incomplete engagement: reagan's south africa policy revisited

Incomplete Engagement: Reagan's South Africa Policy RevisitedAuthor(s): Alex ThomsonSource: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Mar., 1995), pp. 83-101Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/161547 .

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The Journal of Modern African Studies, 33, I (I95), pp. 83-I01 Copyright (C I995 Cambridge University Press

Incomplete Engagement: Reagan's South Africa Policy Revisited

by ALEX THOMSON*

EVENTS in Southern Africa during the early i99os have re-opened a debate over the effectiveness of the Reagan Administration's policy of 'Constructive Engagement'. This was a controversy that had previously been laid to rest with the US Congress passing its Com- prehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in October i986, since the ensuing punitive sanctions imposed by the enactment of this legislation scuttled Ronald Reagan's strategy of using friendly persuasion to encourage the South African Government away from its practice of apartheid. Yet, with hindsight, it may appear that the President's method of drawing the Pretoria regime into the international community, through offering recognition and encouragement in exchange for reform, has been triumphantly vindicated. After all, has not the African National Congress (ANC) come to power via a democratic process, thereby avoiding a bloodbath on the scale that so many had predicted?

CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT

The concept of Constructive Engagement first entered the public domain in I980, when Foreign Affairs (New York) published Chester Crocker's 'academic essay cum job application ', written on the eve of his appointment as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the Reagan Administration. Crocker sought to promote a strategy that would bring peaceful change in the region, enabling America to 'pursue its varied interests in a full and friendly relationship' with South Africa, 'without constant embarrassment or political damage' 2

He had earlier rejected the harsh rhetoric and gesture politics of the Carter Administration, and felt that the United States had 'wrapped

* Lecturer in Government and Politics, Department of Public Policy, University of Central Lancashire, Preston. The research for this study received funding from Lancaster University and the Economic and Social Research Council, Swindon.

1 William Finnegan, 'Coming Apart Over Apartheid: the story behind the Republicans' split on South Africa', in Mother Jones (San Francisco), April-May i986, p. 42.

2 Chester A. Crocker, 'South Africa: strategy for change', in Foreign Affairs (New York), 59, 2,

I980, p. 324.



84 ALEX THOMSON

itself in a straightjacket of principles'.' Instead, friendly persuasion ought to be the order of the day.

The key premise of Crocker's proposed strategy for change was that a 'window of opportunity' had emerged in South Africa.4 He believed significant reform could occur under the new, and (at this time) more progressive, Government of Prime Minister P. W. Botha:

The modernizers who are taking over Afrikaner nationalist politics, unlike Verwoerd, do not have an ideological blueprint. They have a set of attitudes - pragmatic, flexible, determined - and a concept of strategy defined as a continuing process of meeting means and ends ... the current fluidity does not make meaningful change certain, but it does make it possible.5

Constructive Engagement was about exploring and promoting this possibility. The policy advocated by Crocker called for a 'tone of empathy' with the Government in Pretoria, backing its attempts to reform the Republic from above.6 Punitive measures were to be avoided, while a programme of positive sanctions was put in place. The American arms embargo was relaxed, economic links were encouraged, and diplomatic support was extended to South Africa in the United Nations and elsewhere. Parallel to this engagement of the white minority regime was a series of educational and training aid projects directed at the black community.

As will be seen, the implementers of the US South Africa policy struggled against the obduracy of those in power in Pretoria, as well as a growing anti-apartheid movement in America. The township uprisings of the mid- I 98os in South Africa eventually extinguished any last hopes about the effectiveness of Constructive Engagement. Against this background, and pro-economic sanctions protests back in the United States itself (resulting in state legislature divestment campaigns, US corporate withdrawal from the Republic's economy, and mass arrests outside the South African embassy in Washington, DC), Congress enacted its comprehensive anti-apartheid legislation over the veto of President Reagan in October i 986.

Although a semi-autonomous advisory committee appointed by George Shultz, the Secretary of State, reported in i987 that 'The Administration's strategy of constructive engagement has failed to reach its objectives ',7 there is now a growing body of work portraying

3 Chester A. Crocker, 'The Quest for an Africa Policy', in The Washington Review of Strategic and International Studies (Washington, DC), I, 2, 1978, p. 63.

4 Crocker, loc. cit. i980, p. 345. 5 Ibid. p. 337- 6 Ibid. p. 350.

7 US Department of State, A U.S. Policy Toward South Africa: the report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa (Washington, DC, I987), p. I.



REAGAN S SOUTH AFRICA POLICY REVISITED 85

this policy as a success. Leading this school of revisionism is Crocker himself,8 who points to several developments that occurred in the last few months of the Reagan era, and during the Presidency of George Bush, as justification for the approach he took while Assistant Secretary of State. He wrote in I989:

as a result of our efforts, a new regional order is emerging in southern Africa. Africa's last colony, Namibia, is gaining independence; Cuban and South African soldiers are going home; a start has been made in ending the wrenching civil conflict in Angola. A younger generation of Afrikaner nationalists is assuming power in South Africa, and there is growing talk on all sides of a new era of negotiations.9

The part played by the United States in promoting negotiations between the Resiste'ncia facional Mafambicana (Renamo) and the Frente de Liberafio de Mofambique (Frelimo) Government was also emphasised.10

The bulk of Crocker's memoirs, entitled High Noon in Southern Africa: making peace in a rough neighbourhood, is understandably enough given over to describing the mechanics of the Namibia/Angola negotiations." It was here, after all, that Constructive Engagement, after eight years, bore some fruit. Prompted by an increasingly bloody military deadlock on the ground in Angola, the regimes in Pretoria and Luanda were persuaded to accept the negotiation framework that had been advocated by Crocker and his colleagues since i 98I. In the last full month of the Reagan Administration, an agreement was signed that led to Cuban troops withdrawing from Angola and Namibia's independence from South African occupation. This was Constructive Engagement's finest hour.

