russian separatism in crimea and nato-elena mizrokhi

8/10/2019 Russian Separatism in Crimea and Nato-Elena Mizrokhi

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Russian separatism in Crimea and NATO:Ukraines big hope, Russias grand gamble

By Elena MizrokhiResearch assistant for the Chaire de recherche du Canada sur les conflits identitaires et le

terrorisme and for the Programme Paix et scurit internationales, Institut qubcois des hautes tudes internationales (HEI)

MA student in International Studies at Laval University, Quebec cityAugust 2009


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Table of contents

Page

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................1

1. Brief history of Crimea ............................................................................................................2

2. Crimean Identities ................................................................................................4

3. The beginning of demands for Crimean autonomy ..............................................................4

4. Involvement of Russia in this first phase of Russian separatism in Crimea ..................8

5. Why was there no war in Crimea? .......................................................................................10

6. Moscows entanglement round one: lessons learned ...........................................................11

7. Ukraine and NATO ............................................................................................................12

8. Russian separatists 2000 .............................................................................................14

9. The significance of the August Crisis in Georgia ................................................................18

CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................19

BIBLIOGRAPHY..........................................................................................................................21


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Introduction

The Russian incursion into Georgia inAugust 2008 provoked the fear amongWestern political circles and the media thatsimilar Russian military intervention was

possible in other irredentist regions in theCommonwealth of Independent States withlarge Russian minorities like Crimea. Crimea,

part of Imperial Russia since the late 18thcentury, was handed to Soviet Ukraine by theGeneral Secretary of the Communist Partyand the leader of the Soviet Union NikitaKhrushchev in 1954. It became part ofindependent Ukraine in 1991 when the SovietUnion collapsed. 1 Consequently, the Crimeanquestion is often labelled as a Russian

problem. 2 The tensions concerning Crimeaare as much a result of Ukrainian national

politics and external ambitions as the Russianones. In other words, the political situation inCrimea is inextricable linked to the state ofRusso-Ukrainian relations.

A key element in the polemics betweenUkraine and Russia is the 11.3 million-strongRussian minority in Ukraine. 3 While the

overwhelming share of the Russian speaking population resides in the Eastern part of thecountry, only in one region does this minorityrepresent a majority the Crimean peninsula.According to the 1989 census, 67.04 percentof the population of Crimea of 2.43 millionwere Russian and 25.7 percent Ukrainian.Moreover, nearly half of the ethnicUkrainians on the peninsula consideredRussian their native tongue. 4 While self- 1 Thomson Reuters, Ukraine dismisses fears ofCrimea Separatist Crisis,http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSLG374528.2 Roman Solchanyk, The Politics of State Building:Centre-Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine,

Europe-Asia Studies, 46/ 1 (1994), p. 49.3 Ibid., p. 48.4 Janusz Bugajski, Ethnic Relations and RegionalProblems in Independent Ukraine, in Ukraine: A

identification with Russia in the region doesnot follow clear ethnic lines, the vote forUkrainian independence in 1991 only got54.19 percent of support in Crimea in linewith the ethnic divisions further highlighting

the cleavage between the two ethnic groups.5

This schism is representative of the politicallandscape not just in Crimea but in Ukraineas a whole. Crimea was from the outset theregion most hostile to Ukrainianindependence. The support for the countryssovereignty was by far the lowest in Crimeawith the majority of Ukrainian regionsgenerating a support in the ninety percentile.While it would be too reductionist and

primordial to assume that the Russian population of Ukraine is always andexclusively antagonistic to Ukrainian nationalinterests, there is some truth in arguing thatthe minority envisions the countrys nationalgoals differently. The fact that Crimea is theonly region in modern Ukraine to enjoy thestatus of an Autonomous Republic speaksvolumes about the idiosyncrasy of its

political climate.

Ukraines decision to become member ofthe North American Treaty Organization(NATO), a military alliance formed in 1947to counter the Soviet threat, has been thedeterminant factor in the evolution of the

search for National identity, ed. Sharon L. Wochik andVolodymyr Zviglaynich (Maryland: Rowman andLittlefield Publishers Inc, 2000), p. 173.5 Solchanyk, The Politics of State Building, p. 49.(Percentage of voters supporting Ukrainianindependence from December 1 1991: Eastern UkraineWestern Ukraine Donetsk 83.90 L'viv 97.46 Luhans'k83.86 Ivano-Frankovsk 98.42 Zaporizhzhya 90.66Ternopil' 98.67 Dnipropetrovs'k 90.36 Volyn' 96.32Kharkiv 86.33 Rivno 95.96 Zakarpattya 92.59Southern Ukraine Chernivtsi 92.78 Crimean ASSR54.19 Odessa 85.38 Cities Kherson 90.13 Kyiv 92.88Mykolaiv 89.45 Sevastopol' (Crimea) 57.07 CentralUkraine Kyiv 95.52 Poltava 94.93 Chernihiv 93.74Sumy 92.61 Cherkasy 96.03 Kirovohrad 93.88Zhytomyr 95.06 Khmel'nyts'kyi 96.30 Vinnytsya95.43)


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political status quo in the region, in particularwith respect to the increase in pro-Russiangroups. This resolve on behalf of the EasternEuropean nation formerly part of the WarsawPact is responsible for Ukraine being set on a

collision course with Russia who views NATOs Eastern enlargement as a directthreat to its security and foreign policy. Therise of pro-Russian political parties and civilsociety organisations in Crimea musttherefore be viewed in the context of thechanging nature of Russo-Ukrainianrelations, in particular with respect to theformers geopolitical resurgence and thelatters policy towards NATO.

This article contends that there is noviable separatist or irredentist threat inCrimea. Instead the small groups that doargue for Crimean independence or politicalunion with the Slavic Peoples of Belarus andRussia are marginal specks on the Crimean

political radar and do not represent a seriousthreat to Ukraines territorial integrity.However Russia has attempted to exaggeratethe danger and potency of these political andcultural associations in order to hinder or just

plainly sabotage Ukraines admission to NATO and to extend the lease of the military base located in Sevastopol (Crimea) wherethe Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) isanchored. In order to understand thecomplexities of the political situation inCrimea that has drawn, at least temporarily,the watchful gaze of the West a carefulexamination of the regions past and the morerecent political developments is paramount.

1. Brief history of Crimea

Ukraine occupies the strategicallyimportant space between the newly enlargedEuropean Union, the Russian Federation andthe Black Sea region of Turkey. Throughouthistory Ukraine was a battle ground over

which the major powers in the region, 6 suchas the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, theOttoman Empire, the Polish-LithuanianCommonwealth, the Crimean Tatar Khanateand Muscovy. 7 In modern times this region

was the crossroads of the Russian, Habsburg,and Ottoman empires belongingintermittently to each kingdom. 8 Within itscontemporary boundaries Ukraine exists forthe first time in its history as an independentstate. 9 The Crimean peninsula in the Southernmost part of Ukraine separates the Azov fromBlack seas making it the envy of any powervying for the control of the maritime bodies.Its critical location was chiefly disputed

between the Ottoman and Russian Empiresthat have both left their distinct marks on theregion.

The two centuries that the peninsula spentunder Imperial and then Communist Russianrule, probably because this was the lastforeign power to be present in Crimea,altered the regions ethnic and politicalmakeup. Crimea was conquered by Russiaafter numerous military campaigns againstthe Ottoman Empire in 1783. 10 The tsaristand Soviet historiography never presentedCrimea as the territory of one national group.Interestingly enough, it was the CrimeanTatar National Assembly (Kurultay) thatrevived the name Crimea (Qirim) followingthe October Revolution. Under the sloganCrimea for the Crimeans, the Kurultay andthe National Party (Milli Firqa) proposed amultiethnic Crimea as an autonomous unit

6 Gwendolyn Sasse, The Crimea Question: identity,transition and conflict (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 2007), p. 1.7 Kasia Woscuk, Catching up with Europe?constitutional debates on the territorial-administrativemodel in independent Ukraine, (Working Paper,University of Birmingham, 2001), p. 4.8 Sasse, The Crimea Question , op. cit., p. 19 Ibid.10 Jacob Hedeskog, Crimea after the Georgia Crisis,

FOI, (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency,2008), p. 10.


