interviews with lt. col. maggie quenneville and brigadier general

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Page 1: Interviews with Lt. Col. Maggie Quenneville and Brigadier General

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Major MCGRADY Joseph P Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Major DOONAN Dennis W Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Major ANDERSON Hal S Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col DAVIS Jay M Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col LEFAVOR James M Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col DOLAN Michael J Boston CAP Pilot 102FW

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS 102D FIGHTER WING (ACC)

MASSACHUSETIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD OTIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE MASSACHUSETIS 02542-5028

MEMORANDUM FOR HAFXOHP ANG CAT 3 September 2003

FROM 102 FSDO 165 Izzea Street Bld 165 Otismiddot ANGB MA 02542

SUBJECT National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

1 This list ofkey personnel for the 102 Fighter Wing Otis ANGB Massachusetts comes in response to a request for information from USAFXOHP relayed through the Air National Guard Crisis Action Team senior director by e-mail dated Friday 29 August 2003

middot 2 Some of participants are now retired and the current addresses are supplied where known We will provide further address information when it becomes available

3 Listing of personnel follows (current rank)

Rank Name Position on 11 Sep 01 Status Col QUE~VTILLEDonrud Wing Commander1 HQMAANGCol WICKEL Albert S Vice Wing Commande 102FW Col SCHIAVI Anthony E Operations Group Commander3 102FW Col DUPUIS Richard R Support Group Commander4 102FW Col WORCESTER Paul G Logistics Group Commander5 102FW Col ELLIS Mark F Logistics Squadron Commander6 102FW CMSgt SILVA John D Command CMSgt 102FW

Col TREACY John D Fighter Squadron Commander8 ACCIDOG Lt Col RAMSAY William M Operations Officer retired Lt Col LYNCH Timothy M Operations Support Flight Comrnander9 102FW Lt Col FRENCH PhillipS Mission Support Flight Commander retired Major DOONAN Virgina I Aircraft Generation SQ Commander10 102FW Lt Col STEVENS Christina G Maintenance Squadron Commander 102FW

Lt Col DUFFY Timothy Alert Pilot ( 151 to scramble) 102FW Major NASH Daniel S Alert Pilot (1 51 to scramble) 102FW Major MARTYN RobertS NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Major RICHARD Martin J NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col RAY Douglas L Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Capt BECKEL Jeffrey S Boston CAP ilot 102FW

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UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUMFORTHERECORD

Event Interviews at Otis Air National Guard Base (Otis ANGB)

Type of event Interview with Brigadier General Donald J Quenneville

Date January 7 2004

Special Access Issues None

Prepared by Geoffrey Brown

Team Number 8

Location 102nd Fighter Wing Otis Air National Guard Base Massachusetts Air National

Guard

Participants - Non-Conunission Andrew Huddleston (Dep Ch Plans Integration amp Transformation Div AFXOHP 703 696-0024 Fax 703 588-0636)

Participants- Commission John Farmer John Azzarello Geoffrey Brown

Background

Quenileville has been in the military for 33 years Eight years of which was active duty He came to the 102nd Fighter Wing in 1978 and last year became the commander of the Massachusetts Air National Guard

Please see the attached biography for further details

Alert Site Mission

Quenneville recalled that in 1972 NORADs Air Defense mission included fifteen or sixteen alert sites Between 1972 and 2001 the number of sites declined due to the perception of the Cold War threat Most ofthose bases were at the maritime borders in 2001 as opposed to the northern alert sites that were active in the Cold War and meant to respond to an attack from over the North Pole and Canadian airspace

Quenneville explained that the alert site mission was relatively constant through its changes He noted that the mission at Otis ANGB was mostly focused on responding to Russian Bear (a type of aircraft with the capacity to carry air-to-surface missiles) activity When the Russians developed the Bear H model- that has the capability of launching a cruise missile- Otis had a high priority on shadowing those aircraft but as the Russian defense capability declined with the worsening of the Russian economy the number of alert sites declined

Quenneville remarked that prior to 911 the focus of the alert bases was still an outwards-looking monitoring mission Quenneville noted that Dr Finklestein a policy maker at NORAD analyzed possible threats to national airspace Quenneville opined that

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

25

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

his answer to the need of the air alert mission despite the end of the Cold War was that rogue states looking for high level weaponry had a free market in the former Soviet Union He believed that until those weapons were accounted for it was still necessary for Otis ANGB to have an air alert mission He noted that those focused on assessing the need for the air defense mission decided that seven air defense bases was the minimum needed

Hijack Mission

Quenneville noted that the hijack procedure and responsibility did not change over his career He believed that NORAD developed the procedures that were used by the Air Force to intercept a hijacked aircraft He noted that in addition to the radio signals to indicate a hijack that a pilot uses - signals Commission staff is familiar with - there were both hand signals and internationally developed signals that were familiar to the fighter pilots (for instance Quenneville noted that the direction and orientation from which a fighter performs an intercept is a way of signaling the pilot of the target of interest)

Hijack chain of command

According to Quenneville ideally the FAA would notify NORAD of an ongoing hijacking but ifNORAD became aware of a hijacking through a discreet IFF system code change then since both entities used joint-use radar the coordination would be sorted out between a NORAD sector like NEADS and the FAA before fighters are launched

Drug Interdiction Component

Quenneville noted that the F-1 06 did not participate in many drug interdictions circa 1986 He noted that fighters were deployed for forty-five days to Panama in the early nineties They would mostly intercept what was believed as a drug running aircraft then shadow the target aircraft until it landed

F-106 and F-15

Quenneville noted that the firing exercise he was involved in was to test different middot aircrafts ability to fire a tactical nuclear weapon This is one of the designs for the F-106 -to launch a missile referred to as the Geanie Rocket

Though the F ~15 was developed as an air interceptor it quickly showed its ability as a tactical fighter It was never designed to carry a nuclear weapon He noted also that the radar and ability to carry better missiles were improved from the F-106 to the F-15

NORADFAA Cooperation

Quenneville noted that the Otis ANGB take-off route which points off the coast and was designed to respond to an externally orientated threat did not at all times call for

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

26

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

FAA air traffic guidance The route is designed to point out ofthe main air traffic and that coordination could exist directly between NEADS controllers who have the ability to find a target on their radar systems and the fighter pilots He noted that exercises were conducted at night on occasion specifically because there is less air traffic at that time

Quenneville noted that he does not recall a live exercise involving the FAA and an airliner to practice a hijack He explained that the standard procedure was to never approach to closer than five models and to trail the hijacked aircraft to monitor its actions

Threats

Quenneville noted that though he was aware of Osama Bin Laden before 9 11 he never received a link between Bin Laden and the post-Cold War threats that were typified by the 9111 attacks He continued and noted that even though the quantity of threats had changed over his career the outlook and operational appro~ch to those threats had not The adequacy of the air defense mission ofNORAD was based on the ability to perceive a threat with enough time to respond

Quenneville noted that as of90l the fighters sat alert with an external tank and live guns it was possible they would sit with heat seeking missiles as well He said that because of the Russian Bear exercises that were scheduled on 9 11 the fighters were configured as 3-2-2-1 He noted this is a higher state of readiness than the fighters would normally have been at middot middot

Quenneville noted that the last intercept he recalls for Russian Bears was in 1988

911

Quenneville was advised during a weekly meeting that the pilots were put at Battle Stations due to a possible hijack The Operations Group Commander briefed him and he continued the meeting It ended and he went to get paper work for the next meeting Quenneville went into the break room and was told that a commuter airplane had just hit the World Trade Center (WTC) He told Commission staff that he thought at the time that it was a large whole for a commuter airplane He was watching the broadcast when United Airlines Flight 175 (VAL 175) hit the second tower He immediately called to convene the Battle Staff and headed to the Command Post

Quenneville noted that the fighters at alert status were NORAD assets and controlled by NORAD He said that as the Wing Commander on 9 11 he was considered a force provider He noted that NORAD always specified how to posture their air alert assets

At the Command Post the Battle Staff convened He noted that the initial intelligence that they relied on was that the suspected hijacked aircraft was the first aircraft to hit the WTC He did not recall if they initially knew the second aircraft was

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

27

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

hijacked as well He also noted that their aircraft were communicating with NEADS entities since the aircraft were too far away to communicate with directly

Quenneville noted that two of the training sortie fighters backed up the PANT A flight while the other aircraft were being refitted Quenneville believes that the training sortie fighters launched around 852 AM very close to the time the PANT A flight was airborne He noted that the training missions were recalled at 925 The Maine 85 tanker that was used by PANT A was deployed in support of those fighters training He noted there was another tanker in the air that they used as well

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

He noted that the operations group commander would have communicated changes in the ROE to the pilots who were launched subsequently of the initial scrambled fighters Quenneville explained that Duffy and Nash received the information from NEADS and that the other pilots were briefed per the direction ofNEADS by Otis ANGB staff Quenneville noted that the procedure created for this was in place and practiced since it was the same procedure that was used when DEFCONS were changed due to the Cold War threat

Quenneville noted that the ROE was developed based on bigger picture inputs On 911 there was a specific set of ROEs and these were adjusted accordingly The adjusted ROEs redefined where authority would be issued from to have an order to engage an airliner

Assets at Otis

He noted that following direction from NEADS Otis ANGB began manning combat air patrol (CAP) missions They recalled and refitted the training assets and launched fighters in support ofthe PANT A flight He noted that over the course ofthe day Otis ANGB changed the fighters from their training configuration to full armament As airplanes recovered they began loading heavier armament Within four hours they had a full configuration on five airplanes Within seventeen hours during continual flying operations they had fourteen out of seventeen airplanes fully configured All this was done in coordination with NEADS

CAPs

Quenneville noted that the role ofOtis ANGB was as a force provider for the NEADS mission Otis ANGB would tell them their capability and NEADS would make deployment decisionsbased on that He noted that Otis flew airplanes 2417 for six or seven weeks following 911

Post 911

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

28

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

Quenneville noted that as an example of the changes in personnel Otis ANGB was a training organization He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month But after 9111 it served four meals a day for months He noted this displays the amount of recall ofpersonnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks

Current Status

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001 and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002 Most of the personnel that were placed on active duty on 9111 were stood down by a year later

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert He also noted that they are not restricted to looking outward but that this threat still exists

Recommendations

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important and that by watching the countrys protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up ofNorthCom has assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense ofthe country

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States and that the ability to scale up quickly cannot be underestimated

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

Page 2: Interviews with Lt. Col. Maggie Quenneville and Brigadier General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS 102D FIGHTER WING (ACC)

MASSACHUSETIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD OTIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE MASSACHUSETIS 02542-5028

MEMORANDUM FOR HAFXOHP ANG CAT 3 September 2003

FROM 102 FSDO 165 Izzea Street Bld 165 Otismiddot ANGB MA 02542

SUBJECT National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

1 This list ofkey personnel for the 102 Fighter Wing Otis ANGB Massachusetts comes in response to a request for information from USAFXOHP relayed through the Air National Guard Crisis Action Team senior director by e-mail dated Friday 29 August 2003

middot 2 Some of participants are now retired and the current addresses are supplied where known We will provide further address information when it becomes available

3 Listing of personnel follows (current rank)

Rank Name Position on 11 Sep 01 Status Col QUE~VTILLEDonrud Wing Commander1 HQMAANGCol WICKEL Albert S Vice Wing Commande 102FW Col SCHIAVI Anthony E Operations Group Commander3 102FW Col DUPUIS Richard R Support Group Commander4 102FW Col WORCESTER Paul G Logistics Group Commander5 102FW Col ELLIS Mark F Logistics Squadron Commander6 102FW CMSgt SILVA John D Command CMSgt 102FW

Col TREACY John D Fighter Squadron Commander8 ACCIDOG Lt Col RAMSAY William M Operations Officer retired Lt Col LYNCH Timothy M Operations Support Flight Comrnander9 102FW Lt Col FRENCH PhillipS Mission Support Flight Commander retired Major DOONAN Virgina I Aircraft Generation SQ Commander10 102FW Lt Col STEVENS Christina G Maintenance Squadron Commander 102FW

Lt Col DUFFY Timothy Alert Pilot ( 151 to scramble) 102FW Major NASH Daniel S Alert Pilot (1 51 to scramble) 102FW Major MARTYN RobertS NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Major RICHARD Martin J NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col RAY Douglas L Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Capt BECKEL Jeffrey S Boston CAP ilot 102FW

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UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUMFORTHERECORD

Event Interviews at Otis Air National Guard Base (Otis ANGB)

Type of event Interview with Brigadier General Donald J Quenneville

Date January 7 2004

Special Access Issues None

Prepared by Geoffrey Brown

Team Number 8

Location 102nd Fighter Wing Otis Air National Guard Base Massachusetts Air National

Guard

Participants - Non-Conunission Andrew Huddleston (Dep Ch Plans Integration amp Transformation Div AFXOHP 703 696-0024 Fax 703 588-0636)

Participants- Commission John Farmer John Azzarello Geoffrey Brown

Background

Quenileville has been in the military for 33 years Eight years of which was active duty He came to the 102nd Fighter Wing in 1978 and last year became the commander of the Massachusetts Air National Guard

Please see the attached biography for further details

Alert Site Mission

Quenneville recalled that in 1972 NORADs Air Defense mission included fifteen or sixteen alert sites Between 1972 and 2001 the number of sites declined due to the perception of the Cold War threat Most ofthose bases were at the maritime borders in 2001 as opposed to the northern alert sites that were active in the Cold War and meant to respond to an attack from over the North Pole and Canadian airspace

Quenneville explained that the alert site mission was relatively constant through its changes He noted that the mission at Otis ANGB was mostly focused on responding to Russian Bear (a type of aircraft with the capacity to carry air-to-surface missiles) activity When the Russians developed the Bear H model- that has the capability of launching a cruise missile- Otis had a high priority on shadowing those aircraft but as the Russian defense capability declined with the worsening of the Russian economy the number of alert sites declined

Quenneville remarked that prior to 911 the focus of the alert bases was still an outwards-looking monitoring mission Quenneville noted that Dr Finklestein a policy maker at NORAD analyzed possible threats to national airspace Quenneville opined that

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

25

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

his answer to the need of the air alert mission despite the end of the Cold War was that rogue states looking for high level weaponry had a free market in the former Soviet Union He believed that until those weapons were accounted for it was still necessary for Otis ANGB to have an air alert mission He noted that those focused on assessing the need for the air defense mission decided that seven air defense bases was the minimum needed

Hijack Mission

Quenneville noted that the hijack procedure and responsibility did not change over his career He believed that NORAD developed the procedures that were used by the Air Force to intercept a hijacked aircraft He noted that in addition to the radio signals to indicate a hijack that a pilot uses - signals Commission staff is familiar with - there were both hand signals and internationally developed signals that were familiar to the fighter pilots (for instance Quenneville noted that the direction and orientation from which a fighter performs an intercept is a way of signaling the pilot of the target of interest)

Hijack chain of command

According to Quenneville ideally the FAA would notify NORAD of an ongoing hijacking but ifNORAD became aware of a hijacking through a discreet IFF system code change then since both entities used joint-use radar the coordination would be sorted out between a NORAD sector like NEADS and the FAA before fighters are launched

Drug Interdiction Component

Quenneville noted that the F-1 06 did not participate in many drug interdictions circa 1986 He noted that fighters were deployed for forty-five days to Panama in the early nineties They would mostly intercept what was believed as a drug running aircraft then shadow the target aircraft until it landed

F-106 and F-15

Quenneville noted that the firing exercise he was involved in was to test different middot aircrafts ability to fire a tactical nuclear weapon This is one of the designs for the F-106 -to launch a missile referred to as the Geanie Rocket

Though the F ~15 was developed as an air interceptor it quickly showed its ability as a tactical fighter It was never designed to carry a nuclear weapon He noted also that the radar and ability to carry better missiles were improved from the F-106 to the F-15

NORADFAA Cooperation

Quenneville noted that the Otis ANGB take-off route which points off the coast and was designed to respond to an externally orientated threat did not at all times call for

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

26

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

FAA air traffic guidance The route is designed to point out ofthe main air traffic and that coordination could exist directly between NEADS controllers who have the ability to find a target on their radar systems and the fighter pilots He noted that exercises were conducted at night on occasion specifically because there is less air traffic at that time

Quenneville noted that he does not recall a live exercise involving the FAA and an airliner to practice a hijack He explained that the standard procedure was to never approach to closer than five models and to trail the hijacked aircraft to monitor its actions

Threats

Quenneville noted that though he was aware of Osama Bin Laden before 9 11 he never received a link between Bin Laden and the post-Cold War threats that were typified by the 9111 attacks He continued and noted that even though the quantity of threats had changed over his career the outlook and operational appro~ch to those threats had not The adequacy of the air defense mission ofNORAD was based on the ability to perceive a threat with enough time to respond

Quenneville noted that as of90l the fighters sat alert with an external tank and live guns it was possible they would sit with heat seeking missiles as well He said that because of the Russian Bear exercises that were scheduled on 9 11 the fighters were configured as 3-2-2-1 He noted this is a higher state of readiness than the fighters would normally have been at middot middot

Quenneville noted that the last intercept he recalls for Russian Bears was in 1988

911

Quenneville was advised during a weekly meeting that the pilots were put at Battle Stations due to a possible hijack The Operations Group Commander briefed him and he continued the meeting It ended and he went to get paper work for the next meeting Quenneville went into the break room and was told that a commuter airplane had just hit the World Trade Center (WTC) He told Commission staff that he thought at the time that it was a large whole for a commuter airplane He was watching the broadcast when United Airlines Flight 175 (VAL 175) hit the second tower He immediately called to convene the Battle Staff and headed to the Command Post

Quenneville noted that the fighters at alert status were NORAD assets and controlled by NORAD He said that as the Wing Commander on 9 11 he was considered a force provider He noted that NORAD always specified how to posture their air alert assets

At the Command Post the Battle Staff convened He noted that the initial intelligence that they relied on was that the suspected hijacked aircraft was the first aircraft to hit the WTC He did not recall if they initially knew the second aircraft was

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

27

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

hijacked as well He also noted that their aircraft were communicating with NEADS entities since the aircraft were too far away to communicate with directly

Quenneville noted that two of the training sortie fighters backed up the PANT A flight while the other aircraft were being refitted Quenneville believes that the training sortie fighters launched around 852 AM very close to the time the PANT A flight was airborne He noted that the training missions were recalled at 925 The Maine 85 tanker that was used by PANT A was deployed in support of those fighters training He noted there was another tanker in the air that they used as well

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

He noted that the operations group commander would have communicated changes in the ROE to the pilots who were launched subsequently of the initial scrambled fighters Quenneville explained that Duffy and Nash received the information from NEADS and that the other pilots were briefed per the direction ofNEADS by Otis ANGB staff Quenneville noted that the procedure created for this was in place and practiced since it was the same procedure that was used when DEFCONS were changed due to the Cold War threat

Quenneville noted that the ROE was developed based on bigger picture inputs On 911 there was a specific set of ROEs and these were adjusted accordingly The adjusted ROEs redefined where authority would be issued from to have an order to engage an airliner

Assets at Otis

He noted that following direction from NEADS Otis ANGB began manning combat air patrol (CAP) missions They recalled and refitted the training assets and launched fighters in support ofthe PANT A flight He noted that over the course ofthe day Otis ANGB changed the fighters from their training configuration to full armament As airplanes recovered they began loading heavier armament Within four hours they had a full configuration on five airplanes Within seventeen hours during continual flying operations they had fourteen out of seventeen airplanes fully configured All this was done in coordination with NEADS

CAPs

Quenneville noted that the role ofOtis ANGB was as a force provider for the NEADS mission Otis ANGB would tell them their capability and NEADS would make deployment decisionsbased on that He noted that Otis flew airplanes 2417 for six or seven weeks following 911

Post 911

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

28

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

Quenneville noted that as an example of the changes in personnel Otis ANGB was a training organization He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month But after 9111 it served four meals a day for months He noted this displays the amount of recall ofpersonnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks

Current Status

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001 and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002 Most of the personnel that were placed on active duty on 9111 were stood down by a year later

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert He also noted that they are not restricted to looking outward but that this threat still exists

Recommendations

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important and that by watching the countrys protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up ofNorthCom has assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense ofthe country

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States and that the ability to scale up quickly cannot be underestimated

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

Page 3: Interviews with Lt. Col. Maggie Quenneville and Brigadier General

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Major MCGRADY Joseph P Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Major DOONAN Dennis W Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Major ANDERSON Hal S Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col DAVIS Jay M Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col LEFAVOR James M Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col DOLAN Michael J Boston CAP Pilot 102FW

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS 102D FIGHTER WING (ACC)

MASSACHUSETIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD OTIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE MASSACHUSETIS 02542-5028

MEMORANDUM FOR HAFXOHP ANG CAT 3 September 2003

FROM 102 FSDO 165 Izzea Street Bld 165 Otismiddot ANGB MA 02542

SUBJECT National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

1 This list ofkey personnel for the 102 Fighter Wing Otis ANGB Massachusetts comes in response to a request for information from USAFXOHP relayed through the Air National Guard Crisis Action Team senior director by e-mail dated Friday 29 August 2003

middot 2 Some of participants are now retired and the current addresses are supplied where known We will provide further address information when it becomes available

3 Listing of personnel follows (current rank)

Rank Name Position on 11 Sep 01 Status Col QUE~VTILLEDonrud Wing Commander1 HQMAANGCol WICKEL Albert S Vice Wing Commande 102FW Col SCHIAVI Anthony E Operations Group Commander3 102FW Col DUPUIS Richard R Support Group Commander4 102FW Col WORCESTER Paul G Logistics Group Commander5 102FW Col ELLIS Mark F Logistics Squadron Commander6 102FW CMSgt SILVA John D Command CMSgt 102FW

Col TREACY John D Fighter Squadron Commander8 ACCIDOG Lt Col RAMSAY William M Operations Officer retired Lt Col LYNCH Timothy M Operations Support Flight Comrnander9 102FW Lt Col FRENCH PhillipS Mission Support Flight Commander retired Major DOONAN Virgina I Aircraft Generation SQ Commander10 102FW Lt Col STEVENS Christina G Maintenance Squadron Commander 102FW

Lt Col DUFFY Timothy Alert Pilot ( 151 to scramble) 102FW Major NASH Daniel S Alert Pilot (1 51 to scramble) 102FW Major MARTYN RobertS NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Major RICHARD Martin J NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col RAY Douglas L Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Capt BECKEL Jeffrey S Boston CAP ilot 102FW

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UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUMFORTHERECORD

Event Interviews at Otis Air National Guard Base (Otis ANGB)

Type of event Interview with Brigadier General Donald J Quenneville

Date January 7 2004

Special Access Issues None

Prepared by Geoffrey Brown

Team Number 8

Location 102nd Fighter Wing Otis Air National Guard Base Massachusetts Air National

Guard

Participants - Non-Conunission Andrew Huddleston (Dep Ch Plans Integration amp Transformation Div AFXOHP 703 696-0024 Fax 703 588-0636)

Participants- Commission John Farmer John Azzarello Geoffrey Brown

Background

Quenileville has been in the military for 33 years Eight years of which was active duty He came to the 102nd Fighter Wing in 1978 and last year became the commander of the Massachusetts Air National Guard

Please see the attached biography for further details

Alert Site Mission

Quenneville recalled that in 1972 NORADs Air Defense mission included fifteen or sixteen alert sites Between 1972 and 2001 the number of sites declined due to the perception of the Cold War threat Most ofthose bases were at the maritime borders in 2001 as opposed to the northern alert sites that were active in the Cold War and meant to respond to an attack from over the North Pole and Canadian airspace

Quenneville explained that the alert site mission was relatively constant through its changes He noted that the mission at Otis ANGB was mostly focused on responding to Russian Bear (a type of aircraft with the capacity to carry air-to-surface missiles) activity When the Russians developed the Bear H model- that has the capability of launching a cruise missile- Otis had a high priority on shadowing those aircraft but as the Russian defense capability declined with the worsening of the Russian economy the number of alert sites declined

Quenneville remarked that prior to 911 the focus of the alert bases was still an outwards-looking monitoring mission Quenneville noted that Dr Finklestein a policy maker at NORAD analyzed possible threats to national airspace Quenneville opined that

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

25

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

his answer to the need of the air alert mission despite the end of the Cold War was that rogue states looking for high level weaponry had a free market in the former Soviet Union He believed that until those weapons were accounted for it was still necessary for Otis ANGB to have an air alert mission He noted that those focused on assessing the need for the air defense mission decided that seven air defense bases was the minimum needed

Hijack Mission

Quenneville noted that the hijack procedure and responsibility did not change over his career He believed that NORAD developed the procedures that were used by the Air Force to intercept a hijacked aircraft He noted that in addition to the radio signals to indicate a hijack that a pilot uses - signals Commission staff is familiar with - there were both hand signals and internationally developed signals that were familiar to the fighter pilots (for instance Quenneville noted that the direction and orientation from which a fighter performs an intercept is a way of signaling the pilot of the target of interest)

Hijack chain of command

According to Quenneville ideally the FAA would notify NORAD of an ongoing hijacking but ifNORAD became aware of a hijacking through a discreet IFF system code change then since both entities used joint-use radar the coordination would be sorted out between a NORAD sector like NEADS and the FAA before fighters are launched

Drug Interdiction Component

Quenneville noted that the F-1 06 did not participate in many drug interdictions circa 1986 He noted that fighters were deployed for forty-five days to Panama in the early nineties They would mostly intercept what was believed as a drug running aircraft then shadow the target aircraft until it landed

F-106 and F-15

Quenneville noted that the firing exercise he was involved in was to test different middot aircrafts ability to fire a tactical nuclear weapon This is one of the designs for the F-106 -to launch a missile referred to as the Geanie Rocket

Though the F ~15 was developed as an air interceptor it quickly showed its ability as a tactical fighter It was never designed to carry a nuclear weapon He noted also that the radar and ability to carry better missiles were improved from the F-106 to the F-15

NORADFAA Cooperation

Quenneville noted that the Otis ANGB take-off route which points off the coast and was designed to respond to an externally orientated threat did not at all times call for

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

26

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

FAA air traffic guidance The route is designed to point out ofthe main air traffic and that coordination could exist directly between NEADS controllers who have the ability to find a target on their radar systems and the fighter pilots He noted that exercises were conducted at night on occasion specifically because there is less air traffic at that time

Quenneville noted that he does not recall a live exercise involving the FAA and an airliner to practice a hijack He explained that the standard procedure was to never approach to closer than five models and to trail the hijacked aircraft to monitor its actions

Threats

Quenneville noted that though he was aware of Osama Bin Laden before 9 11 he never received a link between Bin Laden and the post-Cold War threats that were typified by the 9111 attacks He continued and noted that even though the quantity of threats had changed over his career the outlook and operational appro~ch to those threats had not The adequacy of the air defense mission ofNORAD was based on the ability to perceive a threat with enough time to respond

Quenneville noted that as of90l the fighters sat alert with an external tank and live guns it was possible they would sit with heat seeking missiles as well He said that because of the Russian Bear exercises that were scheduled on 9 11 the fighters were configured as 3-2-2-1 He noted this is a higher state of readiness than the fighters would normally have been at middot middot

Quenneville noted that the last intercept he recalls for Russian Bears was in 1988