The emphasis placed on these events by the revisionists, however, obscures the poor performance of American policy as regards South Africa's internal situation. The fact remains that the Reagan Administration operated an anti-apartheid strategy for eight years without any real positive results. In the wake of Crocker's I992

memoirs, a reminder of what occurred in South Africa is required. Only then can an accurate balance sheet of Constructive Engagement

8 See Chester A. Crocker, 'Southern Africa in Global Perspective', in CSIS Africa Notes (Washington, DC), 105, I 989, pp. 1-5, and especially High Noon in Southern Africa: making peace in a rough neighbourhood (New York, I992).

Chester A. Crocker, 'Southern Africa: eight years later', in Foreign Affairs, 68, 4, i989, p. I47.

10 Ibid. p. I52. See also, Chester A. Crocker, 'Peacemaking in Southern Africa: the Namibia-Angola settlement of i988', in Daniel Newsom (ed.), The Diplomatic Record, I98g-Iggo (Boulder, CO, 1991), pp. 9-34, and Chas W. Freeman, 'The Angola/Namibian Accords', in Foreign Affairs, 68, 3, i989, pp. I26-41. 1 Crocker, op. cit. 1992.



86 ALEX THOMSON

be produced. In this respect, the central argument of this article is that Reagan's South Africa policy failed, not least because of the unwillingness of Washington fully to implement its advocated engagement strategy. To make matters worse, cold war priorities dictated that resources were concentrated on the Namibia/Angola 'linkage' negotiations, leaving the United States with a fatally weak series of anti-apartheid initiatives.

This incomplete engagement can be illustrated by measuring the Reagan Administration's performance against its declared goals for South Africa as outlined by Kenneth Dam, the Deputy Secretary of State, to a Senate hearing during April i985:

The policy of this Administration has been to foment change away from apartheid: By unambiguous public statements condemning apartheid evils; By reinforcing these views with quiet diplomacy; By working with elements within South Africa that share a vision of peace and equality; By encouraging fair employment practices for U.S. companies; and By including ourselves as a government in financing programs... to give South African blacks better training and educational opportunities.'2

By examining each of these five goals in turn, it will be shown that the advocated strategy was never fully implemented, thereby giving Constructive Engagement little chance of producing results in South Africa.

I. AMBIGUOUS PUBLIC STATEMENTS

Although a stated goal of Constructive Engagement was not to shy away from condemning the evils of apartheid when necessary, the Reagan Administration never shook off the (false) charges that it was merely happy with maintaining the status quo."3 The United States failed to deliver a strong enough message against apartheid in the early i980s, while later, when the State Department did step up the level of condemnation in response to the township uprisings, signals to Pretoria became confused due to bureaucratic infighting in Washington. American public statements on South Africa during these years did not meet Dam's requirement of being 'unambiguous'.

12 US Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy, The Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985: hearings. ist Session: April, May, and June 1985 (Washington, DC i985), p. 53.

13 Austin Chakaodza was not alone in believing that Constructive Engagement was a 'policy designed to appease the white minority', seeking the 'delay self-determination in South Africa'. International Diplomacy in Southern Africa: from Reagan to Mandela (London, i990), pp. 105 and 3.




The problem the Reagan Administration had in relation to its chosen style of language was that there was little to cheer about. A basic premise of the engagement strategy was that the National Party (NP) had the ability to reform South Africa itself."4 Public statements, in this respect, had to be up-beat about the changes actually made by the apartheid regime. This created a range of problems, notably in the run- up to the I984 inauguration of the Republic's new constitution, the most comprehensive step towards more representative government taken by the NP during the Reagan years. Although Crocker thought it would be 'irresponsible to say nothing', the exaggerated tone of the US 'welcome' could not be justified, given that 8o per cent of the population would still be excluded from participating in central government solely on the grounds of their skin pigmentation. Crocker himself conceded that this particular US statement 'left a taste it did not mean to leave'."5 But what choice did American officials have? The strategy being followed dictated that such encouragement should be given, especially as the Reagan Administration had very little else to praise concerning the NP's reform record. Even Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, a cautious supporter of Constructive Engagement, was to regard this US welcome as 'a slap in the face of black South Africa'. 16

America's public stand against white hegemony in Southern Africa was further weakened by the language used with respect to Pretoria's destabilisation campaign against its neighbours. This ambiguity had largely been created by one incident early in the Administration's first term of office. When the South African Defence Force (SADF) launched a military raid into Angola, the United States decided not to follow the example set both in Bonn and London, where the respective South African ambassadors were summoned in order to register a protest. Washington, instead, suggested that this violation of Angolan territory should be 'seen in its full context' - namely that Soviet arms 'have been used to refurbish SWAPO elements that move back and forth freely across that frontier and inflict bloodshed and terrorism upon the innocent noncombatant inhabitants of Namibia'." Crocker later revealed the rationale behind this statement by explaining that it was 'important for Luanda, SWAPO, and their Soviet and Cuban

14 Crocker, loc. cit. i980, p. 337. See also, Chester A. Crocker, 'Africa Policy in the i98os', in The Washington Quarterly, 3, 3, i980, p. 85.

