introducing the maxrange dataset: monthly data on ... › d04e › 2396cdc048a... · back to 1789...

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Introducing the MaxRange Dataset: Monthly Data on Political Institutions and Regimes Since 1789 and Yearly Since 1600

Max Rånge*, Matthew C. Wilson** and Mikael Sandberg*

Presented at the WINIR 2015 Conference in Rio de Janeiro

*Halmstad University, Sweden, [email protected], [email protected]

**West Virginia University, USA, [email protected]

ABSTRACT The MaxRange dataset provides information on political institutions for all countries of the world going back to 1789 on a monthly and yearly basis, and to 1600 on a yearly one. The yearly dataset spanning 1600 to 2014 has over 90,000 country-year observations, and in its monthly format from 1789 has over 660,000 observations. The time-series data are at least 200 years longer than any other comparable time-series dataset on political institutions. Created by Max Rånge, the datasets aggregate specific attributes to create nominal and ordinal rankings of political regimes on a 1-100 scale (the MaxRange1 dataset) and on a 1-1,000 scale (the MaxRange2 dataset). At the same time, however, the codes for each attribute underlying the categorization of political regimes are also included. It is more detailed than any other dataset on political institutions, yielding up to 1,000 different unique combinations of institutional features. In addition to supporting a rigorous classification of democratic and nondemocratic regimes, the dataset allows researchers to exploit institutional variation and to explore alternative ways of aggregating political institutions. The MaxRange dataset on political institutions is by far the biggest and most comprehensive political regime dataset to date, and it offers several advantages compared to other available data. In particular, the availability of monthly time-series data provides greater detail and reliability to support more accurate research on political transitions.

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Introduction

North’s definition of institutions as the “rules of the game,” or more specifically, the “humanly

devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction,” (North 1990) has been

extremely influential both in economic and social sciences. An empirical interest in the relationship

between institutions and political outcomes--embodied in political science by the historical institutionalist

approach (Hall and Taylor 1996)--has led to a number of different datasets on political institutions.

Many of the projects have attempted to classify types of regimes and document temporal changes between

them. Some of the most well-known datasets on democratic institutions are the Freedom House, the

Economist Intelligence Unit (EUI), the Institutional and Elections Project (IAEP), and the Democracy and

Dictatorship datasets (Przeworski 1991). However, only three datasets on democracy go as far back as the

early 19th century: the Polyarchy dataset by Vanhanen (Vanhanen 2003), which goes back to 1810, and

the Boix, Miller, and Rosato (Boix et al. 2012) Political Regimes data (BMR) and the Polity IV dataset,

both of which begin in 1800.

Inspired by Robert Dahl’s (1971) conceptualization of democracy as being based on contestation

and participation, the Vanhanen and BMR datasets focused on these aspects for determining whether a

country was democratic in a particular year. Vanhanen constructed a democracy index by combining the

share of party representatives not belonging to the largest party in the elected parliament with the rate of

electoral participation (Vanhanen 1997). In the BMR dataset that runs to 2007, the authors use the same

distinctions to produce a binary indicator of democracy. Unfortunately, neither Vanhanen’s Polyarchy,

nor the BMR datasets, are sufficient for gauging changes in political institutions with any detail or

precision. Moreover, the two databases are no longer being updated. Polity IV data, in contrast,

represent all nation states with a population of more than 500,000 inhabitants starting from 1800 (Jaggers

and Gurr 1995; Gurr 1974; Marshall and Jaggers 2002, 2010; Eckstein and Gurr 1975). This

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continuously updated dataset provides ordinal measures of the openness, regulation, and competitiveness

of executive recruitment and political participation, as well as a measure of executive constraint.

However, scholars have criticized the “democracy scale” derived from the constituent measures as being

endogenously affected by conflict and regime change (Vreeland 2008). Scholars have also demonstrated

that the component measures themselves do not have equal effects on the democracy score they compose,

nor do they show the same amount of variation among democracies as they do autocracies (Gleditsch and

Ward 1997).

As a whole, there are a number of reviews and critiques of the existing datasets on democracies

and democratic institutions that highlight problematic issues regarding the internal validity of the

measures, conceptual inconsistency, and contextual specificity (Adcock 2001; Bollen 1993; Bollen and

Paxton 1998; Casper and Tufis 2003; Collier and Adcock 1999; Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Sartori

1970). These concerns are not exclusive to datasets that focus on democracy, however, as exemplified by

Wilson (2014). Whether it is operationalized as categorical or in gradations, there is a near-consensus

that there needs to be a clearer focus on the specific institutions and practices by which democracies and

nondemocracies are discerned.

One recent project, the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project based at the University of

Gothenburg and the Kellogg Institute at the University Notre Dame, has taken on the task of improving

indicators of democracy through an impressive team of scientists and country experts. In addition to

involving a large number of knowledgeable scholars, one of the primary benefits of V-Dem is that it aims

to provide the full set of indices for each conception and component by which different forms of

democracy are measured (Coppedge et al. 2015). Still, there are two issues inherent to the project that

have yet to be resolved: V-Dem does not purport to cover institutions and regime types outside of

democracy, and the data only go as far back as 1900. The ongoing data collection effort aims to cover

most nations over the period 1900-2013 (Coppedge et al. 2015). To the extent that the historical

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processes undergirding statebuilding in the contemporary world generated institutional experimentation

that had varied success, there is a need for historical time-series data that “open-mindedly” explores

institutional variations, over a much longer period of time, in order to inductively generate new

institutional categories and compare them to traditional deductive classifications. This is something that

V-Dem recognizes, as evidenced by their use of Bayesian factor analysis to inform sub-level variables that

make up indices such as freedom of expression. Nevertheless, the project’s nearly exclusive focus on

distinguishing among seven high-level principles of democracy runs the risk of omitting the varieties of

nondemocratic government that often precede democracy or that evade democracy altogether.1

More important, however, is the need to identify political institutions in the long-run. As

Gleditsch and Ward (1997) pointed out, “[s]tudies that wish to examine democratic change by focusing on

an overall measure of democracy will have to have fairly long time frames to capture the variance in

democracy scores over time’’ (pg. 378). Lipset and Rokkan (1967) considered the roots and ‘junctures’

of our current political and party systems to lay in the Reformation, and in subsequent democratic and

industrial revolutions. However, data are scarcely available by which to quantitatively assess their

argument. Similarly, Collier and Collier (2002), Pierson (2004), and Putnam (1992) have suggested that

there are institutional path dependencies, based on theory and case studies. Yet, the difference between

‘path dependence’ and ‘diffusion’ hypotheses of national institutional evolution remains unclear to

political scientists, political sociologists, and aid agencies, who lack viable data to explore them. The

need for historical data also resonates with political scientists who have argued in favor of taking the role

of history more seriously in empirical research (Grzymala-Busse 2010; Pierson 2004; Rose and Shin

2001).

Given the recognized need to identify specific institutions, to take a dynamic approach towards

classifying political regimes, and to collect data over a much longer period of time, the MaxRange dataset

offers to resolve some of the inherent issues and complement existing efforts. Created by Max Rånge,

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the dataset aggregates specific attributes to create nominal and ordinal rankings of political regimes on a

1-100 scale (the MaxRange1 dataset) and on a 1-1,000 scale (the MaxRange2 dataset). The data are the

product of over eight years of historical research based at Halmstad University in Sweden, a project

spearheaded by Max Rånge. The MaxRange dataset provides information on political institutions for all

countries of the world going back to 1789 on a monthly and yearly basis, and to 1600 on a yearly one. The

data cover 111 more years of monthly data and 200 more years of yearly data than most current datasets on

political institutions. The monthly coverage is an especially attractive feature of the data, as many

political events and changes can occur over the course of a year that are frequently omitted from yearly

data. Countries that were thought to constitute the “Arab Spring” evidence the way in which countries

in transition can alternate between several varieties of interim forms or backslides from democratization

during the same year. In 2010, for example, Tunisia could be described as having presidential rule in a

semi-authoritarian system. By 2011, however, its political system was qualified democratic and

parliamentarian. Considering the yearly change between regimes says little about the transition

process. Similarly, Egypt had an authoritarian regime in 2010, an interim system in 2011, and

exemplified presidentialism in 2012. Recent years have been extremely unstable in Egypt, with interim

governments, constitutional presidencies, and military governments replacing each other on several

occasions. Such institutional changes are largely missed by data collected at the yearly level. By

providing documentation on monthly changes, MaxRange supports detailed descriptions of the transition

process.

Like V-Dem, the MaxRange dataset includes all of the component measures used to create them,

thereby allowing researchers to focus on individual institutions and to operationalize different

categorizations of regime type. Unlike V-Dem, however, the MaxRange dataset has a wider scope and

includes institutions, regime types, and political systems that may not be not pertinent to democracy. In

identifying political institutions and regime attributes, the author made no prior assumptions about what

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systems actually exist or existed, nor was the focus beholden to existing classifications of regime type.

The new dataset thus supports the empirical study of political transitions in the long term by providing

information on both democratic and non-democratic institutions that can be used to trace the evolution of

different regimes. At the same time, however, MaxRange data can be used to complement and

cross-validate V-Dem and other existing datasets. The data collection efforts are fully transparent; all

sources used to code them have been documented and archived, allowing scholars to compare source

material and to evaluate inter-coder reliability across datasets for specific country-year observations. In

the following sections, we discuss the conceptual motivations behind the creation of the MaxRange

dataset, explain how the data were collected, and describe the variables. Among other substantial

potential contributions, the availability of monthly time-series data offered by the MaxRange dataset

provides greater detail and reliability to support more accurate research on political transitions. In the

following sections we outline the conceptual motivation and collection efforts, describe the variables, and

compare MaxRange data to other sources.

