Images of Democracy

Byong-Kuen Jhee

Chosun University

375 Seosuk-dong, Dong-gu,

Gwangju, 501-759 Korea

+82-62-230-6728

jbkkoh@gmail.com

This paper has been prepared for a presentation at the 2012 Annual Conference of ISA, San

Diego, CA, USA.

Abstract

This study challenges the conventional wisdom that democracy is a universal term with

little temporal and spatial differences. Assuming that the meaning of democracy is reshaped

through a conceptual adjustment to the nation-specific demand for the state, this study

examines whether the rapid economic development of Korea and the presence of antagonistic

North Korea have promoted the lazy and incompetent “grasshopper” image of democracy.

Utilizing the Korea Democracy Barometer Survey conducted in 2010 (KDB 2010

hereafter), it has shown, first, that there exists a notable perceptual discrepancy between

preference for democracy and support for core values of democracy. In addition, a significant

proportion of respondents identifying themselves as democrats are also weak advocates of

democratic virtue and utility. Second, the positive perception of Park Chung Hee reduces

public belief in the capability of democracy to resolve various social problems and

democratic values. Third, the positive perception of North Korea, measured with the political

tolerance of pro-North Korean activists, promotes the belief in the capability of democracy,

but has no impact on public support for democratic values. Based on these findings, this

study claims that Koreans do not perceive the term democracy as it is coined in the historical

contexts of Western Europe.

1

Images of Democracy

Many have argued that democracy is a universal term with little temporal and spatial

differences that refers to a type of political regime that guarantees civil liberties and political

rights. It is, however, notable that public perception of the term is diverse across nations over

time. Recent cross-national studies, especially on new democracies, have shown that the

traditional perception of democracy, which originated from the experience of Western

democracies, has spatial restrictions. In many democratic countries, a significant number of

citizens not only fail to differentiate democracy from an authoritarian regime, but also do not

fully accept or even reject some core values of democracy while identifying themselves as

democrats.

This study is an attempt to examine how people perceive democracy in diverse political

contexts. Utilizing the Korea Democracy Barometer Survey conducted in 2010, this study

examines to what extent Koreans accept core values of democracy, including civil liberties,

political rights, and democratic accountability (intrinsic values of democracy), and believe in

its practical utility (extrinsic values of democracy). Assuming that the meaning of democracy

is reshaped through the conceptual adjustment to the nation-specific demand for the state, this

study examines whether the rapid economic development of Korea and the presence of

antagonistic North Korea, which might create strong nostalgia for authoritarian regime and

justify the trivialization of core democratic values, have promoted the lazy and incompetent

“grasshopper” image of democracy. Although many have claimed that hierarchical political

culture and performance of the past authoritarian regime have affected public support for

democracy, no prior empirical study has sufficiently explained the origins of the weak and

inconsistent democratic values embedded in most new democracies.

2

This study finds, first, that there exists a notable perceptual discrepancy between

preference for democracy and support for its core values. In addition, a significant proportion

of respondents identifying themselves as democrats are also weak advocates of democratic

virtue and utility. Second, the positive perception of Park Chung Hee reduces the belief in the

capability of democracy to resolve various social problems and democratic values. Third, the

positive perception of North Korea, measured with political tolerance of pro-North Korean

activists, promotes the belief in the capability of democracy, but has no impact on public

support for democratic values.

Based on these findings, this study claims that Koreans do not perceive the term

democracy as it is coined in the historical contexts of Western Europe. Democracy is

perceived as an extrinsic value rather than an intrinsic one in Korea: Citizens there prefer

democracy not because its virtues are superior to those of other regimes, but because they

have practical utility. The public nostalgia for authoritarian performance and the antagonistic

relationship with the authoritarian regime in North Korea constrain the proliferation of the

liberal conceptualization of democracy.

This study consists of four sections. Section 1 briefly discusses prior studies on the public

perception of democracy and presents main hypotheses, which are based on several theories

of political psychology, and the debate over the nexus between democracy and economic

development. Section 2 explains the research design of this study. Section 3 presents a

descriptive explanation of how public preference for democracy is incompatible with support

for core values of democracy and how such a discrepancy leads to detachment from an

authoritarian regime and nostalgia. In addition, this section reports test results of the main

hypotheses. Section 4, the conclusion, summarizes the main findings of this study and

discusses their implications for further studies on democratic consolidation.

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1. How People Perceive Democracy?

Misperception or Adjustment?

