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International Relations: One World, Many TheoriesAuthor(s): Stephen M. WaltReviewed work(s):Source: Foreign Policy, No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring, 1998), pp. 29-32+34-46Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLCStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149275 .

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nternational

Relations

n e

World

Man y

heories

byStephenM. Walt

h y

should policymakers

and practitioners

care

about the

scholarly

study

of interna-

tional

affairs?Those who

conduct

foreign

policy

often

dismiss academic

theorists

(frequently,

one

must

admit,

with

good

reason),

but there

is an

inescapable

ink

between

he

abstract orld

of

theory

and the

real

worldof

policy.

We

need theories o

makesenseof

the blizzard

f

information

hat bom-

bardsus

daily.

Even

policymakers

ho

are

contemptuous

f

"theory"

must

rely

on

their own

(often

unstated)

deas

about

how the world

works

n

order

o decidewhat

to do.

It is hard o

make

goodpolicy

f

one'sbasic

organizing

rinciples

re

lawed,

ust

as it is

hard

o

construct

good heorieswithout nowing lotabout herealworld.Everyoneses

theories-whether

e orshe

knows

t

ornot-and

disagreements

bout

policy

usually

est

on more

undamental

isagreements

bout he

basic

forces

hat

shape

nternationalutcomes.

Take,

or

example,

he current ebateon how to

respond

o China.

Fromone

perspective,

hina's

scent s the latest

example

f the

ten-

STEPH

EN

M. WALT sprofessorfpoliticalciencendmasterfthe ocialcienceolle-

giate

ivisiontthe

University

f

Chicago.

e isamember

f

FOREIGN

POLICY'S

ditorialoard.

SPRING 1998 29



International

elations

dency

or

risingpowers

o alter he

global

balance

of

power

n

poten-

tiallydangerous ays,

specially

s their

growing

nfluencemakes

hem

moreambitious.

romanother

perspective,

he

key

to China's

uture

conduct

s

whether

ts behavior

will

be modified

y

its

integration

nto

world

markets nd

by

the

(inevitable?)

pread

f democratic

rinciples.

From

yet

another

iewpoint,

elations etweenChina

and the rest

of

the worldwill be shapedbyissues f culture ndidentity:WillChina

see

itself

and

be seen

by

others)

s a normalmember f

the

world

om-

munity

r a

singular

ociety

hat

deserves

pecial

reatment?

In

the same

way,

he debateover

NATO

expansion

ooksdifferent

depending

n which

theory

one

employs.

rom

"realist"

erspective,

NATO

expansion

s aneffort o

extend

Western

nfluence-well

beyond

the traditional

phere

f

U.S. vital

interests-during period

f Russ-

ian weakness

nd is

likely

o

provoke

harsh

response

rom

Moscow.

Froma liberalperspective, owever,expansionwill reinforce he

nascentdemocracies

f

Central

Europe

nd

extend

NATO'S

conflict-

management

mechanisms

o

a

potentially

urbulent

egion.

A

third

view

might

tress he

value

of

incorporating

he Czech

Republic,

Hun-

gary,

ndPolandwithin he

Western

ecurity ommunity,

hose

mem-

bers hare common

dentity

hathasmade

war

argely

nthinkable.

No

single

approach

an

capture

ll

the

complexity

f

contemporary

world

politics.Therefore,

e are

betteroffwitha

diverse

rray

f com-

peting

deasrather han a

single

theoretical

rthodoxy.

ompetition

between

theories

helps

reveal their

strengths

and

weaknesses nd

spurs ubsequent

efinements,

while

revealing

laws n

conventional

wisdom.

Although

we

shouldtake care

to

emphasize

nventiveness

over

invective,

we

should

welcomeand

encourage

he

heterogeneity

of

contemporary

cholarship.

WHERE ARE WE COMING FROM?

The

study

f

internationalffairss

best

understood

s

a

protracted

om-

petition

etweenhe

realist,iberal,

nd adical

raditions.

ealism

mpha-

sizes

the

enduring

ropensity

or conflict

between

states;

iberalism

identifies

everal

ways

o

mitigate

hese

conflictive

endencies;

nd

the

radicalradition

escribesow heentire ystemf state elations ight e

transformed. he

boundaries

etween

these

traditions

re

somewhat

uzzy

and a numberof

important

worksdo not fit

neatly

into

any

of

them,

but

debates

within

and

among

hem

have

largely

efined

he

discipline.

30

FOREIGN

POLICY



International

elations

principle

earwas hat

t

might quander

tsfavorable

osition

y

adopt-

ing

an

overly ggressive

oreign

olicy.

Thus,

by

theendof the

Cold

War,

realism admoved

away

rom

Morgenthau's

ark

rooding

bout

uman

nature nd aken

on a

slightly

more

optimistic

one.

Liberalism

Theprincipalhallengeo realism ame romabroadamilyof liber-

al theories.

One strand

f liberal

houghtargued

hat economic nter-

dependence

would

discourage

tates

from

using

force

against

each

otherbecausewarfare ould hreaten ach

side's

rosperity.

second

strand,

often

associatedwith President

Woodrow

Wilson,

saw

the

spread

f

democracy

sthe

key

to world

peace,

based n the claim hat

democratic

tateswere

inherently

more

peaceful

han

authoritarian

states. A

third,

more

recent

theory

argued

that

international

institutions uch as the International nergyAgencyand the Inter-

national

Monetary

undcould

help

overcome elfishstate

behavior,

mainly

by encouraging

tates o

forego

mmediate

ains

orthe

greater

benefitsof

enduring

ooperation.

