8

Identity Formation and Separatism: Theoretical Aspects

Many decolonising states like India adopted federal structures in an attempt to

manage their diverse populations or to maintain institutional continuity with

their colonial past. But in case of Russian Federation the logic of disintegration

was very much prominent. Though it seems different but in fact, there was

challenge before both the country to keep their territorial integrity intact. Being

a multi-ethnic country it becomes difficult for both countries to accommodate

theirs diversity. Hardgrave termed this as ‘dilemmas of diversity’ (Hardgrave

1993: 56) (sic).

Introduction

In post-1990 world order, regional identities are demanding their political space either in

the form of secession or autonomy under the present system of sovereign territorial

nation-state. Their demands for independent statehood are based on their cultural

distinctiveness. Secessionist movement often turned into violent confrontation between a

state and an armed grouping seeking to take control over territory within the state with

the aim of establishing an independent state (Baev 1999). The notion of regional identity

has its genesis in the subjective feeling of a community of its separate identity based on

language, religion, and race or shared historical experience which help in forging

common emotional bonds amongst the people. It is the complementariness of interests

and identity that help people to constitute and imagine them as a separate regional

community. Moreover, when the regional identity of a particular community in a country

comes into confrontation with the notion of national identity of that country, it goes to the

extent of demanding autonomy and even secession.

Though the demands of autonomous political arrangements and separatism based on

regional identity are related to the historical and geographical factors like concentration

of particular ethnic or religious minorities groups in peripheral geographic space (Toft

2003), they get much more intensified with the growing sense of deprivation and neglect

as a result of discriminatory, exploitative, and unfavourable policies of the state. It is in

this context, the principle of Self-determination provides philosophical and moral ground

for secessionism or separatism. In addition, the issue of regional identities and separatism

9

becomes more complex given the trans-national support to the movements demanding

autonomy and separation as seen both in cases of Chechnya and Kashmir.

All these above factors are responsible for the revival of ‘ethno-political identity’ though

there is no direct correlation between any one factor and separatism. In fact, secessionist

movements are cumulative results of all these factors. These movements are challenging

the present notion of Westphalian world order by demanding their own nation-state based

on their titular identity.

In a way, ethno-political revival in the form of various separatist movements around the

world is widely regarded as a most serious challenge to the contemporary geo-political

space. In post-Cold War scenario, separatist movements claimed hundreds of thousands

of lives around the globe and put to serious test the theory and practice of Sovereignty in

the present world order. While traditional post-Second World War order tend to support

the status quo with respect to territorial integrity of present states, the principle of self-

determination have inspired many ethno-nationalist movement to demand sub-state

autonomy or to the extent of independence. In general, ethnic identity is based on

“primordial” sentiments and emotions and images of “ancient hatreds have often

accompanied reports of violence and mayhem in various parts of world” (Ganguly and

Macduff 2003: 07).

However, when one tries to discover the roots of the any ethnic conflict then one finds

that there are myriad of issues and problems which are not necessarily related to ethnicity

as such. In other words, one can say that ethnicity and identity itself is not the main cause

though it provides the basis for various ethnic conflicts. Therefore, it is necessary to find

out how politicization of ethnic identity leads to rise of separatist movements.

Broadly, identity is perceived as socially constructed which is all about asking, ‘who am

I’? ‘Who you are’? It is about inter-subjective understanding about each other, or how

one person understands and develops understanding about others over a period of time.

The word ‘identity’ originated presumably from the Latin word ‘idem’ and ‘idem’

transformed into the word ‘identidem’ from which seems to have developed into

10

‘identity’. Indeed, three things are important to understand the notion of identity as

Preston (1992) argues; locale (the place where people live), networks (the way in which

people interact), and lastly memory (the understanding which are sustained and recreated

over time). It means identities are not fixed but fluid in nature, it changes over a period of

time. But the core remains unchanged. In the present context, identity does not only refer

to sameness but also to distinctiveness (Susan et al. 2002).

Identity can also have different levels. In the context of separatism, it is a general

perception that national identity and regional identity are antagonistic to each other. In

other words, regional identity becomes irreconcilable with national identity. Regions start

feeling detached to the national identity, which ultimately leads to separatism. In a way

‘regional identity’ is perceived as a threat to national integrity it demands its own nation-

state on the basis of the titular identity which may be confined to a particular peripheral

region of the concerned country.

Initially, idea of regional identity developed in the favour of group territorial identities

which can be applied to any “level in the hierarchy of attachments to territory, from small

group, to a parochial localism, to a broader (but still sub-state) regionalism, to a

nationalism (which may also be sub-state in area focus), and may be even to an

internationalism” (Knight 1985: 250). Generally, regional identity attached with the sub-

state level is called regionalism and regionalism simply means the awareness of

togetherness among a people of a relatively large area and is recognizable only when it

represents but a part of a larger whole. The latter in this context generally being the

territory of the state when regionalism is clearly linked to a “group’s identity that finds

political expression, then one can refer to a group politico-territorial identity” (Ibid: 250).

The latter, as a regionalism within the state, may develop into sectionalism where by

regional political concerns are held to be more important than those from elsewhere in the

state. Ultimately, if accommodation cannot be reached, regionalism may seek and

achieve secession, creating a new state according to the wishes of self-determination of

the people involved.

11

Regional identity becomes more entrenched due to its complementariness of interest and

identity that help people to constitute and to imagine them as a separate regional

community. It is commonly held that more subjectivity the identity is grounded in, more

intense is the regional movement. Eventually regions question the distributive policy of

the state as discriminatory, exploitative, and unfavourable to the overall well-being of the

concerned regional community. It is from this perceived sense of deprivation, neglect,

and ‘internal colonialism’, that the people of a particular region organize themselves into

a movement seeking in most of the cases separation from the existing state, or in select

instances settling with some autonomy arrangements within the same state. In this

context, outside support to the cause of regional identity, fuel the secessionist feeling

among regional groups. So, given the context, over a period of time, regional identity

becomes in-contradiction with the national identity that leads to separatism. Nevertheless,

it does not necessarily lead to separatism at first instance but because of perpetuation of

grave atrocities or sense of deprivation this leads to the development of secessionist

tendencies. Thus, in order to get the better understanding of identities, there is a need to

examine major theoretical paradigms in the context of the modern nation state.

Theoretical Understanding of Identity Formation

There are two views on nation and nationalism. One view believes that no matter how

many times a country has been conquered, subjugated or even destroyed by enemies,

there are certain attributes called the “core attributes” that never change (Goethe 1998:

139). Another view, believes that nationalism is not the awakening of the nation to self-

consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist (Gellner 1964: 169). Here, the

first view is characterized as a primordial view and second view is characterized as

instrumentalist or constructionist view.

Scholars like Anthony D. Smith in The Ethnic origins of Nations (1986) argues that

nations are an evolution of “common cultural heritage and language” of a society which

have been there since the distant past. Therefore, nations are “historically embedded”.

Smith contradicts Gellner’s idea that modernity and nationalism are related terms.

According to Gellner, pre-modern societies or feudalistic societies were characterized by

12

“networks of feudal bonds and loyalties”. Whereas, modern day industrial societies

“promoted social mobility, self-striving and competition”, and therefore it required a new

foundation of “cultural cohesion”.1 The foundation of this “cultural cohesion” is based on

the idea of nationalism.

Hence, the development of nationalism catered to the needs of industrial societies.

