india's vietnam

8/10/2019 India's Vietnam

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Rediff.com

Josy Joseph

[INDIAS VIETNAM ] In an explosive, exhaustive series over the next fortnight, rediff.com uncovers facets of the operation

that have never been revealed.


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In March exactly a decade ago, the Indian Peace Keeping Force returned from the SriLankan shores after fighting an alien war.

Vanquished.

The IPKF should have been Sri Lanka's saviour in its dark hour. Instead it ended up being hated by the very people it went to save. Hated and condemned.

It suffered too. Suffered terribly in an alien terrain, fighting an enemy which had thefull support of the people and the government, fighting a war which was not its. Itkilled thousands, lost thousands. And came home under a cloud so dark and heavythat it has cast a permanent shadow over the fourth largest army in the world.

What went wrong?

Totally unprepared and ill-equipped, that was the IPKF

Colonel John Taylor (retd), one of the first officers assigned to the IPKF, says thearmy was made to fight with one hand tied behind its back.

By the time the Indian Peace Keeping Force was inductedafter the India-Sri Lanka Accord, the Liberation Tigers ofTamil Ealam had emerged a strong militant group on theisland. They had wiped out all opposition, both Tamil and

Sinhala. They had full control of the North and East. Theywere running a parallel government. The administration and judiciary were with them.

The LTTE was both loved and feared by all. When I was in Sri Lanka, the onlySinhalas north of the Elephant Pass were the Sri Lankan troops stationed there. OnlyTamils were safe in the area. Such was the total control of the LTTE, because of theirmass appeal.

When the Sri Lankan government reached its wit's end, it decided on military action.It sent in its armed forces to sort out the LTTE. The first full-scale military action,

involving tanks, armoured personnel, carriers, artillery and armed helicopters waslaunched in 1987. The ruthless manner in which the Sri Lankan troops assaultedvillages led the Tamils to cry 'genocide'.

Many critics have labelled the IPKF's role on the island as India's Vietnam. The SriLankan Tamils, fed on LTTE propaganda, boasted of giving the fourth largest army inthe world, a bloody nose.


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Nothing can be further from the truth.

The IPKF had successfully eliminated the middle order leadership of the LTTE and broken their stronghold over the Jaffna peninsula. The LTTE was forced to takerefuge in the jungles of the North and East. The Elephant Pass was open for the firsttime after the LTTE had taken control of the Jaffna. Movement of goods from theSouth, East and West was made possible after a long period of time.

However, the IPKF operations were not a complete success. We were unable to unitethe different Tamil groups, mainly because of the intransigent attitude of the LTTE. Itwanted the whole pie or nothing.

Anyone with a military background will tell you that for an army to be successful inan operation of the size and magnitude in Sri Lanka, it must have excellentintelligence, freedom of action to plan and execute its operations, and sound logisticsupport

Intelligence, or lack of it, has always been the bane of independent India. Everymilitary operation undertaken by us has been dogged by poor -- no, pathetic --intelligence. The Kargil Committee Report too has highlighted this aspect.

We were aware of the LTTE's domination over other militant organisations, but wewere not aware of their innovative tactics, resourcefulness, tremendous mass supportand, most importantly, their excellent intelligence network.

Let me give you two small examples of their subtle yet fatally successful methods of passing on information. Whenever an army patrol left their camp or post, the nearesttemple or church would ring their bells to indicate how many men were in the patrol.If the bell chimed six times the strength of the patrol was six, and so on. Only later didwe realise the truth of Hemingway's classic For whom the Bells Toll: they were tollingfor us.

Passing through a village or township, a small boy or girl would run ahead to the endof the street, pass information about the patrol. The next messenger would be cycle-

borne. Thus the message went ahead -- messengers changing every 150 metres or so.Even if they were intercepted, the boy or girl only knew his portion of the route. Noone person knew the ultimate destination.

While passing messages on their radio sets, they switched frequencies continuously.So the intercepts were just one line of a coded message. This was something we werelearning for the first time, and the hard way too.
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The Research and Analysis Wing was in charge of collation of intelligence. The lesssaid about them the better. The intelligence agents were afraid for their lives andhardly dared to venture out of their rooms. All the information they passed on wasacquired from the army. Things should have been the other way round.

Unfortunately Rajiv Gandhi mainly accepted the advise given by RAW and otherintelligence agencies, and decided to induct the IPKF. What we heard on thegrapevine was that the RAW advisors had told the PM, "We will have Prabhakaran inour custody within 72 hours." This was never confirmed, but was an indicator of our

poor intelligence assessment.

The entire IPKF operations were politically guided andintelligence oriented. The armed forces had little or no say. Orelse, a full-scale military operation without the basic supportarm, the artillery, would have never been launched. Tanks andAPCs were not used. There was no air cover. Much later, anodd armed helicopter was brought in. For use against an

enemy which had taken refuge in the jungles. The only other operation conducted onsimilar lines was when the Indian army was asked to flush out militants from theGolden Temple: barefoot, with weapons slung over their shoulders.

To be able to send troops to a neighbouring country for policing or for a militaryoperation one has to have a strong and stable government, be at least a minisuperpower, be politically and economically strong, have a strong army, air force and

a navy with a medium strike radius (something on the lines of the US Seventh Fleet),and be a nuclear power or at least have some nuclear capability.

At that time we did not fulfill any of the above criteria. A strong and capablegovernment means having no internal threat and being able to convince neighbouringcountries of one's 'good intentions.' At the time of the IPKF operations, we were theBig Bad Brother of the subcontinent. Even Bhutan and Nepal had axes to grind withus.

Prior to the Accord, in the 1980s, the US-Israeli line favouring Colombo in the

conflict was a sore point with New Delhi because of our Tamil lobby. The decision tointervene directly was based on wrong assumptions. We did not have the wherewithalfor such large-scale operations and we went in with a token force which was totallyunprepared for the job in hand.

It must go to the credit of the Indian armed forces, especially the air force, forconducting one of the largest airlifts since World War II. Few people are aware that in


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terms of man and material, more tonnage was lifted by land and sea in Sri Lanka thanin any theatre of operation during the WWII. We were not organised for an operationof this nature. We did not have any airborne divisions, nor did we have a MarineCorps; we had never undertaken any amphibious operations. We just sent in aninfantry division which had none of those elements. Such was the IPKF, totallyunprepared and ill-equipped.

There were no proper maps. The IPKF did not even have sufficient cooking utensilsand radio sets. They were more ceremonial than tactical. Even the chain of commandwas not adequately defined. The tactical HQ was initially at Southern Command,Pune. Better sense prevailed later and a separate HQ was set up for co-ordinatingmilitary operations of the IPKF at Madras.

After the assault on Jaffna the IPKF was also tasked to hold provisional elections andother administrative duties like running essential services and keeping the roads open.They manned banks, post offices, railways and vehicular transport. These jobs werecarried out with distinction by the IPKF. This part of the story somehow never got

publicity or praise. It was a Herculean task, done with the typical thoroughness that isthe hallmark of our armed forces.

The army commanders were never given a free rein. It was always 'orders from Delhi'.The intelligence agencies called the shots. Choice of weapons was dictated from thetop. This, in spite of the fact that the IPKF was fighting a very cunning opponent, whohad the full support of the local population and who was operating in a terrain verywell known to him.

The IPKF, on its part, had to fight in an alien country, alien terrain, face a hostile population and deal with an unfavourable foreign government, who never wanted it intheir country in the first place.

India was no economic or military giant to undertake such an operation, but then persons of importance thought otherwise. Militancy cannot be solved by militaryaction alone; more so in some other country. India should have ensured a dialogue

between the Tamils and Sinhalese. That may have been more successful than sendingin troops.

The revival of fresh initiatives for a new round of talks between the Sri Lankangovernment and the LTTE has given rise to a sense of optimism.

The collapse of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, and the unsuccessful intervention of theIPKF had led to a stalemate for more than 10 years. No substantial efforts were made

by a third party. The recent peace initiative made by Norway is most welcome, and


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things appear to be a little more brighter as there is now an international interest toend the Tamil-Sinhala stand-off, which has wrecked the political security andeconomic stability of the island.

A word of caution, however, needs to be added to this: similar attempts have failed inthe past. Especially the stand taken by the LTTE when Sri Lankan PresidentChandrika Kumaratunga proposed peace initiatives. The Tigers have since stepped uptheir offensive in the Jaffna peninsula.

For better leverage they will also step up their vicious policy of elimination of otherTamil groups and leaders. This is their style, a bloodbath before the calm ofnegotiations. Kumaratunga was lucky to survive one such attempt, just a day prior toher re-election.

