IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLOlGDA

CONNIE MCCALLUM-THOMPSON,

Petitioner,

SC CASE NO.: SC12-679Lower Tribunal No(s).: 1D12-967,

2011-CA-1059vs.

THE PRESERVE AT OAKLEAF PLANTATIONCOMDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., et al

Respondent

PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

PETITIONER BRIEF ON JURISDICTION

Connie C. Thompson, Pro se785 OakleafPlantation Pkwy, #1423Orange Park, FL 32065(617)894-8937

TABLEOFCONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.............................................................iii-iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE...........................................................1-2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ..............................................................2-10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .......................................................11-26

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ......................................................27

ARGUMENT ...........................................................................27-34

A. THE MOVING PART MUST SHOW THE ABSENCE OFMATERIAL FACT BEYOND THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT.

B. ONLY COMPETENT EVIDENCE MAY BE CONSIDERED INRULING ON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

C. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION ANDMISAPPLIED THE LAW IN GRANTING APPELLEE'S MOTIONFOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

D. REVERSE WARRANTED WHEN THE PARTIES AFFIDAVITSFILED IN SUPPORT AND IN OPPOSITION TO SUMMARYJUDGMENT CONFLICT AS TO THE AMOUNT DUE

E. SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY BE REVERSED IF COURT FINDSGENUINE ISSUE RAISED BY DEFENDANT'S AFFIRMATIVEDEFENSES THAT ARE NOT CONCLUSIVELY REFUTED ONTHE RECORD

F. THE DECISION...0F THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OFAPPEAL, IN THIS CASE, EXPRESSLY AND DIRECTLYCONFLICTS WITH DECISIONS FROM THIS COURT ANDOTHER DISTRICT COURTS OF APPEAL ON THE SAMEPOINTS OF LAW

CONCLUSION..........................................................................34-36

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................36

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .....................................................36

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P.,760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000)..........................................................11

City of Cocoa v. Leffler, 762 So. 2d 1052, 1055 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)...............12

Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1966)........................................................12

Kitchen v. Ebonite 6 Recreation Ctrs, Inc.,856 So. 2d 1083, 1085 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).............................................12

Krol v. City of Orlando, 778 So.2d 490, 92 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)..........................12

Mivan (Florida), Inc. v. Metric Constructors, Inc.,857 So. 2d 901, 902 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)...............................................12

Charles E. Burkett v. Assocs. v. Vick, 546 SO.2D 1190 (FLA 5TH DCA 1989)..14

Daeda v.Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc.,698 So. 2d 617, 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).................................................15

Tunnell v. Hicks, 574 So. 2d 264, 266 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)..........................15

Bill Williams Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc. v. Haymarket Coop. Bank,. 592So.2d 302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), rev.dismissed, 598 So.2d 76 (Fla. 1992)..........15

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)............................................19, 25

Ferola v. Blue Reef Holding Corp., Inc., 719 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)....22

Kurokawa v. Camelot Gardens Homeowners Association, 758 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 4thDCA 2000)...................................................................................22

Payne v. Cudjoe Gardens Property Owners Association, Inc., CASE NO. 837So.2d 458 Fla.App. Dist.3 (2002).........................................................24

Frost, 15 So. 3d 905, 906...................................................................26

Newton, 544 So. 2d at 225.................................................................26

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Amendment XIV, § 1United States Constitution . ................1, 11, 13, 17, 20, 22, 23, 24, 27, 30, 32, 35

Amendment VIII to the ConstitutionUnited States Constitution ..................................................2, 11, 19, 21, 32

FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND OTHERAUTHORITIES

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c).....................................................................10

Article I, § 2, Florida Constitution ..........................1, 11, 14, 22, 30, 32, 34, 35

Article I, § 9, Florida Constitution ..................................1, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17

Article I, § 17, Florida Constitution..............................2, 11, 16, 17, 21, 25, 32

Article 1, § 21, Florida Constitution ...............................................1,10, 18

Florida Statutes §95.11(5)(a)...............................................................22

Article V, § 3b(3), Florida Constitution.................................................27

Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(iv) .......................................................27

Florida Statutes §720.3085(1)..............................................................27

Florida Statutes §720.3085(2)(c)...........................................................29

Florida Statues §718.116(1)(b).............................................................29

Article 1, § 10, Florida Constitution ............................................12, 34, 35

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal to review the decision of the Fourth District Court of

Clay County, rendered on January 23'd , 2012 and, most recently, the decisions of

the First District Court of Appeals, rendered on May 25'h and including decisions

by the Fourth District Court of Clay County, rendered on June 5th th , and 23'd ,

2012 in the above entitled case; as they are entwined, from the beginning,

succumbing one to the other, following Summary Final Judgment to Foreclose and

despite Appellant's, initial, appeal.

On January 23, 2012, the trial court granted summary final judgment in

favor of Appellee, notwithstanding the remaining issues of material fact, and

allowing foreclosure for both the paid and allegedly unpaid homeowners'

association fees of previous owners, despite the absence of competent evidence;

resulting in said determination, again, including fees already paid by previous

owners. Subsequently, the lower tribunal court appears to have sort to circumvent

Appellant's rights to appeal by withholding a "Certificate of Indigency", while

claiming to have fully reviewed the record, only to provide the aforesaid certificate

only after the First District Court of Appeal's denial for fees; in violation of

Appellant's Florida Constitutional Rights, Article 1, § 21. Consequently, Appellant

believes the court (also) violated both the due process and equal protection clauses

of the U.S. and Florida Constitutions, including but not limited to Appellant's U.S.

1

Const., VIII Amend. and FL, Art 1, §17 rights, prohibiting excessive fines, under

the circumstances; to be determined by the Supreme Court. Thereby, Appellant

now appeals, contending the summary final judgment and all, subsequent, orders

are improper as Appellee has not meet its burden of conclusively showing that

there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law, as evident by the failure to established an authentic claim in its

standing to foreclose absent inadmissible, misleading, and erroneous information

provided the lower tribunal court and in view of both the constitutional issues,

including but not limited to, substantive and procedural rights under the due

process and equal protection clauses and other affirmative defenses, including but

not limited to the statute of limitations and unclean hands, disregarded in

retaliation for Appellant's legitimate dispute and empowering Appellee to,

selectively, discriminatorily and invidiously target the defendant's homestead for

summary judgment and foreclosure, under the color of law.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

This is a foreclosure case for Homeowners' Association Fees; approximately

eighty percent (80 %) or more allegedly accumulated by previous owners or,

otherwise, never invoiced. Appellee filed September 2011 with no amendments.