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within the Russian Federation. 11 This demandwas not well received by the Central Sovietgovernment that instead proceeded to silencethe Tatar intelligentsia. The 1930s - a periodof repression and forced collectivization in

the USSR, resulted in 35 to 40 thousandCrimean Tatars, out of a population of over200 thousand, being deported to Siberia. Thelarge majority of the Tatars that wereuntouched by the purges unfortunately didnot escape mass deportations following theend of the Second World War that sent theremaining members of the ethnic group to theSoviet Central Asian Republics ofUzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan aswell as various other locations in the SovietUnion. A large Slavic population influxoccurred in the 1930s as a result of the Soviet

policy of regional development. 12 Thesedemographic changes permanently altered theethnic balance in the region. After WWIIeven more emphasis was placed on theRussian or Slavic character of Crimea. Inthis new historical conception the CrimeanTatars appeared as the foreign occupiersthereby being denied their historicalattachment to the territory. This fed perfectlyinto the revisionist approach to the regionshistory, part of the Stalinist policy toeradicate the vestiges of Crimean Tatarlengthy and rich presence on the peninsula inthe aftermath of the 1944 deportation. 13 Existing scholarship tells us very little aboutthe motivations surrounding NikitaKhrushchevs 1954 decision to transferCrimea to the Ukrainian Socialist SovietRepublic aside from the fact that the transferof Crimea occurred during a period defined

by de-Stalinization after the leaders death. 14 All that is certain is that by the time thatCrimea was given to Ukraine its ethnic andlinguistic constitution has been transformed

11 Sasse, The Crimea Question, op. cit, p. 44.12 Ibid., p. 94.13 Ibid., p. 69.14 Ibid., p. 118.

as a result of the above mentioned Soviet policies.

The period during which Crimea belonged to the Russian Soviet Federative

Social Republic added a layer of Russianhistory to the region with otherwise deepnon-Russian roots. The multiethnic characterof Crimea is further reinforced by deeplyrooted symbolic, literary, and historicalmemories that provide ample material forethno political mobilization and exclusiveclaims to the territory. 15 Three competingviews of the regions history emerging fromthe main ethnic groups of the region exist.The Tatar view perceives the groupsstatehood between the fifteenth-eighteenthcenturies significant as evidence of the factthat they are the only indigenous Crimean

people and Crimea is thus their onlyhomeland. According to the Russian viewCrimea is naturally part of the Russian world,while the Tatars were part of the Mongolinvasion and collaborators. The Crimea isregarded as an important remnant of the gloryof Catherine the Great and the TsaristRussian Empire. For Ukrainians Crimea wasalways linked to Ukraine through geography,culture and ethnicity prior to, and includingthe medieval Kyiv Rus state. 16 These threecompeting narratives constitute the bone ofcontention in the Crimean question. Theyexplain why there have been continued ethnictensions in Crimea and why the questioncontinues to illicit such a heated responsefrom the three ethnic communities on the

peninsula, the central Ukrainian governmentas well as the major third party to thecontested area the Russian Federation.

15 Ibid., p. 616 Taras Kuzio, Ukraine Crimea Russia: triangle ofConflict, (Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag, 2007), 96.


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2. Crimean Identities

Nonetheless, the competition between thehistorical narratives has not yet and in alllikelihood will not translate into a fullfledged civil war, or in fact anythingremotely close to such scenario. Themultiethnicity of Crimeas population has

prevented clear-cut ethno politicalmobilization and consequent polarization.Pro-Russian orientation of Crimea is a resultof the well preserved national consciousnessof the Russian population on the peninsulaand thus has greatly undermined the risk ofany separatism in Crimea. 17 However, thisnationalist driven movement provedunsustainable because of a blurred Soviet andRussian identities. 18 In fact, Crimeans holdvery much conflicting attitude towards theregions future. Firstly, most residents of the

peninsula do not share the view that Crimeashould secede from Ukraine. All the while,the overwhelming majority of the sameCrimeans, of nearly all ethnic groups, speakout in favour of Crimea to become part ofRussia. 19 The apparent widespread supportfor dual Russian-Ukrainian citizenship

provides a sharp illustration of the extent towhich East and South Ukrainians have beenseeking to find a new status whichaccommodates the Russian component of theregional identity. 20 The regions attitudetowards Ukrainian statehood may be bestdescribed as ambivalent: the population isattracted by both Ukraine and Russia, butnever fully content in its relations with either.It is important to note that although ethnicRussians constitute the majority of theCrimean population, they are not the only

17 Paul S. Pirie, National Identity and Politics inSouthern and Eastern Ukraine, Europe-Asia Studies ,48/7 (Nov. 1996), p. 1090.18 Sasse, The Crimea Question, op. cit., p. 8.19 Pirie, National Identity and Politics in Southern andEastern Ukraine,, op. cit., p. 1097.20 Ibid.

community arguing for a more Russia centric policy for the region and for Ukraine aswhole. Hence the political climate of theregion is very much a mirror image of theethnic climate: neither fully pro-Ukrainian

nor fully pro-Russian, but hovering betweenthe two. 21 The absence of rigid ethniccleavages in Crimea, in theory, diminishesthe support base for either group in case of anethnically driven conflict or a nationalistic

political agenda. In practice, political groupswith several conflicting agendas did blossomin the mid 90s but were not able to sustaintheir political support base. The Russian

political parties and associations thatemerged after Ukrainian independencequickly fragmented and the ones that werecreated in the wake of Vladimir Putins

presidency (and the Orange Revolution) haveonly survived due to Russian externalassistance to these movements that seek to

portray Crimea as the battleground for anethnic conflict, a condition that would hinderUkraines accession to NATO. The multiple

political identifications present in Crimea, intheory and in practice, greatly diminish therisks of a violent ethnic confrontation on the

peninsula. The region, whose Russianmajority has not as in the cases of Abkhaziaand South Ossetia aligned itself with Russia,nonetheless symbolizes a playground forRussias power ambitions in the region.

3. The beginning of demands forCrimean autonomy

The so called Russian separatism inCrimea sprang up in the fertile politicalclimate of the early 90s during which akaleidoscope group of actors producedvarious political demands. The potential forconflict in Crimea existed in the first half ofthe 1990s because of the presence of twofactors. First, the Tatar minority who had and

21 Ibid., p. 1098.


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has historical grievance of ethnic cleansing aswell as contemporary grievances over racial,socio-economic and political discrimination.The second factor that threatened to undo thedelicate balance on the peninsula is the

presence of a large Russian minority thatafter the collapse of the Soviet Union founditself abroad in independent Ukraine. 22 Infact, Crimean separatism was notspearheaded by the Crimean Russians.Instead, it were the Tatars and theCommunists that were most active on the

political scene. The Russian coalition per sewas not formed until 1993.

During the Gorbachev era of reforms(1984 1991) various political movements(pro-Ukrainian, communist, and pro-Russian)arose in Crimea and later transformed into

political parties. These parties began bydemanding the restoration of Crimeanautonomy, pointing to the special status ofthe Crimea in 1989, and later demanding aregional referendum on the peninsulas statusto co-inside with the nationwide referendumon Ukraines future on 1 st December 1991. 23 It was first and foremost the CommunistParty of Crimea that began to mobilize publicopinion in support of Crimean self-determination. The local elections in March1990 confirmed the Communist Partys gripon regional government, and the debate aboutautonomy intensified thereafter. 24 The firstconcrete step to restore autonomy was taken

by the Crimean Oblast' Soviet in September1990, when it adopted a statement addressedto the USSR and RSFSR Supreme Sovietsregarding the need to nullify the 1945-46decision regarding the change in theautonomous status of the Socialist SovietRepublic to an oblast, an administrative unit

22 Kuzio, Ukraine Crimea Russia: triangle ofConflict , op. cit., p. 109.23 Tkachuk, The Crimea: Chronicle of separatism,1992-1995, op. cit., p. 6.24 Sasse, The Crimea Question: identity, transition andconflict , op. cit., p. 135.

hierarchically inferior to a Republic. 25 Themovement was led by Nikolai Bagrov, thechairman of Crimean parliament, and hisassociate Leonid Grach who were the

principal figures responsible for advancing

and framing the debate on the regionsautonomy. The demands concerning thestatus of Crimea gained momentum afterUkraine's declaration of state sovereignty inJuly 1990. 26 The separatist movement of theearly 90s, of which Russian groupsrepresented the last and final wave, should beviewed in the context of and as a reaction toUkrainian nationalism. 27

The drive for the regions sovereigntyaccelerated swiftly. The Supreme Soviet ofCrimea issued a declaration on the state andlegal status of the peninsula declaring theabolition of Crimea's autonomyunconstitutional and maintaining that theCrimeans were entitled to the restoration oftheir statehood in the form of the CrimeanAutonomous Socialist Soviet Republic(ASSR). At the same time, the deputiesdecided to hold a referendum on 20 January1991 on the question of peninsulasindependence. The referendum, in which81.4% of eligible voters cast their ballots,resulted in a 93.3% show of support for therestoration of the Crimean ASSR. Themajority of Crimean Tatars, however,

boycotted the vote, maintaining that theyalone were entitled to decide Crimea's fate. 28 The establishment of the Crimean ASSR in1991 made it the last soviet ASSR, but alsothe first and only one to have beenestablished by a popular vote. 29 The local

25 Solchanyk, The Politics of State Building,, op.cit., p. 51.26 Ibid.27 Sasse, The Crimea Question: identity, transition andconflict , op. cit., p. 20.28 Solchanyk, The Politics of State Building, op. cit.,

p. 51.29 Sasse, The Crimea Question: identity, transition andconflict , op. cit., p. 138.