Though India is not interested in a direct involvement now, any negotiations will haveto take cognisance of her interests also. The 1997 Accord between the People'sAlliance government and the opposition United National Party on the initiative of theBritish government fell through because New Delhi was not consulted. Whoevernegotiates a peace initiative will have to also recognise India's geo-political concernsin the region and bring forward a peace plan that would satisfy all.

The intelligence agencies said, Don't worry about the LTTE,they are our boys, they will not fight us

J N Dixit was India's high commissioner to Sri Lanka from 1985 to1989. He played a major role in drafting the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord in1987, and the subsequent induction of the Indian Peace Keeping Forceto implement it.

Days after Indian troops arrived on the island, the Liberation Tigers ofTamil Eelam started what it was best at: guerrilla attacks in the jungles and shantytowns of north-east Lanka. It killed over 1,200 soldiers, maimed thousands, andforced the IPKF to abandon its task and retreat.

As then prime minister Rajiv Gandhi government's key man in Sri Lanka, Dixit was inthe hot seat and privy to all the greenroom drama. Giving a clean chit to Gandhi, he

blames the heavy casualties India suffered in the initial fighting for Jaffna on MajorGeneral Harkirat Singh, the IPKF's first commander.

Dixit spoke to Josy Joseph last fortnight:


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It is 10 years since the IPKF withdrew. Was it rightly timed?

My view would be prejudiced. I think the Indian forces went to ensure theimplementation of the agreement of July 1987, not to fight the Tamils or theSinhalese. It was the LTTE that primarily created a situation that resulted in the Indianarmy having to fight them. And also, the Sri Lankan government ministers like LalithAthulathamuthali and Premadasa, who sabotaged the agreement.

Despite these limitations, the Indian army did a very effective job of restoringstability, organising a democratic government in the north-eastern provinces of SriLanka. In my judgment, we withdrew in haste. Had we stayed on perhaps for eightmonths or a year, we could have perhaps stabilised the situation and generatedsufficient persuasion on [ LTTE chief Velupillai ] Prabhakaran to come back to the

political path.

We withdrew because the V P Singh government and then foreign minister Mr Gujral partially felt that they need to be legalistically correct: we were in a foreign country,the president of that country says "go away", and you come back.

The second thing is, there was a political motivation to prove Rajiv Gandhi was notright. But have the last 10 years shown the Sri Lankans got a better deal? Have theTamils got anything better compared to what was provided for in the Indo-Sri LankaAgreement? And most of it was implemented under the amendment of the 13th SriLankan government.

In fact, our troop-withdrawal resulted in erosion of the things which were beneficial tothe Tamils. Sri Lanka sunk back into 10 years of violence. It sees no end even today.My view may be considered partisan because I was involved in the process as the highcommissioner. Remarkable proof of it is: Renil Wickramasinghe, the present leader ofthe Opposition, has gone twice on record, once sometime in 1995 or 1996, and he toldthis to [ then Indian prime minister P V ] Narasimha Rao that he would like the Indiantroops to come back.

The second thing, more than one Sri Lankan, Sinhalese and Tamil politician haveacknowledged that the proposals in the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement were the bestcompromise possible. They have become irrelevant because so much of violenceoccurred. New political terms have emerged.

On what basis do you say that had the IPKF stayed for a little more time it wouldhave completed its mission?


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Jaffna was pacified that it was under a civilian government. Trincomalee was pacified.Baticaloa and Ampare were pacified. LTTE cadres were pushed out of north-centralSri Lanka. They were all concentrated in a small place north of Vevunia jungles. Hadwe continued our military containment operation we could have persuaded them tosurrender and give up violence.

More important than the withdrawal is the induction. Was it the right decision tosend in the IPKF?

We didn't want to send troops, who said that? Sending the troops was not part of theIndo-Sri Lanka Agreement. Please understand. There was no thinking on the part ofIndia to send armed forces into Sri Lanka during the negotiations and till the morningof the signing of the agreement on July 27. The Sri Lanka Freedom Party and JanathaVimukti Peramuna organised wide-scale riots all over Colombo, it spread to the wholeof Sinhalese areas in Sri Lanka in the morning a day before. On the morning theagreement was signed it became so violent that they went and burnt down the

president's house somewhere south of Colombo.

President Jayewardane wanted to withdraw his troops from Jaffna to control the riotsin the South. And it was he who said, "I want some Indian troops to come in to ensuresecurity in Jaffna and Trincomalee because I am withdrawing my Sinhalese troops tomaintain law and order here."

And Mr Rajiv Gandhi -- I was present -- said, Are you sure you want our troops?Because India can be criticised, Sri Lanka can be criticised. He said, I am going togive you a formal written invitation. Mr Gandhi said, Let us first sign the agreement,and then in your letter, if you think it is necessary, you say to ensure the efficientimplementation of the agreement you want the troops. So it was a separate matter.

Did Gandhi's agreement to send in the troops surprise you?

No. It didn't. He was reluctant. Why should it surprise you? We had anticipated this possibility, so we had no qualms. 20, 30 days before, all sorts of contingencies werespeculated upon by the army chief, intelligence, ministry of external affairs. Therewas no surprise.

This was one of the contingencies that you foresaw?

Yeah.

Did you expect them to fight?


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No. How can you expect? But we had speculated on the possibility. I have said that inmy book.

In your book you also admit to the fact that India sent in troops with inadequatebriefing.

Yes, the army did not brief its own people why they were going in. But that is thearmed force's responsibility. I had specifically asked [ then army chief Krishnaswamy )Sunderji in the presence of Rajiv Gandhi, suppose you face a situation where youhave to fight the LTTE, what will you do? He said, no, it will take a fortnight to takecare of them. And the chief of intelligence said, These are our boys, once they haveagreed they will not betray. Anand Verma said this to Rajiv Gandhi.

You think that was bad judgment?

Why blame one or the other? All of us who were involved are to be blamed. There was a certain... why certain, there was a very basic lackof judgment about what Prabhakaran's intentions were. There is awhole chapter in my book on how we failed. Read it. The wholechapter, totally uninhibited acknowledgement of where all we wentwrong.

Did we underestimate the capabilities of the LTTE?

Yes. Perhaps we did. We did.

Intelligence agencies, did they come up with inputs?

Intelligence agencies did not analyse it from that point of view at all. They said theseare boys who were trained by us from 1977 or whatever.

The LTTE?

All of them. Why the LTTE? All the 50 different groups. LTTE , EPRLF [ Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front ], all sorts. They did not look at it from that

angle at all. They said these are our boys, we know them very well, they owe so muchto us, so once they say yes, they will not fight us, they won't. That was their judgment.

More than a former foreign secretary you are an analyst of diplomacy andinternational affairs today. Was India's decision to train them wrong?


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See, you do not indulge in value judgement, in retrospect, in hindsight. It isunrealistic. When you take a decision, you are in the middle of a situation. Nobodysitting in a chair 10 years later, five years later, is competent to judge whether it wasnecessary or not. Whether it was necessary or not was decided upon by the thengovernment, then prime minister, on the basis of information and analysis that wereavailable.

The army went in in 87. Between 77 and 85, [ Indian prime minister ] Mrs Gandhiwould have been given information about all sorts of security equations, intelligenceequations, that Jayewardane was developing with Pakistan, with Israel, with theAmericans. Mind you, the Cold War had not ended. Plus, the compulsion of MrsGandhi was not only external, you have 60 million Tamils in your country. It is one ofthe most important states in our republic, and which has a history of secessionism. In67 they threatened to separate on the question of language.

So she had take care of the sentiments of 60 million people who send out messages toher. In fact they went to the extent of saying that, Achcha, when the Bengalis were introuble you gave support. When the Tamils are in trouble, because we are from theSouth, you are not giving us support. It is all easy to sit on moral judgment and say,

No, no, we should not have done it, we should not have interfered, non-alignment,Mahatma Gandhi's country etc. The political pressures of that particular point of timemust have made the then government consider it necessary. It is a different matter thatit did not come through as we desired.

It did not come through as we desired because we did not have the grit to followthrough a policy decision which we took. You have to look at it in two contexts:Either you are a totally committed moral country. In that case, you should have saidthat it is a problem of another country, it is an internal problem, do sort it out[ yourself ]. And to the extent possible, we will receive the refugees. Then you are safeand nice.

Or, because of consideration of our politics, and our internal political pressures,external consequences, we have taken an initiative that is strictly not moral. In thatcase, we should finish the task that has been undertaken. If you leave it half way, thenyou have the perceived lack of judgment, lack of performance. This is what hashappened. You think we did not take the position regarding Bangladesh, there also weinterfered many times. What happened in the Maldives, where we finished theoperation in two-and-a-half days and came back?

If you look at the newspapers of the first two-and-a-half months, from July toOctober, the Indian papers were full of praise. Even the Americans came and told the


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Government of India that you assume responsibilities which are yours, we are glad.The moment you do not do it fully, everybody will say that you are no good.