Although

ome iberals

lirtedwith the

ideathat new

transnational

actors,

especially

the multinational

corporation,

were

gradually

encroaching

n

the

power

f

states,

iberalism

enerally

aw

tates

sthe

centralplayersn internationalffairs. ll liberal heoriesmpliedhat

cooperation

as

more

pervasive

haneventhe

defensive

ersion

f

real-

ism

allowed,

uteach

viewoffered

different

ecipe

or

promoting

t.

Radical

Approaches

Until

the

1980s,

marxism as

the main

alternative

o the

mainstream

realistand liberal

raditions.

Where

realism

and liberalism

ook

the

state

system

or

granted,

marxism

ffered oth a

different

xplanation

forinternationalonflictanda blueprintorfundamentallyransform-

ing

the

existing

nternational

rder.

Orthodoxmarxist

heory

aw

capitalism

sthe

central

auseof inter-

national

onflict.

Capitalist

tates

battled

achotheras a

consequence

of

their

ncessant

truggle

or

profits

ndbattled

ocialist

tates

because

they

saw

in

them

the seeds of

their own

destruction.

Neomarxist

"dependency"

theory,

by

contrast,

focused on

relations

between

advanced

capitalist

powers

and less

developed

states

and

argued

hat

the

former-aided

by

an

unholy

alliance with

the

ruling

classes

of the

developing

world-had

grown

rich

by exploiting

the

latter.

The

solu-

32

FOREIGN

POLICY



International

elations

tion was

to overthrowhese

parasitic

lites and installa

revolutionary

government

ommitted

o autonomous

evelopment.

Both

of thesetheorieswere

argely

iscredited efore he Cold

War

even ended.

The extensive

history

f economicand

military oopera-

tion

among

he advancedndustrial

owers

howed

hat

capitalism

id

not

inevitably

ead to conflict.

The bitterschisms hat

divided he

communistworld howed hat socialism idnot always romote ar-

mony.

Dependency heory

suffered

imilar

empirical

etbacksas it

became

ncreasingly

lear

hat,first,

active

participation

n

the world

economy

was

a

betterroute

to

prosperity

han autonomous

ocialist

development;

nd, second,

many

developing

ountries

roved

hem-

selves

quitecapable

f

bargaining

uccessfully

ith

multinationalor-

porations

ndother

capitalist

nstitutions.

As marxism

uccumbed

o

its various

ailings,

its

mantle was

assumed ya group f theoristswhoborrowedeavily rom he wave

of

postmodern

writings

n

literary

riticism

and social

theory.

This

"deconstructionist"

pproach

was

openly skeptical

of the

effort to

devise

general

or

universal heoriessuch as

realismor liberalism.

Indeed,

ts

proponents

mphasized

he

importance

f

language

nd

discourse

n

shaping

ocial

outcomes.

However,

ecause hesescholars

focused

nitially

on

criticizing

he mainstream

aradigms

ut did not

offerpositivealternativeso them,theyremained self-consciously

dissident

minority

ormost

of the 1980s.

DomesticPolitics

Not all

ColdWar

cholarship

n

international

ffairsit

neatly

ntothe

realist, iberal,

r

marxist

aradigms.

n

particular,

number f

impor-

tant works

ocused

n

the

characteristicsf

states,

governmental

rga-

nizations,

r

individual

eaders. he

democratic

trand f

liberal

heory

fitsunder hisheading,asdo the effortsof scholarsuchasGraham

Allison

and

John

Steinbrunero use

organization

heory

and

bureau-

cratic

politics

o

explain

oreign

policy

behavior,

nd those

of

Jervis,

Irving

anis,

and

others,

which

applied

ocial

and

cognitive

psycholo-

gy.

For

he most

part,

hese

efforts

id

not

seek o

provide

general

he-

ory

of

international

ehavior ut

to

identify

ther

actors

hat

might

lead states

to behave

contrary

o

the

predictions

of

the

realistor

liber-

al

approaches.

Thus,

much of

this

literature

should be

regarded

as a

complement

to the

three main

paradigms

rather than

as a

rival

approach

or

analysis

of

the

international

ystem

as a

whole.

34

FOREIGN

POLICY



Walt

NEW

WRINKLES IN

OLD

PARADIGMS

Scholarship

on

internationalaffairshas

diversified

ignificantly

since

the end of

the

Cold War.

Non-Americanvoices are more

prominent,

a

wider

range

of

methods and theories

are seen as

legitimate,

and

new

issuessuch as

ethnic

conflict,

the

environment,

and the

future

of

the

state have been placedon the agendaof scholarseverywhere.

Yet he

sense

of

deja

vuis

equally triking.

nstead f

resolving

he

strug-

gle

between

competing

heoretical

raditions,

he end of the

Cold War

has

merely

auncheda

new seriesof

debates.

ronically,

ven

as

many

societies

embrace

imilar dealsof

democracy,

ree

markets,

nd human

rights,

he

scholarswho

study

hese

developments

remore

divided han

ever.