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sovereignist parties tried to gain momentumfollowing the success of the first referendum.Another local referendum was underway onthe independence of the Republic of Crimeain union with other states?' 30 The campaign

went into full swing at the beginning of 1992,and within a matter of months the RepublicanMovement for Crimea (RDK), a pro-Russian

party, was able to secure well over the 180000 signatures required by law to hold a vote,thereby setting the stage for a directconfrontation with Kyiv. 31 Shortly before adecision on the referendum was scheduled to

be taken by the Crimean parliamentUkrainian President Leonid Kravchuk issueda strongly worded statement condemning thereferendum campaign, which he maintainedwas being organized by separatistsdetermined to destabilize the situation, sowdiscord among the peoples of Crimea and

between Crimea and Ukraine, and exacerbateUkrainian-Russian relations. 32 However atthis stage in the game neither the Ukrainiannor the Crimean authorities were ready tonegotiate compromise.

While regional leaders in Crimea werefocused on pursuing their separatistambitions; national Ukrainian governmentinitiated the first steps towards a federalistsolution to the tensions on the peninsula.

Notably, the Ukrainian parliament adopted adraft law 'On the Delineation of Power

between Ukraine and the Republic ofCrimea'. The document, which had beenagreed upon by both sides, defined Crimea asan autonomous part of Ukraine bestowingupon it jurisdiction over all questions withinits competence. But the final version of theagreement was a lot different i.e. moredetrimental to Crimea from the originally

30 Solchanyk, The Politics of State Building, op. cit., p. 52.31 Ibid.32 Ibid., p. 55.

convened upon draft. 33 The agreement was perceived by Crimean authorities and theTatars as an act of betrayal. The Mejliscondemned the so-called Agreement ondivision of powers between Ukraine and the

Crimea that was concluded without theconsent of the Crimean-Tatar people. 34 Kyivs mismanagement of the power-sharingagreement was a catalyst to Crimeas callsfor autonomy that soon after this incidenttook on a more separatist character.

Tensions worsened on May 5 th, 1992when the Crimean Verkhovna Rada (theCrimean Parliament), in a move initiated byYuri Meshkov, the leader of the RDK,adopted the Act on State Independence ofCrimea and a new constitution. It alsodecided to hold the referendum onindependence (and union with other states)on August 2, 1992. 35 The new Crimeanconstitution was highly ambiguous as itreferred to the Republic as a state and yet itreaffirmed its place within Ukraine. 36 Byadopting the constitution and threatening areferendum on independence, Nikolai Bagrovwanted Kyiv to make concessions andnegotiate a better deal. 37 The Ukrainian

parliament did indeed intervene. On May 13,1992 the Verkhovna Rada of Ukrainecondemned the Act as anti-constitutional and

proposed that the Crimean Verkhovna Radacancel it within two weeks. 38 PresidentKravchuk and Crimean leader Bagrovworked out a compromise that included thedemand that within two weeks the Crimean

parliament rescind its declaration andreferendum, a requirement which it

33 Ibid.34Tkachuk, The Crimea: Chronicle of separatism,1992-1995 , op. cit., p. 9.35 Ibid., op. cit., p. 1536 Sasse, The Crimea Question: identity, transition andconflict, op. cit., p. 146.37 Ibid.38 Tkachuk, The Crimea: Chronicle of separatism,1992-1995 , op. cit., p. 25.


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eventually fulfilled. 39 The two parties agreedupon the status of Crimea as a constituent

part of Ukraine that would have the necessary political and legal possibilities to realise itsunique potential, including the right to

independent ties with other countries in thesocial, economic and cultural spheres. 40 Thisdeclaration was adopted as a law by theCrimean Parliament shortly after the Junemeeting. This political setting in the region

became the perfect fertile ground for the political ascendancy of more radicalmovements.

It was in this context of politicaldisillusionment with Kyiv, and what seemedto be, a general support for some sort ofseparation of powers with Ukraines nationalgovernment that Russian separatists came to

power in Crimea. The victory in Presidentialelections held in Crimea in January of 1993was claimed by Yuri Meshkov. 41 Meshkovran on the ticket of the recently establishedRussia Bloc and promised to give new life toa referendum on Crimeas status. Meshkovscampaign appealed more to the amorphous

pro-Russian sentiment of the ethnic Russianmajority of Crimea and many Russian-speaking Ukrainians. 42 It should beemphasized that Meshkovs election platformwas not separatist or even uniquely pro-Russian. In fact, the party was alwaysdeliberately vague as to whether they were infavour of an independent Crimea or a unionwith Russia. Moreover, the electoral victorycould be partially attributed to the pro-

39 Sasse, The Crimea Question: identity, transition andconflict, op. cit., p. 23.40 Solchanyk, The Politics of State Building, op. cit.,

p. 56.41 Tkachuk, The Crimea: Chronicle of separatism,1992-1995 , op. cit., p. 73 (According to the Centralelectoral commission data, more than a millionCrimean residents that make up 72.9 per of the

population voted for him).42 Sasse, The Crimea Question: identity, transition andconflict, op. cit. , p. 158.

Russian politicians populist stance. Thecampaign of the Russia Bloc was based onsimple catch-all slogans emphasizing theneed for the further development of Crimeasstatehood, stabilization of the economic

crisis, the improvement of living standards, protection of Crimean citizens political andeconomic interests, and the establishment ofan independent foreign policy. 43 Meshkov,however, did not wait long to reveal his real

political goals. Despite the lack of a clear program, the first moves after his electoralvictory put him on a collision course withKyiv. The newly elected Crimean President

proceeded with plans to hold a regionalreferendum, though he claimed that it would

be non-binding. He also appointed EvgeniiSaburov, a Russian citizen and Moscoweconomist, to the post of Crimean deputyPrime Minister in charge of economic affairsand called for a regional boycott of theelections to the Ukrainian parliament. Inaddition, Meshkov literally put Crimea into anew time zone by switching the clocks toMoscow time. 44 However, the leadersdecision to boycott the parliamentaryelections had backfired. This action had infact limited Meshkovs capacity to influencedecisions in Kyiv. Taking advantage of aseries of strategic mistakes made by Meshkovand the economic crash in the region, Kyivgradually regained control over all of theregions power structures. 45 Thus theexpeditious rise to power of Russianseparatists on the wave of public discontentwith Kyivs policies can also explain themovements quick swift falling out of favourwith the Crimean population. The formerrealised that the Russia Bloc was unable tomarkedly improve the peninsulas socio-economic situation, which was at the root ofthe regions discontent with Ukrainesnational government.

43 Ibid., p. 160.44 Ibid., p. 161.45 Ibid., p. 170.


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4. Involvement of Russia in this firstphase of Russian separatism in

Crimea

Russian involvement in Crimean politics, particularly in questions regarding theregions independence, is a result of aresidual feeling among certain Russian

politicians that Crimea is a historic andintegral part of Russia. For the Federation,the difficulty in accepting Ukrainesindependence after the break-up of the SovietUnion has been accompanied by a fairlystrong conviction that Ukrainianindependence is a temporary phenomenon.

