholic 3 Jewish 4 Other
What re l i g ious a f f i l i a t i o n i s the mother? 1 Protestant 2 Catholic 3 Jewish 4 Other
6. Education: Please circle the child's year in school below:
K 8 9 10 11 12
154
7. What is the father's level of education? 1 graduated high school 2 completed some college 3 graduated college (Bachelor's degree) 4 completed some graduate work 5 completed a Master's degree 6 completed a doctorate 7 don't know
8. What is the mother's level of education? 1 graduated high school 2 completed some college 3 graduated college (Bachelor's degree) 4 completed some graduate work 5 completed a Master's degree 6 completed a doctorate 7 don't know
9. Who currently lives with your child? (you may need to circle more than one option) 0 Parents: (check one or more of the following)
1 Mother 2 Father 3 Step-Mother 4 Step-Father
5 Brothers: How many? 6 Sisters: How many? ____ _ 7 Step-Brothers: How many: 8 Step-Sisters: How many? 9 Grandparents: (check one or more of the following)
Maternal Grandmother _^__ Maternal Grandfather Paternal Grandmother Paternal Grandfather
10 Other Relatives: please list them below
11 Others: specify who
10. Which of the following best characterizes the income level of your family? (check one) 1 low income 2 low-middle income 3 middle income 4 middle-upper income "^^^^^^ 5 upper income
155
11. Has a member of your family ever been (or is now) 111 for a long period of time? 1 yes 2 no
If yes, please indicate below the nature and treatment of this illness and the family member affected.
12. Has someone whom your child or family has known died in the past few years? 1 yes 2 no
If yes, please indicate below the relationship with this person and the year and cause of death.
13. Does your child "know" or has he/she been told of anyone known to your family who is now dead? 1 yes 2 no
If yes, please indicate below the relationship with this person and what you know about this person's death.
14. Do both of the child's parents work? 1 yes 2 no
If both parents work, where does the child stay during the day when both parents are not at home and he/she is not in school?
156
15. Is the father currently employed? 1 yes 2 no
If yes, is the father's full-time or part-time? 1 full-time 2 part-time
Describe below the father's position and duties
16. Is the mother currently employed? 1 yes 2 no
If yes, is the mother's full-time or part-time? 1 full-time 2 part-time
Describe below the mother's position and duties
17. Are you (the parents) members of any civic or church organizations? 1 yes 2 no
If yes, do you now (or have you in the past) hold a leadership position? 1 yes 2 no
Indicate below the name and activities of your organization (s) .
18. Do you (the parents) currently (or have you in the past) participate in any voluntary activities for an organization? (for example: United Way, American Cancer Society) 1 yes 2 no
If yes, please indicate which organization(s) and describe your activities.
157
19. Do you (the parents) currently (or have you in the past) donate money to a charity or organization? (for example: United Way, American Cancer Society) 1 yes 2 no If yes, please indicate which organization(s).
20. Do you (the parents) participate in elections? Do 1 2
you y e s no
If yes, please indicate which type of elections you routinely participate in. 1 local elections only 2 state wide elections only 3 national elections only 4 local and state elections only 5 local and national elections only 6 state and nationaly elections only 7 all elections