911

Quenneville was advised during a weekly meeting that the pilots were put at Battle Stations due to a possible hijack The Operations Group Commander briefed him and he continued the meeting It ended and he went to get paper work for the next meeting Quenneville went into the break room and was told that a commuter airplane had just hit the World Trade Center (WTC) He told Commission staff that he thought at the time that it was a large whole for a commuter airplane He was watching the broadcast when United Airlines Flight 175 (VAL 175) hit the second tower He immediately called to convene the Battle Staff and headed to the Command Post

Quenneville noted that the fighters at alert status were NORAD assets and controlled by NORAD He said that as the Wing Commander on 9 11 he was considered a force provider He noted that NORAD always specified how to posture their air alert assets

At the Command Post the Battle Staff convened He noted that the initial intelligence that they relied on was that the suspected hijacked aircraft was the first aircraft to hit the WTC He did not recall if they initially knew the second aircraft was

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27

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

hijacked as well He also noted that their aircraft were communicating with NEADS entities since the aircraft were too far away to communicate with directly

Quenneville noted that two of the training sortie fighters backed up the PANT A flight while the other aircraft were being refitted Quenneville believes that the training sortie fighters launched around 852 AM very close to the time the PANT A flight was airborne He noted that the training missions were recalled at 925 The Maine 85 tanker that was used by PANT A was deployed in support of those fighters training He noted there was another tanker in the air that they used as well

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

He noted that the operations group commander would have communicated changes in the ROE to the pilots who were launched subsequently of the initial scrambled fighters Quenneville explained that Duffy and Nash received the information from NEADS and that the other pilots were briefed per the direction ofNEADS by Otis ANGB staff Quenneville noted that the procedure created for this was in place and practiced since it was the same procedure that was used when DEFCONS were changed due to the Cold War threat

Quenneville noted that the ROE was developed based on bigger picture inputs On 911 there was a specific set of ROEs and these were adjusted accordingly The adjusted ROEs redefined where authority would be issued from to have an order to engage an airliner

Assets at Otis

He noted that following direction from NEADS Otis ANGB began manning combat air patrol (CAP) missions They recalled and refitted the training assets and launched fighters in support ofthe PANT A flight He noted that over the course ofthe day Otis ANGB changed the fighters from their training configuration to full armament As airplanes recovered they began loading heavier armament Within four hours they had a full configuration on five airplanes Within seventeen hours during continual flying operations they had fourteen out of seventeen airplanes fully configured All this was done in coordination with NEADS

CAPs

Quenneville noted that the role ofOtis ANGB was as a force provider for the NEADS mission Otis ANGB would tell them their capability and NEADS would make deployment decisionsbased on that He noted that Otis flew airplanes 2417 for six or seven weeks following 911

Post 911

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Quenneville noted that as an example of the changes in personnel Otis ANGB was a training organization He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month But after 9111 it served four meals a day for months He noted this displays the amount of recall ofpersonnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks

Current Status

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001 and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002 Most of the personnel that were placed on active duty on 9111 were stood down by a year later

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert He also noted that they are not restricted to looking outward but that this threat still exists

Recommendations

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important and that by watching the countrys protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up ofNorthCom has assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense ofthe country

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States and that the ability to scale up quickly cannot be underestimated

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

Page 4: Interviews with Lt. Col. Maggie Quenneville and Brigadier General

4

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Major MCGRADY Joseph P Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Major DOONAN Dennis W Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Major ANDERSON Hal S Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col DAVIS Jay M Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col LEFAVOR James M Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col DOLAN Michael J Boston CAP Pilot 102FW

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS 102D FIGHTER WING (ACC)

MASSACHUSETIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD OTIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE MASSACHUSETIS 02542-5028

MEMORANDUM FOR HAFXOHP ANG CAT 3 September 2003

FROM 102 FSDO 165 Izzea Street Bld 165 Otismiddot ANGB MA 02542

SUBJECT National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

1 This list ofkey personnel for the 102 Fighter Wing Otis ANGB Massachusetts comes in response to a request for information from USAFXOHP relayed through the Air National Guard Crisis Action Team senior director by e-mail dated Friday 29 August 2003

middot 2 Some of participants are now retired and the current addresses are supplied where known We will provide further address information when it becomes available

3 Listing of personnel follows (current rank)

Rank Name Position on 11 Sep 01 Status Col QUE~VTILLEDonrud Wing Commander1 HQMAANGCol WICKEL Albert S Vice Wing Commande 102FW Col SCHIAVI Anthony E Operations Group Commander3 102FW Col DUPUIS Richard R Support Group Commander4 102FW Col WORCESTER Paul G Logistics Group Commander5 102FW Col ELLIS Mark F Logistics Squadron Commander6 102FW CMSgt SILVA John D Command CMSgt 102FW

Col TREACY John D Fighter Squadron Commander8 ACCIDOG Lt Col RAMSAY William M Operations Officer retired Lt Col LYNCH Timothy M Operations Support Flight Comrnander9 102FW Lt Col FRENCH PhillipS Mission Support Flight Commander retired Major DOONAN Virgina I Aircraft Generation SQ Commander10 102FW Lt Col STEVENS Christina G Maintenance Squadron Commander 102FW

Lt Col DUFFY Timothy Alert Pilot ( 151 to scramble) 102FW Major NASH Daniel S Alert Pilot (1 51 to scramble) 102FW Major MARTYN RobertS NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Major RICHARD Martin J NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col RAY Douglas L Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Capt BECKEL Jeffrey S Boston CAP ilot 102FW

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UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUMFORTHERECORD

Event Interviews at Otis Air National Guard Base (Otis ANGB)

Type of event Interview with Brigadier General Donald J Quenneville

Date January 7 2004

Special Access Issues None

Prepared by Geoffrey Brown

Team Number 8

Location 102nd Fighter Wing Otis Air National Guard Base Massachusetts Air National

Guard

Participants - Non-Conunission Andrew Huddleston (Dep Ch Plans Integration amp Transformation Div AFXOHP 703 696-0024 Fax 703 588-0636)

Participants- Commission John Farmer John Azzarello Geoffrey Brown

Background

Quenileville has been in the military for 33 years Eight years of which was active duty He came to the 102nd Fighter Wing in 1978 and last year became the commander of the Massachusetts Air National Guard

Please see the attached biography for further details

Alert Site Mission

Quenneville recalled that in 1972 NORADs Air Defense mission included fifteen or sixteen alert sites Between 1972 and 2001 the number of sites declined due to the perception of the Cold War threat Most ofthose bases were at the maritime borders in 2001 as opposed to the northern alert sites that were active in the Cold War and meant to respond to an attack from over the North Pole and Canadian airspace

Quenneville explained that the alert site mission was relatively constant through its changes He noted that the mission at Otis ANGB was mostly focused on responding to Russian Bear (a type of aircraft with the capacity to carry air-to-surface missiles) activity When the Russians developed the Bear H model- that has the capability of launching a cruise missile- Otis had a high priority on shadowing those aircraft but as the Russian defense capability declined with the worsening of the Russian economy the number of alert sites declined

Quenneville remarked that prior to 911 the focus of the alert bases was still an outwards-looking monitoring mission Quenneville noted that Dr Finklestein a policy maker at NORAD analyzed possible threats to national airspace Quenneville opined that

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25

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his answer to the need of the air alert mission despite the end of the Cold War was that rogue states looking for high level weaponry had a free market in the former Soviet Union He believed that until those weapons were accounted for it was still necessary for Otis ANGB to have an air alert mission He noted that those focused on assessing the need for the air defense mission decided that seven air defense bases was the minimum needed

Hijack Mission

Quenneville noted that the hijack procedure and responsibility did not change over his career He believed that NORAD developed the procedures that were used by the Air Force to intercept a hijacked aircraft He noted that in addition to the radio signals to indicate a hijack that a pilot uses - signals Commission staff is familiar with - there were both hand signals and internationally developed signals that were familiar to the fighter pilots (for instance Quenneville noted that the direction and orientation from which a fighter performs an intercept is a way of signaling the pilot of the target of interest)

Hijack chain of command

According to Quenneville ideally the FAA would notify NORAD of an ongoing hijacking but ifNORAD became aware of a hijacking through a discreet IFF system code change then since both entities used joint-use radar the coordination would be sorted out between a NORAD sector like NEADS and the FAA before fighters are launched

Drug Interdiction Component

Quenneville noted that the F-1 06 did not participate in many drug interdictions circa 1986 He noted that fighters were deployed for forty-five days to Panama in the early nineties They would mostly intercept what was believed as a drug running aircraft then shadow the target aircraft until it landed

F-106 and F-15

Quenneville noted that the firing exercise he was involved in was to test different middot aircrafts ability to fire a tactical nuclear weapon This is one of the designs for the F-106 -to launch a missile referred to as the Geanie Rocket

Though the F ~15 was developed as an air interceptor it quickly showed its ability as a tactical fighter It was never designed to carry a nuclear weapon He noted also that the radar and ability to carry better missiles were improved from the F-106 to the F-15

NORADFAA Cooperation

Quenneville noted that the Otis ANGB take-off route which points off the coast and was designed to respond to an externally orientated threat did not at all times call for

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

26

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

FAA air traffic guidance The route is designed to point out ofthe main air traffic and that coordination could exist directly between NEADS controllers who have the ability to find a target on their radar systems and the fighter pilots He noted that exercises were conducted at night on occasion specifically because there is less air traffic at that time

Quenneville noted that he does not recall a live exercise involving the FAA and an airliner to practice a hijack He explained that the standard procedure was to never approach to closer than five models and to trail the hijacked aircraft to monitor its actions

Threats

Quenneville noted that though he was aware of Osama Bin Laden before 9 11 he never received a link between Bin Laden and the post-Cold War threats that were typified by the 9111 attacks He continued and noted that even though the quantity of threats had changed over his career the outlook and operational appro~ch to those threats had not The adequacy of the air defense mission ofNORAD was based on the ability to perceive a threat with enough time to respond

Quenneville noted that as of90l the fighters sat alert with an external tank and live guns it was possible they would sit with heat seeking missiles as well He said that because of the Russian Bear exercises that were scheduled on 9 11 the fighters were configured as 3-2-2-1 He noted this is a higher state of readiness than the fighters would normally have been at middot middot

Quenneville noted that the last intercept he recalls for Russian Bears was in 1988

911

Quenneville was advised during a weekly meeting that the pilots were put at Battle Stations due to a possible hijack The Operations Group Commander briefed him and he continued the meeting It ended and he went to get paper work for the next meeting Quenneville went into the break room and was told that a commuter airplane had just hit the World Trade Center (WTC) He told Commission staff that he thought at the time that it was a large whole for a commuter airplane He was watching the broadcast when United Airlines Flight 175 (VAL 175) hit the second tower He immediately called to convene the Battle Staff and headed to the Command Post

Quenneville noted that the fighters at alert status were NORAD assets and controlled by NORAD He said that as the Wing Commander on 9 11 he was considered a force provider He noted that NORAD always specified how to posture their air alert assets

At the Command Post the Battle Staff convened He noted that the initial intelligence that they relied on was that the suspected hijacked aircraft was the first aircraft to hit the WTC He did not recall if they initially knew the second aircraft was

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

27

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

hijacked as well He also noted that their aircraft were communicating with NEADS entities since the aircraft were too far away to communicate with directly

Quenneville noted that two of the training sortie fighters backed up the PANT A flight while the other aircraft were being refitted Quenneville believes that the training sortie fighters launched around 852 AM very close to the time the PANT A flight was airborne He noted that the training missions were recalled at 925 The Maine 85 tanker that was used by PANT A was deployed in support of those fighters training He noted there was another tanker in the air that they used as well

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

He noted that the operations group commander would have communicated changes in the ROE to the pilots who were launched subsequently of the initial scrambled fighters Quenneville explained that Duffy and Nash received the information from NEADS and that the other pilots were briefed per the direction ofNEADS by Otis ANGB staff Quenneville noted that the procedure created for this was in place and practiced since it was the same procedure that was used when DEFCONS were changed due to the Cold War threat

Quenneville noted that the ROE was developed based on bigger picture inputs On 911 there was a specific set of ROEs and these were adjusted accordingly The adjusted ROEs redefined where authority would be issued from to have an order to engage an airliner

Assets at Otis

He noted that following direction from NEADS Otis ANGB began manning combat air patrol (CAP) missions They recalled and refitted the training assets and launched fighters in support ofthe PANT A flight He noted that over the course ofthe day Otis ANGB changed the fighters from their training configuration to full armament As airplanes recovered they began loading heavier armament Within four hours they had a full configuration on five airplanes Within seventeen hours during continual flying operations they had fourteen out of seventeen airplanes fully configured All this was done in coordination with NEADS

CAPs

Quenneville noted that the role ofOtis ANGB was as a force provider for the NEADS mission Otis ANGB would tell them their capability and NEADS would make deployment decisionsbased on that He noted that Otis flew airplanes 2417 for six or seven weeks following 911

Post 911

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

28

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

Quenneville noted that as an example of the changes in personnel Otis ANGB was a training organization He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month But after 9111 it served four meals a day for months He noted this displays the amount of recall ofpersonnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks

Current Status

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001 and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002 Most of the personnel that were placed on active duty on 9111 were stood down by a year later

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert He also noted that they are not restricted to looking outward but that this threat still exists

Recommendations

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important and that by watching the countrys protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up ofNorthCom has assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense ofthe country

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States and that the ability to scale up quickly cannot be underestimated

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

Page 5: Interviews with Lt. Col. Maggie Quenneville and Brigadier General

5

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Major MCGRADY Joseph P Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Major DOONAN Dennis W Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Major ANDERSON Hal S Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col DAVIS Jay M Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col LEFAVOR James M Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col DOLAN Michael J Boston CAP Pilot 102FW

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS 102D FIGHTER WING (ACC)

MASSACHUSETIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD OTIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE MASSACHUSETIS 02542-5028

MEMORANDUM FOR HAFXOHP ANG CAT 3 September 2003

FROM 102 FSDO 165 Izzea Street Bld 165 Otismiddot ANGB MA 02542

SUBJECT National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

1 This list ofkey personnel for the 102 Fighter Wing Otis ANGB Massachusetts comes in response to a request for information from USAFXOHP relayed through the Air National Guard Crisis Action Team senior director by e-mail dated Friday 29 August 2003

middot 2 Some of participants are now retired and the current addresses are supplied where known We will provide further address information when it becomes available

3 Listing of personnel follows (current rank)

Rank Name Position on 11 Sep 01 Status Col QUE~VTILLEDonrud Wing Commander1 HQMAANGCol WICKEL Albert S Vice Wing Commande 102FW Col SCHIAVI Anthony E Operations Group Commander3 102FW Col DUPUIS Richard R Support Group Commander4 102FW Col WORCESTER Paul G Logistics Group Commander5 102FW Col ELLIS Mark F Logistics Squadron Commander6 102FW CMSgt SILVA John D Command CMSgt 102FW

Col TREACY John D Fighter Squadron Commander8 ACCIDOG Lt Col RAMSAY William M Operations Officer retired Lt Col LYNCH Timothy M Operations Support Flight Comrnander9 102FW Lt Col FRENCH PhillipS Mission Support Flight Commander retired Major DOONAN Virgina I Aircraft Generation SQ Commander10 102FW Lt Col STEVENS Christina G Maintenance Squadron Commander 102FW

Lt Col DUFFY Timothy Alert Pilot ( 151 to scramble) 102FW Major NASH Daniel S Alert Pilot (1 51 to scramble) 102FW Major MARTYN RobertS NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Major RICHARD Martin J NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col RAY Douglas L Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Capt BECKEL Jeffrey S Boston CAP ilot 102FW

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UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUMFORTHERECORD

Event Interviews at Otis Air National Guard Base (Otis ANGB)

Type of event Interview with Brigadier General Donald J Quenneville

Date January 7 2004

Special Access Issues None

Prepared by Geoffrey Brown

Team Number 8

Location 102nd Fighter Wing Otis Air National Guard Base Massachusetts Air National

Guard

Participants - Non-Conunission Andrew Huddleston (Dep Ch Plans Integration amp Transformation Div AFXOHP 703 696-0024 Fax 703 588-0636)

Participants- Commission John Farmer John Azzarello Geoffrey Brown

Background

Quenileville has been in the military for 33 years Eight years of which was active duty He came to the 102nd Fighter Wing in 1978 and last year became the commander of the Massachusetts Air National Guard

Please see the attached biography for further details

Alert Site Mission

Quenneville recalled that in 1972 NORADs Air Defense mission included fifteen or sixteen alert sites Between 1972 and 2001 the number of sites declined due to the perception of the Cold War threat Most ofthose bases were at the maritime borders in 2001 as opposed to the northern alert sites that were active in the Cold War and meant to respond to an attack from over the North Pole and Canadian airspace

Quenneville explained that the alert site mission was relatively constant through its changes He noted that the mission at Otis ANGB was mostly focused on responding to Russian Bear (a type of aircraft with the capacity to carry air-to-surface missiles) activity When the Russians developed the Bear H model- that has the capability of launching a cruise missile- Otis had a high priority on shadowing those aircraft but as the Russian defense capability declined with the worsening of the Russian economy the number of alert sites declined

Quenneville remarked that prior to 911 the focus of the alert bases was still an outwards-looking monitoring mission Quenneville noted that Dr Finklestein a policy maker at NORAD analyzed possible threats to national airspace Quenneville opined that

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

25

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

his answer to the need of the air alert mission despite the end of the Cold War was that rogue states looking for high level weaponry had a free market in the former Soviet Union He believed that until those weapons were accounted for it was still necessary for Otis ANGB to have an air alert mission He noted that those focused on assessing the need for the air defense mission decided that seven air defense bases was the minimum needed

Hijack Mission

Quenneville noted that the hijack procedure and responsibility did not change over his career He believed that NORAD developed the procedures that were used by the Air Force to intercept a hijacked aircraft He noted that in addition to the radio signals to indicate a hijack that a pilot uses - signals Commission staff is familiar with - there were both hand signals and internationally developed signals that were familiar to the fighter pilots (for instance Quenneville noted that the direction and orientation from which a fighter performs an intercept is a way of signaling the pilot of the target of interest)

Hijack chain of command

According to Quenneville ideally the FAA would notify NORAD of an ongoing hijacking but ifNORAD became aware of a hijacking through a discreet IFF system code change then since both entities used joint-use radar the coordination would be sorted out between a NORAD sector like NEADS and the FAA before fighters are launched

Drug Interdiction Component

Quenneville noted that the F-1 06 did not participate in many drug interdictions circa 1986 He noted that fighters were deployed for forty-five days to Panama in the early nineties They would mostly intercept what was believed as a drug running aircraft then shadow the target aircraft until it landed

F-106 and F-15

Quenneville noted that the firing exercise he was involved in was to test different middot aircrafts ability to fire a tactical nuclear weapon This is one of the designs for the F-106 -to launch a missile referred to as the Geanie Rocket

Though the F ~15 was developed as an air interceptor it quickly showed its ability as a tactical fighter It was never designed to carry a nuclear weapon He noted also that the radar and ability to carry better missiles were improved from the F-106 to the F-15

NORADFAA Cooperation

Quenneville noted that the Otis ANGB take-off route which points off the coast and was designed to respond to an externally orientated threat did not at all times call for

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

26

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

FAA air traffic guidance The route is designed to point out ofthe main air traffic and that coordination could exist directly between NEADS controllers who have the ability to find a target on their radar systems and the fighter pilots He noted that exercises were conducted at night on occasion specifically because there is less air traffic at that time

Quenneville noted that he does not recall a live exercise involving the FAA and an airliner to practice a hijack He explained that the standard procedure was to never approach to closer than five models and to trail the hijacked aircraft to monitor its actions

Threats

Quenneville noted that though he was aware of Osama Bin Laden before 9 11 he never received a link between Bin Laden and the post-Cold War threats that were typified by the 9111 attacks He continued and noted that even though the quantity of threats had changed over his career the outlook and operational appro~ch to those threats had not The adequacy of the air defense mission ofNORAD was based on the ability to perceive a threat with enough time to respond

Quenneville noted that as of90l the fighters sat alert with an external tank and live guns it was possible they would sit with heat seeking missiles as well He said that because of the Russian Bear exercises that were scheduled on 9 11 the fighters were configured as 3-2-2-1 He noted this is a higher state of readiness than the fighters would normally have been at middot middot

Quenneville noted that the last intercept he recalls for Russian Bears was in 1988

911

Quenneville was advised during a weekly meeting that the pilots were put at Battle Stations due to a possible hijack The Operations Group Commander briefed him and he continued the meeting It ended and he went to get paper work for the next meeting Quenneville went into the break room and was told that a commuter airplane had just hit the World Trade Center (WTC) He told Commission staff that he thought at the time that it was a large whole for a commuter airplane He was watching the broadcast when United Airlines Flight 175 (VAL 175) hit the second tower He immediately called to convene the Battle Staff and headed to the Command Post

Quenneville noted that the fighters at alert status were NORAD assets and controlled by NORAD He said that as the Wing Commander on 9 11 he was considered a force provider He noted that NORAD always specified how to posture their air alert assets

At the Command Post the Battle Staff convened He noted that the initial intelligence that they relied on was that the suspected hijacked aircraft was the first aircraft to hit the WTC He did not recall if they initially knew the second aircraft was

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

27

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

hijacked as well He also noted that their aircraft were communicating with NEADS entities since the aircraft were too far away to communicate with directly

Quenneville noted that two of the training sortie fighters backed up the PANT A flight while the other aircraft were being refitted Quenneville believes that the training sortie fighters launched around 852 AM very close to the time the PANT A flight was airborne He noted that the training missions were recalled at 925 The Maine 85 tanker that was used by PANT A was deployed in support of those fighters training He noted there was another tanker in the air that they used as well

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

He noted that the operations group commander would have communicated changes in the ROE to the pilots who were launched subsequently of the initial scrambled fighters Quenneville explained that Duffy and Nash received the information from NEADS and that the other pilots were briefed per the direction ofNEADS by Otis ANGB staff Quenneville noted that the procedure created for this was in place and practiced since it was the same procedure that was used when DEFCONS were changed due to the Cold War threat

Quenneville noted that the ROE was developed based on bigger picture inputs On 911 there was a specific set of ROEs and these were adjusted accordingly The adjusted ROEs redefined where authority would be issued from to have an order to engage an airliner

Assets at Otis

He noted that following direction from NEADS Otis ANGB began manning combat air patrol (CAP) missions They recalled and refitted the training assets and launched fighters in support ofthe PANT A flight He noted that over the course ofthe day Otis ANGB changed the fighters from their training configuration to full armament As airplanes recovered they began loading heavier armament Within four hours they had a full configuration on five airplanes Within seventeen hours during continual flying operations they had fourteen out of seventeen airplanes fully configured All this was done in coordination with NEADS

CAPs

Quenneville noted that the role ofOtis ANGB was as a force provider for the NEADS mission Otis ANGB would tell them their capability and NEADS would make deployment decisionsbased on that He noted that Otis flew airplanes 2417 for six or seven weeks following 911

Post 911

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

28

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

Quenneville noted that as an example of the changes in personnel Otis ANGB was a training organization He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month But after 9111 it served four meals a day for months He noted this displays the amount of recall ofpersonnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks

Current Status

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001 and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002 Most of the personnel that were placed on active duty on 9111 were stood down by a year later

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert He also noted that they are not restricted to looking outward but that this threat still exists

Recommendations

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important and that by watching the countrys protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up ofNorthCom has assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense ofthe country

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States and that the ability to scale up quickly cannot be underestimated

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

Page 6: Interviews with Lt. Col. Maggie Quenneville and Brigadier General

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13

Major MCGRADY Joseph P Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Major DOONAN Dennis W Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Major ANDERSON Hal S Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col DAVIS Jay M Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col LEFAVOR James M Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col DOLAN Michael J Boston CAP Pilot 102FW

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-signed-JAMES M LEFAVOR Lt Col MAANG Operations Officer 101 FS

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15

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS 102D FIGHTER WING (ACC)

MASSACHUSETIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD OTIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE MASSACHUSETIS 02542-5028

MEMORANDUM FOR HAFXOHP ANG CAT 3 September 2003

FROM 102 FSDO 165 Izzea Street Bld 165 Otismiddot ANGB MA 02542

SUBJECT National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

1 This list ofkey personnel for the 102 Fighter Wing Otis ANGB Massachusetts comes in response to a request for information from USAFXOHP relayed through the Air National Guard Crisis Action Team senior director by e-mail dated Friday 29 August 2003

middot 2 Some of participants are now retired and the current addresses are supplied where known We will provide further address information when it becomes available

3 Listing of personnel follows (current rank)

Rank Name Position on 11 Sep 01 Status Col QUE~VTILLEDonrud Wing Commander1 HQMAANGCol WICKEL Albert S Vice Wing Commande 102FW Col SCHIAVI Anthony E Operations Group Commander3 102FW Col DUPUIS Richard R Support Group Commander4 102FW Col WORCESTER Paul G Logistics Group Commander5 102FW Col ELLIS Mark F Logistics Squadron Commander6 102FW CMSgt SILVA John D Command CMSgt 102FW

Col TREACY John D Fighter Squadron Commander8 ACCIDOG Lt Col RAMSAY William M Operations Officer retired Lt Col LYNCH Timothy M Operations Support Flight Comrnander9 102FW Lt Col FRENCH PhillipS Mission Support Flight Commander retired Major DOONAN Virgina I Aircraft Generation SQ Commander10 102FW Lt Col STEVENS Christina G Maintenance Squadron Commander 102FW

Lt Col DUFFY Timothy Alert Pilot ( 151 to scramble) 102FW Major NASH Daniel S Alert Pilot (1 51 to scramble) 102FW Major MARTYN RobertS NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Major RICHARD Martin J NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col RAY Douglas L Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Capt BECKEL Jeffrey S Boston CAP ilot 102FW

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UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUMFORTHERECORD

Event Interviews at Otis Air National Guard Base (Otis ANGB)

Type of event Interview with Brigadier General Donald J Quenneville

Date January 7 2004

Special Access Issues None

Prepared by Geoffrey Brown

Team Number 8

Location 102nd Fighter Wing Otis Air National Guard Base Massachusetts Air National

Guard

Participants - Non-Conunission Andrew Huddleston (Dep Ch Plans Integration amp Transformation Div AFXOHP 703 696-0024 Fax 703 588-0636)

Participants- Commission John Farmer John Azzarello Geoffrey Brown

Background

Quenileville has been in the military for 33 years Eight years of which was active duty He came to the 102nd Fighter Wing in 1978 and last year became the commander of the Massachusetts Air National Guard

Please see the attached biography for further details

Alert Site Mission

Quenneville recalled that in 1972 NORADs Air Defense mission included fifteen or sixteen alert sites Between 1972 and 2001 the number of sites declined due to the perception of the Cold War threat Most ofthose bases were at the maritime borders in 2001 as opposed to the northern alert sites that were active in the Cold War and meant to respond to an attack from over the North Pole and Canadian airspace

Quenneville explained that the alert site mission was relatively constant through its changes He noted that the mission at Otis ANGB was mostly focused on responding to Russian Bear (a type of aircraft with the capacity to carry air-to-surface missiles) activity When the Russians developed the Bear H model- that has the capability of launching a cruise missile- Otis had a high priority on shadowing those aircraft but as the Russian defense capability declined with the worsening of the Russian economy the number of alert sites declined

Quenneville remarked that prior to 911 the focus of the alert bases was still an outwards-looking monitoring mission Quenneville noted that Dr Finklestein a policy maker at NORAD analyzed possible threats to national airspace Quenneville opined that