This perception was most pronounced amongRussian communists and radical nationalists.Communist Duma deputy and deputychairman of the Duma committee forgeopolitics Yuri Nikiforenko gave a

passionate explanation for the inevitability ofthe reunification of Russia and Ukraineduring the March 1998 debate about whetheror not to ratify the Russian-UkrainianFriendship Treaty: 'We do not need just a partof Ukraine. We need all of Ukraine theyearning of the peoples is for this tohappen'. 46 Inflammatory rhetoric by SupremeSoviet deputies like Alexander Rutskoi andOleg Rumiantsev while visiting Crimea anddeclarations of support for Crimeanseparatists from the extremist NationalSalvation Front, Pravda, and others generated

pressure against Kyiv. Anatoly Sobchak,Mayor of St. Petersburg, and a leadingmember of the Movement for DemocraticReforms argued that Crimea has never

belonged to Ukraine and that there are nolegal or moral grounds for Ukraine to layclaim to the Crimea. 47 Public opinion also

46 Tor Bukkvoll, Off the Cuff Politics: ExplainingRussia's Lack of a Ukraine Strategy, Europe-AsiaStudies , 53/ 8 (Dec. 2001), p. 1142.47 Sasse, The Crimea Question: identity, transition andconflict, op. cit., p. 15.

seemed to agree with this heavilynationalistic stance. In a poll administered in1992 51% of respondents thought Russia andUkraine should reunite into one state, and31% thought they should remain separate

countries but with open borders. Only 8%thought the two countries should develop thesame kind of relations that they had withother countries (border control, visaregulations, and customs etc). 48 WhileRussias official position did notscrupulously follow this view, it wasnonetheless an opinion shared by more than

just a marginal group of politicians.

The strong nationalist rhetoric emanatingfrom certain Russian political milieus wasaccompanied by legislative resolutions anddebates that further enflamed the question. Inmid-January 1992 the Committee on ForeignAffairs and External Economic Ties headed

by Vladimir Lukin, one of the founders ofRussian liberal-democratic party Yabloko,distributed to Russian law makers its motion

proposing that the Russian Supreme Sovietdeclare the 1954 decision invalid and withoutlegal force. 49 Consequently, the Russian

parliament voted overwhelmingly to adoptthe resolution instructing two of itscommittees to examine the constitutionalityof the 1954 decision. 50 Throughout 1992-1993 the Russian parliament escalated itsdemands towards Crimea and Sevastopol.The Duma and Ministry of Foreign Affairsfinally condemned the transfer of Crimea toUkraine on 23 January 1992, eliciting astrong protest from Ukraine. 51 Russo-Ukrainian relations continued to worsen

progressively after this declaration. RussianVice-President Alexander Rutskoi visited

48 Bukkvoll, Off the Cuff Politics, op. cit., p. 1143.49 Solchanyk, The Politics of State Building, op. cit.,

p. 52.50 Ibid.51 Taras Kuzio, Russia Crimea Ukraine: Triangleof Conflict (London: Research Institute for the Studyof Conflict and Terrorism, 1994), p. 15.


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Crimea in April 1992 where he called for itssecession from Ukraine and a month later theRussian parliament passed a resolutiondeclaring the 1954 transfer of the Crimeaillegal. 52 The active calls of the Duma for

Crimean independence and/or reunificationwith Russia appeared only after Meschkov, atthe head of the Russian coalition came to

power in Crimea. The developments inCrimea and Russia worked together hand inhand thereby putting double pressure onKyiv. However, the mainstream Russian

politicians were not so keen to address thequestion of Crimean status within Ukraine asto determine the status of the Russias BlackSea Fleet stationed in Sevastopol.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin, for themost part, distanced himself from these

parliamentary resolutions. In fact themembers of the Russian political elite whoeagerly supported the Russian separatistmovement in Crimea were avid critics of theYeltsin government. 53 While the governmentitself pursued a moderate approach towardsthe peninsula he continued to argue throughthe Russian ambassador to Ukraine thatSevastopol, the home of the BSF should beleased to Russia. 54 Yeltsin on severaloccasions has maintained that the Crimeanquestion is an internal Ukrainian matter andhas attempted to distance himself from the

patriots. 55 Nonetheless, Kremlins actual policies often contradicted the governmentsofficial position on the Crimean question. Forinstance, in May 1992 a power-sharingagreement was finally reached by

parliamentary delegations from Crimea andKyiv. 56 At this juncture Yeltsin dispatched

52 Ibid.53 Astrid S. Tuminez, Russian Nationalism since 1856:

Ideology and the Making of Foreign Policy (Boston:Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), p. 240.54 Ibid.55 Solchanyk, The Politics of State Building, op. cit.,

p. 53.56 Ibid., p. 54.

none other than Rutskoi to Crimea (and to the breakaway Dniester Republic on Moldova'sleft bank) at the head of a delegation. InSevastopol' Rutskoi restated Russia's claim toCrimea, arguing that 'common sense' dictated

that the peninsula should be part of Russia.57

Through political appointments Yeltsinsclaim of neutrality on the issue waseffectively undermined by the declarations ofhis appointees to the region.

1993 marked a turning point in theofficial Russian foreign policy away fromAndrei Kozyrevs pro-western so-calledatlanticist orientation, to a more nationalisticRussia first approach that mirrored the

position of supports of Crimean separatists.In mid July 1993 when the Russian

parliament gave instruction to prepare a draftlaw on enshrining the federal status of thetown of Sevastopol in the Constitution of theRussian Federation the vote was passed with166 for and 1 against. 58 This shift acceleratedafter the victory of Communist and extremenationalist parties in December 1993 RussianDuma elections. Certainly, much of therhetoric by Russian politicians on the Crimeaissue was for domestic consumption inRussia, principally for electoral gain. 59 Thedegree to which the Russian patriots viewedthe Black Sea Fleet and Crimean questions asinterrelated became fully apparent with the

publication of excerpts from a letter sent byLukin to Ruslan Khasbulatov, Chairman ofthe Russian Supreme Soviet, recommending,among other things, that Crimea be used as a

bargaining chip in the dispute over the fleet. 60 In essence, the highest echelons of Russian

post-Soviet power wanted to put pressure onUkraine via the threat of a civil conflict inCrimea (and Russias direct military

57 Ibid.58 Kuzio, Russia Crimea Ukraine: Triangle ofConflict , op. cit., p. 16.59 Sasse, The Crimea Question, op. cit., p. 232.60 Solchanyk, The Politics of State Building, op. cit.,

p. 52.


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interference in it) in order to secure its accessto Sevastopol the headquarters of RussiasBlack Sea Fleet.

5. Why was there no war in Crimea?

In the early 1990s Crimea stood on the brink of conflict and nearly became a hotspotanalogous to the explosive Caucasus region. 61 Similar to the state policies in the countries ofthe Caucasus cauldron, under the presidencyof Leonid Kravchuk, the Ukrainiangovernment found it difficult to promote aunified nationwide political ideology toencourage integration and loyalty to the newstate. 62 Two peaks of crises occurred inrelations between Ukraine and Crimea. Thefirst one in May 1992, when the peninsuladeclared sovereignty and adopted asecessionist constitution, and the second oneduring the mandate of Yuri Meshkov, aRussian nationalist leader, who was electedCrimean President. 63 In general post-independence, Kyiv has proven both hesitantand hamstrung in imposing its authority inthe more Russophone Eastern and Southernregions of Ukraine, which have pressed forfar reaching autonomy. 64 Some scholarsargue that the latency of the government torespond to the political happenings in Crimeacontributed to the absence of ethnic violencein Crimea. In contrast to the Caucasus, it wasthe reluctance of the Ukrainian authorities touse force when suppressing the separatistmovement in Crimea in the mid-1990s thatcontributed to the blood-shed free resolutionof the conflict in the 90s. 65

61 Hedeskog, Crimea after the Georgia Crisis, op.cit., p. 12.62 Bugajski, Ethnic Relations and Regional Problemsin Independent Ukraine, op. cit., p. 167.63 Hedeskog, Crimea after the Georgia Crisis, op.cit., p. 12.64 Bugajski, Ethnic Relations and Regional Problemsin Independent Ukraine, op. cit., p. 167.65 Hedeskog, Crimea after the Georgia Crisis, op.cit., p. 13.

