INFORMATIONINFORMATION and National Securityand National Security

Dr. Dan KuehlDr. Dan KuehlNational Defense University (NDU)National Defense University (NDU)

Information Resources Management College (IRMC)Information Resources Management College (IRMC)My OpinionsMy Opinions: not the USG, DOD, or NDU: not the USG, DOD, or NDU

Homo Erectus:Mankind standing up and staring at movie props“2001 A Space Odyssey” 1968

Homo Sapiens:Mankind’s Superior IntellectMonty Python’s “The Holy Grail”

Homo Connectus:Mankind as Overly-Connected Cyborg“Beetle Bailey”

The Three Stages of Mankind’s EvolutionThe Three Stages of Mankind’s Evolution

OutlineOutline

Information and National PowerInformation and National Power Cyberspace and Info SpaceCyberspace and Info SpaceInformation in National Security StrategyInformation in National Security Strategy Infrastructure Protection/Information AssuranceInfrastructure Protection/Information Assurance Strategic CommunicationStrategic Communication Information-Cyber OperationsInformation-Cyber Operations

Joint, Service, GlobalJoint, Service, Global New DevelopmentsNew Developments

Measuring PowerMeasuring PowerAn Information StrategyAn Information Strategy

Information as Power: DIMEInformation as Power: DIME

Distinct from yet employed Distinct from yet employed across/integrated with all other across/integrated with all other elements of powerelements of power

Political/DiplomaticPolitical/DiplomaticFrom Radio Free Europe to “War of Ideas” From Radio Free Europe to “War of Ideas” to Strategic Communicationto Strategic Communication

MilitaryMilitaryMilitary Technical Revolution to Revolution Military Technical Revolution to Revolution in Military Affairs to “Transformation” to ??in Military Affairs to “Transformation” to ??

EconomicEconomicSynergy of Information Communication Synergy of Information Communication Technologies and national economiesTechnologies and national economies

InfrastructuresInfrastructures

Information Power (1)Information Power (1)

The The Information Component of Power:Information Component of Power:““Combination of information Combination of information content and technologycontent and technology used as a used as a strategic instrumentstrategic instrument to shape fundamental to shape fundamental political, economic, military and cultural forces on a political, economic, military and cultural forces on a long-term basis to affect the long-term basis to affect the global behaviorglobal behavior of of governments, supra- and non governmental governments, supra- and non governmental organizations, and societies to organizations, and societies to support national support national security strategies & objectivessecurity strategies & objectives””

Dan Kuehl, Strategic Forum #115, “Defining Info Power”,(1997)Dan Kuehl, Strategic Forum #115, “Defining Info Power”,(1997)President Ronald Reagan: National Security Strategy (1987)President Ronald Reagan: National Security Strategy (1987)

Used by every nation state and strategic political entity, Used by every nation state and strategic political entity, regardless of technological developmentregardless of technological development

Information EnvironmentInformation EnvironmentPhysical/Electronic Physical/Electronic ConnectivityConnectivity: “Ether”/Cyberspace/”eSpace: “Ether”/Cyberspace/”eSpace””

Infrastructures, wires, networks, etc: a means of delivery Infrastructures, wires, networks, etc: a means of delivery Cyberspace as a unique physical domain (land, sea, air, space)Cyberspace as a unique physical domain (land, sea, air, space)

Includes human (non-technical) connectivityIncludes human (non-technical) connectivity

Information Information ContentContent:: Words, images, databases, 11010111000sWords, images, databases, 11010111000s Deeds/Actions are content Deeds/Actions are content Context: identical content may be understood differentlyContext: identical content may be understood differently

CognitiveCognitive: “influence/perception: “influence/perception”” Meaning and the MindMeaning and the Mind: “most important”: “most important”

Example: Serbian TV vs NATO cohesion 1999Example: Serbian TV vs NATO cohesion 1999 Losing the battle here may negate winning kinetically Losing the battle here may negate winning kinetically Al Q’aida using kinetic ops to create cognitive effectsAl Q’aida using kinetic ops to create cognitive effects

Information Power (2)Information Power (2)““The relative ability to The relative ability to operate in and exploit the operate in and exploit the information environmentinformation environment

the aggregated and synergistic combination of the aggregated and synergistic combination of CONNECTIVITY, CONTENT, & COGNITIONCONNECTIVITY, CONTENT, & COGNITION. It is an . It is an indispensable underpinning for all other forms of power, yet it indispensable underpinning for all other forms of power, yet it is unique in its own right. It is employed across all other forms is unique in its own right. It is employed across all other forms of human activity—economics, war, diplomacy—and across of human activity—economics, war, diplomacy—and across all levels of conflict, from peace to war. Its elements can be all levels of conflict, from peace to war. Its elements can be described, and their impact measured, albeit not necessarily described, and their impact measured, albeit not necessarily to the exactness as other components of power.”to the exactness as other components of power.”