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

25

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

his answer to the need of the air alert mission despite the end of the Cold War was that rogue states looking for high level weaponry had a free market in the former Soviet Union He believed that until those weapons were accounted for it was still necessary for Otis ANGB to have an air alert mission He noted that those focused on assessing the need for the air defense mission decided that seven air defense bases was the minimum needed

Hijack Mission

Quenneville noted that the hijack procedure and responsibility did not change over his career He believed that NORAD developed the procedures that were used by the Air Force to intercept a hijacked aircraft He noted that in addition to the radio signals to indicate a hijack that a pilot uses - signals Commission staff is familiar with - there were both hand signals and internationally developed signals that were familiar to the fighter pilots (for instance Quenneville noted that the direction and orientation from which a fighter performs an intercept is a way of signaling the pilot of the target of interest)

Hijack chain of command

According to Quenneville ideally the FAA would notify NORAD of an ongoing hijacking but ifNORAD became aware of a hijacking through a discreet IFF system code change then since both entities used joint-use radar the coordination would be sorted out between a NORAD sector like NEADS and the FAA before fighters are launched

Drug Interdiction Component

Quenneville noted that the F-1 06 did not participate in many drug interdictions circa 1986 He noted that fighters were deployed for forty-five days to Panama in the early nineties They would mostly intercept what was believed as a drug running aircraft then shadow the target aircraft until it landed

F-106 and F-15

Quenneville noted that the firing exercise he was involved in was to test different middot aircrafts ability to fire a tactical nuclear weapon This is one of the designs for the F-106 -to launch a missile referred to as the Geanie Rocket

Though the F ~15 was developed as an air interceptor it quickly showed its ability as a tactical fighter It was never designed to carry a nuclear weapon He noted also that the radar and ability to carry better missiles were improved from the F-106 to the F-15

NORADFAA Cooperation

Quenneville noted that the Otis ANGB take-off route which points off the coast and was designed to respond to an externally orientated threat did not at all times call for

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

26

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

FAA air traffic guidance The route is designed to point out ofthe main air traffic and that coordination could exist directly between NEADS controllers who have the ability to find a target on their radar systems and the fighter pilots He noted that exercises were conducted at night on occasion specifically because there is less air traffic at that time

Quenneville noted that he does not recall a live exercise involving the FAA and an airliner to practice a hijack He explained that the standard procedure was to never approach to closer than five models and to trail the hijacked aircraft to monitor its actions

Threats

Quenneville noted that though he was aware of Osama Bin Laden before 9 11 he never received a link between Bin Laden and the post-Cold War threats that were typified by the 9111 attacks He continued and noted that even though the quantity of threats had changed over his career the outlook and operational appro~ch to those threats had not The adequacy of the air defense mission ofNORAD was based on the ability to perceive a threat with enough time to respond

Quenneville noted that as of90l the fighters sat alert with an external tank and live guns it was possible they would sit with heat seeking missiles as well He said that because of the Russian Bear exercises that were scheduled on 9 11 the fighters were configured as 3-2-2-1 He noted this is a higher state of readiness than the fighters would normally have been at middot middot

Quenneville noted that the last intercept he recalls for Russian Bears was in 1988

911

Quenneville was advised during a weekly meeting that the pilots were put at Battle Stations due to a possible hijack The Operations Group Commander briefed him and he continued the meeting It ended and he went to get paper work for the next meeting Quenneville went into the break room and was told that a commuter airplane had just hit the World Trade Center (WTC) He told Commission staff that he thought at the time that it was a large whole for a commuter airplane He was watching the broadcast when United Airlines Flight 175 (VAL 175) hit the second tower He immediately called to convene the Battle Staff and headed to the Command Post

Quenneville noted that the fighters at alert status were NORAD assets and controlled by NORAD He said that as the Wing Commander on 9 11 he was considered a force provider He noted that NORAD always specified how to posture their air alert assets

At the Command Post the Battle Staff convened He noted that the initial intelligence that they relied on was that the suspected hijacked aircraft was the first aircraft to hit the WTC He did not recall if they initially knew the second aircraft was

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

27

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

hijacked as well He also noted that their aircraft were communicating with NEADS entities since the aircraft were too far away to communicate with directly

Quenneville noted that two of the training sortie fighters backed up the PANT A flight while the other aircraft were being refitted Quenneville believes that the training sortie fighters launched around 852 AM very close to the time the PANT A flight was airborne He noted that the training missions were recalled at 925 The Maine 85 tanker that was used by PANT A was deployed in support of those fighters training He noted there was another tanker in the air that they used as well

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

He noted that the operations group commander would have communicated changes in the ROE to the pilots who were launched subsequently of the initial scrambled fighters Quenneville explained that Duffy and Nash received the information from NEADS and that the other pilots were briefed per the direction ofNEADS by Otis ANGB staff Quenneville noted that the procedure created for this was in place and practiced since it was the same procedure that was used when DEFCONS were changed due to the Cold War threat

Quenneville noted that the ROE was developed based on bigger picture inputs On 911 there was a specific set of ROEs and these were adjusted accordingly The adjusted ROEs redefined where authority would be issued from to have an order to engage an airliner

Assets at Otis

He noted that following direction from NEADS Otis ANGB began manning combat air patrol (CAP) missions They recalled and refitted the training assets and launched fighters in support ofthe PANT A flight He noted that over the course ofthe day Otis ANGB changed the fighters from their training configuration to full armament As airplanes recovered they began loading heavier armament Within four hours they had a full configuration on five airplanes Within seventeen hours during continual flying operations they had fourteen out of seventeen airplanes fully configured All this was done in coordination with NEADS

CAPs

Quenneville noted that the role ofOtis ANGB was as a force provider for the NEADS mission Otis ANGB would tell them their capability and NEADS would make deployment decisionsbased on that He noted that Otis flew airplanes 2417 for six or seven weeks following 911

Post 911

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

28

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

Quenneville noted that as an example of the changes in personnel Otis ANGB was a training organization He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month But after 9111 it served four meals a day for months He noted this displays the amount of recall ofpersonnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks

Current Status

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001 and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002 Most of the personnel that were placed on active duty on 9111 were stood down by a year later

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert He also noted that they are not restricted to looking outward but that this threat still exists

Recommendations

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important and that by watching the countrys protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up ofNorthCom has assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense ofthe country

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States and that the ability to scale up quickly cannot be underestimated

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

Page 7: Interviews with Lt. Col. Maggie Quenneville and Brigadier General

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Corn rn unity Lt Col Maggie OuennevUie

sarety corniRlat Ca

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bullAt-Operations Oftlcer Support Group Logistics o-oup Lt Col T Schiavi Lt Col R Dupuis Lt Col Paul VVorcester

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Indicates changes have been made since 911

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bullMil Eqaal Opportunity MaJ laurie McAvoylll Col L LaForest

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Withheld from public release by National Archives and Records Administration under 36 CFR sect 125656

13

Major MCGRADY Joseph P Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Major DOONAN Dennis W Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Major ANDERSON Hal S Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col DAVIS Jay M Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col LEFAVOR James M Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col DOLAN Michael J Boston CAP Pilot 102FW

Address for retired Lt Col Ramsayavailable at this time

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ddress f

or retired U Col French is not

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-signed-JAMES M LEFAVOR Lt Col MAANG Operations Officer 101 FS

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15

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS 102D FIGHTER WING (ACC)

MASSACHUSETIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD OTIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE MASSACHUSETIS 02542-5028

MEMORANDUM FOR HAFXOHP ANG CAT 3 September 2003

FROM 102 FSDO 165 Izzea Street Bld 165 Otismiddot ANGB MA 02542

SUBJECT National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

1 This list ofkey personnel for the 102 Fighter Wing Otis ANGB Massachusetts comes in response to a request for information from USAFXOHP relayed through the Air National Guard Crisis Action Team senior director by e-mail dated Friday 29 August 2003

middot 2 Some of participants are now retired and the current addresses are supplied where known We will provide further address information when it becomes available

3 Listing of personnel follows (current rank)

Rank Name Position on 11 Sep 01 Status Col QUE~VTILLEDonrud Wing Commander1 HQMAANGCol WICKEL Albert S Vice Wing Commande 102FW Col SCHIAVI Anthony E Operations Group Commander3 102FW Col DUPUIS Richard R Support Group Commander4 102FW Col WORCESTER Paul G Logistics Group Commander5 102FW Col ELLIS Mark F Logistics Squadron Commander6 102FW CMSgt SILVA John D Command CMSgt 102FW

Col TREACY John D Fighter Squadron Commander8 ACCIDOG Lt Col RAMSAY William M Operations Officer retired Lt Col LYNCH Timothy M Operations Support Flight Comrnander9 102FW Lt Col FRENCH PhillipS Mission Support Flight Commander retired Major DOONAN Virgina I Aircraft Generation SQ Commander10 102FW Lt Col STEVENS Christina G Maintenance Squadron Commander 102FW

Lt Col DUFFY Timothy Alert Pilot ( 151 to scramble) 102FW Major NASH Daniel S Alert Pilot (1 51 to scramble) 102FW Major MARTYN RobertS NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Major RICHARD Martin J NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col RAY Douglas L Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Capt BECKEL Jeffrey S Boston CAP ilot 102FW

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UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUMFORTHERECORD

Event Interviews at Otis Air National Guard Base (Otis ANGB)

Type of event Interview with Brigadier General Donald J Quenneville

Date January 7 2004

Special Access Issues None

Prepared by Geoffrey Brown

Team Number 8

Location 102nd Fighter Wing Otis Air National Guard Base Massachusetts Air National

Guard

Participants - Non-Conunission Andrew Huddleston (Dep Ch Plans Integration amp Transformation Div AFXOHP 703 696-0024 Fax 703 588-0636)

Participants- Commission John Farmer John Azzarello Geoffrey Brown

Background

Quenileville has been in the military for 33 years Eight years of which was active duty He came to the 102nd Fighter Wing in 1978 and last year became the commander of the Massachusetts Air National Guard

Please see the attached biography for further details

Alert Site Mission

Quenneville recalled that in 1972 NORADs Air Defense mission included fifteen or sixteen alert sites Between 1972 and 2001 the number of sites declined due to the perception of the Cold War threat Most ofthose bases were at the maritime borders in 2001 as opposed to the northern alert sites that were active in the Cold War and meant to respond to an attack from over the North Pole and Canadian airspace

Quenneville explained that the alert site mission was relatively constant through its changes He noted that the mission at Otis ANGB was mostly focused on responding to Russian Bear (a type of aircraft with the capacity to carry air-to-surface missiles) activity When the Russians developed the Bear H model- that has the capability of launching a cruise missile- Otis had a high priority on shadowing those aircraft but as the Russian defense capability declined with the worsening of the Russian economy the number of alert sites declined

Quenneville remarked that prior to 911 the focus of the alert bases was still an outwards-looking monitoring mission Quenneville noted that Dr Finklestein a policy maker at NORAD analyzed possible threats to national airspace Quenneville opined that

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

25

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

his answer to the need of the air alert mission despite the end of the Cold War was that rogue states looking for high level weaponry had a free market in the former Soviet Union He believed that until those weapons were accounted for it was still necessary for Otis ANGB to have an air alert mission He noted that those focused on assessing the need for the air defense mission decided that seven air defense bases was the minimum needed

Hijack Mission

Quenneville noted that the hijack procedure and responsibility did not change over his career He believed that NORAD developed the procedures that were used by the Air Force to intercept a hijacked aircraft He noted that in addition to the radio signals to indicate a hijack that a pilot uses - signals Commission staff is familiar with - there were both hand signals and internationally developed signals that were familiar to the fighter pilots (for instance Quenneville noted that the direction and orientation from which a fighter performs an intercept is a way of signaling the pilot of the target of interest)

Hijack chain of command

According to Quenneville ideally the FAA would notify NORAD of an ongoing hijacking but ifNORAD became aware of a hijacking through a discreet IFF system code change then since both entities used joint-use radar the coordination would be sorted out between a NORAD sector like NEADS and the FAA before fighters are launched

Drug Interdiction Component

Quenneville noted that the F-1 06 did not participate in many drug interdictions circa 1986 He noted that fighters were deployed for forty-five days to Panama in the early nineties They would mostly intercept what was believed as a drug running aircraft then shadow the target aircraft until it landed

F-106 and F-15

Quenneville noted that the firing exercise he was involved in was to test different middot aircrafts ability to fire a tactical nuclear weapon This is one of the designs for the F-106 -to launch a missile referred to as the Geanie Rocket

Though the F ~15 was developed as an air interceptor it quickly showed its ability as a tactical fighter It was never designed to carry a nuclear weapon He noted also that the radar and ability to carry better missiles were improved from the F-106 to the F-15

NORADFAA Cooperation

Quenneville noted that the Otis ANGB take-off route which points off the coast and was designed to respond to an externally orientated threat did not at all times call for

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

26

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

FAA air traffic guidance The route is designed to point out ofthe main air traffic and that coordination could exist directly between NEADS controllers who have the ability to find a target on their radar systems and the fighter pilots He noted that exercises were conducted at night on occasion specifically because there is less air traffic at that time

Quenneville noted that he does not recall a live exercise involving the FAA and an airliner to practice a hijack He explained that the standard procedure was to never approach to closer than five models and to trail the hijacked aircraft to monitor its actions

Threats

Quenneville noted that though he was aware of Osama Bin Laden before 9 11 he never received a link between Bin Laden and the post-Cold War threats that were typified by the 9111 attacks He continued and noted that even though the quantity of threats had changed over his career the outlook and operational appro~ch to those threats had not The adequacy of the air defense mission ofNORAD was based on the ability to perceive a threat with enough time to respond

Quenneville noted that as of90l the fighters sat alert with an external tank and live guns it was possible they would sit with heat seeking missiles as well He said that because of the Russian Bear exercises that were scheduled on 9 11 the fighters were configured as 3-2-2-1 He noted this is a higher state of readiness than the fighters would normally have been at middot middot

Quenneville noted that the last intercept he recalls for Russian Bears was in 1988

911

Quenneville was advised during a weekly meeting that the pilots were put at Battle Stations due to a possible hijack The Operations Group Commander briefed him and he continued the meeting It ended and he went to get paper work for the next meeting Quenneville went into the break room and was told that a commuter airplane had just hit the World Trade Center (WTC) He told Commission staff that he thought at the time that it was a large whole for a commuter airplane He was watching the broadcast when United Airlines Flight 175 (VAL 175) hit the second tower He immediately called to convene the Battle Staff and headed to the Command Post

Quenneville noted that the fighters at alert status were NORAD assets and controlled by NORAD He said that as the Wing Commander on 9 11 he was considered a force provider He noted that NORAD always specified how to posture their air alert assets

At the Command Post the Battle Staff convened He noted that the initial intelligence that they relied on was that the suspected hijacked aircraft was the first aircraft to hit the WTC He did not recall if they initially knew the second aircraft was

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

27

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

hijacked as well He also noted that their aircraft were communicating with NEADS entities since the aircraft were too far away to communicate with directly

Quenneville noted that two of the training sortie fighters backed up the PANT A flight while the other aircraft were being refitted Quenneville believes that the training sortie fighters launched around 852 AM very close to the time the PANT A flight was airborne He noted that the training missions were recalled at 925 The Maine 85 tanker that was used by PANT A was deployed in support of those fighters training He noted there was another tanker in the air that they used as well

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

He noted that the operations group commander would have communicated changes in the ROE to the pilots who were launched subsequently of the initial scrambled fighters Quenneville explained that Duffy and Nash received the information from NEADS and that the other pilots were briefed per the direction ofNEADS by Otis ANGB staff Quenneville noted that the procedure created for this was in place and practiced since it was the same procedure that was used when DEFCONS were changed due to the Cold War threat

Quenneville noted that the ROE was developed based on bigger picture inputs On 911 there was a specific set of ROEs and these were adjusted accordingly The adjusted ROEs redefined where authority would be issued from to have an order to engage an airliner

Assets at Otis

He noted that following direction from NEADS Otis ANGB began manning combat air patrol (CAP) missions They recalled and refitted the training assets and launched fighters in support ofthe PANT A flight He noted that over the course ofthe day Otis ANGB changed the fighters from their training configuration to full armament As airplanes recovered they began loading heavier armament Within four hours they had a full configuration on five airplanes Within seventeen hours during continual flying operations they had fourteen out of seventeen airplanes fully configured All this was done in coordination with NEADS

CAPs

Quenneville noted that the role ofOtis ANGB was as a force provider for the NEADS mission Otis ANGB would tell them their capability and NEADS would make deployment decisionsbased on that He noted that Otis flew airplanes 2417 for six or seven weeks following 911

Post 911

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

28

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

Quenneville noted that as an example of the changes in personnel Otis ANGB was a training organization He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month But after 9111 it served four meals a day for months He noted this displays the amount of recall ofpersonnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks

Current Status

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001 and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002 Most of the personnel that were placed on active duty on 9111 were stood down by a year later

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert He also noted that they are not restricted to looking outward but that this threat still exists

Recommendations

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important and that by watching the countrys protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up ofNorthCom has assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense ofthe country

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States and that the ability to scale up quickly cannot be underestimated

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

Page 8: Interviews with Lt. Col. Maggie Quenneville and Brigadier General

8

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Major MCGRADY Joseph P Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Major DOONAN Dennis W Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Major ANDERSON Hal S Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col DAVIS Jay M Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col LEFAVOR James M Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col DOLAN Michael J Boston CAP Pilot 102FW

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS 102D FIGHTER WING (ACC)

MASSACHUSETIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD OTIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE MASSACHUSETIS 02542-5028

MEMORANDUM FOR HAFXOHP ANG CAT 3 September 2003

FROM 102 FSDO 165 Izzea Street Bld 165 Otismiddot ANGB MA 02542

SUBJECT National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

1 This list ofkey personnel for the 102 Fighter Wing Otis ANGB Massachusetts comes in response to a request for information from USAFXOHP relayed through the Air National Guard Crisis Action Team senior director by e-mail dated Friday 29 August 2003

middot 2 Some of participants are now retired and the current addresses are supplied where known We will provide further address information when it becomes available

3 Listing of personnel follows (current rank)

Rank Name Position on 11 Sep 01 Status Col QUE~VTILLEDonrud Wing Commander1 HQMAANGCol WICKEL Albert S Vice Wing Commande 102FW Col SCHIAVI Anthony E Operations Group Commander3 102FW Col DUPUIS Richard R Support Group Commander4 102FW Col WORCESTER Paul G Logistics Group Commander5 102FW Col ELLIS Mark F Logistics Squadron Commander6 102FW CMSgt SILVA John D Command CMSgt 102FW

Col TREACY John D Fighter Squadron Commander8 ACCIDOG Lt Col RAMSAY William M Operations Officer retired Lt Col LYNCH Timothy M Operations Support Flight Comrnander9 102FW Lt Col FRENCH PhillipS Mission Support Flight Commander retired Major DOONAN Virgina I Aircraft Generation SQ Commander10 102FW Lt Col STEVENS Christina G Maintenance Squadron Commander 102FW

Lt Col DUFFY Timothy Alert Pilot ( 151 to scramble) 102FW Major NASH Daniel S Alert Pilot (1 51 to scramble) 102FW Major MARTYN RobertS NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Major RICHARD Martin J NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col RAY Douglas L Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Capt BECKEL Jeffrey S Boston CAP ilot 102FW

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24

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUMFORTHERECORD

Event Interviews at Otis Air National Guard Base (Otis ANGB)

Type of event Interview with Brigadier General Donald J Quenneville

Date January 7 2004

Special Access Issues None

Prepared by Geoffrey Brown

Team Number 8

Location 102nd Fighter Wing Otis Air National Guard Base Massachusetts Air National

Guard

Participants - Non-Conunission Andrew Huddleston (Dep Ch Plans Integration amp Transformation Div AFXOHP 703 696-0024 Fax 703 588-0636)

Participants- Commission John Farmer John Azzarello Geoffrey Brown

Background

Quenileville has been in the military for 33 years Eight years of which was active duty He came to the 102nd Fighter Wing in 1978 and last year became the commander of the Massachusetts Air National Guard

Please see the attached biography for further details

Alert Site Mission

Quenneville recalled that in 1972 NORADs Air Defense mission included fifteen or sixteen alert sites Between 1972 and 2001 the number of sites declined due to the perception of the Cold War threat Most ofthose bases were at the maritime borders in 2001 as opposed to the northern alert sites that were active in the Cold War and meant to respond to an attack from over the North Pole and Canadian airspace

Quenneville explained that the alert site mission was relatively constant through its changes He noted that the mission at Otis ANGB was mostly focused on responding to Russian Bear (a type of aircraft with the capacity to carry air-to-surface missiles) activity When the Russians developed the Bear H model- that has the capability of launching a cruise missile- Otis had a high priority on shadowing those aircraft but as the Russian defense capability declined with the worsening of the Russian economy the number of alert sites declined

Quenneville remarked that prior to 911 the focus of the alert bases was still an outwards-looking monitoring mission Quenneville noted that Dr Finklestein a policy maker at NORAD analyzed possible threats to national airspace Quenneville opined that

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

25

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

his answer to the need of the air alert mission despite the end of the Cold War was that rogue states looking for high level weaponry had a free market in the former Soviet Union He believed that until those weapons were accounted for it was still necessary for Otis ANGB to have an air alert mission He noted that those focused on assessing the need for the air defense mission decided that seven air defense bases was the minimum needed

Hijack Mission

Quenneville noted that the hijack procedure and responsibility did not change over his career He believed that NORAD developed the procedures that were used by the Air Force to intercept a hijacked aircraft He noted that in addition to the radio signals to indicate a hijack that a pilot uses - signals Commission staff is familiar with - there were both hand signals and internationally developed signals that were familiar to the fighter pilots (for instance Quenneville noted that the direction and orientation from which a fighter performs an intercept is a way of signaling the pilot of the target of interest)

Hijack chain of command

According to Quenneville ideally the FAA would notify NORAD of an ongoing hijacking but ifNORAD became aware of a hijacking through a discreet IFF system code change then since both entities used joint-use radar the coordination would be sorted out between a NORAD sector like NEADS and the FAA before fighters are launched

Drug Interdiction Component

Quenneville noted that the F-1 06 did not participate in many drug interdictions circa 1986 He noted that fighters were deployed for forty-five days to Panama in the early nineties They would mostly intercept what was believed as a drug running aircraft then shadow the target aircraft until it landed

F-106 and F-15

Quenneville noted that the firing exercise he was involved in was to test different middot aircrafts ability to fire a tactical nuclear weapon This is one of the designs for the F-106 -to launch a missile referred to as the Geanie Rocket

Though the F ~15 was developed as an air interceptor it quickly showed its ability as a tactical fighter It was never designed to carry a nuclear weapon He noted also that the radar and ability to carry better missiles were improved from the F-106 to the F-15

NORADFAA Cooperation

Quenneville noted that the Otis ANGB take-off route which points off the coast and was designed to respond to an externally orientated threat did not at all times call for

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

26

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

FAA air traffic guidance The route is designed to point out ofthe main air traffic and that coordination could exist directly between NEADS controllers who have the ability to find a target on their radar systems and the fighter pilots He noted that exercises were conducted at night on occasion specifically because there is less air traffic at that time

Quenneville noted that he does not recall a live exercise involving the FAA and an airliner to practice a hijack He explained that the standard procedure was to never approach to closer than five models and to trail the hijacked aircraft to monitor its actions

Threats

Quenneville noted that though he was aware of Osama Bin Laden before 9 11 he never received a link between Bin Laden and the post-Cold War threats that were typified by the 9111 attacks He continued and noted that even though the quantity of threats had changed over his career the outlook and operational appro~ch to those threats had not The adequacy of the air defense mission ofNORAD was based on the ability to perceive a threat with enough time to respond

Quenneville noted that as of90l the fighters sat alert with an external tank and live guns it was possible they would sit with heat seeking missiles as well He said that because of the Russian Bear exercises that were scheduled on 9 11 the fighters were configured as 3-2-2-1 He noted this is a higher state of readiness than the fighters would normally have been at middot middot

Quenneville noted that the last intercept he recalls for Russian Bears was in 1988

911

Quenneville was advised during a weekly meeting that the pilots were put at Battle Stations due to a possible hijack The Operations Group Commander briefed him and he continued the meeting It ended and he went to get paper work for the next meeting Quenneville went into the break room and was told that a commuter airplane had just hit the World Trade Center (WTC) He told Commission staff that he thought at the time that it was a large whole for a commuter airplane He was watching the broadcast when United Airlines Flight 175 (VAL 175) hit the second tower He immediately called to convene the Battle Staff and headed to the Command Post

Quenneville noted that the fighters at alert status were NORAD assets and controlled by NORAD He said that as the Wing Commander on 9 11 he was considered a force provider He noted that NORAD always specified how to posture their air alert assets

At the Command Post the Battle Staff convened He noted that the initial intelligence that they relied on was that the suspected hijacked aircraft was the first aircraft to hit the WTC He did not recall if they initially knew the second aircraft was

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

27

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

hijacked as well He also noted that their aircraft were communicating with NEADS entities since the aircraft were too far away to communicate with directly

Quenneville noted that two of the training sortie fighters backed up the PANT A flight while the other aircraft were being refitted Quenneville believes that the training sortie fighters launched around 852 AM very close to the time the PANT A flight was airborne He noted that the training missions were recalled at 925 The Maine 85 tanker that was used by PANT A was deployed in support of those fighters training He noted there was another tanker in the air that they used as well

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

He noted that the operations group commander would have communicated changes in the ROE to the pilots who were launched subsequently of the initial scrambled fighters Quenneville explained that Duffy and Nash received the information from NEADS and that the other pilots were briefed per the direction ofNEADS by Otis ANGB staff Quenneville noted that the procedure created for this was in place and practiced since it was the same procedure that was used when DEFCONS were changed due to the Cold War threat

Quenneville noted that the ROE was developed based on bigger picture inputs On 911 there was a specific set of ROEs and these were adjusted accordingly The adjusted ROEs redefined where authority would be issued from to have an order to engage an airliner

Assets at Otis

He noted that following direction from NEADS Otis ANGB began manning combat air patrol (CAP) missions They recalled and refitted the training assets and launched fighters in support ofthe PANT A flight He noted that over the course ofthe day Otis ANGB changed the fighters from their training configuration to full armament As airplanes recovered they began loading heavier armament Within four hours they had a full configuration on five airplanes Within seventeen hours during continual flying operations they had fourteen out of seventeen airplanes fully configured All this was done in coordination with NEADS

CAPs

Quenneville noted that the role ofOtis ANGB was as a force provider for the NEADS mission Otis ANGB would tell them their capability and NEADS would make deployment decisionsbased on that He noted that Otis flew airplanes 2417 for six or seven weeks following 911

Post 911

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

28

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

Quenneville noted that as an example of the changes in personnel Otis ANGB was a training organization He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month But after 9111 it served four meals a day for months He noted this displays the amount of recall ofpersonnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks

Current Status

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001 and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002 Most of the personnel that were placed on active duty on 9111 were stood down by a year later

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert He also noted that they are not restricted to looking outward but that this threat still exists

Recommendations

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important and that by watching the countrys protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up ofNorthCom has assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense ofthe country

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States and that the ability to scale up quickly cannot be underestimated

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

Page 9: Interviews with Lt. Col. Maggie Quenneville and Brigadier General

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13

Major MCGRADY Joseph P Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Major DOONAN Dennis W Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Major ANDERSON Hal S Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col DAVIS Jay M Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col LEFAVOR James M Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col DOLAN Michael J Boston CAP Pilot 102FW