Realism Redux

Although the end of the Cold War led a few writersto declare that

realism

was

destined for

the

academic

scrapheap,

umors

of

its demise

have

been

largely

exaggerated.

A recent

contributionof

realist

heory

s

its

attention

to the

problem

of

relativeand

absolute

gains.

Responding

o

the

institutionalists'

laim

that

international

nstitutions

would

enable states

to

forego

short-term

advantages

or the

sakeof

greater

ong-term

gains,

realists

uch as

Joseph

Grieco and

Stephen

Krasner

point out that anarchyforces states to

worry

aboutboth

the

absolute

gains

from

cooperation

and

the

way

that

gains

are

distributed

mong

participants.

The

logic

is

straightforward:

f

one

state

reaps

largergains

than

its

partners,

t will

gradually

ecome

stronger,

nd its

partners

will

eventually

become more

vulnerable.

Realistshave

also been

quick

to

explore

a

variety

of new

issues.

Barry

Posen

offers a

realist

explanation

for

ethnic

conflict,

noting

that the

breakup

f

multiethnic

statescould

place

rival

ethnic

groups

n

an

anar-

chic setting,thereby riggeringntensefearsandtemptingeachgroup o

use

force to

improve

ts

relative

position.

This

problem

would be

par-

ticularly

evere

when

each

group's

erritory

ontained

enclaves

inhabit-

ed

by

their

ethnic

rivals-as

in

the

former

Yugoslavia-because

each

side

would

be

tempted

to

"cleanse"

preemptively)

hese alien

minori-

ties

and

expand

to

incorporate

ny

others from

their

ethnic

group

hat

lay

outside

their

borders.

Realists

have

also

cautioned

that

NATO,

absent a

clear

enemy,

would

likely

face

increasing

strains and

that

expanding

ts

presence

eastward

would

jeopardize

elations

with

Russia.

Finally,

scholarssuch

as

Michael

Mastanduno

have

argued

hat U.S.

SPRING

1998

35



International

elations

a i t i n g

f o r

M r

The

post-Cold

War

world till awaits ts"X" rticle.

Althoughmany

have

tried,

no one

has

managed

o

pen

the sortof

compelling nalysis

that

George

Kennan

rovided

or

an

earlier

ra,

whenhe articulatedhe

theory f containment.nsteadf a singlenewvision, he most mpor-

tant

development

n

post-Cold

War

writings

n world ffairss the

con-

tinuing

lashbetween

hosewho believe

world

politics

hasbeen

(or

is

being) undamentally

ransformed

nd hose

who

believe

hat he future

will looka lot like

the

past.

Scholars

hoseethe end

of

the ColdWar s

a

watershed

all

nto

two

distinct

roups.

Many xperts

till

see

the

state

as

the

main

actor

butbelieve hatthe

agenda

f states s

shifting

rom

militaryompeti-

tion to economicompetitiveness,omesticwelfare,ndenvironmen-

tal

protection.

Thus,

President

ill

Clintonhas embracedhe view

that

"enlightened

elf-interest

and]

hared

values..,

will

compel

sto

cooperate

n

more constructive

ways."

Some

writers ttribute his

change

o the

spread

f

democracy,

thers

o the nuclear

talemate,

and

stillothers

o

changes

n

internationalorms.

An even more

adical

erspective

uestions

hether

he

state s

still the most

mportant

nternationalctor.

essica

Mathews elieves

that "theabsolutes f the Westphalianystem of]territoriallyixed

states

. .

are

all

dissolving,"

nd

John

Ruggie rgues

hat we do

not

even have a

vocabulary

hat can

adequately

escribe

he

new forces

that

(he

believes)

are

transforming

ontemporary

orld

politics.

Although

here s still no

consensus

n

the causes f this

trend,

he

view that states

are

of

decreasing

elevance

s

surprisingly

ommon

among

cademics,

ournalists,

nd

policy

wonks.

Prominent

ealistsuchas

Christopherayne

ndKenneth

Waltz

continue o

give

he state

pride

f

place

and

predict

return

o

familiar

patterns

f

great

power ompetition.

imilarly,

obertKeohane

nd

other

nstitutionalistslso

emphasize

he

central oleof the state

and

argue

hat institutions

uch

as

the

European

nion

and

NATO

are

important

recisely

ecause

heyprovide

ontinuity

n the

midst

f dra-

matic

political

hifts.

Theseauthors ll

regard

he

end

of

the ColdWar

as

a

far-reaching

hift n

the

global

alance f

power

utdo

not see

t

as

a

qualitative

ransformationn

the basic

nature f

world

olitics.

Who is

right?

Too soon

to

tell,

but the

debatebears

watching

in the

years

o come.

-S.W.

36

FOREIGN

POLICY



Walt

foreign olicy

s

generally

onsistentwith

realist

rinciples,

nsofar

s

its

actionsarestill

designed

o

preserve

.S.

predominance

ndto

shape

a

postwar

rder hatadvances

American

nterests.

The

most

nteresting

onceptual

evelopment

ithin he realist

ar-

adigm

hasbeenthe

emerging

plit

between

he "defensive"nd"offen-

sive" trands

f

thought.

Defensive

ealists uch as

Waltz,

Van

Evera,

andJackSnyder ssumedhatstateshad ittle ntrinsicnterestnmili-

tary

conquest

and

argued

hat the

costs

of

expansion enerally

ut-

weighed

he benefits.