Did the V P Singh government consult you while withdrawing troops?

They didn't consult any one of us. They had a two-point programme. We must begiven a certificate for being a very good non-aligned, great non-interfering country.And second, we must do things exactly opposite to what Rajiv Gandhi did.

Did you feel bad that an expert hand on Lanka like you was ignored?

Why should I feel bad? I am a professional. Why should I feel bad? I was not evendealing with Sri Lanka then. I was the high commissioner in Pakistan. You do a job tothe best of your ability in a particular assignment and when you move away from itsomebody will continue. In my profession, there is no place for emotions. The onlything emotional about my profession is hopefully a very deep commitment to India.That is the only thing. In my judgment, the IPKF going in was in India's interest.

But once the IPKF entered we suffered humiliating casualties.

That was the foolishness of [ IPKF's first commander, MajorGeneral ] Harkirat Singh. You don't do a helicopter attack in fullmoonlight after giving advance notice to the enemy.

Was the army aware that the LTTE could intercept its

messages?

Of course they were. [ But ] He [ Major General Harkirat Singh ] was a most ineptgeneral. The first general there was the most inept fellow.

Do you think the death of over 600 soldiers in a most gruesome manner duringthe initial fighting for Jaffna could have been avoided?

Much of it could have been avoided.

Did Major General Harkirat Singh come down to you for any briefings,discussions?

Once in August, and once perhaps in September with General Sunderji. No, notSunderji, Mr K C Pant. He never came otherwise. In fact, he was so wooden thatwhen those fellows where arrested and brought to the Palami airbase, I told them to


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take them into protective custody and not let the Sri Lankan authorities get to theLTTE cadre.

The fellow said, No, no you are not in my chain of command. Please don't tell me.You first send it to the ministry of external affairs, they should send it to the ministryof defence, they should send it to army headquarters, they should send it to SouthernCommand. Then Southern Command should tell Madras. Then they should tell me,then only I will act. I said, By then the game will be over. I am telling you I am fullyresponsible. No, I will not do it, he said. The result was that the 17 fellows werekilled.

That added to the LTTE anger?

That is the origin of where we had to fight the LTTE. The LTTE got an excuse.[Thanks to ] this man's foolishness.

The day the elected government was in place, the military roleof the IPKF was over

From January 1988 till New Delhi withdrew its troops from Sri Lanka,Lieutenant General A S Kalkat was the man in charge of the Indianoperations.

Ten years down the line, he is still evasive when you ask him who is to

blame for rushing in soldiers to the island nation without proper briefing, inadequate logistics and misplaced intelligence inputs. And he feels theIndian Peace Keeping Force completed most of its task.

Lt Gen Kalkat, however, admits that it indeed was an ill-equipped and unpreparedarmy that he was put in charge of. He answered Josy Joseph's queries:

General, do you think the withdrawal was well-timed? Had the IPKF completedit task?

The IPKF went there as part of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord signed in 1987. Our rolewas to assist the democratic implementation of the Accord and prepare the ground forthat. And the test of that was to create conditions such that an election could be held inthe north and the east. In October-November of 1988, elections were held. Basicallyabout a year after the Accord, the conditions were created for the elections.


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The second part of the agreement was that the Sri Lankan government would fulfill itsobligations under the Accord. Primarily, devolution of power. And certain safeguards.In lieu of that the Tamils and LTTE, which was the most militant party, would give uparms. That was part of the agreement itself. That after the conditions were created fordemocratic process to go through, elections will be held. Tamils would vote.

That was done, and elections were held. If you recall, it was the highest ever turnoutin the Sri Lankan history. It was over 60 per cent. That was pretty good for anyelection anywhere, even in our own country.

And the Tamil party, the EPRLF, won. The LTTE boycotted the election. The other parties also participated. The Sri Lankan parties, the Sinhala parties, too. The SriLanka Muslim Party also participated. With the result that an election could be heldand we could have the provisional assembly.

The next part after that had to be the proclamation by the [ Sri Lankan ] president tomerge the two provinces because the demand was for a single homeland, not a dividedhomeland.

And it did not happen soon.

It took a lot of prodding, pressurising by us. But since the IPKF was onthe ground, one was able to get them to do it. The moment the decisiontook place, the northern and eastern provinces stood merged. And that issomething which is even now forgotten: that the north and eastern

provinces stood merged. It became the North-Eastern ProvincialCouncil.

The moment it became so, they elected a chief minister, the leader of the party EelamPeople's Revolutionary Liberation Front, Varadaraja Perumal. Now that was all right.Then the most important thing to define was his rights to function as the provincialgovernment, and that is where the role of the Sri Lankan government, bureaucracyand political hierarchy come into it. They were holding on to it, hedging on it. Theday the militancy was put under control and elections were held and the electedgovernment was in place, the military role of the IPKF was over. A military manthereafter had no role.

But you stayed on.

Because of the peculiar conditions of the north-eastern government. The police forcewas non-existent [ there ]. Actually, the police force had disintegrated. The reason isalso obvious: the police primarily consisted of Sinhalese. The area was predominantly


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Tamil -- in fact the northern part was 90 per cent Tamil. And the eastern part was 33 per cent Tamil. It was 1/3 Tamil, 1/3 Sinhala, 1/3 Muslims. Muslims speak Tamil, butthey do not identify themselves as Tamils.

So there were no Tamils and it would have then been not practical to have a policeforce entirely manned by Sinhalese. A police force had to be created; it was created.And certain notification had to be done. All these things took time. So we wereassisting to that extent.

The police force became fairly functional, but unfortunately the powers of the North-Eastern Provincial Government were not devolved upon this government. So, the

police force took orders from Colombo. The chief minister had no power even on onesimple constable in the entire north-eastern province. So his credibility was gettingquestioned. He had no financial powers, in fact not even the powers of a municipalcorporator. Because all the powers came under the centre, that is part of thedevolution that had to take place.

After that it had to be promulgated. It is something like in Delhi you have the RentControl Act passed; the government hasn't yet notified the act for implementation.Similar thing they were doing there. And it was a very deliberate pattern there inColombo because they wanted to go back on some ingredients of Indo-Sri LankaAccord. We could not have gone back on it, because we had committed ourselves andwe were there, and India was committed to the rights of the Tamils. But Premadasahad no intention of doing so. When he found that a government [ in India ] which hadcome on a platform that it would withdraw [ the IPKF ], all that he had to do was tocarry on delaying it till we withdrew.

Once we had withdrawn then it was a different story because as you are aware, beforewe withdrew, Premadasa announced that he had opened talks with the LTTE and theyhave become the best of friends and that they will never fight again. And they havewithdrawn all defensive postures and therefore the IPKF, the third party, was notrequired and it should go home.

The most difficult part was managing the withdrawal

Read General Kalkat 's interview by Josy Joseph from the beginning.

So that was the game plan of the LTTE and Premadasa?
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This was part of the same game plan. The two of them decidedthat if IPKF remained there, then neither could cheat the other onthe Accord. And each one thought that he was cleverer than theother. So both were playing a game to double-cross each other.Who could prevent them from doing it was the IPKF. Our standwas it was not over and if they do it, they will end up killing eachother. That is the reason why the IPKF remained there. Because we were sure that itwould not work. And it was apparent that both sides would not do what they weresaying. Their priority was, Let us get the IPKF out.

For the LTTE their concern was that as long as the IPKF was there they could neverget away with their demand for an independent Tamil Eelam. For the Sri Lankangovernment, or the Sinhala government of Premadasa, it was quite clear that we couldinsist that the Sri Lankan government honour its part of the agreement.

You had a lot left to be done.

There were so many things to be done. The land reforms. There were illegallyoccupied land, they had many areas where the demographic pattern had been changed.In the northern province certain area was made a separate territory for the so-calledexperiments in irrigation, but basically the Sinhala convicts were resettled there. Itwas a convict's colony. They were trying some arid agricultural experiments etc.Those land belonged to the Tamils, it was part of the Tamil homeland. There weremany issues like that.

But Premadasa pushed you out.

Both felt that it was not in their interest to honour the Accord. Particularly afterJayewardane stepped down and Premadasa took over. He had always opposed theagreement. In that he was backed by a large chauvinistic group of Sinhalese. So bothof them felt that let us get the IPKF out, then we will sort the other guy. So the IPKFcame out on March 24, 1990.

When did you get orders to leave Lanka?

I was told that our government gave a commitment that by the 31st of March the IPKFwould withdraw. So I was given the charter. By that time it was apparent that theLTTE and the Sri Lankan government had joined hands. When I say the Sri Lankangovernment -- I would like to clarify that not all governments have been like that -- Imean Premadasa's government and not of his predecessor or his successors.