Analogous to air-sea-space powerAnalogous to air-sea-space powerDan Kuehl, “The Information Revolution & the Transformation Dan Kuehl, “The Information Revolution & the Transformation of Warfare” (2007)of Warfare” (2007)

Cyberspace is…..??Cyberspace is…..??

““Cyberspace is a global domain Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment within the information environment whose whose distinctive and unique distinctive and unique character is framed by the use of character is framed by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic electronics and the electromagnetic spectrumspectrum to create, store, modify, to create, store, modify, exchange and exploit information exchange and exploit information via interdependent and via interdependent and interconnected networks interconnected networks using using information-communications information-communications technologies (ICT)”technologies (ICT)”

Dan Kuehl, “Cyberspace & Cyberpower: Defining the Problem”, Cyberpower & National Security, 2009

““A global domain within the A global domain within the information environment information environment consisting of the interdependent consisting of the interdependent networks of information networks of information technology infrastructures, technology infrastructures, including the Internet, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and computer systems, and embedded processors and embedded processors and controllers.” (“until further controllers.” (“until further notice”)notice”)

J-5 Cyber Directorate (DepSecDef J-5 Cyber Directorate (DepSecDef memo of 12 May 2008)memo of 12 May 2008)

DOD DTK

Cyberspace is….Cyberspace is….

Man-made technologies are necessary to exploit ALL of our operational domains and the natural phenomena from which they derive their characteristics:

Chariots on land, Airplanes in the air, Ships at sea, Satellites in space

PCPC

Tim Harrell, Booz-Allen-Hamilton

Cyber operations are…Cyber operations are…

““the employment of cyber capabilities where the primary the employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects in or purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects in or through cyberspace. Such operations include computer through cyberspace. Such operations include computer network operations and activities to operate and defend network operations and activities to operate and defend the Global Information Grid” the Global Information Grid”

Is the GIG our “base” in cyberspace?Is the GIG our “base” in cyberspace? A foundation for Organize, Train & EquipA foundation for Organize, Train & Equip

What is excluded: “operations that may cause effects in What is excluded: “operations that may cause effects in cyberspace—EW, Psyop—[but] that do not employ cyber cyberspace—EW, Psyop—[but] that do not employ cyber capabilities.”capabilities.”

VCJCS Memo 25 September 2008 VCJCS Memo 25 September 2008

(Do you agree?) (Do you agree?)

““First Battles’” ThesisFirst Battles’” Thesis

Traditional Warfare: first defeats-even disasters- Traditional Warfare: first defeats-even disasters- did not always equal final defeat; strategic did not always equal final defeat; strategic “space” allowed for recovery“space” allowed for recovery Geographic and Temporal (“land/distance & time”)Geographic and Temporal (“land/distance & time”)

Russia, 1941-44; Pacific, 1941-44Russia, 1941-44; Pacific, 1941-44Battles for operational/technological superiority:Battles for operational/technological superiority:Radar, Airspace, Battle of AtlanticRadar, Airspace, Battle of Atlantic

Cyberwarfare: defeat in the first cyberbattle may Cyberwarfare: defeat in the first cyberbattle may be the defining condition for victorybe the defining condition for victory ““Victory” in Clausewitzian terms, ie./ political Victory” in Clausewitzian terms, ie./ political

objectives, not solely/narrowly militaryobjectives, not solely/narrowly military

US National Security StrategyUS National Security Strategy(Past)(Past)

President Reagan, 1987/1988President Reagan, 1987/1988Political and Political and Informational Informational PowerPower

federal agencies & private sectorfederal agencies & private sector counter “public deception & counter “public deception &

propaganda”propaganda” ““full range of US informational full range of US informational

programs” to “reach peoples of denied programs” to “reach peoples of denied areas”areas”