Not a few scholars have attempted to examine the diverse perception of democracy and its

causes (Bunce 2001; Carothers 2002; Wiarda 2002; Shin and Jhee 2005; Przeworski 2010;

2012). They have shown that public perception of democracy is diverse and that its meaning

is not consistent with the core values of Western liberal democracies. They also claim that

such an inconsistent understanding is inevitable due to the limited political knowledge and

short experience of democratic regimes. As Rose (1998) argued, democratic consolidation

requires time because non-democratic culture and the political legacy of the past have a

continuous influence on support for democracy. Recently, Shin (2012) found that a

significant proportion of Koreans are misinformed and believe that popular elections,

protecting civil liberties, and rejecting political intervention of military or religious

authorities are not essential components of democracy. He also claimed that Confucian Asian

countries have more ill-informed citizens than well-informed citizens.1

It should be, however, noted that diversity in conceptualizing democracy originates mainly

from the historical contexts of installing democratic regimes and the past experience of

authoritarian regimes rather than cultural hindrance and the cognitive incapability to identify

democracy. For example, East Asian countries, including Korea, do not have lower levels of

1 Shin also found that Asian people put more priority on economic equality or economic

security than political freedom as the most essential component of democracy (p. 240). For

example, whereas only 14.5 percent of Koreans see protecting political liberty as the most

important property of democracy, about 35.7 percent view economic equality as the most

important one.

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education than Western European countries. More importantly, democratic values may not be

simply inculcated as Confucian culture in Asia has waned.

As a corollary, the image of prototype democracy that originated in Europe is not simply

mirrored and replicated into new democracies, which have taken different paths to democracy.

It is, therefore, more convincing to say that citizens in each country have developed their own

distinct image of democracy based on their own experience. In the process of shaping an

image of democracy, citizens may adjust the meaning of democracy to national goals to

overcome prior economic and political obstacles that a country faces.

Democracy as an Extrinsic Rather Than Intrinsic Value

It is well known that the democratic regime in Korea was not originally driven by

endogenous forces. The United States liberalized the country from the colonial rule of Japan

and nurtured the first democratic regime in the middle of the 20th

century. For Koreans, the

United States became the most enviable country due to its political development as well as its

economic prosperity. As the reference theory suggests, for Koreans the United States has

served “as an anchor or central reference point” for the identification of democracy (Cottam

et al. 2010, 45).

The exogenous origin of the democratic regime might, inevitably, foster conceptualizing

democracy as an extrinsic value rather than intrinsic one. Different from Western liberal

democracy, established from the struggle against authoritarian monarchy, the original core

values of democracy, such as civil liberties and political rights, might be regarded as only

secondary aims subordinate to those of national security from the threat of communists or

imperialists and economic development to reduce pervasive severe poverty, especially after

the Korean War occurred between 1950 and 1953. The anti-communist foreign policies of the

5

United States also have intensified such tendency to deviate from the original meaning of

democracy.

Democracy and Economic Performance of Authoritarian Regime

There have been two perspectives explaining the effect of democracy on economic growth.

According to the conflict perspective, economic growth is hindered by democracy. This

perspective claims that dysfunctional consequences of premature democracy cause political

instability and low government efficiency, which are harmful to economic growth (Sirowy

and Inkeles 1990,128). Scholars following this perspective argue that an authoritarian

government is more efficient to suppress increasing consumption and social unrest, whereas a

democratic government facilitates overspending, which may decrease savings and investment

(Alesina and Perotti 1994; Lundstroem 2002; Kurzman et al. 2002).

On the other hand, the compatible perspective claims that democracy may foster property

rights and limit rent-seeking behaviors that hinder economic growth (Przeworski and

Limongi 1993). Clague et al. (1997, 68) argue that institutional arrangements that provide

legal rights to property and contract enforcement mechanisms are important to support an

“elaboration of labor in a market economy.” They argue that insecure property rights reduce

incentives to invest, and individuals will not choose to be engaged in complex and non-self-

enforcing transactions without “well-functioning contract enforcement.” Scholars following

this perspective focus on the “predatory state” that exploits the resources of a society. For

example, Mesquita et al. (2001) argue that the main motivation of dictators is to stabilize

their regimes and bribe the “winning coalition,” which is necessary to maintain their regimes.