Gellner proposed that nationalism is a permanent phenomenon for all future societies, as

it is impossible to go back to ‘pre-modern society’ (Heywood 2005). Whereas Smith

believes that nationalism did not come to fulfill the needs of industrial societies, instead,

industrial societies saw the maturity of idea of nationalism. According to Smith, old

“ethnies” got political meaning in the modern era. Moreover, Smith (1986)

acknowledged that, although ethnicity is the precursor of nationalism, modern nations

came into existence only when established ‘ethnies’ were linked to the emerging doctrine

of political sovereignty.2 Essentially, Smith described ethnic group as an ‘ethnic

category’. He argues that ethnic group may not be aware of their own ethnic character

and yet they may still remain part of the group (Smith 1991: 20-1). In his work, he listed

six necessary ethnic attributes: a collective name; a common myth of descent; a shared

history; a distinctive shared culture, comprising language and /or religion and / or

institutions and/ or other cultural features; an association with a specific territory and

finally a sense of ethnic solidarity. For Smith, initially these features were important but

later the sense of ethnic solidarity is the most important feature of all (Fowkes 2002: 02).

But Instrumentalists deny this traditional view of ethnicity. Norwegian theorist, Fredrik

Barth argues that it was the ‘ethnic boundary’ that defined the group, and not the ‘cultural

stuff that it encloses’ (Ibid). This view was further developed by Joanne Nagel, who

argues that “ethnic identities are simply ‘constructed out of the material of language,

religion, culture, appearance or locality and the meaning of particular ethnic boundaries

are continuously negotiated, revised or revitalized” (Nagel 1994: 154).

1 For detail see: Gellner, Earnest, (1983) Nation and Nationalism, Oxford: Blackwell Pub. Ltd.

2 For detail see: Heywood, Andrew, 2005.

13

Authors like Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm each present their own particular

view on how and why different identities exist. Although there are slight differences

between them as to why identities exist and exactly how they are formed, both stress

similar points. People realise as part of one group because they share commonalities with

other people in this group. There are people who consider themselves part of the same

group as one understands, yet one has never met them, and probably never will.

Anderson’s described this as an idea of ‘imagined community’. The argument here is that

a nation though ‘imagined’ does not mean that a nation is false, unreal or to be

distinguished from ‘true’ (unimagined) communities. Rather Anderson is proposing that a

nation is constructed from popular processes3 through which residents share nationality in

common:

It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most

of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each

lives the image of their communion (Anderson, 1991: 6; original emphasis).

In fact, the desire to belong to a community (one that is essentially imagined) is the cause

of this feeling of unity4. In his Work, Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin

and spread of Nationalism, Anderson (1991) demonstrated the importance for members

of a place-based community5 to share a common identity. Identity, according to

Anderson, is like a narrative of people about their own community, which enables them

to give meaning and adhere to the uncertainties in a rapidly changing world. Identity is

basically an outcome of people’s narratives (Anderson 1991; Hall et al. 1992).

In his revised work of 1991, Anderson in the context of post-colonial countries of Asia

and Africa emphasized the importance of colonial census, museums, construction of

national memories, biographies and maps in identity formation (Anderson 1991) what he

called “classificatory grid” constructed by colonial powers. These established boundaries

3 This understanding both shapes and is shaped by political and cultural institutions as people ‘imagine’

they share general beliefs, attitudes and recognize a collective national populace as having similar opinions

and sentiments to their own. 4 When the defining elements of a group are examined, most cases show that groups form their identity by

stressing what they are not. 5 Benedict Anderson argued that the idea of nation is an ‘imagined community’. A nation is an ‘artifact’

created by the growth of print media and modern means of communication. He pointed out that “nations

exists more as mental images”. They are not “genuine communities”. A genuine community requires a

minimum level of individual to individual interaction in order to sustain the notion of common identity.

14

and limits and definition for peoples, places, and histories only made sense in the context

of a national identity. He argues that “maps contribute to the ‘logoization’ of political

space and their innumerable reproductions familiarize people with the limitations of

national sovereignty and community” (Ibid: xi). On the issue of Irish Republican Army

and ethno-nationalist factions in the Balkan Wars of the early 1990s, Anderson assesses:

It may well be that we are faced here with a new type of nationalist: the ‘long-distance

nationalist’ one might perhaps call him. For while technically a citizen of the state in

which he comfortably lives, but to which he may feel little attachment, he finds it

tempting to play identity politics by participation (via propaganda, money, weapons

any way but voting ) in the conflicts of his imagined Heimat now only fax time away

(1992: 13).

In a way, by emphasizing maps and place based community, his works try to highlight the

importance of territory in the imagination of particular community and when citizens of a

particular state feel little attached to it then it leads to the identity politics. It seems

relevant in the context of separatist movement.

As far as Hobsbawm is concerned, he sees nations from instrumentalist6 perspective as

‘invented traditions’ which have no roots in history. He did not accept the argument that

modern nations have developed out of long-established ethnic communities. Hobsbawm,

argued that “belief in historical continuity and cultural purity was invariably a myth, and,

what is more, a myth created by nationalism itself” (Heywood 2005). Hobsbawm cites

the example of myth of ‘national language’ created by ruling classes, though “until the

19th

century, the majority of people had no knowledge of the written form of their

language and usually spoke a regional dialect that had little in common with language of

the educated elite (Ibid). Hobsbawm defines nationalism as “primarily a principle which

holds that the political and national unit should be congruent” (1990: 9). He argues that

nations are a modern construction and that they are not unchanging social entities. He

claims that nations have traditionally been understood as top-down constructions and

argues that they must also be looked at from the bottom up.

6 It developed as a response to the invention of national anthems and national flags by ruling classes. The

extension of primary education helped to socialize young population and spread of the idea of ‘nation’.

15

Thus in order to understand nationalism what Hobsbawm argues, “it must also be

analysed from below that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and

interests of ordinary people” (Ibid: 10). Hobsbawm views the development of nations as

“situated at the point of intersection of politics, technology and social transformation”

(Ibid: 10) and he argues that they must be seen as such. In nutshell, Anderson and

Hobsbawm see nation as political communities rather that ethnic communities.

In the light of above interpretations, there is a need to look at the various separatist

movements which are emerging in the form of “ethno-nationalist revival” in the post-

Cold War era. In the context of ethno-revivalism, there is a high level of ethnic

homogeneity which consolidates the identity of a particular homogeneous group living in

a particular region and develops into a regional identity. In other words, if a certain

homogeneous group of a particular region imagines itself with their language, region,

religion as separate from its broader national identity then it becomes a regional identity

which might or might not lead to secessionism, depending upon the level of “deprivation

and discrimination” as Gurr (2000) underlines. Sometimes it is also spurred by regional

leaders.

In a way, the ethno-nationalist project which involves an interpretation of complex,

though not a mutually exclusive concept of nation, identity, national consciousness and

nationalism are based on two major premises. First, the desire for political and cultural

autonomy arises from simultaneous self-awareness and an awareness of other groups,

essential ingredients for converting an ethnic group into a nation. It requires the

construction of an ‘other’, a referent, “them” vs. “us”. In this self-awareness, perceived

history plays a significant role in defining identity through events which threaten identity.

In the first place, the justification for ethno-nationalism is a claim for an egalitarian

democratic society where there is a direct control over the allocation of resources and

their legitimate extraction. As Hoffman states, “If nations are imagined communities, it is

because we can indeed imagine a community different from the ones we experience daily

(a hierarchical society), one in which we are all alike and equal” (Stanley 1993:100). This

aspiration for equality and political control is often grounded in the feelings certain

16

groups have towards the larger society in which they have been deprived of a status to

which they are entitled.