Conceptual motivation and collection scheme

The MaxRange dataset is meant to represent diversity in political regimes and institutions over a

long period of time. One of the primary goals was to identify political institutions and institutional

practices that distinguish those regimes that could be considered democratic from those that are not; a

second goal was to provide information to distinguish between forms of democracy, in the style of

Cheibub et al. (2010) and V-Dem, as well as between various forms of nondemocracy--as have Cheibub et

al. (Cheibub et al. 2010), Geddes (2003), Geddes et al. (2014), and Hadenius and Teorell (2007).

Identifying potential indicators for inclusion involved studying country histories and inductively coding

the “forms” historical political regimes took. This involved first relying on traditional concepts and

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gradually expanding the taxonomy. The evolution of regime taxonomy in the process of describing

regimes was concerned with fleshing out the relation among concepts, including “gray areas” previously

referred to as “illiberal democracies,” “hybrid regimes,” and “electoral authoritarianism” (Levitsky and

Way 2002; Haber 2006).

The attempt to iteratively refine existing concepts aimed to make “friendly amendments” in order

to adequately capture institutional variations that might be observed over time (Adcock and Collier 2001).

The evolved taxonomy was thus the result of an interactive process in which the operationalization and

scoring of concepts was evaluated, additional institutions were considered, and the expanded concepts

were subsequently added and evaluated. Exploring institutional permutations led first to a 100-degree

scale (MaxRange1). As some concepts necessitated even finer distinctions, this scale was then expanded

into a 1000-degree scale (MaxRange2). MaxRange1 can be thought of as highlighting “first-order”

institutional variation in regimes, while MaxRange2 attempted to account for the many different types of

“interim” political systems that resulted from institutional innovation.

Collecting data on institutions and institutional practices relied on the use of historical sources,

such as the constitutions and laws in a country, as well as news reports and encyclopedias such as The

Statesman's Yearbook, Keesing’s Record of World Events, and BBC Timelines. All of the reference

material that was used for coding has been copied and is archived at Halmstad University in Sweden.

The sources that were referenced were used to qualitatively evaluate institutional changes across the full

period of observation. Beginning in January 1789, specific institutional practices were noted, and

changes in each were coded in the effective month and year of change. Combining indicators as they

changed provided the basis for determining regime type. Given that “parchment institutions” do not

always reflect empirical reality, the coding of institutional practices favored de jure authority.

The first order on which regimes were differentiated involved distinguishing democracy from

nondemocracy. To do so, election results from all general national elections were taken into account

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using election results and news or historical sources covering the election. Mandates and reports from

international observers and other contemporary reports were used to gauge how pluralized, free, and fair

an election had been. Subsequently, a distinction was made between “qualified” and “electoral”

democracies based on how well the parliament and the elected leaders were considered representative of

the “will of the people,” and how well political and civil rights were maintained. In both qualified and

electoral democracies, elections are considered free and legitimate to the people; in systems classified as

electoral democracies, however, political or civil rights are sometimes violated, the government exceeds

its constitutional powers, or government malpractices obstruct democratic rule.

Variable Description

As described in the Appendix 1, the MaxRange1 index has 100 values on on 1-100 value scale,

while MaxRange2 index has 199 values on a 1-1000 scale.3 Each value is given a descriptive lable and

corresponds with one of fourteen regime types that we identified, which range from Absolutism to

Qualified Democracy. This represents a composite “institutional configuration” score for all nations,

which accounts for the legitimacy and degree of pluralism in political elections, the democratic legitimacy

of the executive, political division of power between major institutional actors, the observance of political

and citizen rights (freedom of expression and equal rights in nomination to elections), and the degree of

constitutionalism. The score is ordinal, in the sense that the accumulation of particular attributes can be

considered typical ordinal scale values (e.g., differentiating limited, electoral, and qualified democracy),

but the subcategories that they connote are nominal insofar as they build upon sets of nominal values of

political institutions.

The variables in the monthly MaxRange2 1789-2014 dataset covers approximately 240 nations

over 2,700 months, constituting more than 700,000 unique values. These data provide information about

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political development in the world as a whole, and for each single nation on a monthly basis for more than

two centuries. Figure 1 depicts the sequences of these regime-types ranging from Absolutism (darkest)

to Electoral and Qualified Democracy (lightest) in the world between 1789 and 2014, sorted from the ends

state 2014 (using TraMineR in R). As the figure shows, the MaxRange data allows scholars to trace

modern-day nations back to 1789, or to the month they emerged as nation-states. This is an important asset

of MaxRange data, since institutional paths or path dependencies can be investigated as institutions

emerge, diffuse, and vanish from 1789 until today. In this way, the MaxRange datasets provide a

comprehensive basis for analyzing statebuilding and political institutional development.

Figure 1 about here

The values associated with MaxRange1 (1-100) and MaxRange2 (1-1000) indices imply a

specific combination of dummy-variables. As such, they map onto a large number of dummy variables

regarding specific institutions and institutional practices, which are listed in the Appendix. The index

can therefore also be subdivided into regime-type groups, as well as dummy (0 and 1 value) variables,

denoting the presence or absence of specific institutions in a national political system. The ability to

disaggregate the MaxRange scale into combinations of institutional dummy variables makes it possible

to operationalize different classifications of regime type or institutional configurations, as well as to

analyze the temporal dynamics of specific political institutions. Other datasets, such as the

Institutional and Elections Project and the Database of Political Institutions offer this feature, although

the temporal window associated with MaxRange is considerably larger.

Institutional Components

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In combination with other institutional components (fully described in the Appendix 1), the

MaxRange index values are coded on the basis of the six major institutional components. These are in

order of importance: the MaxRange Regime Types (the most important as it indicates the type of regime to

which the other components add information for the specification of the resulting MaxRange2 index

value), Executive strength (vs. Parliament), the Accountability Structure of Institutions, Normal vs.

Interim Regime, Election of Head of State, and Head of State (Republic or Monarchy). As is indicated in

the Appendix 1, there are also other institutional components in the MaxRange2 dataset that are given but

not essential in the resulting index value classifications. These are: Executive Concentration (to one or two

offices), Head of Government (primary executive power) and Centralization vs. Decentralization (of

Government vs. Parliament). In addition, we have produced a syntax file for transforming MaxRange2

index values 1-1000 into a large set of institutional dummies, which are listed in Appendix 2. These

dummies are not used in the index classification, but as they provide unique institutional dummy

combinations for each value on the 1-1000 scale they are useful for detailed study of separate institutions.

As users may have other conceptualizations of regime types than the MaxRange2 Regime Type

variable, we will describe that variable last below as a suggested classification, before we compare with

other datasets on regime types as a reliability test. The other institutional components described should be

less controversial and useful as separate additions to other datasets.

Executive Strength.

The institutional component Executive strength indicates the political distribution of power between the

legislative and executive powers, and exclusive versus conditional executive powers. The higher value,

the more decentralized is power. The coding is based on information about the actual division of powers

and accounts in mass media of actual conditions rather than constitutional texts. Resulting variable values

are:

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Absolute power,

Overwhelming executive powers,

Dominating executive powers,

Shared executive powers,

Constitutional division of power,

Weak executive power vs. strong legislature.

Accountability Structures of Institutions

The MaxRange2 index values are coded on the basis of the accountability structure and

institutional components of each political system. In particular, the MaxRange2 index scale measures how

persons are elected or appointed to specific institutional positions and the degree to which they are

accountable to each other or the “people”. The typical forms of accountability structures are:

Citizens,

The Parliament,

The Council of Ministers,

The President,

The Regent.

The structure of accountability, together with specific institutional components, comprise fourteen distinct

‘types’, for which we offer brief description:

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Parliamentarism. The accountability structure of a regime is defined as parliamentarian if the executive is

derived from or dependent on the parliament. As this is an accountability structure of institutions, rather

than a regime type in MaxRange data, parliamentarism may occur in democracies as well as

non-democracies. This structure is therefor found in several regime types classified in other datasets. For

example, Cheibub et. al (2010) distinguish between Parliamentary democracy, Mixed (semi-presidential)

democracy, Presidential Democracy, Civilian Dictatorship, Military Dictatorship and Royal Dictatorship

for the period 1946-2008. MaxRange accountability structure Parliamentarism is found primarily in

Cheibub et al. regimes Parliamentary Democracy and Civilian Dictatorships.

Presidential parliamentarism. This accountability structure defines a country’s ‘de facto’ character as a

parliamentarian state, but adds the distinction that the president is elected directly by the people. Being

directly elected, his or her powers are however weak or ceremonial. This structure is found in MaxRange

Regime Types Qualified Democracy and Semi-Authoritarianism. This accountability structure mostly

occur in Cheibub et al. Mixed (semi-presidential) democracy.

Divided executive. The president in a divided executive structure holds individual powers similar to a

semi-presidential president (see below), with the exception of being in charge of and running

cabinet/domestic affairs. This institutional structure embodies the French “Fifth Republic” during periods

of co-habitation as a typical example. Most other divided executive are not affected under co-habitation.

Divided executive as accountability structure is found in MaxRange Regime Types Qualified Democracy,

Electoral Democracy, False Democracy and Semi-Authoritarianism. We notice that country-year cases of

this accountability structure are found in all Cheibub et al. regime types except Royal dictatorships, but

mostly they are found in Mixed (semi-presidential) democracy and Parliamentary democracy.