On November 18th, 2008, by and through its agent, Chris Hallam, Oakleaf

Plantation's Condominium Association filed a Claim of Lien against the previous

2

owner, Andrienne Cairns, for homeowner's association fees "from March, 2007

through October, 2008"; totaling $5,436.96. The race of Andrienne Cairns is white.

On August 10, 2010, the aforesaid residential apartment unit was sold "to

the highest and best bidder for cash at the Front Steps at the Clay County

Courthouse, located at 825 N. Orange Avenue, Green Cove Springs, FL 32043 at

10:00 a.m", as set forth by a Summary Final Judgment of Foreclosure, dated June

29, 2010, and entered in Civil Case No. 2007-1155-CA of the Circuit Court of the

4th Judicial Circuit in and for CLAY County.

"The highest and best bid received for the property was submitted by Dari

Homes, LLC, 2185 Walker Glen Ln, Jacksonville F1 32246 (1/3 interest); GBW

Holdings, LLC, 1730 Kingsley Ave, Suite F, Orange Park F1 32073 (1/3 interest);

and Designer Homes of Florida, LLC, P O Box 65417, Orange Park F1 (1/3

interest); c/o Glenn Mee, Esq, P O Box 65417, Orange Park F1 32065 to whom the

property was sold..." (hereinafter "Dari Homes, LLC" or "the highest and best

bid"); with no demand for fees. The race of said investors is each white.

Subsequently, Connie McCallum-Thompson (hereinafter "Appellant") wired

funds, noting said transfer to be "in full payment of [the] purchase agreement,

including but not limited to cost and fees" as she was informed there were no other

costs, fees, or taxes due on the property, prior to purchase, or associated with the

3

transfer of said residential property and ownership from an individual, Atty Glenn

Mee, agent for Dari Homes, LLC; purchaser of said parcel on August 10, 2010.

On August 24, 2010, pursuant to the Certificate of Title, said property "was

sold to CONNIE MCCALLUM THOMPSON, C/O GLENN R MEE, ESQUIRE,

P.O. BOX 65417, ORANGE PARK FL 32065..."; amended thereafter, showing

Appellant as the sole owner. The race of Appellant, Connie Thompson, is black.

Prior thereto, Appellee made very little to no attempts to pursue this case.

Appellant did not, at any time, receive sufficient notice of the Preserve at

Oakleaf Plantation Condominium (hereafter "the association" or "appellee") or its

initial erroneous demand for $10,200 in defaults by previous owners for unpaid

association fees "from November 2006 through the assessment due [date] of

August 1, 2010", until the following year. See Email, dated "Thursday, August 26,

2010 8:57 A.M."), stating, "[A]ll the documents linformation was forwarded to the

address [P.O. Box 65417, Orange Park, Florida 32065] on the Certificate of

Title...", which is neither familiar to Appellant, nor has she at any time had access.

On or about September 8, 2010, Appellee purports to have forwarded a letter

to Appellant who, later, discovered the United States Postal Service has a policy by

which it does not deliver mail to "vacant" households. The aforesaid

correspondence would have been "returned to sender" as new residents are

required to notify the United States Postal Office when they are not in receipt of

4

mail services to let them know a unit is no longer "vacant" before mail delivery is

resumed. Otherwise, Appellant had (yet) to receive access to the aforesaid unit as

neither the previous owner, nor anyone in its office could tell her what happened to

the keys or any other information; as, clearly, noted in the record. Subsequently,

Appellant did not receive any mail until sometime after October 2010.

As noted in Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment, correspondences

from December 2010 and others were either "returned to sender", as Appellant was

visiting family during the Christmas season and could not be reached by certified

mail; forwarded to the aforesaid post office box of previous owners; or (likely)

removed by whoever held the keys. Notwithstanding, Appellant received two

certified letters mid-2011; to which she responded immediately.

Subsequently, Appellant received notice of Appellee's September 8, 2010

demand for fees from Appellant, stating, "The Unit's unpaid common expenses

and regular periodic assessments which accrued...prior to the date of the Amended

certificate of title [NOW] total $10,200.00 and [NOW] cover the period 'from

November 2006 through the assessment due August 1, 2010'"; in contrast with

Appellee's previous "Claim of Lien" against a previous owner, which Appellee

refused to address or even acknowledge and, knowingly, willfully, and

fraudulently pursued recompense for, in bad faith, with Judge Don H. Lester's full

approval.

5

On August 11, 2011, the association filed an unverified foreclosure

complaint for assessments "from June, 2008 through February, 2011", inconsistent

with prior claims and naming appellant as the defendant; incorporating fees as far

back as "November 2006", previously referred to as "stacked fees" by Appellant.

Subsequently, on September 26, 2011, Appellant submitted her first

application for civil indigence in the above entitled matter, which was returned,

including her Counterclaim and Motion to Rescind Erroneous Lien and

Foreclosure and on October 6, 2011, Appellant re-filed, using the enclosed

standard form "Application for Determination of Civil Indigent Status", pursuant

to instructions by the lower tribunal court; months prior to Summary Judgment.

On October 10, 2011, Appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss Defendant's

Counterclaim; consequently, on October 18, 2011, Appellant filed a "Motion to

Stay Counterclaim and Dismiss Plaintiff's Erroneous Lien, Foreclosure, and

Motion to Dismiss".

On December 15, 2011 Appellee filed a Motion and Stipulation for

Substitution of Counsel; granted on December 20, 2011, by Judge Skinner.

On January 3, 2012, Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Final Judgment

and scheduled a hearing, unbeknownst to the Appellant until mid-January.

Subsequently, Appellee's motion was granted on January 23, 2012, by Judge Don

H. Lester, despite Appellant's objections, the inadmissible evidence, and

6

disregarding a Supreme Court mandate for mediation, as a last resort, prior to

foreclosure. Furthermore, the court both ignored and refused to address any of

Appellant's affirmative defenses; appearing to belittle her. Both Appellant and

Appellee's counsel, William S. Frazier, Esq., were present for the hearing.