Accordingly,hey

maintainedhat

great

power

wars ccurred

argely

ecause

omestic

roups

ostered

xaggerated

er-

ceptions

f

threat ndan

excessive

aith n the

efficacy

f

military

orce.

This

view

s now

being

challenged long

everalronts.

First,

sRan-

dall

Schweller

otes,

he neorealist

ssumption

hat states

merely

eek

to

survive

stackedhe deck" n favorof the status

quo

because

t

pre-

cluded hethreatof

predatory

evisionisttates-nationssuchas Adolf

Hitler's

Germany

r

NapoleonBonaparte's

rance hat

"valuewhat

they

covet

ar

more hanwhat

heypossess"

ndare

willing

o

riskanni-

hilationto achievetheir aims.

Second,

Peter

Liberman,

n

his

book

Does

Conquest

ay?,

ses

a number f

historical ases-such

as the Nazi

occupation

of

Western

Europe

and

Soviet

hegemony

over Eastern

Europe-to

show hat the benefits

f

conquest

ftenexceed he

costs,

therebyasting oubton the claim hatmilitaryxpansions no longer

cost-effective.

Third,

offensive realists such as Eric

Labs,

John

Mearsheimer,

nd FareedZakaria

rgue

hat

anarchy

ncourages

ll

states o

try

o maximizeheirrelative

trength

imply

ecause

o state

can

everbe

surewhena

truly

evisionist

ower

mightemerge.

Thesedifferences

elp

explainwhy

realists

isagree

ver ssues uch

as the

future f

Europe.

or

defensive ealists uchas

Van

Evera,

war

s

rarely

rofitable

nd

usually

esults rom

militarism,

ypemrnationalism,

or someother

distorting

omestic actor.BecauseVanEverabelieves

such

forcesare

argely

bsent n

post-Cold

War

Europe,

e

concludes

that

the

region

s

"primed

or

peace."

By

contrast,

Mearsheimernd

otheroffensive

ealists elieve hat

anarchy

orces

reat

powers

o

com-

pete

irrespective

f their

nternal

haracteristicsndthat

security

om-

petition

will return

o

Europe

s

soon

as the

U.S.

pacifier

s withdrawn.

New LifeforLiberalism

The

defeat of

communism

parked

roundof

self-congratulation

n the

West,

best

exemplified

by

Francis

Fukuyama's

nfamous claim that

SPRING 1998

37



International

elations

COMPETING

PARADIGMS

REALISM

LIBERALISM

CONSTRUCTIVISMI

Main

heoretical

Self-interestedtates

Concern

or

ower

Stateehavior

haped

Proposition

compete

onstantly

or

overridden

y

conomic/

by

61ite

eliefs,

power

r

ecurity

political

onsiderations

collective

orms,

(desire

or

rosperity,

and

ocial

dentities

commitmento

liberalalues)

Main

nits f

Analysis

States

States

Individuals

(especially

61ites)

Main

nstruments

Economicnd

Varies

international

Ideasnd

especiallyilitary institutions,

conomic

discourse

power

exchange,romotion

of

democracy)

Modern

heorists

Hans

orgenthau,

Michael

oyle,

Alexander

endt,

Kennethaltz

Robert

eohane

John

uggie

Representative

Waltz,

heory

f

Keohane,

Wendt,

Anarchy

s

Modern orks

International

olitics

After

egemony

What

tates

akefIt"

Mearsheimer,

Backo

Fukuyama,

Thend

f

(International

the

Future:

nstability

History?"

National

Organization,992);

in

Europe

fter

Interest,

989)

Koslowski

the

Cold

ar"

Kratochwil,

Under-

(International

ecurity,

standing

hanges

n

1990)

International

olitics"

(International

Organization,

994)

Post-Cold ar

Resurgence

f

Increased

ooperation

Agnostic

ecause

t

Prediction

overt

reatower

as iberal

alues,

ree

cannot

redict

he

competition markets,

ndnterna-

contentf deas

tionalnstitutionsspreac

Main

imitation Does

ot ccountor

Tendso

gnore

he

Bettert

describing

he

international

hange

role

f

power

past

han

nticipating

theuture

38

FOREIGN

POLICY



Walt

humankind adnow reached he "endof

history." istory

as

paid

it-

tle

attention

o

this

boast,

but

the

triumph

f the West did

give

a

notableboost o

all

three trands

f

liberal

hought.

By

far

he most

nteresting

nd

mportant evelopment

asbeen

the

lively

debateon the

"democratic

eace."

Although

he

most recent

phase

of

thisdebatehad

begun

ven

before he SovietUnion

collapsed,

it becamemoreinfluential s the numberof democracieseganto

increase

nd

as evidence f this

relationshipegan

o accumulate.

Democratic

eace

theory

s a

refinement

f

the earlier laim

that

democracies

ere

nherently

ore

peaceful

hanautocratictates. t

rests

on

the

belief hat

although

emocracieseemto

fight

warsas

often

as

other

states,

hey

rarely,

f

ever,

fight

one

another.Scholars

uch as

Michael

Doyle,

ames

Lee

Ray,

ndBruce

Russett

ave

offered number

of

explanations

or his

tendency,

he most

popular eing

hat

democra-

cies embrace ormsof

compromise

hat barthe use of force

against

groups

spousing

imilar

rinciples.

t is

hard o thinkof

a

more

nfluen-

tial,

recent cademic

ebate,

nsofar

s

the

belief hat

"democracies

on't

fight

each

other"has been an

importantustification

or

the

Clinton

administration'sfforts

o

enlarge

he

sphere

f

democratic

ule.