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Semi-presidentialism. In Semi-Presidential institutional accountability structures, the president controls

significant powers, though requiring the consent and countersignature of the prime minister. In response,

the signature of the president is needed for cabinet decisions as well. As an accountability structure, it is

defined as having a president with significant strength who shares control of running the executive and

cabinet affairs. In MaxRange data, this structure is found in the Max Range Regime Types Qualified

democracy, Electoral Democracy, False Democracy, Semi-Authoritarianism, De Facto Authoritarianism,

Hierarchical Authoritarianism. In other datasets, such as Cheibub et al. (2010), these country cases are

most likely to be defined as regime types with partly mixed (semi-presidential) democracy or civilian

dictatorship.

Parliamentarian presidentialism. This is a de facto presidentially dominated government accountability

structure, but it is combined with a government based on parliamentary approval and/or support. The

president is more dominant vis-á-vis government and has stronger personal authority relative to the

parliament. This system includes some legislative authorities to rule by decree, and a significant veto on

legislation. In the executive role the president is clearly in charge of running the executive or approving

cabinet decisions. In the reliability test below, aspects of this accountability structure is assessed in

relation to regime types defined in MaxRange and by Cheibub et al. (2010). In MaxRange1 and 2,

Parliamentarian presidentialism is found in Qualified Democracy, False Democracy,

Semi-Authoritarianism, Authoritarianism, and Hierarchical Authoritarianism. Parliamentarian

presidentialism is likewise found in all Cheibub et al. regime types, in particular in Civilian and Military

Dictatorships.

“Accountable” presidentialism. Apart from the president, individual ministers, including the prime

minister, are accountable to and can be dismissed by the parliament in this accountability structure. This is

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a rare accountability structure in MaxRange data, always found in the Regime Type Qualified Democracy,

and most of the 27 country-year cases 1946-2008 also occur in Cheibub et al.’s regime type Mixed

(semi-presidential) democracy.

Council Parliamentarian. In this accountability structure, chairmanship in government rotates and/or is

based on a varieties of parliaments representing different groups (such as in Bosia and Herzegovina). This

is also a rare structure, always a Qualified democracy in the MaxRange Regime Type variable. The

country-year cases 1946-2008 occur in both Cheibub et al. (2010) regime types Presidential democracy

and Civilian dictatorship.

Presidentialism. This is a structure in which the executive of a country is vested in a (usually) directly

elected president who is not dependent on parliamentary approval. The strength of the president varies but

is not relevant for determining the institutional structure. Instead, the executive strength can be measured

separately. Presidentialism is found in most MaxRange Regime Types, such as Qualified Democracy,

Interim regime, Electoral Democracy, False Democracy, False Authoritarianism, Semi-Authoritarianism,

De facto Authoritarianism, Authoritarianism, Despotism and Absolutism. Likewise, it is found in all

Cheibub et al. regime types except Royal dictatorship, but to the largest extent in Presidential democracy

and Civilian dictatorships.

Monarchical parliamentarism. The Executive is shared between a monarch with limited executive power

and a government based on parliamentary approval in this accountability structure. Usually, the monarch

does not take active part in cabinet affairs but is in charge of appointing the prime minister. Where the

monarch plays a more active role, this is marked by a distinctive accountability structure. Monarchical

parliamentarism can be found in Qualified, Electoral and False democracies in the MaxRange Regime

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Type variable.

Constitutional Executive. This is a rare accountability structure, found in the Regime Type Qualified

Democracy, in which the constitution stipulates which parties will participate in the government (of which

Switzerland is one example). Most of the Constitutional Executive cases are found in Cheibub et al.

Presidential democracies, though a few are coded as Civilian and Military dictatorships.

Monarchial. In this structure, the government is vested directly or indirectly in the monarch. However,

usually the constitutional powers are limited. When the monarch possesses stronger authority this is

defined as a separate regime type. Monarchical regime is found in Regime Types False Democracy,

Semi-Authoritarianism, Hierarchical Authoritarianism, Authoritarianism, Despotism, and Absolutism.

For obvious reasons, this structure is mostly found in what Cheibub et al. define as Royal dictatorships. A

few are instead coded as Civilian dictatorships.

Colonial structure. A colony is a structure of accountability in which the territory is controlled by an

executive appointed by a foreign nation. Colonial structure may in MaxRange Regime Types be included

in False Democracy, Colony and Despotism. In Cheibub et al. data, the colonial structures occur primarily

in those regime types referred to as Civilian Dictatorships.

Military. This is a structure in which the executive is vested in the military, officially or unofficially. The

military controls government as a junta, or by controlling the prime minister or president. Where a

monarch exists, militarism is in place if he has a limited role. Militarism resembles an interim structure

when the military has delegated executive powers to a civilian government. Whether the institutional

structure is interim or military, then, is dependent on whether the government represents a broad political

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base and/or constitutional restoration has begun. In general, periods of martial law are counted as

military accountability structures. Military accountability structure may occur in the Regime Types

Military Regime, Interim Regime, Despotism and Absolutism. These regimes are normally referred to by

Cheibub et al. as Military Dictatorship, but may also occur in other regime types, notably Civilian

dictatorships.

Interim. Interim institutional periods represent regime-types that do not fit into the above mentioned

categories. The “type” of interim period varies with regard to whether a parliament/assembly exists, how

broad the political base for the government is, and the stage in the transition phase the government is at.

This frequently occurs immediately after regime change, under new/restored constitution, or the calling of

fresh elections, and is akin to negative Polity scores that represent interrupted, interregna, and transitional

observations (-66, -77, -88). Interim structures are therefore always classified as Interim Regime. In

Cheibub et al. data, we find interim structure in all three types of regimes, but mostly in Civilian and

Military regime types.

Figure 2 describes these accountability structures as they evolve over time.

Figure 2 around here

Normal vs. Interim

A special normal vs. interim institutional component is added in the MaxRange dataset and describes in

more detail some interim forms, which are of particular interest when studying transition period in which

monthly data exhibit various sequences. These sequences are not yet analyzed and therefore not included

in this presentation.4

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Election of Head of State Election.

The Max Range2 index values reflect legislative as opposed to executive powers with exclusive versus

conditional powers. Exclusive and conditional executive powers as values on this variable are mainly

related to those between the President or Regent and the Head of the Council of Ministers in order to

define the various institutional conditions of semi-presidential systems. Conditional executive powers

versus parliament are also considered, when relevant, more often so in authoritarian systems, when coding

this variable. Values of this variable are simply indirectly, directly and undefined.

Head of State (Republic or Monarchy)

As institutional component in defining Regime Types and MaxRange index values, we also have

the Head of State component, which can have values Republic, Monarchy or Undefined.

Figure 3 depicts some of the possible values of the institutional components that are used to define

MaxRange2 index values. Each of the 199 values in the MaxRange2 index represents a unique

combination of institutional component values. The institutional components that correspond to each

index value are given in the Appendix. These institutional component values make it possible to analyze

the historical dynamics of separate political institutions, something which is critical for understanding

nation building processes, transitions, democratizations, revolutions, reversals, path dependences, and

historical dynamics of political institutions in general.


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Regime Types

In combination with other institutional components described above, the MaxRange index values

are coded within the context of regime types, so that components add information for the specification of

the resulting MaxRange2 index value.

MaxRange index values and Regime Type classifications are based on a number of criteria. These

criteria are not added to each other, but are weighted or sorted in order of importance. For meeting

democracy classification there are seven main criteria.

1. Territorial control: In order to have a functioning democratic government it must exercise

control of a significant part of the country (about 2/3 of the territory). If not the country is

under a semi-anarchical or dysfunctional governance.

2. Political competition: The most important factor behind a functioning democracy according to

the MaxRange index and Regime Type is that there exist at least two serious and competing

political alternatives in the national elections. These alternatives shall have a reasonably equal

chance to gain power and are treated equally by state agencies and generally fairly in media

coverage. Without a sufficient political competition a country can never achieve democratic

standards.

3. Freedom of speech, media, assembly etc.: In order to allow and provide opportunities for fair

political competition there must be an acceptable quality of these freedoms. Media freedom is

also essential in the fair coverage of the political alternatives. Freedom of speech is essential

when political alternatives campaigns for the electorate.

4. Electoral integrity and quality: By this candidates are protected from intimidation, repression

or major obstructions in their campaigning and political work. In addition, voting secrecy is

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utmost important and systematic electoral fraud must not exist. Here we make a difference

between systematic actions by the state and logistic problems due to lack in communications,

society or infrastructure.

5. Constitutional consensus: This implies the mutual respect of the political alternatives roles and

positions after the elections. The minority must respect the majority (the government’s) right

to rule in its own right as long as it follows the constitutional rules. In return the government

must guarantee the minority (the opposition’s) right to function as an active opposition both

internally and externally of the parliament. The opposition may of course use all its

constitutional mandates to obstruct/criticize the government

6. General suffrage: There needs be equal votes to both genders from at least 21 years of age. A

country may however be democratic if all other criteria are well functioning. However

qualified democracy requires general suffrage.

7. Constitutional order: the government must not violate constitutional order such as the

separation of executive, legislative and judiciary authorities. Further the government cannot

make decisions that requires constitutional amendment or parliamentary approval.