““electronic media, written materials, electronic media, written materials, increased contact & exchange”increased contact & exchange”

TechnologyTechnology strategic advantagestrategic advantage ““free flow of information” facilitates free flow of information” facilitates

creation & exploitation of advanced creation & exploitation of advanced technologytechnology

economic health and military capabilityeconomic health and military capabilitycomputer technology and softwarecomputer technology and software

Info support to diplomatic powerInfo support to diplomatic power ““fight the war of ideasfight the war of ideas””

President Clinton, 1999/2000President Clinton, 1999/20003 Key pillars3 Key pillars

Info Assurance/Critical Infrastructure Info Assurance/Critical Infrastructure Protection Protection (IA/CIP)(IA/CIP)

Vital national interest, use unilateral Vital national interest, use unilateral force to defend; “Partnership” force to defend; “Partnership”

Information Warfare/Ops Information Warfare/Ops (IW/IO)(IW/IO)MTR/RMA to Network Centric Ops to MTR/RMA to Network Centric Ops to Transformation: Desert Storm to Transformation: Desert Storm to Kosovo to Afghanistan and IraqKosovo to Afghanistan and Iraq

Public Diplomacy/International Public Diplomacy/International Public Information Public Information (PD/IPI(PD/IPI))

””Softpower” (Joe Nye); (Strategic Softpower” (Joe Nye); (Strategic Communication)Communication)““increasingly vital….transmit [our] increasingly vital….transmit [our] message to people around the message to people around the world” to “counter misinformation & world” to “counter misinformation & incitement…mitigate conflict”incitement…mitigate conflict”

““Softpower & Smartpower” (Joe Nye Softpower & Smartpower” (Joe Nye and SecDef Gates, 2008)and SecDef Gates, 2008)

Obama AdminObama Admin

Three SuggestionsThree Suggestions Do not treat cyberspace in isolation from information Do not treat cyberspace in isolation from information

environment (See DepSecDef Memo of May 07)environment (See DepSecDef Memo of May 07)Need comprehensive Cyberstrategy as a segment of an Need comprehensive Cyberstrategy as a segment of an even more comprehensive National Info Strategyeven more comprehensive National Info Strategy

““Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative” (CNCI) is Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative” (CNCI) is vital but not enough by itselfvital but not enough by itself

Grow the PartnershipGrow the PartnershipPublic Sector: Interagency/Government (all levels), Military, Public Sector: Interagency/Government (all levels), Military, Congress, Intel, Agencies, etcCongress, Intel, Agencies, etcPrivate Sector: Industry/Business, Academia, SocietyPrivate Sector: Industry/Business, Academia, SocietyInternational partners and organizationsInternational partners and organizations

Develop an Information StrategyDevelop an Information StrategyBuild the “3Cs” (later)Build the “3Cs” (later)

Information AssuranceInformation Assurance Critical Infrastructure Protection Critical Infrastructure Protection

Dependency/Interconnections create VulnerabilityDependency/Interconnections create VulnerabilityNational Infrastructure controlsNational Infrastructure controls

complex, interconnected, centralized, autonomous: SCADAcomplex, interconnected, centralized, autonomous: SCADA energy, transportation, communications, finance, etc energy, transportation, communications, finance, etc

US Government actions 1990s – 200XsUS Government actions 1990s – 200Xs Australia, Norway, Sweden, Canada…Australia, Norway, Sweden, Canada… Just as valid for Europe, Asia as US: Just as valid for Europe, Asia as US: A global trendA global trend

NATO, EUNATO, EU

Partnership of Public-Private sectorsPartnership of Public-Private sectors Lessons from Estonia & Georgia?Lessons from Estonia & Georgia?

““Smaller is Better”Smaller is Better”

Strategic/economic impact/threat Strategic/economic impact/threat ““Strategic Fragility”Strategic Fragility”

Mobilization = German railroad system 1914?Mobilization = German railroad system 1914?