In the second place, the politics of ethno-nationalism is based on a linkage between

political movement and ethnic identity. National consciousness arises from what

Greenfield has termed ressentiment7 or, in the words of Don Ronan, from the perception

of oppression. Ronan states, “ethnic groups are born and arise because of the perception

of oppression; if there were no perception of oppression, real or imagined, there would be

no ethnic self-determination” (Ronan 1979: 20). In a similar way, Michael Levin suggests

that in certain cases, the claim for nationhood may embody an “ethno-drama”, a history

of victimization, denial, and genocide (Levin 1993: 02). Under such a scenario, both

history and identity merge as much as mental constructs as “demonstrable facts”. Subtle

shifts in identity, therefore, correspond to historical events and the two are mutually

supporting and consistent, even in the face of contradictory historiographical facts

(Nagata 1993).

Ethnic identities are, therefore, “contested and constructed through a complex inter-play

of self-awareness and an awareness of the other within the context of an “ethno-drama”.

A nation must have its past and possess cultural ancestry” (Van 1994). In essence, it

shows that, there is little agreement about the role of ethnic, as opposed to political

component of the nation; or about the balance between subjective elements like will and

memory and more objective elements like territory and language or about the nature and

role of ethnicity in national identity. So, in defining ‘national identity’, culture8 plays a

crucial role9. This debate of construction of nation and identity can be seen in the three

7 A psychological state resulting from feelings of envy and hatred and the impossibility of satisfying them.

8 At one extreme point of view is a cultural nationalist— who believe that the cultural life of the nation

must be allowed to flourish and develop, but whose only political demand is for an environment that

provides enough freedom for this to happen. At the other extreme stand nationalists for whom political self-

determination is central: a nation is a body with a general will (often understood as an historic purpose) that

must be allowed to govern itself, to control the national homeland, and if necessary to assert its rights

against other nations (Hutchison, 2005).

9 First, a nation certainly has a territorial homeland, and its political system may be one of its distinguishing

features, but over and above that it has, or is believed to have, distinctive cultural traits like a language, a

religion, a national style of art or literature, forms of music or dance, perhaps a national cuisine, and so

17

broad approaches: the Primordialist, the Instrumentalist, and the Constructivist (Dawisha

2002).

Approaches to Identity Formation

The literature on ethnicity and nationalism presents many explanations for ethnic

mobilization and separatism. Primordialist scholars concentrate on cultural factors,

arguing that the simple existence of cultural differences can bring about ethnic

mobilization, for example living next to Russians (Fredrik 1969, Geertz 1973). Other

scholars focus on disadvantaged groups and their greater likelihood to mobilize, stressing

the role of economic disparity between groups (for example, Benedict R. Anderson 1991,

Ernest Gellner, 1983, Donald L. Horowitz 1985) as in case of the relative better position

of Kashmiri Pandits vis-à-vis Muslim population or pervasive historical oppression by a

dominant group over another (Dunlop 1998, Glenny 1992). There are some authors who

examine other factors that enhance the effectiveness of ethnic mobilization that include

institutional frameworks such as federalism. This can encourage increased ethnic

awareness and political activity; (Stepan 2000, Treisman 1997) economic wealth can spur

political efforts and strengthen ethnic bargaining power vis-à-vis a dominant group;

(Snyder 2000), a weakened state can inspire elite mobilization strategies as ethnic

political entrepreneurs seek greater status within the system (Brass 1991).

While these theories provide insight into ethnic mobilization and nationalism, there is no

consensus on any of the factors, which can best explain the separatist ethnic mobilization.

Generally, theories of the separate identity of ethnic groups derive in large part from how

ethnic groups come to identify themselves as distinct from other groups that gives rise to

regional identity not necessarily antagonistic to national identity. Some understanding of

the various scholarly approaches to ethnicity and ethnic identity is critical to identify the

forces that spur ethnic separatism. What follows is an assessment of the many approaches

forth. And these are seen as forming an integral whole, so that a particular type of injustice is perpetrated

when one nation is forced to live under laws or institutions designed for another nation. Second, nations are

understood as collective agents with their own distinctive aims and purposes, which are therefore entitled to

self-determination, often in the form of political self-rule (Miller 2009).

18

to ethnic identity and mobilization, in particular linking the causes of identity with

patterns of negotiation.

Primordial approaches stress differences in identity and population characteristics,

instrumental-mobilization explanations cast the behaviour of ethnic groups within the

structures of bargaining, whereas, constructive approach relies on inter-subjective

understanding of identity and elite mobilization.

The Primordialist Explanation

The Primordialist account of the nation postulates that nations are real (not imagined)

entities. Nations so defined differ from other territorially defined units of governance

(like City-States, Empires, and States which are not nation-state) because their

inhabitants define their identities in cultural terms exclusively. Primordialists consider

identity as pre-given entity of distinct races, ethnicity, language, culture, religion etc. It

cannot be constructed (Hass 1997). In fact, it is the fusion of identity and territory that

makes regional community a self-determining community. It is this fusion which

rationalizes their claims to autonomy (Dawisha 2002). Primordial explanations also point

to different levels of cultural differentiation. Some have argued that the ethnic identity

differentiation is more powerful between various groups that are more culturally distinct

– that share fewer cultural similarities or patterns. Huntington, for example, has argued

that religious differences are crucial to identifying the locations of ethnic violence

(Huntington 1996, Triesman 1997). Actually, the notion of ethnicity is very much

attached with the Primordialist account of identity.

There have been constant ethnic conflicts between various given groups for example,

ancient hatred (“ancient animosities”) between the Jewish and Muslim communities,

historical rivalries between the Serbs and the Croats, age-old tensions between the Sunni

and Shiite Muslims in the Middle East. But questions emerge why such conflicts are

perennial in nature? There are some scholars such as Clifford Geertz (1969) and Fredrik

Barth (1973), who emphasize the ‘politics of differentiation’. According to them, cultural

differences are the main cause behind any ethnic mobilization and conflicts. Ethnic

19

identification does seem to exist mostly because of one group’s identification of another

group as different from themselves – the other. This could lead one to conclude that the

most diverse societies will necessarily be the most conflicting.

Observations of the world, however, cast some doubt on the reliability of this conclusion.

Many multicultural states like the United States have managed to avoid nationalist

movements of secession, despite their considerable diversity. Moreover, this approach

does not help us isolate the groups that will attempt violent secession as a strategy, rather

than less violent expressions of ethnic mobilization. In Russia, only Chechnya, one out of

twenty-one ethnically designated regions, has militarily sought independence from the

central government.

In sum one can say that pure ethnic differentiation alone cannot account for the variation

in ethnic mobilization strategies. In case of Kashmir also, only in 1989 onwards, violent

secessionist movement started though the reason was not only cultural differentiation but

gross negligence of the democratic rights (Ganguly 2010) of the people and economic

underdevelopment plus cross-border support (Anant 2009). So, it is not precisely the

cultural differentiation that is the cause of separatism. In other words, any secessionist

movement around the world in general and Chechnya and Kashmir in particular are

products of various complex processes.

Demographic Explanation of Primordialist

One might sharpen the Primordialist argument to account for demographic

considerations. Perhaps violent mobilization is more likely among communities that are

concentrated demographically: the greater the demographic number of one group in a

geographical area, the greater the solidarity and propensity for dire action. Thus one

might expect those minorities who enjoy a demographic advantage in their titular

republics, particularly those who maintain a majority, to follow more separatist strategies

than those who make up smaller percentages within their republics. Within the post-

Soviet context, however, this has not always been the case. In the regions that seceded or

tried to secede violently, Chechnya, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-Karabakh,

20

the titular ethnic groups made up 57.8 percent, 66.2 percent, 17.8 percent, and 76.9

percent, respectively (Toft 2003). Toft argues that an important demographic standard to

consider is the density of a distinct ethnic population in one geographic area, rather than

throughout the rest of the country (Toft 2003, Evera 1994: 17-20). To be more precise, a

group whose members are not dispersed across the country but condensed into a smaller

area might be better able to politicize their identity differences (Olson 1965).