Other possible criteria such as social equality, level of violence, logistical/infrastructural issues or

political and legislative content(reforms) are not in our understanding crucial for democracy as long as the

above criteria and forms are met. Besides criteria for democracy, 2-5 are measured and graded in order to

define levels of autocracy. Contrary to datasets such as Freedom House and Polity, MaxRange does not

use additive index criteria in order to calculate the level of democracy or non-democracy. According to

MaxRange a democracy can vary between qualified or electoral depending on how well political and civil

rights are met otherwise. If the democratic standards are met in a country it can never be considered an

autocracy (something which is the case in for example Afghanistan or Iraq in 2006-2013 in Freedom

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House and Polity IV). The other side of the coin implies that a country can never compensate for not

meeting criteria on basic democracy by, for example, by enhancing levels of social equality or “stability”.

On the basis of the fulfilment of these criteria, and the institutional components described above,

MaxRange data provide the following Regime Type classification:

Qualified democracy, defined as a comparatively well-functioning democracy, where the political

leadership is both legitimate and elected in free and fair elections without serious complaints. Political and

civil rights are well functioning, as are constitutional and legal rights as well. Public administration and

public authorities are politically independent. Qualified democracy requires that all the seven criteria

listed above are acceptable or of good standards.

Electoral democracy, defined as a less well-functioning democracy. Even if the political leadership is

regarded as legitimate and elections considered reflecting the "will of the people," electoral democracy is

often dominated by the leading party whose dominance in media etc. is strong. Political and/or civil rights

are not fully protected. Constitutional rights may be violated with stronger concentration of powers in the

government. Public administration and authorities are somehow linked to dominant party. The

requirements of an Electoral democracy are that standards 1-4 in the list of democracy criteria above are

met even where other political or civil rights are not fully satisfied.

False democracy, defined as a non-functioning democracy, however a regime type with a pluralistic

political system. Elections are generally strongly controlled by dominant party, which also often

manipulates election results. However, there is a significant political opposition. False democracy does

not meet 2 and 4, but must fulfill the first. Criteria 3, 5, 6 and 7 are often met to a reasonable level, but

differ among country cases.

21

False authoritarianism, defined as de facto one-party rule established as a result of opposition boycott of

the elections despite participation in parliament. In contrast to de facto authoritarian status, the boycott is

not considered to be legitimate, since the government either shows democratic ambitions or reflects a

legitimate mandate of the people. False Authoritarianism generally meet criteria 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7, but does

not meet criteria 2 and 5.

Semi-authoritarianism, defined as a repressive and strongly one-party- dominated system. Opposition is

legally allowed but severely repressed by the government party. Free elections are far from implemented

as a result of fraud, manipulation, repression etc. Semi-Authoritarianism meets criterion 1 and usually 6,

can meet criteria 7, but the criteria 2 to 5 have too low standards to reach democracy, however these are

not totally non-existing.

De facto Authoritarianism is a similar regime type to the Semi-Authoritarian, with the difference that

opposition parties are not represented at all in parliament as a result of legitimate boycott or the failure to

gain any mandate. This regime-type is also coded in cases where political parties are non-existing and

Members of Parliament are independent. De Facto Authoritarianism meets criteria 1 and usually 6. I can

meet criterion 7. Criteria 2 to 5 have too low standards. Especially criteria 2 is also critically lower than in

the Semi-Authoritarian case

Authoritarianism (one-party system), is defined as an aristocratic rule or a one-party system where

opposition parties are not legal or allowed to participate. Here, the parliament and/or ruling party holds

significant powers, which contrasts with more personalist systems where an individual is more dominant.

Authoritarianism meets criterion 1, but totally fails 2-5. Criteria 6 and 7 cannot be met.

22

Hierarchical authoritarianism is semi-authoritarianism combined with a dominating or overwhelming

executive, either presidential or monarchical. Hierarchial Authoritarianism meets criteria 1 but fails 2-5,

even though meeting a low standard. The criterion 7 is strongly failed. Criterion 6 is often met.

Despotism is defined is Authoritarianism combined with a dominating or overwhelming executive, either

presidential or monarchical. Despotism meets criterion 1, but fails all other except for 6 which can be met.

Compared to Hierarchial Authoritarianism, criteria 2-4 are not met at all.

Absolutism, where full absolute executive and legislative power is in the hand of the executive, either

military, presidential, monarchical, or under prime minister. This power can be inherited, have been

acquired from a dissolved suspended parliament, a military coup, or be prime ministerial. The parliament

can exist in some cases, but is then elected by or subordinated to the executive. No political institutions or

opposition exist.

Interim regimes indicates a transitional regime between various forms of other types of regimes, typically

without an elected executive or elected parliament.

Semi-Anarchical Regime indicates a non-democratic state of governmental without a single functional

central government, or two or more rival regimes controlling different parts of the territory.


23

Reliability

The variables in the MaxRange2 dataset can also be merged with existing datasets, such as the

V-Dem, Polity, and Polyarchy, based on the country-code variable. Figure 5 shows a plot of the number

of institutionalized democracies that scored at least a 6 or 7 on the Polity index scale, 2 or more on the

Freedom House Civil Liberties scale, the democracy value count on the Geddes, Wright and Franz

Non-Autocracy variable, and the democracy count on the Cheibub, Antonio, Gandhi and Vreeland

variable (2010) and comparing it with the number of countries coded by MaxRange2 as electoral

democracies (790 or greater) or qualified democracies (870 or greater). The information in the

MaxRange2 dataset provides observations that start earlier than Polity IV, includes more country cases

(Polity IV covers nation with populations larger than 500,000), but which also comports with the

time-series plots shown by aggregating Polity IV values. The correlations between MaxRange value of

790 or more with Polity IV values of 6 or more and 7 or more are 0.794 and 0.762, respectively.

Figure 5 around here.

Table 1 around here.

The cross-tabulation in table 1 shows that there exist discrepancies between the MaxRange2

regime types and the Cheibub et al. (2010) regime categories. For example, in the Cheibub et al. dataset,

424 country-year cases are classified as different types of dictatorships, while in MaxRange2 they are

defined as democracies, either Qualified or Electoral. Since Cheibub et al. have data from 1946 to 2008

24

(62 years), this translates into 6 to 7 country cases per year that differ between the two datasets. These

discrepancies are most likely the effect of the “alternation rule” applied by Cheibub et al., which requires

an “alternation in power under electoral rules identical to the ones that brought the incumbent to office

must have taken place,” in order for a political system to be classified as democracy. There are also other

reasons for discrepancies, we believe. Looking at examples from the last year of the Cheibub et al. dataset,

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Guyana, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and

Zambia are all are classified as Civilian dictatorships by Cheibub et al., while in MaxRange2 they are

coded as democracies; in the case of Mozambique as Electoral democracy and in the rest Qualified

democracy. We think that Cheibub et al. have made correct applications of their strict criteria of

democracy, and also sympathize with their alternation rule, but MaxRange2 uses other criteria which may

in some cases produce different resulting classifications.

Likewise, 158 Parliamentary democracies, 143 Mixed (semi-presidential) democracies and 158

Presidential democracies according to Cheibub et al. classifications (altogether 459 or 7,4 per cent each

year 1946-2008), are not defined as democracies in MaxRange2. Typical examples are: Ghana 1980, a

country that by the end of that year had a coup d’état that overthrown the previous democratic

government. In MaxRange2, the value in the yearly data is defined by state of the regime by the end of

December, when the regime cannot reasonably be considered democratic. The authoritarian system in

Panama ended with a coup d’état in December 1989 and since democracy was not implemented that year,

MaxRange2 yearly data differs from the Cheibub et al. dataset. Honduras was not a democracy in 1984

according to MaxRange. Democracy was instead implemented in 1986. Comoros in 1990 and 1991 was

not democratic, since elections were not implemented and a multi-party system did not exist. Bangladesh

in 1986-90 is considered democracy by Cheibub et al. while in MaxRange2 it is classified it as

Hierarchical Authoritarian, since president Ershad is considered too dominant a leader and the elections

that were implemented were hardly democratic. Likewise, in the Republic of Congo 1961-62, the

25

president, according to MaxRange, was not elected in a fair election. Dominican Republic 1966-1977

exhibits a similar pattern; elections held are not considered democratic enough. Venezuela 2007 is another

example which we consider not democratic since the elections 2005 were boycotted by the opposition so it

was not represented in the parliament. Chavez ruled by decree. Both factors are not acceptable in a

democracy according to the listed principles above. As a last example, Cap Verde in the 1990 elections

cannot be considered democratic and a multi-party system was not yet implemented. Our conclusion is

that the Cheibub et al. (2010) criteria for democracy differ from the ones that are used in MaxRange, and

that outcomes in terms of democracy vs. non-democracy also differs as a natural consequence.

Conclusion

MaxRange data addresses some of the issues that have limited the analyses of the historical

dynamics of political institutions and democratization among nations on a world scale. One is length of

time series data and the time steps. MaxRange offers yearly data from 1600 and monthly from 1789. Data

sets beginning in the early 1800s, such as Polity and Polyarchy, do not offer the institutional detail needed

for modeling how formal political institutions have evolved. This has also been an issue in path

dependency studies, since they rely on longer time perspectives. MaxRange also, compared to Polity,

offers data on countries with less than 500,000 inhabitants. In addition, MaxRange is able to be merged

with other datasets using UN and Correlates of War country codes.

26

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29

Figure 1. Sequences of Political Regimes in the World 1789-2014, Sorted from End State

Note: Sequences of political regimes from Absolutism (black) to Qualified Democracy (white) using

TraMineR sequence analysis package in R.