They argue that democracy is necessary to protect property rights and to hinder predatory

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leaders. In addition, they argue that redistributive policies that may increase consumptions

could be a drain on investment (Sirowy and Inkeles, 1990).2

Such different perspectives on the nexus between democracy and economic development

highlight contradictory images of democracy in terms of economic development not only for

scholars but also for citizens. First, for Koreans, in line with the conflict perspective,

democracy may be perceived as the grasshopper in Aesop’s fable “The Ants and the

Grasshopper”: incompetent, irresponsible, and lazy to consume all it has before the winter

comes. It contradicts the ant, the image of the authoritarian developmental state in which

rulers are competitive, responsible, and diligent to store up foods for future needs. In this

perspective, democracy is regarded as luxury goods that are to be restricted before achieving

a certain level of economic development.

Second, on the contrary and in line with the compatible perspective, democracy may be

perceived as a fair umpire or coordinator rather than the grasshopper. In contrast to the

authoritarian predatory state, in which rulers are greedy, irresponsible, and obsessed with the

exploitation of national resources for their own interests, democracy may have the image of a

liberal state in which rulers guarantee free and fair competition between citizens with equal

opportunity. In this perspective, democracy is essential goods to be satisfied for the

encouragement of economic development.

As noted earlier, a democratic regime is an instrument for the resolution of diverse national

problems including national security and economic development. As a corollary, the image of

2 Criticizing these two perspectives, Przeworski and Limongi (1993) claim that the conflict

perspective ignores the fact that authoritarian regimes are “predatory,” whereas the

compatible perspective fails to explain how democracies establish commitment to a

(economic) policy.

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democracy is often associated with the performance of a democratic regime in comparison

with that of an authoritarian regime. In Korea, therefore, citizens may have the grasshopper

image of democracy due to their experience of the rapid economic development under the

authoritarian government of Park Chung Hee, who seized power in a military coup in 1961

and maintained his presidency until his assassination in 1979. Negative belief in the

capability of democracy may also lead to the adjustment of the original values of democracy.

As the consistency theory of political psychology suggests, Koreans would experience the

cognitive process to avoid psychological discomfort by holding balance between evaluations

of two different aspects of democracy (Houghton 2009).

Hypothesis 1-1: Citizens who have a positive attitude toward Park Chung Hee are less likely

to believe in the capability of democracy (the conflict hypothesis I).

Hypothesis 1-2: Citizens who have a positive attitude toward Park Chung Hee are less likely

to believe in the core values of democracy (the conflict hypothesis II).

Democracy and Military Threats from North Korea

Prior studies on political psychology have claimed that people often have

misunderstandings due to their tendency not to take responsibility. According to the

attribution theory, people tend to find the causes of wrong behavior in the personality or

situation, although this is not true. In addition, people may utilize reference groups to

evaluate others. People may rely on apparent references of political regimes representing

democratic or non-democratic regimes for their evaluation of democracy.

The presence of a military threat from North Korea and its hostile communist leaders,

which intensifies the public concern for national security rather than the democratic

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deepening of Korea, may undermine the belief in the capability of democracy. It has also

provided a convincing rationale for the legal restriction of civil liberties, which are against

democratic values. Psychological trivialization of civil liberties justifies the distortion of the

original meaning of democracy (Cottam et al. 2010). The anti-communist foreign policies of

the United States during the Cold War, as the reference theory suggests, intensifies such a

tendency to delimit the scope of civil liberties and political rights. Therefore, those who are

hostile to North Korea and communism may have an image of democracy as helpless and

dependent, which contradicts the iron-man image of an authoritarian regime.

Hypothesis 2-1: Citizens who have a negative attitude toward North Korea are less likely to

believe in the capability of democracy (the attribution hypothesis I).

Hypothesis 2-2: Citizens who have a negative attitude toward North Korea are less likely to

believe in the core values of democracy (the attribution hypothesis II).

2. Research Design: Data, Variables, and Estimation Methods

To estimate perception of democracy among Korean citizens, this study adopts the Korea

Democracy Barometer Survey collected in 2010. It includes various questions asking

respondents’ preference for democracy (“democracy is better than any other political

regimes”) and authoritarian regimes (military, strong leaders without national assembly and

elections, one party), their evaluation of democratic capability (“democracy has the capability

to resolve social problems”), democratic levels of seven Korean governments (Park Chung

Hee, Chun Doo Hwan, Roh Tae Woo, Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, Roh Moo Hyun, Lee

Myung Park), the necessity of constraining civil liberties and political rights (free election,

free assembly and demonstration, parliamentary legislation, free expression), and horizontal

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accountability (executive violation of laws, no judicial independence, no parliamentary

constraints).