For example, there are more who live inside Chechnya as opposed to outside it; therefore,

it is the more likely to witness ethnic mobilization there. As this study will indicate,

demographic concentration certainly affects how regional leaders articulate their

demands vis-à-vis the central government, but it does not determine their actions. In case

of Kashmir, it is clearly visible that the demand of secessionism is largely because

majority of the people in the Valley carry the same religious identity, which provides

cohesiveness to their group to demand independence from India though it is not a sole

cause and there are others reasons as well. But one thing is clear that they are able to

demand strongly because of the homogeneous nature of population concentrated in a

particular region which lies in the periphery of the country. In sum, a group living in a

particular region has different cultural traits from those in the region and will have more

chance to feel different from others. Daniel Triesman (1997) finds in his quantitative

examination of ethnic separatism in Russia that Muslim regions are slightly more likely

to follow separatist strategies than non-Muslim regions.

While Treisman’s analysis and conclusions focus on other factors, there are however

difficulties linking cultural factors with separatism. The reason for this is that the Soviet

context makes religious differentiation challenging. The Soviet federal system

distinguished its ethno-federal regions according to historical classifications of people

who had inhabited certain areas, not according to religion, which they hoped to, eradicate

through communist ideology. One consequence of this kind of classification is that it

does not account for difference within a religion in groups. For example, the Muslims in

Dagestan are Sufist, whereas the Tatars and Bashkir adhere to Jadidism. Moreover, the

21

de-legitimization of religion in the Soviet period has affected the identities of Muslim

followers within regions differently.

Finally, religious distinctions help to draw conclusions about motivations that may not

accurately portray the circumstances of separatism. For example, the crisis in Chechnya

is often interpreted in Western media as “expression of Islamic extremist” interests,

influenced by the threat of Wahhabism or Sufism in the area. While there is some truth to

this, it does not explain early Chechen separatist strategies, which emerged before

Wahhabism entered the area. In fact, the radicalization of Chechnya occurred after the

initial conflict in 1992. The religious explanation, although popular in recent years, does

not provide a comprehensive account of events surrounding separatism in Russia. Even if

there were a clear link between Islamic radicalism and violent secession, the region that

harbours the most radical of Islamic movements, Dagestan, has firmly signalled its

intentions to remain within Russia (although certainly some Daghestanis actively support

the Chechen cause).

In case of Kashmir, the insurgency started in 1989 was violent and demanded separation

from India. Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) was one of the separatist

organisations and tried to make the movement inclusive but once Hizb-ul-Mujahideen

(HJM) entered into the picture, it became radicalised. Basically HJM supported by

Pakistani authorities, replaced the broader movement of JKLF (Anant 2009). When HJM

entered in to the Kashmiri affairs, the Kashmiri Pandit’s exodus started taking place and

this movement became Islamic in nature.

Hence, simple cultural differentiation does not necessarily provide sufficient ground for

secession unless or until there are outside forces or other forces fuelling such kind of

separatist tendencies. It can be argued that religious differences consolidated the

movement further, which is not possible without any kind of external or internal support.

Like Russian federation, in Kashmir also, Islam is not the main reason for demanding

secessionism. The Muslims of Kargil area of Jammu & Kashmir are not demanding

independence, though they are demanding for the status of Union Territory along with the

region of Ladakh within the Indian federation (Behra 2007). It shows that Islamic

22

radicalisation took place only in the Valley, not in the all Muslim inhabited areas and that

is due to cross-border support.

Thus, if one is going by the Primordialist argument of cultural differentiation as the basis

of consolidation of identity then it does not sufficiently explain the context of Russian

federation and Indian case of Kashmir, though it is one of the important aspects. The

answer lies in the conception of Instrumentalist School.

Instrumentalist Explanation

Contrary to Primordialist explanation about identity formation, the Instrumentalist school

emphasizes the political use of ethnic identity to achieve group goals. Rather than

conceiving ethnic identity and mobilization as static and unchanging, scholars of

instrumental persuasion focus on the causes of heightened or diminished ethnic

identification and ethnic mobilization (Brass 1996). According to the instrumentalist

conception, spiritual and social linkages do not just happen. They are shaped and

nurtured specifically for political and material advantage. Elite used to shape and nurture

the identity in their own favour for political mobilization. Regional elites, Brass (1991)

argues, may find that they can increase their own power through mobilizing ethnic

movements and making separatist demands. In more or less similar fashion, Snyder

(2000) argues that democratic reforms in a non-democratic state actually enhance elite

power-seeking by opening up the political playing field. Aided by enhanced mobilization

capabilities in the form of free press and free speech, ethnic nationalism will increase as

ethnic elites ensure their own position in the new political system. Nationalism uses the

pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures or cultural wealth, though it

uses them very selectively, and it most often transforms them radically (Gellner 1983,

Brass 1991).

Other elite mobilization studies examine the extent to which regional elites are tied to

political leaders in the central governments, and the extent to which this affects the

bargaining strategies of the regional elites (Willerton 1992). In other words, on one hand,

it depends on the clout and linkages of political elite to organize and mobilize people and

23

on the other, the success or failure of any elite mobilization depends on the particular

leader’s relation with the central government. Theorists, however, disagree on the most

salient factors that might cause groups to attach political significance to their cultural

identities. This study organizes instrumental approaches into two key categories: theories

of oppression and theories of mobilization. This study concludes that the mobilization

approaches promote better accounts of ethnic separatism, particularly in the post-Soviet

successor states.

In People versus States, Ted Robert Gurr argues that multicultural democratic states are

much less likely to experience divisive ethnic mobilization or conflict. Part of the reason

for this, he argues, is that democratic countries are unlikely to carry out coercive and

repressive anti-minority policies that one might find in regimes not held accountable to

an active citizenry. Gurr argues that ethnic conflict occurs because of a lack of outlets for

political participation. Groups that might desire greater autonomy, or more equal

participation in the political system, can be stymied by oppressive regimes (Gurr 2000).

This broad institutional contextualization of ethnic separatism, however, does not account

for the evolution of ethnic rights within the Soviet Union. For many ethnic minorities

within Russia in 1917, the Soviets offered greater benefits for their culture, language, and

history than the minorities had ever experienced under the Tsars 10

(Martin 2001).

The democratic oppression argument continues into the current period of democratic

transition and state building. Echoing Gurr’s sentiments, popular policy strategies for

ethnic conflict avoidance and resolution promote democratic decentralization or

federalism. Governments can ignore the interests of ethnic minorities and thus inhibit

those minorities’ ability to maintain their cultural and political identity. By creating

institutions by which ethnic groups are guaranteed greater inclusion into a system,

tyranny by the majority group is avoided, and ethnic minorities will have fewer

incentives to use violence to attain political autonomy. This perspective emphasizes the

10

The Bolsheviks actively sought alliances with the ethnic minorities, co-opting them to fight for the Red

Army in the Russian Civil War. As part of the application of Communism to ethnic territories, the

Bolsheviks established structures that promoted both native and Russian literacy, constructed printing

houses that published native language newspapers and books, built native language schools, and created

written alphabets for languages that had until that time only been spoken (Martin 2001).

24

avoidance of violence by mitigating ethnic complaints before they appear. Democracy

scholars such as Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) agree with Gurr that groups need an

outlet for their political aspirations.