Source: Rånge and Sandberg (2014)

30

Figure 2. Accountability structures and institutional components, 1600-2014

31

Figure 3. Examples of Institutional Components in MaxRange2, 1600-2014

32

Figure 4. Regime Types in MaxRange2, 1600-2014

33

Figure 5. Comparing the number of democracies in the world: MaxRange values Electoral and Qualified

Democracy 1780-2014 vs. Polity IV Democracy

Note: Years 1600-1700 have 0 on MaxRange2 760 or more and are therefore omitted.

34

Table 1. A cross tabulation of the MaxRange Regime Types and Cheibub et al. regime types.

35

Endnotes:

1 The seven principles are Electoral, Liberal, Participatory, Majoritarian, Consensual, Deliberative, and

Egalitarian (Coppedge et al. 2015).

3 Value 5 is omitted on the scale, since it cannot exist as type of Absolutism. 4 Values of this variable include also interim regime conditions such as Government Acting,

Extra-Parliamentary Government, Parliament Obsolete Election, Parliamentarism Illegitimate Election,

Interim Post- Election Parliamentarian, Interim Elected Assembly, Interim Opposition Grand Coalition,

Interim Parliamentarian Pluralism, Interim Parliamentarian Dominating Party, Interim Acting President

Interim Coalition New Regime – Old Regime, Interim Pre- Election Coalition, Constitutional, Interim

Coalition, Interim New Regime Constitutional or Pre-Election, Interim New Regime, Interim Old Regime

Constitutional, Interim Old Regime Pre- Election, Interim Old Regime Reform, Interim Democracy Open

to Reform Approved by Opposition, Interim Democracy Open to Reform Unilaterally, Military Regime-

Civilian Coalition, Military Regime-Civilian Dominated & Constitutional, Interim Military Regime,

Civilian Group or Party Dominated, Disputed Governance, Semi-Anarchical, Martial Law Institutions

Martial Law Suspended Institutions, Suspended Parliament, Occupational Military Regime Rule

and Military Regime Junta (see Appendix 1). As mentioned in text, the interim regimes and sequences are

not described or analyzed here.

1

Appendix 1. MaxRange2 Index Values, Institutional Components Used, and Additional Institutional Characteristics

Resulting MaxRange2 Index Values Regime and Institutional Components Used in MaxRange2 Classification (in order of importance from left to right) Additional Institutional Characteristics

MaxRange2 Value

MaxRange2 Value Label MaxRange2 Regime Types

Executive strength (vs. Parliament)

Accountability Structure of Institutions

Normal vs. Interim Regime

Election of Head of State

Head of State (Republic or Monarchy)

Executive Concentration (to one or two offices)

Head of Government (primary executive power)

Centralization vs. Decentralization (of Government vs. Parliament)

1000 Qualified Democratic Parliamentarism.

Qualified democracy, defined as a comparatively well-functioning democracy where the parliament is both legitimate, elected in free and fair elections without serious complaints. Political and civil rights are well functioning, constitutional and legal rights as well. Public administration and public authorities are politically independent. In both qualified and electoral democracy (see below), the executive is either elected by the parliament or directly elected in legitimate popular elections.

Constitutional Parliamentarism. Political systems of nations are defined as Parliamentarian if the executive is derived from or dependent on the parliament.

Normal Indirectly Republic Concentrated Executive

Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

995 Qualified Democratic Monarchical Parliamentarism.

Qualified Democracy. See above.

Constitutional Parliamentarism. See above.

Normal Undefined Monarchy Concentrated Executive

Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

990 Qualified Democratic Presidential Parliamentarism


Constitutional Presidential parliamentarism. The country is a ‘de factofacto’ Parliamentarian state, but the president is elected directly by the people. Though directly elected, the powers of the president are weak or ceremonial.

Normal Directly Republic Separated Executive

Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

985 Qualified Democratic Divided Executive


Constitutional Divided executive. The president in a divided executive system holds similar individual powers as the semi-presidential president (see below),


Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

2

with the exception of being in charge of and running cabinet/domestic affairs.

980 Qualified Democratic Divided Executive


Constitutional Divided Executive. See above.


Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

975 Qualified Democratic Semi-Presidentialism.


Constitutional Semi- Presidentialism. The Semi-Presidential institutional type in MaxRange is largely defined on the example of the French “Fifth Republic”. The president controls significant powers, but much of it is dependent on the consent and countersignature of the prime minister. In response, the signature of the president is needed for cabinet decisions as well. Nevertheless, the president has significant strength and is in charge of running the executive and cabinet affairs.


Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

970 Qualified Democratic Semi-Presidentialism.


Constitutional Semi- Presidentialism. See above.


Presidential

Decentralized

965 Qualified Democratic Parliamentarian Presidentialism.


Significant Parliamentarian Presidentialism. This is a de facto presidentially dominated government, however it is combined with a government based on parliamentary approval and/or support. The president is more dominating vis-á-vis government and has stronger personal authority in relation to the parliament. The system includes some


Presidential

Balanced

3

legislative authorities to rule by decree, and a significant veto on legislation. In the executive role the president is clearly in charge of running the executive or approving cabinet decisions.

960 Qualified Democratic Parliamentarian Presidentialism.


Significant Parliamentarian- Presidentialism. See above.


Presidential

Balanced

955 Qualified Democratic Indirect Divided Executive.



Normal Indirectly Republic Separated Executive

Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

950 Qualified Democratic Indirect Semi-Presidentialism.




Presidential

Decentralized

945 Qualified Democratic Indirect Parliamentarian Presidentialism.


Significant Parliamentarian Presidentialism. See above.


Presidential

Balanced

940 Qualified Democratic Indirect Parliamentarian Presidentialism.




Presidential

Balanced

935 Qualified Democratic Included Territory.


Constitutional Parliamentarian. See above.

Normal Undefined Undefined Undefined Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

930 Qualified Democratic Included Territory.


Constitutional Presidentialism. See above.

Normal Undefined Republic Undefined Presidential

Decentralized

925 Qualified Democratic Accountable Presidentialism.


Constitutional “Accountable” Presidentialism, “accountable” indicating that apart from the president, individual ministers, including the prime minister, are accountable to and can be dismissed by the parliament.


Presidential

Decentralized

920 Qualified Democratic Accountable Presidentialism.


Constitutional ”Accountable” Presidentialism. See above.

Normal Directly Republic Concentrated Executive

Presidential

Decentralized

915 Qualified Democratic Presidentialism.


Constitutional Presidentialism. This is a system in which the executive of a country is vested in a (usually) directly elected president not dependent on parliamentary approval. The strength of the president varies but is not relevant for the institutional structure.


Presidential Decentralized

4

Instead, executive strength can vary in this kind of system and measured separately.

910 Qualified Democratic Presidentialism.




Presidential

Decentralized

905 Provisional Parliamentarian Interism.



Government Acting

Undefined Undefined Concentrated Executive

Prime- Ministerial

Undefined

900 Extra-Parliamentarian Interism. Interim Regimes indicates a transitional Regime between various forms of other types of Regimes, typically without an elected executive or elected parliament.

Undefined Interim Parliamentarism.

Extra- Parliamentarian Government.


Prime- Ministerial

Undefined

895 Qualified Democratic Indirect Presidentialism




Presidential

Decentralized

890 Qualified Democratic Indirect Presidentialism




Presidential

Decentralized

885 Democratic Council Parliamentarian


Constitutional Council Parlimentarian Chairmanship in government rotates and/or is based on a varieties of parliaments representing different groups.


Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

880 Democratic Council Parliamentarian


Constitutional Council Parliamentarian See above.


Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

875 Democratic Constitutional Executive.


Constitutional Constitutional Executive.


Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

870 Democratic Constitutional Executive.


Constitutional Constitutional Executive.

Normal Indirectly Republic Concentrated Executive

Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

865 Semi-Democratic Parliamentarism.

Interim Regime. See above.


Parliamentarism Obsolete Election

Undefined Undefined Undefined Prime- Ministerial

Undefined

860 Semi-Democratic Parliamentarism

Interim Regime. See above.


Parliamentarism Illegitimate Election

Undefined Undefined Undefined Interim Undefined

855 Intermediate Elected Interism Interim Regime. See above.

Undefined Parlimentarism. See above.

Interim Post- Election Parliamentarian


850 Intermediate Elected Interism Interim Regime. See above.

Undefined Presidentialism. See above.

Interim Post- Election


5

Presidential

845 Electoral Democratic parliamentarism

Electoral democracy, defined as a less well-functioning democracy. Even if the political executive and the parliament are regarded as legitimate and elections considered reflecting the "will of the people", electoral democracy is often dominated by the leading party whose dominance in media etc. is strong. Political and/or civil rights are not fully protected. Constitutional rights may be violated with stronger concentration of powers in the government. Public administration and authorities are somehow linked to dominant party.


Normal Undefined Undefined Concentrated Executive

Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

840 Electoral Democratic Presdidential Parliamentarism.

Electoral Democracy. See above.

Constitutional Presidential Parliamentarism. See above.

Normal Undefined Republic Separated Executive

Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

835 Democratic Monarchical Prime-Ministerial Parliamentarism.


Constitutional Monarchical parliamentarism. The Executive is shared between a monarch with some, but limited, executive powers and a government based on parliamentary approval. Usually the monarch does not take active part in cabinet affairs but is in charge of appointing the prime minister. Where the monarch plays a more active role, the value 830 applies.

Normal Undefined Monarchy Separated Executive

Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

830 Democratic Monarchical Parliamentarism.


Constitutional Monarchical Parliamentarian. See above.