In its quest to regain control of itsterritory, Kyiv, was undoubtedly aided by thefragility and instability of the pro-Russianseparatist coalition. The secessionistmovement in Crimea collapsed in 94-95 due

to internal quarrels, lack of substantialRussian support and Ukrainian economic, political and military pressure. 66 Support forthe Russia Bloc disintegrated by the end of1994 due to infighting between the CrimeanSupreme Soviet and the Crimean president.The Russian nationalists were also unable todeal with the economic crisis or attractforeign investment and tourists. 67 TheRussian Bloc had always been a compromiseof two tendencies. One of these had stood fora sovereign, democratic Crimean state inunion with Ukraine, Belarus and Russiawithin the CIS. The second more radicalstrand called for unification of Crimea withRussia. This last movement was too radial formost Crimeans and never received supportfrom Russia, unlike covert Russian supportfor Abkhaz and Trans-Dniester separatism. 68 By mid- to late 1994, the Russianmovements failure to deliver effectivesocioeconomic policies discredited it in thevoters eyes. 69 Russian nationalists were alsoat a distinct disadvantage in two areascompared to other CIS conflicts. First, Russia

provided little support beyond rhetoric.Second, the Ukrainian authorities controlledthe security forces stationed in the Crimea,with the exception of the BSF, which provedto be an important deterrent against violent

political acts. 70 All in all, the pro-Russianmovement in Crimea was neither sufficientlyunified nor considered important enough byRussia to support these separatist - the two

66 Ibid..67 Kuzio, Ukraine Crimea Russia: triangle ofConflict, op. cit., p. 163.68 Ibid., p.162.69 Sasse, The Crimea Question: identity, transition andconflict, op. cit., p. 172.70 Kuzio, Ukraine Crimea Russia: triangle ofConflict, op. cit., p. 110.


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element that have led to the downfall ofRussian separatism in the 90s.

The steady institutionalization of the newUkrainian state through elections, party

development, and center-regional interactionshelped to contain the conflict potentialinherent in the Crimean issue. Admittedly,even through the turbulent period from 1991-1994 politics was conducted within theconfines of institutions, and all but small-scale and episodic street violence wasavoided. Even the more radical Russiannationalists operated through regional

political institutions and organizations, andcompeted in the regional and sometimes evenin national elections. 71 By October 1994 theRussia Bloc fractured into three factions.Moreover, some former Russian movementdeputies and some belonging to the CrimeanTatar faction began to work together on anagreement with Kyiv. This realignmentreduced the ethnic political polarization andshifted Crimean politics back towards thecenter. 72 It also helped to reinforce Crimeasrelationship with the centre government. Theabolition of Crimean presidency by Kuchmaalso undoubtedly played a role. Moreimportantly, Crimeas political landscape wasreshaped by the 1996 Ukrainian constitution,which was designed to constrain regionalist

party development specifying that every party has to be registered as an all-Ukrainian party in a number of oblasts (regions). The ban on regional parties tied Crimean politicsmore closely to the centre, although regionalspecificities survived in non-partyorganizations or electoral blocs that alignedthemselves loosely with parties at thenational level. 73 The 1998 Crimean electionwas the final confirmation of the failure ofseparatism, following which the idea of union

71 Sasse, The Crimea Question: identity, transition andconflict, op. cit., p. 172.72 Ibid., p. 176.73 Ibid., p. 197.

with Russia had been transformed into vaguecalls for a Slavic one. The Crimean branch ofthe Communist Party of Ukraine took overthe reins of the Crimean Supreme Sovietmaking both main seats of power in the

Crimea out of reach for the Russian separatist parties. 74 Finally, on October 21, 1998, theCrimean Supreme Soviet adopted by a widemargin the fifth Crimean constitution since1991. Unlike previous drafts, in this one therewas no mention of Crimean statehood orcitizenship rights. Moreover, this new draftaccepted the Ukrainian as the state languageof Crimea. 75 Russias economic crash inearly 1998 undermined the belief that it could

be an attractive alternative option forCrimeas electorate serving the final blow tothe pro-Russian groups. 76 Despite thesuccessful resolution of the institutionalconflict of the 90s Crimean separatismremained a potential threat due to Moscowscontinued fuelling of the tensions through thedistribution of Russian passports to Ukrainiancitizens in Crimea. 77

6. Moscows entanglement roundone: lessons learned

The separatist pressures that emerged inCrimea immediately following the collapseof the Soviet Union largely subsided after1995. External developments in Russia

played a defining role in the limited successand longevity of the Russian separatist forcesin Crimea. The Chechen conflict providedUkraine with a window of opportunity to

74 Paul DAnieri, Robert Kravchuk, and Taras Kuzio, Politics and Society in Ukraine (Bolder: WestviewPress, 1999), p. 67.75 Ibid., p. 67.76Sasse, The Crimea Question: identity, transition andconflict, op. cit., p. 199.77 Taras Kuzio, BSU Stops Terrorism in Its Tracks,Eurasia Daily Monitor 5/237, December 12, 2008.http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34266.


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peacefully deal with its own separatistchallenge as Moscow showed littleinclination in supporting the Russianmovement in Crimea in its own time oftroubles. Additionally, the re-election of

Yeltsin as Russian President was the second blow to Russian separatists in Crimea whohad pinned their hopes on RussianCommunist leader Gennadiy Zyuganovwinning the election. 78 Finally, Meshkovs

brief term as president of Crimea probablytaught the Russian leadership the lesson thata strong separatist movement in Ukrainewould be difficult to control from Moscow -the high emotional content in Meshkov's

political messages that made quite a politicalstir in Moscow. 79 The Big Treaty, the twoagreements between Ukraine and Russia one on the division of the former SovietBlack Sea Fleet and one on Friendship, Co-operation and Partnership was signed in May1997. 80 The signature of the treaty and the1998 Ukrainian election brought an end tothe politically turbulent 90s in Crimea. Thisstage of the political instability was officially

brought to a close on December 25 1998,when the Russian State Duma ratified, withthe support of the Communists who oncechampioned Meshkov's cause, the Ukrainian Russian treaty, signifying Russianrecognition that Crimea is part of Ukraine. 81 At the time, the Federation was preoccupiedwith its own domestic politics and had little

political capital, or time, to dedicate to theCrimean question. However, the presence ofthe Federations Black Sea Fleet inSevastopol has tied, at least until 2017 whenthe lease of the base is set to expire, Russiaeven more firmly to the region. Of course, the

78 Kuzio, Ukraine Crimea Russia: triangle ofConflict, op. cit., p. 33.79 Bukkvoll, Off the Cuff Politics, op. cit., p. 1145.80 Hedeskog, Crimea after the Georgia Crisis, op.cit., p. 18.81 Paul DAnieri, Robert Kravchuk, and Taras Kuzio,

Politics and Society in Ukraine, op. cit., p. 67.

fleet will eventually have to relocate ifUkraine ever hopes to accede to NATO.

7. Ukraine and NATO

Ukraines political ambitions to join itsone time ideological and military rival

NATO has set off alarm bells in Russia.The countrys institutionalization of itsrelations with the alliance began in 1997 withthe signing of the NATO-Ukraine SpecialPartnership Charter. In 2002, Kuchmaannounced that Ukraine would apply for

NATO membership. However, thePresidents increasingly repressive domestic

policies and reports that he had authorizedthe sale of radar tracking systems to Iraqcompelled NATO to put relations withUkraine on hold for the latter half ofKuchmas mandate. 82 Viktor Yushchenko,Ukraines president since 2005, being highlysuspicious of Russia has his political compassset firmly on NATO accession. His risefollowing the success of Orange Revolutionof 2004 gave new impetus to Ukrainianambitions to join the military organization. In2005, NATO granted Ukraine IntensifiedDialogue status, which is generally regardedas an important preparatory step towardobtaining a Membership Action Plan theinitiative that prepares countries for NATOmembership. 83 Political differences withinthe Orange camp between the two leaders ofthe popular uprising Yushchenko and YuliaTymoshenko have inhibited the consolidationof democratic reforms and createduncertainties about Ukraines future politicalevolution and foreign policy orientation. 84 Tymoshenko, Ukraines Prime Minister andYushchenkos ally turned bitter rival, isambivalent on the issue of NATOmembership, while the former adversary of

82 F. Stephen Larrabee, Ukraine at the Crossroads,The Washington Quarterly , August 2007, p. 48.83 Ibid.84 Ibid., p. 45.


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both during the Orange Revolution, theleader of the Regions Party whose political

base lies in Eastern more pro-RussianUkraine, Viktor Yanukovych, is firmlyagainst. 85 The string of political crises in the

country following the democratic breakthrough of 2004 has left Ukraine in political limbo without a clear direction in itsdomestic or foreign policy putting its NATOaccession bid on hold.