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4 Point of contact e 102nd Fighter Wing is Lt Col Jim LeFavor DSN 557-4385 or Lt Col Margaret Que eville DSN 557middot4664

-signed-JAMES M LEFAVOR Lt Col MAANG Operations Officer 101 FS

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15

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS 102D FIGHTER WING (ACC)

MASSACHUSETIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD OTIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE MASSACHUSETIS 02542-5028

MEMORANDUM FOR HAFXOHP ANG CAT 3 September 2003

FROM 102 FSDO 165 Izzea Street Bld 165 Otismiddot ANGB MA 02542

SUBJECT National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

1 This list ofkey personnel for the 102 Fighter Wing Otis ANGB Massachusetts comes in response to a request for information from USAFXOHP relayed through the Air National Guard Crisis Action Team senior director by e-mail dated Friday 29 August 2003

middot 2 Some of participants are now retired and the current addresses are supplied where known We will provide further address information when it becomes available

3 Listing of personnel follows (current rank)

Rank Name Position on 11 Sep 01 Status Col QUE~VTILLEDonrud Wing Commander1 HQMAANGCol WICKEL Albert S Vice Wing Commande 102FW Col SCHIAVI Anthony E Operations Group Commander3 102FW Col DUPUIS Richard R Support Group Commander4 102FW Col WORCESTER Paul G Logistics Group Commander5 102FW Col ELLIS Mark F Logistics Squadron Commander6 102FW CMSgt SILVA John D Command CMSgt 102FW

Col TREACY John D Fighter Squadron Commander8 ACCIDOG Lt Col RAMSAY William M Operations Officer retired Lt Col LYNCH Timothy M Operations Support Flight Comrnander9 102FW Lt Col FRENCH PhillipS Mission Support Flight Commander retired Major DOONAN Virgina I Aircraft Generation SQ Commander10 102FW Lt Col STEVENS Christina G Maintenance Squadron Commander 102FW

Lt Col DUFFY Timothy Alert Pilot ( 151 to scramble) 102FW Major NASH Daniel S Alert Pilot (1 51 to scramble) 102FW Major MARTYN RobertS NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Major RICHARD Martin J NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col RAY Douglas L Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Capt BECKEL Jeffrey S Boston CAP ilot 102FW

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UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUMFORTHERECORD

Event Interviews at Otis Air National Guard Base (Otis ANGB)

Type of event Interview with Brigadier General Donald J Quenneville

Date January 7 2004

Special Access Issues None

Prepared by Geoffrey Brown

Team Number 8

Location 102nd Fighter Wing Otis Air National Guard Base Massachusetts Air National

Guard

Participants - Non-Conunission Andrew Huddleston (Dep Ch Plans Integration amp Transformation Div AFXOHP 703 696-0024 Fax 703 588-0636)

Participants- Commission John Farmer John Azzarello Geoffrey Brown

Background

Quenileville has been in the military for 33 years Eight years of which was active duty He came to the 102nd Fighter Wing in 1978 and last year became the commander of the Massachusetts Air National Guard

Please see the attached biography for further details

Alert Site Mission

Quenneville recalled that in 1972 NORADs Air Defense mission included fifteen or sixteen alert sites Between 1972 and 2001 the number of sites declined due to the perception of the Cold War threat Most ofthose bases were at the maritime borders in 2001 as opposed to the northern alert sites that were active in the Cold War and meant to respond to an attack from over the North Pole and Canadian airspace

Quenneville explained that the alert site mission was relatively constant through its changes He noted that the mission at Otis ANGB was mostly focused on responding to Russian Bear (a type of aircraft with the capacity to carry air-to-surface missiles) activity When the Russians developed the Bear H model- that has the capability of launching a cruise missile- Otis had a high priority on shadowing those aircraft but as the Russian defense capability declined with the worsening of the Russian economy the number of alert sites declined

Quenneville remarked that prior to 911 the focus of the alert bases was still an outwards-looking monitoring mission Quenneville noted that Dr Finklestein a policy maker at NORAD analyzed possible threats to national airspace Quenneville opined that

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

25

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

his answer to the need of the air alert mission despite the end of the Cold War was that rogue states looking for high level weaponry had a free market in the former Soviet Union He believed that until those weapons were accounted for it was still necessary for Otis ANGB to have an air alert mission He noted that those focused on assessing the need for the air defense mission decided that seven air defense bases was the minimum needed

Hijack Mission

Quenneville noted that the hijack procedure and responsibility did not change over his career He believed that NORAD developed the procedures that were used by the Air Force to intercept a hijacked aircraft He noted that in addition to the radio signals to indicate a hijack that a pilot uses - signals Commission staff is familiar with - there were both hand signals and internationally developed signals that were familiar to the fighter pilots (for instance Quenneville noted that the direction and orientation from which a fighter performs an intercept is a way of signaling the pilot of the target of interest)

Hijack chain of command

According to Quenneville ideally the FAA would notify NORAD of an ongoing hijacking but ifNORAD became aware of a hijacking through a discreet IFF system code change then since both entities used joint-use radar the coordination would be sorted out between a NORAD sector like NEADS and the FAA before fighters are launched

Drug Interdiction Component

Quenneville noted that the F-1 06 did not participate in many drug interdictions circa 1986 He noted that fighters were deployed for forty-five days to Panama in the early nineties They would mostly intercept what was believed as a drug running aircraft then shadow the target aircraft until it landed

F-106 and F-15

Quenneville noted that the firing exercise he was involved in was to test different middot aircrafts ability to fire a tactical nuclear weapon This is one of the designs for the F-106 -to launch a missile referred to as the Geanie Rocket

Though the F ~15 was developed as an air interceptor it quickly showed its ability as a tactical fighter It was never designed to carry a nuclear weapon He noted also that the radar and ability to carry better missiles were improved from the F-106 to the F-15

NORADFAA Cooperation

Quenneville noted that the Otis ANGB take-off route which points off the coast and was designed to respond to an externally orientated threat did not at all times call for

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

26

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

FAA air traffic guidance The route is designed to point out ofthe main air traffic and that coordination could exist directly between NEADS controllers who have the ability to find a target on their radar systems and the fighter pilots He noted that exercises were conducted at night on occasion specifically because there is less air traffic at that time

Quenneville noted that he does not recall a live exercise involving the FAA and an airliner to practice a hijack He explained that the standard procedure was to never approach to closer than five models and to trail the hijacked aircraft to monitor its actions

Threats

Quenneville noted that though he was aware of Osama Bin Laden before 9 11 he never received a link between Bin Laden and the post-Cold War threats that were typified by the 9111 attacks He continued and noted that even though the quantity of threats had changed over his career the outlook and operational appro~ch to those threats had not The adequacy of the air defense mission ofNORAD was based on the ability to perceive a threat with enough time to respond

Quenneville noted that as of90l the fighters sat alert with an external tank and live guns it was possible they would sit with heat seeking missiles as well He said that because of the Russian Bear exercises that were scheduled on 9 11 the fighters were configured as 3-2-2-1 He noted this is a higher state of readiness than the fighters would normally have been at middot middot

Quenneville noted that the last intercept he recalls for Russian Bears was in 1988

911

Quenneville was advised during a weekly meeting that the pilots were put at Battle Stations due to a possible hijack The Operations Group Commander briefed him and he continued the meeting It ended and he went to get paper work for the next meeting Quenneville went into the break room and was told that a commuter airplane had just hit the World Trade Center (WTC) He told Commission staff that he thought at the time that it was a large whole for a commuter airplane He was watching the broadcast when United Airlines Flight 175 (VAL 175) hit the second tower He immediately called to convene the Battle Staff and headed to the Command Post

Quenneville noted that the fighters at alert status were NORAD assets and controlled by NORAD He said that as the Wing Commander on 9 11 he was considered a force provider He noted that NORAD always specified how to posture their air alert assets

At the Command Post the Battle Staff convened He noted that the initial intelligence that they relied on was that the suspected hijacked aircraft was the first aircraft to hit the WTC He did not recall if they initially knew the second aircraft was

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

27

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

hijacked as well He also noted that their aircraft were communicating with NEADS entities since the aircraft were too far away to communicate with directly

Quenneville noted that two of the training sortie fighters backed up the PANT A flight while the other aircraft were being refitted Quenneville believes that the training sortie fighters launched around 852 AM very close to the time the PANT A flight was airborne He noted that the training missions were recalled at 925 The Maine 85 tanker that was used by PANT A was deployed in support of those fighters training He noted there was another tanker in the air that they used as well

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

He noted that the operations group commander would have communicated changes in the ROE to the pilots who were launched subsequently of the initial scrambled fighters Quenneville explained that Duffy and Nash received the information from NEADS and that the other pilots were briefed per the direction ofNEADS by Otis ANGB staff Quenneville noted that the procedure created for this was in place and practiced since it was the same procedure that was used when DEFCONS were changed due to the Cold War threat

Quenneville noted that the ROE was developed based on bigger picture inputs On 911 there was a specific set of ROEs and these were adjusted accordingly The adjusted ROEs redefined where authority would be issued from to have an order to engage an airliner

Assets at Otis

He noted that following direction from NEADS Otis ANGB began manning combat air patrol (CAP) missions They recalled and refitted the training assets and launched fighters in support ofthe PANT A flight He noted that over the course ofthe day Otis ANGB changed the fighters from their training configuration to full armament As airplanes recovered they began loading heavier armament Within four hours they had a full configuration on five airplanes Within seventeen hours during continual flying operations they had fourteen out of seventeen airplanes fully configured All this was done in coordination with NEADS

CAPs

Quenneville noted that the role ofOtis ANGB was as a force provider for the NEADS mission Otis ANGB would tell them their capability and NEADS would make deployment decisionsbased on that He noted that Otis flew airplanes 2417 for six or seven weeks following 911

Post 911

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

28

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

Quenneville noted that as an example of the changes in personnel Otis ANGB was a training organization He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month But after 9111 it served four meals a day for months He noted this displays the amount of recall ofpersonnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks

Current Status

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001 and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002 Most of the personnel that were placed on active duty on 9111 were stood down by a year later

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert He also noted that they are not restricted to looking outward but that this threat still exists

Recommendations

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important and that by watching the countrys protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up ofNorthCom has assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense ofthe country

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States and that the ability to scale up quickly cannot be underestimated

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

Page 10: Interviews with Lt. Col. Maggie Quenneville and Brigadier General

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13

Major MCGRADY Joseph P Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Major DOONAN Dennis W Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Major ANDERSON Hal S Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col DAVIS Jay M Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col LEFAVOR James M Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col DOLAN Michael J Boston CAP Pilot 102FW

Address for retired Lt Col Ramsayavailable at this time

-r------------

ddress f

or retired U Col French is not

4 Point of contact e 102nd Fighter Wing is Lt Col Jim LeFavor DSN 557-4385 or Lt Col Margaret Que eville DSN 557middot4664

-signed-JAMES M LEFAVOR Lt Col MAANG Operations Officer 101 FS

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15

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS 102D FIGHTER WING (ACC)

MASSACHUSETIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD OTIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE MASSACHUSETIS 02542-5028

MEMORANDUM FOR HAFXOHP ANG CAT 3 September 2003

FROM 102 FSDO 165 Izzea Street Bld 165 Otismiddot ANGB MA 02542

SUBJECT National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

1 This list ofkey personnel for the 102 Fighter Wing Otis ANGB Massachusetts comes in response to a request for information from USAFXOHP relayed through the Air National Guard Crisis Action Team senior director by e-mail dated Friday 29 August 2003

middot 2 Some of participants are now retired and the current addresses are supplied where known We will provide further address information when it becomes available

3 Listing of personnel follows (current rank)

Rank Name Position on 11 Sep 01 Status Col QUE~VTILLEDonrud Wing Commander1 HQMAANGCol WICKEL Albert S Vice Wing Commande 102FW Col SCHIAVI Anthony E Operations Group Commander3 102FW Col DUPUIS Richard R Support Group Commander4 102FW Col WORCESTER Paul G Logistics Group Commander5 102FW Col ELLIS Mark F Logistics Squadron Commander6 102FW CMSgt SILVA John D Command CMSgt 102FW

Col TREACY John D Fighter Squadron Commander8 ACCIDOG Lt Col RAMSAY William M Operations Officer retired Lt Col LYNCH Timothy M Operations Support Flight Comrnander9 102FW Lt Col FRENCH PhillipS Mission Support Flight Commander retired Major DOONAN Virgina I Aircraft Generation SQ Commander10 102FW Lt Col STEVENS Christina G Maintenance Squadron Commander 102FW

Lt Col DUFFY Timothy Alert Pilot ( 151 to scramble) 102FW Major NASH Daniel S Alert Pilot (1 51 to scramble) 102FW Major MARTYN RobertS NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Major RICHARD Martin J NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col RAY Douglas L Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Capt BECKEL Jeffrey S Boston CAP ilot 102FW

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24

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUMFORTHERECORD

Event Interviews at Otis Air National Guard Base (Otis ANGB)

Type of event Interview with Brigadier General Donald J Quenneville

Date January 7 2004

Special Access Issues None

Prepared by Geoffrey Brown

Team Number 8

Location 102nd Fighter Wing Otis Air National Guard Base Massachusetts Air National

Guard

Participants - Non-Conunission Andrew Huddleston (Dep Ch Plans Integration amp Transformation Div AFXOHP 703 696-0024 Fax 703 588-0636)

Participants- Commission John Farmer John Azzarello Geoffrey Brown

Background

Quenileville has been in the military for 33 years Eight years of which was active duty He came to the 102nd Fighter Wing in 1978 and last year became the commander of the Massachusetts Air National Guard

Please see the attached biography for further details

Alert Site Mission

Quenneville recalled that in 1972 NORADs Air Defense mission included fifteen or sixteen alert sites Between 1972 and 2001 the number of sites declined due to the perception of the Cold War threat Most ofthose bases were at the maritime borders in 2001 as opposed to the northern alert sites that were active in the Cold War and meant to respond to an attack from over the North Pole and Canadian airspace

Quenneville explained that the alert site mission was relatively constant through its changes He noted that the mission at Otis ANGB was mostly focused on responding to Russian Bear (a type of aircraft with the capacity to carry air-to-surface missiles) activity When the Russians developed the Bear H model- that has the capability of launching a cruise missile- Otis had a high priority on shadowing those aircraft but as the Russian defense capability declined with the worsening of the Russian economy the number of alert sites declined

Quenneville remarked that prior to 911 the focus of the alert bases was still an outwards-looking monitoring mission Quenneville noted that Dr Finklestein a policy maker at NORAD analyzed possible threats to national airspace Quenneville opined that

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

25

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

his answer to the need of the air alert mission despite the end of the Cold War was that rogue states looking for high level weaponry had a free market in the former Soviet Union He believed that until those weapons were accounted for it was still necessary for Otis ANGB to have an air alert mission He noted that those focused on assessing the need for the air defense mission decided that seven air defense bases was the minimum needed

Hijack Mission

Quenneville noted that the hijack procedure and responsibility did not change over his career He believed that NORAD developed the procedures that were used by the Air Force to intercept a hijacked aircraft He noted that in addition to the radio signals to indicate a hijack that a pilot uses - signals Commission staff is familiar with - there were both hand signals and internationally developed signals that were familiar to the fighter pilots (for instance Quenneville noted that the direction and orientation from which a fighter performs an intercept is a way of signaling the pilot of the target of interest)

Hijack chain of command

According to Quenneville ideally the FAA would notify NORAD of an ongoing hijacking but ifNORAD became aware of a hijacking through a discreet IFF system code change then since both entities used joint-use radar the coordination would be sorted out between a NORAD sector like NEADS and the FAA before fighters are launched

Drug Interdiction Component

Quenneville noted that the F-1 06 did not participate in many drug interdictions circa 1986 He noted that fighters were deployed for forty-five days to Panama in the early nineties They would mostly intercept what was believed as a drug running aircraft then shadow the target aircraft until it landed

F-106 and F-15

Quenneville noted that the firing exercise he was involved in was to test different middot aircrafts ability to fire a tactical nuclear weapon This is one of the designs for the F-106 -to launch a missile referred to as the Geanie Rocket

Though the F ~15 was developed as an air interceptor it quickly showed its ability as a tactical fighter It was never designed to carry a nuclear weapon He noted also that the radar and ability to carry better missiles were improved from the F-106 to the F-15

NORADFAA Cooperation

Quenneville noted that the Otis ANGB take-off route which points off the coast and was designed to respond to an externally orientated threat did not at all times call for

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

26

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

FAA air traffic guidance The route is designed to point out ofthe main air traffic and that coordination could exist directly between NEADS controllers who have the ability to find a target on their radar systems and the fighter pilots He noted that exercises were conducted at night on occasion specifically because there is less air traffic at that time

Quenneville noted that he does not recall a live exercise involving the FAA and an airliner to practice a hijack He explained that the standard procedure was to never approach to closer than five models and to trail the hijacked aircraft to monitor its actions

Threats

Quenneville noted that though he was aware of Osama Bin Laden before 9 11 he never received a link between Bin Laden and the post-Cold War threats that were typified by the 9111 attacks He continued and noted that even though the quantity of threats had changed over his career the outlook and operational appro~ch to those threats had not The adequacy of the air defense mission ofNORAD was based on the ability to perceive a threat with enough time to respond

Quenneville noted that as of90l the fighters sat alert with an external tank and live guns it was possible they would sit with heat seeking missiles as well He said that because of the Russian Bear exercises that were scheduled on 9 11 the fighters were configured as 3-2-2-1 He noted this is a higher state of readiness than the fighters would normally have been at middot middot

Quenneville noted that the last intercept he recalls for Russian Bears was in 1988

911

Quenneville was advised during a weekly meeting that the pilots were put at Battle Stations due to a possible hijack The Operations Group Commander briefed him and he continued the meeting It ended and he went to get paper work for the next meeting Quenneville went into the break room and was told that a commuter airplane had just hit the World Trade Center (WTC) He told Commission staff that he thought at the time that it was a large whole for a commuter airplane He was watching the broadcast when United Airlines Flight 175 (VAL 175) hit the second tower He immediately called to convene the Battle Staff and headed to the Command Post

Quenneville noted that the fighters at alert status were NORAD assets and controlled by NORAD He said that as the Wing Commander on 9 11 he was considered a force provider He noted that NORAD always specified how to posture their air alert assets

At the Command Post the Battle Staff convened He noted that the initial intelligence that they relied on was that the suspected hijacked aircraft was the first aircraft to hit the WTC He did not recall if they initially knew the second aircraft was

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

27

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

hijacked as well He also noted that their aircraft were communicating with NEADS entities since the aircraft were too far away to communicate with directly

Quenneville noted that two of the training sortie fighters backed up the PANT A flight while the other aircraft were being refitted Quenneville believes that the training sortie fighters launched around 852 AM very close to the time the PANT A flight was airborne He noted that the training missions were recalled at 925 The Maine 85 tanker that was used by PANT A was deployed in support of those fighters training He noted there was another tanker in the air that they used as well

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

He noted that the operations group commander would have communicated changes in the ROE to the pilots who were launched subsequently of the initial scrambled fighters Quenneville explained that Duffy and Nash received the information from NEADS and that the other pilots were briefed per the direction ofNEADS by Otis ANGB staff Quenneville noted that the procedure created for this was in place and practiced since it was the same procedure that was used when DEFCONS were changed due to the Cold War threat

Quenneville noted that the ROE was developed based on bigger picture inputs On 911 there was a specific set of ROEs and these were adjusted accordingly The adjusted ROEs redefined where authority would be issued from to have an order to engage an airliner

Assets at Otis

He noted that following direction from NEADS Otis ANGB began manning combat air patrol (CAP) missions They recalled and refitted the training assets and launched fighters in support ofthe PANT A flight He noted that over the course ofthe day Otis ANGB changed the fighters from their training configuration to full armament As airplanes recovered they began loading heavier armament Within four hours they had a full configuration on five airplanes Within seventeen hours during continual flying operations they had fourteen out of seventeen airplanes fully configured All this was done in coordination with NEADS

CAPs

Quenneville noted that the role ofOtis ANGB was as a force provider for the NEADS mission Otis ANGB would tell them their capability and NEADS would make deployment decisionsbased on that He noted that Otis flew airplanes 2417 for six or seven weeks following 911

Post 911

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

28

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

Quenneville noted that as an example of the changes in personnel Otis ANGB was a training organization He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month But after 9111 it served four meals a day for months He noted this displays the amount of recall ofpersonnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks

Current Status

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001 and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002 Most of the personnel that were placed on active duty on 9111 were stood down by a year later

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert He also noted that they are not restricted to looking outward but that this threat still exists

Recommendations

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important and that by watching the countrys protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up ofNorthCom has assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense ofthe country

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States and that the ability to scale up quickly cannot be underestimated

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

Page 11: Interviews with Lt. Col. Maggie Quenneville and Brigadier General

102FW Military Org on 911

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13

Major MCGRADY Joseph P Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Major DOONAN Dennis W Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Major ANDERSON Hal S Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col DAVIS Jay M Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col LEFAVOR James M Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col DOLAN Michael J Boston CAP Pilot 102FW

Address for retired Lt Col Ramsayavailable at this time

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ddress f

or retired U Col French is not

4 Point of contact e 102nd Fighter Wing is Lt Col Jim LeFavor DSN 557-4385 or Lt Col Margaret Que eville DSN 557middot4664

-signed-JAMES M LEFAVOR Lt Col MAANG Operations Officer 101 FS

1 Now serving as Commander Mass Air National Guard 2 Now serving as Operations Group Commander 3 Now serving as Vice Wing Commander middot 4 Now serving as Maintenance Group Commander 5 Now serving as Wing Commander 6 Now serving as Mission Support Group Commander 7 Now serving as Superintendant of Security Forces middot 8 Now ser-Ving as Air National Guard Assitant Director of Operations ACCDOG 9 Now serving as Fighter Squadron Commander 10Now serving as Mission Support Flight Commander

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15

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS 102D FIGHTER WING (ACC)

MASSACHUSETIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD OTIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE MASSACHUSETIS 02542-5028

MEMORANDUM FOR HAFXOHP ANG CAT 3 September 2003

FROM 102 FSDO 165 Izzea Street Bld 165 Otismiddot ANGB MA 02542

SUBJECT National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

1 This list ofkey personnel for the 102 Fighter Wing Otis ANGB Massachusetts comes in response to a request for information from USAFXOHP relayed through the Air National Guard Crisis Action Team senior director by e-mail dated Friday 29 August 2003

middot 2 Some of participants are now retired and the current addresses are supplied where known We will provide further address information when it becomes available

3 Listing of personnel follows (current rank)

Rank Name Position on 11 Sep 01 Status Col QUE~VTILLEDonrud Wing Commander1 HQMAANGCol WICKEL Albert S Vice Wing Commande 102FW Col SCHIAVI Anthony E Operations Group Commander3 102FW Col DUPUIS Richard R Support Group Commander4 102FW Col WORCESTER Paul G Logistics Group Commander5 102FW Col ELLIS Mark F Logistics Squadron Commander6 102FW CMSgt SILVA John D Command CMSgt 102FW

Col TREACY John D Fighter Squadron Commander8 ACCIDOG Lt Col RAMSAY William M Operations Officer retired Lt Col LYNCH Timothy M Operations Support Flight Comrnander9 102FW Lt Col FRENCH PhillipS Mission Support Flight Commander retired Major DOONAN Virgina I Aircraft Generation SQ Commander10 102FW Lt Col STEVENS Christina G Maintenance Squadron Commander 102FW

Lt Col DUFFY Timothy Alert Pilot ( 151 to scramble) 102FW Major NASH Daniel S Alert Pilot (1 51 to scramble) 102FW Major MARTYN RobertS NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Major RICHARD Martin J NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col RAY Douglas L Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Capt BECKEL Jeffrey S Boston CAP ilot 102FW

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24

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUMFORTHERECORD

Event Interviews at Otis Air National Guard Base (Otis ANGB)

Type of event Interview with Brigadier General Donald J Quenneville

Date January 7 2004

Special Access Issues None

Prepared by Geoffrey Brown

Team Number 8

Location 102nd Fighter Wing Otis Air National Guard Base Massachusetts Air National

Guard

Participants - Non-Conunission Andrew Huddleston (Dep Ch Plans Integration amp Transformation Div AFXOHP 703 696-0024 Fax 703 588-0636)

Participants- Commission John Farmer John Azzarello Geoffrey Brown

Background

Quenileville has been in the military for 33 years Eight years of which was active duty He came to the 102nd Fighter Wing in 1978 and last year became the commander of the Massachusetts Air National Guard

Please see the attached biography for further details

Alert Site Mission

Quenneville recalled that in 1972 NORADs Air Defense mission included fifteen or sixteen alert sites Between 1972 and 2001 the number of sites declined due to the perception of the Cold War threat Most ofthose bases were at the maritime borders in 2001 as opposed to the northern alert sites that were active in the Cold War and meant to respond to an attack from over the North Pole and Canadian airspace

Quenneville explained that the alert site mission was relatively constant through its changes He noted that the mission at Otis ANGB was mostly focused on responding to Russian Bear (a type of aircraft with the capacity to carry air-to-surface missiles) activity When the Russians developed the Bear H model- that has the capability of launching a cruise missile- Otis had a high priority on shadowing those aircraft but as the Russian defense capability declined with the worsening of the Russian economy the number of alert sites declined

Quenneville remarked that prior to 911 the focus of the alert bases was still an outwards-looking monitoring mission Quenneville noted that Dr Finklestein a policy maker at NORAD analyzed possible threats to national airspace Quenneville opined that

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

25

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

his answer to the need of the air alert mission despite the end of the Cold War was that rogue states looking for high level weaponry had a free market in the former Soviet Union He believed that until those weapons were accounted for it was still necessary for Otis ANGB to have an air alert mission He noted that those focused on assessing the need for the air defense mission decided that seven air defense bases was the minimum needed

Hijack Mission

Quenneville noted that the hijack procedure and responsibility did not change over his career He believed that NORAD developed the procedures that were used by the Air Force to intercept a hijacked aircraft He noted that in addition to the radio signals to indicate a hijack that a pilot uses - signals Commission staff is familiar with - there were both hand signals and internationally developed signals that were familiar to the fighter pilots (for instance Quenneville noted that the direction and orientation from which a fighter performs an intercept is a way of signaling the pilot of the target of interest)

Hijack chain of command

According to Quenneville ideally the FAA would notify NORAD of an ongoing hijacking but ifNORAD became aware of a hijacking through a discreet IFF system code change then since both entities used joint-use radar the coordination would be sorted out between a NORAD sector like NEADS and the FAA before fighters are launched

Drug Interdiction Component

Quenneville noted that the F-1 06 did not participate in many drug interdictions circa 1986 He noted that fighters were deployed for forty-five days to Panama in the early nineties They would mostly intercept what was believed as a drug running aircraft then shadow the target aircraft until it landed

F-106 and F-15

Quenneville noted that the firing exercise he was involved in was to test different middot aircrafts ability to fire a tactical nuclear weapon This is one of the designs for the F-106 -to launch a missile referred to as the Geanie Rocket

Though the F ~15 was developed as an air interceptor it quickly showed its ability as a tactical fighter It was never designed to carry a nuclear weapon He noted also that the radar and ability to carry better missiles were improved from the F-106 to the F-15