Monarchy Decentralized

825 Electoral Democratic Divided Executive.




Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

6

820 Electoral Democratic Semi-Presidentialism.




Presidential

Decentralized

815 Provisional Presidentialism. Electoral Democracy. See above.


Government Acting

Undefined Republic Concentrated Executive

Presidential

Decentralized

810 Provisional Presidentialism. Interim Regime. Undefined Interim. Interim institutional periods represent all existing Regime-types not fitting into above mentioned categories. The “type” of Interim period varies with regard to whether a parliament/assembly exists, how broad the political base for the government is, and the stage in the transition phase the government is at. This frequently occurs immediately after Regime change, under new/restored constitution, or calling of fresh elections.

Government Extra- Parliamentarian


Presidential

Decentralized

805 Electoral Democratic Presidentialism.


Constitutional Parliamentarian Presidentialism. See above.


Presidential

Decentralized

800 Electoral Democratic Presidentialism.



Normal Undefined Republic Concentrated Executive

Presidential

Decentralized

795 Democratic Strong Presidentialism.




Presidential

Balanced

790 Democratic Strong Presidentialism.


Significant Presidentialism. See above.


Presidential

Balanced

785 False Democratic Semi-Parliamentarism

False democracy, defined as a non-functioning democracy (i.e. a type of nondemocracy), though it is a Regime type with a pluralistic political system. Elections are generally strongly dominated by dominant party, which also often manipulate election results. However, there is a significant political

Constitutional Semi- Parliamentarian. See above.

Normal Undefined Undefined Separated Executive

Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

7

opposition.

780 False Democratic Semi-Parliamentarism.

False Democracy. See above.

Constitutional Undefined. Normal Undefined Undefined Concentrated Executive

Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

775 Parliamentary Interim coalition. Interim Regime. See above.

Undefined Interim. See above. Interim Elected Assembly


Presidential

Undefined

770 Elected Interim Parliamentarian Interim Regime.See above.

Undefined Interim. See above. Interim Opposition Grand Coalition


Presidential

Undefined

765 Interim Parliamentarism Interim Regime.See above.

Undefined Interim. See above. Interim Parliamentarian Pluralism

Undefined Undefined Undefined Interim Decentralized

760 Interim Parliamentarism Interim Regime.See above.

Undefined Interim. See above. Interim Parliamentarian Dominating Party

Undefined Undefined Undefined Interim Decentralized

755 Strong Monarchial Parliamentarism.


Significant Monarchical Parliamentarism. See above.

Normal Undefined Monarchy Monarchical Balanced

750 Strong Monarchial Parliamentarism.


Significant Monarchical- Parliamentarian.


Monarchical Balanced

745 Semi-Democratic Presidentialism.


Constitutional Parliammentarian Presidentialism. See above.

Interim Presidential

Undefined Republic Presidential

Decentralized

740 Semi-Democratic Presidentialism.



Interim Acting President


Presidential

Decentralized

735 Constitutional Interim coalition Interim Regime. See above.

Undefined Interim. See above. Interim Coalition New Regime – Old Regime


730 Constitutional Interim coalition Interim Regime. See above.

Undefined Interim. See above. Interim Pre- Election Coalition Constitutional


725 Constitutional centralised Interim

Interim Regime.See above.

Undefined Interim. See above. Interim Coalition


720 Transitional Interim coalition Interim Regime.See above.

Undefined Interim. See above. Interim New Regime Constitutional or Pre- Election


715 False Democratic parliamentarism




Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

710 False Democratic presidential- Parliamentarian




Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

705 False Democratic Monarchical Parliamentarism


Constitutional Monarchical Parliamentarism. See above.


Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

700 False Democratic Strong Monarchical Parliamentarism


Significant Monarchical Parliamentarism.



695 False Democratic Divided Executive




Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

8

690 False Democratic Semi-Presidentialism




Presidential

Decentralized

685 False Democratic Parliamentarian Presidentialism


Constitutional Presidentialism. Parliamentarism. See above.


Presidential

Decentralized

680 False Democratic Presidentialism




Presidential

Decentralized

675 Dominating Democratic Parliamentarism


Dominating Parliamentarism. See above.


Prime- Ministerial

Centralized

670 Dominating Democratic Parliamentarism




Prime- Ministerial

Centralized

665 Dominating Democratic Presidentialism


Dominating Presidentialism. See above.


Presidential

Centralized

660 Dominating Interim Presidentialism




Presidential

Centralized

655 Transitional Centralised Interim Interim Regime.See above.

Undefined Interim. See above. Interim New Regime


Interim Undefined

650 Transitional Centralised Interim Interim Regime.See above.

Undefined Interim. See above. Interim Old Regime Constitutional


645 False Democratic Monarchism False Democracy. See above.

Constitutional Monarchial Regime. The government is vested directly or Indirectly in the monarch. However, usually constitutional powers are limited; where the monarch possesses stronger authority, this is defined as a separate Regime type.


Monarchical Decentralized

640 False Democratic Monarchism False Democracy. See above.

Constitutional Monarchical Regime. See above.



635 False Democratic Strong Presidentialism




Presidential

Balanced

630 False Democratic Strong Presidentialism


Significant Presidentalism. See above.


Presidential

Balanced

625 Hierarchial Democratic Parliamentarism


Overwhelming Parliamentarism. See above.


Prime- Ministerial

Centralized

620 Hierarchial Democratic Parliamentarism


Overwhelming Parliamentarism. See above.


Prime- Ministerial

Centralized

615 Reconstructed Regime-based Interim


Undefined Interim. See above. Interim Old Regime Pre- Election


Interim Undefined

610 Reconstructed Regime-based Interim


Undefined Interim. See above. Interim Old Regime Reform


Interim Undefined

605 Hierarchial Democratic Presidentialism


Overwhelming Presidentialism. See above.


Presidential

Centralized

9

600 Hierarchial Democratic Presidentialism




Presidential

Centralized

595 Autonomous Colonialism False Democracy. See above.

Undefined Colonial structure. See above.


Colonial Undefined

590 Autonomous Colonialism False Democracy. See above.

Undefined Colonial structure. See above.


Colonial Undefined

585 Reformed Regime-based Interim


Undefined Interim. See above. Interim Democracy Open to Reform Approved by Oppition


580 Reformed Regime-based Interim


Undefined Interim. See above. Interim Democracy Open to Reform Unilaterally


575 False Authoritarian Parliamentarian Majority Government,

False authoritarianism defined as a de facto one-party rule established as a result of opposition boycott of the elections and participation in parliament. In contrast to de facto authoritarian status, the boycott is not considered to be legitimate since the government either shows Democratic ambitions or reflects a legitimate mandate of the people.



Prime- Ministerial

Undefined

570 False Authoritarian Presidential Majority Government

False Authoritarianism. See above.



Presidential

Decentralized

565 Illegitimate False Democratic Monarchism





560 Illegitimate False Democratic Monarchism





555 False Democratic Dominating Parliamentarism.


Significant/ Dominant

Parliamentarian Presidentialism. See above.


Presidential

Centralized

550 False Democratic Dominating parliamentarism



Presidentialism. See above.


Presidential

Centralized

545 Illegitimate Hierarchial parliamentarism


Dominate Parliamentarism. See above.


Prime- Ministerial

Centralized

540 Illegitimate Hierarchial parliamentarism


Dominate Presidentialism. See above.


Prime- Ministerial

Centralized

535 False Democratic Strong monarchism



Monarchical Regime. See above.



530 False Democratic Strong False Democracy. See Significant/ Monarchical Regime. Normal Undefined Monarchy Concentrated Monarchical Balanced

10

monarchism above. Dominant See above. Executive

525 Semi-Authoritarian Parliamentarism,

Semi- authoritarianism defined as a repressive and strongly one-party- dominated system. Opposition is legally allowed but severely repressed by the government party. Free elections are far from implemented as a result of fraud, manipulation, repression etc.



Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

520 Semi-Authoritarian Presidential Parliamentarism

Semi- Authoritarianism. See above.



Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

515 Semi-Authoritarian Divided Executive.




Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

510 Semi-Authoritarian Semi-Presidentialism.




Presidential

Decentralized

505 False Authoritarian Parliamentarian Minority Government.




Prime- Ministerial

Undefined

500 False authoritarian Presidential Minority Government




Presidential

Undefined

495 Semi-Authoritarian Parliamentarian Presidentialism




Presidential

Decentralized

490 Semi-Authoritarian Presidentialism




Presidential

Decentralized

485 De facto Authoritarian Parliamentarism,

De facto Authoritarianism, is a Regime type similar to the Semi-Authoritarian one, with the difference that opposition parties are not represented at all in parliament, as a result of legitimate boycott or failure to gain any mandate. This Regime-type is also coded in cases where political parties are non-existing and MP's are independent.



Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

480 De facto Authoritarian De facto Constitutional Parliamentarism. See Normal Undefined Undefined Concentrated Prime- Decentralized

11

Semi-Presidentialism. Authoritarianism. See above.

above. Executive Ministerial

475 Constitutional Military Interim. Interim Regime.See above.

Undefined Military. The executive is vested in the military, officially or unofficially. The military rules as a junta, prime minister or president. Where a monarch exists, militarism is in place if he has a limited role. Militarism may have an Interim characterwhere the military has delegated executive powers to a civilian government. Whether the institutional structure is Interim or military, then, is dependent on whether the government represents a broad political base and/or a constitutional restoration is under way. Martial law generally falls under militarism.