It is

thereforeronic

hat aith n the

"democratic

eace"

ecame he

basis orU.S.

policy ust

as additional

esearch

as

beginning

o

identify

severalqualifierso this theory.First,SnyderandEdwardMansfield

pointed

out

thatstates

may

be more

prone

o warwhen

they

are n

the

midstof a

democratic

ransition,

hich

implies

hat efforts

o

export

democracymight

actually

make

things

worse.

Second,

critics

uch as

Joanne

Gowa

andDavid

Spiro

have

argued

hat he

apparent

bsence f

war

between

democraciess

due to the

way

that

democracy

as

been

defined nd o

the

relative

earth f

democratictates

especially

efore

1945).

In

addition,

Christopher

ayne

has

pointed

out

that when

democraciesavecomeclose o war n thepast heirdecisionoremain

at

peace

ultimately

ad

ittle

do

withtheir

hared

emocratic

haracter.

Third,

learcut

vidence

hat

democracieso

not

fight

ach

other scon-

fined o

the

post-1945

ra,

and,

as

Gowahas

emphasized,

he absence f

conflict n

this

period

may

be

duemore

o their

ommon

nterestn

con-

taining

he

Soviet

Unionthanto

shared

emocratic

rinciples.

Liberal

nstitutionalists

ikewise

have

continued to

adapt

their own

theories.On

the

one

hand,

the

core claims

of

institutionalist

heory

have

become

more

modest over

time.

Institutionsare

now

said to

facilitate

cooperation

when it

is

in

each

state's

nterestto

do

so,

but

it is

widely

SPRING

1998

39



International

elations

agreed

hat

they

cannot

orce tates

o behave n

ways

hat

are

contrary

to the states'

own

selfish nterests.

For

urther

iscussion,

lease

see

Robert

Keohane's

rticle.]

On the

other

hand,

nstitutionalists

uchas

John

Duffield

ndRobert

McCalla

aveextended he

theory

ntonew

substantive

reas,

most

notably

he

study

of NATO.For hese

scholars,

NATO'S

ighly

nstitutionalized

haracter

elpsexplainwhy

it has

been

able osurvivendadapt, espitehedisappearancefitsmainadversary.

The economic trand

f liberal

heory

s

still

nfluential

s

well.In

par-

ticular,

number f scholars ave

recently

uggested

hatthe

"globaliza-

tion" of world

markets,

he

rise of

transnational etworksand

nongovernmental

rganizations,

nd

he

rapid pread

f

global

ommu-

nications

echnology

re

undermining

he

power

of

statesand

shifting

attention

way

rom

militaryecurity

oward conomics

nd

social

wel-

fare.The detailsarenovel but the basic

ogic

is familiar: s

societies

aroundhe

globe

becomeenmeshedn a web of economicand social

connections,

he costsof

disrupting

heseties will

effectively reclude

unilateral

tate

actions,

specially

he useof

force.

This

perspectivemplies

hat warwill remain

a remote

possibility

among

he

advanced

ndustrial

emocracies.t also

suggests

hat

bring-

ing

China

and

Russianto

the relentless

mbrace

f

world

apitalism

s

the best

way

to

promote

oth

prosperity

nd

peace,particularly

f

this

processreates strongmiddle lass n thesestatesandreinforcesres-

sures o

democratize. et

thesesocieties

ooked n

prosperity

ndcom-

petition

will

be confined o the economic

ealm.

Thisview

hasbeen

challenged

y

scholars

who

argue

hatthe actu-

al

scope

of

"globalization"

s

modest nd

that

thesevarious

ransactions

still

take

place

n

environmentshat

are

shaped

nd

regulated y

states.

Nonetheless,

he belief

hat

economic orces

re

superseding

radition-

al

greatpower

politics

enjoyswidespread

cceptance

mong

cholars,

pundits, ndpolicymakers,nd the role of the state is likely o be an

important

opic

or

uture

cademic

nquiry.

Constructivist

heories

Whereas

ealism nd

iberalismend

o

focuson material

actors

uch

as

power

r

trade,

onstructivist

pproaches

mphasize

he

impact

f

ideas.

Insteadof

taking

the

state

for

granted

and

assuming

hat it

simply

seeks

to

survive,

constructivists

egard

he

interests

and identitiesof

states as

a

highly

malleable

product

of

specific

historical

processes.

They

pay

close

attention to

the

prevailing

discourse(s)

in

society

because

dis-

40

FOREIGN

POLICY



Walt

course eflects nd

shapes

eliefs nd

nterests,

ndestablishes

ccepted

norms f behavior.

onsequently,

onstructivisms

especially

ttentive

to

the

sources f

change,

andthis

approach

as

largely eplaced

marx-

ism

as the

preeminent

adical

erspective

n

international

ffairs.