You came across proof of the LTTE-Sri Lankan government collaboration?


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The collaboration between the LTTE and the government had started around October1989. It came to our notice, and we brought it to the notice of the Sri Lankangovernment and our government also. I myself took it up at the highest level, with thePresident.

But the Lankan government never accepted that?

Of course, it was denied. There was nothing that they could do. I am literally accusingthem of collaborating with or sleeping with the enemy. The whole scenario changedsoon after President Jayewardane decided that he will not stand for elections. The

presidential election was held around, I think, December 1988, and as soon asPresident Jayewardane decided that and nominated Premadasa to be his successor, the

bureaucracy and government started naturally behaving in the interest of Premadasa.So he started working on it earlier, and as soon as the announcement came the tilt wasslowly and slowly taking place.

You interacted with the Sri Lankan army closely. How did they react toPremadasa's decision to tie up with the LTTE? Did the army also change itstunes to suit the new president?

Obviously, the last organisation to be affected by the tilt was the Sri Lankan army.They were professionals, they were dedicated. But over a period of time that also getsaffected when the government gives you certain orders. Slowly and slowly theystarted replacing those officers who would not play ball with Premadasa. Because itwas hurting them also, because the Sri Lankan army had been fighting the LTTE.They had lost a lot of people. And then suddenly to ask them to collaborate with themand assist them wouldn't go well. In fact, to the extent that Mr Premadasa faced arevolt within the army at that time.

You could feel that revolt?

I could feel that revolt simmering. And there was talk in Colombo that they might press a coup. The [ Sri Lankan ] army chief that time was Hamilton Vanasinghe. But itwas not one person, it was simmering across the board with generals because theywere not happy. Because on the one hand they were asked to go easy on the LTTE,and on the other hand they had been asked to give them weapons.

A lot of officers would say We are giving them weapons today, and they will be usedagainst us one day. So he was in a precarious situation. I think for him getting past it,he owes it to his late foreign minister who was assassinated, Ranjan Wijayarante. Hewas also the minister for defence, because he was liked by the army and he supportedtheir action. What he did was since he could not go in any way against his president


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on the IPKF issue, he got clearance from the president for the Sri Lankan army to goagainst the JVP.

They were facing two problems. The JVP, the leftist Marxistmovement in the South, and the LTTE in the North. Therefore,he got the clearance that the army would have a free handagainst the JVP. And as you know, within three months theyhad virtually destroyed the JVP. They just destroyed it. Ofcourse there were no human right activists there that time,

otherwise it is a matter that would have come up. Those times, the visual media wasn'tlike it is today, so a lot of it did not come out. Today, there is a lot of transparency inmilitary operations; at that time it was by and large close. With that the army, andevery one got a respite.

You haven't answered my question: Was it the right time for the IPKF towithdraw?

It was preordained. There was no option. It had been announced by the newgovernment in India in 1989. Once it was elected, the IPKF had to withdraw. We weretold the time.

Once the withdrawal was announced, what were your concerns?

The main thing I was concerned about was that the Sri Lankan government washostile to us to the extent possible. Not that they were fighting us, but they wereabetting the fighting. I did not want my soldiers to be caught like what happened inVietnam or in Afghanistan. I wanted to make sure that every soldier came homesafely. I did not want to lose lives during the withdrawal.

Secondly, I wanted the withdrawal to be with dignity, not as in Vietnam where peoplewere running away, hanging on to helicopters. Those thing would be terrible for themorale of an army. I was quite determined that as we went in with our flag flyinghigh, we would come out with our heads high. So certain plans had to be put intoaction.

The most difficult part of my entire command was managing the withdrawal of theIPKF. At one stage we had 70,000 troops, we slowly brought them down to 50, 40,and then to 30,000. When you are in a narrow bridge head, with the LTTE all aroundand you getting militarily no assistance from the Sri Lankan army and the LTTE freeat that stage, the prime concern for me was the lives of my soldiers.


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Every day we withdrew certain amount with ships at Trincomalee andKonkeshanthurai in the northern province of Jaffna. We had planned the de-induction.Each day a battalion would withdraw; over three days that would complete a brigadeand that was how it was done.

The last day a ceremonial send-off was given by the Sri Lankan army. Guard ofhonour was given at Trincomalee. The foreign minister came there, then the threeservice chiefs of the Sri Lankan armed forces, senior officers of the armed forces and,of course, the media was there to see. While we were pulling back, we had our partystanding by on all sides to make sure that someone did not double-cross or conspireagainst our soldiers. We had even helicopters on board standing by to extricate.

We did not want to leave behind a single item of equipment because it was costly andthey were heavy equipment which had to be phased out. We had heavy vehicles,tanks, armoured cars, which was useful. Now, we needed them there, we wanted tokeep them till the last, but then to keep them till the last and pulling them out on a shiptakes hours. So you had to have a fine balance, take them as late as possible but nottoo late.

And ultimately, of course, the infantry solider was on his own. For these kind of problem one did make arrangements for some kind of naval guns to support, if we cancall. These kind of management, tactical planning was done.

Did any trouble happen during the withdrawal?

No. If anything, we were over careful, and things went off as we planned.

While withdrawing did you not think that you could have brought completepeace, disarmed the LTTE?

There are a couple of things. Disarming the group cannot be an ongoing task. You candisarm a group, there are no arms today. But you cannot guarantee that they will notacquire them in future. So it cannot be a job in perpetuity. It should be time-framed.The military part is disarming, the LTTE was disarmed to that extent, their holding

became negligible once we were able to hold elections. But then they continued to getarms. That is why they went to the Sri Lankan government and got arms.

Now, that task cannot be given to the military, to prevent the government from armingthem. Because the implications of that are far serious. To prevent that I have to go atthe personnel arming them, I cannot go at the Sri Lankan government.


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The second part is, what about peace? Can you bring in peace? Let me say this:Application of military force will never bring peace, anywhere in the world. I know Iam making a categorical statement, but I stand by that statement. Application ofmilitary force can never bring about peace. Peace in the minds of the civil populationis the perception in the minds of the common man on his environment, on the kind ofgovernance he has, on his basic needs being met, on his rights being protected.

These are all political matters, not one of them is a military matter. So it is a fallacy ifanyone thinks anywhere that by sending it military you bring in peace.

The military can only create a condition for the political actions to take place. It canneither take political action, nor take on the role of the political system.

So did you complete your task? The popular perception is that you did not.

If the IPKF was deemed a political weapon, obviously [ it did not ]. If it was deemed amilitary weapon, the task was completed the day election was held and thegovernment could be installed. Thereafter there were no dispensation that the IPKFcould give out. We could not give them independence, we could not give themdevolution of powers, we could not give financial control to the chief minister, wecould not give the provincial government what it took them to be a strong crediblegovernment.

I agree that we could not prevent the Sri Lankan government from arming the LTTE.But I could have done it, I had the strength to do it. That would have meant to forcibly

preventing the Sri Lankan government from arming the LTTE.

You could have done that?

You know what that means. That means, taking over the country.

Did you think of taking over Sri Lanka any time?

No, no. Because we cannot be involved in it. It was not me, in fact nobody in Indiacould have done that to force the Sri Lankan government not to [ arm the LTTE ].

Because what do you do with the Sri Lankan government still doing it? What do youdo? You go to war.


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The humiliation wasn't in Lanka. It was when theIPKF returned

So you came to a highly volatile disagreement with the Lankan

government. You had other confrontations too?

Well, there were differences, but they were not aired in public. The aim was not tofurther murky the waters whereas our relationship, country-to-country, wasconcerned. We had gone there to cement it, not to destroy it. Differences were thereall along. Strong ones. But they were not aired in public. I took it up with thegovernment there, I made my stand clear to them. But thereafter there is nothing youcan do.

If the intent of a government is not to go along with the agreement, you can't force

another country to do it.

Did someone in Delhi suggest that you force it on Lanka?

No. Use of military force against the government was never envisaged and wouldhave been totally wrong.

Not even during meetings in Delhi?

These issues were not discussed. They should not be certainly discussed at public

levels. The fact of the matter is that the Sri Lankan government was welting theircommitment. The only time when there was an open confrontation between me andthe government was when President Premadasa ordered the IPKF confined to its lines.He gave this order sometime in December 1989. Then he announced in a pressstatement that the IPKF has been ordered to stay in its lines, if they do not complythey would be ordered an army of occupation. And that we will then take actionwhatever it is.

It was told to me. That was a time when my forces were spread out all over north andeast of Sri Lanka. This was not a legitimate order as far as I was concerned. I had to

respond to it. It came at a crucial time, I think the election had just been held in India.So one could not expect the Delhi government to respond to the Sri Lankangovernment. It had to be played at my level, because I was the commander of theforces there under the Accord. And technically speaking I was accountable not just toone person but to the Accord where there were two signatories, the prime minister ofIndia and prime minister of Sri Lanka.