On January 27, 2012, Appellant received Notice of Foreclosure Sale and

filed a Motion to Vacate Final Judgment/Emergency Motion to Stop Foreclosure

Sale and Motion to Stay Pending Appeal; including another Application for

Determination of Civil Indigent Status. On February 23, 2012, Appellant filed a

Notice ofAppeal with the First District Court ofAppeal.

On March 1, 2012, Appellant submits a letter to the Clerk of the Circuit

Court of Clay County, directing him to forward "the full record" to the Clerk of the

First District Court ofAppeal; pursuant to Rule 9.200, "excluding none".

On March 5, 2012, Appellant received notice from the First District Court of

Appeal requiring payment "of the filing fee of $300.00" or an "order of

insolvency"; which Appellant was led to believe was impending and would be

forwarded with "the full record", otherwise, her case would be dismissed.

On March 21, 2012, Appellant submits "Appellant's Initial Brief", by

Federal Express, overnight delivery.

On April 3, 2012, Appellant submits a Notice of Appeal of the First District

Court of Appeal's Order demanding she pay the "filing fee" or secure "an order of

7

indigency" or face dismissal of her appeal; being informed the foresaid documents

must come from the lower tribunal court.

On May 25, 2012, Appellant received notice from the FDCA that "not

having received a response" to its order "requiring appellant to pay the filing fee of

$300.00 or submit a Lower tribunal order of insolvency, the above-styled cause is

hereby dismissed."

On May 31, 2012, Appellee submits a Motion to Reset Foreclosure Sale.

On June 4, 2012, Appellant receives Motion to Reset Foreclosure Sale.

On June 5, 2012, Appellant receives both the Fourth Circuit Court of Clay

County's Order Resetting Sale of Property and Notice of Sale; granting Plaintiff's

Motion to Reset, submitted just days before.

On June 25, 2012, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the FDCA's Order

Dismissing her appeal for non-payment of filing fees; despite submitting numerous

Applications for Determination of Civil Indigent Status, none of them denied and a

Notice of Appeal of the Fourth Circuit Court's Order Resetting Sale of Property

granted within five days after Appellee's Motion, dated May 31, 2012.

On June 25, 2012, Appellant hand delivers and files four Applications for

Determination of Civil Indigent Status, two Motions for Certificate of Indigency,

one Motion for Order of Certificate of Indigency, and a Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff's Motion to Reset Foreclosure Sale; this time demanding stamped copies.

8

On July 5, 2012, Appellant hand delivers and files two Applications for

Determination of Civil Indigent Status, a Motion for Order of Indigency, and an

Emergency Motion to Stop Foreclosure Sale and Stay Pending Appeal; this time

demanding stamped copies.

On July 9, 2012, Appellant hand delivered and filed another Application for

Determination of Civil Indigent Status and a Motion for Telephonic Appearance;

this time demanding stamped copies. Subsequently, unbeknownst to Appellant,

Judge Don H. Lester (finally) approves her motion for Order of Indigency and for

leave to proceed in forma pauperis for purposes of appeal, without a hearing.

On July 11, 2012, Judge Don H. Lester grants Appellant's Emergency

Motion to Stop Foreclosure Sale and Stay Pending Appeal, in part, but only on the

grounds that she post "a bond in the amount of $5,000.00"; otherwise "the motion

is...denied" and "the judicial sale shall proceed"; despite Appellant's appeal and

the aforesaid "Order of Indigency".

On July 19, 2012, Appellant submits a letter to the Clerk of the Circuit Court

of Clay County, directing him to forward "the full record" to the Appeals Court,

including the Clerk of the Supreme Court and the First District Court of Appeals;

pursuant to Rule 9.200, "excluding none".

On July 21, 2012, Appellant files a Motion to Disqualify Judge Don H.

Lester, attaching a sworn Affidavit in Support of [the] Motion to Disqualify.

9

On July 23, 2012, Judge Don H. Lester denies Appellant's Motion to

Disqualify him, without addressing any of the issues

On July 30, 2012, Appellant files a Notice of Appeal of the lower tribunal's

court Order on Appellant's Emergency Motion to Stop Foreclosure Sale and Stay

Pending Appeal and a separate Notice of Appeal of the aforesaid Order, rendered

July 23, 2012, denying Appellant's Motion to Disqualify Judge Don H. Lester.

On or about August 15, 2012, Appellant receives FDCA response, dated

August 10, 2012 and on September 12, 2012, Appellant files two (2) briefs;

including two separate Orders of Indigency; which Appellee acknowledges.

On October 1, 2012 Appellee files two (2) Motion(s) and two (2) Amended

Motion(s) to Dismiss Appeal, alleging failure to timely file Order of Indigency or

alternatively, First Motion for Enlargement of Time to Serve Brief, Case No.(s):

1D12-3663 and 1D12-3660

On October 5, 2012, Appellant files responses in opposition to the aforesaid

Motion(s) to Dismiss Appeal; including letters to the court regarding postal

delivery delays and receipt concerns resulting from problems with the length of the

mailing address, causing some mail to be returned to sender as "undeliverable",

despite displaying the correct address and resulting in due process issues outside of

her control.

10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Summary judgment is only proper when there are no issues of material fact;

when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and can only be

had on competent evidence (Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c), Volusia County v. Aberdeen

at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000)); in contrast with the

aforesaid matter and rulings by the Fourth Judicial Circuit Court of Clay County on

January 23, 2012, allowing judgment for fees already paid by previous owners and

levying an excessive bond & fees against Appellant for debts incurred by others.

Otherwise, it is unconstitutional to "make or enforce any law which shall

abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" (Amend.

XIV, § 1, U.S. Const.; and Article 1, §'s 9 and 21, Florida Const.); including but

not limited to, circumventing Appellant's access to the courts, on appeal or

otherwise, as both the lower tribunal court and First District Court of Appeal has

allowed in this case. Subsequently, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process...nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" (U.S. Const. Amend. XIV§ 1 and Art.

I, § 2, Florida Const.), including but not limited to, those incorporated by the Bill

of Rights (Amend. VIII, U.S. Const.; and Art. I, § 17, Florida Const.); which

forbids "excessive bail... fines...[or] cruel and unusual punishments" as

unconstitutionally coercive as reflected in the court's July 11, 2012 ruling that the

11

"indigent" Appellant either post "a bond in the amount of $5,000.00...[or] the

udicial sale [of her homestead] shalf proceed"; despite contributory negligence.

A. The moving party must show the absence of material fact beyond thÀslightest doubt.

"Generally, '[t]he moving party for summary judgment has the burden to

prove conclusively the nonexistence of any genuine issue of material fact.'" Krol

v. City of Orlando, 778 So. 2d 490, 92 (Fla. 5* DCA 2001), (citing City of Cocoa

v. Leffler762 So. 2d 1052, 1055(FLa. 5* DCA 2000)(citing Holl v. Talcott, 191

So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1966)). The court must draw every possible inference in favor

of the nonmoving party. See Kitchen v. Ebonite 6 Recreation Ctrs, Inc., 856 So.

2d 1083, 1085 (Fla. 5'' DCA 2003). The slightest doubt will bar an entry of

summary judgment. See Mivan (Florida), Inc. v. Metric Constructors, Inc., 857 So.

2d 901, 902 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).

B. Only competent evidence may be considered in ruling on a motionfor summary judgment.

Attached as an Exhibit to Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment is one

letter, date31 February 17, 2011, which was neither signed, nor notarized; though,

purportedly sent to the Appellant and considered in the lower tribunal court's

decision for summary judgment, despite being (clearly) inadmissible.

A såcond letter, while signed by ChrÍs Hallam and dated November 18,

2008, is new evidence appearing to contradict claims by the association tha

12

Appellant is liable for previous unpaid fees as far back as "November 2006", a date

undisputed by the same agent, Chris Hallam, in another correspondence, dated

September 8, 2010; also, considered by the lower tribunal court in a decision for

summary judgment in favor of the association. In fact, the "second letter" shows a

lien assessed against the previous owner, Adrienne Cairns, implying the

association fees from "November 2006" up to "March 2007" were already

satisfied; subsequently, the records shows there are no other liens against the same

unit, until Appellant was notified by certified mail, on or about May 2011, of an

'Intent [by Appellee] to Foreclose in 30 days", dated April 15, 2011; in violation

of Prohibited laws (Art 1, § 10, Florida Const). Otherwise, Appellant was neither

hotified, nor invoiced and was, thereby, denied due process (Amend. XIV, § 1,

U.S. Const. and Art. I, § 9, Florida Const.).

Further, while the association had occasion to attach an "Affidavit of

Indebtedness in Support of Final Judgment", the lack of competent or, otherwise

admissible evidence is gut wrenching under the circumstances; serving only to

magnify the presence of issues of genuine material fact in that one document

signed by the association's agent (Chris Hallam) maintains appellant's liability is

from "November 2006", while others (clearly) contradict that claim.

C. The trial court abused its discretion and misapplied the law ingranting appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment.

13

Appellee failed to present, attach, or file any instrument that would (in fact)

authenticate its "claim" or otherwise render its documents admissible into

evidence. Instead, by and through both its agent and counsel, the association

preferred to (simply) frustrate Appellant's efforts by denying the obvious, i.e., that

after four years (since the infancy of construction and prior to Appellant's

purchase) there would remain genuine issues of material facts regarding any

waivers, abandonment, or acquiescence with respect to the non-payment of

association fees for such a lengthy period, absent the good-faith completion of

discovery, which would have provided an itemized history for review and cross,

pxamination.

D. Reverse warranted when the parties affidavits filed in support and in 1opposition to summary judgment conflict as to the amount due. CharlesE. Burkett v. Assocs. v. Vick, 546 SO.2D 1190 (FLA 5" DCA 1989)

Alternatively, Appellee continued to misrepresent the same, i.e., erroneously

claiming Appellant is liable for assessments as far back as "November 2006",

despite her purchase four years later and opposed to an official "Claim of Lien",

dated November 18, 2008, against Adrienne Cairns, the previous owner, showing

monthly assessments due from "March 2007"; not "November 2006", as indicated

by claimant's agent, Chris Hallam. Thereby, evidence to establish its truthfulness

is still required as the aforesaid letters and other documents raise far more

questions than not and are insufficient for summary f'mal judgment purposes,

14

because, by law, only "competent" evidence may be considered in ruling on a

motion for summary judgment and, in this case, there are tremendous

inconsistencies and the allegation of "stacked fees", which hinders the court's

ability to assess the accuracy of Appellee's claim in addressing the affirmative

defenses, including but not limited to the statute of limitations. Consequently, the

trial court should not have attempted to resolve issues raised by conflicting

affidavits as to amount due under the contractual agreement at issue through

summary judgment. Daeda v.Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 698 So. 2d

617, 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Tunnell v. Hicks, 574 So. 2d 264, 266 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1991).

E. Summary Judgment may be reversed if the Court finds genuine issuesraised by Defendant's affirmative defenses that are not conclusivelyrefuted on the record. Bill Williams Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc. v.Haymarket Coop. Bank,. 592 So.2d 302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991),rev.dismissed, 598 So.2d 76 (Fla. 1992)

In this case, Appellant raises numerous "affirmative defenses"; none of

which this court can find either "conclusively refuted on the record" or addressed

by the lower tribunal court, including but not limited to the admissibility of

erroneous affidavits and other documentation submitted by Plaintiff in what

Appellant has consistently alleged is a non-verified claim.

Consequently, said misrepresentations served only to prejudice Appellant in

both the lower tribunal court's decision to allow summary judgment on the

15

erroneous claim, affidavits, and other questionable documentation, forcing

Appellant to pay homeowner's association fees allegedly incurred by previous

owners, which Appellee knew and established with the court were already paid by

said "owners" long before Appellant's purchase, and during the process of

Appellant's Emergency Motion to Stop Foreclosure Sale and Stay Pending Appeal,

effectively, culminating in a surreptitious effort to take advantage of Appellant's

misfortunes by imposing excessive interest, fees, and a "bond" of $5,000.00 being

upon Appellant, (again) unduly, as an "indigent" litigant forced to scrounge in

defense of her homestead despite an erroneous claim to foreclose for both the paid

and alleged unpaid homeowners' assessment fees of previous owners, which

Appellant has reason to believe can NOT be verified.

Moreover, said fees were allowed to accumulate for well over a period of

four or more years prior to Appellant's purchase; including fees Appellant was

never invoiced/billed for in, clear, violation of her due process rights and what

Appellant has alleged, consistently, is a result of contributory negligence on the

part of the Appellee; creating tremendous duress for Appellant as she is ordered to

pay the debts incurred by previous owners, immediately, or lose her home; despite

the fact that said owners were (again) allegedly allowed to incur said debt over an

extensive period of time, beyond reason.