The

end of the Cold

War

played

an

important

ole in

legitimating

constructivistheoriesbecause ealism

and liberalism oth failed

to

anticipatehis event and had sometrouble xplainingt. Construc-

tivists had

an

explanation:

Specifically,

ormer

president

Mikhail

Gorbachev evolutionizedoviet

foreign

policy

because e

embraced

new ideas uch

as "common

ecurity."

Moreover,

iven

that

we live in an era

whereold norms

are

being

challenged,

nce

clear

boundariesre

dissolving,

nd issues f identi-

ty

are

becoming

more

alient,

t is

hardly

urprising

hat

scholars ave

been drawn o

approaches

hat

place

these

issues ront and

center.

Froma constructivist erspective,n fact, the central ssue in the

post-Cold

Warworld

s how

different

roups

onceive heir

dentities

and

interests.

Although power

is not

irrelevant,

constructivism

emphasizes

ow ideas

and dentities re

created,

ow

they

evolve,

and

how

they

shape

he

way

states

understandnd

respond

o their

situa-

tion.

Therefore,

t

matterswhether

Europeans

efine

hemselves

ri-

marily

n

national

or

continental

erms;

whether

Germany

nd

Japan

redefineheirpasts nways hatencourageheiradoptingmoreactive

international

oles;

nd

whether

he

UnitedStates

embracesr

rejects

its

identity

as

"global

oliceman."

Constructivist

heories re

quite

diverse

nd

do not offer

a

unified

set

of

predictions

n

any

of

these ssues.

At a

purely

onceptual

evel,

Alexander

Wendt

has

argued

hat

the

realist

conception

of

anarchy

does

not

adequately

xplain

why

conflictoccurs

between tates.

The

real ssue s

how

anarchy

s

understood-in

Wendt's

words,

Anarchy

iswhatstatesmakeof it."Another trand fconstructivistheoryhas

focused

on

the

futureof

the

territorial

tate,

suggesting

hat

transna-

tional

communication

nd

shared

ivic

values

are

undermining

radi-

tional

national

oyalties

nd

creating

adically

ewforms

of

political

association.

Other

constructivists

ocus

on the

role of

norms,

arguing

that

nternational

aw

and

other

normative

rinciples

ave

eroded

ar-

lier

notions

of

sovereignty

and

altered

the

legitimate

purposes

for

which state

powermay

be

employed.

The

common

theme

in

each of

these

strands

s

the

capacity

of

discourse

o

shape

how

political

actors

define

themselves and

their

interests,

and

thus

modify

their

behavior.

SPRING

1998

41



Internationalelations

DomesticPoliticsReconsidered

As

in

the Cold

War,

cholars ontinue o

explore

he

impact

f

domes-

tic

politics

on the behavior f

states.Domestic

politics

are

obviously

central

o

the

debate

on

the democratic

eace,

and scholars

uch

as

Snyder, effrey

rieden,

ndHelenMilnerhave

examined ow

domes-

tic interest

roups

andistort he formation

f

state

preferences

nd ead

to suboptimalnternational ehavior.GeorgeDowns,DavidRocke,

andothershave

also

explored

ow

domesticnstitutions

an

help

states

deal

with

the

perennial roblem

f

uncertainty,

hile

students f

psy-

chology

have

applied

prospectheory

and othernew

tools to

explain

why

decisionmakersail to

act

in a

rational

ashion.

For

urther is-

cussion

about

oreignpolicy

decision

making,

lease

ee

the article

by

Margaret

ermann

nd

Joe

Hagan.]

The

past

decadehas also

witnessed

n

explosion

f

interest n

the

conceptofculture, developmenthatoverlaps iththeconstructivist

emphasis

n

the

importance

f

ideasand

norms.

Thus,

Thomas

Berger

andPeter

Katzenstein

aveused

cultural

ariableso

explain

why

Ger-

many

and

Japan

ave

thus ar

eschewedmore

elf-reliant

ilitary oli-

cies;

ElizabethKier

has

offered

cultural

nterpretation

f

British

nd

French

military

octrinesn

the

interwar

eriod;

nd

ain

Johnston

as

traced ontinuities

n Chinese

oreign

olicy

o

a

deeply

ooted

ormof

"culturalealism."amuelHuntington'sirewarningsboutan immi-

nent

"clash f

civilizations"

re

symptomatic

f

this

trendas

well,

nso-

faras his

argument

ests

on

the claim

hat

broad

ultural

ffinities

re

now

supplanting

ational

oyalties.

Though

these

and

other

works

defineculture n

widely

varying

ways

and

have

yet

to

provide

a

full

explanation

f

how it works

r how

enduring

ts

effects

might

be,

cul-

tural

perspectives

ave

been

very

much n

vogue

during

he

past

five

years.

This

trend s

partly

reflection

f the

broader

nterest

n

cultural

issues ntheacademic orld andwithin hepublicdebate swell)and

partly

response

o the

upsurge

n

ethnic,

nationalist,

nd

cultural on-

flicts

sincethe

demise

f the

Soviet

Union.

TOMORROW'S

CONCEPTUAL

TOOLBOX

While

these

debates

reflect he

diversity

f

contemporary

cholarship

n

international

ffairs,

hereare

also

obvious

igns

of

convergence.