If federal democratic institutions are in place, conflicts that do occur, such as those

between Québec and Canada, can be resolved practically through institutional

mechanisms11

. The Soviet experience of federalism, being non-democratic, did not

provide outlets for free participation. When democratization reforms emerged in the

Soviet Union under Gorbachev, however, the federal structure began to offer means for

greater minority group participation. After the Soviet Union collapsed12

and successor

states began building their new institutions, usually retaining the national territorial

structure that had existed under Soviet rule, separatism grew out of the politics of

establishing the rules behind those federal structures. Some argue that within the post-

Soviet context, institutions associated with diminishing ethnic strife – democratization

and federalism – actually promoted strife (Roeder 1991).

Legacies and Historical Oppression

Gurr also emphasizes historical oppression when analyzing incentives for minority

groups to follow secessionary strategies. Groups that have been systematically oppressed

by a regime, he argues, are more likely to attempt to leave that regime. John Dunlop, in

his assessment of the historical roots of the Chechen conflict in Russia, argues that

“continued and malicious oppression” of the Chechen people since the Tsarist period

sowed the seeds of the Chechen wars (Dunlop 1998). The emphasis on historical

oppression as a rationale for separatism pervades the international law of self-

determination. While the United Nations Charter rhetorically supports nations’ rights of

self-determination, it does not do so for all groups evenly; international law favours

11

In the Canadian case, Quebec held a referendum to determine the interest for separatism in 1995. Now it

has granted as a special status within Canadian federation.

12

In the case of the Union Republics, this culminated in peaceful and successful secessionary efforts.

However, within the successor states, the experience was more mixed, with some regions engaging in

violent separatism, others engaging in high-level, but non-violent, separatism, and others not demanding

much at all.

25

groups that have experienced oppression from a repressive regime13

. The principle of

self-determination in the context of separatism will be discussed later in this chapter.

A history of repression has affected separatist movements in the former Soviet Union.

Regional leaders used the Soviet Union’s history of repression to mobilize their citizenry,

as well as to exact concessions from the newly forming national governments, which

sought to distance themselves from the illegitimate Soviet regime. It is difficult to assess

the impact of oppression in the Soviet case itself, because the Stalinist period targeted

many ethnic groups, including Russians. However, the most extreme case of oppression

against ethnic groups was the cleansing of the “punished people,” enforced mass

deportations14

during and after World War II. Although several groups were singled out

for punishment, only one of those groups subsequently sought secession from the Soviet

Union. In 1944, the Soviets deported the entire nation of Chechnya to Central Asia. At

the same time, the Soviets similarly deported the Ingush, the Balkars, and the Kalmyks.15

In case of Kashmir, there is no such oppression visible but over period of time,

particularly in post-1989 scenario, there is accusation against the Indian army about

atrocities done over Kashmiri people. Non-withdrawal of Armed Forces Special Power

Act (AFSPA) despite demand from every section of Kashmiri society, fake encounters

and mass-graves issues added colour in their suspicion towards Indian state. This

ultimately develops a sense of oppression in the mind of youth in the Valley leading to

the rise of separatist movement in the post-1990 scenario.

13

See UN Charter on self-determination; for the standard of oppression, “Report of the International

Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations with the Task of Giving an

Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Åaland Islands Question,” League of Nations Official

Journal, Special Supp., No. 3, 1920, 5-10. 14

The reverse is also the case in some circumstances: not every region that engaged in violent secessionist

behaviour experienced such punishment as the , for example South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As will become

clear in the case studies introduced in later chapters, all regions referred to their historical experiences as

they sought autonomy or independence from the centre. However, the extent of that oppression itself did

not determine the demands they made 15

This refers to the groups deported who had autonomous status at the time of the Soviet dissolution.

Others without such status were also deported, for example, the Koreans and the Germans.

26

Economic Oppression

Economic oppression theories explain ethnic mobilization by pointing to inequalities that

emerge between ethnic groups during modernization and industrialization processes16

. As

industrialization and modernization occurred, groups moved into cities and found

common identities through communication in the same language, class differentiation

according to group, or economic mobilisation according to group. For example, Benedict

Anderson argues that ethnic differentiation materialises when groups who do not speak

the majority language are economically marginalised because they cannot move into the

workforce as easily as those groups who do speak the language17

. Ethnic groups then find

mechanisms to contend with their economic disadvantage. According to Donald

Horowitz (1985), ethnic mobilization emerges when ethnic divisions correspond with

class divisions in society. Ernest Gellner (1983) contends that economically

disadvantaged minorities turn to ethnic mobilization as a way to achieve economic

prosperity.

But there are authors who counter the economic oppression argument. Daniel Treisman

pointed out that economic factors do apply, but that it is the wealthier groups that will

seek greater levels of separatism and autonomy. Economic development offers

bargaining power to elites seeking to change their political circumstances in relationship

to the center, or power to those seeking outright independence (Treisman 1997, 1999).

However, this argument does not investigate how wealth might affect violent versus non-

violent strategies (Hale 2000). Many scholars argue that ethnic groups respond to

perceived state weaknesses in their attempts for greater political recognition. According

to Gurr (2000) ethnic groups that perceive deterioration in central state power as an

opportunity for achieving greater political power spur separatist strategies. These

explanations will be discussed in other chapters respectively, focusing on how historical

oppression and economic deprivations have played an important role in developing

secessionist tendencies.

16

for example Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism,

Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict. 17

Anderson Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.

27

Constructivist Explanation

The constructivist position, on the other hand, sees nothing that is fixed or predetermined

in the concept of the nation. National identification can change if and when social

interactions change. A nation in this conception is anything but immutable. It is wholly

subjective (Dawisha 2002). Alexander Wendt argues that “structures of human

association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces and

identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather

than given by nature. Therefore, constructivism rests on the inter-subjective dimension of

human action”18

(Palan 2000: 578). As soon as actors start interacting with each other,

privately held beliefs immediately become a ‘distribution of knowledge’. When two

actors meet for the first time, each side begins to encounter with private, domestically

rooted beliefs about ‘Self’ and ‘Other’. These beliefs help actors define the situation and

constitute their interests. That ultimately led to the formation of identity.

These explanations are useful only when the modernization and industrialization

processes differentiated ethnic groups along economic or class lines. For example,

Stalin’s forced industrialization program targeted all groups with the goal of negating

classes within Russia. The Soviet system of industrialization combined with the

Bolshevik’s efforts to promote the interests of ethnic minorities in certain contexts

created conditions limiting the applicability of the modernization argument. The

Bolshevik system organized ethnic territories to promote the interests of national

minorities, seeking to bring them up to the level of the industrialised ethnic groups, such

as the Russians. Modernizing policies such as urbanisation and increased education were

mandated from above. Consequently, the Soviet industrialization policy advantaged the

perceived “backward” populations. Even so, by the fall of the Soviet Union, some

disparity existed among the regional populations.

In sum, on one hand, the Primordialist believes identity as given and an individual

acquired it by his or her birth which remains unchanged. It means it is fixed and given.

18

For further discussion see: Ronen, Palan, ‘A world of their making: an evaluation of the constructivist

critique in International Relations’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2000, pp. 575-598.

28

On the other hand, Instrumentalists believe that identity formation is a result of the

political use of ethnic identity to achieve group goals. It means identity is constructed by

political elites specifically for political and material advantage (Gellner 1983, Brass

1991). Constructivists believe that there is nothing fixed or determined, rather it is

evolved over a period of time because of social interactions. They differ from

instrumentalists with regard to how social linkages and connections are created. In other

words, on one hand, instrumentalists believe that social linkages and connections are

created purposefully for political use; constructivists rather see it as a natural social

interaction.