The countrys attitude towards NATOfollows Ukraines habitual political cleavageof East-West. Ukraines presidential electionsare thus invariably perceived by internationalobservers deciding the countrys geopoliticalfuture as either lying with Russia or theWest. 86 However, one of the key problems inUkraine is that support for NATOmembership in general is much lower than itwas in other Easter European countries. The

poll in 2006 indicated that only 17 percent ofUkrainians supported this goal and 50 percentwould apparently vote against Ukrainesaccession to the alliance in a referendum. 87 This low support can be attributed to Soviet

propaganda against NATO throughout theCold War and is particularly strong inEastern and Southern areas of Ukraine thathave a strong history of Russian control.

Nowhere else in Ukraine is the questionof NATO membership so controversial as inCrimea and Sevastopol. In a disputedunofficial referendum held in Crimea inDecember 2006 98 percent voted againstUkraines possible accession to theorganization, while according to an opinion

poll in March 2007, 99 percent of theinhabitants of Sevastopol declared

85 Dmitry Trenin, Thinking Strategically AboutRussia (Carnegie Endowment International Centre,December 2008).86 Taras Kuzio, Ukrainian-Russian Cultural Conflict(Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor,Volume 6 Issue 87, May 6, 2009).87 Larrabee, Ukraine at the Crossroads, p. 49.

themselves against Ukraine entering thealliance. 88 These reached a crescendo in Juneand led to the first ever cancellation of jointmilitary exercises with the US and other

NATO countries through its Partnership for

Peace (PfP) programme. These exerciseshave been regularly held in Crimea and inmilitary bases in western Ukraine since1997. 89 Following an anti-NATO protest inFeodosiia in 2006, several towns and citiesaround Crimea declared themselves NATO-free territories, an action later proclaimedillegal by Ukrainian authorities. 90 Whileagitations continue in Crimea and other partsof Ukraine with respect to the prospects ofthe country eventually joining the alliance,Ukraines path to NATO is now de facto onhold until after the January 2010 presidentialelections. 91

Another issue that plays a defining role inUkraines hopes of NATO membership aswell as Russian policy towards Ukraine is thequestion of Russian Black Sea Fleet. TheBlack Sea region is one of the moststrategically important regions in Europe,

providing, in particular, a major trade linkand transit routes for Caspian energysupplies. 92 Russia's Black Sea Fleet is basedin the port of Sevastopol under a leasingagreement due to expire in 2017.Yushchenko has announced that the leasewill not be renewed and talks should focus onoverseeing the fleet's orderly departure. Infact, Ukrainian constitution bans thestationing of foreign troops on its soil,making a temporary exception for the currentaccord with Russia. Thus, an extension of theaccord of the lease would require a change inthe constitution, which makes it unlikely

88 Hedeskog, Crimea after the Georgia Crisis, p. 44.89 Taras Kuzio, Russian Subversion in the Crimea,

Janes Intelligence Digest, November 3 rd, 2006.90 Hedeskog, Crimea after the Georgia Crisis, op.cit., p. 44.91 Ibid., p. 48.92 Ibid., p. 52.


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because that would require a two-thirdsmajority in the Ukrainian Rada, an advantagethat none of the current Ukrainian parties,especially the Party of Regions that is infavour of extending the lease to Russia, have.

As a perspective NATO member, theescalating demands of the Ukrainian Orangegovernment for Russian withdrawal of theBSF was also driven by NATOs ban on non-

NATO member states having bases on NATO territory. 93 The Ukrainian presidenthas recently decreed that the Fleet mustnotify Kyiv of its movements in and out ofUkraines waters and disclose its armaments,

personnel; and precise mission. 94 So far,Moscow has declined to comply, saying itwill only be bound by bilateral agreements.However, the question of the Fleet is of

paramount importance to Russia for whomSevastopol provides a year round maritimeaccess. It is the overall fear of NATOadvancing into space that Russia hastraditionally viewed as part of its core zone ofinfluence that will make Ukraines NATOmembership a matter of discord betweenRussia and the West for years to come.

8. Russian separatists 2000

Russia has sought to instrumentalize the political fragility in Ukraine by increasing itsfinancial and moral support for the pro-Russian, and thus almost without exceptionanti-NATO, groups in Crimea in hopes offurther destabilizing the countrys domestic

political situation in favour of the anti-NATO political parties. As stated earlier, theseparatist pressures, while diminished,continued to exist in Crimea. Russian supportfor its compatriots abroad increased duringVladimir Putins presidency. Kyivs policytowards Crimea also took a sharp turn, partlydue to the more aggressive Russian stance on

93 Ibid., p. 20.94 Trenin, Thinking Strategically About Russia.

the issue but also as a result of a more pro-Western government that came to power withthe Orange Revolution and that soughtamong other things entry into NATO. Russiahas made no secret of its displeasure

regarding NATOs Eastern Enlargement.Ukraines accession to the militaryorganization would be viewed by Russia as agreat encroachment into its Near Abroadspace. That is precisely why the Federationwith the arrival of Putin has begun to fundvarious Russian separatist organisations and

political movements in Crimea that would jeopardize Ukraines admission to thealliance. State officials, political parties, civicorganisations, youth movements, Cossacks,the Orthodox Church and the universities all these pro-Russian entities have becomeinstruments in Russias propagandacampaign. 95 Russian-language media totallycontrols the information space in Crimea.One of the themes regularly raised in theRussian and Crimean media and by certainRussian politicians centres on the continuedquestioning of the status of Crimea. The

purpose of this appears to be to questionUkraines sovereignty in Sevastopol andCrimea in order to create a bilateral orinternational debate about the issue, probablyin hopes that Ukrainian territorial integritycan again form part of a deal on the extensionof the lease on the Black Sea Fleet station inSevastopol. 96

This situation is now significantlydifferent from that of the early 90s, withnumerous signs that Russia is taking anincreasingly active role in Crimea. Thegrowth of Russian nationalism and rise ofnationalist youth groups within Russia, suchas Nashi and the Eurasian Youth Movement,have led to the spread of their activities intoCrimea. These associations have taken part in

95 Hedeskog, Crimea after the Georgia Crisis, op.cit., p. 15.96 Ibid., p. 16.


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numerous anti-NATO and anti-US ralliesthere. 97 Through the Russian Federal SecurityService (FSB) and the Russian MilitaryIntelligence Service (GRU), Russia hassupplied intelligence on the location and

plans for military exercises, and has provided personnel to increase attendance at rallies anddemonstrations to pro-Russian NGOs andyouth groups. 98 During the June 2006 ralliesin Crimea against the Sea Breeze militaryexercise, many of the leading organizers werespouses of serving BSF officers. Thesesdemonstrations, which led to the cancellationof the military exercise envisioned as part ofthe Membership Action Plan, a NATOinitiative, were largely covered in theRussian-speaking media, both of Ukrainianand Russian origin. 99 The Crimean branch ofthe Pan-Slavic extremist organisationEurasian Youth Union is a subdivision of theinternational Eurasian movement founded byAlexander Dugin, a Moscow State University

professor and a Russian nationalist, withclose ties to the Kremlin. 100 Another pro-Russian youth organisation Breakthrough(Proryv), which also has branches in theunrecognised republics of Trans-Dniester,Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, is active inCrimea and other regions of the Ukraine. 101 Acriminal investigation by the UkrainianSpecial Service (SBU) was opened on theleaders of the youth organisation followingthe groups short film in which theyattempted to dig a ditch that would separatethe Crimean peninsula from Ukraine.

In addition, there has been a noticeable proliferation of political parties andorganization formed with religious andcultural agendas in tow. All of the groups

97 Taras Kuzio, Russian Subversion in the Crimea, Janes Intelligence Digest , November 3 rd, 2006.98 Hedeskog, Crimea after the Georgia Crisis, op.cit., p. 24.99 Ibid., p. 25.100 Ibid., p. 26.101 Ibid.

espouse hopes of some form of Slavic Union.Firstly, there is the Union of OrthodoxCitizens of Crimea, an organization createdin 2001 that seeks to protect the RussianOrthodox Church in the lands of the triad:

Ukraine, Russia and Crimea.102

According tothe party, Crimea is the cradle of theOrthodox Church. They advocate thatRussian people have the same heritage andthe same Orthodox faith. The RussianMovement of Crimea is another organizationcreated in 2001 in Simferopol. Its officialgoal is to protect the rights of the Russian

population in Crimea, or other people whoidentify themselves as Russian. 103 It is notclear what role Russia plays in sponsoringthese organizations, but regardless of thelinks between the two, these civil societygroups play a quite minimal function inCrimean politics. What is important to note istheir remarkable proliferation since thearrival of Putin in the Kremlin.