NORADFAA Cooperation

Quenneville noted that the Otis ANGB take-off route which points off the coast and was designed to respond to an externally orientated threat did not at all times call for

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

26

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

FAA air traffic guidance The route is designed to point out ofthe main air traffic and that coordination could exist directly between NEADS controllers who have the ability to find a target on their radar systems and the fighter pilots He noted that exercises were conducted at night on occasion specifically because there is less air traffic at that time

Quenneville noted that he does not recall a live exercise involving the FAA and an airliner to practice a hijack He explained that the standard procedure was to never approach to closer than five models and to trail the hijacked aircraft to monitor its actions

Threats

Quenneville noted that though he was aware of Osama Bin Laden before 9 11 he never received a link between Bin Laden and the post-Cold War threats that were typified by the 9111 attacks He continued and noted that even though the quantity of threats had changed over his career the outlook and operational appro~ch to those threats had not The adequacy of the air defense mission ofNORAD was based on the ability to perceive a threat with enough time to respond

Quenneville noted that as of90l the fighters sat alert with an external tank and live guns it was possible they would sit with heat seeking missiles as well He said that because of the Russian Bear exercises that were scheduled on 9 11 the fighters were configured as 3-2-2-1 He noted this is a higher state of readiness than the fighters would normally have been at middot middot

Quenneville noted that the last intercept he recalls for Russian Bears was in 1988

911

Quenneville was advised during a weekly meeting that the pilots were put at Battle Stations due to a possible hijack The Operations Group Commander briefed him and he continued the meeting It ended and he went to get paper work for the next meeting Quenneville went into the break room and was told that a commuter airplane had just hit the World Trade Center (WTC) He told Commission staff that he thought at the time that it was a large whole for a commuter airplane He was watching the broadcast when United Airlines Flight 175 (VAL 175) hit the second tower He immediately called to convene the Battle Staff and headed to the Command Post

Quenneville noted that the fighters at alert status were NORAD assets and controlled by NORAD He said that as the Wing Commander on 9 11 he was considered a force provider He noted that NORAD always specified how to posture their air alert assets

At the Command Post the Battle Staff convened He noted that the initial intelligence that they relied on was that the suspected hijacked aircraft was the first aircraft to hit the WTC He did not recall if they initially knew the second aircraft was

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

27

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

hijacked as well He also noted that their aircraft were communicating with NEADS entities since the aircraft were too far away to communicate with directly

Quenneville noted that two of the training sortie fighters backed up the PANT A flight while the other aircraft were being refitted Quenneville believes that the training sortie fighters launched around 852 AM very close to the time the PANT A flight was airborne He noted that the training missions were recalled at 925 The Maine 85 tanker that was used by PANT A was deployed in support of those fighters training He noted there was another tanker in the air that they used as well

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

He noted that the operations group commander would have communicated changes in the ROE to the pilots who were launched subsequently of the initial scrambled fighters Quenneville explained that Duffy and Nash received the information from NEADS and that the other pilots were briefed per the direction ofNEADS by Otis ANGB staff Quenneville noted that the procedure created for this was in place and practiced since it was the same procedure that was used when DEFCONS were changed due to the Cold War threat

Quenneville noted that the ROE was developed based on bigger picture inputs On 911 there was a specific set of ROEs and these were adjusted accordingly The adjusted ROEs redefined where authority would be issued from to have an order to engage an airliner

Assets at Otis

He noted that following direction from NEADS Otis ANGB began manning combat air patrol (CAP) missions They recalled and refitted the training assets and launched fighters in support ofthe PANT A flight He noted that over the course ofthe day Otis ANGB changed the fighters from their training configuration to full armament As airplanes recovered they began loading heavier armament Within four hours they had a full configuration on five airplanes Within seventeen hours during continual flying operations they had fourteen out of seventeen airplanes fully configured All this was done in coordination with NEADS

CAPs

Quenneville noted that the role ofOtis ANGB was as a force provider for the NEADS mission Otis ANGB would tell them their capability and NEADS would make deployment decisionsbased on that He noted that Otis flew airplanes 2417 for six or seven weeks following 911

Post 911

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

28

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

Quenneville noted that as an example of the changes in personnel Otis ANGB was a training organization He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month But after 9111 it served four meals a day for months He noted this displays the amount of recall ofpersonnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks

Current Status

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001 and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002 Most of the personnel that were placed on active duty on 9111 were stood down by a year later

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert He also noted that they are not restricted to looking outward but that this threat still exists

Recommendations

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important and that by watching the countrys protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up ofNorthCom has assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense ofthe country

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States and that the ability to scale up quickly cannot be underestimated

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

Page 12: Interviews with Lt. Col. Maggie Quenneville and Brigadier General

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13

Major MCGRADY Joseph P Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Major DOONAN Dennis W Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Major ANDERSON Hal S Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col DAVIS Jay M Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col LEFAVOR James M Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col DOLAN Michael J Boston CAP Pilot 102FW

Address for retired Lt Col Ramsayavailable at this time

-r------------

ddress f

or retired U Col French is not

4 Point of contact e 102nd Fighter Wing is Lt Col Jim LeFavor DSN 557-4385 or Lt Col Margaret Que eville DSN 557middot4664

-signed-JAMES M LEFAVOR Lt Col MAANG Operations Officer 101 FS

1 Now serving as Commander Mass Air National Guard 2 Now serving as Operations Group Commander 3 Now serving as Vice Wing Commander middot 4 Now serving as Maintenance Group Commander 5 Now serving as Wing Commander 6 Now serving as Mission Support Group Commander 7 Now serving as Superintendant of Security Forces middot 8 Now ser-Ving as Air National Guard Assitant Director of Operations ACCDOG 9 Now serving as Fighter Squadron Commander 10Now serving as Mission Support Flight Commander

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15

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS 102D FIGHTER WING (ACC)

MASSACHUSETIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD OTIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE MASSACHUSETIS 02542-5028

MEMORANDUM FOR HAFXOHP ANG CAT 3 September 2003

FROM 102 FSDO 165 Izzea Street Bld 165 Otismiddot ANGB MA 02542

SUBJECT National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

1 This list ofkey personnel for the 102 Fighter Wing Otis ANGB Massachusetts comes in response to a request for information from USAFXOHP relayed through the Air National Guard Crisis Action Team senior director by e-mail dated Friday 29 August 2003

middot 2 Some of participants are now retired and the current addresses are supplied where known We will provide further address information when it becomes available

3 Listing of personnel follows (current rank)

Rank Name Position on 11 Sep 01 Status Col QUE~VTILLEDonrud Wing Commander1 HQMAANGCol WICKEL Albert S Vice Wing Commande 102FW Col SCHIAVI Anthony E Operations Group Commander3 102FW Col DUPUIS Richard R Support Group Commander4 102FW Col WORCESTER Paul G Logistics Group Commander5 102FW Col ELLIS Mark F Logistics Squadron Commander6 102FW CMSgt SILVA John D Command CMSgt 102FW

Col TREACY John D Fighter Squadron Commander8 ACCIDOG Lt Col RAMSAY William M Operations Officer retired Lt Col LYNCH Timothy M Operations Support Flight Comrnander9 102FW Lt Col FRENCH PhillipS Mission Support Flight Commander retired Major DOONAN Virgina I Aircraft Generation SQ Commander10 102FW Lt Col STEVENS Christina G Maintenance Squadron Commander 102FW

Lt Col DUFFY Timothy Alert Pilot ( 151 to scramble) 102FW Major NASH Daniel S Alert Pilot (1 51 to scramble) 102FW Major MARTYN RobertS NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Major RICHARD Martin J NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col RAY Douglas L Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Capt BECKEL Jeffrey S Boston CAP ilot 102FW

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24

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUMFORTHERECORD

Event Interviews at Otis Air National Guard Base (Otis ANGB)

Type of event Interview with Brigadier General Donald J Quenneville

Date January 7 2004

Special Access Issues None

Prepared by Geoffrey Brown

Team Number 8

Location 102nd Fighter Wing Otis Air National Guard Base Massachusetts Air National

Guard

Participants - Non-Conunission Andrew Huddleston (Dep Ch Plans Integration amp Transformation Div AFXOHP 703 696-0024 Fax 703 588-0636)

Participants- Commission John Farmer John Azzarello Geoffrey Brown

Background

Quenileville has been in the military for 33 years Eight years of which was active duty He came to the 102nd Fighter Wing in 1978 and last year became the commander of the Massachusetts Air National Guard

Please see the attached biography for further details

Alert Site Mission

Quenneville recalled that in 1972 NORADs Air Defense mission included fifteen or sixteen alert sites Between 1972 and 2001 the number of sites declined due to the perception of the Cold War threat Most ofthose bases were at the maritime borders in 2001 as opposed to the northern alert sites that were active in the Cold War and meant to respond to an attack from over the North Pole and Canadian airspace

Quenneville explained that the alert site mission was relatively constant through its changes He noted that the mission at Otis ANGB was mostly focused on responding to Russian Bear (a type of aircraft with the capacity to carry air-to-surface missiles) activity When the Russians developed the Bear H model- that has the capability of launching a cruise missile- Otis had a high priority on shadowing those aircraft but as the Russian defense capability declined with the worsening of the Russian economy the number of alert sites declined

Quenneville remarked that prior to 911 the focus of the alert bases was still an outwards-looking monitoring mission Quenneville noted that Dr Finklestein a policy maker at NORAD analyzed possible threats to national airspace Quenneville opined that

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

25

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

his answer to the need of the air alert mission despite the end of the Cold War was that rogue states looking for high level weaponry had a free market in the former Soviet Union He believed that until those weapons were accounted for it was still necessary for Otis ANGB to have an air alert mission He noted that those focused on assessing the need for the air defense mission decided that seven air defense bases was the minimum needed

Hijack Mission

Quenneville noted that the hijack procedure and responsibility did not change over his career He believed that NORAD developed the procedures that were used by the Air Force to intercept a hijacked aircraft He noted that in addition to the radio signals to indicate a hijack that a pilot uses - signals Commission staff is familiar with - there were both hand signals and internationally developed signals that were familiar to the fighter pilots (for instance Quenneville noted that the direction and orientation from which a fighter performs an intercept is a way of signaling the pilot of the target of interest)

Hijack chain of command

According to Quenneville ideally the FAA would notify NORAD of an ongoing hijacking but ifNORAD became aware of a hijacking through a discreet IFF system code change then since both entities used joint-use radar the coordination would be sorted out between a NORAD sector like NEADS and the FAA before fighters are launched

Drug Interdiction Component

Quenneville noted that the F-1 06 did not participate in many drug interdictions circa 1986 He noted that fighters were deployed for forty-five days to Panama in the early nineties They would mostly intercept what was believed as a drug running aircraft then shadow the target aircraft until it landed

F-106 and F-15

Quenneville noted that the firing exercise he was involved in was to test different middot aircrafts ability to fire a tactical nuclear weapon This is one of the designs for the F-106 -to launch a missile referred to as the Geanie Rocket

Though the F ~15 was developed as an air interceptor it quickly showed its ability as a tactical fighter It was never designed to carry a nuclear weapon He noted also that the radar and ability to carry better missiles were improved from the F-106 to the F-15

NORADFAA Cooperation

Quenneville noted that the Otis ANGB take-off route which points off the coast and was designed to respond to an externally orientated threat did not at all times call for

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

26

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

FAA air traffic guidance The route is designed to point out ofthe main air traffic and that coordination could exist directly between NEADS controllers who have the ability to find a target on their radar systems and the fighter pilots He noted that exercises were conducted at night on occasion specifically because there is less air traffic at that time

Quenneville noted that he does not recall a live exercise involving the FAA and an airliner to practice a hijack He explained that the standard procedure was to never approach to closer than five models and to trail the hijacked aircraft to monitor its actions

Threats

Quenneville noted that though he was aware of Osama Bin Laden before 9 11 he never received a link between Bin Laden and the post-Cold War threats that were typified by the 9111 attacks He continued and noted that even though the quantity of threats had changed over his career the outlook and operational appro~ch to those threats had not The adequacy of the air defense mission ofNORAD was based on the ability to perceive a threat with enough time to respond

Quenneville noted that as of90l the fighters sat alert with an external tank and live guns it was possible they would sit with heat seeking missiles as well He said that because of the Russian Bear exercises that were scheduled on 9 11 the fighters were configured as 3-2-2-1 He noted this is a higher state of readiness than the fighters would normally have been at middot middot

Quenneville noted that the last intercept he recalls for Russian Bears was in 1988

911

Quenneville was advised during a weekly meeting that the pilots were put at Battle Stations due to a possible hijack The Operations Group Commander briefed him and he continued the meeting It ended and he went to get paper work for the next meeting Quenneville went into the break room and was told that a commuter airplane had just hit the World Trade Center (WTC) He told Commission staff that he thought at the time that it was a large whole for a commuter airplane He was watching the broadcast when United Airlines Flight 175 (VAL 175) hit the second tower He immediately called to convene the Battle Staff and headed to the Command Post

Quenneville noted that the fighters at alert status were NORAD assets and controlled by NORAD He said that as the Wing Commander on 9 11 he was considered a force provider He noted that NORAD always specified how to posture their air alert assets

At the Command Post the Battle Staff convened He noted that the initial intelligence that they relied on was that the suspected hijacked aircraft was the first aircraft to hit the WTC He did not recall if they initially knew the second aircraft was

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

27

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

hijacked as well He also noted that their aircraft were communicating with NEADS entities since the aircraft were too far away to communicate with directly

Quenneville noted that two of the training sortie fighters backed up the PANT A flight while the other aircraft were being refitted Quenneville believes that the training sortie fighters launched around 852 AM very close to the time the PANT A flight was airborne He noted that the training missions were recalled at 925 The Maine 85 tanker that was used by PANT A was deployed in support of those fighters training He noted there was another tanker in the air that they used as well

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

He noted that the operations group commander would have communicated changes in the ROE to the pilots who were launched subsequently of the initial scrambled fighters Quenneville explained that Duffy and Nash received the information from NEADS and that the other pilots were briefed per the direction ofNEADS by Otis ANGB staff Quenneville noted that the procedure created for this was in place and practiced since it was the same procedure that was used when DEFCONS were changed due to the Cold War threat

Quenneville noted that the ROE was developed based on bigger picture inputs On 911 there was a specific set of ROEs and these were adjusted accordingly The adjusted ROEs redefined where authority would be issued from to have an order to engage an airliner

Assets at Otis

He noted that following direction from NEADS Otis ANGB began manning combat air patrol (CAP) missions They recalled and refitted the training assets and launched fighters in support ofthe PANT A flight He noted that over the course ofthe day Otis ANGB changed the fighters from their training configuration to full armament As airplanes recovered they began loading heavier armament Within four hours they had a full configuration on five airplanes Within seventeen hours during continual flying operations they had fourteen out of seventeen airplanes fully configured All this was done in coordination with NEADS

CAPs

Quenneville noted that the role ofOtis ANGB was as a force provider for the NEADS mission Otis ANGB would tell them their capability and NEADS would make deployment decisionsbased on that He noted that Otis flew airplanes 2417 for six or seven weeks following 911

Post 911

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

28

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

Quenneville noted that as an example of the changes in personnel Otis ANGB was a training organization He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month But after 9111 it served four meals a day for months He noted this displays the amount of recall ofpersonnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks

Current Status

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001 and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002 Most of the personnel that were placed on active duty on 9111 were stood down by a year later

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert He also noted that they are not restricted to looking outward but that this threat still exists

Recommendations

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important and that by watching the countrys protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up ofNorthCom has assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense ofthe country

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States and that the ability to scale up quickly cannot be underestimated

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

Page 13: Interviews with Lt. Col. Maggie Quenneville and Brigadier General

Withheld from public release by National Archives and Records Administration under 36 CFR sect 125656

13

Major MCGRADY Joseph P Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Major DOONAN Dennis W Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Major ANDERSON Hal S Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col DAVIS Jay M Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col LEFAVOR James M Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col DOLAN Michael J Boston CAP Pilot 102FW

Address for retired Lt Col Ramsayavailable at this time

-r------------

ddress f

or retired U Col French is not

4 Point of contact e 102nd Fighter Wing is Lt Col Jim LeFavor DSN 557-4385 or Lt Col Margaret Que eville DSN 557middot4664

-signed-JAMES M LEFAVOR Lt Col MAANG Operations Officer 101 FS

1 Now serving as Commander Mass Air National Guard 2 Now serving as Operations Group Commander 3 Now serving as Vice Wing Commander middot 4 Now serving as Maintenance Group Commander 5 Now serving as Wing Commander 6 Now serving as Mission Support Group Commander 7 Now serving as Superintendant of Security Forces middot 8 Now ser-Ving as Air National Guard Assitant Director of Operations ACCDOG 9 Now serving as Fighter Squadron Commander 10Now serving as Mission Support Flight Commander

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f~rJ f c t ~J -fl1 75 ~d~- middot tz~gt (1h 7 5~4-Yra wS

15

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS 102D FIGHTER WING (ACC)

MASSACHUSETIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD OTIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE MASSACHUSETIS 02542-5028

MEMORANDUM FOR HAFXOHP ANG CAT 3 September 2003

FROM 102 FSDO 165 Izzea Street Bld 165 Otismiddot ANGB MA 02542

SUBJECT National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

1 This list ofkey personnel for the 102 Fighter Wing Otis ANGB Massachusetts comes in response to a request for information from USAFXOHP relayed through the Air National Guard Crisis Action Team senior director by e-mail dated Friday 29 August 2003

middot 2 Some of participants are now retired and the current addresses are supplied where known We will provide further address information when it becomes available

3 Listing of personnel follows (current rank)

Rank Name Position on 11 Sep 01 Status Col QUE~VTILLEDonrud Wing Commander1 HQMAANGCol WICKEL Albert S Vice Wing Commande 102FW Col SCHIAVI Anthony E Operations Group Commander3 102FW Col DUPUIS Richard R Support Group Commander4 102FW Col WORCESTER Paul G Logistics Group Commander5 102FW Col ELLIS Mark F Logistics Squadron Commander6 102FW CMSgt SILVA John D Command CMSgt 102FW

Col TREACY John D Fighter Squadron Commander8 ACCIDOG Lt Col RAMSAY William M Operations Officer retired Lt Col LYNCH Timothy M Operations Support Flight Comrnander9 102FW Lt Col FRENCH PhillipS Mission Support Flight Commander retired Major DOONAN Virgina I Aircraft Generation SQ Commander10 102FW Lt Col STEVENS Christina G Maintenance Squadron Commander 102FW

Lt Col DUFFY Timothy Alert Pilot ( 151 to scramble) 102FW Major NASH Daniel S Alert Pilot (1 51 to scramble) 102FW Major MARTYN RobertS NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Major RICHARD Martin J NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col RAY Douglas L Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Capt BECKEL Jeffrey S Boston CAP ilot 102FW

middot

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24

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUMFORTHERECORD

Event Interviews at Otis Air National Guard Base (Otis ANGB)

Type of event Interview with Brigadier General Donald J Quenneville

Date January 7 2004

Special Access Issues None

Prepared by Geoffrey Brown

Team Number 8

Location 102nd Fighter Wing Otis Air National Guard Base Massachusetts Air National

Guard

Participants - Non-Conunission Andrew Huddleston (Dep Ch Plans Integration amp Transformation Div AFXOHP 703 696-0024 Fax 703 588-0636)

Participants- Commission John Farmer John Azzarello Geoffrey Brown

Background

Quenileville has been in the military for 33 years Eight years of which was active duty He came to the 102nd Fighter Wing in 1978 and last year became the commander of the Massachusetts Air National Guard

Please see the attached biography for further details

Alert Site Mission

Quenneville recalled that in 1972 NORADs Air Defense mission included fifteen or sixteen alert sites Between 1972 and 2001 the number of sites declined due to the perception of the Cold War threat Most ofthose bases were at the maritime borders in 2001 as opposed to the northern alert sites that were active in the Cold War and meant to respond to an attack from over the North Pole and Canadian airspace

Quenneville explained that the alert site mission was relatively constant through its changes He noted that the mission at Otis ANGB was mostly focused on responding to Russian Bear (a type of aircraft with the capacity to carry air-to-surface missiles) activity When the Russians developed the Bear H model- that has the capability of launching a cruise missile- Otis had a high priority on shadowing those aircraft but as the Russian defense capability declined with the worsening of the Russian economy the number of alert sites declined

Quenneville remarked that prior to 911 the focus of the alert bases was still an outwards-looking monitoring mission Quenneville noted that Dr Finklestein a policy maker at NORAD analyzed possible threats to national airspace Quenneville opined that

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

25

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

his answer to the need of the air alert mission despite the end of the Cold War was that rogue states looking for high level weaponry had a free market in the former Soviet Union He believed that until those weapons were accounted for it was still necessary for Otis ANGB to have an air alert mission He noted that those focused on assessing the need for the air defense mission decided that seven air defense bases was the minimum needed

Hijack Mission

Quenneville noted that the hijack procedure and responsibility did not change over his career He believed that NORAD developed the procedures that were used by the Air Force to intercept a hijacked aircraft He noted that in addition to the radio signals to indicate a hijack that a pilot uses - signals Commission staff is familiar with - there were both hand signals and internationally developed signals that were familiar to the fighter pilots (for instance Quenneville noted that the direction and orientation from which a fighter performs an intercept is a way of signaling the pilot of the target of interest)

Hijack chain of command

According to Quenneville ideally the FAA would notify NORAD of an ongoing hijacking but ifNORAD became aware of a hijacking through a discreet IFF system code change then since both entities used joint-use radar the coordination would be sorted out between a NORAD sector like NEADS and the FAA before fighters are launched

Drug Interdiction Component

Quenneville noted that the F-1 06 did not participate in many drug interdictions circa 1986 He noted that fighters were deployed for forty-five days to Panama in the early nineties They would mostly intercept what was believed as a drug running aircraft then shadow the target aircraft until it landed

F-106 and F-15

Quenneville noted that the firing exercise he was involved in was to test different middot aircrafts ability to fire a tactical nuclear weapon This is one of the designs for the F-106 -to launch a missile referred to as the Geanie Rocket

Though the F ~15 was developed as an air interceptor it quickly showed its ability as a tactical fighter It was never designed to carry a nuclear weapon He noted also that the radar and ability to carry better missiles were improved from the F-106 to the F-15

NORADFAA Cooperation

Quenneville noted that the Otis ANGB take-off route which points off the coast and was designed to respond to an externally orientated threat did not at all times call for

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

26

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

FAA air traffic guidance The route is designed to point out ofthe main air traffic and that coordination could exist directly between NEADS controllers who have the ability to find a target on their radar systems and the fighter pilots He noted that exercises were conducted at night on occasion specifically because there is less air traffic at that time

Quenneville noted that he does not recall a live exercise involving the FAA and an airliner to practice a hijack He explained that the standard procedure was to never approach to closer than five models and to trail the hijacked aircraft to monitor its actions

Threats

Quenneville noted that though he was aware of Osama Bin Laden before 9 11 he never received a link between Bin Laden and the post-Cold War threats that were typified by the 9111 attacks He continued and noted that even though the quantity of threats had changed over his career the outlook and operational appro~ch to those threats had not The adequacy of the air defense mission ofNORAD was based on the ability to perceive a threat with enough time to respond

Quenneville noted that as of90l the fighters sat alert with an external tank and live guns it was possible they would sit with heat seeking missiles as well He said that because of the Russian Bear exercises that were scheduled on 9 11 the fighters were configured as 3-2-2-1 He noted this is a higher state of readiness than the fighters would normally have been at middot middot

Quenneville noted that the last intercept he recalls for Russian Bears was in 1988

911

Quenneville was advised during a weekly meeting that the pilots were put at Battle Stations due to a possible hijack The Operations Group Commander briefed him and he continued the meeting It ended and he went to get paper work for the next meeting Quenneville went into the break room and was told that a commuter airplane had just hit the World Trade Center (WTC) He told Commission staff that he thought at the time that it was a large whole for a commuter airplane He was watching the broadcast when United Airlines Flight 175 (VAL 175) hit the second tower He immediately called to convene the Battle Staff and headed to the Command Post

Quenneville noted that the fighters at alert status were NORAD assets and controlled by NORAD He said that as the Wing Commander on 9 11 he was considered a force provider He noted that NORAD always specified how to posture their air alert assets

At the Command Post the Battle Staff convened He noted that the initial intelligence that they relied on was that the suspected hijacked aircraft was the first aircraft to hit the WTC He did not recall if they initially knew the second aircraft was

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

27

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

hijacked as well He also noted that their aircraft were communicating with NEADS entities since the aircraft were too far away to communicate with directly

Quenneville noted that two of the training sortie fighters backed up the PANT A flight while the other aircraft were being refitted Quenneville believes that the training sortie fighters launched around 852 AM very close to the time the PANT A flight was airborne He noted that the training missions were recalled at 925 The Maine 85 tanker that was used by PANT A was deployed in support of those fighters training He noted there was another tanker in the air that they used as well

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

He noted that the operations group commander would have communicated changes in the ROE to the pilots who were launched subsequently of the initial scrambled fighters Quenneville explained that Duffy and Nash received the information from NEADS and that the other pilots were briefed per the direction ofNEADS by Otis ANGB staff Quenneville noted that the procedure created for this was in place and practiced since it was the same procedure that was used when DEFCONS were changed due to the Cold War threat

Quenneville noted that the ROE was developed based on bigger picture inputs On 911 there was a specific set of ROEs and these were adjusted accordingly The adjusted ROEs redefined where authority would be issued from to have an order to engage an airliner

Assets at Otis

He noted that following direction from NEADS Otis ANGB began manning combat air patrol (CAP) missions They recalled and refitted the training assets and launched fighters in support ofthe PANT A flight He noted that over the course ofthe day Otis ANGB changed the fighters from their training configuration to full armament As airplanes recovered they began loading heavier armament Within four hours they had a full configuration on five airplanes Within seventeen hours during continual flying operations they had fourteen out of seventeen airplanes fully configured All this was done in coordination with NEADS

CAPs

Quenneville noted that the role ofOtis ANGB was as a force provider for the NEADS mission Otis ANGB would tell them their capability and NEADS would make deployment decisionsbased on that He noted that Otis flew airplanes 2417 for six or seven weeks following 911

Post 911

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

28

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

Quenneville noted that as an example of the changes in personnel Otis ANGB was a training organization He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month But after 9111 it served four meals a day for months He noted this displays the amount of recall ofpersonnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks

Current Status

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001 and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002 Most of the personnel that were placed on active duty on 9111 were stood down by a year later

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert He also noted that they are not restricted to looking outward but that this threat still exists

Recommendations

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important and that by watching the countrys protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up ofNorthCom has assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense ofthe country

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States and that the ability to scale up quickly cannot be underestimated

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

Page 14: Interviews with Lt. Col. Maggie Quenneville and Brigadier General

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15

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS 102D FIGHTER WING (ACC)

MASSACHUSETIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD OTIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE MASSACHUSETIS 02542-5028

MEMORANDUM FOR HAFXOHP ANG CAT 3 September 2003

FROM 102 FSDO 165 Izzea Street Bld 165 Otismiddot ANGB MA 02542

SUBJECT National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

1 This list ofkey personnel for the 102 Fighter Wing Otis ANGB Massachusetts comes in response to a request for information from USAFXOHP relayed through the Air National Guard Crisis Action Team senior director by e-mail dated Friday 29 August 2003

middot 2 Some of participants are now retired and the current addresses are supplied where known We will provide further address information when it becomes available