But, yet, both schools of thought agree on the core argument: that nation is not

predetermined; they are instead constructed (Dawisha 2002). In essence, for

Primordialist, identity is given and pre-determined whereas for instrumentalists and

constructivists, it is not predetermined, though both have difference over how identity is

constructed. In the context of secessionism, it becomes imperative to view the issue of

identity in case of federations, because federations generally haves multi-ethnic and

multi-cultural societies, where there is a myriad of reasons for separatism. So identity

must be contextualised in a federal setup. It became more important due to Chechnya and

Kashmir problems, which are pressing issues for Russian and Indian federation

respectively.

Contextualizing Secessionism in Federal Political System

Essentially, federalism as a ‘concept’ and federation as a ‘structure of government’ rest

on the division of sovereignty between two levels of government: the level of territorially

defined units of the federation (of which there must be at least two) and the central level.

The division of power between the constituent units does not preclude the

interdependence of the two levels of government; it merely requires that for at least some

governmental functions neither level is subordinate to the other (Watts 1970: 11).

Federations, therefore, differ from unitary states in which sovereignty resides with the

center, regardless of how decentralized that state is. Kenneth Wheare argues,

“Federations must desire to be united but not to be unitary” (1963:36). Federations should

29

also be distinguished from confederations where the constituent units retain their

sovereignty, and form a union for limited purposes. As both states Russia and India are

ethnically heterogeneous and issues of provincial design recur in the political debates

within the two countries, this increases their value as a subject for comparative political

analysis.

Federation is important to achieve administrative efficiency for reasons of size or

complexity, especially in territorially large countries like India and Russia. It was

basically an attempt to reconcile diversity within the structure of a single country. The

institutionalization of a territorial division of political power creates conditions for a new

level of political debate to occur, both between the center and the provincial unit, but also

within the provincial unit. This is why the design of provincial units is so important. The

nature of this “political space,” in which political entrepreneurs can command loyalty

from their provincial and state-wide populations, is crucial for determining the success of

a federal system in a multiethnic state.

Eric Nordlinger contests the effectiveness of federalism as an ethnic conflict regulation

device. Yet several successful multi-ethnic federations exist. Switzerland, Canada, and

India are all good examples of this fact. Although there are many countries where

federations have significantly failed to regulate ethnic conflict, like Nigeria in 1966 and

Pakistan in 1971—failure was not inevitable. Multi-ethnic states, per se, are not doomed

to failure; there are always additional factors affecting their success (Katherene 2007).

There are some authors like Treisman and Stepan who are also pessimistic about the role

of federation in accommodating various diversities. They argue that it is possible that

institutional frameworks such as federalism can encourage increased ethnic awareness

and political activity (Stepan 2000, Treisman 1997). But generally, lack of outlets for

political participation, level of economic development and the ‘memories of grievances’

lead to the formation of separate identity. Gurr argues that ethnic conflict occurs because

of a lack of outlets for political participation. Groups that might desire greater autonomy,

or more equal participation in the political system, can be stymied by oppressive regimes

(Gurr 2000).

30

The composition of federal units is a crucial yet contested feature of federal design,

especially in relation to its status as a method of ethnic conflict regulation (Horowitz

1985). So, broadly speaking, experience of federal success in managing diverse groups is

mixed. It is true that the idea of multi-national state was a valuable end in itself but after

the First World War, the fragmentation of great empires like Austria-Hungarian punched

a deep hole in the notion that a stable multi-ethnic state could be sustained. The idea

survived of course, but one could see that subsequent disintegration of a multi-national

entity over a period of time eroded the very credential to manage a multi-national state.

But there are examples like Switzerland and India where such model works; but the dying

days of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia illustrated an alternative and much less

appealing scenario of what may happen at worst, when the model fails (Coakly 2010).

However, federation is the only best alternative system where various ethnic identities

can be managed though it depends on others reasons as well. Detailed discussion will

follow in the next chapters about how Russian and Indian federations have managed their

vast territorial integrity and diversified population in the context of their respective

federations. In both the countries, several secessionist movements are going on and both

countries are trying to co-opt various identities, which are demanding secessionism and

the basis is not other than the principle of self-determination.

The Principle of Self-Determination and Separatism

The right to self-determination is all about right of individual or community to decide

their political future. Precisely it is about the right of people to “freely determine their

political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (Puri 2001:

263-264). The self-determination philosophy was espoused by Wilson19

. Though once

rejected by the colonial powers that dominated geopolitics at the turn of the 20th century,

it is now apparently the dominant force in modern geo-politics. Earlier, this principle had

provided philosophical ground for nation-state to fight against colonial powers (against

imperialism) particularly in Third World countries. In the post-Cold War era, this

19

Woodrow Wilson was US president, who supported the principle of self-determination. He was the first

one who viewed self-determination in political context. But his notion of self-determination was concerned

with the recognizing cultural and autonomy right of the people.

31

principle has given ideological and philosophical impetus to several secessionist

movements (like Kashmir, Chechnya, Basque and so on) around the world, which are

aimed to achieve their separate homeland based on their particular identity. In case of

both Chechnya and Kashmir, the right to self-determination is providing ground for

independence. In fact, it is a legitimizing ideology for ethnic separatism20

, perhaps a

necessary condition for its emergence (Horowitz 1981). Generally, separatist movements

that invoke principles of self-determination as their anthem imply that domination of their

region by another ethnic group is illegitimate. State organizations and bureaucracies that

are dominated by one or more dominant ethnic groups will forcefully resist the break-up

of the state (Olzak 2005).

Basically, separatism is built upon a region’s assertion of ethnic distinctiveness. Its

ideological force rests upon this claim to ethnic self-determination (for this reason the

study of ethnicity is essential to the analysis of separatism) (Hechter 1979). Sometimes,

ethnic protests21

are also associated with the issues of separatism or secessionism. Such

kind of ethnic identity is consolidated over a period of time. Initially people were defined

by the social group into which they were born, and their territory could only be

understood in terms of “social relations and the juxtaposition of social groups (Bohannan

1964: 176). But over a period of time in the West, there is change in group-to-territory

relationship. Earlier socially cohesive group once defined its territory; over time

politically bounded territory came to define the people: there was change in emphasis

20

In most of the cases separatism and secessionism used interchangeably although there are theoretically

differences exists. Wood argues that political separation and especially separatism is more vague and

encompassing term, covering all instances of political alienation which feature a desire for the reduction of

control by a central authority in a specific area. Separatism, as Lyon has suggested, implies resistance by a

political entity to further incorporation or subordination within the larger political authority of which it is

already a member. Separatism may be expressed in demands for provincial rights or local or regional

autonomy in certain spheres of decision-making. Secessionism, by contrast, is a narrower, more specific

term, referring to a demand for formal withdrawal from a central political authority by a member unit or

units on the basis of a claim to independent sovereign status (Wood, 1981; ‘Secession: A Comparative

Analytical Framework Canadian Journal of Political Science 4, No. 1. 107-134). This study will use both

words interchangeably.

21

Ethnic protests that seek to eradicate and replace existing geographical and administrative state

boundaries are secession or separatist movements. They differ from other forms of ethnic movements in

that they involve demands for ‘formal withdrawal from a central political authority by a member unit or

units on the basis of a claim to independent sovereign status’ (Hechter 1992, p. 267).

32

from group to territory. Shafer (1995: 97) suggested that people determined that they

might live in groupings larger than family and tribe, although they could not comprehend

an international or universal state. Identity and territory became intimately linked and,

when combined with a third concept, self-determination, the mix turned out to be volatile

(Ibid). So it is necessity to trace the historical and legal foundation of self-determination

to get the clear picture.