To test the conflict hypotheses I and II, the capability of democracy measured with

respondents’ evaluation of the capability of democracy to resolve social problems (1=capable,

0=incapable) is adopted as a dependent variable. Because it is a binary variable, the logistic

estimation method is utilized to test the main hypotheses. In addition, to test the attribution

hypotheses I and II, an index of democratic values generated by summing up responses to

four questions asking respondents’ rejection of constraining civil liberties (freedom of

assembly and demonstration, parliamentary legislation, freedom of expression, freedom of

the press; 16=complete advocate, 0=others) is adopted as a dependent variable and the

ordinary least square estimation method is utilized.

Each model involves two main independent variables: public evaluation of Park’s

government measured with its democracy score under his government (10=complete

democracy, 0=complete dictatorship) and political tolerance toward North Korea, measured

with an index generated by summing up responses to four items asking respondents’ rejection

of constraining civil liberties and political rights of pro-North Korean activists (freedom of

assembly, freedom of running for public positions, freedom to become government officials,

and freedom to form organizations; 16=complete tolerance, 1=complete intolerance). These

two variables are expected to promote positive evaluation of democracy’s capability and

support for democratic values.

Control variables includes the self-placement of ideological location (10=conservative,

1=progressive), age (19 to 78), income (5=highest, 1=lowest), and education (1=university

graduation, 0=other). These variables are expected to have a positive effect on the dependent

variables.

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3. Test Results

Preference for Democracy and Support for Core Values of Democracy

It is certain that most Koreans believe that democracy is better than any other political

regime. About 69.9 percent of respondents prefer a democratic regime to non-democratic

ones (Appendix 1).3 It should, however, be noted that preference for democracy is not

compatible with cognitive evaluation of the core values of democracy. Table 1 presents how

self-democrats, who believe that democracy is always better than non-democratic regimes,

perceive civil liberties and political rights. Note that non-democrats who believe that any

non-democratic regime can be better than a democratic regime and disinterests who do not

have any concern about regime types are excluded here.

Table 1 Support for Civil Liberties and Political Rights of Citizens among Self-

democrats

Free

Election

Free Assembly &

Demonstration

Parliamentary

Legislation

Free

Expression

Free

Press

Strong 63.9 19.6 39.6 44.1 44.6

Weak 28.0 35.0 41.9 40.6 34.8

No 8.1 45.4 18.5 15.3 20.6

Source: KDB 2010

As the table shows, most self-democrats support basic democratic values, but a significant

proportion of them are weak advocates of those values. Holding elections for political

representatives obtained the highest support from the public. About 63.9 percent of them

3 However, a notable proportion of respondents believe that dictatorship can be better in

certain cases (20.6%) or that it does not matter whether they have democracy or dictatorship

(10.6%).

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believe that “selection of political leaders through free elections” is “very much” necessary to

exert democracy, and 28.0 percent believe that it is “somewhat” necessary.

More surprising, however, is that only about 19.6 percent of them are strong advocates of

free assembly and demonstration. Respondent attitudes toward other items of civil liberties

are slightly higher, but no substantive difference exists between them: Less than 45 percent of

self-democrats (39.6%~44.6%) are strong supporters of “parliamentary legislation,”

“freedom of political expression,” and “freedom of the press.” The majority of respondents

are weak- or non-supporters of democratic values who believe that constraining such

fundamental civil liberties is “somewhat” or “very much” necessary or “somewhat”

unnecessary.

Cognitive discrepancy between the preference for democracy and the advocacy of

democratic horizontal accountability is also prominent. Table 2 presents how self-democrats

view institutional constraints on the executive power. It is notable that self-democrats are

weak dissenters of delegative democracy (O’Donnell 1994). Although 79.9 percent of self-

democrats disagree with the idea that “government may violate the law to resolve problems

when their nation is in trouble,” only about 46.8 percent of self-democrats are strong

dissenters of governmental violation of laws. About 33.1 percent of self-democrats are weak

dissenters who do not fully reject such a delegative democracy.

Table 2 Support for Horizontal Accountability among Self-democrats

Violation

of Laws

No Judicial

Independence

Parliamentary

Constraint

Strong 46.8 35.0 21.2

Weak 33.1 39.1 40.5

No 20.1 25.9 38.3

Source: KDB 2010

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The inconsistency of self-democrats is more prevalent on the issue of check and balance of

the government. Only about 35.5 percent of them strongly disagree with the idea that “judges

should take the side of the government when they make decisions on important cases.”