3 Listing of personnel follows (current rank)

Rank Name Position on 11 Sep 01 Status Col QUE~VTILLEDonrud Wing Commander1 HQMAANGCol WICKEL Albert S Vice Wing Commande 102FW Col SCHIAVI Anthony E Operations Group Commander3 102FW Col DUPUIS Richard R Support Group Commander4 102FW Col WORCESTER Paul G Logistics Group Commander5 102FW Col ELLIS Mark F Logistics Squadron Commander6 102FW CMSgt SILVA John D Command CMSgt 102FW

Col TREACY John D Fighter Squadron Commander8 ACCIDOG Lt Col RAMSAY William M Operations Officer retired Lt Col LYNCH Timothy M Operations Support Flight Comrnander9 102FW Lt Col FRENCH PhillipS Mission Support Flight Commander retired Major DOONAN Virgina I Aircraft Generation SQ Commander10 102FW Lt Col STEVENS Christina G Maintenance Squadron Commander 102FW

Lt Col DUFFY Timothy Alert Pilot ( 151 to scramble) 102FW Major NASH Daniel S Alert Pilot (1 51 to scramble) 102FW Major MARTYN RobertS NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Major RICHARD Martin J NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col RAY Douglas L Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Capt BECKEL Jeffrey S Boston CAP ilot 102FW

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24

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUMFORTHERECORD

Event Interviews at Otis Air National Guard Base (Otis ANGB)

Type of event Interview with Brigadier General Donald J Quenneville

Date January 7 2004

Special Access Issues None

Prepared by Geoffrey Brown

Team Number 8

Location 102nd Fighter Wing Otis Air National Guard Base Massachusetts Air National

Guard

Participants - Non-Conunission Andrew Huddleston (Dep Ch Plans Integration amp Transformation Div AFXOHP 703 696-0024 Fax 703 588-0636)

Participants- Commission John Farmer John Azzarello Geoffrey Brown

Background

Quenileville has been in the military for 33 years Eight years of which was active duty He came to the 102nd Fighter Wing in 1978 and last year became the commander of the Massachusetts Air National Guard

Please see the attached biography for further details

Alert Site Mission

Quenneville recalled that in 1972 NORADs Air Defense mission included fifteen or sixteen alert sites Between 1972 and 2001 the number of sites declined due to the perception of the Cold War threat Most ofthose bases were at the maritime borders in 2001 as opposed to the northern alert sites that were active in the Cold War and meant to respond to an attack from over the North Pole and Canadian airspace

Quenneville explained that the alert site mission was relatively constant through its changes He noted that the mission at Otis ANGB was mostly focused on responding to Russian Bear (a type of aircraft with the capacity to carry air-to-surface missiles) activity When the Russians developed the Bear H model- that has the capability of launching a cruise missile- Otis had a high priority on shadowing those aircraft but as the Russian defense capability declined with the worsening of the Russian economy the number of alert sites declined

Quenneville remarked that prior to 911 the focus of the alert bases was still an outwards-looking monitoring mission Quenneville noted that Dr Finklestein a policy maker at NORAD analyzed possible threats to national airspace Quenneville opined that

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

25

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

his answer to the need of the air alert mission despite the end of the Cold War was that rogue states looking for high level weaponry had a free market in the former Soviet Union He believed that until those weapons were accounted for it was still necessary for Otis ANGB to have an air alert mission He noted that those focused on assessing the need for the air defense mission decided that seven air defense bases was the minimum needed

Hijack Mission

Quenneville noted that the hijack procedure and responsibility did not change over his career He believed that NORAD developed the procedures that were used by the Air Force to intercept a hijacked aircraft He noted that in addition to the radio signals to indicate a hijack that a pilot uses - signals Commission staff is familiar with - there were both hand signals and internationally developed signals that were familiar to the fighter pilots (for instance Quenneville noted that the direction and orientation from which a fighter performs an intercept is a way of signaling the pilot of the target of interest)

Hijack chain of command

According to Quenneville ideally the FAA would notify NORAD of an ongoing hijacking but ifNORAD became aware of a hijacking through a discreet IFF system code change then since both entities used joint-use radar the coordination would be sorted out between a NORAD sector like NEADS and the FAA before fighters are launched

Drug Interdiction Component

Quenneville noted that the F-1 06 did not participate in many drug interdictions circa 1986 He noted that fighters were deployed for forty-five days to Panama in the early nineties They would mostly intercept what was believed as a drug running aircraft then shadow the target aircraft until it landed

F-106 and F-15

Quenneville noted that the firing exercise he was involved in was to test different middot aircrafts ability to fire a tactical nuclear weapon This is one of the designs for the F-106 -to launch a missile referred to as the Geanie Rocket

Though the F ~15 was developed as an air interceptor it quickly showed its ability as a tactical fighter It was never designed to carry a nuclear weapon He noted also that the radar and ability to carry better missiles were improved from the F-106 to the F-15

NORADFAA Cooperation

Quenneville noted that the Otis ANGB take-off route which points off the coast and was designed to respond to an externally orientated threat did not at all times call for

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

26

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

FAA air traffic guidance The route is designed to point out ofthe main air traffic and that coordination could exist directly between NEADS controllers who have the ability to find a target on their radar systems and the fighter pilots He noted that exercises were conducted at night on occasion specifically because there is less air traffic at that time

Quenneville noted that he does not recall a live exercise involving the FAA and an airliner to practice a hijack He explained that the standard procedure was to never approach to closer than five models and to trail the hijacked aircraft to monitor its actions

Threats

Quenneville noted that though he was aware of Osama Bin Laden before 9 11 he never received a link between Bin Laden and the post-Cold War threats that were typified by the 9111 attacks He continued and noted that even though the quantity of threats had changed over his career the outlook and operational appro~ch to those threats had not The adequacy of the air defense mission ofNORAD was based on the ability to perceive a threat with enough time to respond

Quenneville noted that as of90l the fighters sat alert with an external tank and live guns it was possible they would sit with heat seeking missiles as well He said that because of the Russian Bear exercises that were scheduled on 9 11 the fighters were configured as 3-2-2-1 He noted this is a higher state of readiness than the fighters would normally have been at middot middot

Quenneville noted that the last intercept he recalls for Russian Bears was in 1988

911

Quenneville was advised during a weekly meeting that the pilots were put at Battle Stations due to a possible hijack The Operations Group Commander briefed him and he continued the meeting It ended and he went to get paper work for the next meeting Quenneville went into the break room and was told that a commuter airplane had just hit the World Trade Center (WTC) He told Commission staff that he thought at the time that it was a large whole for a commuter airplane He was watching the broadcast when United Airlines Flight 175 (VAL 175) hit the second tower He immediately called to convene the Battle Staff and headed to the Command Post

Quenneville noted that the fighters at alert status were NORAD assets and controlled by NORAD He said that as the Wing Commander on 9 11 he was considered a force provider He noted that NORAD always specified how to posture their air alert assets

At the Command Post the Battle Staff convened He noted that the initial intelligence that they relied on was that the suspected hijacked aircraft was the first aircraft to hit the WTC He did not recall if they initially knew the second aircraft was

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

27

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

hijacked as well He also noted that their aircraft were communicating with NEADS entities since the aircraft were too far away to communicate with directly

Quenneville noted that two of the training sortie fighters backed up the PANT A flight while the other aircraft were being refitted Quenneville believes that the training sortie fighters launched around 852 AM very close to the time the PANT A flight was airborne He noted that the training missions were recalled at 925 The Maine 85 tanker that was used by PANT A was deployed in support of those fighters training He noted there was another tanker in the air that they used as well

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

He noted that the operations group commander would have communicated changes in the ROE to the pilots who were launched subsequently of the initial scrambled fighters Quenneville explained that Duffy and Nash received the information from NEADS and that the other pilots were briefed per the direction ofNEADS by Otis ANGB staff Quenneville noted that the procedure created for this was in place and practiced since it was the same procedure that was used when DEFCONS were changed due to the Cold War threat

Quenneville noted that the ROE was developed based on bigger picture inputs On 911 there was a specific set of ROEs and these were adjusted accordingly The adjusted ROEs redefined where authority would be issued from to have an order to engage an airliner

Assets at Otis

He noted that following direction from NEADS Otis ANGB began manning combat air patrol (CAP) missions They recalled and refitted the training assets and launched fighters in support ofthe PANT A flight He noted that over the course ofthe day Otis ANGB changed the fighters from their training configuration to full armament As airplanes recovered they began loading heavier armament Within four hours they had a full configuration on five airplanes Within seventeen hours during continual flying operations they had fourteen out of seventeen airplanes fully configured All this was done in coordination with NEADS

CAPs

Quenneville noted that the role ofOtis ANGB was as a force provider for the NEADS mission Otis ANGB would tell them their capability and NEADS would make deployment decisionsbased on that He noted that Otis flew airplanes 2417 for six or seven weeks following 911

Post 911

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

28

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

Quenneville noted that as an example of the changes in personnel Otis ANGB was a training organization He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month But after 9111 it served four meals a day for months He noted this displays the amount of recall ofpersonnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks

Current Status

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001 and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002 Most of the personnel that were placed on active duty on 9111 were stood down by a year later

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert He also noted that they are not restricted to looking outward but that this threat still exists

Recommendations

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important and that by watching the countrys protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up ofNorthCom has assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense ofthe country

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States and that the ability to scale up quickly cannot be underestimated

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

Page 15: Interviews with Lt. Col. Maggie Quenneville and Brigadier General

15

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS 102D FIGHTER WING (ACC)

MASSACHUSETIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD OTIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE MASSACHUSETIS 02542-5028

MEMORANDUM FOR HAFXOHP ANG CAT 3 September 2003

FROM 102 FSDO 165 Izzea Street Bld 165 Otismiddot ANGB MA 02542

SUBJECT National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

1 This list ofkey personnel for the 102 Fighter Wing Otis ANGB Massachusetts comes in response to a request for information from USAFXOHP relayed through the Air National Guard Crisis Action Team senior director by e-mail dated Friday 29 August 2003

middot 2 Some of participants are now retired and the current addresses are supplied where known We will provide further address information when it becomes available

3 Listing of personnel follows (current rank)

Rank Name Position on 11 Sep 01 Status Col QUE~VTILLEDonrud Wing Commander1 HQMAANGCol WICKEL Albert S Vice Wing Commande 102FW Col SCHIAVI Anthony E Operations Group Commander3 102FW Col DUPUIS Richard R Support Group Commander4 102FW Col WORCESTER Paul G Logistics Group Commander5 102FW Col ELLIS Mark F Logistics Squadron Commander6 102FW CMSgt SILVA John D Command CMSgt 102FW

Col TREACY John D Fighter Squadron Commander8 ACCIDOG Lt Col RAMSAY William M Operations Officer retired Lt Col LYNCH Timothy M Operations Support Flight Comrnander9 102FW Lt Col FRENCH PhillipS Mission Support Flight Commander retired Major DOONAN Virgina I Aircraft Generation SQ Commander10 102FW Lt Col STEVENS Christina G Maintenance Squadron Commander 102FW

Lt Col DUFFY Timothy Alert Pilot ( 151 to scramble) 102FW Major NASH Daniel S Alert Pilot (1 51 to scramble) 102FW Major MARTYN RobertS NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Major RICHARD Martin J NYC CAP Pilot 102FW Lt Col RAY Douglas L Boston CAP Pilot 102FW Capt BECKEL Jeffrey S Boston CAP ilot 102FW

middot

~JdG

(a - ~ ~ ~ 171 -vc~ middot _ - ~ i i

middotmiddotmiddot bullmiddotmiddotmiddot 3~J ~- _bull bullbull bullmiddot middotmiddot__middot middot

1=-~r-~~-- il Q ~~ middot- Ymiddot-J

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24

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUMFORTHERECORD

Event Interviews at Otis Air National Guard Base (Otis ANGB)

Type of event Interview with Brigadier General Donald J Quenneville

Date January 7 2004

Special Access Issues None

Prepared by Geoffrey Brown

Team Number 8

Location 102nd Fighter Wing Otis Air National Guard Base Massachusetts Air National

Guard

Participants - Non-Conunission Andrew Huddleston (Dep Ch Plans Integration amp Transformation Div AFXOHP 703 696-0024 Fax 703 588-0636)

Participants- Commission John Farmer John Azzarello Geoffrey Brown

Background

Quenileville has been in the military for 33 years Eight years of which was active duty He came to the 102nd Fighter Wing in 1978 and last year became the commander of the Massachusetts Air National Guard

Please see the attached biography for further details

Alert Site Mission

Quenneville recalled that in 1972 NORADs Air Defense mission included fifteen or sixteen alert sites Between 1972 and 2001 the number of sites declined due to the perception of the Cold War threat Most ofthose bases were at the maritime borders in 2001 as opposed to the northern alert sites that were active in the Cold War and meant to respond to an attack from over the North Pole and Canadian airspace

Quenneville explained that the alert site mission was relatively constant through its changes He noted that the mission at Otis ANGB was mostly focused on responding to Russian Bear (a type of aircraft with the capacity to carry air-to-surface missiles) activity When the Russians developed the Bear H model- that has the capability of launching a cruise missile- Otis had a high priority on shadowing those aircraft but as the Russian defense capability declined with the worsening of the Russian economy the number of alert sites declined

Quenneville remarked that prior to 911 the focus of the alert bases was still an outwards-looking monitoring mission Quenneville noted that Dr Finklestein a policy maker at NORAD analyzed possible threats to national airspace Quenneville opined that

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

25

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

his answer to the need of the air alert mission despite the end of the Cold War was that rogue states looking for high level weaponry had a free market in the former Soviet Union He believed that until those weapons were accounted for it was still necessary for Otis ANGB to have an air alert mission He noted that those focused on assessing the need for the air defense mission decided that seven air defense bases was the minimum needed

Hijack Mission

Quenneville noted that the hijack procedure and responsibility did not change over his career He believed that NORAD developed the procedures that were used by the Air Force to intercept a hijacked aircraft He noted that in addition to the radio signals to indicate a hijack that a pilot uses - signals Commission staff is familiar with - there were both hand signals and internationally developed signals that were familiar to the fighter pilots (for instance Quenneville noted that the direction and orientation from which a fighter performs an intercept is a way of signaling the pilot of the target of interest)

Hijack chain of command

According to Quenneville ideally the FAA would notify NORAD of an ongoing hijacking but ifNORAD became aware of a hijacking through a discreet IFF system code change then since both entities used joint-use radar the coordination would be sorted out between a NORAD sector like NEADS and the FAA before fighters are launched

Drug Interdiction Component

Quenneville noted that the F-1 06 did not participate in many drug interdictions circa 1986 He noted that fighters were deployed for forty-five days to Panama in the early nineties They would mostly intercept what was believed as a drug running aircraft then shadow the target aircraft until it landed

F-106 and F-15

Quenneville noted that the firing exercise he was involved in was to test different middot aircrafts ability to fire a tactical nuclear weapon This is one of the designs for the F-106 -to launch a missile referred to as the Geanie Rocket

Though the F ~15 was developed as an air interceptor it quickly showed its ability as a tactical fighter It was never designed to carry a nuclear weapon He noted also that the radar and ability to carry better missiles were improved from the F-106 to the F-15

NORADFAA Cooperation

Quenneville noted that the Otis ANGB take-off route which points off the coast and was designed to respond to an externally orientated threat did not at all times call for

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

26

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

FAA air traffic guidance The route is designed to point out ofthe main air traffic and that coordination could exist directly between NEADS controllers who have the ability to find a target on their radar systems and the fighter pilots He noted that exercises were conducted at night on occasion specifically because there is less air traffic at that time

Quenneville noted that he does not recall a live exercise involving the FAA and an airliner to practice a hijack He explained that the standard procedure was to never approach to closer than five models and to trail the hijacked aircraft to monitor its actions

Threats

Quenneville noted that though he was aware of Osama Bin Laden before 9 11 he never received a link between Bin Laden and the post-Cold War threats that were typified by the 9111 attacks He continued and noted that even though the quantity of threats had changed over his career the outlook and operational appro~ch to those threats had not The adequacy of the air defense mission ofNORAD was based on the ability to perceive a threat with enough time to respond

Quenneville noted that as of90l the fighters sat alert with an external tank and live guns it was possible they would sit with heat seeking missiles as well He said that because of the Russian Bear exercises that were scheduled on 9 11 the fighters were configured as 3-2-2-1 He noted this is a higher state of readiness than the fighters would normally have been at middot middot

Quenneville noted that the last intercept he recalls for Russian Bears was in 1988

911

Quenneville was advised during a weekly meeting that the pilots were put at Battle Stations due to a possible hijack The Operations Group Commander briefed him and he continued the meeting It ended and he went to get paper work for the next meeting Quenneville went into the break room and was told that a commuter airplane had just hit the World Trade Center (WTC) He told Commission staff that he thought at the time that it was a large whole for a commuter airplane He was watching the broadcast when United Airlines Flight 175 (VAL 175) hit the second tower He immediately called to convene the Battle Staff and headed to the Command Post

Quenneville noted that the fighters at alert status were NORAD assets and controlled by NORAD He said that as the Wing Commander on 9 11 he was considered a force provider He noted that NORAD always specified how to posture their air alert assets

At the Command Post the Battle Staff convened He noted that the initial intelligence that they relied on was that the suspected hijacked aircraft was the first aircraft to hit the WTC He did not recall if they initially knew the second aircraft was

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

27

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

hijacked as well He also noted that their aircraft were communicating with NEADS entities since the aircraft were too far away to communicate with directly

Quenneville noted that two of the training sortie fighters backed up the PANT A flight while the other aircraft were being refitted Quenneville believes that the training sortie fighters launched around 852 AM very close to the time the PANT A flight was airborne He noted that the training missions were recalled at 925 The Maine 85 tanker that was used by PANT A was deployed in support of those fighters training He noted there was another tanker in the air that they used as well

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

He noted that the operations group commander would have communicated changes in the ROE to the pilots who were launched subsequently of the initial scrambled fighters Quenneville explained that Duffy and Nash received the information from NEADS and that the other pilots were briefed per the direction ofNEADS by Otis ANGB staff Quenneville noted that the procedure created for this was in place and practiced since it was the same procedure that was used when DEFCONS were changed due to the Cold War threat

Quenneville noted that the ROE was developed based on bigger picture inputs On 911 there was a specific set of ROEs and these were adjusted accordingly The adjusted ROEs redefined where authority would be issued from to have an order to engage an airliner

Assets at Otis

He noted that following direction from NEADS Otis ANGB began manning combat air patrol (CAP) missions They recalled and refitted the training assets and launched fighters in support ofthe PANT A flight He noted that over the course ofthe day Otis ANGB changed the fighters from their training configuration to full armament As airplanes recovered they began loading heavier armament Within four hours they had a full configuration on five airplanes Within seventeen hours during continual flying operations they had fourteen out of seventeen airplanes fully configured All this was done in coordination with NEADS

CAPs

Quenneville noted that the role ofOtis ANGB was as a force provider for the NEADS mission Otis ANGB would tell them their capability and NEADS would make deployment decisionsbased on that He noted that Otis flew airplanes 2417 for six or seven weeks following 911

Post 911

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

28

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

Quenneville noted that as an example of the changes in personnel Otis ANGB was a training organization He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month But after 9111 it served four meals a day for months He noted this displays the amount of recall ofpersonnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks

Current Status

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001 and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002 Most of the personnel that were placed on active duty on 9111 were stood down by a year later

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert He also noted that they are not restricted to looking outward but that this threat still exists

Recommendations

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important and that by watching the countrys protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up ofNorthCom has assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense ofthe country

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States and that the ability to scale up quickly cannot be underestimated

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

Page 16: Interviews with Lt. Col. Maggie Quenneville and Brigadier General

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24

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUMFORTHERECORD

Event Interviews at Otis Air National Guard Base (Otis ANGB)

Type of event Interview with Brigadier General Donald J Quenneville

Date January 7 2004

Special Access Issues None

Prepared by Geoffrey Brown

Team Number 8

Location 102nd Fighter Wing Otis Air National Guard Base Massachusetts Air National

Guard

Participants - Non-Conunission Andrew Huddleston (Dep Ch Plans Integration amp Transformation Div AFXOHP 703 696-0024 Fax 703 588-0636)

Participants- Commission John Farmer John Azzarello Geoffrey Brown

Background

Quenileville has been in the military for 33 years Eight years of which was active duty He came to the 102nd Fighter Wing in 1978 and last year became the commander of the Massachusetts Air National Guard

Please see the attached biography for further details

Alert Site Mission

Quenneville recalled that in 1972 NORADs Air Defense mission included fifteen or sixteen alert sites Between 1972 and 2001 the number of sites declined due to the perception of the Cold War threat Most ofthose bases were at the maritime borders in 2001 as opposed to the northern alert sites that were active in the Cold War and meant to respond to an attack from over the North Pole and Canadian airspace

Quenneville explained that the alert site mission was relatively constant through its changes He noted that the mission at Otis ANGB was mostly focused on responding to Russian Bear (a type of aircraft with the capacity to carry air-to-surface missiles) activity When the Russians developed the Bear H model- that has the capability of launching a cruise missile- Otis had a high priority on shadowing those aircraft but as the Russian defense capability declined with the worsening of the Russian economy the number of alert sites declined

Quenneville remarked that prior to 911 the focus of the alert bases was still an outwards-looking monitoring mission Quenneville noted that Dr Finklestein a policy maker at NORAD analyzed possible threats to national airspace Quenneville opined that

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

25

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

his answer to the need of the air alert mission despite the end of the Cold War was that rogue states looking for high level weaponry had a free market in the former Soviet Union He believed that until those weapons were accounted for it was still necessary for Otis ANGB to have an air alert mission He noted that those focused on assessing the need for the air defense mission decided that seven air defense bases was the minimum needed

Hijack Mission

Quenneville noted that the hijack procedure and responsibility did not change over his career He believed that NORAD developed the procedures that were used by the Air Force to intercept a hijacked aircraft He noted that in addition to the radio signals to indicate a hijack that a pilot uses - signals Commission staff is familiar with - there were both hand signals and internationally developed signals that were familiar to the fighter pilots (for instance Quenneville noted that the direction and orientation from which a fighter performs an intercept is a way of signaling the pilot of the target of interest)

Hijack chain of command

According to Quenneville ideally the FAA would notify NORAD of an ongoing hijacking but ifNORAD became aware of a hijacking through a discreet IFF system code change then since both entities used joint-use radar the coordination would be sorted out between a NORAD sector like NEADS and the FAA before fighters are launched

Drug Interdiction Component

Quenneville noted that the F-1 06 did not participate in many drug interdictions circa 1986 He noted that fighters were deployed for forty-five days to Panama in the early nineties They would mostly intercept what was believed as a drug running aircraft then shadow the target aircraft until it landed

F-106 and F-15

Quenneville noted that the firing exercise he was involved in was to test different middot aircrafts ability to fire a tactical nuclear weapon This is one of the designs for the F-106 -to launch a missile referred to as the Geanie Rocket

Though the F ~15 was developed as an air interceptor it quickly showed its ability as a tactical fighter It was never designed to carry a nuclear weapon He noted also that the radar and ability to carry better missiles were improved from the F-106 to the F-15

NORADFAA Cooperation

Quenneville noted that the Otis ANGB take-off route which points off the coast and was designed to respond to an externally orientated threat did not at all times call for

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

26

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

FAA air traffic guidance The route is designed to point out ofthe main air traffic and that coordination could exist directly between NEADS controllers who have the ability to find a target on their radar systems and the fighter pilots He noted that exercises were conducted at night on occasion specifically because there is less air traffic at that time

Quenneville noted that he does not recall a live exercise involving the FAA and an airliner to practice a hijack He explained that the standard procedure was to never approach to closer than five models and to trail the hijacked aircraft to monitor its actions

Threats

Quenneville noted that though he was aware of Osama Bin Laden before 9 11 he never received a link between Bin Laden and the post-Cold War threats that were typified by the 9111 attacks He continued and noted that even though the quantity of threats had changed over his career the outlook and operational appro~ch to those threats had not The adequacy of the air defense mission ofNORAD was based on the ability to perceive a threat with enough time to respond

Quenneville noted that as of90l the fighters sat alert with an external tank and live guns it was possible they would sit with heat seeking missiles as well He said that because of the Russian Bear exercises that were scheduled on 9 11 the fighters were configured as 3-2-2-1 He noted this is a higher state of readiness than the fighters would normally have been at middot middot

Quenneville noted that the last intercept he recalls for Russian Bears was in 1988

911

Quenneville was advised during a weekly meeting that the pilots were put at Battle Stations due to a possible hijack The Operations Group Commander briefed him and he continued the meeting It ended and he went to get paper work for the next meeting Quenneville went into the break room and was told that a commuter airplane had just hit the World Trade Center (WTC) He told Commission staff that he thought at the time that it was a large whole for a commuter airplane He was watching the broadcast when United Airlines Flight 175 (VAL 175) hit the second tower He immediately called to convene the Battle Staff and headed to the Command Post

Quenneville noted that the fighters at alert status were NORAD assets and controlled by NORAD He said that as the Wing Commander on 9 11 he was considered a force provider He noted that NORAD always specified how to posture their air alert assets

At the Command Post the Battle Staff convened He noted that the initial intelligence that they relied on was that the suspected hijacked aircraft was the first aircraft to hit the WTC He did not recall if they initially knew the second aircraft was

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

27

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

hijacked as well He also noted that their aircraft were communicating with NEADS entities since the aircraft were too far away to communicate with directly

Quenneville noted that two of the training sortie fighters backed up the PANT A flight while the other aircraft were being refitted Quenneville believes that the training sortie fighters launched around 852 AM very close to the time the PANT A flight was airborne He noted that the training missions were recalled at 925 The Maine 85 tanker that was used by PANT A was deployed in support of those fighters training He noted there was another tanker in the air that they used as well

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

He noted that the operations group commander would have communicated changes in the ROE to the pilots who were launched subsequently of the initial scrambled fighters Quenneville explained that Duffy and Nash received the information from NEADS and that the other pilots were briefed per the direction ofNEADS by Otis ANGB staff Quenneville noted that the procedure created for this was in place and practiced since it was the same procedure that was used when DEFCONS were changed due to the Cold War threat

Quenneville noted that the ROE was developed based on bigger picture inputs On 911 there was a specific set of ROEs and these were adjusted accordingly The adjusted ROEs redefined where authority would be issued from to have an order to engage an airliner

Assets at Otis

He noted that following direction from NEADS Otis ANGB began manning combat air patrol (CAP) missions They recalled and refitted the training assets and launched fighters in support ofthe PANT A flight He noted that over the course ofthe day Otis ANGB changed the fighters from their training configuration to full armament As airplanes recovered they began loading heavier armament Within four hours they had a full configuration on five airplanes Within seventeen hours during continual flying operations they had fourteen out of seventeen airplanes fully configured All this was done in coordination with NEADS

CAPs

Quenneville noted that the role ofOtis ANGB was as a force provider for the NEADS mission Otis ANGB would tell them their capability and NEADS would make deployment decisionsbased on that He noted that Otis flew airplanes 2417 for six or seven weeks following 911

Post 911

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

28

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

Quenneville noted that as an example of the changes in personnel Otis ANGB was a training organization He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month But after 9111 it served four meals a day for months He noted this displays the amount of recall ofpersonnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks

Current Status

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001 and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002 Most of the personnel that were placed on active duty on 9111 were stood down by a year later

