INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

Judgment of 4 November 1948

Page numbers in braces refer to International Military Tribunal for the Far East, judgment of

12 November 1948, in John Pritchard and Sonia M. Zaide (eds.), The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, Vol. 22

{48,413}

Thursday, 4 November 1948

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

FOR THE FAR EAST

Court House of the Tribunal

War Ministry Building

Tokyo, Japan

The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment, at 0930.

Appearances:

For the Tribunal, all Members sitting.

For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

For the Defense Section, same as before.

(English to Japanese and Japanese to English interpretation was made by the Language Section, IMTFE.)

Contents

PART A - CHAPTER I .............................................................................................. 26

Establishment and Proceedings of the Tribunal.................................................... 26

PART A - CHAPTER II ............................................................................................. 35

THE LAW .............................................................................................................. 35

(a) JURISDICTION OF THE TRIBUNAL ........................................................... 35

(b) RESPONSIBILITY FOR WAR CRIMES AGAINST PRISONERS ................ 37

(c) THE INDICTMENT....................................................................................... 40

PART A -- CHAPTER III ........................................................................................... 42

A SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ 42

OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED AND RIGHTS ACQUIRED BY JAPAN...................... 44

EVENTS PRIOR TO 1 JANUARY 1928. ........................................................... 44

SINO-JAPANESE WAR OF 1894-5. ................................................................. 44

FIRST PEACE CONFERENCE AT THE HAGUE ............................................. 44

THE BOXER TROUBLES OF 1899-1901. ........................................................ 45

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR ................................................................................ 45

TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH............................................................................ 45

TREATY OF PEKING........................................................................................ 46

SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILWAY COMPANY ................................................ 46

OPEN DOOR POLICY IN CHINA...................................................................... 46

JAPANESE-AMERICAN IDENTIC NOTES OF 1908 ........................................ 47

ANNEXATION OF KOREA................................................................................ 47

CONFLICTING CLAIMS BY CHINA AND JAPAN............................................. 47

TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS, SINO-JAPANESE TREATY OF 1915................... 48

ALLIED INTERVENTION IN RUSSIA, 1917-20 ................................................ 49

RUSSO-JAPANESE CONVENTION OF PEKING, 1925................................... 49

TREATY OF PEACE, 1919 ............................................................................... 49

COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OP NATIONS.................................................. 50

MANDATE OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS ........................................................... 51

MANDATE CONVENTION, JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES, 1922........... 52

WASHINGTON CONFERENCE........................................................................ 52

FOUR-POWER TREATY OF 1921................................................................... 52

FOUR-POWER ASSURANCES TO THE NETHERLANDS AND PORTUGAL 53

WASHINGTON NAVAL LIMITATIONS TREATY.............................................. 53

NINE-POWER TREATY ................................................................................... 54

OPIUM CONVENTION OF 1912....................................................................... 55

SECOND OPIUM CONFERENCE OF THE LEAGUE....................................... 56

OPIUM CONVENTION OF 1931....................................................................... 57

LAWS OF BELLIGERENCY.............................................................................. 57

FIRST HAGUE CONVENTION ......................................................................... 58

KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT................................................................................ 59

THIRD HAGUE CONVENTION......................................................................... 59

FIFTH HAGUE CONVENTION.......................................................................... 60

FOURTH HAGUE CONVENTION..................................................................... 60

GENEVA PRISONER OF WAR CONVENTION................................................ 62

GENEVA RED CROSS CONVENTION ............................................................ 64

TENTH HAGUE CONVENTION........................................................................ 65

JAPAN WAS A MEMBER OF THE FAMILY OF NATIONS............................... 66

PART B -- CHAPTER IV........................................................................................... 66

THE MILITARY DOMINATION OF JAPAN AND PREPARATION FOR WAR...... 66

INTRODUCTORY ............................................................................................. 66

THE "PRINCIPLES" OF KODO AND HAKKO ICHIU ........................................ 67

THE ADVOCACY OF THESE "PRINCIPLES" BY OKAWA .............................. 67

THE RISE OF THE ARMY UNDER THE TANAKA CABINET........................... 67

EXPANSIONIST PROPAGANDA DURING THE PERIOD OF THE

HAMAAGUCHI CABINET.................................................................................. 68

HASHIMOTO AND THE MARCH INCIDENT OF 1931. .................................... 69

THE WAKATSUKI CABINET AND THE MUKDEN INCIDENT.......................... 70

CONSOLIDATION OF THE ARMY'S POWER DURING THE PERIOD OF THE

WAKATSUKI CABIKET. .................................................................................... 71

THE CONQUEST OF MANCHURIA DURING THE PERIOD OF INUKAI' S

CABINET........................................................................................................... 72

THE ATTACK ON PARTY, GONVERNMENT AND ASSASSINATION OF

INUKAI. ............................................................................................................. 73

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR DURING THE PERIOD OF THE SAITO CABINET.

.......................................................................................................................... 74

THE PREPARATION OF PUBLIC OPINION FOR WAR: ARAKI DISCLOSES

THE ARMY'S PLANS ........................................................................................ 75

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR DURING THE PERIOD OF THE SAITO CABINET:

AND THE AMAU STATEMENT......................................................................... 76

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF HIROTA DURING THE PERIOD OF THE SAITO

AND OKADA CABINETS .................................................................................. 77

ARMY EXPANSION AND GOVERMENTAL ECONOMIC PREPARATIONS ON

THE CONTINENT IN 1935................................................................................ 78

THE COORDINATION OF HIROTA'S FOREIGN POLICY WITH ARMY

PLANNING........................................................................................................ 79

THE INCREASING POWER OF THE ARMY DURING THE PERIOD OF THE

OKADA CABINET ............................................................................................. 80

THE 26 FEBRUARY 1936 INCIDENT, AND THE DOWNFALL OF THE OKADA

CABINET........................................................................................................... 80

OKADA'S POLICY AND DOWNFALL SHOW THE EXTREME NATURE OF THE

ARMY'S DEMANDE .......................................................................................... 80

HITORA AND HIS CABINET............................................................................. 82

THE ORDINANCE REQUIRING SERVICE MINISTERS TO BE CHOSEN FROM

GENERAL OFFICERS UPON THE ACTIVE LIST ............................................ 82

THE BASIC OF JAPAN'S NATIONAL POLICY WAS DECIDED ON 11 AUGUST

1936 .................................................................................................................. 82

THE PRINCIPLES DECIDED UPON................................................................ 83

THE MEASURE OF THE PREPARATIONS FOR WAR DEMANDED BY THE

1936 DECISION ............................................................................................... 84

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AIMS EXPRESSED IN THE 1936 POLICY

DECISION ........................................................................................................ 84

THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL POLICY DECISION................................. 85

THE ANTI-COMINTERN PACT......................................................................... 85

ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL PREPARATIONS FOR WAR UNDER HIROTA

.......................................................................................................................... 86

PLANS FOR CONTROL OF PUBLIC OPINION IN TIME OF WAR .................. 87

NAVAL PREPARATIONS.................................................................................. 87

JAPAN'S RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE TREATIES FOR NAVAL

DISARMAMENT................................................................................................ 88

THE PERIOD OF GROWING OPPOSITION TO THE NAVAL TREATIES. ...... 89

THE POLICY OF THE COMMON UPPER LIMIT, 1934. ................................... 90

WITHDRAWAL FROM THE LONDON CONFERENCE 1935........................... 91

NAVAL EXPANSION UNDER HIROTA............................................................. 92

THE HISTORY OF THE MANDATED ISLANDS............................................... 93

THE FORTIFICATION OF MANDATED ISLANDS BEFORE 1936 .................. 93

SECRECY IN THE MANDATED ISLANDS MAINTAINED DURING THE

PERIOD OF THE HIROTA CABINET............................................................... 94

NAVAL OFFICERS AS ADMINISTRATORS IN THE MANDATED ISLANDS.. 94

POSITIONS OF ACCUSED UNDER HIROTA .................................................. 94

HASHIMOTO AND THE GREATER JAPAN YOUNG MEN'S SOCIETY .......... 95

THE HISTORY OF MILITARY TRAINING IN SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES 96