Historical and Legal Perspective on Self-Determination

For the first time, Woodrow Wilson used the term self-determination in the political

context but he never meant it for secession. He never referred for external aspects of self-

determination; in fact, his support was for internal self-determination, which means

recognizing the cultural and autonomy right of the groups. For Wilson, the right to self-

determination of people was rooted in the Anglo-American tradition of civic nationalism:

that means the right of communities to self-government. It had “nothing to do with the

tradition of collective or ethnic nationalism” (Lynch 2004: 423). In similar fashion, under

UN system, and particularly UN resolution on decolonization, 1960, used the word self-

determination for colonized countries. This resolution categorically mentions the self-

determination right for all the people of the territory not for particular nation, though the

resolution supported the emergence of new state but in the context of decolonization22

(Carley 1996).

However, if one look at the contemporary debate on self-determination it clubbed both

the two previous views namely the Wilson’s idea of recognizing cultural and autonomy

right and demand for own new state. That is why in contemporary self-determination

movement (in the context of post-1990), there are elements of both; demands for new

state on the basis of their distinctive cultural and autonomous right (Ibid). In fact, people

who live in a remote corner of a country and “are a majority locally but a minority in the

larger state” want independence and are prepared to fight for it (Talbott 2000: 152).

22

In 1960, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1514(XV) entitled Declaration on the Granting of

Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples which declares that: [para. 2]. “All peoples have the right

to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue

their economic, social and cultural development.”

33

Most of the writings on self-determination in the 20th

and 21st

century have shown

pessimism about the notion of self-determination as a right for independence though

these writings recognize the importance of the right to self-determination but only as a

cultural and autonomy right. In fact, contemporary self-determination movements are

demanding their own nation-state which has its root in the treaty of Westphalia (1648).

But it is not possible for every nationality to have its own nation-state because

ethnographic boundaries hardly coincide with political ones (Ibid). At the same time, it

will not be concede by any post-colonial state. Wilsons’ secretary of state, Robert

Lansing, revealed that self-determination would likely “breed discontent, disorder and

rebellion,” and that the phrase itself was “simply loaded with dynamite” (Ibid: 152).

Talbott (2000) argues that the European countries are moving away from old Westphalian

notion, which emphasised more on territorial sovereignty to new Westphalian notion of

nation-state where this notion of territorial sovereignty is losing its relevance by

implementing common currency and creating porous border between themselves, while

supporting pooled sovereignty. At the same time they are granting more autonomy right

to their respective regions like for example, within Spain’s borders23

. In a way two

parallel things are going on hand in hand in Europe. On one hand, by creating European

Union, they are trying to give less importance to the notion of territorial sovereignty. At

the same time, by granting special status to certain secessionist territory within the

border, they are moving in the direction of a new Westphalian notion.

Under the UN system, there are both kinds of arguments. Supporters of self-

determination emphasize on those articles which suit them and same in the case of those

who are in favour of territorial integrity of the country. Both principles have been

defended in the name of international peace and security. For example, the principle of

self-determination was invoked on many occasions during World War II. It was

proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter (14 August 1941). Later, it was restated in

23

For example, Catalonia is an entity that calls itself the state of Catalonia, where Catalan is the official

language and schools teach Spanish as an elective.

34

Washington declaration of 1942 and Moscow declaration of 1943. Finally, the Charter

[Article 1(2)] clearly enunciated the principle of self-determination:

The purposes of the United Nations are: To develop friendly relations among nations

based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determinations of peoples”

and self-determination is conceived as one among several possible “measures to

strengthen universal peace.”

Apart from that, there have been a number of UN resolutions and articles, which talked

about the acceptance of self-determination as a right. It was further strengthened by the

incorporation of the principle of self-determination as a human right in the Article 1 of

both international Covenants of Human Rights, namely Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights and Covenant on Economic-Socio-and Cultural Rights of Dec, 1966 (Dyke 1969).

Dyke argued that self-determination as a ‘right’ was incorporated due to the pressure of

new post-colonial state. Earlier most of the countries were in the favour of self-

determination as ‘principle’ not as ‘right’. But only, in 1960, by a vote of 89 to 0, with 9

abstentions, the General Assembly adopted its Declaration on the Granting of

Independence to Colonial countries and Peoples (Ibid: 225). It was further incorporated

in the Article 1 of both the international covenants of 1966 on Human Rights. It is an

irony that, this very principle was adopted due to the pressure of developing countries.

Now these covenants have become the legitimate ground for self-determination. Due to

the international human rights regime, now no sovereign state can detached itself from its

obligation to protect human rights. Many writings on self-termination accept that self-

determination is an essential condition for the genuine existence of other human rights

and freedoms (Avery 1996). But the problem with this principle is, exactly who is

entitled to “claim this right – a group, a people, or a nation” (Carley 1996: V) is not clear.

Thus self-determination still remains ambiguous in nature.

Ambiguity does not end here only; there is idea for external self-determination and

internal self-determination. Internal self-determination has to do with control over

domestic affairs, e.g. with the question of freedom from foreign intervention and with the

question of representative government or majority rule. External self-determination has to

do with the status of the “self” in relation to other selves; it means it is attached with the

35

question of independence or sovereignty (Dyke 1969: 226). On the other side, as far as

the principle of territorial integrity is concerned, particularly in post-World War II era,

territories of post-colonial states became uninfringeable. No one questioned the

inviolability of existing nation-state’s borders “regardless of how and when they were

determined24

” (Connor 1994, Carley 1996: V).

Conceding the self-determination right becomes more complex in a multi-national state.

For multi-national states, granting right to secede to one unit of its territory will set a

precedent, leading to the balkanization of the country, which threatens the security at

large. Basically, self-determination is legal and geographical. It is legal because it

involves many parts of the body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon

civilized states in their relation with one another (Brierly 1963: 1) and geographical

because it involves people, sense of place, and bounded space. So territory is important. It

is defined as “space to which identity is attached by a distinctive group who hold or covet

that territory and who desire to have full control over it for the groups’ benefit (Knight

1982: 526)

It shows that in both ways, ultimately state has to face either loss of its territorial

sovereignty or facing criticism regarding not respecting self-determination right. As a

result, since the World War II, international community (including UN and international

organization) defended the system based on the concept of present nation-state. Article

2(4) of the UN Charter declares:

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force

against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other

manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

As per the Helsinki Final Act (adopted on August 1, 1975) which also supports the

territorial integrity of the states:

24

Particularly since the end of the World War I and especially since World War II, the world has ordered

its affairs with an international system based on the concept of states whose borders, no matter how they

were originally determined, are considered inviolable.

36

The participating States will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their

international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial

integrity or political independence of any State…

In a similar fashion, at the OSCE summit of 1999 in Istanbul, it was decided that

international borders should not be changed by force – “either by wars of aggression or by

wars of secession”. At the same time, governments have a responsibility not just to defend

the territorial integrity of the state but to “establish and preserve the civic integrity of the

population”.

In sum, one can say that there are both kinds of documentary supports available in favour

of the principle of self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity. But self-

determination has been used for all the people not for a nation. As Chandhoke opined “in

effect, when the right to self-determination came to deciding between the two units which

are supposed to possess the right to self-determination, either (a) the entire people within

a territory, or (b) nations, the UN clearly decided in favour of the former (Chandhoke

2008: 03). In other words, UN General Assembly has recognized self-determination as a

universal right but it applies to those people who seek an end to colonial domination

within their colonially derived bounded territories. It is not intended for people who from

a minority within an existing state territory. In a way, self-determination is all about

maintenance of the status quo, for keeping existing international territories as they are,

and for denying the further application of self-determination (Knight 1985).