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert He also noted that they are not restricted to looking outward but that this threat still exists

Recommendations

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important and that by watching the countrys protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up ofNorthCom has assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense ofthe country

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States and that the ability to scale up quickly cannot be underestimated

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

Page 17: Interviews with Lt. Col. Maggie Quenneville and Brigadier General

17

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24

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUMFORTHERECORD

Event Interviews at Otis Air National Guard Base (Otis ANGB)

Type of event Interview with Brigadier General Donald J Quenneville

Date January 7 2004

Special Access Issues None

Prepared by Geoffrey Brown

Team Number 8

Location 102nd Fighter Wing Otis Air National Guard Base Massachusetts Air National

Guard

Participants - Non-Conunission Andrew Huddleston (Dep Ch Plans Integration amp Transformation Div AFXOHP 703 696-0024 Fax 703 588-0636)

Participants- Commission John Farmer John Azzarello Geoffrey Brown

Background

Quenileville has been in the military for 33 years Eight years of which was active duty He came to the 102nd Fighter Wing in 1978 and last year became the commander of the Massachusetts Air National Guard

Please see the attached biography for further details

Alert Site Mission

Quenneville recalled that in 1972 NORADs Air Defense mission included fifteen or sixteen alert sites Between 1972 and 2001 the number of sites declined due to the perception of the Cold War threat Most ofthose bases were at the maritime borders in 2001 as opposed to the northern alert sites that were active in the Cold War and meant to respond to an attack from over the North Pole and Canadian airspace

Quenneville explained that the alert site mission was relatively constant through its changes He noted that the mission at Otis ANGB was mostly focused on responding to Russian Bear (a type of aircraft with the capacity to carry air-to-surface missiles) activity When the Russians developed the Bear H model- that has the capability of launching a cruise missile- Otis had a high priority on shadowing those aircraft but as the Russian defense capability declined with the worsening of the Russian economy the number of alert sites declined

Quenneville remarked that prior to 911 the focus of the alert bases was still an outwards-looking monitoring mission Quenneville noted that Dr Finklestein a policy maker at NORAD analyzed possible threats to national airspace Quenneville opined that

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

25

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

his answer to the need of the air alert mission despite the end of the Cold War was that rogue states looking for high level weaponry had a free market in the former Soviet Union He believed that until those weapons were accounted for it was still necessary for Otis ANGB to have an air alert mission He noted that those focused on assessing the need for the air defense mission decided that seven air defense bases was the minimum needed

Hijack Mission

Quenneville noted that the hijack procedure and responsibility did not change over his career He believed that NORAD developed the procedures that were used by the Air Force to intercept a hijacked aircraft He noted that in addition to the radio signals to indicate a hijack that a pilot uses - signals Commission staff is familiar with - there were both hand signals and internationally developed signals that were familiar to the fighter pilots (for instance Quenneville noted that the direction and orientation from which a fighter performs an intercept is a way of signaling the pilot of the target of interest)

Hijack chain of command

According to Quenneville ideally the FAA would notify NORAD of an ongoing hijacking but ifNORAD became aware of a hijacking through a discreet IFF system code change then since both entities used joint-use radar the coordination would be sorted out between a NORAD sector like NEADS and the FAA before fighters are launched

Drug Interdiction Component

Quenneville noted that the F-1 06 did not participate in many drug interdictions circa 1986 He noted that fighters were deployed for forty-five days to Panama in the early nineties They would mostly intercept what was believed as a drug running aircraft then shadow the target aircraft until it landed

F-106 and F-15

Quenneville noted that the firing exercise he was involved in was to test different middot aircrafts ability to fire a tactical nuclear weapon This is one of the designs for the F-106 -to launch a missile referred to as the Geanie Rocket

Though the F ~15 was developed as an air interceptor it quickly showed its ability as a tactical fighter It was never designed to carry a nuclear weapon He noted also that the radar and ability to carry better missiles were improved from the F-106 to the F-15

NORADFAA Cooperation

Quenneville noted that the Otis ANGB take-off route which points off the coast and was designed to respond to an externally orientated threat did not at all times call for

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

26

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

FAA air traffic guidance The route is designed to point out ofthe main air traffic and that coordination could exist directly between NEADS controllers who have the ability to find a target on their radar systems and the fighter pilots He noted that exercises were conducted at night on occasion specifically because there is less air traffic at that time

Quenneville noted that he does not recall a live exercise involving the FAA and an airliner to practice a hijack He explained that the standard procedure was to never approach to closer than five models and to trail the hijacked aircraft to monitor its actions

Threats

Quenneville noted that though he was aware of Osama Bin Laden before 9 11 he never received a link between Bin Laden and the post-Cold War threats that were typified by the 9111 attacks He continued and noted that even though the quantity of threats had changed over his career the outlook and operational appro~ch to those threats had not The adequacy of the air defense mission ofNORAD was based on the ability to perceive a threat with enough time to respond

Quenneville noted that as of90l the fighters sat alert with an external tank and live guns it was possible they would sit with heat seeking missiles as well He said that because of the Russian Bear exercises that were scheduled on 9 11 the fighters were configured as 3-2-2-1 He noted this is a higher state of readiness than the fighters would normally have been at middot middot

Quenneville noted that the last intercept he recalls for Russian Bears was in 1988

911

Quenneville was advised during a weekly meeting that the pilots were put at Battle Stations due to a possible hijack The Operations Group Commander briefed him and he continued the meeting It ended and he went to get paper work for the next meeting Quenneville went into the break room and was told that a commuter airplane had just hit the World Trade Center (WTC) He told Commission staff that he thought at the time that it was a large whole for a commuter airplane He was watching the broadcast when United Airlines Flight 175 (VAL 175) hit the second tower He immediately called to convene the Battle Staff and headed to the Command Post

Quenneville noted that the fighters at alert status were NORAD assets and controlled by NORAD He said that as the Wing Commander on 9 11 he was considered a force provider He noted that NORAD always specified how to posture their air alert assets

At the Command Post the Battle Staff convened He noted that the initial intelligence that they relied on was that the suspected hijacked aircraft was the first aircraft to hit the WTC He did not recall if they initially knew the second aircraft was

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

27

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

hijacked as well He also noted that their aircraft were communicating with NEADS entities since the aircraft were too far away to communicate with directly

Quenneville noted that two of the training sortie fighters backed up the PANT A flight while the other aircraft were being refitted Quenneville believes that the training sortie fighters launched around 852 AM very close to the time the PANT A flight was airborne He noted that the training missions were recalled at 925 The Maine 85 tanker that was used by PANT A was deployed in support of those fighters training He noted there was another tanker in the air that they used as well

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

He noted that the operations group commander would have communicated changes in the ROE to the pilots who were launched subsequently of the initial scrambled fighters Quenneville explained that Duffy and Nash received the information from NEADS and that the other pilots were briefed per the direction ofNEADS by Otis ANGB staff Quenneville noted that the procedure created for this was in place and practiced since it was the same procedure that was used when DEFCONS were changed due to the Cold War threat

Quenneville noted that the ROE was developed based on bigger picture inputs On 911 there was a specific set of ROEs and these were adjusted accordingly The adjusted ROEs redefined where authority would be issued from to have an order to engage an airliner

Assets at Otis

He noted that following direction from NEADS Otis ANGB began manning combat air patrol (CAP) missions They recalled and refitted the training assets and launched fighters in support ofthe PANT A flight He noted that over the course ofthe day Otis ANGB changed the fighters from their training configuration to full armament As airplanes recovered they began loading heavier armament Within four hours they had a full configuration on five airplanes Within seventeen hours during continual flying operations they had fourteen out of seventeen airplanes fully configured All this was done in coordination with NEADS

CAPs

Quenneville noted that the role ofOtis ANGB was as a force provider for the NEADS mission Otis ANGB would tell them their capability and NEADS would make deployment decisionsbased on that He noted that Otis flew airplanes 2417 for six or seven weeks following 911

Post 911

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

28

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

Quenneville noted that as an example of the changes in personnel Otis ANGB was a training organization He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month But after 9111 it served four meals a day for months He noted this displays the amount of recall ofpersonnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks

Current Status

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001 and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002 Most of the personnel that were placed on active duty on 9111 were stood down by a year later

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert He also noted that they are not restricted to looking outward but that this threat still exists

Recommendations

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important and that by watching the countrys protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up ofNorthCom has assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense ofthe country

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States and that the ability to scale up quickly cannot be underestimated

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

Page 18: Interviews with Lt. Col. Maggie Quenneville and Brigadier General

il l 18

i

1middot I

l l I r

22

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9- - middot -- --- - -- - i ~

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23 bull

i

M ~ ~ -~ rcrd-middot -~ -~-~

- ~ ) middot -t-middot (~ )~-L-A - ~- -u~r~ -~ shy-

- c+-middotmiddot ~ l ~~~ ~--ll

l

~

24

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUMFORTHERECORD

Event Interviews at Otis Air National Guard Base (Otis ANGB)

Type of event Interview with Brigadier General Donald J Quenneville

Date January 7 2004

Special Access Issues None

Prepared by Geoffrey Brown

Team Number 8

Location 102nd Fighter Wing Otis Air National Guard Base Massachusetts Air National

Guard

Participants - Non-Conunission Andrew Huddleston (Dep Ch Plans Integration amp Transformation Div AFXOHP 703 696-0024 Fax 703 588-0636)

Participants- Commission John Farmer John Azzarello Geoffrey Brown

Background

Quenileville has been in the military for 33 years Eight years of which was active duty He came to the 102nd Fighter Wing in 1978 and last year became the commander of the Massachusetts Air National Guard

Please see the attached biography for further details

Alert Site Mission

Quenneville recalled that in 1972 NORADs Air Defense mission included fifteen or sixteen alert sites Between 1972 and 2001 the number of sites declined due to the perception of the Cold War threat Most ofthose bases were at the maritime borders in 2001 as opposed to the northern alert sites that were active in the Cold War and meant to respond to an attack from over the North Pole and Canadian airspace

Quenneville explained that the alert site mission was relatively constant through its changes He noted that the mission at Otis ANGB was mostly focused on responding to Russian Bear (a type of aircraft with the capacity to carry air-to-surface missiles) activity When the Russians developed the Bear H model- that has the capability of launching a cruise missile- Otis had a high priority on shadowing those aircraft but as the Russian defense capability declined with the worsening of the Russian economy the number of alert sites declined

Quenneville remarked that prior to 911 the focus of the alert bases was still an outwards-looking monitoring mission Quenneville noted that Dr Finklestein a policy maker at NORAD analyzed possible threats to national airspace Quenneville opined that

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

25

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

his answer to the need of the air alert mission despite the end of the Cold War was that rogue states looking for high level weaponry had a free market in the former Soviet Union He believed that until those weapons were accounted for it was still necessary for Otis ANGB to have an air alert mission He noted that those focused on assessing the need for the air defense mission decided that seven air defense bases was the minimum needed

Hijack Mission

Quenneville noted that the hijack procedure and responsibility did not change over his career He believed that NORAD developed the procedures that were used by the Air Force to intercept a hijacked aircraft He noted that in addition to the radio signals to indicate a hijack that a pilot uses - signals Commission staff is familiar with - there were both hand signals and internationally developed signals that were familiar to the fighter pilots (for instance Quenneville noted that the direction and orientation from which a fighter performs an intercept is a way of signaling the pilot of the target of interest)

Hijack chain of command

According to Quenneville ideally the FAA would notify NORAD of an ongoing hijacking but ifNORAD became aware of a hijacking through a discreet IFF system code change then since both entities used joint-use radar the coordination would be sorted out between a NORAD sector like NEADS and the FAA before fighters are launched

Drug Interdiction Component

Quenneville noted that the F-1 06 did not participate in many drug interdictions circa 1986 He noted that fighters were deployed for forty-five days to Panama in the early nineties They would mostly intercept what was believed as a drug running aircraft then shadow the target aircraft until it landed

F-106 and F-15

Quenneville noted that the firing exercise he was involved in was to test different middot aircrafts ability to fire a tactical nuclear weapon This is one of the designs for the F-106 -to launch a missile referred to as the Geanie Rocket

Though the F ~15 was developed as an air interceptor it quickly showed its ability as a tactical fighter It was never designed to carry a nuclear weapon He noted also that the radar and ability to carry better missiles were improved from the F-106 to the F-15

NORADFAA Cooperation

Quenneville noted that the Otis ANGB take-off route which points off the coast and was designed to respond to an externally orientated threat did not at all times call for

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

26

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

FAA air traffic guidance The route is designed to point out ofthe main air traffic and that coordination could exist directly between NEADS controllers who have the ability to find a target on their radar systems and the fighter pilots He noted that exercises were conducted at night on occasion specifically because there is less air traffic at that time

Quenneville noted that he does not recall a live exercise involving the FAA and an airliner to practice a hijack He explained that the standard procedure was to never approach to closer than five models and to trail the hijacked aircraft to monitor its actions

Threats

Quenneville noted that though he was aware of Osama Bin Laden before 9 11 he never received a link between Bin Laden and the post-Cold War threats that were typified by the 9111 attacks He continued and noted that even though the quantity of threats had changed over his career the outlook and operational appro~ch to those threats had not The adequacy of the air defense mission ofNORAD was based on the ability to perceive a threat with enough time to respond

Quenneville noted that as of90l the fighters sat alert with an external tank and live guns it was possible they would sit with heat seeking missiles as well He said that because of the Russian Bear exercises that were scheduled on 9 11 the fighters were configured as 3-2-2-1 He noted this is a higher state of readiness than the fighters would normally have been at middot middot

Quenneville noted that the last intercept he recalls for Russian Bears was in 1988

911

Quenneville was advised during a weekly meeting that the pilots were put at Battle Stations due to a possible hijack The Operations Group Commander briefed him and he continued the meeting It ended and he went to get paper work for the next meeting Quenneville went into the break room and was told that a commuter airplane had just hit the World Trade Center (WTC) He told Commission staff that he thought at the time that it was a large whole for a commuter airplane He was watching the broadcast when United Airlines Flight 175 (VAL 175) hit the second tower He immediately called to convene the Battle Staff and headed to the Command Post

Quenneville noted that the fighters at alert status were NORAD assets and controlled by NORAD He said that as the Wing Commander on 9 11 he was considered a force provider He noted that NORAD always specified how to posture their air alert assets

At the Command Post the Battle Staff convened He noted that the initial intelligence that they relied on was that the suspected hijacked aircraft was the first aircraft to hit the WTC He did not recall if they initially knew the second aircraft was

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

27

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

hijacked as well He also noted that their aircraft were communicating with NEADS entities since the aircraft were too far away to communicate with directly

Quenneville noted that two of the training sortie fighters backed up the PANT A flight while the other aircraft were being refitted Quenneville believes that the training sortie fighters launched around 852 AM very close to the time the PANT A flight was airborne He noted that the training missions were recalled at 925 The Maine 85 tanker that was used by PANT A was deployed in support of those fighters training He noted there was another tanker in the air that they used as well

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

He noted that the operations group commander would have communicated changes in the ROE to the pilots who were launched subsequently of the initial scrambled fighters Quenneville explained that Duffy and Nash received the information from NEADS and that the other pilots were briefed per the direction ofNEADS by Otis ANGB staff Quenneville noted that the procedure created for this was in place and practiced since it was the same procedure that was used when DEFCONS were changed due to the Cold War threat

Quenneville noted that the ROE was developed based on bigger picture inputs On 911 there was a specific set of ROEs and these were adjusted accordingly The adjusted ROEs redefined where authority would be issued from to have an order to engage an airliner

Assets at Otis

He noted that following direction from NEADS Otis ANGB began manning combat air patrol (CAP) missions They recalled and refitted the training assets and launched fighters in support ofthe PANT A flight He noted that over the course ofthe day Otis ANGB changed the fighters from their training configuration to full armament As airplanes recovered they began loading heavier armament Within four hours they had a full configuration on five airplanes Within seventeen hours during continual flying operations they had fourteen out of seventeen airplanes fully configured All this was done in coordination with NEADS

CAPs

Quenneville noted that the role ofOtis ANGB was as a force provider for the NEADS mission Otis ANGB would tell them their capability and NEADS would make deployment decisionsbased on that He noted that Otis flew airplanes 2417 for six or seven weeks following 911

Post 911

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

28

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

Quenneville noted that as an example of the changes in personnel Otis ANGB was a training organization He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month But after 9111 it served four meals a day for months He noted this displays the amount of recall ofpersonnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks

Current Status

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001 and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002 Most of the personnel that were placed on active duty on 9111 were stood down by a year later

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert He also noted that they are not restricted to looking outward but that this threat still exists

Recommendations

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important and that by watching the countrys protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up ofNorthCom has assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense ofthe country

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States and that the ability to scale up quickly cannot be underestimated

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

Page 19: Interviews with Lt. Col. Maggie Quenneville and Brigadier General

22

- _ ~~- - - () - Tll -~ ) ~ ---o--l--0 7 -~ ~ -

9- - middot -- --- - -- - i ~

- shy

23 bull

i

M ~ ~ -~ rcrd-middot -~ -~-~

- ~ ) middot -t-middot (~ )~-L-A - ~- -u~r~ -~ shy-

- c+-middotmiddot ~ l ~~~ ~--ll

l

~

24

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUMFORTHERECORD

Event Interviews at Otis Air National Guard Base (Otis ANGB)

Type of event Interview with Brigadier General Donald J Quenneville

Date January 7 2004

Special Access Issues None

Prepared by Geoffrey Brown

Team Number 8

Location 102nd Fighter Wing Otis Air National Guard Base Massachusetts Air National

Guard

Participants - Non-Conunission Andrew Huddleston (Dep Ch Plans Integration amp Transformation Div AFXOHP 703 696-0024 Fax 703 588-0636)

Participants- Commission John Farmer John Azzarello Geoffrey Brown

Background

Quenileville has been in the military for 33 years Eight years of which was active duty He came to the 102nd Fighter Wing in 1978 and last year became the commander of the Massachusetts Air National Guard

Please see the attached biography for further details

Alert Site Mission

Quenneville recalled that in 1972 NORADs Air Defense mission included fifteen or sixteen alert sites Between 1972 and 2001 the number of sites declined due to the perception of the Cold War threat Most ofthose bases were at the maritime borders in 2001 as opposed to the northern alert sites that were active in the Cold War and meant to respond to an attack from over the North Pole and Canadian airspace

Quenneville explained that the alert site mission was relatively constant through its changes He noted that the mission at Otis ANGB was mostly focused on responding to Russian Bear (a type of aircraft with the capacity to carry air-to-surface missiles) activity When the Russians developed the Bear H model- that has the capability of launching a cruise missile- Otis had a high priority on shadowing those aircraft but as the Russian defense capability declined with the worsening of the Russian economy the number of alert sites declined

Quenneville remarked that prior to 911 the focus of the alert bases was still an outwards-looking monitoring mission Quenneville noted that Dr Finklestein a policy maker at NORAD analyzed possible threats to national airspace Quenneville opined that

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

25

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

his answer to the need of the air alert mission despite the end of the Cold War was that rogue states looking for high level weaponry had a free market in the former Soviet Union He believed that until those weapons were accounted for it was still necessary for Otis ANGB to have an air alert mission He noted that those focused on assessing the need for the air defense mission decided that seven air defense bases was the minimum needed

Hijack Mission

Quenneville noted that the hijack procedure and responsibility did not change over his career He believed that NORAD developed the procedures that were used by the Air Force to intercept a hijacked aircraft He noted that in addition to the radio signals to indicate a hijack that a pilot uses - signals Commission staff is familiar with - there were both hand signals and internationally developed signals that were familiar to the fighter pilots (for instance Quenneville noted that the direction and orientation from which a fighter performs an intercept is a way of signaling the pilot of the target of interest)

Hijack chain of command

According to Quenneville ideally the FAA would notify NORAD of an ongoing hijacking but ifNORAD became aware of a hijacking through a discreet IFF system code change then since both entities used joint-use radar the coordination would be sorted out between a NORAD sector like NEADS and the FAA before fighters are launched

Drug Interdiction Component

Quenneville noted that the F-1 06 did not participate in many drug interdictions circa 1986 He noted that fighters were deployed for forty-five days to Panama in the early nineties They would mostly intercept what was believed as a drug running aircraft then shadow the target aircraft until it landed

F-106 and F-15

Quenneville noted that the firing exercise he was involved in was to test different middot aircrafts ability to fire a tactical nuclear weapon This is one of the designs for the F-106 -to launch a missile referred to as the Geanie Rocket

Though the F ~15 was developed as an air interceptor it quickly showed its ability as a tactical fighter It was never designed to carry a nuclear weapon He noted also that the radar and ability to carry better missiles were improved from the F-106 to the F-15

NORADFAA Cooperation

Quenneville noted that the Otis ANGB take-off route which points off the coast and was designed to respond to an externally orientated threat did not at all times call for

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

26

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

FAA air traffic guidance The route is designed to point out ofthe main air traffic and that coordination could exist directly between NEADS controllers who have the ability to find a target on their radar systems and the fighter pilots He noted that exercises were conducted at night on occasion specifically because there is less air traffic at that time

Quenneville noted that he does not recall a live exercise involving the FAA and an airliner to practice a hijack He explained that the standard procedure was to never approach to closer than five models and to trail the hijacked aircraft to monitor its actions

Threats

Quenneville noted that though he was aware of Osama Bin Laden before 9 11 he never received a link between Bin Laden and the post-Cold War threats that were typified by the 9111 attacks He continued and noted that even though the quantity of threats had changed over his career the outlook and operational appro~ch to those threats had not The adequacy of the air defense mission ofNORAD was based on the ability to perceive a threat with enough time to respond

Quenneville noted that as of90l the fighters sat alert with an external tank and live guns it was possible they would sit with heat seeking missiles as well He said that because of the Russian Bear exercises that were scheduled on 9 11 the fighters were configured as 3-2-2-1 He noted this is a higher state of readiness than the fighters would normally have been at middot middot

Quenneville noted that the last intercept he recalls for Russian Bears was in 1988

911

Quenneville was advised during a weekly meeting that the pilots were put at Battle Stations due to a possible hijack The Operations Group Commander briefed him and he continued the meeting It ended and he went to get paper work for the next meeting Quenneville went into the break room and was told that a commuter airplane had just hit the World Trade Center (WTC) He told Commission staff that he thought at the time that it was a large whole for a commuter airplane He was watching the broadcast when United Airlines Flight 175 (VAL 175) hit the second tower He immediately called to convene the Battle Staff and headed to the Command Post

Quenneville noted that the fighters at alert status were NORAD assets and controlled by NORAD He said that as the Wing Commander on 9 11 he was considered a force provider He noted that NORAD always specified how to posture their air alert assets

At the Command Post the Battle Staff convened He noted that the initial intelligence that they relied on was that the suspected hijacked aircraft was the first aircraft to hit the WTC He did not recall if they initially knew the second aircraft was

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

27

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

hijacked as well He also noted that their aircraft were communicating with NEADS entities since the aircraft were too far away to communicate with directly

Quenneville noted that two of the training sortie fighters backed up the PANT A flight while the other aircraft were being refitted Quenneville believes that the training sortie fighters launched around 852 AM very close to the time the PANT A flight was airborne He noted that the training missions were recalled at 925 The Maine 85 tanker that was used by PANT A was deployed in support of those fighters training He noted there was another tanker in the air that they used as well

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

He noted that the operations group commander would have communicated changes in the ROE to the pilots who were launched subsequently of the initial scrambled fighters Quenneville explained that Duffy and Nash received the information from NEADS and that the other pilots were briefed per the direction ofNEADS by Otis ANGB staff Quenneville noted that the procedure created for this was in place and practiced since it was the same procedure that was used when DEFCONS were changed due to the Cold War threat

Quenneville noted that the ROE was developed based on bigger picture inputs On 911 there was a specific set of ROEs and these were adjusted accordingly The adjusted ROEs redefined where authority would be issued from to have an order to engage an airliner

Assets at Otis

He noted that following direction from NEADS Otis ANGB began manning combat air patrol (CAP) missions They recalled and refitted the training assets and launched fighters in support ofthe PANT A flight He noted that over the course ofthe day Otis ANGB changed the fighters from their training configuration to full armament As airplanes recovered they began loading heavier armament Within four hours they had a full configuration on five airplanes Within seventeen hours during continual flying operations they had fourteen out of seventeen airplanes fully configured All this was done in coordination with NEADS

CAPs

Quenneville noted that the role ofOtis ANGB was as a force provider for the NEADS mission Otis ANGB would tell them their capability and NEADS would make deployment decisionsbased on that He noted that Otis flew airplanes 2417 for six or seven weeks following 911

Post 911

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

28

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

Quenneville noted that as an example of the changes in personnel Otis ANGB was a training organization He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month But after 9111 it served four meals a day for months He noted this displays the amount of recall ofpersonnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks

Current Status

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001 and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002 Most of the personnel that were placed on active duty on 9111 were stood down by a year later

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert He also noted that they are not restricted to looking outward but that this threat still exists

Recommendations

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important and that by watching the countrys protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up ofNorthCom has assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense ofthe country

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States and that the ability to scale up quickly cannot be underestimated

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

Page 20: Interviews with Lt. Col. Maggie Quenneville and Brigadier General

23 bull

i

M ~ ~ -~ rcrd-middot -~ -~-~

- ~ ) middot -t-middot (~ )~-L-A - ~- -u~r~ -~ shy-

- c+-middotmiddot ~ l ~~~ ~--ll

l

~

24

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUMFORTHERECORD

Event Interviews at Otis Air National Guard Base (Otis ANGB)

Type of event Interview with Brigadier General Donald J Quenneville

Date January 7 2004

Special Access Issues None

Prepared by Geoffrey Brown

Team Number 8

Location 102nd Fighter Wing Otis Air National Guard Base Massachusetts Air National

Guard

Participants - Non-Conunission Andrew Huddleston (Dep Ch Plans Integration amp Transformation Div AFXOHP 703 696-0024 Fax 703 588-0636)

Participants- Commission John Farmer John Azzarello Geoffrey Brown

Background

Quenileville has been in the military for 33 years Eight years of which was active duty He came to the 102nd Fighter Wing in 1978 and last year became the commander of the Massachusetts Air National Guard

Please see the attached biography for further details

Alert Site Mission

Quenneville recalled that in 1972 NORADs Air Defense mission included fifteen or sixteen alert sites Between 1972 and 2001 the number of sites declined due to the perception of the Cold War threat Most ofthose bases were at the maritime borders in 2001 as opposed to the northern alert sites that were active in the Cold War and meant to respond to an attack from over the North Pole and Canadian airspace

Quenneville explained that the alert site mission was relatively constant through its changes He noted that the mission at Otis ANGB was mostly focused on responding to Russian Bear (a type of aircraft with the capacity to carry air-to-surface missiles) activity When the Russians developed the Bear H model- that has the capability of launching a cruise missile- Otis had a high priority on shadowing those aircraft but as the Russian defense capability declined with the worsening of the Russian economy the number of alert sites declined

Quenneville remarked that prior to 911 the focus of the alert bases was still an outwards-looking monitoring mission Quenneville noted that Dr Finklestein a policy maker at NORAD analyzed possible threats to national airspace Quenneville opined that

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

25

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

his answer to the need of the air alert mission despite the end of the Cold War was that rogue states looking for high level weaponry had a free market in the former Soviet Union He believed that until those weapons were accounted for it was still necessary for Otis ANGB to have an air alert mission He noted that those focused on assessing the need for the air defense mission decided that seven air defense bases was the minimum needed