16

Appellant has reason to believe said decision is not only unreasonable but

that it is no longer just to grant Appellee's claim as it has, willfully, deceived the

court in pursuit of both personal and professional gain, including Appellant's very

modest homestead, which Appellee seeks to "selectively" deprive Appellant of,

because she is a vulnerable homeowner and litigant, i.e., an unemployed, single

minority mother, housing inveterate ministers, including but not limited to her son,

his wife, and two grandchildren, who do not have the resources to either defend

against an erroneous claim or pay the accumulated fees and other charges, which

previous owners were (allegedly) allowed to incur over an extensive period of

time.

F. The decision of the lower tribunal court and First District Court ofAppeal, in this case, expressly and directly conflicts with decisions fromthis court and other district courts of appeal on the same points of law

Due process is the legal requirement that the state must respect all legal

rights owed a person and, without said, "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty

or property...".

I. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge theprivileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any Statedeprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of thelaws." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV §1"; FL Art 1, § 2 & 9.

Generally, with a "clerk's determination" of indigency, as Appellant was

informed was impending, there is no need to proceed with a hearing on the matter;

17

as was, ultimately, concluded on July 9, 2011, without any change in

circumstances since June 2003. Consequently, Appellant had cause to believe she

had provided sufficient information, from the beginning, and that the lower

tribunal court had reviewed the record, as indicated by Judge Don H. Lester, prior

to granting Summary Final Judgment for foreclosure and should have provided the

necessary waiver/certificate of indigency to the FDCA, allowing her to proceed in

forma pauperis, accordingly.

If, however, the court parted company with Appellant's failure to submit a

motion for either an Order or Certificate of Indigency, despite numerous

"Applications for Determination" and a complete "review" of the record for

Summary Final Judgment, thereby, the mere semantics of a (simple) motion has

become the instrument by which an, otherwise, "indigent" party is, suddenly,

denied access in bringing "court actions", immaterial of the substance of a matter;

in which case said technicality becomes invalid (Article 1, § 21, Florida Const.).

Does it not? In fact, by virtue of its unintended use as a tool to "abridge the

privileges or immunities of [a] citizen...of the United States", in this case,

circumventing appeal, said technicality must be dismissed in favor of the

constitutional right to access.

18

In hindsight, Defendant believes the court's withholding of said certificáte

constitutes a due-process violation, which offends against the rule of law;

especially, when coupled with the following sequence of events: e

e 1) The court granted Summary Judgment on the inadmissible/erroneous

evidence, allowing foreclosure to proceed, despite genuine issues ofmaterial facts;z

2) The damages assessed, largely, as a result of the unpaid and (including

already) paid homeowners' association dues, by previous owners, not counting

Appellee's unclean hands, i.e., acting in bad faith by refusing to mediate or even

correct the erroneous claim, engaging in discriminatory conduct with said impact;

and failing to recognize the constitutional implications of its own actions alone, in

this case, represents a violation of substantive due process rights to freedom from

excessive punitive damages (Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Article I, §

17, Florida Const.; and Amend. VIII to the U.S. Const.), especially in regards to

debts incurred by someone else and the natural right to dispute said assessments in

a case where a claim is, clearly, erroneous;

3) That the court's withholding of Appellant's "Certificate of Indigency",

under the circumstances, appear far more deliberate in an effort to ply her with

enormous fees, otherwise, waived in the case of "indigent" parties and to both

justify foreclosure and prevent her from exercising her rights to appeal the

19

erroneous Summary Final Judgment on grounds of inadmissible evidence and

numerous other affirmative defenses well noted in the record;

4) That following the First District Court of Appeals dismissal. of

Appellant's Appeal on the basis of fees that would have, otherwise, been waived

had the lower tribunal court, simply, provided the "Certificate. of Indigency",

which Appellant's numerous applications were sufficient to obtain, the court

rushed to grant Appellee's Motion to Reset Foreclosure at a rapid speed, i.e ,

within days; in which case Appellant received both Appellee's Motion and the

court's Order granting said Motion within a 24 hour period, again, absent due

process (Amend. XIV, § 1, U.S. Const. and Article I, § 9, Florida Const);

5) That, subsequently, Appellant was compelled to appeal said action;

demanding a hearing on both the Application for Indigency and an Emergency

Motion to Stop foreclosure following Appellee's insistence, by and through its

attorney, that they intended to proceed with foreclosure despite Appellant's due

process rights to appeal;

6) That while Appellant, finally, was granted an Order of Indigency, even

prior to said hearing, the court (subsequently) circumvented said order by

penalizing the "indigent" Appellant, unduly, in her Emergency Motion to Stop

Foreclosure; demanding Appellant pay "a bond in the amount of $5,000.00" or the

foreclosure would proceed as scheduled, within six days; a clear violation of both

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her VIII Amend., U.S., and Art. 1, § 17, Florida constitutional rights against

"excessive bail and cruel and unusual punishment"; especially when "patently

unnecessary" and "obviously inflicted in wholly arbitrary fashion", as shown in

this case; to be determined by the Supreme Court.

In fact, one might argue there is a substantive due process right of

compelling state interest to not have their home foreclosed on for someone else's

debt; especially when said accumulations of fees are, clearly, excessive and

unconstitutional (Amend VIII, U.S. Const. and Article I, § 17, Florida Const.);

resulting from unclean hands. That being deprived of one's property, by

foreclosure, for the non-payment of fees that have never been invoiced is a

violation of said rights in that Appellant has a due process right to know what she's

being billed for and what's incorporated in said billing, as opposed to having to

guess, research, or depend on inadmissible evidence, because there is (absolutely)

no billing process.

Either way, it would appear the court has engaged in a disturbing pattern of

invidiously discriminatory abuse of both the due process and equal protection

clauses in the aforesaid matter and is inclined to act vindictively and with utter

contempt in an effort to frustrate Appellant in her efforts to secure the very rights

to due process and equal protection that are the bedrock of the American

constitution.

21

In fact, the Equal Protection Clause provides that "no state shall ... deny to

any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

II. Statute of Limitations: "[L]imits the liability..."

On May 20, 2011, Appellee, by and through its counsel, noted "that anybody

who buys the property owes the dues. [And that, while there] is an exception for

the first Mortgagee which...limits the liability to 12 months of prior

dues....[Appellant is] not the first mortgagee but a third party."