After viewing both kinds of arguments, no clear cut norm or definition has been

developed about the way secessionist movements are surfacing; it forces a need to find a

way out of this contested terrain of self-determination vs. territorial integrity. Ultimately,

the very purpose of the state is protect the life of the people, but if state is not able to

protect the life of the people then why should people respect the territorial integrity of the

states. At the same time, it is also needed to look that the group which is demanding

secession in the name of self-determination has legitimate grievances or not. The

complexities of the issue require normative framework to look in to it.

37

Normative Framework of Self-Determination

Appearance of secessionist movements around the world in 1990s raised the eyebrows of

several philosophers regarding the legitimacy of these movements. Allen Buchanan in his

book “Secessionism: The Morality of Divorce from East Sumter to Lithuania and

Quebec” (1991) tries to view secessionism on ethical ground. Several questions have

been raised like what are the moral bases of the right to secession? On what moral ground

can a nation deny secession? And how should constitutions and international law

accommodate these competing rights. At the same time, state territorial integrity was also

questioned and so also the ethical foundation of claims to national division or unity of the

country.

These are some of the questions which have generated the debate in the post Cold War

era. The main thrust of this new conversation on secession has been to detach the right to

secede from the passion of nationalism and force of armed might. Basically the right to

self-determination cannot be invoked to undermine the “territorial integrity or political

unity” of states “possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to

the territory without distinction as to race, creed, or colour”. It only de-legitimises the

colonial rule, not beyond that, “its scope of application has remained in question”

(Hoeing 2010:45) as mentioned earlier.

From the normative perspective, self-determination right will be legitimate if there are

legitimate grievances of the people. Buchanan defends moral framework for secessionism

because the “moral risks of waging a war against terrorism are great in a world in which

there are many groups that have legitimate grievances against their states, especially if we

lack a normative framework for evaluating and responding to claims to self-

determination” (Buchanan 2004: 26). If the state is able to do justice to its citizens then

only there is moral claim for territorial integrity, otherwise the state cannot demand

allegiance from groups. In respect of post-9/11 scenario, Buchanan argues “lacking such

a framework, the United States and its allies in the ‘war against terrorism’ are likely to

fail to discriminate between insurgent groups that have legitimate grievances and those

that do not” (Buchanan: 2004: 25).

38

In today’s world order, ‘state-centric paradigm’, which emphasizes the notion of state

territorial sovereignty, is the dominant paradigm. Territorial sovereignty is considered as

pious and there is no scope for granting self-determination rights. Those who are

supporting the territorial integrity of the present state are criticizing all sorts of

secessionist movement on the ground that any demand for secessionism will threaten the

survival of the existing state. On the other side, secessionists are saying that their

aspirations will not be fulfilled unless and until their own state will not come. Buchanan

argues that in both cases their imagination lies in the state framework. Buchanan suggests

“we must choose between self-determination and order”. For that Buchanan suggested,

‘intra-state autonomy regimes’ as ways of coping or avoiding secessionism. According to

his view, such kind of arrangement “too represents a significant curtailment of the

traditional power of sovereignty”. Such kind of ‘intra-state autonomy regimes’ would be

just ‘short of full sovereignty’ (Buchanan: 2004: 24).

The above discussion suggests what should be the way out of this dilemma of territorial

integrity and secessionism. Both have their own arguments to justify their claim. State

sovereignty is justified on the ground of ‘order’ and the secessionist movement is

justified in the name of the right to self-determination. Broadly this discussion can be

summarized in major principles. First is ‘statist theory’ which emphasizes on the

territorial integrity. Second, one tries to focus on ‘just cause theory’. Apart from that

there are ‘choice theory’ and ‘collective right’ theories. In response to the preceding

question, the ‘just cause theory’ argues that the nation-state has obligation to protect basic

human right and that any group denied those rights has justifiable rights to secede. This

theory is grounded in enlightenment ideas and natural rights theories of social contract.

‘Just cause’ theory can be found in American declaration of independence which is based

on the assumption that “grievances must be both numerous and long endured in order to

legitimate a drastic measure like separatism. Independence is remedy of last resort to

prolonged abuse of human rights. The best way for an ethnically diverse, geographically

sprawling state to protect itself against separatism is to protect the rights of minorities and

far-flung communities. Democracy is the political system most explicitly designed to

39

ensure self-determination. Democracy can be a vehicle for peaceful secession, but it is

also the best antidote to secessionism and civil war, since, in a truly democratic state,

citizens seeking to run their own lives have peaceful alternatives to taking up arms

against their government.

Contextualizing Regional Identity and Separatism in the Context of Chechnya and

Kashmir

The end of Cold War led to the emergence of a new kind of conflict. Earlier it was

primarily inter-state in nature, but in post-Cold war era, it became intra-state in nature.

Paradoxically, it neither has brought an ‘end of history’ as Francis Fukuyama had

propagated nor opened an era of universal peace and democratic capitalism. Instead, one

can see violent conflicts between weakened states and rebellious ethno-national

communities (Riggs 1998). The rise of modernity25

in the West during the past few

centuries created forces and situations that have now reached a boiling point and are

producing civil wars, genocide, refugees, and international interventions on a global scale

(Smith 1996). At the same time, ethnic diversity and cosmopolitanism flourish and

increasingly cross-cultural relationships are pervasively harmonious. Ethnic identity has,

therefore, simultaneously become a cause for conflict and a reason for celebration (Riggs

1998). Riggs argues that present ethnic conflicts are modern in the sense that it is one of

the features of multi-ethnic modern state which is based on ‘ideology’ rather than their

national unity. To quote Riggs,

Modern states that are conspicuously multi- ethnic stress their ideological goals rather than

national unity-the former Soviet Union and South Africa under apartheid are good examples.

The goal of “Americanization” has been important in the United States but obstacles to its

attainment have led increasingly to emphasis on such values as “freedom,” “equality,” and

“justice” for all, regardless of ethnicity” (1998: 272).

In the context of secessionism, precisely, the ruling minorities of the successor states of

industrial empires, the Third World countries have become the targets of second-

generation self-determination movements, of revolts designed to partition multi-national

25

Modernity combined three ingredients into a new synthesis. Neither industrialism, nor nationalism, nor

democracy can be equated with modernity, but after they are fused in a modern state we can identify them

as the necessary strands of a weave called “modern”.

40

states and reunite divided nations, giving their citizens the advantages they feel deprived

of in the states where they live. In fact, this mood has now become global. Governments

in many First World states also are now increasingly are hard pressed by movements

among members of indigenous or national minorities within their own boundaries. The

distinctive feature of these movements is the negative attitude of the supporters of

citizenship in the states where they live, and on the other hand their desire to assert their

rights, as “nations,” to govern themselves. Their concrete goals range from demands for

independence or the reunification of divided nations to the acceptance of autonomy (a

nation within a nation) as an acceptable goal.

Many decolonizing states like India adopted federal structures in an attempt to manage

their diverse populations or to maintain institutional continuity with their colonial past.

But in case of Russian Federation the logic of disintegration was very much prominent.

Though it seems different but in fact, there was challenge before both the countries to

keep their territorial integrity intact. Being a multi-ethnic country it becomes difficult for

both countries to accommodate theirs diversity or what Hardgrave termed as ‘dilemmas

of diversity’ (Hardgrave 1993).

The main dilemma before the Russian political leaders after the disintegration of Soviet

Union was to harmonize nation and state-building processes. Actually, the specter of

regional separatism has haunted Russian politics since the collapse of the Soviet Union

(Sakawa 2004). At the same time, the Russian federal system is basically asymmetrical

and bureaucratic in nature, and it is based on a series of treaties between the center and

constituent units (Lynn and Novice 1997) rather than on an effective constitution