THE HISTORY OF CENSORSHIP AND THE DISSEMINATION OF

PROPAGANDA ................................................................................................. 97

HASHIMOTO'S POLICY IN 1936 ...................................................................... 98

THE POLITICAL CRISIS OF JANUARY 1937. ................................................. 98

THE DOWNFALL OF THE HIROTA CABINET AND THE NEFUSAL OF THE

ARMY TO PERMIT UGAKI TO FORM ONE ..................................................... 99

THE COMPOSITION OF THE HAYASHI AND FIRST KONOYE CABINETS. 100

NEW ECONOMIC POLICIES FOR NORTH CHINA UNDER HAYASHI ......... 100

THE ARMY'S PART IN THE ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

OF MANCHURIA UNDER HIROTA AND HAYASHI ....................................... 101

THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR MANCHUKUO .................................................. 102

THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR IMPORTANT INDUSTRIES 29 MAY 1937 ....... 102

THE DECISION TO EXPLOIT THE RESOURCES OF THE CONTINENT ..... 103

THE DETAILED PLANS FOR THE WAR-SUPPORTING INDUSTRIES AND

FOR THE PRODUCTION OF WAR MATERIALS ........................................... 103

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE 1936 DECISIONS AND THE 1937 PLANS

........................................................................................................................ 104

THE PLANS SIGNIFIED THE ARMY'S INTENTION TO ATTACK THE SOVIET

UNION............................................................................................................. 104

THE ARMY'S PLANS WERE DIRECTED ALSO AGAINST THE WESTERN

POWERS ........................................................................................................ 105

NAVAL PREPARATIONS AND PREPARATIONS IN THE MANDATED

ISLANDS DURING 1937................................................................................. 106

THE REFUSAL TO AGREE TO AN INTERNATIONAL LIMITATION OF NAVAL

GUN CALIBRE ................................................................................................ 107

SATO ON THE PURPOSE OF THE ARMY'S 1937 PLANS ........................... 108

THE EFFECT OF THE 1937 PLANS UPON THE INDUSTRIALIZATION

PROGRAM OF JAPAN ................................................................................... 108

THE CABINET PLANNING BOARD................................................................ 109

THE EFFECT OF THE CHINA WAR UPON THE FIVE-YEAR PLANS........... 110

THE LUKOUCHIAO INCIDENT WAS INSTIGATED BY THE ARMY.............. 111

THE FIRST KONOYE CABINET ADOPTS THE ARMY POLICY OF WAR WITH

CHINA. ............................................................................................................ 112

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PREPARATIONS FOR WAR AND THE

CONQUEST OF CHINA. ................................................................................. 113

THE RELATION OF THE FIGHTING IN CHINA TO THE "PRINCIPLES" OF

KODO AND HAKKO ICHIU. ............................................................................ 114

HIROTA'S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE LUKOUCHIAO INCIDENT. ........ 114

THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE AND VIOLATION OF TREATY

OBLIGATIONS AS PART OF THE PATTERN OF PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.

........................................................................................................................ 116

INDUSTRIAL PLANNING IN MANCHUKUO AFTER THE LUKOUCHIAO

INCIDENT. ...................................................................................................... 117

DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAR-SUPPORTING INDUSTRIES AFTER THE

LUKOUCHIAO INCIDENT............................................................................... 118

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONTROLLED ECONOMY. ........................... 119

ARMY PREPARATIONS AGAINST THE USSR AFTER THE LUKOUCHIAO

INCIDENT ....................................................................................................... 120

THE CHINA WAR LED JAPAN TO ADOPT THE ARMY'S SCHEME FOR A

NATION-WIDE MOBILSATION....................................................................... 121

SATO ON NATIONAL PREPARATIONS FOR WAR AFTER THE LUKOUCHIAO

INCIDENT ....................................................................................................... 121

THE CABINET ADVISORY COUNCIL, IMPERIAL GENERAL

HEADQUARTERS, AND THE WAR EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT. ................. 122

THE CONTROL OF PROPAGANDA AND THE USE OF CENSORSHIP AFTER

THE LUKOUCHIAO INCIDENT....................................................................... 123

THE USE MADE OF EDUCATION TO PREPARE PUBLIC OPINION FOR WAR

AFTER THE LUKOUCHIAO INCIDENT.......................................................... 124

KIDO AVERTS A CABINET CRISIS IN NOVEMBER 1937............................. 125

HIROTA STRENGTHENS THE CABINET'S RESOLVE TO ACHIEVE THE

CONQUEST OF CHINA.................................................................................. 126

THE ARMY CQNTINUES TO PLAN AND FREE ARE FOR THE, EXPECTED

WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION. .................................................................. 127

THE CONSOLIDATION OF JAPANESE POWER AND THE DEVELOPMENT

OF WAR-SUPPORTING INDUSTRIES in CHINA........................................... 129

HIROTA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN 1938 WAS FOUNDED ON THE FIVE

MINISTERS' DECISION OF AUGUST 1936 ................................................... 130

DETERIORATION OF JAPANESE RELATIONS WITH THE WESTERN

POWERS THE LUKOUCHIAO INCIDENT...................................................... 131

NAVAL PREPARATIONS AND PREPARATIONS IN THE MANDATED

ISLANDS DURING 1938................................................................................. 132

HIROTA REFUSES TO EXCHANGE NAVAL INFORMATION ....................... 133

HIROTA'S POLICY IS EXPLAINED IN THE WORDS OF THE BASIC

NATIONAL POLICY DECISION...................................................................... 133

JAPAN'S ECONOMIC DOMINATION AND EXPLOITATION OF HER SUBJECT

TERRITORIES ................................................................................................ 134

INDUSTRIAL PREPARATIONS: THE SYNTHETIC OIL AND PETROLEUM

INDUSTRY...................................................................................................... 136

OTHER INDUSTRIAL PREPARATIONS FOR WAR....................................... 137

THE ARMY PREPARES THE NATIONAL GENERAL MOBILIZATION LAW . 138

THE POLITICAL CRISIS OF FEBRUARY 1938: AND THE ENACTMENT OF

THE MOBILIZATION LAW .............................................................................. 139

THE NATIONAL GENERAL MOBILIZATI0N LAW AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO

THE BASIC NATIONAL POLICY DECISION .................................................. 140

THE ARMY EXPLAINS THE PURPOSE OF THE MOBILIZATION LAW........ 141

THE ARMY HAD NOW SUCCEEDED IN COMMITTING JAPAN TO NATIONAL

MOBILISATION FOR WAR. ............................................................................ 142

THE MANCHUKUOAN LONG-RANGE INDUSTRIAL PROGRAMME OF MAY

1938. ............................................................................................................... 143

THE ECONOMIC CRISIS OF MAY 1938 THREATENED THE ARMY'S LONG-

RANGE PLANNING. ....................................................................................... 144

THE CABINET REORGANISATION OF MAY 1938........................................ 145

THE KONOYE CABINET TAKES NEW STEPS TO ACHIEVE THE GENERAL

MOBILISATION FOR WAR. ............................................................................ 146

ITAGAKI AND ARAKI OF THE NATIONAL MOBILISATION FOR WAR......... 147

CHANGES IN THE ARMY STAFF ACCOMPANIED THE CABINET

REORGANISATION OF MAY 1938. ............................................................... 148

A NEW OFFENSIVE IN CENTRAL CHINA: JULY 1938. ................................ 149

CONTINUED PREPARATIONS FOR WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION: THE

ARMY BEGINS NEGOTIATIONS FOR A MILIARY ALLIANCE WITH

GERMANY. ..................................................................................................... 149

THE ARMY'S INTENTION TO ATTACK THE SOVIET UNION HAD ITS

ORIGINS IN THE CONQUEST OF MANCHURIA........................................... 150

THE ARMY DEFERS ITS PLANS FOR AN ATTACK ON THE SOVIET UNION:

AUGUST 1938. ............................................................................................... 152

DESIGNS UPON THE SOVIET UNION LED THE ARMY TO SEEK A GERMAN

ALLIANCE....................................................................................................... 153

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAPAN AND GERMANY AFTER THE

CONCLUSION OF THE ANTI-COMINTERN PACT........................................ 154

THE FAILURE OF HIROTA'S POLICY IN REGARD TO GERMAN ECONOMIC

COOPERATION IN CHINA ............................................................................. 155

THE ARMY MAINTAINS JAPAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH GERMANY ......... 156

THE ARMY INITIATES A PROPOSAL FOR A MILITARY ALLIANCE AMONG

THE AXIS POWERS ....................................................................................... 157

THE ARMY RENEWS ITS DETERMINATION TO ACHIEVE THE CONQUEST

OF CHINA: AUGUST 1938 ............................................................................. 158

THE ATTEMPT TO FORM A PRO-JAPANESS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF

CHINA ............................................................................................................. 159

THE MILITARY FACTION OPPOSES COMPROMISES IN CHINA................ 159

THE CABINET CRISIS OF SEPTEMBER 1938 LEADS TO THE RESIGNATION

OF FOREIGN MINISTER UGAXI.................................................................... 160

CHANGES IN ARMY POLICY: JULY 1937 - SEPTEMBER 1938................... 161

THE ARMY'S PART IN THE MOBILISATION OF PUBLIC OPINION ............. 162

ARAKI'S INFLUENCE ON THE JAPANESE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM ......... 164

THE GENERAL PROGRESS OF THE ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL

MOBILISATION FOR WAR............................................................................. 164

THE EXTENSION OF JAPAN'S "NEW ORDER" TO THE OCCUPIED AREAS

OF CHINA ....................................................................................................... 165

THE ASIA DEVELOPMENT BOARD .............................................................. 166

MEASURES TAKEN TO PROMOTE THE ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL

EXPLOITATION OF CHINA ............................................................................ 167

THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ARMY USED ITS ASSOCIATION WITH

GERMANY TO EXERCISE TO CONTROL OVER JAPANESE FOREIGN

POLICY ........................................................................................................... 168

CHANGES IN DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION REVEAL THE CABINET'S

DESIRE TO STRENGTHEN RELATIONS WITH GERMANY AND ITALY...... 169

THE ARMY CONTINUES TO NEGOTIATE FOR A MILITARY ALLIANCE WITH

THE AXIS POWERS ....................................................................................... 171

THE CULTURAL TREATY WITH GERMANY AND THE KONOYE CABINET'S

POLICY TOWARDS THAT COUNTRY........................................................... 172

THE GENERAL DETERIORATION IN JAPANESE RELATIONS WITH THE

WESTERN POWERS DURING 1938.............................................................. 173

JAPANESE VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHTS OF THE WESTERN POWERS IN

CHINA, JULY 1937 - SEPTEMBER 1938 ....................................................... 174

CONTINUED VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHTS OF THE WESTERN POWERS IN

CHINA AND THE EWERGENCE OF THE "GREATER EAST ASIA" DOCTRINE

OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1938 ........................................................................ 175

THE DECISION TO CAPTURE HAINAN AND TO BRING PRESSURE TO

BEAR UPON FRENCH INDO-CHINA ............................................................. 176

THE SEVERANCE OF JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE LEAGUE OF

NATIONS AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE............................................................... 177

PREPARATIONS FOR A SOUTHWARD ADVANCE, AND ARAKI UPON

JAPAN'S ULTIMATE AIMS ............................................................................. 178

JAPAN'S IMMEDIATE AIMS: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW ORDER IN

EAST ASIA AND PREPAREDNESS FOR WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION 179

THE RESIGNATION OF THE FIRST KONOYE CABINET 4 JANUARY 1939;

AND THE COMPOSITION OF THE HIRANUMA CABINET............................ 180

THE BASIC CAUSES OF THE PACIFIC WAR ARE TO BE FOUND IN THE

CONQUEST OF CHINA.................................................................................. 182

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JAPANESE POLICY TOWARDS CHINA: THE

PRINCIPLE OF "NEIGHBOURLY FRIENDSHIP" ........................................... 183

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JAPANESE POLICY TOWARDS CHINA: THE

PRINCIPLE OF "JOINT DEFENCE AGAINST THE COMINTERN" ................ 183

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JAPANESE, POLICY TOWARDS CHINA THE

PRINCIPLE OF "ECONOMIC COOPERATION"............................................. 184

THE CONTINUITY OF JAPAN'S ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR DURING 1937 AND 1938. ................................ 185

THE PLAN FOR WAR-SUPPORTING INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION APPROVED

BY THE HIRANUMA CABINET IN JANUARY 1939........................................ 186

ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL MOBILISATION FOR WAR DURING THE

PERIOD OF THE HIRANUMA CABINET. ....................................................... 187

THE HIRANUMA CABINET'S POLICY TOWARDS CHINA, AND. THE

OCCUPATION OF HAINAN AND THE SPRATLFY ISLANDS........................ 189

THE GROWING DEMAND FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL AXIS ALLIANCE WHILE

THE FIRST KONOYE CABINET WAS IN POWER......................................... 190

FURTHER DETERIORATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE WESTERN

POWERS AS AN ADDED REASON FOR STRENGTHENING AXIS

RELATIONS. ................................................................................................... 192

DEVELOPMENT OF DIFFERENCE IN THE CABINET .................................. 193

THE MILITARY FACTION RESISTS A CABINET ATTEMPT TO REACH A

COMPROMISE AGREEMENT WITH GERMANY: APRIL 1939 ..................... 195

THE "HIRANUMA DECLARATION" OF 4 MAY 1939...................................... 197

THE DEADLOCK CONTINUES ...................................................................... 198

HIRANUMA SUPPORTS A MILITARY CONSPIRACY TO CONCLUDE AN

UNCONDITIONAL AXIS ALLIANCE ............................................................... 199

HASHIMOTO SUPPORTS THE AIMS OF THE MILITARY FACTION............ 200

HIRANUMA CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE DEMANDS OF THE MILITARY

FACTION......................................................................................................... 201

ITAGAKI ATTEMPTS TO FORCE THE CONCLUSION OF AN ALLIANCE WITH

GERMANY AND ITALY................................................................................... 202

THE CABINET'S DIFFICULTIES WERE INCREASED BY THE ARMY'S

ACTIVITIES IN CHINA, AND BY THE ATTACK OF THE SOVIET UNION AT

NOMONHAN. .................................................................................................. 203

THE OPPOSING POLICIES OF ARITA AND THE MILITARY FACTION

PREVENTED ANY NEW STEP BEING TAKEN DURING JUNE AND JULY

1939. ............................................................................................................... 204

THE HIRANUMA CABINET ATTEMPTS TO DECIDE ITS POLICY REGARDING

AN ALLIANCE WITH GERMANY 8 AUGUST 1939 ........................................ 205

THE GERMAN-SOVIET NEUTRALITY PACT OF 23 AUGUST 1939 CAUSED

THE DOWNFALL OF THE HIRANUMA CABINET.......................................... 205

THE ABE CABINET TAKES OFFICE 30 AUGUST......................................... 207

THE MILITARY FACTION CONSPIRES TO ALLY JAPAN with GERMANY

AGAINST THE WESTERN POWERS............................................................. 210

OSHIMA, WITH GERMAN ENCOURAGEMENT, PLANS FOR A JAPANESE

ATTACK UPON THE PACIFIC POSSESSIONS OF THE WESTERN POWERS.

........................................................................................................................ 212

THE REASONS FOR THE DOWNFALL OF THE ABE CABINET AND THE

RESUMPTION OF A PRO-GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY BY THE YONAI

CABINET......................................................................................................... 212

THE YONAI CABINET ADHERES TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE BASIC

NATIONAL POLICY DECISION. ..................................................................... 214

JAPAN ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN A FAVOURED ECONOMIC POSITION IN THE

NETHERLANDS FAST INDIES....................................................................... 215

THE YOKAI CABINET'S POLICY OF NON-INTERVEN TION IN THE

EUROPEAN WAR AROUSES STRONG OPPOSITION IN JAPAN................ 216

THE ARMY SUPPORTS THE NON-INTERVENTION POLICY IN ORDER TO

COMPETE THE CONQUEST OF CHINA AND THE NATIONAL MOBILISATION

FOR WAR. ...................................................................................................... 217

DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN SOURCES OF RAW MATERIALS PREVENTED

JAPAN FROM OPENLY REPUDIATING THE NINE-POWER TREATY. ........ 218

JAPAN MAKES NEW PLANS FOR INDUSTRIAL SELFSUFFICIENCY IN

ORDER TO ELIMINATE DEPENDENCE UPON THE UNITED STATES. ...... 220

THE YONAI CABINET MAKES PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR A

SOUTHWARD ADVANCE............................................................................... 220

IN VIEW OF GERMANY SUCCESSES IN EUROPE, AND CONTINUED

OPPOSITION FROM THE WESTERN POWERS, THE PRO-GERMAN

FACTION GAINS STRENGTH........................................................................ 221

SHIGEMITSU COUNSELS ARITA TO CONCILIATE WESTERN POWERS.. 223

JAPAN STRESSES HER SPECIAL INTERESTS IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST

INDIES: MAY 1940.......................................................................................... 224

JAPAN PREPARES FOR THE ADVANCE TO THE SOUTH: GERMANY

DECLARE HER DIEINTEREST IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES....... 225

JAPAN CONTINUES TO PREPARR FOR A SOUTHWARD ADVANCE,

DISREGARDING SHIGEMITSU'S ADVICE .................................................... 227

THE YONAI CABINET, DESIRING A FREE HAND IN INDO-CHINA, MAKES

OVERTURES TO GERMANY FOR COOPERATION AGAINST THE WESTERN

POWERS. ....................................................................................................... 229

SHIGEMITSU REMAINS OPPOSED TO POLICY OF YONAI CABINET........ 230

ARITA REJECTS A PROPOSAL FOR COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED

STATES. ......................................................................................................... 231

ARITA SHOWS THAT JAPAN'S POLICY IS BASED ON COOPERATION WITH

GERMANY AGAINST THE WESTERN POWERS.......................................... 232

THE PRO-GERMAN FACTION PREPARES FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THE

YONAI CABINET AND THE CONCLUSION OF AN AXIS ALLIANCE............ 232

MEMBERS OF THE PRO-GERMAN FACTION MAKE DIRECT APPROACHES

TO THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR ................................................................ 234

POLITICAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE EXPECTED KONOYE CABINET AND

A ONE-PARTY SYSTEM ................................................................................ 235

THE PRO-GERMAN FACTION PREPARE FOR A CHANGE IN CABINETS,

AND PLOT TO ASSASSINATE PRIME MINISTER YONAI AND OTHERS.... 236

GERMANY, BY REFUSAL TO DECLARE HER POLICY TOWARDS JAPAN

UNDERMINES THE YONAI CABINET'S POSITION ...................................... 237

THE EMERGENCE OF THE PLAN FOR AN AXIS ALLIANCE, WHICH WOULD

ENABLE JAPAN TO DOMINATE EAST ASIA AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC ... 238

THE REASONS FOR WHICH THE ARMY OPPOSED THE YONAI CABINET

........................................................................................................................ 239

THE ARMY BRINGS ABOUT THE DOWNFALL OF THE YONAI CABINET .. 240

KIDO'S PART IN THE DOWNFALL OF THE YONAI CABINET AND

SELECTION OF KONOYE AS PHEMIER....................................................... 241

THE FORMATION AND POLICY OF THE SECOND KONOYE CABINET..... 243

THE SECOND KONOYE CABINET WAS RESOLVED TO COMPLETE THE

MILITARY DOMINATION OF JAPAN.............................................................. 244

THE LIAISON CONFERENCE AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THE

DOMINATION OF THE MILITARY FACTION WAS MADE COMPLETE ........ 245

THE TENTATIVE PLAN FOR COLLABORATION WITH GERMANY AND THE

EXTENT OF JAPANESE PLANNING FOR THE DOMINATION OF GREATER

EAST ASIA...................................................................................................... 247

THE ADOPTIOH OF THE TENTATIVE PLAN BY THE SECOND KONOYE

CABINET......................................................................................................... 248

THE SECOND KONOYE CABINET'S POLICY WAS BASED UPON THE

NATIONAL POLICY DECISION OF 11 AUGUST 1936 .................................. 249

THE POLICY OF "SETTLING THE SOUTHERN PROBLEM WITHIN LIMITS"

........................................................................................................................ 250

SHIGEMITSU'S VIEWS ON THE "GREATER EAST ASIA" POLICY.............. 251

MATSUOKA PROPOSES TO GERMANY THE TERMS Of JAPANESE

COLLABORATION WITH THE AXIS POWERS.............................................. 252

THE DETAILED PLAN FOR A TRIPARTITE MILITARY ALLIANCE: FOUR

MINISTERS' CONFERENCE. 4 SEPTEMBER 1940. ..................................... 254

THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE 9 - 11 SEPTEMBER

1940. ............................................................................................................... 256

THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CONCLUSION OF THE

TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE. ................................................................................ 257

THE TERMS OF THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE AND ASSURANCES

EXCHANCED BETWEEN JAPAN AND GERMANY 27 SEPTEMBER 1940. . 258

THE INTENTIONS OFJAPANESE LEADERS IN CONCLUDING THE

TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE ................................................................................. 259

PART B. -- CHAPTER V......................................................................................... 261

JAPANESE AGGRESSION AGAINST CHINA. .................................................. 261

SECTION I. INVASION & OCCUPATION OF MANCHURIA. THE CHINA WAS

AND ITS PHASES........................................................................................... 261

JAPAN'S FOOTHOLD IN MANCHURIA AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CHINA

WAR. .............................................................................................................. 261

THE TAMAKA CABINET AND ITS "POSITIVE POLICY." .............................. 262

AGITATION IN SUPPORT OF THE "POSITIVE POLICY." ............................ 262

THE TSINAN INCIDENT. ............................................................................... 263

MURDER OF HARSHAL CHANG TSO-LIN. .................................................. 264

MARSHAL CHANG HSUEH-LIANG, THE YOUNG MARSHAL ..................... 265

JAPANESE-CHINESE RELATIONS STRAINED ........................................... 265

RESIGNATION OF THE TANAKA CABINET................................................. 266

REINSTATEMENT OF THE "FRIENDSHIP POLICY".................................... 266

MANCHURIA AT- JAPAN'S "LIFELINE" ........................................................ 267

ASSASSINATION OF PREMIER HAMAGUCHI............................................. 268

THE MARCH INCIDENT ................................................................................ 268

THE WAKATSUKI CABINET CONTINUED THE "FRIENDSHIP POLICY" .... 269

THE WANPAOSHAN INCIDENT.................................................................... 269

THE NAKAMURA INCIDENT ......................................................................... 270

THE ARMY ATTITUDE STIFFENED.............................................................. 270

DOHIHARA INVESTIGATES.......................................................................... 271

FOREIGN MINISTER SHIDEHARA ALIO INVESTIGATED........................... 271

DOHIHARA REPORTED TO THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF........................ 272

FOREIGN MINISTER SHIDEHARA CONTINUED EFFORTS AT MEDIATION

....................................................................................................................... 272

NIGHT MANEUVERS BY THE KWANTUNG ARMY...................................... 273

MARSHAL CHANG HSUEH-LIANG'S COMMISSION RETURNEL TO MUKDEN

....................................................................................................................... 274

MINAMI'S EMISSARY WENT ASTRAY ......................................................... 274

THE MUKDEN INCIDENT.............................................................................. 275

ITAGAKI REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE............................................................ 276

THE MUKDEN INCIDENT WAS PLANNED.................................................... 277

GENERAL HONJO ASSUMED COMMAND AT MUKDEN ............................ 279

MINAMI SANCTIORED. THE KWANTUNG ARMY ACTION ......................... 279

COLONEL DOHIHARA RETURNED TO MUKDEN ....................................... 281

COLONEL DOHIHARA AS MAYOR OF MUKDEN ........................................ 281

SELF-COVERNMENT CUILING BOARD....................................................... 282

PROTESTS AND ASSURANCES .................................................................. 282

THE OCTOBER INCIDENT............................................................................ 283

DECISION TO ENTHONE PU YI ................................................................... 283

COLONEL DOHIHARA PHOCEEDS TO RETURN PU YI ............................. 284

ENTHRONEMENT OF PU YI DELAYED ....................................................... 285

THE ADVANCE ON CHINCHOW................................................................... 286

THE LEAGUE APPOINTED A COMMISSION OF INQUIRY.......................... 287

THE WAKATSUKI CABINET WAS FORCED TO RESIGN............................ 288

THE INUKAI CABINET................................................................................... 288

HOHJO AND ITAGAKI MOVED TO EXECUTE HONJO'S PLAN................... 288

MANCHURIA WAS COMPLETELY OCCUPIED AFTER THE CAPTURE OF

CHINCHOW ................................................................................................... 289

ITAGAKI COMPLETED HIS MISSION AND RETURNED TO MUKDEN ........ 290

THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT GAINED IN INTENSITY ...................... 290

ADDITIONAL ASSURANCES BY JAPAN ...................................................... 291

HASHIMOTO OBJECTED TO THIS ASSURANCE ....................................... 291

DOHIHARA. NEGOTIATED WITH GENERAL MA CHAN-SHAN................... 292

FIRST INVASION OF SHANGHAI ................................................................. 293

CHINA MADE ANOTHER APPEAL TO THE LEAGUE .................................. 293

GENERAL MA BARGAINED WITH DOHIHARA............................................ 293

SUPREME ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL...................................................... 294

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE........................................................... 295

ORGANIZATION OF THE NEW STATE ........................................................ 295

JAPANESE CABINET APPROVED FAIT ACCOMPLI ................................... 296

THE LYTTON COMMISSION ARRIVED IN TOKYO...................................... 297

ARAKI DISPATCHED REINFORCEMENTS TO SHANGHAI......................... 297

THE LEAGUE TOOK ACTION ....................................................................... 298

MANCHUKUO WAS CONSTRUCTED AND OPERATED AS A PUPPET..... 300

THE CONCORDIA SOCIETY AND THE "KINGLY WAY" .............................. 301

THE LYTTON COMMISSION VISITED MANCHURIA ................................... 302

THE ASSASSINATION OF PREMIER INUKAI .............................................. 302

RECOGNITION OF MANCHUKUO BY JAPAN.............................................. 303

PREPARATION FOR THE CONQUEST OF JKHOL ..................................... 306

THE LYTTON COMMISSION REFORTED .................................................... 307

THE SHANHAIKWAN INCIDENT................................................................... 308

JAPAN DECLINED ALL EFFORTS OF THE COMMITTEE OF NINETEEN .. 309

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS CONDEMNED JAPAN..................................... 309

JAPAN WITHDREW FROM THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS............................. 310

INVASION OF JEHOL.................................................................................... 310

TANGKU TRUCE ........................................................................................... 311

ARAKI, A POPULAR FIGURE........................................................................ 311

SECTION II. CONSOLIDATION AND EXPLOITATION OF MANCHURIA

REORGANIZATION OF MANCHUKUO.......................................................... 312

"TWO-IN-ONE" SYSTEM ............................................................................... 314

MANCHURIAN AFFAIRS BUREAU ............................................................... 315

CONTROL OF PUBLIC OPINION IN MANCHURIA....................................... 315

HOSHINO BECAME DIRECTOR OF ECONOMY OF MANCHURIA ............. 315

ECONOMY OF MANCHURIA SEIZED .......................................................... 316

KWANTUNG ARMY'S ECONOMIC PLAN FOR GUIDING MANCHUKUO.... 316

ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR MANCHUKUO.................. 317

JAPAN-MANCHUKUO JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE............................. 317

YEN BLOC ORGANIZED ............................................................................... 318

RELEASE OF EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY...................................................... 318

INDUSTRIAL BANK OF MANCHUKUO ......................................................... 319

SECOND PERIOD CONSTRUCTION PLAN ................................................. 319

CONTROL OF INDUSTRIES ......................................................................... 320

MANCHURIA HEAVY INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION.......... 320

MANCHUKUO A WORK-HOUSE FOR JAPAN.............................................. 321

OPIUM AND NARCOTICS ............................................................................. 321

SECTION III. THE PLAN TO ADVANCE FURTHER INTO CHINA. ................ 323

THE HOPEI INCIDENT. ................................................................................. 323

THE NORTH CHAHAR INCIDENT................................................................. 324

INNER MONGOLIAN AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT................................ 325

ATTEMPT TO SET UP A NORTH CHINA AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT. 326

THE JAPANESE ARMY' S PLANS FOR AN ADVANCE INTO NORTH CHINA.

....................................................................................................................... 328

HIROTA'S THREE FRINCIPLES.................................................................... 330

THE FEBRUARY INCIDENT. ......................................................................... 332

FORMATION OF THE HIROTA CABINET..................................................... 332

FOREIGN POLICIES UNDER THE HIROTA CABINET................................. 333

ITAGAKI'S MONGOLIAN POLICY ................................................................. 333

STATE-FOUNDING CONFERENCE IN MONGOLIA..................................... 334

JAPAN'S POLICIES TOWARD NORTH CHINA - 1936-1937 ........................ 335

THE FENGTAI INCIDENT.............................................................................. 336

THE CHANG-KAWAGOE TALKS .................................................................. 336

THE FALL OF THE HIROTA CABINET.......................................................... 337

UGAKI FAILED TO FORM A CABINET.......................................................... 337

THE HAYASHI CABINET AND ITS NORTH CHINA POLICY ........................ 337

THE FIRST KONOYE CABINET FURTHER PLANNING AGAINST NORTH

CHINA ............................................................................................................ 338

SECTION IV. FROM THE MARCO POLO BRIDGE INCIDENT (7 July 1937) TO

THE KONOYE DECLARATION OF 16 JANUARY 1938................................. 339

SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR TRUCE ............ 341

ATTITUDE OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.......................................... 341

UNITED STATES OFFER OF GOOD OFFICES............................................ 343

THE LANGFANG INCIDENT.......................................................................... 344

JAPAN'S ULTIMATUM REJECTED ............................................................... 344

REACTION IN GERMANY ............................................................................. 344

PEIPING CAPTURED .................................................................................... 345

THE OYAMA INCIDENT................................................................................. 345

OTHER EVENTS PRECEDING THE SHANGHAI WAR ................................ 346

THE SHANGHAI WAR ................................................................................... 347

CONTINUED MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN NORTH CHINA.............................. 348

CHINA APPEALED TO THE LEAGUE OF MATICES .................................... 350

JAPAN'S TERMS FOR PEACE...................................................................... 350

BRITISH OFFER OF GOOD OFFICES.......................................................... 351

THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE .................................................................. 352

THE INGERIAL GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.............................................. 352

THE ATTACK ON NANKING.......................................................................... 352

GEMANY ACTED AS GO-BETWEEN............................................................ 353

THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE ON 11 JANUARY 1938............................... 354

THE KONOYE DECLARATION OF 16 JANUARY 1938 ................................ 355

SECTION V. THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IN NORTH CHINA......... 356

THE RENOVATION GOVERNMENT IN IN CENTRAL CHINA ...................... 357

OTHER CITIES INVADED BY JAPANESE TROOPS UNDER HATA'S

COMMAND..................................................................................................... 359

THE NATIONAL GENERAL MOBILIZATION LAW ........................................ 360

CHINA POLICY AND THE FIVE MINISTERS CONFERENCE 1938 ............. 361

THE DOHIHARA AGENCY. ........................................................................... 363

THE "FEDERATED COMMITTEE" OF PUPPET REGIMES.......................... 364

OCCUPATION OF CANTON AND HANKOW ................................................ 364

JAPAN TE.RMINATED ALL RELATIONS WITH LEAGUE OF NATIONS...... 365

THE NEW ORDER IN EAST ASIA ................................................................. 365

THE KO-A-IN OR ASIA DEVELOPMENT BOARD......................................... 367

WANG CHING-WEI DEPARTED CHUNGKING............................................. 368

KONOYE'S THREE PRINCIPLES.................................................................. 368

HIRANUMA FORMED A CABINET. ............................................................... 369

WANG CHING-WEI TAKEN TO SHANGHAI ................................................. 370

WANG CHING-WEI VISITED JAPAN ............................................................ 371

DECISION OF THE FIVE MINISTERS' CONFERENCE-JUNE 1939............. 371

CABINET RESHUFFLED IN JAPAN AND CONTINUED MILITARY

OPERATIONS IN CHINA ............................................................................... 372

INAUGURATION OF THE PUPPET CENTRAL GOVERNMENT .................. 372

SECTION VI: GREATER EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE ............... 373

THE SECOND KONOYE CABINET ............................................................... 374

FURTHER MILITARY ACTION BY JAPAN AGAINST CHINA ....................... 374

JAPAN SIGNED A TREATY WITH WANG CHING-WEI GOVERNMENT...... 375

"TREATY CONCERNING THE BASIC RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND

CHINA" ........................................................................................................... 375

INTERMITTENT PEACE TALKS AND CONTINUED MILITARY OPERATIONS

....................................................................................................................... 376

HULL-NOMURA TALKS RELATING TO CHINA ............................................ 377

THE THIRD KONOYE CABINET.................................................................... 377

TOJO FORMED A CABINET.......................................................................... 379

CONTINUANCE OF UNITED STATES - JAPAN PARLEYS.......................... 379

CONTINUED MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN CHINA............................................ 379

SECTION VII - JAPAN'S ECONOMIC DOMINATION OF MANCHUKIA AND

OTHER PARTS OF CHINA............................................................................ 380

GENERAL ECONOMIC MATTERS................................................................ 380

PARTICULAR INDUSTRIES .......................................................................... 382

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS............................................ 382

NATURAL RESOURCES ............................................................................... 383

PUBLIC UTILITIES......................................................................................... 384

BANKING ....................................................................................................... 384

PROTESTS OF THE UNITED STATES......................................................... 384

NARCOTICS IN CHINA.................................................................................. 385

INNER MONGOLIA ........................................................................................ 386

CENTRAL CHINA........................................................................................... 386

CHAPTER VI ...................................................................................................... 387

JAPAN'S POLICY TOWARDS U.S.S.R. MANCHURIA, THE "LIFELINE" OF

JAPAN............................................................................................................. 387

"NATIONAL DEFENCE".................................................................................. 388

DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES........................................................................... 388

CONTINUATION OF DESIGNS UPON U.S.S. R............................................ 389

THE FEBRUARY INCIDENT........................................................................... 389

THE 1936 STATEMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY........................................... 390

EXPECTATION AND ADVOCACY OF WAR WITH THE U.S.S.R .................. 391

THE ANTI-COMINTERN PACT....................................................................... 391

THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE ......................................................................... 393

JAPANESE ATTACKS ON BORDERS OF MANCHURIA............................... 395

NEUTRALITY PACT BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE SOVIET UNION. ............ 395

GERMANY ATTACKS THE U.S.S.R. IN JUNE 1941...................................... 395

JAPAN DELAYS ATTACK ON U.S.S.R. ......................................................... 398

THE GREATER EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERI INCLUDES PART OF

SIBERIA. ......................................................................................................... 398

PLANNING AND PREPARING WAR AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION........... 399

MANCHURIA AS A BASE AGAINST THE U.S.S.R. ....................................... 399

AGREEMENT BETWEEN WAR OFFICE AND GENERAL STAFF................. 401

MILITARY ATTACHE IN MOSCOW APVOCATES ATTACK.......................... 401

PLANS FOR WAR AGAINST THE U.S.S.R. ................................................... 401

ACTIVE PREPARATIONS FOR WAR AGAINST THE U.S.S.R...................... 402

PLANS FOR CONTROL OF OCCUPIED SOVIET TERRITORIES................. 403

ACTIVE PREPARATIONS FOR WAR AFTER GERMANY'S ATTACK UPON

THE U.S.S.R. .................................................................................................. 405

SUBVERSION AND SABOTAGE.................................................................... 405

NEUTRALITY PACT........................................................................................ 406

GERMANY'S ATTACK ON THE U.S.S.R........................................................ 406

GENERAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE BY JAPAN TO GERMANY................... 408

JAPAN GIVES GERMANY MILITARY INFORMATION CONCERNING THE

U.S.S.R. .......................................................................................................... 409

JAPANESE INTERFERENCE WITH SOVIET SHIPPING............................... 409

JAPAN'S OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE U.S.S.R. IN 1938-39.. 410

HOSTILITIES IN THE LAKE KHASSAN AREA............................................... 410

OPERATIONS IN NOMONHAN (KHALKHIN GOL) ........................................ 413

THE DEFENSE OF CONDONATION.............................................................. 416

DEFENCE THAT MONGOLIA WAS NOT INDEPENDENT ............................ 416

PART B - CHAPTER VII ......................................................................................... 417

PACIFIC WAR .................................................................................................... 417

JAPANESE POLICY IN 1940 .......................................................................... 419

MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT POLICY .......................................................... 420

IMPERIAL RULE ASSISTANCE ASSOCIATION ............................................ 421

HASHIMOTO AND SHIRATORI APPEAL FOR PUBLIC SUPPORT OF WAR

POLICY ........................................................................................................... 422

TOTAL WAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE ........................................................... 423

COOPERATION UNDER TRIPARTITE PACT................................................ 424

PREPARATIONS FOR MOVE TO THE SOUTH............................................. 425

THAILAND'S CLAIMS ..................................................................................... 426

FRENCH INDO-CHINA AND THAILAND TO BE USED FOR ATTACK ON

SINGAPORE................................................................................................... 427

LIAISON CONFERENCES.............................................................................. 428

DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS......................................................................... 429

PREPARATION FOR THE ATTACK UPON SINGAPORE ............................. 431

FURTHER PREPARATION............................................................................. 432

NEUTRALITY PACT - JAPAN - U.S.S.R......................................................... 433

FRENCH INDO-CHINA ................................................................................... 433

RELATIONS WITH THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES............................... 435

PREPARATIONS FOLLOWING TRI-PARTITE PACT. ................................... 443

RELATIONS WITH U.S.A. AND GREAT BRITAIN.......................................... 444

UNITED STATES CONDITIONS FOR DISCUSSIONS................................... 448

UNITED STATES AGREES TO NEGOTIATE - May 1941.............................. 451

PREPARATIONS INTENSIFIED ..................................................................... 453

CABINET POLICY AND DECISIONS OF JUNE AND JULY 1941. ................. 453

THIRD KONOYE CABINET............................................................................. 456

OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN FRENCH INDO-CHINA ............................... 457

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ............... 457

SUPPLY PROBLEMS ..................................................................................... 458

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ............... 459

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE 6th SEPTEMBER 1941........................................ 461

CONTINUED PREPARATIONS FOR WAR .................................................... 462

TALKS WITH UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONTINUED. ....................... 463

DECISION FOR WAR - 12 OCTOBER 1941. ................................................. 465

TOJO BECOMES PRIME MINISTER 18 OCTOBER 1941. ............................ 467

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR CARRIED ON UNDER TOJO........................... 468

NEGOTIATIONS WITH UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RENEWED............ 470

NAVY ORDER FOR ATTACK......................................................................... 472

PROPOSAL "A" PRESENTED 7 NOVEMBER 1941....................................... 473

PROPOSAL "B" 20th NOVEMBER 1941 ........................................................ 475

LIAISON CONFERENCE 30 NOVEMBER 1941............................................. 478

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE 1 DECEMBER 1941 ............................................ 479

TERMINATION OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 480

PEARL HARBOR ............................................................................................ 480

KOTA BHARU................................................................................................. 481

THE PHILIPPINES, WAKE AND GUAM. ........................................................ 482

HONG KONG .................................................................................................. 482

SHANGHAI...................................................................................................... 482

THE JAPAMESE NOTE DELIVERED IN WASHINGTON ON 7th DECEMBER

1941 ................................................................................................................ 483

THE FORMAL DECLARATION OF WAR........................................................ 484

CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................. 485

PART B. CHAPTER VIII ......................................................................................... 489

CONVENTIONAL WAR CRIMES (Atrocities) ..................................................... 489

ALLEGATION THAT THE LAWS OF WAR DID NOT APPLY TO THE

CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN CHINA .............................................................. 490

FORMULATION OF MILITARY POLICY......................................................... 491

CAPTIVES TAKEN IN THE CHINA WAR WERE TREATED AS BANDITS.... 492

THE POLICY REMAINED UNCHANGED AFTER THE MARCO POLO BRIDGE

INCIDENT ....................................................................................................... 494

THE RAPE OF NANKING ............................................................................... 494

THE WAR WAS EXTENDED TO CANTON AND HANKOW........................... 497

RETURNING SOLDIERS TOLD OF ATROCITIES COMMITTED BY THEM.. 499

MURDER OF CAPTURED AVIATORS........................................................... 500

MASSACRES.................................................................................................. 503

MASSACRES WERE ORDERED. .................................................................. 508

DEATH MARCHES. ........................................................................................ 509

OTHER FORCED MARCHES......................................................................... 511

BURMA-SIAM RAILWAY ................................................................................ 512

TORTURE AND OTHER INHUMANE TREATMENT ...................................... 516

VIVISECTION AND CANNIBALISM................................................................ 519

PRISON SHIPS WERE SUBJECTED TO ATTACK........................................ 521

SUBMARINE WARFARE ................................................................................ 523

ILLEGAL EMPLOYMENT, STAVATION AND NEGLECT OF PRISONERS AND

INTERNEES.................................................................................................... 524

CONSIDERATION FOR RACIAL NEEDS FOOD AND CLOTHING................ 526

HOUSING........................................................................................................ 527

Work ............................................................................................................... 528

Native Labor ................................................................................................... 528

PRISONERS AND INTERNESS FORCED TO SIGN PAROLE...................... 528

EXCESSIVE AND UNLAWFUL PUNISHMENT WAS IMPOSED.................... 530

PRISONERS OF WAR HUMILIATED. ............................................................ 533

THE SYTEM.................................................................................................... 534

JAPAN AGREED TO APPLY THE GENEVA CONVENTION, 1929 ............... 535

ILL-TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR A POLICY................................ 539

JAPANESE PURPOSE WAS TO PROTECT JAPANESE NATIONALS ......... 539

CREATION OF THE PRISONER OF WAR INFORMATION BUREAU........... 540

CREATION OF THE PRISONER OF WAR ADHINESTRATION SECTION ... 540

THE MILITARY AFFAIRS BUREAU RETAINED CONTROL .......................... 541

DETENTION CAMPS AND THEIR ADMINISTRATION .................................. 541

THE NAVY PARTICIPATED IN THE SYSTEM ............................................... 542

ADMINISTRATION OF THE SYSTEM IN JAPAN PROPER........................... 543

ADMINISTRATION OF THE SYSTEM IN FORMOSA, KOREA AND SAKHALIN

........................................................................................................................ 543

ADMINISTRATION OF THE SYSTEM IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES .. 543

ACCUSED WHO ADMINISTERED THE SYSTEM IN THE OCCUPIED

TERRITORIES ................................................................................................ 544

ALLIED PROTESTS........................................................................................ 545

ILL-TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEES WAS

CONDONED AND CONCEALED.................................................................... 549

PART C -- CHAPTER IX......................................................................................... 554

FINDINGS ON COUNTS OF THE INDICTMENT ............................................... 554

PART C -- CHAPTER X.......................................................................................... 558

VERDICTS.......................................................................................................... 558

ARAKI, Sadao ................................................................................................. 558

DOHIHARA, Kenji ........................................................................................... 559

HASHIMOTO, Kingoro .................................................................................... 560

HATA, Shunroko ............................................................................................. 561

War Crimes..................................................................................................... 562

HIRANUMA, Kiichiro........................................................................................ 562

HIROTA, Koki.................................................................................................. 563

HOSHINO, Naoki ............................................................................................ 565

ITAGAKI, Seishiro ........................................................................................... 565

War Crimes..................................................................................................... 567

KAYA, Okinori ................................................................................................. 567

KIDO, Koichi.................................................................................................... 568

KIMURA, Heitaro............................................................................................. 569

KOISO, Kuniaki ............................................................................................... 571

War Crimes..................................................................................................... 571

MATSUI, Iwane ............................................................................................... 572

MINAMI, Jiro.................................................................................................... 573

MUTO, Akira.................................................................................................... 574

War Crimes..................................................................................................... 574

OKA, Takasumi ............................................................................................... 575

War Crimes..................................................................................................... 575

OSHIMA, Hiroshi ............................................................................................. 575

SATO, Kenryo ................................................................................................. 576

SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru ................................................................................... 577

War Crimes..................................................................................................... 578

SHIMADA, Shigetaro....................................................................................... 579

War Crimes..................................................................................................... 579

SHIRATORI, Toshio ........................................................................................ 579

TOGO, Shigenori............................................................................................. 581

War Crimes..................................................................................................... 582

TOJO, Hideki................................................................................................... 582

War Crimes..................................................................................................... 583

UMEZU, Yoshijiro ............................................................................................ 585

War Crimes..................................................................................................... 585

{48,414}

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

THE PRESIDENT: All of the accused are present except HIRANUMA, SHIRATORI and UMEZU. The Sugamo prison surgeon certifies that they are ill and unable to attend the trial today. The certificates will be recorded and filed.

CLERK OF THE COURT: THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE, THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, INDIA, AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES.

AGAINST

ARAKI, Sadao, DOHIHARA, Kenji, HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, HATA, Shunroku, HIMANUMA, Kiichiro, HIROTA, Koki, HOSHINO, Kaoki, ITAGAKI, Seishiro, KAYA, Okinori, KIDO, Koichi, KIKURA, Heitaro, KOISO, Kuniaki, MATSUI, Iwane, MATSUOKA, Yosuke, MINAMI, Jiro, MUTO, Akira, MAGANO, Osami, OKA, Takasumi, OKAWA, Shumei, OSHIMA, Hiroshi, SATO, Kenryo, SHIGEMITSU Mamoru, SHIMADA, Shigetaro, SHIRATORI, Toshio, SUZUKI, Teiichi- TOGO. Shigenori, TOJO, Hideki, OMEZU, Yoshijiro JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

{48,415}

FOR THE FAR EAST.

THE PRESIDENT: I will now read the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. The title and formal parts will not be read.

PART A - CHAPTER I

Establishment and Proceedings of the Tribunal The Tribunal was established in virtue of and to implement the Cairo Declaration of the 1st of December, 1943, the Declaration of Potsdam of the 26th of July, 1945, the Instrument of Surrender of the 2nd of September 1945, and the Moscow Conference of the 26th of December, 1945.

The Cairo Declaration was made by the President of the United States of America, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain. It reads as follows:

"The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already rising.

"The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan

{48,416}

shall be stripped or all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid Three Great Powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

"With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan."

The Declaration of Potsdam (Annex No. A-1) was made by the President of the United States of America, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain and later adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Its principal relevant provisions are:

"Japan shall be given on opportunity to end this war.

"There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and

{48,417}

misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

"The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

"We do not intend that the Japanese people shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners."

The Instrument of Surrender (Annex No. A-2) was signed on behalf of the Emperor and Government of Japan and on behalf of the nine Allied Powers. It contains inter alia the following proclamation, undertaking, and order:

"We hereby proclaim the unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and all Japanese armed forces and all armed forces under Japanese control wherever situated.

"We hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Government, and their successors, to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith, and to issue whatever orders and take whatever action

{48,418}

may be required by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by any other designated representatives of the Allied Powers for the purpose of giving effect to the Declaration.

"The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of surrender. We hereby command all civil, military, and naval officials to obey and enforce all proclamations, orders, and directives deemed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be proper to effectuate this surrender and issued by him or under his authority."

By the Moscow Conference (Annex No. A-3) it was agreed by and between the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with the concurrence of China that:

"The Supreme Commander shall issue all orders for the implementation of the Terms of Surrender, the occupation and control of Japan and directives supplementary thereto."

Acting on this authority on the 19th day of January, 1946, General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, by Special Proclamation established the Tribunal for "the trial of those persons charged

{48,419}

individually or as member of organizations or in both capacities with offences which include crimes against peace." (Annex No. A-4) The constitution, jurisdiction, and functions of the Tribunal were by the Proclamation declared to be those set forth in the Charter of the Tribunal approved by the Supreme Commander on the same day. Before the opening of the Trial the Charter was amended in several respects. (A copy of the Charter as amended will be found in Annex No. A-5).

On the 15th day of February, 1946, the Supreme Commander issued an Order appointing the nine members of the Tribunal nominated respectively by each of the Allied Powers. This Order also provides that "the responsibilities, powers, and duties of the Members of the Tribunal are set forth in the Charter thereof. . ."

By one of the amendments to the Charter the maximum number of members was increased from nine to eleven to permit the appointment of members nominated by India and the Commonwealth of the Philippines. By subsequent Orders the present members from the United States and France were appointed to succeed the original appointees who resigned and the members from India and the Philippines were appointed.

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 9 (c) of the Charter each of the accused before the opening of

{48,420}

the Trial appointed counsel of his own choice to represent him; each accused being represented by American and Japanese counsel.

On the 29th of April, 1946, an indictment, which had previously been served on the accused in conformity with the rules of procedure adopted by the Tribunal, was lodged with the Tribunal.