Consequently, Appellant is a "third party" American citizen subject to the

same "limits [of] liability", as opposed to some other standard, as previously held

by Florida case law and applied to the aforesaid "mortgagee" in the affirmative

defense of both the implied statute of limitations and Florida's Art. 1, § 2, in

support of the XIV Amendment of the U.S. Const.; proffered by its "equal

protection clause". In other words, there can be no such distinction, as the law

must be applied "[equally] to all people within its jurisdiction".

That, in fact, in the Fourth District Court decision of Ferola v. Blue Reef

Holding Corp., Inc., 719 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) and Kurokawa v.

Camelot Gardens Homeowners Association, 758 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000),

the courts held (in both cases) that a one year statute of limitations under

§95.11(5)(a), Fla. Stat. applies to actions to enforce associations' declarations of

condominiums; which (clearly) supports Appellant's affirmative defense,

22

upholding both the provisions of "equal protection" and the argument that

Appellee is subject to a statute of limitations not greater than "one year", pursuant

to the U.S. Const. Amend XIV §1 and Florida's Art 1, § 2; as oppose to being

victimized, discriminatorily, by different standards applied at the whim of the

homeowners' association. Thereby, and again, Appellant challenges the validity of

such an assessment as she is convinced, among other things, that the law provides

that she cannot be deprived of equal protection; as set forth in the constitution,

despite both Appellee's claim and the, subsequent, Summary Final Judgment to

foreclose on incompetent evidence.

III. Selective Enforcement: The association engaged in discriminatoryconduct.

While "the purchaser at the foreclosure sale is liable by statute for all

assessments that were due at the time that title transferred...", as previously noted,

"selective enforcement" is not supported by law. Subsequently, Appellant is only

liable for her own homeowners' association fees and not those, which the Plaintiff

abandoned, willfully, due to "unclean hands"; including failing to invoice

Appellant, as instructed.

While Appellee claims it notified Appellant of the aforesaid dues within a

week of the Amended Certificate of Title, clearly, she did not have access to the

23

unit or its mailbox at the time; as the record indicates, clearly, no one could or

would tell her who had the keys.

In any case, it is Appellant's decision to (selectively) apply the law, contrary

to the Equal Protection Clause ( U.S. Const. Amend XIV § 1 and Florida's Art. 1,

§ 2) and that disregard of previous "white" owners who incurred the bulk of said

debt, including those noted in the Certificate of Sale and purchase "as the highest

bidder" at the foreclosure sale on August 10, 2012 and others prior to Appellant's

purchase, which (now) comes into question; considering Appellee preferred to

pursue only the Appellant, clearly, engaging in "discriminatory conduct" with

similar "effect" in that Appellee chose to ignore violations by previous owners:

Adrienne Cairns, Dari Homes, LLC, GBW Holdings, Designer Homes of Florida,

and others who Appellee failed to pursue for said defaults, which it effectively

abandoned; waiving the right to enforce homeowner's association fees as a result

of waiver, acquiescence, abandonment, and unclean hands on the ground that many

plaintiffs were themselves in violation, yet, Appellee preferred to engage in

selective enforcement; a result of which the association is attempting to enforce

covenants arbitrarily and unreasonably in an effort to deprive Appellant and

Appellant alone of her homestead. Payne v. Cudjoe Gardens Property Owners

Association, Inc., CASE NO. 837 So.2d 458 Fla.App. Dist.3 (2002).

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IV. XIII Amend., U.S., and Florida, Const. Art 1, § 17 - Prohibition ofexcessive bail and cruel and unusual punishment.

In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), there are four principles by

which we may determine whether a particular punishment is 'cruel and unusual'; all

of which Appellant feels are quite relevant to her circumstances, especially, as an

"indigent" party, qualifying since June 2003; a position the court is well aware of.

Nonetheless, only two have been (previously) addressed in this matter and in an

effort to conclude said summary, Appellant believes it unwarranted to be

redundant except to reflect back on one: "A severe punishment that is obviously

inflicted in wholly arbitrary fashion."

Such is the, unfortunate, case with fees awarded Appellee in this matter, on

January 23, 2012; which, ironically, more than doubled the erroneous claim for

homeowners' association fees said to have been "reviewed" by numerous attorneys

AND the court (apparently) without regards for either the constitutional

implications or even the fairness of such an accumulation based, predominantly, on

the neglect of previous owners and others; yet, there is no greater evidence of the

court's contempt, intending to punish Appellant for exercising her rights against

said constitutional violations than its July 11, 2012 determination in which it

demands "a bond in the amount of $5,000.00" to halt the "judicial sale" of her

homestead, despite an appeal and regardless of the "Order of Indigency".

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Consequently, Appellant filed a Motion to Disqualify the Honorable Judge

Don H. Lester on July 21, which he denied on July 23 without addressing any of

the outstanding concerns raised by Appellant who presents several affirmative

defenses in addition to the aforesaid issues of material fact, which still remain,

including but not limited to the constitutional violations of both the due process

and equal protection clauses; such as the clear lack of notice and the court's failure

to ensure its process of adjudication appears fair and impartial, from the turtle walk

on Appellant's "Certificate of Indigency", circumventing her right to appeal, to the

incredible sprint to grant Appellee's Motion to Reset Foreclosure within 24 hours

of Appellant's receipt of said motion; something is amiss.

Subsequently, the statute of limitations proffered by Appellee, themselves,

regarding "first morgagee[s]" is, yet, another basis for concern regarding the

constitutionality of said claim, the accumulation of excessive fees, and the

application of different standards; coupled with overt "selective enforcement", as

evident by the associations engagement in discriminatory conduct (favoring

"white" owners) in both its approach and determination to foreclose. Otherwise,

the record infers waiver, acquiescence, abandonment, unclean hands, and failure to

produce any authentic documentation to either support Appellee's claim, refute the

affirmative defenses (even by affidavit) or establish their legal insufficiency.

Frost, 15 So. 3d 905, 906; Newton, 544 So. 2d at 225.

26

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The Florida Supreme Court has discretionary jurisdiction to review a decision of a

district court of appeal that expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of the

Florida Supreme Court or another district court of appeal on the same point of

law. Art. V, § 3b(3) Fla. Const.; Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(iv).

ARGUMENT

Effective July 1, 2008. §720.3085(1), Florida Statutes causes a homeowners'

association assessment lien to relate back to the date on which the original

declaration of the community was recorded when such liens are authorized by the

governing documents; a provision creating a "super" priority position for the

Appellee's HOA assessment lien, recorded thereafter on November 18, 2008,

extending lender liability for past due assessments to Citimortgage, Inc. and others;

whom Appellee choose not to pursue in its confident pursuit of Appellant, in clear

violation of prohibited laws (Art. 1, § 10, Florida's Const.) and both Florida and

U.S. Const. laws against "selective enforcement"; including but not limited to Art.

I, § 2, Florida Const. and Amend. XIV, § 1, U.S. Const, respectfully.

In fact, while the association, by and through its counsel, implies "Copies of

the Certificate of Title and the related Final Judgment", somehow, show Appellant

"had actual as well as constructive notice of the existence of [Appellee's]

Association", despite "[A]Il the documents /information [being] forwarded to the

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address [P.O. Box 65417, Orange Park, Florida 32065] on the Certificate of

Title...", which Appellant (again) had no access or control over, neither document

explains why the very same counsel, notwithstanding professional experience,

would continue to misrepresent the facts recorded in those very same documents

contained within the court's own records; insisting in a Motion for Summary Final

Judgment/Statement of Undisputed Facts, para 6, that Appellant "was the high

bidder for " her homestead at foreclosure or why fees already satisfied are now

being demanded in "stacked fees" from Appellant with the lower tribunal court's

approval, nor does it explain other inconsistencies that remain in the court's

records regarding actual amounts Appellant paid for her homestead or why the

"Association manager" neither invoiced her as, clearly, instructed in the September

8, 2010 correspondence, nor (at least) 125 others Appellant discovered who, also,

have liens for similar amounts during the same period; yet, were not subjected to

foreclosure proceedings, unless said document was, actually, created after the fact

to unduly hinder the efforts of Appellant and other homeowner's by circumventing

their rights, under the aforesaid laws.

Even so, because Appellant purchased the property from an individual, not

the original developer and did not receive either the original or a copy of the

Certificate of Title, which was re-routed to a post office box noted on the original

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Certificate of Title, she neither had notice of the association, nor has she ever been

invoiced.

Consequently, in order to analyze the issues, including those relating to the

affirmative defense of selective enforcement and the constitutional issues

established within the due process and equal protection clauses, Appellant submits

to the court that the association's subsequent pursuit of her and her alone is

inconsistent with actions taken regarding both the previous owners and others,

including but not limited to secondary and third party lenders and mortgagee(s);

whom Appellant contends are neither limited, nor governed by Florida Statutes

§720.3085(2)(c) as both the HOA documents, first and subsequent mortgages were

recorded prior to July 1, 2008. Thereby, Appellee waived, acquiescence, and

abandonment said rights to collect the homeowners' association fees of prior

owners by selective enforcement and unclean hands and cannot, by "ex post facto

law", go back and retroactively collect the fees of previous owners from Appellant

(Art 1, § 10, Florida Const. (Prohibited laws)); neither of which is supported by

Florida case law.

That Florida Statues §718.116(1)(b) provides that "the liability of a first

mortgagee or its successor or assignees who acquire title to a unit by foreclosure

or by deed in lieu offoreclosure" for the unpaid assessments that became due

before the mortgagee's acquisition of title "is limited" to the lesser of: (a) the unit's

29

unpaid common expenses and regular periodic assessments which accrued or came

due during the 12 months immediately preceding the acquisition of title and for

which payment in full has not been received by the association; or (b) one percent

of the original mortgage debt. In order to obtain the "protections" of the statute,

the first mortgagee must join the association as a defendant in the foreclosure

action. Thus, the protections and limitations afforded by law do not apply to

Citimortgage and others who (clearly) did not take "acquisition of title", as

required, "by foreclosure or by deed in lieu of foreclosure", unless erroneously

recorded; thereby, Appellee cannot sustain its burden to refute Appellant's

affirmative defense of selective enforcement.

That said, the record reflects numerous examples by which the association

selectively waived or abandoned its right to enforce said assessments during

transfers from Quicken Loans, Inc. and Mortgage electronic Registration Systems,

Inc. ("MERS") to Citimortgage Inc., to Cadles of Grassy Meadows II, LLC., to

Greenwich Investors XXXIII LLC, to Citimortgage (again), and then to "the

highest and best bid", i.e., Dari Homes LLC and others, prior to Appellee's rather

diligent pursuit of Appellant; conduct so, overtly, discriminatory that Appellant is

compelled to invoke her rights under the equal protection clause of both the XIV

Amend, § 1, U.S. Const. and Florida's Const. Art 1, § 2 to overcome said

disparities in an effort to defend herself, under the circumstances.

30

Notwithstanding said provision, a "first mortgagee" or its successor or

assignees who acquire title to a condominium unit as a result of the foreclosure of

the mortgage or by deed in lieu of foreclosure of the mortgage shall be exempt

from liability for all unpaid assessments attributable to the parcel or chargeable to

the previous owner which came due prior to acquisition of title if the first mortgage

was recorded prior to April 1, 1992. If, however, the first mortgage was recorded

on or after April 1, 1992, or on the date the mortgage was recorded, the declaration

included language incorporating by reference future amendments to the

Condominium Statute, then the provisions requiring the lender to pay assessments

applies.

Subsequently, while a purchaser at a foreclosure sale is liable by statute for

all assessments that were due at the time that title transferred, there are still

affirmative defenses and other protections, pursuant to both the statute of

limitations and selective enforcement; whereas Appellee chose to disregard said

provisions, claiming in its "Motion for Summary Final Judgment" that Appellee

"has no legal duty to foreclose on a unit if such action would impact negatively on

the Association"; yet, Appellee has no right to either apply the laws unequally or to

enforce them discriminatorily; again, neither or which is supported by law.

Appellee goes on to state that the "Preserve's lien was inferior to the interest of the

first mortgage holder and a foreclosure action by the Association would have

31

simply resulted in unrecoverable expenses to the Association", yet, that is only the

case "if thefirst mortgage was recorded prior to April 1, 1992" and with regards to

those "who acquire title to a unit by foreclosure or by deed in lieu of foreclosure"

and not for acquisitions that occur outside of that scope.

Therefore, in an effort to selectively enforce said liability, ignoring

violations by previous owners for years, including but not limited to Adrienne

Cairns, Citimortgage and others, Appellee effectively abandoned its right to

enforce homeowner's association fees against the aforesaid previous owners only

to attempt to arbitrarily and unreasonably pursue the Appellant in an effort to

foreclose on her homestead, which it knew to be absent any mortgage obligations.

Furthermore, in an effort to deceive the courts regarding Appellant's obligations,

Appellee sort fees in access of $20,000 above and beyond Appellant's own

individual assessments; a burden inconsistent with previous practice and in (clear)

violation of both federal and Florida constitutional law (Amend. VIII, U.S. Const.;

and Florida Const., Art. 1, § 17), including equal protection under the XIV

Amend., § 1 and Article I, § 2, Florida Const.; again, as evident in at least another

125 liens Appellant discovered filed by Appellee against other homeowners during

the same period and as demonstrated in both the "amounts" due and the "late

fees/interest" incurred astronomically, by the Appellant, compared to others

similarly situated:

32

UNIT ASSESSED DATE AMOUNT LATE FEES/INTEREST1423 APPELLANT 9/10-1/12 3,920.00 6,428.841423 (PRIOR OWNERS)11/06-8/10 10,200.001423 CAIRNS 3/07-10/08 4,595.00 680.48831 BRIMM 3/07-10/08 4,595.00 680.481533 HALEY 4/07-10/08 4,347.00 611.561113 HAMILTON 2/07-10/08 4,843.00 753.13

1734 MOTT 6/08-2/11 11,630.62 2,530.551321 RAMJOON 9/07-11/08 3,355.00 373.061913 SOOKHOO 4/07-10/08 4,347.00 611.561911 TEEMAL 5/07-10/08 4,099.00 546.35

312 VAN ZANDT 7/06-10/08 6,246.00 1,433.35

Further, while the association makes a point to clarify that Appellant's

allegations are "immaterial, repugnant, and scandalous", it fails to explain why

both Appellee and the court's own records show an enormous difference between

"legal fees" charged others under similar circumstances shown above, averaging

$130.00, and the thousands assessed against the Appellant; mainly, for the unpaid

assessments and default of previous owners, other than Appellant and

notwithstanding several "Application[s] for Determination of Civil Indigent

Status", beginning in September 2011.

Appellee, also, fails to explain why the association would either abandon or,

at the least, waiver claims against the previous owner, Adrienne Cairns, leading up

to March 2007, notwithstanding a diligent pursuit by and through its counsel and

other representatives of Appellant for assessments, beginning from "November

2006"; again, contrary to its own record, which it had previously waived,

33

abandoned, or simply misrepresented in an insidious effort to selectively target

Appellant with unduly "stacked fees", totaling $16,390.17 and reflecting $4,519.19

in "Interest and late fees [through) February 4, 2011", just five months following

Appellant's purchase. Again, conduct unbecoming and apparently inconsistent

with previous practices; including misrepresenting the facts by, simply, claiming

there are no genuine issues of material fact to fraudulently obtain the desired relief.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, while Appellee made very little to no attempts to pursue this

case and was (previously) lax in preferring not to bring a lien foreclosure action

against ALL delinquent owners, in this case, allowing homeowner's association

fees to mount up over a period of (at least) four (4) or more years prior to

Appellant's purchase of her homestead and committing fraud by estoppel in the

sudden and aggressive pursuit of Appellant only for fees incurred by previous

owners, the law does not allow for the unequal and unreasonable application of any

provision, by any means; selectively or otherwise, nor does Article 1, § 10 of

Florida's constitution provide for ex post facto law or the weakening of one

individual's obligation under contractual law in the discriminatory pursuit of

another who neither received or enjoyed the services allowed under said contract.

Consequently, Appellant has demonstrated the existence of express and direct

conflict and, as a result, this Court should grant the petition for discretionary

34

review and vacate the Order granting Appellee's Motion for Summary Final

Judgment and Foreclosure to uphold the constitutionality of both the U.S., XIV

Amend. § 1 and FL's Art. 1, § 2 against selective enforcement, in favor of equal

protection and stopping the undue foreclosure of Appellant's homestead;

consequently, dismissing Appellee's "erroneous" claim, with prejudice, for the

inadmissible evidence and unclean hands. Appellant, also, ask the court to grant

her counterclaim as a means to discourage selective enforcement and the

imposition of excessive "bonds", unduly, against "indigent" litigants in foreclosure

as a callous form of abuse, distress, intimidation, and frustration, under the color of

law; despite evidence of contributory negligence, waiver, and the assumption of

risk as a result of Appellee's own failure to assert its rights in a timely manner.

Consequently, circumstances have changed such that it is no longer just to grant

Appellee's claim, which Appellant request this court bar by laches and issue "an

express written finding of willful or deliberate refusal to obey a court order",

including but not limited to Appellee's own noncompliance for failing to mediate,

verify their complaint, or even invoice Appellant, in accordance with its own initial

claim, dated September 2010, for the "[un]verified" fees it allegedly allowed

previous owners to accumulate . For the above-stated reasons, Appellant request

this honorable court order payment of homeowners' association fees beginning

either from the date of this court's order or upon her first and only invoice, yet to

35

be received, in this matter, as a sanction. Thereby, Appellant submits the court

order Appellee to invoice Appellant by email notification, as provided below, once

every month and in advance of fees due; providing a receipt and any other relief

the court deems equitable. In the alternative, Appellant reasons she should at least

be given as much time to pay said fees as Appellee allowed in the accumulation

and that, under the circumstances, there should be no interest and/or attorney fees

allowed as this is, again, allegedly an unverified claim, which Appellant could

show (given a trial) and has contested from the beginning as erroneous.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy hereof has been furnished to the Supreme Court, Thomas D.

Hall, 500 South Duval Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399 and the FDCA, Hon Jon

Wheeler, Clerk of the Court, located at 2000 Drayton Drive, Tallahassee, Florida

32399-0950 by U.S. Mail on this ()$$) day ofNovember 20, 2012.

Copies Also Furnished To:

Atty Christine M. Russell Honorable James B. Jett, Clerk of the Circuit Court

CERT ICATE REGARDING FONT

The undersigned further certifie the font used herein is Times New Roman 14-

point, in accordance with Rule 9.010(a)(2), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Res c ubmitted,

Connie C. hompson, pro se785 Oakleaf Plantation Pkwy, #1423Orange Park, Florida 32065Cthom_online@yahoo.com(617)894-9837

36