15 Personal interview with Chester Crocker, Washington, DC, 5 October I993. 16 The New rork Times, i i January i983, p. A9. 17 US Administration's press conference of 28 August i98i, quoted by William Minter, King

Solomon's Mines Revisited: Western interests and the burdened history of Southern Africa (New York, I 986), p. 3I5. See also, The New rork Times, 27 August 198I, p. AIO.



88 ALEX THOMSON

backers to know that it was a new situation after i 98i ... South African power was one of the anvils of our diplomacy'. 18

The leaders of the Frontline states constantly complained about the havoc being created throughout Southern Africa by the Republic's strategy of destabilization. The statement issued at the meeting of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) Heads of State in Maputo in July i983 illustrated the exasperation felt by their governments: 'South Africa can invade and occupy sovereign states, blow up vital installations, and massacre populations at no apparent cost to its relations with its main allies. '9 Subsequent American comments and diplomatic initiatives, designed to curb the excesses of SADF aggression, never managed to counter the initial indirect encouragement that had been given to Pretoria at the start of its campaign of cross-border violence.

Even after the State Department had attempted to toughen US rhetoric towards Pretoria as a response to the township uprisings during the mid-ig8os, differences amongst officials within the Reagan Administration only led to this message becoming contradictory and unclear. For example, after South African security forces had shot dead I7 unarmed protesters outside Uitenhage in March i 985, Reagan attempted to place the blame for these deaths equally between 'the law and order side' and those 'who want trouble on the streets' 20 whereas Crocker strongly denounced the National Party's rule 'with guns'. 21

Indeed, a few months later the President expressed his view that the NP Government had already 'eliminated the segregation that we once had in our own country', and that South Africa's problems were more 'tribal' than 'racial .22 The most public view of this policy rift between

18 Crocker, op. cit. 1992, p. I70. 19 Quoted byJoseph Hanlon, Beggar rour Neighbours: apartheidpower in Southern Africa (London,

i986), p. 35. As explained by P. S. Mmusi, Vice-President of Botswana: 'It is not much use to develop ports and pipelines, and roads and railways, and then to watch in silence as they are blown up. We cannot ignore the continuing, indeed escalating, acts of sabotage which are being directed at our member states.' Quoted by Steve Kibble and Ray Bush, 'Reform of Apartheid and Continued Destabilisation in Southern Africa', in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), 24, 2, June i986, p. 2I3.

20 Ronald Reagan's news conference of 2I March i 985, in U.S. Department of State Bulletin (Washington, DC), 85, 2098, i985, p. I I.

21 Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, interviewed on ABC's 'This Week with David Brinkley', quoted by Kathy Sawyer, 'South Africa's Rule by Guns Hit', in The Washington Post, 25 March I985, p. AI4.

22 Ronald Reagan interviewed on WBS Radio, Atlanta, 24 August i985, quoted by Anthony Sampson, Black and Gold: tycoons, revolutionaries and apartheid (London, i987), p. 188. Also, Reagan's meeting with newspaper editors and broadcasters, June i986, quoted by Pauline H. Baker, The United States and South Africa: the Reagan years (New York, i989), p. 25, and Reagan's news conference of 24 February i988, in U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 88, 2 I 34, i988, p. i O.




the White House and the State Department came in July I986, when much of what the latter had put forward as constituting its new, more aggressive, 'active Constructive Engagement' was contradicted by Reagan in an address that emphasised the 'calculated terror by elements of the African National Congress'. 23

Looking back to this period, Crocker complained that 'the President tended to discredit his case by sounding so much like the government from which he was so reluctant to distance himself'.24 On numerous occasions the State Department was involved in record-straightening exercises to put the Chief Executive's comments 'into context' or to ' explain a point further'. This not only had the effect of weakening the message that the United States was sending to Pretoria, but also discrediting the policy of Constructive Engagement at home.25 As explained later by Senator Richard Lugar, 'I would not have persisted in opposing the President if after all these conversations, debates, and statements I had developed reasonable confidence in his comprehension of what the South African situation was all about'.26 Enough of his Republican colleagues shared this view to ensure the safe passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in October i986.

2. THE FAILURE OF QUIET DIPLOMACY

The Reagan Administration put great faith in its dialogue with the South African Government in the belief that this could encourage and hasten the reform process already under way. Yet, despite attempts to build a non-confrontation relationship, the leaders of the NP never really tested what might have been achieved through Constructive Engagement, they simply took what they could, giving little in return.

One of the clearest indications of how Pretoria might try to manipulate American initiatives came in May i98i, after Alexander Haig, the US Secretary of State, had met Pik Botha in Washington in

23 Address before the Wold Affairs Council and Foreign Policy Association, White House, Washington, DC, 22July I986, published as Ronald Reagan, 'Ending Apartheid in South Africa', in U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 86, 2I 4, I986, pp. I-5.

24 Crocker, op. cit. 1992, p. 3I9. 25 Reagan's press interview, I April I985, published in Department of State, Bureau of Public

Relations, Office of the Historian, The United States and South Africa: U.S public statements and documents, 1977-i985 (Washington, DC, I985), p. 308;John M. Goshko, 'U.S. Influence in Region is Limited, Administration Says', in The Washington Post, 29 August I985, p. A32; Editorial, 'The President, as Amended', in The New rork Times, 3I August I985, p. 22; and Julie Johnson, 'U.S. Officials Move to Clarify Reagan's Remarks', in ibid. 26 February i988, p. A8.

26 Richard G. Lugar, Letters to the Next President (New York, I988), p. 238.



90 ALEX THOMSON

order to outline exactly what Constructive Engagement was offering his regime. This particular definition of US policy, however, was apparently not what South Africa's officials were seeking. On arriving back home, the Foreign Minister sent a letter to the Reagan Administration supposedly recapping the conditions for co-operation that had been discussed. But Pik Botha's version of the talks was 'so politically unacceptable' that the State Department decided it would be unwise even to acknowledge this correspondence.27

Pretoria attempted to by-pass the official channels of engagement established by the State Department, being more impressed with the fiery anti-communist language of Reagan's i980 election campaign than with the reality of US policy once his Administration came to power. The March i98i meetings between South African representatives and the American Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, as well as US intelligence and defence officials, saw the white minority regime striving to build a relationship with the Reagan Administration via its more conservative agencies. The Africa Bureau of the State Department, at this stage, though, had a sufficient hold over Constructive Engagement to ensure that the visas of these visitors were revoked once their intentions had become clear.28 This incident, however, did not stop future liaisons between South African officials and conservative members of the Reagan Administration, making the emergence of a definitive US policy difficult.29

Diplomacy between the United States and South Africa throughout the entire Reagan period was always strained, not least because the leadership of the National Party was rigidly 'xenophobic' about any outside 'interference'. The American Ambassador to Pretoria, Herman Nickel, later recounted the lecture received from the South African Prime Minister on the occasion of their first meeting in i982, when P. W. Botha warned him against the United States trying to 'meddle' in the Republic's affairs. Whenever the Reagan Administration pushed for an accelerated pace of reform, at a faster rate than that envisaged by the National Party, US officials were 'warned off'. For example, Nickel was told by the Minister ofJustice, HendrikJ. Coetsee, that any

27 Donald F. McHenry, 'Southern Africa Policy', in The New rork Times, ioJuly i98i, p. A23.

This incident is alluded to by Crocker, op. cit. I992, p. 95. 28 Mohamed A. El-Khawas, 'Reagan's Africa Policy: a turn to the right', in A Current

Bibliography on African Affairs (Farmingdale, NY), i 6, 3, I 983-4, pp. 2 I 3-I 4; The New York Times, 20, 22, 24, 25, and 27 March i98i; US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, Enforcement of the United States Arms Embargo Against South Africa: hearings (Washington, DC, i982), pp. 24-6; and personal interview, Crocker, October I992. 29 See, for example, Crocker, op. cit. I992, p. 314.



REAGAN S SOUTH AFRICA POLICY REVISITED 9I

formal requests for Nelson Mandela's release from prison would be unhelpful (as they would only play to Botha's xenophobia), and asked if the United States was more interested in a 'public show' than the ANC leader's freedom. Backing the 'quiet diplomacy' approach, the Reagan Administration was not to officially demand Mandela's release until I 985. Even with such efforts to avoid confrontation, Ambassador Nickel still described his dialogue with the South African Government as always being 'rough '.3

This failure of quiet diplomacy to build a fruitful relationship with the Pretoria regime continued into the turbulent years of the mid- I980S. Seeking a way forward amid the carnage of the township uprisings, the Reagan Administration agreed to a meeting between US and South African officials in Vienna during August I985, held on the optimistic pretext that Pretoria had something to offer by way of substantial reforms.3' Impressed by the South African briefing, US officials began to pave the way, especially amongst members of Congress, for a South African announcement of major significance.32 P. W. Botha's 'Rubicon' speech, however, failed to live up to American expectations, since the State President chose the occasion to 'warn off' foreign governments from interfering in the Republic's internal affairs. Although Crocker publicly called this address 'an important statement', officials in Washington were privately disappointed.33 As Robert McFarlane, the National Security Adviser, commented: 'I think the spectrum of possibilities that were discussed in Vienna included surely more than was announced this past Thursday'. 34 Only later would Crocker write of the State President as 'falling into, instead of crossing, the Rubicon in I 985 '5.35

By this time it should have been acknowledged that the potential for the quiet diplomacy advocated by Constructive Engagement had been exhausted. In i98i, the risk of offering 'sweeteners' and a friendly dialogue to Pretoria could be justified as a style of approach that might hasten the process of reform. By I985, however, it was evident that P. W. Botha had nothing more to offer. Crocker later claimed that the

30 Personal interview with Herman Nickel, US Ambassador to South Africa, I982-6, Washington, DC, 9 October I992.

31 Gerald M. Boyd, 'U.S. is Reported to Warn Pretoria', in The New York Times, io August i985, pp. i and 4, and 'U.S. Official Says South Africans in Vienna Offered Power-sharing', in ibid. 22 August I 985, pp. AI and AIO. 32 Lugar, op. cit. pp. 2 I8-I9.

33 Gerald M. Boyd, 'Botha Speech Said to Disappoint U.S.', in The New rork Times, I 7 August I985, p. 4.

3' Robert C. McFarlane's ABC-TV interview, i8 August i985, 'This Week with David Brinkley', in US Department of State Bulletin, 85, 2I03, i985, p. 7.

35 Crocker, loc. cit. i989, p. i6o.



92 ALEX THOMSON

continuing policy of the United States was an attempt to 'underscore our message and buy time for a return to sanity in Pretoria before broad-scale, punitive economic measures were adopted in Congress'. 36

Surely a more positive approach to the situation was demanded, rather than just waiting for the National Party to see reason?

It was during this policy vacuum that Congress did, indeed, implement sanctions against South Africa. Backed by substantial domestic support in the United States, the legislative branch of the US Government stepped in to instigate what the Executive had refused to do.

3. SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT

In his i985 statement to Congress, the Deputy Secretary of State explained that Constructive Engagement was about encouraging a move away from apartheid by 'working with elements within South Africa that share a vision of peace and equality'.37 This was another element of Reagan's policy that was only partially implemented. The strategy always seemed to be directed at dealing with structures of white authority within the Republic, with the Administration never seriously trying to tap into the power of the black community. Indeed, at times, it seemed as if Washington's efforts to build channels of communication with officials in Pretoria had become an end in itself, despite the fact that the black opposition had an equal, if not greater claim in holding Dam's required 'vision of peace and equality'

The imbalance in the respective contacts between the Reagan Administration and the leaders of South Africa's black and white communities was evident right from the start of the Constructive Engagement initiative. When Crocker visited Cape Town in April i98i, he chose to talk officially with government representatives and not with black leaders.38 Indeed, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs was to meet formally only I5 black South Africans in the three-year period fromJanuary I 982 to December I 984.39 Although a regular commuter to Southern Africa, Crocker felt unable directly to engage the black opposition. This was a decision hardly compatible

36 Ibid. 37 See Dam's testimony in The Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985, p. 53. 38 'Whites Only Talks', in Financial Times (London), I4 April I98I, p. 3. Also, 'Press Guidance Crocker Meetings in South Africa', US Embassy unclassified cable, I 5 April I98I, published in

Kenneth Mokoena (ed.), South Africa: the making of U.S. policy, i962-1989 (Alexandria, VA, I99I),

Document No. 0 II 95. 8 Testimony of Chester Crocker, US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,

Subcommittee on African Affairs, in U.S. Policy on South Africa: hearings (Washington, DC, I985), p. 26.




with the declared aim of making the United States 'a credible partner [on] both sides of the lines'.40

Similarly, Ambassador Nickel's public profile in South Africa gave the impression that the Reagan Administration was more interested in establishing a dialogue with white leaders rather than simultaneously engaging both sides in the conflict. Although Nickel met a number of opposition representatives from time to time, no meaningful or consistent relationship emerged between them and the US embassy.4 As Robert Cabelly, Crocker's assistant, later explained:

for the first four years our policy was focused on trying to do business on a number of internal and regional issues with South Africa. That caused us to burn some bridges with blacks. It didn't shut down the dialogue, as some would say, but it did not promote a dialogue.42

The Administration conducted its relationship with Pretoria occasionally at the expense of furthering contacts with the black community. The Ambassador, in one instance, took a number of United Democratic Front (UDF) members off a list of candidates selected for a US Information Service exchange programme. This was done specifically as the embassy was trying not to antagonism its host government.43

If Constructive Engagement demanded that Washington became more involved with talking to leaders of the apartheid state, parallel discussions were needed with the opposition, not least in order to counter charges that the United States had tilted its policy towards the interests of the white minority. In November I982, Inkatha's Gibson Thula expressed just such misgivings: 'We are greatly perturbed by the Reagan Administration's friendly attitude towards South Africa. We have some suspicions that this is being carried out at the expense of the voteless people'."4 Bishop Desmond Tutu was even more sceptical. Asked by journalists if he thought Constructive Engagement was becoming more conservative, he replied: 'I frankly don't care ... I have written off the Americans as a government'.45 Only when Edward Perkins arrived as Ambassador in Pretoria during i986 did US officials begin actively to build meaningful contacts within the black com-

40 Testimony of Chester Crocker during April and May i98i, US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, in Nomination of Chester A. Crocker (Washington, DC, i98i).

41 Personal interview with Bob Gosende, Counsellor for Public Affairs, US Embassy, Pretoria, I 98 I-6, Washington, DC, I4 October I 992.

42 Personal interview with Robert Cabelly, Personal Assistant to Chester Crocker, State Department, i98i-9, Washington, DC, I3 October 1992.

43 Personal interview, Gosende, October I992.

44 Gibson Thula quoted by Bengamin Pogrund, Reagan's Shift: the view from Pretoria', in Washington Quarterly, 5, I, I982, p. I82.

4 Desmond Tutu quoted by Pogrund, loc. cit. p. 182.



94 ALEX THOMSON

munity. By this time, however, it was to late. Virtual civil war existed in the townships, creating an environment hostile to the possibility of encouraging negotiations.

Given that the ANC had enough popular support to make it the prime candidate to form South Africa's first post-apartheid government, it was particularly surprising that the declared American policy of promoting a broad dialogue was not implemented. Indeed, before I985, the Reagan Administration made clear that its friendly relationship with the leaders in Pretoria did not hinge on them talking to the ANC. Frank Wisner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, told Congress that the United States was 'not going to dictate' such talks be initiated.46 Instead, the Administration held the ANC at arm's length. America's strategic interests apparently dictated that a continuing relationship with the South African Government was more important than any form of meaningful dialogue with the main exiled opposition movement.

Even when Reagan agreed to high-level contacts between the ANC and the United States inJanuary i987, the Administration appeared to be acting reluctantly and under pressure. As Cabelly later put it, 'events pushed us'. 7 American officials gave no impression that this decision would stimulate a more dynamic policy towards the Republic. In fact, it should be noted that this meeting was only regarded as a diplomatic breakthrough because the Reagan Administration had itself ended all such meetings earlier in i98i. As Donald McHenry, a former US Ambassador to the United Nations, remarked, the Carter Administration previously had contacts with the ANC 'at every level under the sun'.48

The state-led reform of apartheid, however fundamental, was never going to be a substitute for constitutional negotiations between all the parties concerned in the future of South Africa. Given its own lack of success in bringing together the Government and the black opposition at any time during the I 98os, the Reagan Administration was only able to watch from the sidelines when the Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group came close to making such a breakthrough in i 986.49

46 Testimony of Frank Wisner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, September I983, US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, Internal Political Situation in South Africa (Washington, DC, 1984), p. I04.

4 Personal interview, Cabelly, October 1992.

48 Personal interview with Donald F. McHenry, US Ambassador to the United Nations, 1979-8I, Washington, DC, 20 October I992.

4 See Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons, Mission to South Africa: the Commonwealth report (London, i986).




Nickel was quite right not to apologist for his attempts to build a dialogue with the white minority regime while US Ambassador in Pretoria: 'you deal with the power structure because that's where the power is'.50 But this should not have been at the expense of also engaging the regime's black opposition.

4. OVER-RELIANCE ON THE SULLIVAN PRINCIPLES

Dam's declared objective of encouraging American companies to operate fair employment practices in South Africa became potentially the greatest source of contact that the United States would have with the country's majority population. Yet, the emphasis placed on the so- called 'Sullivan Principles' was highly unrealistic because the strategy of letting capitalist forces gradually erode apartheid away did not meet the realities of the mid- I 98os. Black South Africans were demanding an immediate end to racial oppression, and were not impressed by American programmes seeking long-term evolutionary change. As David Welsh observed at the time, 'This is late twentieth century South Africa, not nineteenth century Western Europe, and the time- scale has become telescoped.'51

Through backing capitalism as an agent to help dismantle apartheid, the Reagan Administration relied heavily on American transnational corporations (TNCs) operating in South Africa, and their adherence to the Sullivan Principles. Although such fair employment practices undoubtedly improved the standard of living for the workers concerned, it was wrong for US officials to exaggerate their significance. The Sullivan Principles should not have been regarded as the flag-ship of the Administration's black empowerment strategy. They ought to have been promoted as a minor component in a wider, more dynamic, American involvement with the Republic's black population.

American TNCs had only the ability to make a small dent in an economy suffering from the legacies of apartheid. It was a question of scale: 7 I per cent of those South Africans employed by US corporations may have been covered by the Sullivan Principles,52 but they only amounted to I 7 per cent of the total working population.53 This was

50 Personal interview with Herman W. Nickel, US Ambassador to South Africa, i982-6, Washington, DC, 9 October 1992.

51 David Welsh and Marinus Wiechers, The i983 Constitutional Referendum and the Future of South Africa: two views', in South Africa International Johannesburg), I4, 3,i984, p. 433.

52 Vic Razis, The American Connection: the influence of United States business on South Africa (London, i986), p. I30- 53 Ibid. p. 88.



96 ALEX THOMSON

an insufficient base from which to claim, let alone demand, that these employment practices should become accepted rights for the entire South African workforce.

Constructive Engagement's over-reliance on the Sullivan Principles was compounded by the fact that the Reagan Administration opposed legislation to make this code of conduct mandatory for all US transnational corporations operating in South Africa. The Reverend Leon Sullivan himself campaigned for this change,54 and the Executive's stand did little to deflect charges that these Principles were merely a form of moral protection money being paid by American firms continuing to benefit from the apartheid economy.55 In this respect, it was argued by opponents that the continued presence of these companies only served to legitimise the existing status quo. Needless- to-say, the South African Government also received financial assistance from US corporate tax revenue, and as TransAfrica's Randall Robinson argued before a House of Representatives hearing:

When one measures what those corporations do for that small number of blacks in the job place as opposed to the great contribution they make to the state and its capacity to perpetuate apartheid, I think we would be better served if the corporations left.56

Even if American corporations did contribute to the progress of capitalist development in South Africa, it is hardly conceivable that the black population would have been willing to wait patiently for the benefits to trickle down from above. Something more immediate and dynamic, rather than the Sullivan Principles, should have formed the centre-piece of the Reagan Administration's engagement with the majority population.

Between i984 and i988, as a result of economic and political pressures, as many as I78 (over half) of the American companies withdrew from South Africa, including such flagships of TNC

5 Leon H. Sullivan, 'The Sullivan Principles and Change in South Africa', in Africa Report (New York), 29, 3, 1984, pp. 48-9. See testimony of Leon H. Sullivan, US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and on Africa, in U.S. Corporate Activities in South Africa: hearings, September and October i98i, and May and June 1992 (Washington, DC, 1983), pp. 7-8.