Furthermore, only about 21.2 percent of self-democrats strongly deny parliamentary efforts to

check the government. Surprisingly, about 38.3 percent of them believe that “government

may not be able to do important work if the parliament oversees the government all the time.”

Detachment from Authoritarian Regime and Nostalgia

Such cognitive discrepancy may be led to the weak detachment from those non-democratic

regimes. Table 3 presents to what extent self-democrats support non-democratic regimes

ruled by military, strong leaders, or one party. Less than 10 percent of respondents do not

reject non-democratic regimes ruled by military, strong leaders, and one party.

Table 3 Support for Non-democratic Rules among Self-democrats

Military Strong Leaders One Party

Very much disagree 74.0 68.9 71.2

Somewhat disagree 19.3 22.3 22.3

Very much or somewhat disagree 6.7 8.8 6.6

Source: KDB 2010

It should be, however, noted that about 20 percent of them are not strong dissenters of

those non-democratic regimes.4 Such a weak detachment implies that public preference for

democracy on the affective dimension cannot be equated with their rejection of authoritarian

rules.

4 Weak dissenters of non-authoritarian regimes, who “somewhat” disagree with military, no-

electoral, or one-party rule, are not strong supporters of democracy.

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Table 4 presents how Koreans perceive seven consecutive governments from 1961 to now.

As the table shows, Park’s government is one of the least democratic but was the favorite in

Korea. About 17.8 percent of respondents evaluate Park’s government as the least democratic

government out of the seven governments, next to Chun’s government (60.7%). Almost half

of respondents (40.3%), however, evaluate Park’s government as the best.

Table 4 Public Evaluation of Korean Governments

Governments (Duration) Best Worst Most

Democratic

Least

Democratic

Park Chung Hee (1961-79) 40.3 3.5 6.5 17.8

Chun Doo Hwan (1980-88) 6.5 37.3 1.1 60.7

Roh Tae Woo (1988-93) 1.8 9.3 3.2 2.8

Kim Young Sam (1993-98) 1.3 9.4 3.8 2.9

Kim Dae Jung (1998-2002) 16.9 8.8 19.3 4.2

Roh Moo Hyun (2002-2008) 26.0 11.4 55.2 1.9

Lee Myung Park (2008-) 7.3 20.3 11.0 9.8

Source: KDB 2010

It is also notable that Park’s government received a better evaluation in terms of

democracy than did the successive governments of his two generals, Chun Doo Hwan and

Roh Tae Woo, and of the first civilian president, Kim Young Sam. The seemingly

unreasonable evaluation of Park’s government shows, at least, that the meaning of democracy

deviates from its original one in different political contexts.

Determinants of the Grasshopper Image of Democracy

Then what determines the contrasting attitudes toward democracy? Models 1 and 3 of

Table 5 show that the positive evaluation of Park Chung Hee’s government, which obtained

successful economic performance, has a significant negative impact on the evaluation of the

capability of democracy. Those who evaluate Park’s government positively are more likely to

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give a negative evaluation of the capability of democracy. As the conflict hypothesis suggests,

the prominent performance of his authoritarian regime weakens public belief in the extrinsic

value of democracy (See also Appendix 2).

Models 2 of Table 5 shows that the public attitude toward pro-North Korean activists also

has a statistically significant impact on the evaluation of the capability of democracy. Those

who are tolerant of pro-North Korean activists, one of the least-liked groups in Korea, are

more likely to give a positive evaluation of the capability of democracy, whereas those who

are intolerant of pro-North Korean activists are less likely to believe in it (Gibson 1992, 2005;

Jhee 2011). As the attribution hypothesis suggests, those who have an antagonistic attitude

toward North Korea underestimate the capability of democracy.

Table 5 Determinants of Intrinsic or Extrinsic Values of Democracy

Model 1

Capability

Model 2

Values

Model 3

Capability

Model 4

Values

Park's -0.684 -0.835

Administration (4.13)** (4.53)**

Tolerance of 0.053 0.015

North Korea (2.60)** (0.66)

Ideology -0.072 -0.107 -0.071 -0.122

(1.74) (2.34)* (1.77) (2.70)**

Age 0.006 0.004 0.004 -0.005

(0.90) (0.60) (0.58) (0.78)

University 0.056 0.398 0.07 0.415

(0.30) (1.93) (0.39) (2.07)*

Income 0.02 -0.016 0.044 -0.028

(0.30) (0.23) (0.69) (0.41)

Constant 1.044 12.476 0.321 12.557

(2.36)* (25.48)** (0.66) (23.36)**

Observations 778 879 832 948

R-squared 0.04 0.02

Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Source: KDB 2010

15

It is also interesting to see how the evaluation of Park’s government and the perception of

pro-North Korean activities are associated with the core values of democracy. As Models 4 of

Table 5 shows, the evaluation of Park’s government also has a statistically significant and

negative impact on the intrinsic value of democracy. It shows that, as the consistency theory

suggests, the positive evaluation of Park’s administration leads to the adjustment of the core

values of democracy to maintain cognitive balance.