By far the most influential of the pro-Russian organisations in Crimea is theRussian Community of Crimea (RusskaiaObshina Kryma). It has 25 regionalorganisations operating in all cities andregions in Crimea and a membership ofapproximately 15,000 people. The leader,Sergei Tsekov is the First Deputy Speaker ofthe Crimean Verkhovna Rada. Since the mid-1990s, ROK has been financed by MoscowMayor Luzhkov and his then advisor andnow member of the Russian DumaKonstantin Zatulin and by the RussianMinistry of Foreign Affairs and thePresidential Administration. 104 The RussianCommunity, the Russian Youth Centre ofCrimea, and the Russian Block are allgrouped under the same organizational

102 Sevastopol Krim Rossija, http://www.kro-krim.narod.ru/.103 Rysskoe Dvijenie Krima, http://www.rdk.wallst.ru/.104 Hedeskog, Crimea after the Georgia Crisis, op.cit., p. 26.


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umbrella whose main platform maintains thatRussian Orthodox culture that is found inCrimea is the native culture of Ukraine as awhole. 105 The organization seeks to regroupthe Crimeans that identify themselves as

Russians; increase cultural and othercooperation with Russia; nurture of a Russianconsciousness and identity; promote ofRussian language, literature, culture. Thegroup proclaims itself as a solid force of

political authority in Crimea that canwithstand the expansionist tendencies ofUkrainian nationalists. 106 In reality theorganization, the largest pro- Russian of itskind, is a speck on Crimeas political scene.

The Russian Block is a Ukrainian political party created in 2002 through themerger with the Russian Ukrainian Union

party, whose goal was to unite the SlavicPeoples. While its leaders insist that the partywas not created on a nationalist basis, itsslogans call for an integration of Ukrainewith Russia and Belorussia to form a unionwith other Slavic people, and for accordingRussian language an official status. TheRussian Block together with the RussianSociety staged a demonstration in front of theCrimean Parliament to commemorate thereferendum of 1991. 107 This wasaccompanied by the crowd shouting:Ukrainians, Russians, Belorussians together we will revive our holy union!Ironically one of the partys platforms seeksto elimination nationalist ideology from state

building. 108 The Block as a member of the

105 Portal Russkogo Naroda Krima, Ukraine in theContext of Russian Civilization,http://www.ruscrimea.ru/cms/?go=mon&in=view&id=12. 106 Ibid . 107 Rysski Block, The Anniversary of the 1991Constitutional Referendum,http://www.rblok.org.ua/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=169&Itemid=1, , 18 2009108 Russkii Block,

ruling coalition in Crimea, officially at least,does not look favourably upon Crimeanseparatism. However, experts insist that isfinanced by Moscow Mayor Luzhkovthrough the Moskva - Krym Foundation and

various expatriate funds.109

It does argue forthe need of Ukrainian regions to have controlof their individual budgets as well asimportance of introducing a program thatwould seek to achieve equal levels of socialand economic development in the variousregions of the country. The Block insists thatCrimean autonomous status within Ukraineshould be preserved in order to respect the

particularity of the composition of theCrimean population, a large part of which,according to the Block, found itselfunwillingly part of Ukraine. The Block isvehemently against Ukraines NATOmembership. It sees the BSF as a result of a

joint struggle of Ukrainians and Russians,and thus the fleet should be protected as asymbol of stability in the Black Sea region. 110

Two other pro-Russian organisations thePeoples Front Sevastopol-Crimea-Russiaand the National Front Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia were both founded in 2005-6. ThePeople's Front brought together 12 pro-Russian organisations. The radical characterof the methods used by this political party ledthe SBU, the Ukrainian special service, in2008 to open criminal charges against thePeoples Front regarding threats against theterritorial integrity of Ukraine. 111 The Frontwas consequently banned and two of itsleaders have been charged with threats toUkraine's territorial integrity. The NationalFront along with numerous other pro-Russian

http://www.rblok.org.ua/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=26109 Hedeskog, Crimea after the Georgia Crisis, 25.110 Russkii Block,http://www.rblok.org.ua/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=26111 Hedeskog, Crimea after the Georgia Crisis, op.cit., p. 26.


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groups in Crimea have been organizingregular protests over the past years. Thecatalyst to these actions appears to be thesuccess, or what it was perceived as at thetime, of the Orange Revolution. For instance,

during a Sevastopol town council protestaction on 19 January 2009, the groupsdenounced the unconstitutional actions ofVictor Yushchenko and Yulia Timoshenko ofovertaking the offices of the president andvice-president, respectfully, of Ukrainethereby robbing the lawful victor of theelection, Victor Yanukovitch of his rightful

position. Along with this claim, the groupsadvanced demands for the return ofSevastopol and Crimea to Russia and doubleRussian-Ukrainian citizenship. 112 In March2007 the group organized a Museum ofOccupation of Crimea (by Ukraine).According to the representatives of themovements, this action was a response toPresident Yushchenkos comments regarding

plans to open a Museum of RussianOccupation of Ukraine in Kyiv during hisrecent trip to Georgia. 113 On March 21, 2006the National Front declared the beginning ofthe action Ukraine without Crimea whosegoal is to stop the annexation of the Crimean

peninsula by Ukraine and to return Crimeaand Sevastopol to the jurisdiction of theRussian Federation. 114 The movement claimsthat there is no judicial substance as to whyCrimea and Sevastopol are currently underUkraines control. On April 23, 2009 the

National Front lost its case in the court of theAutonomous Republic of Crimea on theconstitutional status of the peninsula. TheFront argued that the present Crimeanconstitution did not respect the wishes of the

population that voted for the creation of theAutonomous Crimean Socialist Republic in

112 Rossiiskoe Narodnoe Veche,http://sevrus.narod.ru/#v29

113 Ukraina Novosti,http://www.ukraine.ru/news/308024.html114 .http://sevrus.narod.ru/#v29

1991 and it thus sought to overturn thecurrent constitution. 115 According to experts,the purpose of these two organisations, the

National and the Peoples Fronts, is to createa radical background for some more serious

pro-Russian organisations in Crimea in orderto help them to maintain the status ofrespective politicians. 116

Of course, none of these organisationswould have been able to survive and developwithout financial support and political cloutof a powerful sympathiser. The Russian

politician who over the years has most persistently questioned Ukraines sovereigncontrol over Crimea and Sevastopol isMoscows Mayor Yuri Luzhkov. Luzhkovsrise as the protector of Russian speakers inthe near abroad is intimately tied to his

political ambitions. Since becoming mayor in1992 he had acquired a reputation of a verysuccessful administrator and was seen as acontender for the 1996 presidential elections.However, Luzhkov needed a patriotic imagein addition to the good administrator image.He therefore wanted to promote himself onan issue where he could appeal to a Russianself-image of pride and glory - Crimea.Luzhkov started his crusade to saveCrimea, and especially the city ofSevastopol, from the Ukrainians in early1995. The mayor visited the region on regular

basis to flex his rhetorical muscles andmake political capital for his image as aRussian patriot in the run-up to the

presidential elections. He launched a numberof initiatives to assist socio-economicdevelopment, including Moscow-subsidizedhousing and schools for the fleet

personnel. 117 One of which, an agreement on

115 Krimskii Portal,http://kport.info/news/crimean.php?ELEMENT_ID=5787116 Hedeskog, Crimea after the Georgia Crisis, op.cit., p. 26.117 Sasse, The Crimea Question: identity, transitionand conflict, op. cit., p. 235.


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cooperation between Moscow and Sevastopolof January 1995, gave Sevastopol thesymbolic status of the 11th prefecture districtof Moscow. Luzhkov even managed to

persuade the Russian Federation Council to

pass a declaration stating that the city wasRussian and not Ukrainian territory inDecember 1996. 118 While no official figuresare available for obvious reasons, theestimates of the Mayors contribution to

projects in Crimea transferred directlythrough the Moscow City Council totallednearly $20 million in 2006-8. 119 The steadyincrease in Russian interference in Ukrainesdomestic affairs by way of pro-Russianorganizations, cultural centres andinflammatory speeches of Russiannationalists has rightfully sent off alarm bellsin Ukraine.