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So I was told this. In fact, a letter was prepared, signed by Premadasa, very legalistic,all "herein after" and "therein after", "whomsoever" etc, saying if you do not do thisyou will be declared ABCD. I was called up from Colombo, asked that a specialmessenger, a brigadier, was coming carrying the letter from the president of SriLanka, could you accept it? I said, Of course I would accept it. Will you be there? Iwas flying out, there was some operations on. I said if it is coming, I would make sureI was there to receive them.

I, of course, had got to know the contents of the letter from various sources. Plus, theBBC had also got to know of what had happened, this ultimatum being given to me.They wanted to how I would respond to it. I did not want things to come to a head-on.On the other hand I was not going to risk the lives of my soldiers. Thirdly, this was avery unilateral action by one party to the Accord. It was against the Accord.

So when the ultimatum was conveyed to me, I conveyed back that as per the Accord,the North-Eastern province is under the IPKF. I am responsible here for the safety ofthe entire region and if there was militant activity by anyone, any force I wouldrespond. And that if my forces are attacked by anyone I would respond. That is as faras you can go, but it conveyed the meaning of what it meant.

What was their response?

They backed out. I was told that the order will be given to the Sri Lankan forces tothrow us out. See, that is part of it. Then I explained that any such action takes place,it could have 'unpredictable consequences.' For which the responsibility would lieentirely with Sri Lanka. To make sure, I conveyed to the press the same.

What was your assessment as the commander about the completion of the task?

My assessment was simple. In case the Sri Lankan government does not givedevolution, then nothing better will have happened. If they give devolution, then mystaying on would have some meaning. Then one could assist the provincialgovernment in being more effective. To make the Sri Lankan government to givedevolution would have needed pressure from the Government of India.

And that was not happening?

It was the other way [ round ]. That we had to get out. The [ Indian ] election had taken place, the decision was there, and Premadasa was reading the manifesto better thanme, because he was watching what was happening in India. The Sri Lankangovernment and their policy were very much influenced by the changes in the Indian

politics at that time. Therefore they were very observant of nuances of any position


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taken by any party [ in India ]. V P Singh had already said he was against it. So once VP Singh was elected, Premadasa knew the IPKF's days were numbered. All that hehad to do was make sure that he could delay the devolution till the IPKF was gone.

So the IPKF did not come back to India as a victorious force.

Yes. There was some feeling in my soldiers. The humiliation was not in Sri Lanka, because there was no humiliation. The humiliation came when we came back to India.The question people asked was, Why did we go there, what were you doing there?When you send soldiers to such an area, you don't ask them these questions, you don'task them what were you doing there. Those are things that you should have sorted outearlier.

Questions came from within the army?

No, never. But when the public started saying this, and the soldierstarts hearing it, he gets hurt. And the main thing was the so-called

boycott of IPKF soldiers when they arrived at Madras port. I think thatwas a needless act. It was no good. I think the DMK was [ then in

power in Tamil Nadu ] the one, they boycotted it. The government inIndia did the right thing, they said if they will not participate in the

welcome, fine, we will send our people from here.

So the defence minister that time, Raja Ramanna, came from Delhi and others camefrom Delhi. Governor of the state Dr [ P C ] Alexander was there. But that leaves a badtaste. It could have been avoided because it was not conveying anything to me.

How did your appointment come through as the IPKF commander?

I was in Delhi only on leave. I had been earlier to UK doing a fellowship at the IISS[ International Institute of Strategic Studies ]. It was a one-year fellowship, it was 11months when I was asked to cut it short, the army wanted me in Southern Command.This was in the month of September-October 1987. I would have finished in

November. I initially came, that time [ Major ] General Harkirat Singh was thedivisional commander in Jaffna.

My first encounter was that we had a setback in Jaffna, when the Sikh Light Infantrycarried out a helicopter attack [ on Jaffna university ] and it was foiled. Our troopscould not get there, they were held up all over Jaffna, 3 or 5 km outside. All the troopscame under fire, they couldn't move. The whole division was pinned down. That timethey asked me to go into Jaffna to direct operations for a short while. So I flew in, Iwas there for 10 days. In fact, when I flew in I did not even have spare clothing, I had


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have been discussed with the superiors. Superiors are always watching. So I don'tknow what all inputs went into his decision... of course, he was the final authority.

Didn't Delhi push more troops into the furnace?

Out of the 1,200 killed, in the next two years when I was in command only sixhundred were killed. Six hundred or so died in the first few months.

What failed in Jaffna?

The operation was planned to capture Jaffna. And it didn't work. Basically I feltattacking it frontally perhaps is wrong. But then it also has to be based on what werethe perceptions and inputs available: Will the LTTE fight, how capable they were. Infact, it was the first time that head-on attack took place. The perception andintelligence build-up was that they would not fight the IPKF. And we felt it [ frontalattack ] was the right thing to do. If there were any possibility of attack, it would nothave been done.

All along your intelligence agencies told you that the LTTE would not fight you?

I don't know. I wasn't there. When I was there, I firmly believe battlefield intelligencehad to be collected by my soldiers. The intelligence of RAW and other agencies isgood at political or strategic level.

But when the soldiers went in, they had no idea at all about the LTTE and

others?

Absolutely. There is no doubt the force went in unprepared. Not only that, theequipment that the army had then, compared to even some of the other Asiancountries, was prehistoric. Infantry soldiers particularly: the kind of radio sets, rifle,machine gun. I mean they were out of date.

Even there were no maps. What they had was printed a 100 years ago. Reprints weredone. It was at a scale when you fly over you can see an area, but you cannot makeout any roads or any marks. It was almost six months after I had taken over that we

could get some maps. Almost nine months after the IPKF landed there. Unfortunate.

And then, you are operating in an area where you don't know the language. Tamil isthe language that is spoken there. In our army, except for the Madras regiment, noother regiment speaks Tamil. You had gone there to help people, and if you cannotspeak their language how are you going to help them? You can't help them with sign


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language. How do you except them to come and co-operate with you? These need preparation.

One thing is certain, it was a totally unprepared and ill-equipped force that landedthere. If the role was only to show your overbearing presence, and make sure that theyamicably handed over their weapons, it was fine. But if the role involved peaceenforcement, then it was totally unprepared and ill-equipped.

Why did General Sunderji agree with the political establishment to rush introops?

One does not know what were the inputs General Sunderji got. By the time I wasthere, we were at firing range with each other. It was open hostility. It was in the

previous six months all this happened. Someone will have to write who played a rolein Delhi, and I am not the person. To begin with I was across the seas, and after wecaptured Jaffna I came back.

After the Jaffna take-over you came back. Why did you go back permanently?

I was on leave in Delhi. On 31st of December, New Year's eve, I got a message,Please be at the operations room on January 1. There they told me that a decision has

been taken to put me in charge as the chief of IPKF. Technically, I came in commandin the first week of January in 1998.

There are reports that India's diplomatic mission in Lanka and the IPKFdiffered on most issues. Was that true?

I know there were disagreements taking place when I went in. But I feel when we areabroad for this kind of role neither of us can have private agendas. It has to be oneagenda, that is the national agenda. I was clear on that, I spoke to the highcommissioner. We never had a problem for the two years. Our interaction was regular.

Ultimately the soldier was humiliated

Read General Kalkat's interview by Josy Joseph fromthe beginning.

India suffered a huge casualty. Some of it could have been avoided?

You cannot avoid casualties in fighting, in war. Whether they could be reduced?Somebody is wearing a flak jacket, he wouldn't die. My soldiers didn't have any.There were none. You cannot ask for something that was not there. Initially, we did
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not have good detectors for mines, for booby traps. We asked for and our army slowlyand slowly acquired them. That is why I said, even our army was ill-equipped, not justthe IPKF. It was different from fighting the Nagas. You were fighting, in theAmerican assessment, one of the deadliest militant force. There to send yourunsuspecting soldier, it was tough, isn't it?

Why was air power not properly used against the LTTE?

Air power would have only destroyed civilians. We had gone there to rehabilitatecivilians. If we had used air power, it could have been the other way: we would haverendered more homeless. It is totally counterproductive. It is counterinsurgency, theapplication of military force has to be controlled. Even artillery, we used it sparingly,only in jungles where there were no civilian population.

We had that rifle, your old SLR, which is not designed for counterinsurgency. It is socumbersome. Our army did not have any better. We tried sawing up half the barrel sothat it wouldn't get caught in the branches. No army in the world uses such heavy,cumbersome rifle with such slow rate of fire.

Then, we didn't have the modern devise of night vision. Our radio sets were heavy.And communication was a problem. But slowly we overcame these. As far as the riflewent, I told my soldiers, if they capture AK-47s you can use them. So a lot of mysoldiers were using it, they were captured. Then I ran short of ammunition. I had toarrange for ammunition. That is the way it was. The communication too was very bad.How do you command a force like that?

What were the most touching incidents during your command?

One was the six, seven days when Jaffna had to be captured. I had to move two battalions fast to attack from the rear. At some point they got into a fight with someLTTE group. There was concern. We got through, it was there we won the Param VirChakra. That was a tricky time.

The most critical time was when we were fighting the battle of Neethikaikulam, partof Vaani jungles. It is east of Vavoonia, a thick jungle. It was a major hideout of theLTTE. It was the month of August 1988, and I had planed my operations in a mannerto clean up the area because we wanted elections in September. From Batticaloa insouth to Jaffna in north. We cleaned up Batticaloa district, then we cleaned upTrincomalee, then we cleaned up Jaffna top.

The enemy had withdrawn into the jungles. Their backbone had to be broken. Theywere a potent force and so by a series of operations we got into the jungle. The battle


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was joint and that is the time when paracommandos went there and entered the tunneland [ LTTE chief ] Prabhakaran escaped through the second tunnel from the right. Wedestroyed the LTTE headquarters.

There were a series of bunkers connecting to the tunnel. When they entered the first bunker, he was in the second bunker and he entered the third bunker and escaped. Wecaptured a lot of their leaders, destroyed their leadership, captured a lot ofheadquarters papers.

You told your men to shoot Prabhakaran if he was caught?

No. I didn't tell them to kill him. I told them to capture him.

If you had caught Prabhakaran, what would have you done?

I would have treated him like any other militant. We had a concentration camp orwhatever you call, where we put the militants under detention. Of course, ifPrabhakaran was caught, what to do with him would have been a political decision.

You are taking a politically and morally right position.

No, no. This every soldier is to be taught. Soldiers are not to be assassination squads.One army has done it, to their discomfiture. The Indonesians did it. Military soldiersfight a war in a military manner.

Where were you when this particular operation was going on?

Right at the place of action. They were keeping a watch on my movements. Theircode name for me was Eagle, the Tamil for it. I took off from Trincomalee. I said itwas a tough battle, I should go there. I had a general there, General Goel.

As I was taking off, they [ the LTTE ] said, Eagle has taken off. I was landing rightinside the battle area. Fighting was taking place all over. They had identified me, andthey opened up rockets. While touching down, we hit the rocket and my helicopter

burnt. I jumped out. It was hovering. Totally burnt out, and they had surrounded this

place.

For the next two hours, there was firing all around. It is all part of the game. It wasafter this battle that I announced the time was now right, the situation is under control,the last command of the LTTE has been destroyed, and now I am ready for elections.It was that announcement that forced the Sri Lankan government to announce theelections.


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That was the closest you came to death?

No. I came even closer to death. A number of times. Once I was driving into Jaffna, Iwas going on the road. There was this old black Morris car parked there. Some boywent and checked this car. When they checked, it was found that this car was ready to

be exploded as I passed by. It was detected beforehand.

Once I was with General [ Ashok ] Mehta, the operation wasgoing on in his area, Batticaloa. We saw the fighting from ahelicopter. I saw some movement of Indian troops down

below, I said, I must meet them. There were some LTTEthere. They [ Indian troops ] knew I was there. I told my pilot,to go down and keep the rotators flying. The senior-most

steps down first, and I jumped out. The pilot of the aircraft, he was a little worried, itwas not a secure helipad. As I jumped out, the LTTE was sitting in ambush all around.They opened fire. I did not realise it because of the sound of the helicopter.

But the pilot realised, smoke and flashes coming out. He said, Come back, sir, so I gotinside fast. And then the pilot put in what they call 'power retro' or something, I havenever been whisked up in a helicopter so fast. Soon after, our troops rushed in andopened an elixir of fire. After 10 minutes I said I must go back. A commander cannot

be seen as going back from the scene of action.

You interacted with key figures. What was your impression of them, especially ofPrabhakaran?

The LTTE could not interfere with the elections, they could not assassinate even asingle of our candidates. After that I said at Neethikaikulam that we marginalised theLTTE militarily, and in the elections they were politically marginalised. Then I got amessage from my head of intelligence, he was a South Indian, a very good man. Hesaid someone had been contacted by Prabhakaran's number two, Mahathiah, who hadcome around somewhere in Trincomalee. He wanted to contact the IPKF, no,Prabhakaran wanted to meet him.

I said I would meet him, I am a military man but if we were to meet for politicaldiscussions, I would not. If he wanted to meet, I would come. I can only talk about mymilitary, I can't say terms of the Accord be changed. I think they got the message thatI wouldn't get involved in talks, again the same old talks. So he backtracked.

Were some of your field commanders reluctant participants?


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No. In fact, if anyone felt so, the choice was always there. He could have gone back.He could get another posting.

Did you come across any incident of people asking for leave?

Yes, indeed. Not for this reason. Not everyone is made to withstand rigours anddangers, battle fatigue gets hard. In protracted insurgency, these things come up, not

just there, but anywhere. In counterinsurgency, there is no front and rear, the enemy isall around. I am aware that some people's performance dropped.

Any psychological disorders among your soldiers?

No... there may have been cases. But nothing did come to my notice. There was not asingle case of desertion, no absent without leaves.

How was your relations with [ then I ndian army chi ef ] General Sunderji?

I had no problems. In fact the fact that he picked me up is the right indication. Hemight have been influenced by my performance. Obviously he had confidence in me.

Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw refused to go into war when Indira Gandhiwanted. Don't you think General Sunderji could have done something like that?

Sunderji as a chief is functioning within a government, what problems it was facing Ihad no preview. My sum total is that the Indian army that went to Sri Lanka was ill-

equipped and unprepared for the kind of task that was undertaken. I say itcategorically. The question is whether such a task was envisaged, I am not qualified tocomment on that. You can ask people who took the decision. What was theirunderstanding? What political understanding were they given?

The DMK and other Tamil parties were supporting the LTTE. What did you feelabout that?

You know what happened? The government was dismissed. All of them wereapprehended. They were put into jail, all those shops were closed. Earlier, the LTTE

was there, they even participated in the elections there pasting posters etc. Mr [ P C ]Alexander was the governor. Earlier it was funny. All the local police were told toassist them when they were smuggling things in small boats. Such contradictions wereadding to the problem. The policeman said, Earlier by assisting them I was becominga martyr. Today I am a criminal. Where do I stand?

Did you expect Rajiv Gandhi's murder?


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I did not think they would carry it across the shores.

The Americans and Israelis were providing active assistance in Lanka. How didyou react when you reached there?

There was no American assistance. Israeli assistance was for the Sri Lankan specialforce. Their training camp was on the edge of Batticaloa district, my soldiers haddiscovered it. And I straight away took up the matter, if they don't leave in 24 hours,my soldiers will deal with them. And in 24 hours they left the place lock, stock and

barrel, both Israeli trainers and Sri Lankans.

Was Rajiv Gandhi's assessment of the situation right?

By the time I was there, the assessment was history. On operational matters helistened to me. He was supportive.

Did the nation treat the IPKF well?

In the IPKF the number of bravery awards were totally commensurate with any suchoperation. Legal obligation of the government was fulfilled. You got the pension andall that. That was the part of the terms and conditions of service.

Whereas in the case mobilisation of nation and people, it did not happen. Initially ithappened at lower levels in Tamil Nadu. Women's organisations used to come up,they did little little things. Over a period of time it needs mobilisation from the top.

That did not happen. The IPKF operations fell in the same pattern of 1971. Themobilisation of the national support for the cause becomes more and more importanttoday.

Do you have any major regrets?

The only thing is, if the Premadasa government was not allowed to get away the wayhe went back and, consequently, the IPKF had stayed on, then I think in six monthstime the government would have become efficient in the north-eastern province. Afterthat, the Tamil parties in Sri Lanka would have been able to handle it.

So ultimately the soldier was humiliated.

Yes. The government in Delhi did not [ humiliate him ]. The prime minister receivedme. The government in Tamil Nadu did.

How do you assess the present situation in Lanka?


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The problem has come to a stage where both parties realise that there is no militarysolution to the problem. For the LTTE, they can carry on fighting, but ultimately allthat will be left will be Tamil babes-in-arms, no young men. The Sri Lankans, theycan't also carry on fighting, it has economically hit them so badly. In the South, theJVP which had been wiped out once, will end up coming back due to poverty. Andthey will end up destroying their own systems. So for both of them, the future isdoomed if they carry on fighting.

Both having understood that, I feel they would like to resolve it. The present presidentof Sri Lanka, Chandrika Kumaratunga, has shown a great amount of willingness tocome down. Perhaps the realities of the political system has stopped her from showingso much of willingness. But in my heart of heart I am convinced that if she has to givein some, she will give in to resolve the issue.

The LTTE, if it can have some kind of face-saving, that we fought for Eelam, wecouldn't get it, but we came the closest to it because it is Tamil Eelam, or otherwise itwas not the end, but that was the means. The end was where the minority Tamils havetheir rights, their culture is protected, their religion is protected, everything is

protected. That is the aim. Now the concern of the Tamils will be, even if a honest broker comes, what prevents the agreement? Even if they today amend the [ Lankan ]Constitution, what prevents a brute majority from changing it?

Today the broker, I believe, is Norway. Earlier on, the attempt was under the aegis ofthe International Alert, it is an NGO based in London. The critical issue is whateverthe agreement is going to be, who will underwrite it? It will have to be a partyacceptable to both the sides. I do not see any western country taking on theresponsibility of underwriting it.

The IPKF in essence was really India committing to underwrite an agreement betweenthe Tamils and the Sri Lankan government. Obviously, there may be or there will be

pressure trying to get back India as the country to underwrite such an agreement. AndI strongly feel that we must avoid giving any such undertaking or taking on any suchcommitment.

Why?

For the reason I explained, we have tried it once by sending out our soldiers. But oneof the parties decided to break the Accord. And when national sovereignties areinvolved, it becomes very difficult for a third party to enforce it.


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Secondly, the position taken by all the political parties other than the Congress is thatit is wrong to involve ourselves in Sri Lanka. Those parties will not go back on thattoday.

Till the LTTE get Eelam, they won't stop

One early morning in 1987, Indian army's 54 Division landedin Sri Lanka from Secunderabad. At its head was MajorGeneral Harkirat Singh, the Indian Peace Keeping Force's firstcommander.

General Singh first tried to buy peace with the Liberation Tigersof Tamil Eelam. When that failed, he plunged his men into a blood war. And Indiasuffered horrifying casualties.

After the infamous killing of Indian soldiers on the Jaffna University football groundunder his command, New Delhi inducted Lieutenant General A S Kalkat. Thus, itslowly began relieving General Singh of his charge. Within a year, he returned toIndia.

General Singh has been subject to much criticism. But, except for an interviewimmediately after his retirement, he has kept his counsel.

A decade after those terrible days, he completed his memoirs on Lanka, wherein he

blames key individuals involved in the IPKF operation for the unprecedented loss oflife, and questions several long-held beliefs.

In a candid interview to Josy Joseph, he accuses several people -- including thenIndian army chief General K Sunderji and high commissioner to Colombo J N Dixit --and admits that "chaos" reigned in the jungles of Sri Lanka where the Indian troopsfaced humiliation.

How did the IPKF, sent to enforce peace, get involved in a bloody fight with theLTTE? Do you personally believe that it could have been prevented?

One afternoon I was in my operations room when then vice chief of army staff ( S F )Rodrigues came. Later he became [ army ] chief. He talked of hard options. I advisedhim against it. I told him, If you adopt hard options you would be fighting for the next10 to 20 years. And this will lead to insurgency and there is no stopping it. You arefighting in Nagaland, Mizoram, all over. This will be another. And sure enough, it hasnot ended to date. And it won't end.
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Why?

I have all regards for Sri Lanka. The Tamils have sacrificed [ a lot ], the LTTE ishighly motivated and there is one aim: Eelam. Independence. Till they getindependence they are not going to stop. You see stray incidents everyday, they evenattempted to kill the present president.

When did General Rodrigues speak to you about hard options?

A week before the war started. It started on the 10th of October 1987. He came abouta fortnight before; he had just taken over as the vice-chief from J K Puri. So he cameand spoke to me.

So you actually opposed what you went out to do?

Actually [ yes]. And, you know, [ General Rodrigues said ], No, no, no...don't get coldfeet. We will take care of them. I said, They have fought their entire lives in the

jungles. I have flown over the jungles with Mahathiah, the number two man toPrabhakaran, in my helicopter. We flew over the jungles of Vavoonia and heexplained to me how they fought against the Sri Lankans all these years. So they kneweach inch of the land. We would push them out of Jaffna, they would get into the

jungles. Then you would be fighting them for the next 10 years.

You had no intelligence inputs?

All these people who were in Delhi, I am afraid, they visited Sri Lanka because it wasa foreign country. They went back without any hard intelligence. They had nointelligence to give me about terrain, about enemy. I had to buy tourist maps inHyderabad before I went into operations. And I had to borrow a Sri Lankan

photocopying machine to make copies for my staff.

Only one officer, now he is a general, Memon, he got hold of some maps, because hewas my staff officer. He was my brigade major once upon a time. He said, Sir, wehave only these maps. You please take them, you will need them. He was very nice,he gave me a dozen maps. For army a dozen maps is nothing. Every platoon

commander has to have a map, a section commander has to have a map.

So you went in with a tourist map?

We went in with a tourist map. We didn't know the geography of this country at all,except that it was an island country. That is it. What it was inside, my God, youcouldn't see A to B, it was such thick foliage.


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It was total lack of intelligence. You are sending a formation into battle, it has to be properly briefed. What happened in Kargil ? Lack of intelligence, lack of strategicintelligence, lack of technical intelligence. They were building up and all behind thelines we didn't know about it. Obviously our missions were sleeping.

When did you reach Delhi for the briefing? If they had no intelligence what werethey discussing?

They were discussing various options. Various options of going into Sri Lanka. Nowyou will say what were these options? Firstly there was no aim to this entire battle. Itwas a wavering aim. When you have to spell out so many options, where is the setaim for you? There is no aim. It is against the basic principle of war.

What were the options given to you?

It was wavering. Like this: if there is a coup in Colombo, how will we reinstate [ thenSri Lankan president ] Jayewardane? Somebody came out with some kind of plan. Allright. If we have to favour the LTTE, then how will we land in Sri Lanka? If we are tofavour Sri Lankans, how will we land in Sri Lanka?

After all, you just cannot land, you are going overseas, you are going by sea, going byair. So various options had to be discussed. This kind of scenario we were working on.War was never thought of. Nobody told us that behind-the-scenes there was anAccord being worked out.

You were not told that the Indo-Lankan Accord was being worked on?

Of course not. What happened was, I was going back to Secunderabad. As I arrived atthe airport, all my staff were lined up there. I said, Why are you all here, only myADC is supposed to be here. They said, Sir, first flight is to take off at 1o'clocktonight. I said, For where? For Sri Lanka.

I said, It is 10 o'clock when I arrived and we are on a six-eight hour notice? Then mystaff informed that me, Sir, the Accord has been signed in Sri Lanka, the primeminister is there, he rang up the army commander Depinder Singh to move a division

to Sri Lanka.

I said, Get into the ops room. We talked about it. And the brigade commanders tookoff. And I get a message at 2 clock from signal-in-chief, not to leave, till I get a noticefrom the chief. The message came, lightning. Un dino hamare pas fax machine nahinthe so telex spelled out the Accord.
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Which day was it?

27th night [ of June ]. The Accord was signed, that thing came, so I read the Accord, itmade no sense for operations. It meant I leave for Sri Lanka, go and establish peace.And we left. My flight took off at 5 o'clock. Every minute there used to be an aircrafttaking off.

Your brigade commanders agreed to it?

They had no option, had to agree. Mentally we were prepared because we had beentalking about the operation for sometime. Say, we may be talking about it for a month,

but there was no intelligence given to us. I should have got a proper intelligencesummary, this is the terrain, this is the enemy strength. I should have been given a

proper operational instruction.

When you are going into the blue in army terminology, a proper operationalinstruction must be given. A proper overseas command must be formed. Nothing wasdone. The air force was commanding its own troops, army its own troops, navy itsown troops. Who is there to co-ordinate? Nobody. Everybody went independently,there was no joint command. It was a tri-service operation, air force, navy and armyinvolved, but there was no joint command. There should have been a single commandto take this full force across.

Each one on his own?

Everybody did his own and we landed there. And we landedthere like a refugee camp I saw in Assam, Chabua, when wewere fighting the Chinese. Everybody was just beinginducted, nobody knew anything. Anyway, I met the SriLankan brigade commander, went to his operations roomand he told me what it was all about.

I said, Have you seen the Tigers, LTTE? He said, Never. I sit inside my bunker and atlast light I have APCs outside my bunker. Why should I go and see the LTTE? I said,You have been there for a long time. Alright, let us do one thing, you take me to theLTTE, I want to establish contact with them.

We established contact. Kumaran, who got killed in the boat tragedy, he was theJaffna commander, very nice chap, he came in a car and took me and one of my

brigade commanders, who got killed in Srinagar, Fernandes, he got blown off by amine aimed at the ammunition depot. We both went with Kumaran, Mahathiah wasstanding outside a bungalow. He said, General, I am not prepared to talk to you. I


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said, Why? I have come here with a message of peace, goodwill. He said, Unless you bring back Prabhakaran, we will not talk to you. I said, Where is Prabhakaran?

I didn't even know that. They kept the army absolutely in the dark. Prabhakaran wasin the Ashoka Hotel in Delhi. Now I know the room number also, 512 or 522. And hewas to see the prime minister, before the prime minister went in for the Accord.Anyway he saw him, the PM gave him certain assurances, and before he could say'Jack Robinson', the prime minister was in Colombo, signing the Accord.

Prabhakaran learnt it on television that the Accord had been signed and they were not party to it. It was one reason why the LTTE never accepted the Accord and India'sstand.

If we had taken the LTTE into confidence, they would have known the whole thing,their terms would have been put across to Jayewardane, and the situation would have

been different. Dixit was in a great hurry to get the Accord signed, with his name up.He became foreign secretary; he got the award later. But he never studied the mood ofthe people, especially the JVP. And since he didn't study the mood of the people, therewas an attempt to assassinate the prime minister.

We would have lost our prime minister. After signing the Accord, they themselveswould have killed him. We didn't know of it. Why did they not tell us? We only saw iton television, newspapers never came.

Shoot Prabhakaran, shoot Mahathiah!

So tell us more about your encounter with the LTTE.

Then I came back from there, from Mahathiah. He gave me a cold drink,I came back. I went straight to [ Lieutenant General ] Depinder Singh. Hehad landed. You know his habit. He would take off from Madras, land at11.30, 12 in the afternoon, take off again by one, and go back to Madras.This was his daily routine. He never came and stayed with me, or sawanything. He used to land in Jaffna and move to Madras. His headquartershad moved to Madras.

All these people used to fly in from Madras to Jaffna and go back. If I was available,they met me. I was never available. I was working from Jaffna town to Ambarai, and Iwas working from Malaithevu in the east to Manar in the west. I had to hop byhelicopter; our troops were all over, all over. So one would start the day early. Sowhatever it was, it was a sad story.


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Then I spoke to Depinder. I said, Prabhakaran must come back if you want me to talkabout surrender of weapons. That was the main issue. He picked up the Sri Lankan

phone, spoke to Delhi. Then he went back to Madras and pursued the matter. He did agood job.

The next day Prabhakaran's aircraft landed in Jaffna with Prabhakaran and his bodyguards, his wife and children, Kitu, whose leg was blown up, who was his righthand then. The air force pilot wanted a receipt from me saying that I received thesesouls safely. Then I was told that you will ensure that he reaches safely to Jaffna townand handed over to his people. I said, Fine. We ensured that. We put him and theothers in various APCs [ armoured personnel carriers ] so that if one is blown off, theother is alive. We took them through the Sri Lankan lines to Jaffna.

I told my staff, take a receipt from Mahathiah that he has received Prabhakaran. Theseare normal formalities. After all, Prabhakaran is not a small man. He is the leader, acharismatic leader of the LTTE. His life is very precious. And a very simple man. No

bullshit about him. His wife lived with three saris -- one she wore, one she washedand one was ready to wear. That is all. They never drank Coca-Cola. They offered usCoca-Cola, but never drank it themselves. They drank that goliwala soda.

So that was your first encounter with him?

After all that I said, Prabhakaran, we must meet. He said, General, tomorrow, 11o'clock. And we landed in the football ground of the Medical College, Jaffna. Theentire area was manned by LTTE guns. I got down from the helicopter and lookedaround. I walked till I met Prabhakaran. He was standing outside a conference hall.He took me to his office. We spoke for five hours. I had to convince him that heshould surrender weapons.

And he was convinced?

He gave it in writing. I can show you. The only letter he gave in writing. I flew toColombo showed it to [ then Indian high commissioner to Colombo J N ] Dixit. Hiswords: "General what you have achieved the nation will appreciate. And I speak onthe behalf of the prime minister of India." These were his words to me at that point oftime.

Right. The letter was flashed all over. Surrender ceremony was fixed for 5th ofAugust. Surrender started. Prabhakaran said, I won't come, my political officer willcome. Quite right. Atal Bihari tho nahi na jatha hain, minister hein jatha hain [the

Indian prime minister doesn't go for surrenders, it is his minister who goes ]. So, wo


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meet him. LTTE chaps told me, General, the people's emotions are so high that if youappear on the scene they might create a problem. They asked me to stay there. Iwanted to go and tell him, Give up. How will he give up?

Unless the assurances given by the prime minister of India are fulfilled I am notgiving up, he said. I kept requesting the high commissioner, Come and meet, comeand meet, come and meet. He dragged his feet, he delayed it, he didn't come. Finallyhe came when the man was dead. We should have saved his life, one life.

Then the boat tragedy, I was in a meeting with Mahathiah and Prabhakaran. Youknow, when we go for a meeting, they used to have two video cameras focused on us,tape recorders, everything. With great difficulty we had a thing like this [ he points atthis correspondent's recorder ]. The poor brigade commander used to keep thatrecording, then give it to his PA, and then send it to the army headquarters. Whetheranybody took action on what our reports were, I don't know.

Even after the riots you were in touch with Prabhakaran?

Oh yes. I never gave up with Prabhakaran. He is a leader of the LTTE. Ihad all the time to meet him because I knew he was the only man whocould solve the problem. Nobody else. Otherwise, you take up arms, andwe took arms and look what happened.

And what exactly happened during the boat tragedy in which theLTTE cadres committed mass suicide?

Yes, I was having a meeting with him, I came down from the boat. Mahathiah hadcome down a little later. Kumaran, the Trincomalee leader, and Pulinderan, the Jaffnaleader, they were in the boat. Mahathiah said, General, I want to talk to you. I had amajor who could translate. Prabhakaran spoke to me in English many a time. Heappeared well-read. He [ Mahathiah ] said, At all cost these people [ who were

surrounded by Lankan troops ] must be released. IPKF is here to protect the LTTE,and they should not go to Colombo. Otherwise, they will be tortured.

They were 17, four we were able to save. So instead of going to Colombo, we flewthem from the naval base to the Jaffna airbase. Now, the tamasha started. There wereLTTE, around them were the Indian troops, around us were the Sri Lankan troops,around them were the Indian troops, around them the APCs of Sri Lanka. Now tellme, if you try to fight, there would have been a conflict between the Sri Lankan andIndian troops. Of course, the orders were very clear to the [ Sri Lankan ] brigadecommander, otherwise get into the helicopter and reach Colombo, relinquish thecommand. Wo tho haath jhod tha tha, ke mein mara ja raha hum kaam kaam kar ke.


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Anyway I was told, you go to Trincomalee and prevent reinforcement of Trincomalee by Sri Lankans. Deny the airport to them. I reached Trincomalee, and we took overthe control tower, commandos were deployed, no troop movement was allowed. Itcreated lot of ill-feeling with the Sri Lankan troops.

In the meantime, I had said that it was high time that Dixit, who was on leave inDelhi, go to Colombo, and mediate their release in the boat. Depinder Singh also flew,I generally had my hat off to him but he was not a strong man. I needed a commanderlike Maneckshaw or Rolli who could stand up to the government at the cost of theirown service.

So how did the boat tragedy end?

I was guarding the airfield. And all of them came, Depinder, Dixit and some otherstaff officers. They landed there, they could not convince Jayewardane, and he wastoo clever for them. Too clever. I cannot have that much say in my country? he askedthem. You are given amnesty to them, fulfill it, but these politicians, they couldn't.Depinder next day flew into Trincomalee and told me, Hand over, let them go and dowhatever they want. Let us go and have a cup of tea with them, with the three chiefs.They were staring at me: This man created all the problems.

Anyway, we had a cup of tea. At 2 o'clock I get a message, why is the G-o-C IPKFinterfering in the 'constitutional activities of Sri Lanka? These were the exact words.This message came all the way from the force headquarters in Madras. And, 'Pleaselift your siege in Jaffna, let the Sri Lankans do what they want to.'

I was upset. I was in Trincomalee; they were in Jaffna, my staff officers, everybodywas taking charge of everything. I spoke to my Colonel G S Hoshiar Singh. Hesaid, Saab ea hukhum aya hein. I said, Chod do, aap tho ye mili gaya tho. Chod gayatho mare jayenge saren. He said, Anyway we have got ambulances, cars, 13, 14 ofthem, the hospital is all geared up to flush poison.

Our troops withdrew, the Sri Lankan troops charged, and these fellows swallowedcyanide. Those who chewed, they died on the spot, those who swallowed were saved.This created chaos in the Indo-Sri Lankan entity. That t

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