Military Regime- Civilian Coalition

Undefined Undefined Undefined Prime- Ministerial

Undefined

470 Constitutional Military Interim Regime.

Military Regime. See above.

Undefined Military. See above. Military Regime- Civilian Dominated & Constitutional

Undefined Undefined Undefined Military Regime

Undefined

465 Illegitimate Dominating Semi-Authoritarian Regime.


Dominating Monarchical Regime. See above.

Normal Undefined Undefined Undefined Undefined Centralized

460 Illegitimate Dominating Semi-Authoritarian Regime.


Dominating Parliamentarian Presidentialism. See above.

Normal Undefined Undefined Undefined Undefined Centralized

455 Semi-Democratic Parliamentary Military.


Constitutional Military. See above. Normal Undefined Undefined Concentrated Executive

Military Regime

Decentralized

450 Semi-Democratic Parliamentary Military Regime.


Constitutional Military. See above. Normal Undefined Undefined Concentrated Executive

Military Regime

Decentralized

445 Illegitimate False Democratic Strong Monarchism.


Significant Monarchical Regime. See above.



440 Illegitimate False Democratic Strong Monarchism





435 De facto Authoritarian Parliamentarian

De facto Authoritarianism. See

Constitutional Parliamentarian Presidentialism. See


Presidential

Decentralized

12

Presidentialism above above.

430 De facto Authoritarian Presidentialism

De facto Authoritarianism. See above



Presidential

Decentralized

425 Semi-Authoritarian Delegated Monarchy





420 Semi-Authoritarian delegated monarchy





415 False Democratic Hierarchial Parliamentarian Presidentialism




Presidential

Centralized

410 False Democratic Hierarchial Presidentialism




Presidential

Centralized

405 Authoritarian Decentralised Parliamentarism

Authoritarianism, is defined as an aristocratic rule or a one-party system where opposition parties are not legal or allowed to participate. Here, parliament and/or ruling party holds significant powers, in contrast to more personalist systems where an individual or the government is more dominant.



Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

400 Authoritarian Decentralised Parliamentarism

Authoritarianism. See above.

Constitutional Party Regime. Normal Undefined Republic Concentrated Executive

Secratary General

Decentralized

395 Authoritarian Decentralised Parliamentarian Presidentialism.




Presidential

Decentralized

390 Authoritarian Decentralised Presidentialism.




Presidential

Decentralized

385 Semi-Authoritarian Strong Parliamentarian Presidentialism




Presidential

Balanced

380 Semi-Authoritarian Strong Presidentialism




Presidential

Balanced

375 Semi-Authoritarian Dominating Divided Executive


Significant /Dominating

Divided Executive. See above.


Prime- Ministerial

Centralized

370 Semi-Authoritarian Dominating semi-Presidentialism


Significant/ Dominating

Semi- Presidentialism. See above.


Presidential

Centralized

365 Authoritarian Dominating Monarchism

Hierarchical authoritarianism is semi-authoritarianism combined with a



Monarchical Centralized

13

dominating or overwhelming executive, either presidential or monarchical.

360 Authoritarian Dominating Monarchism

Hierarchical Authoritarianism. See above.




355 Parliamentary Colonialism Colony. See above. Weak Parliamentarism. See above.


Prime- Ministerial

Undefined

350 Parliamentary Colonialism Colony. See above. Weak Parliamentarism. See above.


Prime- Ministerial

Undefined

345 Parliamentary Strong Military Military Regime. See above.

Significant Military. See above. Normal Undefined Undefined Concentrated Executive

Military Regime

Balanced

340 Parliamentary Strong Military Military Regime. See above.

Significant Military. See above. Normal Undefined Undefined Concentrated Executive

Military Regime

Balanced

335 Semi-Authoritarian Dominating Parliamentarism


Dominating Semi- Presidentialism. See above.


Prime- Ministerial

Centralized

330 Semi-Authoritarian Dominating Semi-Presidentialism




Prime- Ministerial

Centralized

325 Semi-Authoritarian Dominating Parliamentarian Presidentialism




Presidential

Centralized

320 Semi-Authoritarian Dominating Presidentialism




Presidential

Centralized

315 De facto Authoritarian Strong Presidentialism.

De facto Authoritarianism. See above.



Presidential

Balanced

310 De facto Authoritarian Strong Presidentialism.

De facto Authoritarianism. See above.



Presidential

Balanced

305 Authoritarian Selected Parliamentarism.




Prime- Ministerial

Decentralized

300 Authoritarian Selected Presidentialism.


Constitutional Presidentialism, Party Regime, or Undefined. See above.


Presidential

Decentralized

295 Autonomous Interim Military. Military Regime. Undefined Military. See above. Normal Undefined Undefined Undefined Military Regime

Undefined

290 Semi-Constitutional Centralised Military Interim Regime.

Military Regime. Undefined Military. See above. Interim Military Regime, Civilian Group or Party Dominated

Undefined Undefined Undefined Military Regime

Undefined

285 Authoritarian Strong Parliamentarian-Presidentialism




Presidential

Balanced

280 Authoritarian Strong Presidentialism




Presidential

Balanced

275 Authoritarian Delegated Monarch



Monarchical Regtime. See above.



14

270 Authoritarian Delegated Monarch






265 Semi-Authoritarian Hierarchical Parliamentarian Presidentialism


Overwhelming Parliamentarian Presidentialism. See above.


Presidential

Centralized

260 Semi-Authoritarian Hierarchial Presidentialism




Presidential

Centralized

255 Decentralised Aristocratic monarchism


Weak or constitutional

Monarchical Regime. Normal Undefined Monarchy Decentralized Monarchical Decentralized

250 Decentralised Aristocratic Monarchism


Weak or Constitutional

Monarchical Regime. Normal Undefined Monarchy Decentralized Monarchcial Decentralized

245 De facto Authoritarian Dominating Parliamentarian Presidentialism




Presidential

Centralized

240 De facto Authoritarian d Dominating Presidentialism




Presidential

Centralized

235 "Institutionalised" Colonialism Colony. See above. Overwhelming Colonial structure. See above.


Colonial Undefined

230 "Institutionalised" Colonialism Colony. See above. Overwhelming Colonial structure. See above.


Colonial Undefined

225 Authoritarian Hierarchial Non-Partyism


Dominating Parliamentialism. See above.


Prime- Ministerial

Centralized

220 Authoritarian Hierarchial non-partyism


Dominating Presidentialism or Monarchical Regime. See above.


Undefined Centralized

215 Authoritarian directoriat Hierarchical Authoritarianism. See above.

Dominating Party Regime. See above.


General Secretary

Centralized

210 Authoritarian Directoriat, a totalitarian system with authoritarian, one-party rule, where dominating powers are held by a politburo, a central committee, or the like.


Dominating Party Regime. See above.


General Secretary

Centralized

205 Autoritarian Dominating Secretary General


Significant Party Regime. See above.


General Secretary

Centralized

200 Autoritarian Dominating Secretary General


Significant Party Regime. See above.


General Secretary

Centralized

195 Authoritarian Dominating Parliamentarian Predidentialism

Despotism is defined is authoritarianism combined with a dominating or overwhelming executive, either presidential or monarchical.



Presidential

Centralized

190 Authoritarian Dominating Presidentialism

Despotism. See above. Dominating Presidentialism. See above.


Presidential

Centralized

185 De facto Authoritarian Despotism. See above. Overwhelming Parliamentarian Normal Undefined Republic Separated Presidential Centralized

15

Hierarchial Parliamentarian Presidentialism

Presidentialism. See above.

Executive

180 De facto Authoritarian Hierarchial Presidentialism

Despotism. See above. Overwhelming Presidentialism. See above.


Presidential

Centralized

175 Authoritarian Hierarchial Monarchism

Despotism. See above. Overwhelming Monarchical Regime. See above.



170 Authoritarian Hierarchial Monarchism

Despotism. See above. Overwhelming Monarchical Regime. See above.



165 Centralised Aristocratic Monarchism


Constitutional or Significant


Normal Undefined Monarchy Monarchical Balanced

160 Centralised Aristocratic Monarchism


Constitutional or Significant




155 Semi-Anarchism Semi-Anarchical Regime indicates a non-Democratic state of government without a single functional central government, or two or more rival Regimes controlling different parts of the territory.

Undefined Undefined. See above.

Disputed Governance

Undefined Undefined Undefined Undefined Undefined

150 Semi-Anarchism Semi- Anarchical Regime. See above.

Undefined Undefined. See above.

Semi- Anarchical

Undefined Undefined Undefined Undefined Undefined

145 Authoritarian Hierarchial Secretary General

Despotism. See above. Overwhelming Party Regime. See above.


Secretary General

Centralized

140 Authoritarian Hierarchial Secretary General

Despotism. See above. Overwhelming Party Regime. See above.


Secretary General

Centralized

135 Authoritarian Hierarchial Parliamentarism

Despotism. See above. Overwhelming Semi- Presidentialism. See above.


Prime- Ministerial

Centralized

130 Authoritarian Hierarchial Semi-Presidential

Despotism. See above. Overwhelming Parliamentarism. See above.


Prime- Ministerial

Centralized

125 Authoritarian Hierarchial Parliamentarian Presidentialism

Despotism. See above. Overwhelming Parliamentarian Presidentialism. See above.


Presidential

Centralized

120 Authoritarian Hierarchial Presidentialism

Despotism. See above. Overwhelming Presidentialism. See above.