While such Russian political chauvinismwas never much appreciated in Ukraine, theleaders that came to power following theOrange Revolution have taken a more activestance on the issue. Under Leonid Kuchma anumber of officials from Russia weredeclared persona non grata for short periodsin retaliation for inciting separatism inUkraine. Under Yushchenko, Kyiv's official

policy has hardened, especially following theJune 2006 protests in Crimea during whichRussian politicians gave inflammatoryspeeches. 120 In October 2006, PresidentViktor Yushchenko ordered the SecurityService of Ukraine to upgrade its operationalactivities in the Crimea. The SBU was giventwo months to 'look into the efficiency ofintelligence, counterintelligence andoperative measures in order to identify,

prevent and halt intelligence, subversive and

118 Bukkvoll, Off the Cuff Politics, op. cit., p. 1153.119 Taras Kuzio,http://www.ucipr.kiev.ua/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=6032746&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0120 Kuzio, Russian Subversion in the Crimea, Janes

Intelligence Digest , November 3 rd, 2006.

other illegal activities in the Crimea byforeign secret services and NGOs'. 121 TheSBU was also ordered to develop a plan ofaction to, 'neutralize' activities in the Crimea,'which are harmful to Ukraine's sovereignty

and territorial integrity and pose securitythreats and incite ethnic, racial and religioustension'. 122 The security services have thusfar foiled three terrorist organizationsoperating in Ukraine. First, the SevastopolBranch of the CIS Institute was closed down.The Moscow headquarters of the institute isheaded by Konstantin Zatulin who has been

banned from entering Ukraine for their pro-separatist views. 123 The second target of theSBU was the Peoples Front Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia. 124 Finally, in May 2008,Luzhkov was declared perona non grata inUkraine in the wake his statements calling forthe return of Sevastopol to Russia andquestioned whether Sevastopol had ever beenhanded over to Ukraine. 125 Despite the

political stalemate in Ukraine after theOrange Revolution, the new politicalleadership has nonetheless stayed the courseon tougher measures against Russianagitation and meddling in Crimea.

9. The significance of the AugustCrisis in Georgia

The August Crisis in Georgia had a greatimpact on how we envision the CIS space.Russias war in Georgia was a lesson forthose who might have forgotten that military

121 Ibid.122 Ibid.123 Taras Kuzio,http://www.ucipr.kiev.ua/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=6032746&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0124 Taras Kuzio, BSU Stops Terrorism in Its Tracks,Eurasia Daily Monitor 5/237,http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34266125 Hedeskog, Crimea after the Georgia Crisis, op.cit., p. 16.


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means still exist as a tool in Russian foreign policy. It is not useful to make thecomparison between the situation in Georgiaand Crimea that do not inhibit the sameambitions. There are nonetheless parallels to

be drawn between Russias behaviour withregards to the two regions. While a similarmilitary confrontation appears to be unlikelyin the case of Crimea, the August conflictraised several serious questions regardingRussias foreign policy objectives withrespect the CIS space. Russias influence inCrimea is very high due to the presence ofthe Black Sea Fleet, the dominance of theRussian media, and the general support forRussian policy from the ethnic Russianmajority in Crimea. Kyiv continues to lackappropriate leverage to get its policiesimplemented in Crimea and to resist thegrowing Russian influence there. 126 Moscows tactics in Abkhazia and SouthOssetia provide cause for concern in thisregard. Russia encouraged and supportedseparatist movements in both entities, thenused the separatist tensions to justify sendingRussian peacekeepers into the regions.Moreover, it granted Russian citizenship toAbkhaz and South Ossetia residents, and then

justified its recent invasion of Georgia on thegrounds that it had an obligation to protectRussian citizens. 127 After the Georgian crisis,Ukrainian Minister of Foreign AffairsVolodymyr Ohryzko accused Russia oforganising mass distribution of Russian

passports in Crimea. This led to a protestfrom the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,which assessed these accusations as a

provocation since dual citizenship is bannedunder Ukrainian law. 128 Estimates of thecurrent number of Russian passport-holdersin Crimea range from as low as 6000 to

126 Ibid., p. 4.127 Larrabee, Ukraine: The Next Crisis? RAND,September 7, 2008.128 Hedeskog, Crimea after the Georgia Crisis, op.cit., p. 34.

100000. 129 This is alarming because Russia justified its invasion of Georgia by claimingit was defending Russian citizens after ithad distributed passports to South Ossetiansover the last two decades. Moreover, the

issuing of passports is an infringement ofUkrainian law that does not permit dualcitizenship. 130 Some scholars argue thatRussia's strategy is twofold. First, it aims tofoment instability in the Crimea to haltUkraine's driven to join NATO. Second,Moscow seems to want to make use ofincreased political volatility in the Crimea asa way to pressure Kyiv to seek its assistancewhich would enhance its leverage over itsweaker and anxious neighbour. Such

protection would be reminiscent of similartactics in Georgia's two separatist enclaveswhere Russia first incited inter-ethnic tensionand then offered 'CIS' (in reality Russian)'peacekeeping troops' who have frozen theconflict in Moscow's favour. As Putin said,'Russia cannot be indifferent to what happensin Ukraine and the Crimea'. 131

Conclusion

The Soviet nationality policy and Russianhistoriography have influenced to a greatdegree contemporary Ukrainian-Russianrelations. The elder-younger brothersyndrome and propagation of Russianmission civilisatrice have produced a

paternalistic Russian view of other peoples inthe former USSR, in particular towardsUkraine and Belarus. 132 While aggressive

129 Ibid.130 Kuzio, BSU Stops Terrorism in Its Tracks,Eurasia Daily Monitor 5/237,http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34266.131 Kuzio, Russian Subversion in the Crimea, Jane's

Intelligence Digest , 3 November 2006,http://www.taraskuzio.net/media22_files/Russian_Subversion_Crimea.pdf132 Taras Kuzio, Russia- Crimea-Ukraine: Triangle ofConflict , op. cit., p. 2.


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factions among Moscows post-Sovietimperialists would like to annex Crimea, ifnot all of South-Eastern Ukraine, they do not

play a dominant role in Russian foreign policy. 133 The customary take on Ukraines

relations with Russia regards the countrys bid for NATO membership as a betrayal.

This research points to the conclusion thatthe actions of pro-Russian political parties,youth groups, and cultural centres in Crimeain fact hold hopes of sabotaging Ukrainesaccession to NATO all the while securing itsfleets access to Sevastopol. The so calledseparatists in Crimea were never a viable

political force. In the 90s this movement wassimply an outgrowth of the general discontentamong the various parties on the peninsulawith Kyivs policies after the fall of theSoviet Union. During this period Crimeanseparatists failed to receive mass support inCrimea because of the lack of an ethnicRussian base upon which to mobilize.Although Crimea has a slim 58 per centethnic Russian majority (declining from 65

per cent in the 1989 Soviet census), theCrimean population is divided between localterritorial, ethnic Russian and Soviet-PanSlavic identities. 134 Crimea is therefore not aRussian enclave and the real threat ofseparatism is minimal. The majority of the

political groups in Crimea are not pursuingseparatist goals. The few groups that doespouse this agenda, which is betterdescribed as irredentist and not separatist, arenot powerful enough to form a governmenton their own in order to advance their cause.The only real danger lies in the Russiancontinued sponsorship of pro-Russianorganizations on the peninsula. Currently,there is a rise of more potent and vocalgroups in Crimea advocating some form ofseparatism or union with other Slavic nations.

133 Andreas Umland, Will There be a SecondCrimean War? Open Democracy , April 25, 2009.134 Kuzio, Jane's Intelligence Review, February 2009.

These organizations have been able to bloomalmost exclusively with the material supportand rhetorical assistance from the RussianFederation. There is therefore a possibilitythat these movements could be

instrumentalized by Russia in the future, probably as the Black Sea Fleets lease drawsto a close. However, in light of the currenteconomic crisis that has been particularly

painful for the exporters of raw materials likeRussia, without the financial support fromMoscow the survival of these groups isquestionable. Regardless of what willtranspire in Crimea, the Black Sea Regionwill remain as it was in the ancient times azone of acute international economic and

political competition between Russia, thecountries belong to NATO and the EU(Greece, Bulgaria, Romania) and the oneslooking to join either of the institutions(Turkey, Ukraine, Georgia).


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russian separatism in crimea and nato-elena mizrokhi

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