Most

real-

ists

recognize

hat

nationalism,

militarism,

ethnicity,

and

other

domestic

factors

are

important;

iberals

cknowledge

hat

power

s

central

o

inter-

42

FOREIGN

POLICY



Walt

national

behavior;

nd some

constructivistsdmit hat

ideas

will

have

greatermpact

whenbacked

y

powerful

tates ndreinforced

yenduring

materialorces.The

boundaries

f

each

paradigm

resomewhat

erme-

able,

and

here s

ample

pportunity

or

ntellectual

rbitrage.

Which

of

thesebroad

erspectives

heds

he most

ight

on

contem-

porary

nternational

ffairs,

nd

which

should

policymakerseep

most

firmly n mind when chartingour course into the next century?

Althoughmany

academics

and

morethan a few

policymakers)

re

loathe o admit

t,

realism emainshe

most

compelling eneral

rame-

work or

understanding

nternational

elations.

tatescontinue o

pay

close

attention o the balanceof

power

and to

worry

bout he

possi-

bility

of

major

onflict.

Among

other

hings,

his

enduring reoccupa-

tion

with

power

nd

security

xplains

whymany

Asiansand

Europeans

are now

eager

o

preserve-and

possibly

xpand-the

U.S.

military

presence n their regions.As Czech

president

Vaiclav

Havel has

warned,

f

NATO

ails o

expand,

we

might

be

heading

ora new

glob-

al

catastrophe

..

[which]

ouldcost

us

all

muchmore

han the two

worldwars."

hesearenot

the words f a man

who

believes hat

great

power

ivalry

as been

banishedorever.

As

for

he

United

States,

he

past

decade

as

shown

how

much

t

likes

being

"number

ne"

nd

how

determinedt is to

remain

n

a

predominant

position.TheUnitedStateshastakenadvantagef itscurrentuperiori-

ty

to

impose

ts

preferences

herever

ossible,

venat

the riskof

irritat-

ingmany

f its

ong-standing

llies. t

has orced

series f

one-sidedrms

control

greements

n

Russia,

ominatedhe

problematic

eace

ffortn

Bosnia,

aken

teps

o

expand

ATO nto

Russia's

ackyard,

ndbecome

increasingly

oncerned

bout

he

rising

power

of China.

It

has called

repeatedly

or

greater

eliance n

multilateralism

nd a

larger

ole for

international

nstitutions,

ut has

treated

gencies

uch as

the

United

Nationsand heWorldTradeOrganizationithdisdainwheneverheir

actions

idnot

conform

o U.S.

interests.t

refusedo

join

the rest

of

the

world

n

outlawing

he

production

f

landmines ndwas

politely

unco-

operative

t

the

Kyoto

nvironmental

ummit.

lthough

U.S.

leaders re

adept

t

cloaking

heir

actionsn

the

ofty

hetoric

f

"world

rder,"

aked

self-interesties

behindmostof

them.

Thus,

he

endof

the

Cold

Wardid

not

bring

he

end

of

power

politics,

and

realism s

likely

to remain

he sin-

gle

most

useful

nstrument n

our

intellectual

oolbox.

Yet

realism

does not

explain

everything,

and

a

wise

leader

would

also

keep

insights

from

the rival

paradigms

n

mind.

Liberal

theories

SPRING

1998

43



Internationalelations

identify

the instrumentsthat states

can

use to

achieve shared

inter-

ests,

highlight

the

powerful

economic forces

with

which states

and

societies must now

contend,

and

help

us understand

why

states

may

differ

in

their basic

preferences.Paradoxically,

because

U.S.

protec-

tion reduces

the

danger

of

regional

rivalriesand reinforces he

"liber-

al

peace"

that

emerged

after

1945,

these factors

may

become

relatively

more important,as long as the United States continues to provide

security

and

stability

in

many parts

of the

world.

Meanwhile,

constructivist

heories are best

suited to

the

analysis

of

how identities

and interests

can

change

over

time,

thereby

producing

subtle shifts in

the

behavior of

states and

occasionally

triggering

ar-

reaching

but

unexpected

shifts

in

international

affairs.It matters if

political

identity

in

Europe

continues

to shift

from

the nation-state

to

more local

regions

or to

a broader

ense of

European

dentity, ust

as

it

mattersif nationalism is

gradually

upplanted

by

the sort of "civiliza-

tional"

affinities

emphasizedby

Huntington.

Realism has

little to

say

about these

prospects,

and

policymakers

could be

blind-sided

by

change

if

they ignore

these

possibilities

entirely.

In

short,

each

of these

competing

perspectives

captures

mportant

aspects

of world

politics.

Our

understanding

would

be

impoverished

were our

thinking

confined to

only

one of them.

The

"compleatdiplo-

mat"of the future houldremaincognizantof realism'smphasison the

inescapable

ole of

power,keep

liberalism's

wareness

f

domestic

orces

in

mind,

and

occasionally

reflecton

constructivism's

ision of

change.

WANT TO

KNOW

MORE?

For a

fair-minded

urvey

of

the

realist,

iberal,

and

marxist

paradigms,

see MichaelDoyle'sWays of Warand Peace (New York,NY:Norton,

1997).

A

guide

to

some recent

developments

n

international

political

thought

is

Doyle

&

G.

John

Ikenberry,

ds.,

New

Thinking

in

Inter-

national

Relations

Theory

(Boulder,

CO:

Westview,

1997).