It is, however, notable that political tolerance of pro-North Korean activists has no

statistically significant impact on public support for the delimitation of civil liberties and

political rights. This test result may arise from the dual aspects of pro-North Korean activities

in South Korea. Here is the dilemma: Advocating the political rights of pro-North Korean

activities in South Korea can also be interpreted as advocating the authoritarian regime in

Korea. Whereas some may argue that engaging in pro-North Korea activities are basic

political rights that citizens should enjoy in democratic countries, others may believe that

these activities are threatening democratic values and justifying the authoritarian regime in

North Korea. As a corollary, it is not safe to say that those who are intolerant of pro-North

Korea activists are more likely to support core values of democracy. This test result

highlights that political tolerance is not always compatible with democratic values. Its

relationship depends on the nature of its object: pro-democratic or anti-democratic.

4. Conclusion

Based on the assumption that the meaning of democracy is adjusted to nation-specific

goals, this study examines whether the rapid economic development of Korea and the

presence of antagonistic North Korea affect public understanding of democracy. Utilizing the

Korea Democracy Barometer Survey conducted in 2010, it has shown, first, that preference

for democracy is not compatible with support for the core values of democracy. A significant

16

proportion of self-democrats who believe that democracy is better than non-democratic

regimes are weak- or non-supporters of democratic values including civil liberties, political

rights, and horizontal accountability. Second, public perception of an authoritarian

government has a significant impact on the perception of democracy. Those who evaluate

Park Chung Hee’s government positively are more likely to believe in the capability of

democracy and to support democratic values. Third, public perception of North Korea also

has a significant impact on the perception of democracy. Those who are tolerant of North

Korea tend to believe in the capability of democracy. However, political tolerance of North

Korea does not have any statistically significant impact on the public support for core values

of democracy.

These findings have shown that the original meaning of democracy established in Western

Europe is not simply mirrored into other countries. For Korean citizens, democracy is

perceived as an extrinsic value rather than an intrinsic one. They have adjusted its meaning to

the national goals of improving national security and economic development. The successful

economic development under an authoritarian regime and the military threat from North

Korea have suppressed the predator and warmonger image of the authoritarian regime and

facilitated the grasshopper image and helpless, dependent image of democracy.

As many have claimed, public nostalgia for an authoritarian regime may harm the

legitimacy of a democratic regime. In addition, the presence of military conflict between the

two Koreas may hinder the inculcation of democratic values. It should, however, also be

noted that the public nostalgia for Park’s government does not seem to drive any reverse

transition to an authoritarian regime. It originated from the public demand for economic

prosperity rather than an authoritarian regime. The conceptual deviation from the original

meaning of democracy also may not harm democratic consolidation. The public perception of

democracy as an extrinsic value implies that citizens’ democratic support may not simply rely

17

on their perceptual assimilation of the original meaning of democracy. A democratic regime

may not be terminated as long as it continues satisfying the basic economic and political

demand of its citizens.

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Appendix 1: Preference, Priority, and Capability of Democracy

Preference for

Democracy

Democracy vs.

Economic Development

Democracy’s

Capability

Strong 69.9 16.7 66.2

Weak 30.1 83.4 33.8

Source: KDB 2010

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Appendix 2 Determinants of Intrinsic or Extrinsic Values of Democracy

Model 1

Capability

Model 2

Core Values

Model 3

Capability

Model 4

Core Values

Park's -0.669 -0.82

Administration (4.09)** (4.39)**

Tolerance of 0.06 0.025

North Korea (3.03)** (1.12)

Age 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.011

(0.47) (0.18) (0.52) (1.59)

University 0.111 0.378 0.142 0.419

(0.59) (1.80) (0.80) (2.09)*

Income 0.011 0.016 0.043 -0.009

(0.17) (0.21) (0.68) (0.13)

Constant 0.768 12.021 -0.149 11.97

(1.93) (26.96)** (0.35) (25.27)**

Observations 786 895 840 964

R-squared 0.04 0.02

Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Source: KDB 2010

20

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