The Indictment (Annex No. A-6) is long, containing fifty-five counts charging twenty-eight accused with Crimes against Peace, Conventional War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity during the period from the 1st of January, 1928, to the 2nd of September, 1945.

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It may be summarized as follows:

In Count 1 all accused are charged with conspiring as leaders, organisers, instigators or accomplices between 1st January 1928 and 2nd September 1945 to have Japan, either alone or with other countries, wage wars of aggression against any country or countries which might oppose her purpose of securing the military, naval, political and economic domination of East Asia and of the Pacific and Indian oceans and their adjoining countries and neighboring islands.

Count 2 charges all accused with conspiring throughout the same period to have Japan wage aggressive war against China to secure complete domination of the Chinese provinces of Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang (Kanchuria), and Jehol."

Count 3 charges all accused with conspiracy over the same period to have Japan wage aggressive war against China to secure complete domination of China.

Count 4 charges all accused with conspiring to have Japan, alone or with other countries, wage aggressive war against the United States, the British Commonwealth, France, the Netherlands, China, Portugal, Thailand, the Philippines and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to secure the complete domination of East Asia and the Pacific Indian Oceans and their

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adjoining countries and neighboring islands.

Count 5 charges all accused with conspiring with Germany and Italy to have Japan, Germany and Italy mutually assist each other in aggressive warfare against any country which might oppose them for the purpose of having these three nations acquire complete domination of the entire world, each having special domination in its own sphere, Japan's sphere to cover East Asia and the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Counts 6 to 17 charge all accused except SHIRATORI with having planned and prepared aggressive war against named countries.

Counts 18 to 26 charge all accused with initiating aggressive war against named countries.

Counts 27 to 36 charge all accused with waging aggressive war against named countries.

Count 37 charges certain accused with conspiring to murder members of the armed forces and civilians of the United States, the Philippines, the British Commonwealth, the Netherlands and Thailand by initiating unlawful hostilities against those countries in breach of the Hague Convention No. III of 18th October 1907.

Count 38 charges the same accused with conspiring to murder the soldiers and civilians by initiating hostilities in violation of the agreement between the United

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States and Japan of 30th November 1908, the Treaty between Britain, France, Japan and the United States of 13th December 1921, the Pact of Paris of 27th August 1928, and the Treaty of Unity between Thailand and Japan of 12th June 1940.

Counts 39 to 43 charge the same accused with the commission on 7th and 8th December 1941 of murder at Pearl Harbour (Count 39) Kohta Behru (Count 40) Hong Kong (Count 41) on board H. M. S. Petrel at Shanghai (Count 42) and at Davao (Count 43).

Count 44 charges all accused with conspiring to murder on a wholesale scale prisoners of war and civilians in Japan's power.

Counts 45 to 50 charge certain accused with the murder of disarmed soldiers and civilians at Nanking (Count 45) Canton (Count 46) Hankow (Count 47) Changsha (Count 48) Hengyang (Count 49) and Kweilin and Liuchow. (Count 50).

Count 51 charges certain accused with the murder of members of the armed forces of Mongolia and the Soviet Union in the Khalkin-Gol River area in 1939.

Count 52 charges certain accused with the murder of members of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the Lake Khasan area in July and August 1938.

Counts 53 and 54 charge all the accused except

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OKAWA and SHIRATORI with having conspired to order, authorize or permit the various Japanese Theatre Commanders, the officials of the War Ministry and local camp and labour unit officials frequently and habitually to commit breaches of the laws and customs of war against the armed forces, prisoners of war, and civilian internees of complaining powers and to have the Government of Japan abstain from taking adequate steps to secure the observance and prevent breaches of the laws and customs of war.

Count 55 charges the same accused with having recklessly disregarded their legal duty by virtue of their offices to take adequate steps to secure the observance and prevent breaches of the laws and customs of war.

There are five appendices to the Indictment:

Appendix A summarizes the principal matters and events upon which the counts are based.

Appendix B is a list of Treaty Articles.

Appendix C specifies the assurances Japan is alleged to have broken.

Appendix D contains the laws and customs of war alleged to have been infringed.

Appendix E is a partial statement of the facts with respect to the alleged individual responsibility of the accused.

These appendices are included in Annex A-6.

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During the course of the Trial two of the accused, MATSUOKA and NAGANO, died and the accused OKAWA was declared unfit to stand his trial and unable to defend himself. MATSUOKA and NAGANO were therefore discharged from the Indictment. Further proceedings upon the Indictment against OKAWA at this Trial were suspended.

On the 3rd and 4th of May the Indictment was read in open court in the presence of all the accused, the Tribunal when adjourning till the 6th to receive the pleas of the accused. On the latter date pleas of "not guilty" were entered by all the accused now before the Tribunal.

The Tribunal then fixed the 3rd of June following as the date for the commencement of the presentation of evidence by the Prosecution.

In the interval the Defence presented motions challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hear and decide the charges contained in the Indictment. On the 17th of May, 1946, after argument, judgment was delivered dismissing all the said motions "for reasons to be given later." These reasons will be given in dealing with the law of the case in Chapter II of this part of the judgment.

The Prosecution opened its case on the 3rd of June, 1945, and closed its case on the 24th of January 1947.

The presentation of evidence for the Defence opened on the 24th of February, 1947, and closed on the

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12th of January 1948, an adjournment having been granted from the 19th of June to the 4th of August 1947, to permit defense counsel to co-orginate their work in the presentation of evidence common to all the accused.

Prosecution evidence in rebuttal and defense evidence in reply were permitted; the reception of evidence terminating on the 10th of February 1948. In all 4335 exhibits were admitted in evidence, 419 witnesses testified in court, 779 witnesses gave evidence in depositions and affidavits, and the transcript of the proceedings covers 48,412 pages.

Closing arguments and summations of prosecution and defense counsel opened on the 11th of February and closed on the 16th of April 1948.

Having regard to Article 12 of the Charter, which requires "an expeditious hearing of the issues" and the taking of "strict measures to prevent any action which would cause any unreasonable delay", the length of the present trial requires some explanation and comment

In order to avoid unnecessary delay which would have been incurred by adopting the ordinary method of translation by interrupting from time to time evidence, addresses and other matters which could be prepared in advance of delivery, an elaborate public address system was installed. Through this system whenever possible a simultaneous

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translation into English or Japanese was given and in addition when circumstances required from or into Chinese, Russian, and French. Without such aids the trial might well have occupied a very much longer period. Cross-examination and extempore argument on objections and other incidental proceedings had, however, to be translated in the ordinary way as they proceeded.

Article 13(a) of the Charter provides that "the Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. It shall . . . admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value. . ." The application of this rule to the mass of documents and oral evidence offered inevitably resulted in a great expenditure of time. Moreover, the charges in the Indictment directly involved an inquiry into the history of Japan during seventeen years, the years between 1928 and 1945. In addition our inquiry has extended to a less detailed study of the earlier history of Japan, for without that the subsequent actions of Japan and her leaders could not be understood and assessed.

The period covered by the charges was one of intense activity in Japanese internal and external affairs.

Internally, the Constitution promulgated during the Meiji Restoration was the subject of a major struggle

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between the military and the civilian persons who operated it. The military elements ultimately gained a predominance which enabled them to dictate, not only in matters of peace or war, but also in the conduct of foreign and domestic affairs. In the struggle between the civilian and the military elements in the Government, the Diet, the elected representatives of the people, early ceased to be of account. The battle between the civilians and the military was fought on the civilian side by the professional civil servants, who almost exclusively filled the civilian ministerial posts in the Cabinet and the advisory posts around the Emperor. The struggle between the military and the civil servants was protracted one. Many incidents marked the ebb and flow of the battle, and there was seldom agreement between the Prosecution and the Defence as to any incident. Both the facts and the meaning of each incident were the subject of controversy and the topic towards which a wealth of evidence was directed.

Internally, also, the period covered by the Indictment saw the completion of the conversion of Japan into a modern industrialized state, and the growth of the demand for the territory of other nations as an outlet for her rapidly increasing population, a source

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from which she might draw raw materials for her manufacturing plants, and a market for her manufactured goods. Externally the period saw the efforts of Japan to satisfy that demand. In this sphere also the occurrence and meaning of events was contested by the Defence, often to the extent of contesting the seemingly incontestable.

The parts played by twenty-five accused in these events had to be investigated, and again every foot of the way was fought.

The extensive field of time and place