international history: the united nations...

International History: The United Nations (SBQ)

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THE UNITED NATIONS

Conflicts Time Periods 1. Arab-Israeli Conflicts

o First Arab-Israeli War (1948) o Suez Crisis (1956) o Six-Day War (1967) o Yom Kippur War (1973) o Lebanon (1978 and 1982)

2. Congo Crisis (1960-66) 3. Vietnamese-Cambodian War (1979) 4. UN and The Cold War

o Korean War (1950) o Bay of Pigs Invasion (1961) o Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) o Vietnam War (1955-75) o Iran-Iraq (1980) o Afghanistan (1979-89) o Nicaragua (1989) o El Salvador (1989-91)

5. UN And The End Of The Cold War o Gulf War (1990-91)

6. Peacekeeping In Africa In The 1990s o Somalia (1991) o Rwandan (1994) o Bosnia (1992)

1. 1960s – Worsening Cold War relations 2. 1970s – Détente

o Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) o Yom Kippur War (1973)

3. 1980s – Second Cold War 4. End of Cold War

o Cambodia – success o Somalia – failure o Bosnia – failure

UN SECRETARY-GENERALS 1) TRYGVE LIE (1946-52, Norwegian) • Started his term before the Cold War period. • Kept a high political profile and annoyed both the USSR and USA. Key Events • Involvement in the Korean War, his role in seeking recognition for the PRC and

his willingness to allow the USA to screen and dismiss disloyal Americans (i.e. with communist tendencies) in the UN Secretariat

• Eventually resigned and did not run for 2nd term due to Soviet opposition and loss of support

Evaluation/Limitations: • Played a more active political role due to the paralysis of the UN caused by the Cold

War. However, SG’s ability to take effective action was curbed and hampered by superpower interests.


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2) DAG HAMMARSKJOLD (1953-61, Danish) • Architect of the concept of “combined private and public multilateral diplomacy”,

using quiet diplomacy to negotiate with governments. This resulted in many successes, particularly his securing the release of 17 US airmen from China and the establishment of UNEF in response to the Suez Crisis.

• Was also convinced the UN should concentrate on preventive rather than corrective action in international security, and came up with the fundamental concept of preventive diplomacy in peacekeeping

Key Events • Strengthened UN position in Jordan-Lebanon crisis despite SC inability to come up

with a resolution (was prepared to face “any consequences”) • Took initiatives of his own, e.g. in playing a major role in resolving a border

dispute between Laos and Thailand without official authorization from SC or GA (but neither disapproved)

• Invoked Article 99 which authorized him to raise the issue of the Congo crisis to the SC

• Fell out with the USSR over the Congo crisis

Evaluation • Enhanced the prestige of the office by using quiet diplomacy to resolve various

conflicts. 3) U THANT (1961-71, Burmese) • 1st SG from a Third World country, giving him an advantage in dealing with

colonialism issues • Continued Hammarskjold’s quiet diplomacy but acted “with circumspection” after the

USSR’s strong reaction to Hammarskjold’s boldness

Key Events • Dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia over West Irian Jaya • 1962 civil conflict in Yemen • Dispute over Cyprus (Turks & Greeks in 1964) • Conflict between Philippines and Malaysia over Sarawak and North Borneo • Indo-Kashmir conflict • Ending the Congo conflict

Evaluation • Played a quieter role than his two predecessors and was less controversial, largely due

to the Great Powers – preferred to delegate tasks to him, but did not want him to exercise leadership. U Thant was largely ineffective when it came to dealing with conflicts of interest to the superpowers, e.g. inability to resolve the Vietnam War despite putting in much effort. (his attempts – e.g. a 3-stage proposal to restore order to Vietnam in Paris Peace Talks in 1968 – to intervene in the Vietnam War were almost completely ignored by the USA and almost never brought up at GA or SC)


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o Was criticized for withdrawing UNEF forces before the 1967 Arab-Israeli War; was questioned in his efficiency in dealing with the refugee crisis caused by the 1971 Bangladesh War. Also involved in sticky situations like the civil war in Nigeria in 1967-70 (which was delicate as the issue was not avidly discussed at GA or SC out of deference to the African nations) and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (U Thant led 10 members in the SC in condemning Soviet action, but was vetoed by the USSR).

4) KURT WALDHEIM (1972-81, Austrian) • Suspected war criminal based on his forced involvement with the Nazis, but later

deemed “innocent”. • Generally kept a low profile and was less inclined than his predecessors to offend

the major powers. • Term was plagued with much anti-Israeli sentiment and his Nazi background won

him much skepticism. • UN mounted only 3 new peacekeeping missions while he was SG: 2 from the 1973

Yom Kippur War which were largely Kissinger creations (a Soviet-American resolution presented to the SC and accepted, producing UNEF 2; and the UN Disengagement Observer Force on the Golan Heights between Israel and Syria). The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (after Israel invaded Lebanon in 1978) also arose from US diplomacy – was obviously ineffective

• Key events: Mediated conflicts in Cyprus, between India and Pakistan and in Southern Africa (Namibia)

Evaluation • Was described once as a “headwaiter”, serving the interests of the major powers.

While he did have a number of successes, these were regarding small conflicts that were outside the interests of the major powers. His diplomatic efforts, particularly in the Middle East, were overshadowed by the diplomacy of the then-US Secretary of State, Kissinger.

o Waldheim’s efforts to mediate in the Vietnam War were unsuccessful due to the superpowers’ refusal to cooperate.

o Efforts to deal with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were futile due to Cold War tensions

o Was unable to prevent the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War (1973), and could not enforce Resolution 242 as the USA vetoed each time he tried

o In 1980, flew to Iran in an attempt to negotiate the release of the US hostages held in Tehran, but Ayatollah Khomeini refused to see him

o His critical comments about US bombing of North Vietnam resulted in a public denouncement by President Nixon.

5) JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR (1982-91, Peruvian) Key events • Enjoyed considerable success in resolving long-standing problems in Namibia,

Western Sahara between Morocco and Polisario Front, Cyprus, South Africa and Nicaragua


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• Brought an end to the Iran-Iraq war, the Cambodian war and the war in El-Salvador.

• Oversaw the UN’s intervention in the Gulf War, often hailed as one of the UN’s greatest successes in the aspect of peacekeeping.

Evaluation • The end of the Cold War marked a rise in prominence of the Secretary-General’s

political role, seen in the number of successful mediations and resolutions of conflict Cuellar presided over.

• Critics however claim his successes were borne from the favourable circumstances brought about by the end of the Cold War due to greater cooperation among the superpowers and P5.

o As such, how large a role the SG could play was still very much dependent on the permission of the major powers?

6) BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI (1992-96, Egyptian) • Inherited the “morning-after hangover from that false renaissance and the difficult

problems of policing the tumult of the post-Cold War world” • Hangover included a whole host of political problems including regional conflicts in

Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti and Yugoslavia; one of the hardest tasks was dealing with the crisis of the Yugoslav Wars after the disintegration of former Yugoslavia

• Was vilified by the Arabs as the architect of the 1979 Camp David peace treaty, “the academic engineer of Arab surrender”

• Was very independent (mistrustful; did not attempt to have close relations with various ambassadors) and was a poor public communicator – was not savvy with the press, particularly with US journalists

o As a contrast to Cuellar, refused to attend closed-door consultations of the SC as a way of establishing independence

• Was primarily interested in peacekeeping and peace enforcement o In 1992, presented The Agenda for Peace: “preventative deployment” of

troops to an area of potential crisis; agreements with governments to set aside special troops for possible rapid deployment by the UN; use of peace-enforcement troops (more heavily armed than peacemakers) for dangerous military missions like forcible maintenance of ceasefire

o He was of the opinion that effective peacekeeping missions entailed the commitment of the Great Powers. He berated UN members for failing to provide troops when needed, and castigated the SC for trying to “micro-manage peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations

o Boutros-Ghali liked to describe himself as the servant of the Security Council and often proclaimed his political weaknesses. Yet he did not see himself as a pure administrator; he saw himself as the catalyst and executor of decisions

• Was not re-elected for a second term despite African nations support due to US opposition and accusations of fund mismanagement/overbudgeting on frivolous pursuits (UNESCO)


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o Was very unpopular with the US – e.g. the Clinton administration succeeded in deluding the US public into believing that it was Boutros Ghali alone who led US soldiers to disaster in Somalia

Key events • Played a major role in the Camp David breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli conflict;

managed to negotiate ceasefires in Slovenia and Croatia where the European Community failed

Evaluation • Was criticized for being both too activist and too passive. Effectiveness in resolving

conflict was severely hampered by a multitude of limitations, such as the proliferation of political conflicts, high costs of conflict resolution and limited resources of the UN (lack of a central UN military force, and thus costs involved in creating a peacekeeping force for each operation)

7) Kofi Annan (1997-2006, Ghanaian) • Accused of blocking proactive measures and logistical support in protecting the

Tutsis and preventing the Rwandan genocide • Called for overhauling the UN (UN Reform Plan), particularly the SC, to make it more

representative of the UN’s membership and to increase the organisation’s effectiveness, but was not able to get member nations to agree to significant changes in the UN’s structure

Key Events • In 1997, formulated the Kyoto Protocol but was criticized for being too passive in

his attempts to get countries to ratify the treaty. • In 1998, helped to ease the transition to civilian rule in Nigeria. • In 1998, visited Iraq in an effort to resolve an impasse between Iran and the SC over

compliance with resolutions involving weapons inspections and other matters, which helped avoid an outbreak of imminent hostilities. Was largely unsuccessful but won the respect of the SC and Saddam Hussein.

• In 1999, was deeply involved in the process by which Timor-Leste gained independence from Indonesia

• In 1999, endorsed NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia, but criticized for working too close with the USA and ignoring the SC’s legitimacy

• In 2000, certified Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon Evaluation Particularly emphasized the UN’s traditional obligations in the area of human rights and the newer challenges of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and international terrorism. Critics argue Annan’s main achievement lay in the social aspects of the UN and did not do much to quell or solve political disputes in the international scene.


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GA DEVELOPMENTS 1) Rise in power (1945-60) • Membership expansion: the GA became the main instrument of world pressure in

favour of the emancipation of colonized people. The GA adopted resolution 1514, which legitimized all anti-colonial struggles and provided legal and psychological support to national liberation movements.

• Increase in authority and influence: GA’s role was strengthened due to the involvement of Cold War politics in the SC, which perpetually frustrated decision-making in the UN by the free use of the veto.

o The GA’s power reached its height in 1950 during the Korean War resulting in the Uniting for Peace Resolution, enabling a special assembly to hold an “emergency special session” to be called at any time when there was deadlock in the SC. The Assembly was authorized to recommend if necessary the use of force.

o Represented a transfer of power to the GA/ subversion of power since it rendered the veto useless.

o Before the 1960s (at the time it was proposed), most of the GA members took a pro-USA stance – thus the Uniting for Peace Resolution was often criticized as a tool by the USA to control and dominate the GA.

o However, by the 2) Stagnation (1960-75) • Decline of the GA: This was due to opposition from the USSR and France, which

refused to fund peacekeeping operations authorized by the GA. • Moreover, with the backdrop of detente, the USSR exercised its use of the veto far

more infrequently in the SC, signaling a “revival” of the role of the SC and reducing the need for the GA to step in.

• Changing composition: With the rise of the Afro-Asian bloc, the majority of the GA was now anti-USA. The US was no longer able to command the majority of votes, and hence reverted to the SC.

3) Marginalisation and revival (1975-2000) • Marginalisation: The US’ hostility towards the GA was apparent in the mid-1980s

when the Reagan administration relayed the US government’s displeasure by accusing the GA of being anti-American and anti-Israel.

o The GA was accused of not condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and supporting the national terrorist movements supported by the Arab league and USSR.

o In 1985, the US Congress passed the Kassebaum Solomon Agreements which was a direct attack on the GA, demanding that states which contributed the most financially to the UN should be given more voting rights in the GA.

• Revival: Growing emphasis on development problems, including questions on human rights which led to the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on Genocide, etc.


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SC DEVELOPMENTS 1) Largely ineffective (1945-60) • Cold War politics caused stalemates

o Discussions of the SC made public, placing great pressure on both superpowers to not be too compromising lest they face criticism at home

2) Greater effectiveness (1960-80) • Easing of East-West tensions between the two superpowers during the period of

detente, thus facilitating greater cooperation in the SC • Increase in the size of the SC from 11 to 15 in 1963 to ensure a fair geographical

representation – thus non-permanent members grew to two-thirds of council membership, making it more difficult for permanent members to impose their will

3) Ineffective (1980s) • Dominance of the Third World – seen to be openly hostile to the USA • Revival of Cold War tensions 4) Greater effectiveness (1980-2000) • End of the Cold War IMPORTANT TIME PERIODS • 1960s: Period of worsening Cold War tensions

o SC’s atmosphere became distinctly theatrical; the most histrionic ambassadors were perceived to be doing the best jobs

• 1970s: Period of detente • 3rd world domination

o West could no longer make the General Assembly do their bidding; US viewed the UN as the Third World’s “soap box”

• Period of detente o UN was increasingly bypassed by the superpowers who were starting to deal

directly with each other; UN was simply rubberstamping agreements and sending troops

o Architect of detente on the US side was Kissinger, who was fairly disdainful about the UN

• 1980s: The Second Cold War o Virtually no role for the UN; in the decade after 1978, there were no UN

peacekeeping missions at all o SC was so impotent that most countries in conflict no longer bothered to take

their troubles there; resolutions, even when passed, were increasingly defied o Western states constructed forces to help achieve primarily western interests

• Effects of end of the Cold War a) Created a much better environment for peacekeeping b) Active participation of the superpowers in peacekeeping missions


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- Also removed constraints – e.g. UN involvement not permitted in spheres of influence e.g. Hungary

c) Increases a demand for peacekeeping d) USSR presented itself as “international good citizen”

- E.g. paid off debts to the UN e) More positive US attitude under Bush (compared to Reagan, who was hostile to

the UN) SIGNIFICANT CONFLICTS FIRST ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (1948) • Trygve Lie greatly resented the US’ outright reversal in position (UN trusteeship of

Palestine, as opposed to partition idea)

Significance • Marked the last time Israel ever felt reasonably happy about the UN • UNTSO: genuine international character (participation of many countries); became the

longest continuous UN peacekeeping operation

1956 SUEZ CRISIS • UNTSO was pathetically weak • UK and France wanted to use the UN as a world forum to expose Nasser’s

intransigence; going with the UN was only to better disguise their intention for armed intervention

• Even after ostensibly pursuing a solution via the UN, UK and France proceeded anyway in their military intervention

• Both the USSR and US condemned France and UK (proving Cold War was not always dominant influence in UN); used Uniting for Peace procedure against them

• Hammarskjold asked for vote of confidence in the SC • Israel made no effort to facilitate UNEF’s task (possibly even deepened hostility); UNEF

remained until 1967

Significance • UNEF was often regarded as a model of UN peacekeeping: temporary; non-

coercive; limited brief; no aggressor identified (not collective security) • SG’s reputation enhanced • Compared to the Hungarian Revolution, UN could not stop aggression – USSR was

implacably indifferent to UN condemnation SIX-DAY WAR (1967) • U Thant completely withdrew troops

o The Hammarskjold memorandum (managed to limit Nasser’s authority to expel UN troops in 1956, in what became known as the “good faith clause – the Egyptians could not ask the UN to withdraw before the completion of the tasks


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set down by the resolution) was persuasive evidence that U Thant should have hesitated before embracing Egyptian authority whole.

o He also erred on a second count by withdrawing all troops permanently even if Nasser allegedly only demanded a partial withdrawal; he also did not exercise his right to call an emergency meeting of the SC or GA to consider the issue

o The UN may be faulted for not lifting the blockade even with US pressure • U Thant did make attempts to ease tensions, e.g. flying to Cairo after Egypt had

carried out the blockade to ask that they lift it for two weeks, and Israel to halt its use of the Gulf of Aqaba for two weeks to allow time for negotiations

YOM KIPPUR WAR (1973) Significance • UNEF II formed at the behest of the two superpowers (direct talks between Gromyko

and Kissinger; the UN was simply a vehicle to rubberstamp an established US-Soviet agreement)

• USSR sent military observers to UNTSO (new attitude towards peacekeeping generated by detente); Poland also formed part of UNEF II (softening of the neutralist principle). USSR also accepted that UNEF II could be treated as a “regular expense” of the organization and its costs could be levied on all members

LEBANON (1978 AND 1982) • In 1978, UNIFIL was established at the twilight of detente (UNIFIL had no robust

mandate) and was largely ineffective; as such Israel invaded again in 1982 • Difficulties UNIFIL faced:

o Israel’s default posture of instinctive hostility to peacekeeping (only temporarily suspended in respect of UNEF II and UNDOF). Israel installed the Christian Phalangist militias who became a rival focus of power to the UN as a more effective defence than the long-suspect UN against Palestinian incursions along the border.

o To restore peace and security would require the force to confront both Palestinian and Phalangist forces who were, with or without an Israeli presence, intent on destroying each other.

o Did not have freedom or movement; Palestinian refused to withdraw from a number of their own positions within the UN’s supposed area of command

• Since UNIFIL was useless, the US created the Multinational Force (MNF), but that also proved a complete failure

THE CONGO CRISIS (1960-66) • UN Force: ONUC • Hammarskjold for the first time invoked Article 99 which permitted him to presenting

matters to the SC. • Resolution 143 was passed calling for the withdrawal of Belgian troops and for the UN

to provide 'military assistance' to the Congolese forces through ONUC. UN Failures/ Difficulties • Ambiguity in mandate


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o Neither the UN troops nor the local Congolese knew what ONUC was there for. • Inadequate manpower • Hostility by Lumumba • Lawbreaking ANC • Cold War alignments (Lumumba became pro-Soviet; UN seemed to favour Kasavubu) • UN perceived as pro-Western (American Andrew Cordier + all senior UN figures were

Westerners) Significance • USSR’s changing attitudes towards the direction of UN and nature of peacekeeping in

general: o Was suddenly favourable to Uniting to Peace Resolution due to changing

composition of GA (shift in balance of power to Third World countries who were anti-imperialistic and ∴ very sensitive to the effect of ONUC’s actions in Congo Ò USSR could align itself with them to pursue its own interests).

o Accused peacekeeping operations of suppressing liberation movements in Congo. o Accused SG of being an agent for imperialism; proposed a “troika” (which was

rejected anyway). • Role of the SG as an operational center of peacekeeping and peace enforcement was

incontestable • Sense that the UN had not been neutral and consensual (as UN felt obliged to support

the central government over the breakaway forces) • UN castigated for failing to prevent Lumumba’s death (also suspicion of Belgian and US

complicity) • SG granted ONUC the authority to use force to prevent civil war if necessary

(Resolution 161), but ambiguous as to whether it could end Katanga’s secession via force (eventually, Operation Morthor* was used – which went disastrously wrong)

• This prompted Hammerskjold to personally fly to Congo to negotiate some kind of settlement/ truce, but he died on the way in a plane crash Ò replaced by U Thant.

• Force eventually employed to end Katanga’s independence; ONUC finally withdrew in Jun 1964

VIETNAMESE-CAMBODIAN WAR (1979) • UN Force: UNTAC • Vietnamese-Cambodian war escalated when Chinese forces invaded Vietnam’s

northern provinces on Feb 1979, aimed to force Vietnam to withdraw from Kampuchea and weaken the Vietnamese alliance with the USSR.

• Prince Sihanouk began exploring the possibility of an agreement with the pro-Vietnamese Hun Sen regime, and thus emerged the extremely ambitious 1989 plan for the UN to provide a transitional government for Cambodia.

o This administration would run the country, organize and control elections that would give legitimacy to a new Cambodian government and oversee the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia.

• Thus UNTAC, the largest, most elaborate and most expensive UN operation, was created to oversee this.


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UN Failures (or difficulties) • External actors (Vietnam, ASEAN states, China, the US, Russia) were committed to a

successful outcome, but internal parties were less cooperative. o Khmer Rouge did not cooperate with the demobilization and disarmament of

its fighters; as such the Hun Sen faction was also unwilling to disarm unilaterally, leading to sporadic violence at UNTAC.

UN Success • Relative success – UN had facilitated the creation of the basic structures of pluralist

democracy. Significance • Showed that peacekeeping could only work when the dynamics of the conflict

permitted it to. External powers were behind the peacekeeping effort, but local ones were not.

• Notable UN success that bridged the gap to the new era of cooperation between the Soviets and China with the West.

KOREAN WAR (1950) • GA passed a resolution providing for separate UN-supervised elections in N and S

Korea for a united national assembly; since USSR refused, UN GA recognized South (Republic of Korea) as the only “lawful government” (recognized as a state – such that later North Korean attack was an international war under UN jurisdiction).

• A UN commission was established to bring about unification. • USSR felt betrayed by Trygve Lie as he supported UN intervention in Korea. • After North Korean invasion, SC resolutions passed:

o Called for withdrawal of northern forces back to 38th parallel (but they did not comply).

o Recommended UN members assist South Korea (US responded unilaterally by deploying US Seventh Fleet, justified under Article 51 – “collective self-defence”)

Significance 1. Could this be considered collective security? 2. UN force created with a contingent from 17 countries under the command of

MacArthur (American) Ò Problems arose under MacArthur’s/ American leadership:

o MacArthur was strongly anti-communist – influenced his speech and actions o More significantly was not the issue of his nationality, but the issue of the chain

of command, for MacArthur reported back to Washington rather than to UN Ò shows increasing American autonomy and misrepresents the UN (a US force flying the UN flag).

o American-dominated expedition Ò hardly a global force and hardly representing collective security.

3. Uniting for Peace resolution introduced, when decision about crossing 38th parallel came Ò American manipulation of UN processes


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o Represented a transfer of power to the GA Ò significant subversion of the Charter (stating that in order to embark on considered military action, an SC resolution was required), which renders the veto useless because if something is not passed in the SC, it can always be passed in the GA.

o Western sponsored resolution in the GA calling for the UN to establish unity in Korea.

4. Evolution of the Sec-Gen post – Trygve Lie o Trygvie Lie expanded his role as SG beyond that of a bureaucrat (by right, a

bureaucrat does not express his opinions and try to influence the outcome of policy making in the Executive Council).

5. USSR became implacably opposed to Lie; deliberately made things difficult for him. 6. UN perceived as a lackey of the US. US would be contemptuous or indifferent to the

UN later, if unable to lead due to Soviet vetoes and Third World intransigence. 7. Marked a transformation in USSR attitude – Russians would henceforth be far more

suspicious about UN, and less likely to work cooperatively – would veto more often. BAY OF PIGS (1961) • Humiliating incident for Stevenson – US involvement completely denied by Stevenson

as the White House briefers had not informed him of the cover story Ò he unknowingly lied.

• This was very quickly exposed as a fraud. o Undermined his reputation (similar to the shift in American policy on the Israel-

Palestine issue, though much worse because it was duplicitous as they gave Stevenson the wrong message).

o Also, reflected badly on US attitude towards UN – complete lack of respect. CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1962) • Key Actor: Adlai Stevenson Significance • UN as a world theatre rather than a world forum – theatrical performances by

ambassadors to sway world opinion (Cold War drama). o U2 photographs of Soviet missile sites in Cuba were dramatically rolled out by

Stevenson, in response to Soviet ambassador Zorin’s denial there were missiles. o Basically, Americans were trying to look better than the Russians, and their

drama certainly succeeded in persuading everyone, including U Thant. • SG did not play significant role in resolving the CMC; was settled by US and USSR Ò

served as rubberstamp rather than mediator. o SG served less as a mediator than as a conduit for proposals that the US felt it

could not make in public (if Kennedy had been forced to make the withdrawal of US missiles from Turkey public, he planned to do so by persuading U Thant to suggest it first)

o US regarded UN as a useful foreign policy tool/ rubber stamp, not an independent force on its own


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VIETNAM WAR (1955-75) • SC meeting entirely unsuccessful in preventing military escalation after 1964 Tonkin

incident o Action blocked due to possibility of Soviet veto (as USSR supported North

Vietnam while US supported South Vietnam), and unwillingness of US and North Vietnam to accept SC’s judgment.

o Sets the tone that the UN would have a small role in the Vietnam War despite U Thant’s eagerness to play a role.

• U Thant believed he had a responsibility to end the conflict (felt it was “immoral” of the US to “wage a war of this kind”) and used personal diplomacy to set up peace negotiations between US and North Vietnam.

UN Failures 1. Basic problem: Geneva Accord negotiated outside the UN; no prescribed role for the

UN. Moreover, neither S or N Vietnam were members of the UN at the start of the war ∴ created difficulties for U Thant’s desire to have a role in ending the war.

2. U Thant setting himself as the “moral authority” irked the Americans and led to permanent antagonism between the US and UN

o When his approach of personal diplomacy failed upon US’ decision to withdraw from peace negotiations with N. Vietnam, U Thant blamed the US for a lack of “truth”, destroying what usefulness he had as a mediator between US and Vietnam.

o Also earned the contempt and distrust of US Secretary of State Dean Rusk o By allowing his emotions to spill over to his rhetoric, U Thant’s relations with US

soured and UN’s prestige had fallen to an all-time low in Washington Ò UN was marginalized in this and future conflicts.

Significance • US leaders believed they could defeat insurgency without complications of UN

involvement; Allies also did not want to commit their forces to the UN due to political and military costs involved.

o UN remained marginalized throughout the peace negotiations. IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1980) • Waldheim was still SG but did not bother very much about it. Once Cuellar took over

the Sec-Gen post, he began to press this issue urgently. • Perez de Cuellar’s approaches:

o Close door negotiations with the P5 (in contrast to theatrics of the 1960s) – encouraged USSR and US to work together in the SC. Succeeded because of Gorbechev’s new reconciliatory Foreign Policy approach.

o Shift in power from GA to SC: Cuellar would sell the SC’s strategy to the GA. • After 6 months of closed-door sessions, SC was able to pass a strong resolution

condemning the conflict and demanding an immediate ceasefire. Was not effective in ending the war (no effect whatsoever), but showed the SC was still a place for major powers to meet and agree on collective security issues; could function as its founders had intended.


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Significance • Importance of the individual in the effectiveness of the Sec-Gen post – Waldheim

vs. Cuellar. • Shift in power from GA to SC – started to use SC much more. Brought Big 5 into his

office behind closed doors informally for discussion. This was significant because UN should be a world forum. He was bypassing the usual UN procedures, a complete departure from the 60s.

AFGHANISTAN (1979-89) • UN Force: UNGOMAP • UN paralysis during the 2nd Cold War; discussion in the SC could not advance due to

the notion of permitted areas – UN could not affect areas within spheres of influence. • When Gorbachev withdrew troops from Afghanistan, this directly opened up a role to

the UN – formed UNGOMAP, which served as the guarantor for the peace arrangements.

o UNGOMAP was to monitor the mutual non-interference in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s affairs, observe (not organize) the return of external refugees to Afghanistan, and most importantly verify the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan

o Important symbolic function: witness to an important shift in superpower relationship

Significance • Transitional conflict – began as part of the Cold War conflict and ended as part of the

end of the Cold War. When the Cold War ended, this impacted the UN by: o Creating a new environment whereby peacekeeping can resume because the

notion of permitted areas was negated. o Increasing UN activity in peacekeeping due to the local instability and conflict

that came with the end of the Cold War o Changing the nature of peacekeeping – previously, the UN avoided the use of

troops from the superpowers so as to ensure that peacekeeping operations do not drag the Cold War into local areas. With the Cold War over, there could now be significant US involvement in UN peacekeeping initiatives. Also, USSR began to change its attitude towards the UN under Gorbechev. This change of heart can be explained by the fact that the USSR no longer had a role to play in the international stage with the end of the Cold War, so it had to reconcile with UN by playing the role of “good citizen of the world”.

NICARAGUA (1989) • UN Force: ONUCA • ONUCA’s purpose: Monitor implementation of an agreement between El Salvador,

Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua to stop the movement of fighters and supplies across their shared borders and to end the provision of support for foreign revolutionary movements in each other’s territory.


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Significance: • During the Cold War, in most of the Latin American countries, America was supporting

right-wing governments challenged by communists (heavy CIA involvement). Nicaragua was an exception – left-wing supported by US to counter the challenge posed by the right-wing Contras.

EL SALVADOR (1989-91) • UN Force: ONUSAL (observer mission) • The US was bolstering the right-wing government; Soviets arming the left-wing rebels

(FMLN). • ONUSAL reduced armed forces, created a new civil police force to replace the

paramilitary police force responsible for many human rights offenses, disarmed the FMLN, observed the next election, monitored human rights, etc.

• Perez de Cuellar played an important role (as he was Latin American) o As his term came to an end in 1991, both the government and rebel brokered a

deal so that it could be said that a fellow Latin American resolved the conflict. • ONUSAL completed its mandate to observe elections under an admittedly favourable

political climate. Significance • Example of effective UN intervention. GULF WAR (1990) • UN Force: UNIKOM • After Iraq invaded Kuwait, US called on UN to pass 12 resolutions condemning the

invasion, imposing a trade embargo on Iraq, and authorizing action to repel the invasion.

• By 1990, a coalition was formed with the US in the lead, and a deadline was given to Saddam Hussein to withdraw. When he ignored the deadline, war was declared – (1) bombing campaign, (2) land offensive. The Iraqis were easily defeated and Kuwait was liberated.

• UN observation team was set up on the border to deter any future Iraqi adventurism – UNIKOM. UNIKOM was eventually expanded from an observer mission to a full-blown peacekeeping mission.

• Many parallels with the Korean War Significance 1. Was it genuine collective security?

o Some argue it is the first example of collective security since Korea. § Some argue it was the first example of genuine collective security. § Resolution was passed barely 12 hours into the war; never in the history

of the UN had aggression been condemned more swiftly. § US and Soviets were cooperating – and the decision went against Russia’s

economic interests, which showed this cooperation was genuine (Iraq had been one of Russia’s links to the Mideast, its main client there for military sales).


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o Some also deny that it was genuine collective security. § Rehash of the Korean War – Old West expanded to include its former

rivals in the East (e.g. USSR) with a coalition of interests, dominated by US seeking to legitimize its action via the UN.

§ Resolution 678 made no reference to Chapter 7 of the Charter – no formal basis in international law for the UN’s collective response to the crisis. Member states were merely “requested” to provide support to enforce the SC resolution, but Chapter 7 would have given the SC power to require this support

§ Self-interest of the US – feared that oil sources would be threatened, particularly if Saddam invaded Saudi Arabia next.

§ Bush pursuing his personal agenda through the UN – had hitherto been engaged in a protracted courtship with Saddam Hussein. He allegedly told 4 Arab journalists in a post-war interview that he might have pursued the war against Iraq even without UN blessing

§ Russia did not willingly want to cooperate – was fragmented economically and politically after Cold War, and not in a position to assert itself diplomatically.

2. US manoeuvring in UN processes – lack of commitment to UN o Key figure: Thomas Pickering (US Ambassador) o E.g.1: As with Truman in the KW, if the UN did not officiate it, the US would

have went ahead with its plans to intervene in Kuwait. o E.g. 2: US announced unilaterally that it would stop any Iraqi ships by force if

they attempted to get around the economic sanctions. This was not run through the UN.

o E.g. 3: Two months after the war, US declared trade sanctions should remain in place until Saddam Hussein was removed Ò not consistent with UN resolutions.

o E.g. 4: US, Britain and France decided to help the Kurds (living in the autonomous region in North Iraq) and protect them from the brutality of Saddam Hussein. They sent troops in and imposed a no-fly zone in Iraq. This was all done without UN and SC approval Ò 3 powers were prepared and willing to bypass the UN.

o E.g. 5: Pickering was dismissed after the war for being too independent, as he had not always referred back to Washington for instructions, using much of his own initiative. Crude slap for the UN, as it seemed as if the UN was not important enough to the US to send Pickering as a US representative.

3. US-led military action in the Gulf was widely regarded as exemplifying a new stronger post-Cold War UN – reflected in the increase in UN peacekeeping activities after 1989

4. Highlighted an important problem in the post-Cold War era: “ambivalence of many states toward a stronger UN is now coupled with apprehension about a pax Americana, even a UN-centered one, without a Soviet counterweight”


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SOMALIA (1991) • UN Force: UNOSOM/ UNITAF (US)/ UNOSOM II (1993) • Pressing problems after the Cold War: Civil war by competing clans (no racial element)

for power, which degenerated into complete anarchy (failed state). o End of the Cold War brought about instability to Africa as control was now

abandoned. o Cold War armed the world ∴ stored the potential for massive violence and

devastation. o Conflict could be boiled down to Said Barre vs. Aideed.

UN Failures 1. Limited humanitarian objective which was not even properly carried through (time lag

+ small force) o Took long to act despite the humanitarian emergency, as there was no host

state – no legal status of any peacekeeping operation in Somalia. o When the SC finally did act, it was due to pressure from Boutros Ghali (accused

the SC for caring more about Bosnia than Somalia, and thus preferring white Muslims to black Muslims) and the “CNN effect”.

o Small force could not control the Somali forces. § Main job was to distribute food, but the soldiers were harassed all the

time by the militia of the warlords. o In response, US offered to supply its own military force to Somalia, UNITAF, to

supplement UNOSOM. Boutros-Ghali was in favour, but imposed an elaborate set of restrictions, strategic goals and reporting requirements for the US-led mission

2. UNITAF was confused over its objectives (in relation to disarmament) o The UN thought they were supposed to disarm the factions, but the US thought

otherwise. o The resolution passed by the SC was not explicit about the disarmament,

although BBG insisted that it was necessary “for at least the heavy weapons of the organized factions to be neutralized and brought under international control and for the irregular forces and gangs to be disarmed.”

o Bush did not agree that the phrase “to establish a secure environment” meant disarmament, and only intended for the distribution of aid without interference.

o Nevertheless, the UN could not force the US to do what it did not want to do. o ∴ Could not disarm the militias to solve the basic problem, providing only a

short-term solution in terms of humanitarian aid. 3. UNOSOM II had a divided command structure

o Primarily a US force (huge contingent of 4000 US troops; SG’s representative was a retired US admiral, Jonathan Howe).

o Lines of command and distribution of autonomy were dangerously tangled. o ∴ In a situation that demanded the clearest and most streamlined peacekeeping

arrangements, the reality was divided responsibilities and parallel command structures.

4. UNOSOM II faced unclear objectives


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o Confusion over UNOSOM II’s role between peacekeeping and peace enforcement – the USA ironically believed it was the latter, to disarm the warlords. Thus the missions for humanitarian relief and strong military action were entangled – for the latter, the enemy identified was General Aideed to justify peace enforcement.

o However, this was fundamentally misguided and made confrontation inevitable.

UN Successes 1. UNITAF provided humanitarian aid

o Was successful mainly because it was so limited in objective – merely to facilitate distribution of humanitarian aid.

Significance 1. Full-scale war between UN and Aideed’s militia, as Aideed perceived the UN force was

biased against him and presented himself not as a faction leader but as a Somali nationalist persecuted by neocolonialists, lambasting the UN and US as aggressors intent on colonizing Somalia and turning it back into a trusteeship.

2. Almost farcical lack of coordination between UN and US – operation was planned by US special forces command and launched without consultation with UNOSOM II or even Howe

3. Clinton withdrew US troops, which crippled the UN operation. Clinton administration publicly blamed Boutros-Ghali and the UN for leading US soldiers into a debacle and asked Oakley (who had infuriated Boutros-Ghali in the early days of 1993 by insisting the SG was dragging his feet on the Somali operation) to return to Somalia to work out a political settlement with all the clans and factions.

RWANDA (1994) • UN Force: UNAMIR

o Deployed to enforce the Arusha Accords (1993), a peace agreement between the Hutu government and Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

o Under the command of Romeo Dallaire.

UN Failures 1. Failed to act upon Dallaire’s recommendations after receiving intelligence of a planned

extermination of the Tutsis by the extremist Hutu militia (Interhamwe) o Dalliare had sent a cable to the UN forwarding this intelligence; however the

Peacekeeping Operations department headed by Kofi Annan ordered Dallaire not to disarm the Interhamwe, as Dalliare had recommended.

o Instead, it instructed Dallaire to pass the information received to the US, French and Belgian embassies and Hutu President of Rwanda; no suggestion was made to share this information with the RPF.

o Fundamental problem in the attitude of the UN – “the overriding consideration is the need to avoid entering into a course of action that might lead to the use of force and unanticipated consequences.” Ò extremely cautious and passive.


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§ Extreme caution of the UN due to the events in Somalia – they came to the conclusions that it was because the Somali peacekeepers had lost their neutrality and taken sides that the mission failed.

§ Refute: Somalia and Rwanda are two completely different countries and faced different problems then. In Somalia, there were no sides to take; it was an archical situation involving numerous rival clans and warlords. This unique, multisided civil war doomed the Somali mission. In Rwanda, there was clearly one party to blame – the Hutus (military).

o Moreover, Iqbal questioned the reliability of Dallaire’s informant. § Refute 1: Dallaire’s cable was not an isolated report; the UN had received

other reports of Hutus arresting and killing mass numbers of Tutsis. § Refute 2: UN Human Rights Commission had visited Rwanda in 1993 and

reported signs of genocide 2. Failed to act even with signs of impending genocide and eventually in the face of

actual mass killings o Even after the Hutu President and Prime Minister was killed by Hutus, the UN

refused to change its stance on disarmament. o Dallaire was given clear instructions to evacuate only foreigners, not locals (due

to neutrality issue). o This was the start of UN re-grouping to facilitate evacuation. But this had

severe consequences: § Significant episode: Belgian troops protecting a school with 2,000 Tutsis

and some 400 children taking refuge while Hutu militia surrounded the compound outside – in following military orders, all the Tutsis left in the school as the UN troops withdrew were immediately killed by the Hutus waiting outside.

o Troops were cut to 250 at a time when already 100,000 Tutsis were massacred. o RPF appealed directly to the President of the SC, Keating, to help, invoking the

1948 Genocide Convention and reminding him of the UN’s purpose (to prevent the Holocaust).

§ Keating got the SC to formally define what was happening in Rwanda, only to be met with implacable opposition within the SC as the powers did not want to act.

3. French intervention was problematic – traditionally close ties with the Hutus and hostility to RPF went against impartiality and created suspicions.

o The RPF was convinced the French were there to protect the Hutus, not save the Tutsis.

o Possible motive: The RPF was winning, and the French wanted to be there when the Tutsis eventually won to protect their Hutu clients from impending punishment.

UN Success 1. UNAMIR achieved a certain amount in terms of humanitarian objectives (mostly in the

aftermath of the genocide).


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Who was to blame? 1. P5 – Reluctant to act due to: 1) trauma from Somalia; 2) sense of danger from the

Belgian soldiers being abducted, tortured and killed by the Hutus. 2. Boutros-Boutros Ghali – Claimed innocence by saying that he was away from the UN

headquarters in New York and it was not until 3 years later that he heard of Dallaire’s famous cable warning of the impending massacres Ò feeble excuse for a SG

3. Kofi Annan – Claimed that he was not the one making the decisions; rather it was Iqaz. Also, he rigidly adhered to the principle of impartiality which blocked any active course of action. Moreover, his emphasis was misguidedly on the peace process, which was increasingly bypassed and marginalized by the genocide (yet he was promoted to SG in 1997 – demonstrates how accountability is not enforced in the UN).

4. Booh-Booh – Minimized the extent and organized nature of the massacres, undermining Dallaire’s reports. If the UN needed reports to justify its passivity, Booh-Booh supplied the goods. Also reportedly enjoyed good connections with the Hutu militant elite.

Significance • Fuelled chaos not just in Rwanda but also in a much wider portion of Africa. • Can we say that the UN was not just responsible for the genocide, but for the wider

implications in Africa as well? BOSNIA (1992) 1. UN Force: UNPROFOR

o Was stationed in Croatia and Slovenia after the break-up of Yugoslavia 2. Bosnian crisis arose as it followed the lead of Croatia and Slovenia in declaring its

independence. 3. Some troops of UNPROFOR was transferred to Bosnia after (1) the Serbian army

attempted to create a territorial bridge within Bosnia between Serbia and part of Croatia that was dominated by the Serbs and (2) the ethnic cleansing carried out by the Serbs of the non-Serbs (mostly Muslims).

UN Failures 1. UNPROFOR operated on a limited humanitarian objective, but did nothing to stop

Serbian aggression. o Made Serbs co ntemptuous of the UN due to their impotence.

2. No-fly zone was ignored; imposed by the SC with the intention of preventing Serbs from attacking Bosnians on the ground.

3. NATO was deployed in support of UNPROFOR, but this plan also did not work because: o NATO planes could not fire upon an offending aircraft without prior UN

approval Ò UN and NATO operated by a dual key process for authorizing air strikes, whereby both parties must turn their ‘key’ (approve) to officiate air strikes.

o Potential retaliation of the Serbs on peacekeepers on the ground. 4. “Safe Areas” (1993) were not backed up by sufficient troops


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o Declared Srebrenica a “safe” area and dispatched peacekeepers there. Since it seemed to have worked, more “safe” areas were created – but this proved unwise as governments hesitated to commit troops to such a dangerous assignment and hence could not ensure the safety of the safe areas.

o In 9 months, Boutros-Ghali could muster no more than an inadequate force of 5000 troops.

5. Failed to use airstrikes which could have been very effective, but was not implemented because:

o Put French and British peacekeepers on the ground at risk (complicated things)

o SG’s special representative at Bosnia, Akashi, would always warn the Serbs of an airstrike first. He was notorious for his extreme caution (note: element of the particular individual rather than the organization as a whole) thereby favouring negotiation rather than airstrikes so as not to alienate the Serbs and acted in accordance with the principle of impartiality (not taking sides) Ò made the UN look like a toothless bomber and served to reinforce the Serbs’ contempt and behavior towards the UN.

o It was suspected that General Janvier of France had reached a “gentleman’s agreement” with General Mladic to hold back NATO air strikes in exchange for the release of up to 400 (mostly French) UN peacekeepers whom the Bosnian Serbs had held hostage Ò undermined the UN.

4. The UN policies of (4) and (5) led to the tragic result of the 1995 massacre of Srebrenica.

o Situation: High population density population due to influx of Muslim refugees, with only 429 peacekeepers stationed there to protect them. Serbs were getting increasingly emboldened by the impotence of the UN and indifferent to the threat of airstrikes.

o The peacekeepers were severely undermanned and highly dependent on airstrikes (if they could even get Javier to approve it) – they had actually requested for airstrikes but Javier rejected this.

o Furthermore, the Dutch peacekeepers fled the scene and abandoned the population.

o Dutch never told anyone of the massacre. Significance 1. UN refused to take sides Ò heart of the mission’s failure (principle of impartiality).

o If you don't do anything to stop aggression, by default you are facilitating aggression.

2. Srebrenica massacre came with broader, chaotic consequences (other Safe Areas came under assault and ethnic cleansing became even more prevalent). Note: Similar to Rwanda – need to look at broader implications.

3. Conflict was handed over to NATO (marked the end of the dual-key concept) and enabled the effective use of airstrikes Ò shows what could have happened had there been more effective political will.

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