Those

interested

n

realism

hould

examine The

Perils

of

Anarchy:

Contemporary

Realism

and

International

Security

(Cambridge,

MA:

MIT

Press,

1995)

by

Michael

Brown,

Sean

Lynn-Jones,

& Steven

Miller,

eds.;

"Offensive

Realism and

Why

States

Expand

Their

War

Aims"

(Security

tudies,

ummer

1997)

by

Eric

Labs;

and

"Dueling

Realisms"

(International

rganization,

ummer

1997)

by

Stephen

Brooks.

Foralter-

44

FOREIGN

POLICY



Walt

native realistassessments

f

contemporary

orld

politics,

see

John

Mearsheimer's

Back

to the Future:

Instability

n

Europe

afterthe

Cold War"

(International

ecurity,

ummer

1990)

and Robert

Jervis'

"TheFuture

of

WorldPolitics:

Will It Resemble

he

Past?"

Interna-

tional

ecurity,

Winter

1991-92).

A realist

xplanation

f ethnic

con-

flict

is

Barry

Posen's

"The

Security

Dilemmaand Ethnic

Conflict"

(Survival,pring1993);anup-to-dateurvey f offense-defenseheory

can be

found

n "The

Security

DilemmaRevisited"

y

CharlesGlaser

(WorldPolitics,

October

1997);

and recent U.S.

foreignpolicy

is

explained

in Michael

Mastanduno's

Preserving

the

Unipolar

Moment:RealistTheories

and

U.S.

Grand

Strategy

fterthe

Cold

War"

International

ecurity,

pring

1997).

The

liberal

approach

o

international ffairs s summarizedn

Andrew

Moravcsik's

Taking

references

eriously:

A

LiberalTheo-

ry of InternationalPolitics" (Internationalrganization,utumn

1997).

Many

of the

leading

ontributorso the debate n the

democra-

tic

peace

can be

found

n Brown

&

Lynn-Jones,

ds.,

Debating

he

Democratic

Peace

(Cambridge,

MA: MIT

Press,

1996)

and Miriam

Elman,

d.,

Paths to Peace: Is

Democracy

he

Answer?

Cambridge,

MA:

MIT

Press,

997).

The

contributions

f

institutionalist

heory

nd

the

debate n relative

ains

are

ummarized

n

David

Baldwin,d.,

Neo-

realismand Neoliberalism: he Contemporaryebate(New York,

NY:

Columbia

University

Press,1993).

An

important

ritique

f

the

institutionalistiterature

s

Mearsheimer'sThe

FalsePromise

f Inter-

national

nstitutions"

(Intemrnational

ecurity,

Winter

1994-95),

but

one

should lsoexamine he

responses

n the Summer

995 ssue.For

appli-

cations

of

institutionalist

heory

o

NATO,

see

John

Duffield'sNATO's

Functionsafter the

Cold

War"

(Political

cience

Quarterly,

Winter

1994-95)

and

Robert

McCalla's NATO's

ersistence

fterthe Cold

War" Internationalrganization,ummer 996).

Authors

questioning

he role of

the

state nclude

Susan

Strange

n

The

Retreat

of

the

State:

The

Diffusion f

Power

n the

WorldEcon-

omy

Cambridge:

ambridge

niversity

ress, 996);

and

Jessica

Math-

ews in

"Power

Shift"

(Foreign

ffairs,

anuary/February

997).

The

emergence

f the

state s

analyzed

y

Hendrik

pruyt

n

The

Sovereign

Stateand

Its

Competitors

Princeton, J:PrincetonUniversity ress,

1994),

and its

continued

importance

s

defended

in

Globalization

n

Question:

The

International

Economy

and the

Possibilities

of

Gover-

nance

(Cambridge:Polity,

1996)

by

Paul

Hirst and

Grahame

Thomp-

SPRING

1998

45



International

ffairs

son,

and

Governing

he

GlobalEconomy:

nternational inance

and

the State

(Cambridge,

A:

Harvard

niversity

ress,

994)

by

Ethan

Kapstein.

notherdefense

from

a

somewhat

nlikely

ource)

s "The

World

Economy:

The Futureof the State"

The

Economist,

eptem-

ber

20, 1997),

and

a more

academic iscussion

f these issues s

Peter

Evans' The

Eclipse

of

the State?Reflections n

Stateness

n

an

Era

of Globalization"

World olitics,

ctober

1997).

Readersnterestedn constructivistpproacheshouldbeginwith

Alexander

Wendt's

Anarchy

s

WhatStates

Makeof It: The

Social

Constructionof Power

Politics"

(International

rganization,

pring

1992),

while

awaiting

his Social

Theory of

InternationalPolitics

(Cambridge: ambridge

University

Press,

orthcoming).

A diverse

array

f cultural nd

constructivist

pproaches

may

also be

found n

Peter

Katzenstein,

d.,

The

Culture

of

National

Security

New York,

NY:

Columbia

University

Press,

1996)

and

Yosef

Lapid

&

Friedrich

Kratochwil,ds.,

The

Return

of

Culture

and

Identity

n

IR

Theory

(Boulder:

O:

Lynne

Rienner,

996).

For inks

o relevantWeb

sites,

as well as

a

comprehensive

ndex

of

related

rticles,

ccess

www.foreignpolicy.com.

aheanwaaetl

g

place

o

ah

fregng

gg

icyCmuiy

http://wwwfore

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