Presidential

Centralized

115 Hierarchial parliamentary military

Despotism. See above. Overwhelming Military. See above. Normal Undefined Monarchy Concentrated Executive


110 Hierarchial parliamentary military

Despotism. See above. Overwhelming Military. See above. Normal Undefined Undefined Concentrated Executive

Military Regime

Centralized

105 Absolute Colonialism Despotism. See above. Overwhelming Colonial structure. See above.


Colonial

Centralized

100 Absolute Colonialism Despotism. See above. Absolutism Colonial structure. See above.


Colonial

Centralized

95 State of Martial Law Despotism. See above. Overwhelming Undefined. See above.

Martial Law Institutions



90 State of Martial Law Despotism. See above. Absolutism Undefined. See above.

Martial Law Suspended Institutions



16

85 Enforced Absolutisam Despotism. See above. Absolutism Undefined. See above.

Suspended Parliament

Undefined Undefined Separated Executive


80 Enforced Absolutisam Despotism. See above. Absolutism Undefined. See above.

Suspended Parliament



75 Institutionalised Military Junta,

Absolutism, full absolute executive and legislative power in the hand of the executive, who is either military, presidential, monarchical, or prime minister. This power can be inherited, acquired from a dissolved suspended parliament, military coup, or be prime ministerial. Parliament can exist in some cases, but is then elected by or subordinated to the executive. No opposition exist.

Absolutism Military. See above. Normal Undefined Undefined Military Regime

Centralized

70 Institutionalised Military Junta. Absolutism. See above.

Absolutism Military. See above. Normal Undefined Undefined Concentrated Executive

Military Regime

Centralized

65 Occupation Military Rule. Absolutism. See above.

Absolutism Military. See above. Occupational Military Regime Rule


Military Regime

Centralized

60 Genuine military junta. Absolutism. See above.

Absolutism Military. See above. Military Regime Junta


Military Regime

Centralized

55 Semi-Authoritarian Despotic Parliamentarian Presidentialism,

Despotism. See above. Absolutism Parliamentarian Presidentialism. See above.


Presidential

Centralized

50 Semi-Authoritarian Despotic Presidentialism.

Despotism. See above. Absolutism Presidentialism. See above.


Presidential

Centralized

45 Parliamentary Absolute Monarchy.

Absolutism. See above.

Absolutism Monarchical Regime. See above.


Monarcical Centralized

40 Parliamentary Absolute Monarchy.


Absolutism or Overwhelming




35 Parliamentary Absolute Prime-Ministerial Regime.



Parliamentarian Presidentialism. See above.


Presidential

Centralized

30 Parliamentary Absolute Presidentialism



Presidentialism or Party Regime. See above.


Presidential

Centralized

25 Absolute monarchy Absolutism. See above.




20 Absolute monarchy Absolutism. See above.




15 Absolute Governance Absolutism. See above.

Absolutism Parliamentarism. See above.


Prime- Ministerial

Centralized

10 Absolute Governance. Absolutism. See above.

Absolutism Presidentialism. See above.


Presidential

Centralized

1

Institutional Dummy Variables in MaxRange2 Appendix 2

Variable Name Value Label

Parliamentarism Parliamentarism

PresParliam Presidential Parliamentarism

DivExec Divided Executive

SemiPres Semi-Presidentialism

ParlPres Parliamentary Presidentialism

Presidentialism Presidentialism

AccountPres Accountable Presidentialism

CouncParl Council Parliamentarian

MonParl Monarchical Parliamentarian

ConstExec Constitutional Executive

SemiParl Semi-Parliamentarism

Monarchism Monarchical Regime

Colonial Colony

MilitaryStr Military

PartyInstStr Party

PresOrPartyUndef Presidential or Party Undefined

PresOrMonarch Presidential or Monarchical

InterimStr Interim Institutional Structure

UndefStr Undefined Institutional Structure

Constitutional Constitutional Strength

Significant Significant Executive Strength

UndefExecStrenth Undefined Executive Strength

DominExecStrenth Dominating Executive Strength

OverwhExecStrenth Overwhelming Executive Strength

SignDOmExecStrenth Significant or Dominant Exec Strength

WeakExecStrenth Weak Executive Strength

WeakConstExecStrength Weak or Constitutional Executive Strength

2

ConstSigExecStrength Constitutional or Significant Exec Strength

AbsoluteExecStrength Absolute Executive Strength

AbsOverwhExecStrength Absolute or Overwhelming Exec Strength

NonInterim Noninterim status

GovernmentAct Government Acting (interim)

GovernmExtraParl Government Extra Parliament

ParliamObsolElection Parliament based on obsolete election result

ParliamIllegElection Parliament based on illegitimate election

InterPostElect Interim Post Election

InterOppGrandCoal Interim Opposition Grand Coalition

InterParlPlural Interim Parliament Plural

InterParlDom Interim Parliament Dominating

InterPresidential Interim Presidential

InterActingPresident Interim Acting President

InterCoalNewRegOldReg Interim Coalition New Regime and Old Regime

InterPreElecCoalConst Interim Pre-Election Coalition Constitutional

InterCoalition Interim Coalition

InterNewRegConstOrPreElec Interim New Regime Constitutional or PreElect

InterNewRegime Interim New Regime

InterOldRegimConstit Interim Old Regime Constitutional

InterOldRegimPreElct Interim Old Regime Pre-Election

InterOldRegimReform Interim Old Regime Reform

InterDemOpenReformOppPos Interim Democracy Open to Certain Reform, Opposition Positive

InterUnDemRefOpenReform Interim Democracy Open to Reform

MilCivCoal Military-Civilian Coalition

MilCivDomConst Military Civilian Dominant Constitutional

InterimMilCivDomin Interim Military Civilian Dominating

DisputedGovernance Disputed Governance

SemiAnarchical Semi-Anarchical

MarshLawInst Marshall Law Institutions

3

MartLawSuspInst Martial Law Suspended Institutions

SuspendParl Suspended Parliament

OccMilRule Occupational Military Rule

MilJunta Military Junta

Republic Republic

Monarchy Monarchy

UndefHeadOfState Undefined Head of State

ConcExecutive Concentrated Executive

EstatesGen Estate Generale

SepExecutive Separate Executive

UndefExecConc Undefined Executive Concentration

PrimeMinisterial Prime Ministerial Head of Government

Presidential Presidential Head of Government

InterimHeadOfGovernm Interim Head of Government

MonarchHeadOfGovernm Monarch Head of Government

ColonialHeadOfGovernm Colonial Head of Government

MilitaryHeadOfGovernm Military Head of Government

UndefHeadOfGovernm Undefined Head of Government

GenSecrHeadOfGovernm General Secratary de facto Head of Government

DecentralizedStrength Decentralized Strength

BalancedStrength Balanced Strength

UndefinedStrength Undefined Strength

CentralizedStrength Centralized Strength

ParliamentSuspended Parliament Suspended

ParliamentNo No Parliament

ParliamentElected Parliament Elected

ParliamentNominated Parliament Nominated

DirectoryYes Directory Exists

DirectoryStrong Directory Strong

DirectoryWeak DIrectory Weak

4

HeadOfStateElected Head of State Elected

HeadOfStateMonarch Head of State Monarch

HeadOfStateDirectElected Head of State Directly Elected

HeadOfStateIndirectElection Head of State Indirectly Elected

HeadOfStateDirectlyOrIndirectlyE Head of State Directly of Indirectly Elected

HeadOfStateMilitary Head of State Military

HeadOfStateExecutive Head of State Executive

HeadOfStateWithSigExecPowers Head of State with Significant Executive Powers

HeadOfStateSignifPOrLimitOrWeak Head of State Significant, Limited or Weak

GovPresidential Government Presidential

GovParliamentarian Government Parliamentarian

GovMonExcl Government Monarchic Exclusive

GovMonDel Government Monachic Delimited

GovPArty Government Party

GovMil Governement Military

GovInterim Government Interim

ExecAbsolute Executive Absolute

ExecOverw Executive Overwhelming

EcecDomin Executive Dominating

ExecStrong Executive Strong

ExecExtend Executive Extended

ExecConst Executive Constitutional

ExecWeak Executive Weak

ParlDomin Parliament Dominating

ParlLimit Parliament Limited

ParlWeak Parliament Weak

ElectOneParty Elected One Party

ElectDefactoOneP Elected De Facto One Party

ElectRepress Elected Repressive

ElecFair Elected Fair

5

SuffrFull Suffrage Full

PolRightSignif Political Rights Significant

PolRightsGen Political Rights General

PolRightsLim Political Rights Limited

PolRightsWeak Political Right Weak

PolRightsNone Political Right None

MartLawYes Martial Law Yes

MilOfficial Military Official

MilConst Military Constitutional

StateofEmergFailedSt State of Emergency/Failed State

InterGovCoalOldRegimeAndOpp Interim Governmental Coalition Old Regime & Opposition

InterGovOppExcl Interim Governmental Opposition Excluded

InterGovOppIncl Interim Governmental Opposition Included

InterGovAppointHeadOfStateOrNewO Interim Governmental Appointed Head of State

InterGovAppointOldReg Interim Government Appointed Old Regime

InterimMilitReform Interim Military Reform

IntereimMilitaryCivilizedCoal Interim Military Civilized Coalition

InterGovNewOrder Interim Government New Order

InterConstit Interim Constitutional

InterPostElec Interim Post Election

RegencyCouncilYes Regency Council Yes

RegencyCouncilStrong Regency Council Strong

LimitedAuthYes Limited Authority Yes

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