5 US corporate spending on welfare projects in South Africa was reported to have risen from $io million in i984 to $33 million by I 987. See Task Group of the Sullivan Signatories, Meeting the Mandate for Change: a progress report on the application of the Sullivan Principles by U.S. companies in South Africa (New York, Industry Support Unit, I 984), and D. J. Venter, South Africa, Sanctions and the Multinationals (Chichester, I989), pp. I60-2.

5 Testimony of Randall Robinson, Executive Director of TransAfrica, US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Subcommittees on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, South African Restrictions: hearings (Washington, DC, 1983), p. 126.




representation as Ford, IBM, and General Motors.57 By i987, even the Reverend Sullivan no longer believed that the presence of US firms could be justified.58 Plainly stated, the human rights concerns of the United States were no longer compatible with its economic interests in the South African context. Disinvesting as a result of the stresses and strains created by this situation, American business was to impose its own economic sanctions against the apartheid regime. This voluntary disinvestment made a mockery of the Reagan Administration's goal of continued economic contact with the Republic of South Africa.

5. EMPOWERMENT NOW

Dam's final declared component of US policy was to involve the Reagan Administration 'in financing programs ... to give South African blacks better training and educational opportunities'.59 These programmes, however, paled into insignificance alongside the determination of black South Africans to forge a new society by their own actions, and on a time-scale much shorter than that envisaged by either Pretoria or Washington. Only a comparatively small number of individuals could benefit from such American-financed educational, entrepreneurial, or trade union projects when compared to the vast majority of black South Africans who were being denied similar opportunities by their 'own' Government. Once again, there was a question of scale. Funds from the US Agency for International Development averaged only $5 million per annum during I 98 I-4, and not surprisingly failed to have far-reaching consequences during this period on the Republic's $8o,ooo million economy.60

Although the US Administration correctly identified the labour movement in South Africa as the black opposition's most progressive and effective lever of change, more aid was allocated to tertiary education projects, mainly because it was felt that the unions were not politically 'neutral' enough.6" Any overt support of black activists in

57 See Alison Cooper, U.S. Business in South Africa, 1992 (Washington, DC, I992), pp. 193-5. 58 Stuart Auerbach, 'Sullivan Abandons S. African Code', in The Washington Post, 4 June

i987, pp. Ei and E4. 5 Dam's testimony, loc. cit. p. 53. 60 See US Agency for International Development, Congressional Presentation Fiscal Year... Annex

one: Africa (Washington, DC, annual editions); US Department of State, Special Working Group on South and Southern Africa, AID in South Africa: making a difference (Washington, DC, i987); and address by the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs prepared for the World Affairs Council, Cleveland, Ohio, I5 June I987, published as Michael H. Armacost, 'The U.S. and Southern Africa: a current appraisal', in U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 87, 2I25, I987, p. 49.

61 Christopher Coker, The United States and South Africa, 1968-1985: Constructive Engagement and its critics (Durham, NC, i986), p. i88.



98 ALEX THOMSON

the Republic, it was thought, would damage Washington's relations with the leaders of the National Party, even assuming they would have let such labour training programmes go ahead in the first place. Constructive Engagement could not commit itself to a fully-fledged strategy of 'black empowerment' because it would have had the effect of dampening the dialogue it was trying to create with the NP Government. Gaining the trust of both the black and white communities at the same time was a next to impossible task, given the Reagan Administration's decision to put its relationship with the white minority regime first.

Scepticism on the part of the targets of 'black empowerment' also limited the viability of such a strategy. Many South Africans, wary of past US policy, were cautious about this new intervention. Some rightly wondered why the Reagan Administration was not willing to back existing 'empowerment' initiatives, such as that for shop stewards by the Federation of South African Trade Unions (Fosatu).62 Why did Constructive Engagement only involve itself in such training through the African-American Labor Center (AALC) in the United States? Suspicions were further heightened by the fact that Irving Brown, a member of an AFL-CIO delegation which visited the Republic in i98i, and the AALC's first director, was alleged by the South African Labour Review to be an agent of the US Central Intelligence Agency, while Nana Mahomo, a programme officer, had been expelled from the Pan-Africanist Congress in the early I 96os following allegations that he too was an operative for the CIA.63

After US AID had established a mission in Pretoria during i986, funds for these training projects rose from $5-8 million in I984 to $25

million by i988.64 This certainly represented an expansion on what Ambassador Perkins called the 'minuscule' programmes of the earlier i980s.65 Yet even with increased levels of aid, the Reagan Admin- istration's attempts at 'black empowerment' continued to operate on a time-scale inappropriate to the circumstances of the society it was engaging. It was a policy rejected, for this reason, by the very organizations it was designed to support. As Dennis Barrett, director of US AID's South African operation at this time, later recalled: we 'did

62 Ibid. 63 Jeremy Baskin, 'AFL-CIO-AALC-CIA', in South African Labour Bulletin (Durban), 8, 3,

I982, pp. 5I and 6o. 64 US Department of State, Special Working Group on South and Southern Africa, AID in

South Africa: making a difference (Washington, DC, i987), and US Agency for International Development, Congressional Presentation Fiscal Year i989. Annex one: Africa (Washington, DC, i989).

65 Telephone conversation with Edward J. Perkins, US Ambassador to South Africa, i986 9, 30 December I992.




encounter some reluctance on the part of the black South Africans ... they thought US policy was antithetical to the overall objectives of the liberation movement'.66 Another aid official was reported to have stated that half the black groups approached by the Administration refused to accept assistance on these grounds.67 With demonstrators being shot in the townships for demanding democracy immediately, most black organisations considered it inappropriate to encourage any programmes that envisaged 'black empowerment' only at some ill-defined point in the future.

The South African Government also began to oppose American- financed activities during the mid- I980s. Although Pretoria had no wish to create a diplomatic incident, and hence ignored US AID's challenge to its authority, the National Party did occasionally make its feelings known.68 In i986, for instance, Christine Babcock, a US AID official, was refused a visa to conduct research into levels of malnutrition in the Homelands.69 The United States certainly had to tread carefully after I988, when the NP Government introduced new laws restricting foreign assistance to various opposition organisations.70

Like the parallel American corporate welfare projects during the I980S, the Reagan Administration's black empowerment programmes eased the lives of many South Africans, but they were neither widespread nor immediate enough to make a significant difference as regards the country's on-going conflict. The money spent on training projects was certainly no substitute for a more direct US engagement with those advocating fundamental change. As Michael Clough reasoned at the time, 'The cornerstone of a black empowerment strategy should be the development of an on going dialogue with the black leadership'.71 Although the Reagan Administration did help 'to give South African blacks better training and educational opportunities', these simply looked inadequate, if not out of place, given the immediacy and scale of the problems that faced the Republic.

66 Personal correspondence with Dennis P. Barrett, Director, South Africa Programmes, US AID, 4 March I993.

67 Mark Edelman quoted by Pauline H. Baker, 'Facing Up to Apartheid', in Foreign Policy (Washington, DC), 64, i986, p. 49.

68 Personal interview with J. H. de Klerk, Director, Americas, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 23 April I993.

69 'U.S. Envoy in South Africa', in The New York Times, i9 November i986, p. AI5, and 'Envoy Says Pretoria Barred Visit to Priest', in ibid. i6 January i987, p. A2.

7 Department of State briefing, 2 March I988, published as 'South Africa's Proposal to Ban Foreign Funds', in US Department of State Bulletin, 88, 2I34, i988, p. 23.

71 Michael Clough, 'Southern Africa: challenges and choices', in Foreign Affairs, 66, 5, i988, P. I084.



I00 ALEX THOMSON

CONCLUSIONS

The Reagan Administration's foreign policy as regards South Africa failed to realise its own declared objectives. Constructive Engagement, as it was only partially implemented, proved insubstantial and inappropriate for the circumstances of the I 98os. The United States, as a result, contributed little to the eradication of apartheid during these watershed years of South Africa's history. Only when Congress unilaterally decided to impose punitive economic sanctions would Washington really begin to make an impression on the obdurate regime in Pretoria.

If US policy can take some credit for helping to create a framework for the negotiations that eventually brought peace elsewhere in Southern Africa, this should not be automatically extended to assume that Constructive Engagement played a part in laying the foundations for talks between the National Party and the ANC in the i99os. In many ways, a successful strategy of offering recognition for reform had to wait until George Bush and F. W. de Klerk arrived. Reagan's South Africa policy, in practice, amounted only to the stalling of the international sanctions campaign, and an ineffective diplomatic engagement with a regime in Pretoria stubbornly disinterested in the potential way forward that was being offered by Washington. Indeed, Constructive Engagement never really progressed beyond the position that existed during the mid-I 980s, when Crocker and his colleagues were forced into a rearguard action, attempting to 'buy time for a return to sanity in Pretoria'.72 Waiting for a display of sanity from P. W. Botha's Government did not amount to an effective foreign policy.

Southern Africa can certainly be described as having enjoyed a level of peace since mid-I988 that had not been experienced during the preceding years, and there can be little doubt that the diplomatic skills of US officials contributed greatly to this improved situation. The way in which these successes for American policy are portrayed, however, should not come to disguise the fact that the Reagan Administration operated eight years of its Constructive Engagement strategy towards South Africa with few, if any, positive results. Crocker, in his memoirs, concentrating on the Angola/Namibia negotiations, explains to those who criticise the Reagan Administration's record towards South Africa that Constructive Engagement makes 'no sense except as a regional

72 Crocker, loc. cit. i989, p. i6o.



REAGAN S SOUTH AFRICA POLICY REVISITED IOI

strategy'.73 This may be the case, but achievements elsewhere should not come to hide the failings of American policy in the Republic.

Although Crocker made a creative and determined attempt to ease tensions in a highly volatile area, should the South African components of the US strategy have paid the price for a myopic concentration on the 'linkage' negotiations? Could not parallel initiatives have been implemented in the Republic? In the borrowed phraseology of one former US diplomat who worked in the American embassy in Pretoria during the i98os, 'Couldn't they walk and chew gum at the same time?'."" There is some validity in Crocker's belief that if Constructive Engagement had only 'one chance of ten of success', then it was 'worth trying'." Such odds, however, could have been considerably reduced if this strategy had ever been fully implemented. No revisionism concerning the performance of the United States, based on regional events, should be used to vindicate the reality of the Reagan Administration's incomplete engagement in South Africa.

7 Crocker, op. cit. I992, p. 76, original emphasis. " Personal interview, Gosende, October 1992.

7 Personal interview, Crocker, October I992.



incomplete engagement: reagan's south africa policy revisited

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