Hijack Mission

Quenneville noted that the hijack procedure and responsibility did not change over his career He believed that NORAD developed the procedures that were used by the Air Force to intercept a hijacked aircraft He noted that in addition to the radio signals to indicate a hijack that a pilot uses - signals Commission staff is familiar with - there were both hand signals and internationally developed signals that were familiar to the fighter pilots (for instance Quenneville noted that the direction and orientation from which a fighter performs an intercept is a way of signaling the pilot of the target of interest)

Hijack chain of command

According to Quenneville ideally the FAA would notify NORAD of an ongoing hijacking but ifNORAD became aware of a hijacking through a discreet IFF system code change then since both entities used joint-use radar the coordination would be sorted out between a NORAD sector like NEADS and the FAA before fighters are launched

Drug Interdiction Component

Quenneville noted that the F-1 06 did not participate in many drug interdictions circa 1986 He noted that fighters were deployed for forty-five days to Panama in the early nineties They would mostly intercept what was believed as a drug running aircraft then shadow the target aircraft until it landed

F-106 and F-15

Quenneville noted that the firing exercise he was involved in was to test different middot aircrafts ability to fire a tactical nuclear weapon This is one of the designs for the F-106 -to launch a missile referred to as the Geanie Rocket

Though the F ~15 was developed as an air interceptor it quickly showed its ability as a tactical fighter It was never designed to carry a nuclear weapon He noted also that the radar and ability to carry better missiles were improved from the F-106 to the F-15

NORADFAA Cooperation

Quenneville noted that the Otis ANGB take-off route which points off the coast and was designed to respond to an externally orientated threat did not at all times call for

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

26

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

FAA air traffic guidance The route is designed to point out ofthe main air traffic and that coordination could exist directly between NEADS controllers who have the ability to find a target on their radar systems and the fighter pilots He noted that exercises were conducted at night on occasion specifically because there is less air traffic at that time

Quenneville noted that he does not recall a live exercise involving the FAA and an airliner to practice a hijack He explained that the standard procedure was to never approach to closer than five models and to trail the hijacked aircraft to monitor its actions

Threats

Quenneville noted that though he was aware of Osama Bin Laden before 9 11 he never received a link between Bin Laden and the post-Cold War threats that were typified by the 9111 attacks He continued and noted that even though the quantity of threats had changed over his career the outlook and operational appro~ch to those threats had not The adequacy of the air defense mission ofNORAD was based on the ability to perceive a threat with enough time to respond

Quenneville noted that as of90l the fighters sat alert with an external tank and live guns it was possible they would sit with heat seeking missiles as well He said that because of the Russian Bear exercises that were scheduled on 9 11 the fighters were configured as 3-2-2-1 He noted this is a higher state of readiness than the fighters would normally have been at middot middot

Quenneville noted that the last intercept he recalls for Russian Bears was in 1988

911

Quenneville was advised during a weekly meeting that the pilots were put at Battle Stations due to a possible hijack The Operations Group Commander briefed him and he continued the meeting It ended and he went to get paper work for the next meeting Quenneville went into the break room and was told that a commuter airplane had just hit the World Trade Center (WTC) He told Commission staff that he thought at the time that it was a large whole for a commuter airplane He was watching the broadcast when United Airlines Flight 175 (VAL 175) hit the second tower He immediately called to convene the Battle Staff and headed to the Command Post

Quenneville noted that the fighters at alert status were NORAD assets and controlled by NORAD He said that as the Wing Commander on 9 11 he was considered a force provider He noted that NORAD always specified how to posture their air alert assets

At the Command Post the Battle Staff convened He noted that the initial intelligence that they relied on was that the suspected hijacked aircraft was the first aircraft to hit the WTC He did not recall if they initially knew the second aircraft was

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

27

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

hijacked as well He also noted that their aircraft were communicating with NEADS entities since the aircraft were too far away to communicate with directly

Quenneville noted that two of the training sortie fighters backed up the PANT A flight while the other aircraft were being refitted Quenneville believes that the training sortie fighters launched around 852 AM very close to the time the PANT A flight was airborne He noted that the training missions were recalled at 925 The Maine 85 tanker that was used by PANT A was deployed in support of those fighters training He noted there was another tanker in the air that they used as well

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

He noted that the operations group commander would have communicated changes in the ROE to the pilots who were launched subsequently of the initial scrambled fighters Quenneville explained that Duffy and Nash received the information from NEADS and that the other pilots were briefed per the direction ofNEADS by Otis ANGB staff Quenneville noted that the procedure created for this was in place and practiced since it was the same procedure that was used when DEFCONS were changed due to the Cold War threat

Quenneville noted that the ROE was developed based on bigger picture inputs On 911 there was a specific set of ROEs and these were adjusted accordingly The adjusted ROEs redefined where authority would be issued from to have an order to engage an airliner

Assets at Otis

He noted that following direction from NEADS Otis ANGB began manning combat air patrol (CAP) missions They recalled and refitted the training assets and launched fighters in support ofthe PANT A flight He noted that over the course ofthe day Otis ANGB changed the fighters from their training configuration to full armament As airplanes recovered they began loading heavier armament Within four hours they had a full configuration on five airplanes Within seventeen hours during continual flying operations they had fourteen out of seventeen airplanes fully configured All this was done in coordination with NEADS

CAPs

Quenneville noted that the role ofOtis ANGB was as a force provider for the NEADS mission Otis ANGB would tell them their capability and NEADS would make deployment decisionsbased on that He noted that Otis flew airplanes 2417 for six or seven weeks following 911

Post 911

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

28

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

Quenneville noted that as an example of the changes in personnel Otis ANGB was a training organization He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month But after 9111 it served four meals a day for months He noted this displays the amount of recall ofpersonnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks

Current Status

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001 and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002 Most of the personnel that were placed on active duty on 9111 were stood down by a year later

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert He also noted that they are not restricted to looking outward but that this threat still exists

Recommendations

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important and that by watching the countrys protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up ofNorthCom has assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense ofthe country

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States and that the ability to scale up quickly cannot be underestimated

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

Page 21: Interviews with Lt. Col. Maggie Quenneville and Brigadier General

24

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUMFORTHERECORD

Event Interviews at Otis Air National Guard Base (Otis ANGB)

Type of event Interview with Brigadier General Donald J Quenneville

Date January 7 2004

Special Access Issues None

Prepared by Geoffrey Brown

Team Number 8

Location 102nd Fighter Wing Otis Air National Guard Base Massachusetts Air National

Guard

Participants - Non-Conunission Andrew Huddleston (Dep Ch Plans Integration amp Transformation Div AFXOHP 703 696-0024 Fax 703 588-0636)

Participants- Commission John Farmer John Azzarello Geoffrey Brown

Background

Quenileville has been in the military for 33 years Eight years of which was active duty He came to the 102nd Fighter Wing in 1978 and last year became the commander of the Massachusetts Air National Guard

Please see the attached biography for further details

Alert Site Mission

Quenneville recalled that in 1972 NORADs Air Defense mission included fifteen or sixteen alert sites Between 1972 and 2001 the number of sites declined due to the perception of the Cold War threat Most ofthose bases were at the maritime borders in 2001 as opposed to the northern alert sites that were active in the Cold War and meant to respond to an attack from over the North Pole and Canadian airspace

Quenneville explained that the alert site mission was relatively constant through its changes He noted that the mission at Otis ANGB was mostly focused on responding to Russian Bear (a type of aircraft with the capacity to carry air-to-surface missiles) activity When the Russians developed the Bear H model- that has the capability of launching a cruise missile- Otis had a high priority on shadowing those aircraft but as the Russian defense capability declined with the worsening of the Russian economy the number of alert sites declined

Quenneville remarked that prior to 911 the focus of the alert bases was still an outwards-looking monitoring mission Quenneville noted that Dr Finklestein a policy maker at NORAD analyzed possible threats to national airspace Quenneville opined that

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

25

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

his answer to the need of the air alert mission despite the end of the Cold War was that rogue states looking for high level weaponry had a free market in the former Soviet Union He believed that until those weapons were accounted for it was still necessary for Otis ANGB to have an air alert mission He noted that those focused on assessing the need for the air defense mission decided that seven air defense bases was the minimum needed

Hijack Mission

Quenneville noted that the hijack procedure and responsibility did not change over his career He believed that NORAD developed the procedures that were used by the Air Force to intercept a hijacked aircraft He noted that in addition to the radio signals to indicate a hijack that a pilot uses - signals Commission staff is familiar with - there were both hand signals and internationally developed signals that were familiar to the fighter pilots (for instance Quenneville noted that the direction and orientation from which a fighter performs an intercept is a way of signaling the pilot of the target of interest)

Hijack chain of command

According to Quenneville ideally the FAA would notify NORAD of an ongoing hijacking but ifNORAD became aware of a hijacking through a discreet IFF system code change then since both entities used joint-use radar the coordination would be sorted out between a NORAD sector like NEADS and the FAA before fighters are launched

Drug Interdiction Component

Quenneville noted that the F-1 06 did not participate in many drug interdictions circa 1986 He noted that fighters were deployed for forty-five days to Panama in the early nineties They would mostly intercept what was believed as a drug running aircraft then shadow the target aircraft until it landed

F-106 and F-15

Quenneville noted that the firing exercise he was involved in was to test different middot aircrafts ability to fire a tactical nuclear weapon This is one of the designs for the F-106 -to launch a missile referred to as the Geanie Rocket

Though the F ~15 was developed as an air interceptor it quickly showed its ability as a tactical fighter It was never designed to carry a nuclear weapon He noted also that the radar and ability to carry better missiles were improved from the F-106 to the F-15

NORADFAA Cooperation

Quenneville noted that the Otis ANGB take-off route which points off the coast and was designed to respond to an externally orientated threat did not at all times call for

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

26

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

FAA air traffic guidance The route is designed to point out ofthe main air traffic and that coordination could exist directly between NEADS controllers who have the ability to find a target on their radar systems and the fighter pilots He noted that exercises were conducted at night on occasion specifically because there is less air traffic at that time

Quenneville noted that he does not recall a live exercise involving the FAA and an airliner to practice a hijack He explained that the standard procedure was to never approach to closer than five models and to trail the hijacked aircraft to monitor its actions

Threats

Quenneville noted that though he was aware of Osama Bin Laden before 9 11 he never received a link between Bin Laden and the post-Cold War threats that were typified by the 9111 attacks He continued and noted that even though the quantity of threats had changed over his career the outlook and operational appro~ch to those threats had not The adequacy of the air defense mission ofNORAD was based on the ability to perceive a threat with enough time to respond

Quenneville noted that as of90l the fighters sat alert with an external tank and live guns it was possible they would sit with heat seeking missiles as well He said that because of the Russian Bear exercises that were scheduled on 9 11 the fighters were configured as 3-2-2-1 He noted this is a higher state of readiness than the fighters would normally have been at middot middot

Quenneville noted that the last intercept he recalls for Russian Bears was in 1988

911

Quenneville was advised during a weekly meeting that the pilots were put at Battle Stations due to a possible hijack The Operations Group Commander briefed him and he continued the meeting It ended and he went to get paper work for the next meeting Quenneville went into the break room and was told that a commuter airplane had just hit the World Trade Center (WTC) He told Commission staff that he thought at the time that it was a large whole for a commuter airplane He was watching the broadcast when United Airlines Flight 175 (VAL 175) hit the second tower He immediately called to convene the Battle Staff and headed to the Command Post

Quenneville noted that the fighters at alert status were NORAD assets and controlled by NORAD He said that as the Wing Commander on 9 11 he was considered a force provider He noted that NORAD always specified how to posture their air alert assets

At the Command Post the Battle Staff convened He noted that the initial intelligence that they relied on was that the suspected hijacked aircraft was the first aircraft to hit the WTC He did not recall if they initially knew the second aircraft was

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

27

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

hijacked as well He also noted that their aircraft were communicating with NEADS entities since the aircraft were too far away to communicate with directly

Quenneville noted that two of the training sortie fighters backed up the PANT A flight while the other aircraft were being refitted Quenneville believes that the training sortie fighters launched around 852 AM very close to the time the PANT A flight was airborne He noted that the training missions were recalled at 925 The Maine 85 tanker that was used by PANT A was deployed in support of those fighters training He noted there was another tanker in the air that they used as well

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

He noted that the operations group commander would have communicated changes in the ROE to the pilots who were launched subsequently of the initial scrambled fighters Quenneville explained that Duffy and Nash received the information from NEADS and that the other pilots were briefed per the direction ofNEADS by Otis ANGB staff Quenneville noted that the procedure created for this was in place and practiced since it was the same procedure that was used when DEFCONS were changed due to the Cold War threat

Quenneville noted that the ROE was developed based on bigger picture inputs On 911 there was a specific set of ROEs and these were adjusted accordingly The adjusted ROEs redefined where authority would be issued from to have an order to engage an airliner

Assets at Otis

He noted that following direction from NEADS Otis ANGB began manning combat air patrol (CAP) missions They recalled and refitted the training assets and launched fighters in support ofthe PANT A flight He noted that over the course ofthe day Otis ANGB changed the fighters from their training configuration to full armament As airplanes recovered they began loading heavier armament Within four hours they had a full configuration on five airplanes Within seventeen hours during continual flying operations they had fourteen out of seventeen airplanes fully configured All this was done in coordination with NEADS

CAPs

Quenneville noted that the role ofOtis ANGB was as a force provider for the NEADS mission Otis ANGB would tell them their capability and NEADS would make deployment decisionsbased on that He noted that Otis flew airplanes 2417 for six or seven weeks following 911

Post 911

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

28

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

Quenneville noted that as an example of the changes in personnel Otis ANGB was a training organization He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month But after 9111 it served four meals a day for months He noted this displays the amount of recall ofpersonnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks

Current Status

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001 and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002 Most of the personnel that were placed on active duty on 9111 were stood down by a year later

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert He also noted that they are not restricted to looking outward but that this threat still exists

Recommendations

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important and that by watching the countrys protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up ofNorthCom has assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense ofthe country

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States and that the ability to scale up quickly cannot be underestimated

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

Page 22: Interviews with Lt. Col. Maggie Quenneville and Brigadier General

25

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

his answer to the need of the air alert mission despite the end of the Cold War was that rogue states looking for high level weaponry had a free market in the former Soviet Union He believed that until those weapons were accounted for it was still necessary for Otis ANGB to have an air alert mission He noted that those focused on assessing the need for the air defense mission decided that seven air defense bases was the minimum needed

Hijack Mission

Quenneville noted that the hijack procedure and responsibility did not change over his career He believed that NORAD developed the procedures that were used by the Air Force to intercept a hijacked aircraft He noted that in addition to the radio signals to indicate a hijack that a pilot uses - signals Commission staff is familiar with - there were both hand signals and internationally developed signals that were familiar to the fighter pilots (for instance Quenneville noted that the direction and orientation from which a fighter performs an intercept is a way of signaling the pilot of the target of interest)

Hijack chain of command

According to Quenneville ideally the FAA would notify NORAD of an ongoing hijacking but ifNORAD became aware of a hijacking through a discreet IFF system code change then since both entities used joint-use radar the coordination would be sorted out between a NORAD sector like NEADS and the FAA before fighters are launched

Drug Interdiction Component

Quenneville noted that the F-1 06 did not participate in many drug interdictions circa 1986 He noted that fighters were deployed for forty-five days to Panama in the early nineties They would mostly intercept what was believed as a drug running aircraft then shadow the target aircraft until it landed

F-106 and F-15

Quenneville noted that the firing exercise he was involved in was to test different middot aircrafts ability to fire a tactical nuclear weapon This is one of the designs for the F-106 -to launch a missile referred to as the Geanie Rocket

Though the F ~15 was developed as an air interceptor it quickly showed its ability as a tactical fighter It was never designed to carry a nuclear weapon He noted also that the radar and ability to carry better missiles were improved from the F-106 to the F-15

NORADFAA Cooperation

Quenneville noted that the Otis ANGB take-off route which points off the coast and was designed to respond to an externally orientated threat did not at all times call for

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FAA air traffic guidance The route is designed to point out ofthe main air traffic and that coordination could exist directly between NEADS controllers who have the ability to find a target on their radar systems and the fighter pilots He noted that exercises were conducted at night on occasion specifically because there is less air traffic at that time

Quenneville noted that he does not recall a live exercise involving the FAA and an airliner to practice a hijack He explained that the standard procedure was to never approach to closer than five models and to trail the hijacked aircraft to monitor its actions

Threats

Quenneville noted that though he was aware of Osama Bin Laden before 9 11 he never received a link between Bin Laden and the post-Cold War threats that were typified by the 9111 attacks He continued and noted that even though the quantity of threats had changed over his career the outlook and operational appro~ch to those threats had not The adequacy of the air defense mission ofNORAD was based on the ability to perceive a threat with enough time to respond

Quenneville noted that as of90l the fighters sat alert with an external tank and live guns it was possible they would sit with heat seeking missiles as well He said that because of the Russian Bear exercises that were scheduled on 9 11 the fighters were configured as 3-2-2-1 He noted this is a higher state of readiness than the fighters would normally have been at middot middot

Quenneville noted that the last intercept he recalls for Russian Bears was in 1988

911

Quenneville was advised during a weekly meeting that the pilots were put at Battle Stations due to a possible hijack The Operations Group Commander briefed him and he continued the meeting It ended and he went to get paper work for the next meeting Quenneville went into the break room and was told that a commuter airplane had just hit the World Trade Center (WTC) He told Commission staff that he thought at the time that it was a large whole for a commuter airplane He was watching the broadcast when United Airlines Flight 175 (VAL 175) hit the second tower He immediately called to convene the Battle Staff and headed to the Command Post

Quenneville noted that the fighters at alert status were NORAD assets and controlled by NORAD He said that as the Wing Commander on 9 11 he was considered a force provider He noted that NORAD always specified how to posture their air alert assets

At the Command Post the Battle Staff convened He noted that the initial intelligence that they relied on was that the suspected hijacked aircraft was the first aircraft to hit the WTC He did not recall if they initially knew the second aircraft was

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

hijacked as well He also noted that their aircraft were communicating with NEADS entities since the aircraft were too far away to communicate with directly

Quenneville noted that two of the training sortie fighters backed up the PANT A flight while the other aircraft were being refitted Quenneville believes that the training sortie fighters launched around 852 AM very close to the time the PANT A flight was airborne He noted that the training missions were recalled at 925 The Maine 85 tanker that was used by PANT A was deployed in support of those fighters training He noted there was another tanker in the air that they used as well

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

He noted that the operations group commander would have communicated changes in the ROE to the pilots who were launched subsequently of the initial scrambled fighters Quenneville explained that Duffy and Nash received the information from NEADS and that the other pilots were briefed per the direction ofNEADS by Otis ANGB staff Quenneville noted that the procedure created for this was in place and practiced since it was the same procedure that was used when DEFCONS were changed due to the Cold War threat

Quenneville noted that the ROE was developed based on bigger picture inputs On 911 there was a specific set of ROEs and these were adjusted accordingly The adjusted ROEs redefined where authority would be issued from to have an order to engage an airliner

Assets at Otis

He noted that following direction from NEADS Otis ANGB began manning combat air patrol (CAP) missions They recalled and refitted the training assets and launched fighters in support ofthe PANT A flight He noted that over the course ofthe day Otis ANGB changed the fighters from their training configuration to full armament As airplanes recovered they began loading heavier armament Within four hours they had a full configuration on five airplanes Within seventeen hours during continual flying operations they had fourteen out of seventeen airplanes fully configured All this was done in coordination with NEADS

CAPs

Quenneville noted that the role ofOtis ANGB was as a force provider for the NEADS mission Otis ANGB would tell them their capability and NEADS would make deployment decisionsbased on that He noted that Otis flew airplanes 2417 for six or seven weeks following 911

Post 911

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Quenneville noted that as an example of the changes in personnel Otis ANGB was a training organization He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month But after 9111 it served four meals a day for months He noted this displays the amount of recall ofpersonnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks

Current Status

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001 and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002 Most of the personnel that were placed on active duty on 9111 were stood down by a year later

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert He also noted that they are not restricted to looking outward but that this threat still exists

Recommendations

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important and that by watching the countrys protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up ofNorthCom has assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense ofthe country

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States and that the ability to scale up quickly cannot be underestimated

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

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FAA air traffic guidance The route is designed to point out ofthe main air traffic and that coordination could exist directly between NEADS controllers who have the ability to find a target on their radar systems and the fighter pilots He noted that exercises were conducted at night on occasion specifically because there is less air traffic at that time

Quenneville noted that he does not recall a live exercise involving the FAA and an airliner to practice a hijack He explained that the standard procedure was to never approach to closer than five models and to trail the hijacked aircraft to monitor its actions

Threats

Quenneville noted that though he was aware of Osama Bin Laden before 9 11 he never received a link between Bin Laden and the post-Cold War threats that were typified by the 9111 attacks He continued and noted that even though the quantity of threats had changed over his career the outlook and operational appro~ch to those threats had not The adequacy of the air defense mission ofNORAD was based on the ability to perceive a threat with enough time to respond

Quenneville noted that as of90l the fighters sat alert with an external tank and live guns it was possible they would sit with heat seeking missiles as well He said that because of the Russian Bear exercises that were scheduled on 9 11 the fighters were configured as 3-2-2-1 He noted this is a higher state of readiness than the fighters would normally have been at middot middot

Quenneville noted that the last intercept he recalls for Russian Bears was in 1988

911

Quenneville was advised during a weekly meeting that the pilots were put at Battle Stations due to a possible hijack The Operations Group Commander briefed him and he continued the meeting It ended and he went to get paper work for the next meeting Quenneville went into the break room and was told that a commuter airplane had just hit the World Trade Center (WTC) He told Commission staff that he thought at the time that it was a large whole for a commuter airplane He was watching the broadcast when United Airlines Flight 175 (VAL 175) hit the second tower He immediately called to convene the Battle Staff and headed to the Command Post

Quenneville noted that the fighters at alert status were NORAD assets and controlled by NORAD He said that as the Wing Commander on 9 11 he was considered a force provider He noted that NORAD always specified how to posture their air alert assets

At the Command Post the Battle Staff convened He noted that the initial intelligence that they relied on was that the suspected hijacked aircraft was the first aircraft to hit the WTC He did not recall if they initially knew the second aircraft was

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

27

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

hijacked as well He also noted that their aircraft were communicating with NEADS entities since the aircraft were too far away to communicate with directly

Quenneville noted that two of the training sortie fighters backed up the PANT A flight while the other aircraft were being refitted Quenneville believes that the training sortie fighters launched around 852 AM very close to the time the PANT A flight was airborne He noted that the training missions were recalled at 925 The Maine 85 tanker that was used by PANT A was deployed in support of those fighters training He noted there was another tanker in the air that they used as well

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

He noted that the operations group commander would have communicated changes in the ROE to the pilots who were launched subsequently of the initial scrambled fighters Quenneville explained that Duffy and Nash received the information from NEADS and that the other pilots were briefed per the direction ofNEADS by Otis ANGB staff Quenneville noted that the procedure created for this was in place and practiced since it was the same procedure that was used when DEFCONS were changed due to the Cold War threat

Quenneville noted that the ROE was developed based on bigger picture inputs On 911 there was a specific set of ROEs and these were adjusted accordingly The adjusted ROEs redefined where authority would be issued from to have an order to engage an airliner

Assets at Otis

He noted that following direction from NEADS Otis ANGB began manning combat air patrol (CAP) missions They recalled and refitted the training assets and launched fighters in support ofthe PANT A flight He noted that over the course ofthe day Otis ANGB changed the fighters from their training configuration to full armament As airplanes recovered they began loading heavier armament Within four hours they had a full configuration on five airplanes Within seventeen hours during continual flying operations they had fourteen out of seventeen airplanes fully configured All this was done in coordination with NEADS

CAPs

Quenneville noted that the role ofOtis ANGB was as a force provider for the NEADS mission Otis ANGB would tell them their capability and NEADS would make deployment decisionsbased on that He noted that Otis flew airplanes 2417 for six or seven weeks following 911

Post 911

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Quenneville noted that as an example of the changes in personnel Otis ANGB was a training organization He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month But after 9111 it served four meals a day for months He noted this displays the amount of recall ofpersonnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks

Current Status

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001 and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002 Most of the personnel that were placed on active duty on 9111 were stood down by a year later

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert He also noted that they are not restricted to looking outward but that this threat still exists

Recommendations

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important and that by watching the countrys protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up ofNorthCom has assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense ofthe country

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States and that the ability to scale up quickly cannot be underestimated

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

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hijacked as well He also noted that their aircraft were communicating with NEADS entities since the aircraft were too far away to communicate with directly

Quenneville noted that two of the training sortie fighters backed up the PANT A flight while the other aircraft were being refitted Quenneville believes that the training sortie fighters launched around 852 AM very close to the time the PANT A flight was airborne He noted that the training missions were recalled at 925 The Maine 85 tanker that was used by PANT A was deployed in support of those fighters training He noted there was another tanker in the air that they used as well

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

He noted that the operations group commander would have communicated changes in the ROE to the pilots who were launched subsequently of the initial scrambled fighters Quenneville explained that Duffy and Nash received the information from NEADS and that the other pilots were briefed per the direction ofNEADS by Otis ANGB staff Quenneville noted that the procedure created for this was in place and practiced since it was the same procedure that was used when DEFCONS were changed due to the Cold War threat

Quenneville noted that the ROE was developed based on bigger picture inputs On 911 there was a specific set of ROEs and these were adjusted accordingly The adjusted ROEs redefined where authority would be issued from to have an order to engage an airliner

Assets at Otis

He noted that following direction from NEADS Otis ANGB began manning combat air patrol (CAP) missions They recalled and refitted the training assets and launched fighters in support ofthe PANT A flight He noted that over the course ofthe day Otis ANGB changed the fighters from their training configuration to full armament As airplanes recovered they began loading heavier armament Within four hours they had a full configuration on five airplanes Within seventeen hours during continual flying operations they had fourteen out of seventeen airplanes fully configured All this was done in coordination with NEADS

CAPs

Quenneville noted that the role ofOtis ANGB was as a force provider for the NEADS mission Otis ANGB would tell them their capability and NEADS would make deployment decisionsbased on that He noted that Otis flew airplanes 2417 for six or seven weeks following 911

Post 911

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

Quenneville noted that as an example of the changes in personnel Otis ANGB was a training organization He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month But after 9111 it served four meals a day for months He noted this displays the amount of recall ofpersonnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks

Current Status

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001 and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002 Most of the personnel that were placed on active duty on 9111 were stood down by a year later

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert He also noted that they are not restricted to looking outward but that this threat still exists

Recommendations

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important and that by watching the countrys protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up ofNorthCom has assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense ofthe country

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States and that the ability to scale up quickly cannot be underestimated

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

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Quenneville noted that as an example of the changes in personnel Otis ANGB was a training organization He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month But after 9111 it served four meals a day for months He noted this displays the amount of recall ofpersonnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks

Current Status

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001 and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002 Most of the personnel that were placed on active duty on 9111 were stood down by a year later

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert He also noted that they are not restricted to looking outward but that this threat still exists

Recommendations

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important and that by watching the countrys protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up ofNorthCom has assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense ofthe country

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States and that the ability to scale up quickly cannot be underestimated

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED