india's forward policy

8/4/2019 India's Forward Policy

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Indias Forward Policy

The objective of the forward policy were, first, to block potential lines of further Chinese

advance; secondly, to establish an Indian presence in Aksai Chin which would make Indian

participation in the joint withdrawals proposed by Nehru more than theoretical, and thus give

strength to that diplomatic lever for getting the Chinese out of the area. Beyond that, implicit atthe onset, was the intention to undermine Chinese control of the disputed areas by the imposition

of Indian posts and patrols between Chinese positions, thus cutting their supply lines and

ultimately forcing them to withdraw, but the objectives emerged after the policy was formulated,

and more a rationale; the forward policy really sprang from the conclusion that there was nothing

else India could do.

The policy was legalistic, assuming that India had only to go and stand on as many parts of

Aksai Chin as possible to turn the tables on China, or at least attain a position of equality with

her. It was reckless, ignoring the often repeated Chinese warning that assertion of Indian claims

in the western sector courted retaliation across the McMohan line. And at the bottom it wasirrational, because its fundamental premise was that no matter how many posts and patrols India

sent into Chinese-claimed and occupied territory the Chinese would not physically interfere

with them-provided only that Indians did not attack Chinese positions. In Lok Sabha in 1961,

Nehru explained that the objective of the forward policy was to force the Chinese to vacate

Indian territory.1 He pointed out that, if diplomatic means failed, India would have to go on a war

with the aggressor.2 He stated that India would go on strengthening its position to deal with the

situation until it no longer has to deal from a weak position. Maxwell argues that how it could be

believed that the Chinese would stand idly and let India gradually and laboriously build positions

of strength from which to attack them is difficult to understand.3

Nehru emphasized the dangers of war, not only for India and Indians but for the world as a

whole. He believed that a war between India and China would be one of the major disasters of

the world, for it would mean world war. He feared that both the parties would not be able to limit

the war in time because it will not be possible for China to defeat India and it would be

impossible for India to march up to Peaking across Tibet.

1 P176

2 176

3 P176


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Mr. Lore J. Kavic notes, "The cautious and limited deployment of Indian troops in Ladakh

proved inadequate as either a deterrent to or a bulwark against further Chinese advances."4

General Kaul writes that Mr. Nehru "had a meeting in his room somewhere in the autumn of

1961 in which Krishna Menon (Defense Minister), General Thapar (Chief of Army Staff) and I

were present. He first saw on a military map all the recent incursions China had made against us.He said that whoever succeeded in establishing (even a symbolic) post, would establish a claim

to that territory, as possession was nine-tenths of law. If the Chinese could set up posts, why

couldn't we? "The numerical and logistical difficulties" were pointed out but were rejected. The

whole basis of the "forward policy" was the assumption that "China was unlikely to wage war

with India." When Mr. Nehru thought of war he thought always of total war, never of limited

war.

Mr. Mankekar gives more precise details about the origin of the new policy, saying that the

Prime Minister gave the green light in November 1961. "Accordingly, on December 5, 1961, the

Army H.Q. directed Eastern as well as Western Commands to patrol as far forward as possibletowards the international border; to establish additional posts to prevent the Chinese from

advancing further and also to dominate any Chinese posts already established in our territory; to

be in effective occupation of the whole frontier; to cover gaps either by patrolling or by posts;

and finally to make a re-appraisal of the tasks."

China's reaction was to point out, in a note of 30 November, that if the policy was pursued she

would "have every reason to send troops to cross the so-called 'McMahon Line.' "This was

followed by a resumption of patrolling in the Western Sector in April 1962.5

In retrospect, it seems that by then China had already decided to resolve the stalemate by use offorce. Dalvi maintains that "The Chinese in 1962 had prepared both for war and for talks, if India

appreciated the futility of fighting for her rights. India was prepared neither for fighting nor for

talking."

The next event was on 10 July when an Indian post in the Galwan Valley in Ladakh was

surrounded by Chinese troops. The post held out till it was overrun in October. The two sides

drew different conclusions from this incident. India felt confirmed in the wisdom of its forward

policy and in the assumption that China would not attack, while China realized that India was

now prepared to risk armed conflict. In Dalvi's opinion, Galwan "was the perfect decoy to make

their point without alerting NEFA."

4India's Quest for Security: Defense Policies 1947-1965 (San Francisco: University of

California Press, 1967), p. 169.

5Note of 30 April 1962, White Paper, VI, p. 39.


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A new IV Corps was created and Lieut.-General Kaul was appointed its Commander.6 At a

Conference in Dhola on 9 October, General Kaul told the Commanders assembled there that "in

spite of the stark facts and irrefutable arguments against military action, he had no option but to

make some move on 10th October, as this was the last date acceptable to the Cabinet, whatever

the cost." According to Dalvi, "As a direct assault on Thagla was ruled out, he decided to do a

'positional-warfare' ,maneuver and occupy Yumtsola-to the west of Thagla peak, which was not,

at that time, occupied by the Chinese." Accordingly, he ordered a battalion of Rajputs to move to

Yumtsola, crossing the Namka Chu River, "to sit behind the Chinese, on 10th October 1962."

Brigadier Dalvi persuaded General Kaul to have a patrol sent before committing the whole

battalion. A platoon was sent, but it was heavily attacked by some 800 Chinese troops supported

by heavy mortars. The Indian troops fired back. "The 'swift and massive retribution' for our

attempt to disturb the de facto boundary shook General Kaul, who saw the first Chinese attack

develop. His first reaction was one of disbelief, shock and disillusionment. 'Oh my God,' he

cried, 'you are right, they mean business.' "6

On 20 October, China launched a major military offensive in both the eastern as well as the

western sector. The justification claimed was not one of response to Indian provocation, but of

self-defense. According to the Chinese account "On October 20, Indian forces started a massive

general offensive."

The forward policy was not designed to evict China altogether from territory India considered

hers, but to check the continuing Chinese advance. India was not militarily strong enough to

sustain this policy, but it assumed that since China would not mount a major military attack, the

deteriorating condition could be arrested. In the event, India found itself confronted with an

eventuality for which it had never allowed: a military clash which fell short of total war, but wentfar beyond the familiar local military skirmishes.

When, at last, it realized the gravity of the situation, the Indian Government felt it was too late to

retreat, not because this would entail capitulation to China, but because of the unacceptable

domestic political consequences. A government that had been too short-sighted to negotiate

when it could and should have, or to have prepared for the worst while there was yet time, found

itself too weak to tell the truth to its own people.

6Dalvi, p. 292.

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