Cybersecurity Report (Melissa Hathaway’s effort)Cybersecurity Report (Melissa Hathaway’s effort)

The New National/GlobalThe New National/Global Security Environment Security Environment

““Global Asymmetric Engagement/Asymmetric Global Asymmetric Engagement/Asymmetric Counterforce’Counterforce’

Cyberwar vs information & networks; operating in a contested Cyberwar vs information & networks; operating in a contested global commons global commons

(see Flournoy/Brimley in USNI July 2009)(see Flournoy/Brimley in USNI July 2009)

Asymmetric warfare & the “revolution in military affairs” = Asymmetric warfare & the “revolution in military affairs” = others are looking for OUR weaknessesothers are looking for OUR weaknesses

Information-dependent military operationsInformation-dependent military operations Critical infrastructure-dependent national societiesCritical infrastructure-dependent national societies Inter-connected global economiesInter-connected global economies

Have we the organizations, doctrines, personnel needed Have we the organizations, doctrines, personnel needed to survive and win the First Battle in Cyberspace?to survive and win the First Battle in Cyberspace?

Potential Cyber Potential Cyber Attack ObjectivesAttack Objectives

Disrupt enemy infrastructure, logistics and supply Disrupt enemy infrastructure, logistics and supply chainschains

Distract, confuse, and disable enemy C4ISRDistract, confuse, and disable enemy C4ISROODA-Loop effectsOODA-Loop effects

Impair the movement of military forcesImpair the movement of military forces Deny similar capabilities to the enemyDeny similar capabilities to the enemy Create opportunities for strategic attacks on enemy Create opportunities for strategic attacks on enemy

infrastructuresinfrastructures Weaken, distract and disorient social cohesion and Weaken, distract and disorient social cohesion and

political will of both military forces and civil populacepolitical will of both military forces and civil populace Shape global perceptions of the conflictShape global perceptions of the conflict Time-Gap: potentially NANOSECONDS!Time-Gap: potentially NANOSECONDS!

Bob Miller & Irv Lachow, “Strategic Fragility”,http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/defense_horizons/DH59.pdf

Strategic InfluenceStrategic InfluenceStrategic CommunicationStrategic Communication

““Strategic Influence” is a strategic instrument…Strategic Influence” is a strategic instrument…and always has beenand always has been

Assyrian palace at Nimrud 700BCAssyrian palace at Nimrud 700BCTV is everywhere (“Softwar”)TV is everywhere (“Softwar”)

““This weapon of television could be useful”; Edward This weapon of television could be useful”; Edward R. Murrow 1951R. Murrow 1951

Vietnam to “Tear Down This Wall” to Al Firdos Vietnam to “Tear Down This Wall” to Al Firdos bunker to “Live from the WTC”bunker to “Live from the WTC”

New mediums: Internet, cell phone cameras New mediums: Internet, cell phone cameras (London 2005), Twitter(London 2005), Twitter

Cyberspace & Terrorism = cyberterrorism?Cyberspace & Terrorism = cyberterrorism?Info battle of Iraq: winning?Info battle of Iraq: winning?Global influence: succeeding?Global influence: succeeding?

MUST see through THEIR lensMUST see through THEIR lens Al Jazeera - Al Hurra, Radio Sawa Al Jazeera - Al Hurra, Radio Sawa

Recent congressional engagementRecent congressional engagement Needed for resources, supportNeeded for resources, support

Strategic CommunicationStrategic CommunicationSymphony Orchestra or Jazz Ensemble?Symphony Orchestra or Jazz Ensemble?

Cdr Steve Tatham, RN “Strategic Communication: a Primer”

War of Ideas…or Images?War of Ideas…or Images?Narratives and PicturesNarratives and Pictures

Influence “Campaigning”Influence “Campaigning”

Perceiving-Internalizing

Believing

Behaving

Goal:Desired Action

CognitiveDissonance

CulturalMismatch

Faith and/or Reason

Confirmation orContradiction

Sensing-ReceivingElements of an Information “Campaign”Elements of an Information “Campaign”

WHAT is the desired EFFECT?WHAT is the desired EFFECT? WHO is the audience?WHO is the audience?

Cultural awareness Cultural awareness Are we listening or just talking?Are we listening or just talking?

WHAT is the message?WHAT is the message?Content analysisContent analysis

Perceptions = RealityPerceptions = Reality

DEEDS = messages!DEEDS = messages! HOW to deliver it?HOW to deliver it?

Which Media and Spokesman: Which Media and Spokesman: Shortwave to Arab street, or Imam in Shortwave to Arab street, or Imam in Mosque?Mosque?

WAS it successful?WAS it successful?Metrics & measurementMetrics & measurement

Measure impact, not effortMeasure impact, not effort

C2W to Info Ops RoadmapC2W to Info Ops Roadmap

“Integrated use of OPSEC, military deception, PSYOP, EW, and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade or destroy adversary C2 capabilities, while protecting friendly capabilities against such actions.”

JCS, Command and Control Warfare”

1993

“Integrated employment of the core capabilities of EW, Computer Network Operations, Psyop, Military Deception, and Opsec, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own”

Info Ops Roadmap 2003

Doctrine Pub 3-13, 2006Doctrine Pub 3-13, 2006“the Thesis”“the Thesis”

Highlights/Key PointsHighlights/Key Points Retains Roadmap definition of Info OpsRetains Roadmap definition of Info Ops Part of “Transformation”Part of “Transformation” ““IW” no longer used; (irregular warfare)IW” no longer used; (irregular warfare) Three interrelated dimensionsThree interrelated dimensions

Physical, Informational, CognitivePhysical, Informational, Cognitive Strategic Command Strategic Command

Coord IO across AORs and functional boundariesCoord IO across AORs and functional boundaries Importance of Strategic CommunicationImportance of Strategic Communication Important role of allied/coalition Info OpsImportant role of allied/coalition Info Ops

An Info Ops MapServices

An Info Ops MapServices

• EW, Influence, Networks

• AFDD-1, 2-5• Realm to control• Cyberspace

Command?• 24th AF – 67th NW Wg

Air ForceAir Force ArmyArmy

NavyNavyUSMCUSMC

• Human factors & Tech

• MCWP 3-40.5• Command

Dominance• OODA loop

• MCIOC at Quantico• IOps career field

• Maritime Dominance• Fleet Operations• Net Centric Ops• NETWAR Command• Cyber Forces Cmd?• Info Warriors

• Digital battlefield• FM 3-0 & 3-13• Info Superiority• 1st IOpsCmd – 4th POG• FAs 29, 30 & 39

JOINTJOINTInfo OpsInfo Ops

RMAs require Operational and Organizational change/”Transformation”

A DOD MapA DOD Map

JCS JOINT JOINT Info OpsInfo Ops

JROC ProcessJ2 Threats/TGTSJ39 (DDGO) OffensiveJ5 Cyber DivisionJ6 Networks/Cyberspace J7 Doctrine/Education

DISADefensive IWJTF-GNOIndications & WarningNCS/NSTAC

JIOWCntrSupport to CoComsStratcom –

Global Strike

Nodal AnalysisJWAC

Nodal analysis

DIAINTEL Focal PointIndications & WarningHuman Factors Analysis

NSAThreat AnalysisE-space AnalysisJFCC-NW

Combat CmdsPlan-Exercise

ExecutionSOCOM-Psyop

USD(I)Info OperationsMil Dec, CNO, Opsec

SERVICESSERVICESOrganize/Train/EquipOrganize/Train/Equip

ASD/NIINetworks & Info IntegrationIA/CIP

PolicyRoadmapPsyop-DSPD

USD(P) STRATCOMMission/AdvocateSupport to CoComsPlan/ExecuteNew Cyber Command

Allies’ Info OpsAllies’ Info Ops

UK Joint Warfare Pub 3-80UK Joint Warfare Pub 3-80 ““Co-ordinated actions Co-ordinated actions

undertaken to undertaken to influence influence an an adversary or potential adversary or potential adversary in support of adversary in support of political and military political and military objectives by undermining objectives by undermining his his will, cohesion and will, cohesion and decision-making abilitydecision-making ability, , through affecting his through affecting his information, information-information, information-based processes and based processes and systems while protecting systems while protecting one’s own decision-makers one’s own decision-makers and decision-making and decision-making processes.”processes.”

EU Military Info Ops EU Military Info Ops EU Mil Committee 2/2008EU Mil Committee 2/2008 ““Military function that Military function that

provides advice and provides advice and coordination of coordination of military military activities affecting activities affecting information and information information and information systems in order to systems in order to create create desired effectsdesired effects in support of in support of the mission specific Crisis the mission specific Crisis Information Strategy and of Information Strategy and of the political and military the political and military objectives of the EU”objectives of the EU”

What is a “crisis info strat”?What is a “crisis info strat”?

NATONATOInfo Ops comprises three interrelated activitiesInfo Ops comprises three interrelated activities Changing, Changing, influencing influencing or reinforcing perceptions and or reinforcing perceptions and

attitudes or adversaries, potential adversaries, othersattitudes or adversaries, potential adversaries, others Preserve and Preserve and protectprotect Alliance freedom of maneuver in Alliance freedom of maneuver in

the information environment by defending the data and the information environment by defending the data and information [of] decision makers/processes information [of] decision makers/processes

CounteringCountering command, functions, and capabilities by command, functions, and capabilities by affecting data/info of adversaries’ C2, intelligence, affecting data/info of adversaries’ C2, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and weapons systems surveillance, target acquisition and weapons systems

an an integrating function focused on the info integrating function focused on the info environment, not a capability in its own rightenvironment, not a capability in its own right

Military Policy on IO MC 422/3 9 March 07 (agreed July 2008)Military Policy on IO MC 422/3 9 March 07 (agreed July 2008) Allied Joint Pub 3-10 (pending official publication)Allied Joint Pub 3-10 (pending official publication)

Others’ IOOthers’ IO

RussiaRussia ““Information Security Doctrine Information Security Doctrine

of the Russian Federation”of the Russian Federation” 9 Sept 20009 Sept 2000

Protect “national interests…in Protect “national interests…in the information sphere”the information sphere”

Protect the IT industryProtect the IT industry Send: reliable info on the RFSend: reliable info on the RF Protect: spiritual life of the RFProtect: spiritual life of the RF

Russian Info OpsRussian Info OpsTwo, not five, core areasTwo, not five, core areas

Info Technical, PsychologicalInfo Technical, PsychologicalTim Thomas, FMSO at Tim Thomas, FMSO at Ft LeavenworthFt Leavenworth

ChinaChina Overlays IW with ideologyOverlays IW with ideology

““New People’s New People’s War”--“Overcome superior War”--“Overcome superior with inferior”with inferior”

Focus on non-technologicalFocus on non-technological Unconventional warfare Unconventional warfare

Not a battlefield force Not a battlefield force enabler/multiplierenabler/multiplier““Anti-Info-Strategy Anti-Info-Strategy Technology”Technology”

Info campaign precludes the Info campaign precludes the need for military action!---a need for military action!---a preemption weaponpreemption weapon

Jim Mulvenon, “PLA in Info Jim Mulvenon, “PLA in Info Age”, RANDAge”, RAND

DiscussionDiscussion

Is Cyberspace a warfighting domain?Is Cyberspace a warfighting domain? Define “domain” (Definitions DO matter!)Define “domain” (Definitions DO matter!)

Did the USAF try to “grab the cyberturf”?Did the USAF try to “grab the cyberturf”? How much of Cyberspace does AF/DOD How much of Cyberspace does AF/DOD

“own”?...civilian infrastructure is 90%+ of DOD use“own”?...civilian infrastructure is 90%+ of DOD use

Are we making the right changes in…Are we making the right changes in… Organizations, doctrines, technologyOrganizations, doctrines, technology

What are coalition partners/allies doing?What are coalition partners/allies doing?Who will be the “Billy Mitchell” of Cyberspace? Who will be the “Billy Mitchell” of Cyberspace? (do we need/want one?)(do we need/want one?)

Cyber ChangesCyber Changes

US Strategic CommandUS Strategic Command New Subordinate Unified New Subordinate Unified

Cyber Command Cyber Command Director National Security Director National Security Agency 4 stars, 2 hatsAgency 4 stars, 2 hatsJFCC-NW and JTF-GNO JFCC-NW and JTF-GNO folded into itfolded into itMissions, Roles, Missions, Roles, Responsibilities evolvingResponsibilities evolvingProtect military—not civilianProtect military—not civilian—networks—networks

Generating Generating significantsignificant discussion/uneasediscussion/unease

QDR Cyber StrategyQDR Cyber Strategy Broad goals (draft)Broad goals (draft)

Freedom of Action in Freedom of Action in cyberspacecyberspacePrevent/Deter conflictPrevent/Deter conflictCyber support to Cyber support to homeland defensehomeland defense

SupportsSupportsSecure NetworksSecure NetworksCyber OpsCyber OpsExternal partnersExternal partnersDOD & national effortsDOD & national efforts

Information OperationsInformation Operations

QDR sub-panel on Info OpsQDR sub-panel on Info OpsMoving away from “5 core competencies”, and Moving away from “5 core competencies”, and towards the “Information Environment”towards the “Information Environment” DTK proposal (based on QDR proposals):DTK proposal (based on QDR proposals):

[M] = Military[M] = Military

Information Operations are [M] activities conducted in or via the Information Operations are [M] activities conducted in or via the information environment to affect and protect information itself information environment to affect and protect information itself as well as the connectivity necessary to exchange that as well as the connectivity necessary to exchange that information and create cognitive effects. Info Ops is thus the information and create cognitive effects. Info Ops is thus the integrated and coordinated [M] use of the information integrated and coordinated [M] use of the information environmentenvironment in order to create desired [M] effects. This use of in order to create desired [M] effects. This use of the [M] information environment spans the range of operations, the [M] information environment spans the range of operations, and exists within and supports larger governmental and and exists within and supports larger governmental and national uses of the information environment and information national uses of the information environment and information power in national security. power in national security.

Measuring PIMEMeasuring PIME

Traditional measure of power is control of Traditional measure of power is control of resourcesresources

Land, iron/coal/oil, people Land, iron/coal/oil, people M M and and EE: easily visible and quantifiable: easily visible and quantifiable

Military: hardware, troops, trainingMilitary: hardware, troops, training Economic: GDP, trade, industryEconomic: GDP, trade, industry

P/D:P/D: may have some visible metrics may have some visible metrics Stability, continuity, participationStability, continuity, participation Embassies, treaties, diplomatsEmbassies, treaties, diplomats

I most difficult of allI most difficult of all What metrics can we use? What metrics can we use?

Information/Cyber PowerInformation/Cyber Power

““Use of information Use of information content and technology content and technology as strategic instrumentsas strategic instruments to…affect global to…affect global behaviors”behaviors”

“ “The relative ability to The relative ability to operate in and exploit operate in and exploit the information (cyber) the information (cyber) environment…environment…””

Two Critical Two Critical and measurableand measurable factors:factors:

CONNECTIVITYExchange of informationExchange of information

CONTENTWhat’s exchangedWhat’s exchanged

One somewhat less—but still-measurable factor

COGNITIVEInfluence/behavior

Bottom Line: Impact and Effectiveness

Information Power…Information Power…Who’s in Charge?Who’s in Charge?

Diplomatic and Military…Centralized and Hierarchical

Economic and Information…Diffused and Shared

Which model is correct for Information?

What’s LackingWhat’s LackingWho and Where do we go to Who and Where do we go to shape and create Information shape and create Information Power?Power?

National Information Council?National Information Council? Public & Private PartnersPublic & Private Partners

What do need from them?What do need from them? National Information StrategyNational Information Strategy

What are we lacking? Why What are we lacking? Why don’t we have one?don’t we have one?

We need a strategic and We need a strategic and conceptual foundation for how conceptual foundation for how we can employ Information we can employ Information Power to support national Power to support national securitysecurity

Needed: Information-age Needed: Information-age corollary to the “Long corollary to the “Long Telegram”Telegram”

861.00/2 - 2246: Telegram861.00/2 - 2246: TelegramThe Charge in the Soviet Union (George The Charge in the Soviet Union (George Kennan) to the Secretary of StateKennan) to the Secretary of State[was classified at the time…now declassified][was classified at the time…now declassified]Moscow, February 22, 1946--9 p.m. [Received February 22--3: Moscow, February 22, 1946--9 p.m. [Received February 22--3: 52 p.m.]52 p.m.]511. Answer to Dept's 284, Feb 3 [13] involves questions so 511. Answer to Dept's 284, Feb 3 [13] involves questions so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so important to analysis of our international environment that I important to analysis of our international environment that I cannot compress answers into single brief message without cannot compress answers into single brief message without yielding to what I feel would be dangerous degree of over-yielding to what I feel would be dangerous degree of over-simplification. I hope, therefore, Dept will bear with me if I simplification. I hope, therefore, Dept will bear with me if I submit in answer to this question five parts, subjects of which submit in answer to this question five parts, subjects of which will be roughly as follows: will be roughly as follows: (1) Basic features of post-war Soviet outlook.(1) Basic features of post-war Soviet outlook.(2) Background of this outlook(2) Background of this outlook(3) Its projection in practical policy on official level. (3) Its projection in practical policy on official level. (4) Its projection on unofficial level.(4) Its projection on unofficial level.(5) Practical deductions from standpoint of US policy.(5) Practical deductions from standpoint of US policy.

The “LongTelegram”

Information StrategyInformation Strategy

Builds on “3Cs”Builds on “3Cs” Build, enhance, support Build, enhance, support ConnectivityConnectivity

Physical: networks, infrastructures, Information-Communication Physical: networks, infrastructures, Information-Communication Technology (ICT)Technology (ICT)Human: one-one, one-many, many-manyHuman: one-one, one-many, many-manyGet the REAL experts (ie. Private Sector)Get the REAL experts (ie. Private Sector)

Build/Use institutions that create Build/Use institutions that create ContentContentEntertainment, News, Marketing, Education, moreEntertainment, News, Marketing, Education, moreGet the REAL experts (ie. Private Sector)Get the REAL experts (ie. Private Sector)

Measure Measure CognitiveCognitive impact impactGet the REAL experts (ie. Private Sector)Get the REAL experts (ie. Private Sector)

All Three require All Three require partnershipspartnerships beyond government, beyond government, military, and especially the private sector to include non-military, and especially the private sector to include non-US, and they require a long-term view…this isn’t years, US, and they require a long-term view…this isn’t years, it’s it’s decades decades

Taliban: “Americans have all the watches, we have all the time”Taliban: “Americans have all the watches, we have all the time”

What’s Needed?What’s Needed?“Wire the World!”“Wire the World!”

New strategy is not “Containment”…New strategy is not “Containment”…

it’s it’s CONNECTIVITYCONNECTIVITY See Hart-Rudman Commission’s 2See Hart-Rudman Commission’s 2ndnd

Report, May 2000Report, May 2000 An (increasingly) Networked WorldAn (increasingly) Networked World

Free flows of information and Free flows of information and exchangeexchange of of CONTENTCONTENT

Via both Via both Human & Technological Human & Technological InteractionInteraction

Enhance Enhance economic growtheconomic growth and and productivity, standards of living and productivity, standards of living and health care, etchealth care, etc

EnhanceEnhance strategic strategic communicationcommunication, , which which cancan enhance enhance

Human rights, Democracy, PeaceHuman rights, Democracy, Peace Bridge the “Core-Gap”Bridge the “Core-Gap” paradigm paradigm ……BUT: won’t be 100% successfulBUT: won’t be 100% successful

Critical IssuesCritical IssuesQuestions for DiscussionQuestions for Discussion

How do we develop and protect “National Cyberspace? How do we develop and protect “National Cyberspace? What is it? Who?What is it? Who?

Organizations, people, doctrinesOrganizations, people, doctrines

How do we leverage Info Ops to fully support military How do we leverage Info Ops to fully support military operations/commanders?operations/commanders?

Enabler? Multiplier? Partner? Supported/ing?Enabler? Multiplier? Partner? Supported/ing?

How do we communicate and influence?How do we communicate and influence? Who? What? How? Did we Succeed?Who? What? How? Did we Succeed?

RolesRoles Intel Community, Private Sector, Allies/Friends, NGOsIntel Community, Private Sector, Allies/Friends, NGOs

Where fit within NATO security strategy?Where fit within NATO security strategy?

Cubicle-Centric WarfareCubicle-Centric WarfareAre we too busy fighting ourselves…and not paying Are we too busy fighting ourselves…and not paying

sufficient attention to THEM?sufficient attention to THEM?

http://www.ndu.edu/irmc/programs/index.html

Programs/Certifications for/in…Programs/Certifications for/in…Chief Information OfficersChief Information OfficersInformation AssuranceInformation AssuranceOrganizational Transformation…Organizational Transformation…

……and and Information StrategistsInformation Strategists

Dr Dan KuehlDr Dan Kuehlkuehld@ndu.edu 202-685 2257 202-685 2257Twittersphere: “Daninfowar”Twittersphere: “Daninfowar”